U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Updated January 17, 2024
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
which has deteriorated over the past decade, historically
United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in
have limited the types of cooperation the U.S. government
1995, overlapping strategic and economic interests have led
is willing to undertake, particularly in the security sector.
the two countries to expand ties across a wide spectrum of
issues. Particularly since 2010, the two governments have
Vietnam’s Political Structure
formed partnerships on many regional security and
Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the
economic issues, prompted in part by shared concerns about
CPV. The CPV sets the general policy direction, leaving
China’s increased assertiveness in the region. In 2022, the
most of the day-to-day implementation to the government.
United States was Vietnam’s second largest trading partner
The two top leadership posts are the CPV General Secretary
(after China), and Vietnam was the United States’ ninth
and the Prime Minister, positions currently held by Trong
largest trading partner. A potential agreement under the
(age 79) and Pham Minh Chinh (64), respectively. Trong
U.S.-led, 14-country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
has been General Secretary since 2011.
Prosperity (IPEF) initiative, which includes Vietnam, may
further deepen U.S.-Vietnam economic ties. Congress has
Under Trong and Chinh, the CPV and government are
played a significant role in charting the course of U.S.-
continuing the “blazing furnace” anti-corruption campaign
Vietnam relations during the more than three decades since
Trong first launched a decade ago. Corruption is viewed by
the two began normalizing relations in the early 1990s. In
many analysts as a threat to the CPV’s legitimacy, though
particular, Members have been at the forefront of efforts to
some perceive Trong’s campaign also as a way to weaken
improve relations, highlight human rights conditions, and
political rivals. Vietnam’s leaders have tried to diversify the
address unresolved issues from the Vietnam War.
country’s export markets and sources of foreign direct
investment (FDI) as they pursue stated goals of becoming
In September 2023, President Joseph Biden traveled to
an upper middle-income economy by 2030 and a high-
Hanoi, where he and Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)
income developed country by 2045. On foreign policy,
Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong elevated the U.S.-
Vietnam’s approach has included boosting its defense
Vietnam relationship from a “comprehensive partnership”
capabilities and expanding its security relationship with the
to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the highest level
of Vietnam’s hierarchy of official partnerships
United States, Australia, India, and Japan as a hedge against
. Five other
China. A stated principle of Vietnam’s foreign policy since
countries—China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Russia—
the late 1980s has been to avoid an over-dependence on any
hold the designation, which provides top-down blessing
one country or group of countries. This pursuit of balance,
inside Vietnam for the government and ruling party to
combined with a wariness of alarming China, has resulted
deepen and expand areas of cooperation with the United
in Vietnam expanding relations with the United States
States. The upgrade was accompanied by a host of new and
incrementally and in a non-linear fashion.
expanded initiatives and other announcements, including
plans for the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister to
Figure 1. Vietnam Map and Selected Statistics
meet annually. The U.S. pledged to support Vietnam’s
development of its semiconductor industry (including with
$2 million in U.S. government funds) and digital
infrastructure ($12 million), as well as physical
infrastructure construction and climate change mitigation
efforts ($11 million). Following the summit, a U.S. news
outlet reported the two sides had begun discussing a
possible large-scale arms deal, which likely would be
subject to congressional review.
The pace and extent of further improvement in bilateral
relations is limited by several factors. First, Vietnam
Source: Map, CRS; Other information, Central Intelligence Agency,
usually does not undertake large-scale diplomatic moves—
The World Factbook, 2022.
especially with the United States—without first calculating
China’s likely reaction, and Hanoi and Beijing share
China-Vietnam Relations
interests on many issues. Second, although opinion polls
Vietnam’s relationship with China is its most important
show the Vietnamese public holds positive views of the
bilateral relationship. The two countries have Communist
United States, many Vietnamese officials suspect that the
Party-led political systems that provide a party-to-party
United States’ goal is to end the Vietnamese Communist
communication channel and engender similar official
Party’s monopoly on power though “peaceful evolution.”
world-views. China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner.
Third, U.S. concerns about Vietnam’s human rights record,
Two months after hosting Biden, Vietnam welcomed
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Chinese President Xi Jinping to Hanoi, where the two
U.S. business interest in Vietnam as an alternative supplier to
countries signed over 30 cooperation agreements. The Sino-
China has grown, largely due to several trends: rising
Vietnamese relationship, however, is prone to tension,
production costs in China; ongoing U.S.-China trade tensions
particularly over Chinese dams on the upper Mekong River
and supply chain diversification; and the entry into force of
and the two countries’ competing claims in the South China
regional trade agreements among Vietnam and key trading
Sea. China’s actions in the South China Sea prompted the
partners in East Asia. Vietnam’s relatively low wages,
CPV at its 2021 Party Congress to initiate a thorough
market-oriented economic reforms, and political stability
modernization of Vietnam’s military forces. The U.S.
make the country an attractive place for FDI. In 2022, U.S.
government has sought to improve Vietnam’s ability to
foreign direct investment in Vietnam was $3.5 billion, up
maintain maritime domain awareness and patrol its coastal
27% from 2021. At the same time, some U.S. business
waters. The Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations
leaders assert that Vietnam’s weak infrastructure, lack of
have provided Vietnam with 24 new coast guard patrol
regulatory transparency, weak labor rights, inadequate
vessels, unmanned aircraft systems, coastal radar, and two
protection of intellectual property rights, restrictive data
decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters,
policies, and other trade barriers pose challenges.
Vietnam’s largest coast guard ships.
The U.S.-Vietnam 2007 Trade and Investment Framework
Vietnam and the War in Ukraine
Agreement (TIFA) is the primary platform for discussing
bilateral trade and investment issues. The IPEF, launched in
Vietnam has maintained a low-profile position on Russia’s
2022, could provide another forum to address such issues in a
2022 invasion of Ukraine, abstaining on votes at the United
multilateral setting. The September 2023 upgrade of the U.S.-
Nations to condemn Russian aggression. Russia supplied
Vietnam relationship could increase opportunities to expand
around 80% of Vietnam’s arms imports from 2000 to 2021.
Despite Vietnam’s purchases of Russian defense articles,
bilateral economic engagement, including increasing U.S.
investment in Vietnam and expanding Vietnam’s
neither the Trump nor Biden Administration has determined
manufacturing capacity in sectors of U.S. interest, such as
that Vietnam has engaged in a “significant transaction” with
semiconductors and critical minerals.
Russia’s security sector, a determination that under U.S.
law would require the President to impose sanctions.
Following the upgrade of bilateral relations, the Commerce
Department initiated a review of Vietnam’s nonmarket
Human Rights
economy designation under U.S. trade law. Other trade issues
The CPV maintains an extensive organization that allows it
that may be a source of friction include U.S. labeling
to monitor the daily activities of citizens. For the past three
regulations, along with U.S. antidumping and countervailing
decades, the CPV appears to have followed a strategy of
duties on imports of Vietnamese catfish, which have been the
permitting many forms of personal and religious
subject of ongoing dispute settlement at the World Trade
expression, while selectively repressing individuals and
Organization (WTO).
organizations that it deems a threat to the party’s monopoly
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Vietnam
on power. Over the past decade, according to many
observers, repression against dissenters has worsened, and
Congress appropriated over $197 million in U.S. assistance
the government has increased its legal and technological
for Vietnam for FY2023, about $12 million more than it
capacity to monitor Vietnamese citizens’ social media
appropriated in FY2022 ($185 million). One aim of this
activity. In the 118th Congress, the Vietnam Human Rights
assistance is remediating the Vietnam War-era damage from
the U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange and its
Act (H.R. 3172) would prohibit U.S. assistance to
Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security and require the
accompanying dioxin defoliant over Vietnam between 1961
executive branch to put more emphasis on ensuring internet
and 1971. A 2003 study estimated 2.1-4.8 million
freedom in Vietnam. In its 2023 Trafficking in Persons
Vietnamese were exposed to Agent Orange and/or dioxin.
Report, the State Department upgraded Vietnam from “Tier
Since 2007, Congress has appropriated over $380 million for
3” to “Tier 2 Watch List” for making “achievements” in its
dioxin removal and related health care services. About 70%
efforts to eliminate trafficking.
has been used for dioxin removal. A joint dioxin cleanup
project in Da Nang was completed in 2017. In 2020, the two
Economics and Trade
governments developed a 10-year remediation plan for
Over the last decade, Vietnam has emerged as a major
cleaning up the Bien Hoa airbase, with an estimated cost of
manufacturing center and has risen to become one of the
up to $450 million. The Vietnamese government has pressed
United States’ top 10 trading partners. Based on U.S. trade
the United States to do more to remove dioxin and help
data, bilateral trade in goods was nearly $139 billion in
victims of Agent Orange.
2022, up 22% from 2021. The U.S. bilateral trade deficit in
Bilateral cooperation in locating U.S. military personnel
goods with Vietnam in 2022 ($116 billion) was the United
missing in action (MIA), a program that has been in
States’ third largest. Vietnam is a major source for
operation for over three decades, has been one of the
consumer electronics, furniture, semiconductor and parts,
centerpieces of the bilateral relationship. Since 2020,
apparel, and footwear imports. It is the second-largest
Congress has appropriated $7 million for the Defense
source of U.S. clothing imports, after China. Top U.S.
Department to help Vietnam’s Defense Ministry account for
goods exports to Vietnam are cotton, civilian aircrafts and
some of the approximately 300,000 Vietnam War-era
parts, semiconductors, and various agricultural goods. The
Vietnamese MIA personnel.
United States maintains a surplus in bilateral services trade,
which in 2022 was around $1.6 billion.
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Liana Wong, Analyst in International Trade and Finance
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
IF10209
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10209 · VERSION 20 · UPDATED