Updated October 4, 2023
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
have limited the types of cooperation the U.S. government
United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in
is willing to undertake, particularly in the security sector.
1995, overlapping strategic and economic interests have led
the two countries to expand ties across a wide spectrum of
Vietnam’s Political Structure
issues. Particularly since 2010, the two governments have
Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the
formed partnerships on many regional security and
CPV. In practice, the CPV sets the general policy direction,
economic issues, prompted in part by shared concerns about
leaving most of the day-to-day implementation to the
China’s increased assertiveness in the region. In 2022, the
government. The two top leadership posts are the CPV
United States was Vietnam’s second largest trading partner
General Secretary and the Prime Minister, positions
(after China), and Vietnam was the United States’ ninth
currently held by Trong (age 79) and Pham Minh Chinh
largest trading partner. A potential agreement under the
(64), respectively. Trong has been General Secretary since
U.S.-led, 14-country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
2011.
Prosperity (IPEF) initiative, which includes Vietnam, may
further deepen U.S.-Vietnam economic ties. Congress has
Under Trong and Chinh, the CPV and government are
played a significant role in charting the course of U.S.-
continuing the “blazing furnace” anti-corruption campaign
Vietnam relations during the more than three decades since
Trong first launched a decade ago. Corruption is viewed by
the two began normalizing relations in the early 1990s. In
many analysts as a threat to the CPV’s legitimacy, though
particular, Members have been at the forefront of efforts to
some perceive Trong’s campaign also as a way to weaken
improve relations, highlight human rights conditions, and
political rivals. Vietnam’s leaders have tried to diversify the
address unresolved issues from the Vietnam War.
country’s export markets and sources of foreign direct
investment (FDI) as they pursue stated goals of becoming
In September 2023, President Joseph Biden traveled to
an upper middle-income economy by 2030 and a high-
Hanoi, where he and Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)
income developed country by 2045. On foreign policy,
Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong elevated the U.S.-
Vietnam’s approach has included boosting its defense
Vietnam relationship from a “comprehensive partnership”
capabilities and expanding its security relationship with the
to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” the highest level
of Vietnam’s hierarchy of official partnerships
United States—as well as its security ties with Japan, India,
. Four other
and Australia—as a hedge against China’s increasing
countries—China, India, South Korea, and Russia—hold
influence. A stated principle of Vietnam’s foreign policy
the designation, which provides top-down blessing inside
since the late 1980s has been to avoid an over-dependence
Vietnam for the government and ruling party to deepen and
on any one country or group of countries. This pursuit of
expand areas of cooperation with the United States. The
balance, combined with a wariness of alarming China, has
upgrade was accompanied by a host of new and expanded
resulted in Vietnam expanding relations with the United
initiatives and other announcements, including plans for the
States incrementally and in a non-linear fashion.
Secretary of State and Foreign Minister to meet annually.
The U.S. pledged to support Vietnam’s development of its
Figure 1.Vietnam Map and Selected Statistics
semiconductor industry (including with $2 million in U.S.
government funds) and digital infrastructure ($12 million),
as well as physical infrastructure construction and climate
change mitigation efforts ($11 million). Following the
summit, a U.S. news outlet reported the two sides had
begun discussing a possible large-scale arms deal, which
likely would be subject to congressional review.
The pace and extent of further improvement in bilateral
relations is limited by several factors. First, Vietnam
usually does not undertake large-scale diplomatic moves—

especially with the United States—without first calculating
Source: Map, CRS; Other information, Central Intelligence Agency,
China’s likely reaction, and Hanoi and Beijing share
The World Factbook, 2022.
interests on many issues. Second, although opinion polls
show the Vietnamese public holds positive views of the
China-Vietnam Relations
United States, many Vietnamese officials suspect that the
Vietnam’s relationship with China is its most important
United States’ goal is to end the Vietnamese Communist
bilateral relationship. The two countries have Communist
Party’s monopoly on power though “peaceful evolution.”
Party-led political systems that provide a party-to-party
Third, U.S. concerns about Vietnam’s human rights record,
communication channel and engender similar official
which has deteriorated over the past decade, historically
world-views. China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner.
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U.S.-Vietnam Relations
The Sino-Vietnamese relationship, however, is prone to
U.S. business interest in Vietnam as an alternative supplier
tension, particularly over the two countries’ competing
to China has grown, largely due to several trends: rising
claims in the South China Sea. China’s actions in the South
production costs in China; ongoing U.S.-China trade
China Sea prompted the CPV at its 2021 Party Congress to
tensions and supply chain vulnerabilities; and the entry into
initiate a thorough modernization of Vietnam’s military
force of regional trade agreements among Vietnam and key
forces. The U.S. government has sought to improve
trading partners in East Asia. Vietnam’s relatively low
Vietnam’s ability to maintain maritime domain awareness
wages, market-oriented economic reforms, and political
and patrol its coastal waters. The Obama, Trump, and Biden
stability make the country an attractive place for FDI. U.S.
Administrations have provided Vietnam with 24 new coast
companies are among the largest sources of FDI in
guard patrol vessels, unmanned aircraft systems, coastal
Vietnam. At the same time, some U.S. business leaders
radar, and two decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard
assert that Vietnam’s weak infrastructure, lack of regulatory
Hamilton-class cutters, Vietnam’s largest coast guard ships.
transparency, weak labor rights, inadequate protection of
intellectual property rights, restrictive data policies, and
Vietnam and the War in Ukraine
other trade barriers pose challenges.
Vietnam has maintained a low-profile position on Russia’s
The U.S.-Vietnam 2007 Trade and Investment Framework
2022 invasion of Ukraine, abstaining on votes at the United
Agreement (TIFA) is the primary platform for discussing
Nations to condemn Russian aggression. Russia supplied
bilateral trade and investment issues. The IPEF, launched in
around 80% of Vietnam’s arms imports from 2000 to 2021.
2022, could provide another forum to address such issues in
Despite Vietnam’s purchases of Russian defense articles,
a multilateral setting. The September 2023 upgrade of the
neither the Trump nor Biden Administration has determined
U.S.-Vietnam relationship could increase opportunities to
that Vietnam has engaged in a “significant transaction” with
expand bilateral economic engagement, including
Russia’s security sector, a determination that under U.S.
increasing U.S. investment in Vietnam and expanding
law would require the President to impose sanctions.
Vietnam’s manufacturing capacity in sectors of U.S.
Human Rights
interest, such as semiconductors and critical minerals.
The CPV maintains an extensive country-wide organization
Following the upgrade of bilateral relations, the Biden
that allows it to monitor the daily activities of citizens. For
Administration has also committed to “expeditiously”
the past three decades, the CPV appears to have followed a
review Vietnam’s nonmarket economy designation under
strategy of permitting many forms of personal and religious
U.S. trade law. Other trade issues that may be a source of
expression, while selectively repressing individuals and
friction include U.S. labeling regulations, along with U.S.
organizations that it deems a threat to the party’s monopoly
antidumping and countervailing duties on imports of
on power. Over the past decade, according to many
Vietnamese catfish, which have been the subject of ongoing
observers, repression against dissenters and protestors has
dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
worsened, and the government has increased its legal and
technological capacity to monitor Vietnamese citizens’
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Vietnam
social media activity. In the 118th Congress, the Vietnam
Congress appropriated over $197 million in U.S. assistance
Human Rights Act (H.R. 3172) would, among other things,
for Vietnam for FY2023, about $12 million more than it
prohibit U.S. assistance to Vietnam’s Ministry of Public
appropriated in FY2022 ($185 million). One aim of this
Security, and require the executive branch to put more
assistance is remediating the Vietnam War-era damage
from the U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange and its
emphasis on ensuring internet freedom in Vietnam.
accompanying dioxin defoliant over Vietnam between 1961
In its 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report, the State
and 1971. A 2003 study estimated 2.1-4.8 million
Department upgraded Vietnam from “Tier 3,” the lowest
Vietnamese were exposed to Agent Orange and/or dioxin.
level, to “Tier 2 Watch List” for making “achievements” in
Since 2007, Congress has appropriated over $380 million
its efforts to eliminate trafficking, including more
for dioxin removal and related health care services. About
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions.
70% has been used for dioxin removal. A joint dioxin
cleanup project in Da Nang was completed in 2017. In
Economics and Trade
2020, the two governments developed a 10-year
Over the last decade, Vietnam has emerged as a major
remediation plan for cleaning up the Bien Hoa airbase, with
manufacturing center and has risen to become one of the
an estimated cost of up to $450 million. The Vietnamese
United States’ top 10 trading partners. Based on U.S. trade
government has pressed the United States to do more to
data, bilateral trade in goods was nearly $139 billion in
remove dioxin and help victims of Agent Orange.
2022, up 22% from 2021. The U.S. bilateral trade deficit in
goods with Vietnam in 2022 ($116 billion) was the United
Bilateral cooperation in locating U.S. military personnel
States’ third largest. Vietnam is a major source for
missing in action (MIA), a program that has been in
consumer electronics, furniture, semiconductor and parts,
operation for over three decades, has been one of the
apparel, and footwear imports. It is the second-largest
centerpieces of the bilateral relationship. Since 2020,
source of U.S. clothing imports, after China. Top U.S.
Congress has appropriated $7 million for the Defense
goods exports to Vietnam are cotton, civilian aircrafts and
Department to help Vietnam’s Defense Ministry account
parts, semiconductors, and various agricultural goods. The
for some of the approximately 300,000 Vietnam War-era
United States maintains a surplus in bilateral services trade,
Vietnamese MIA personnel.
which in 2022 was around $1.6 billion.
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Liana Wong, Analyst in International Trade and Finance
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U.S.-Vietnam Relations

IF10209


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10209 · VERSION 18 · UPDATED

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