Updated July 17, 2023
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
and the Chairperson of the National Assembly also are
United States and Vietnam in 1995, overlapping strategic
important posts.
and economic interests have led the two countries to expand
ties across a wide spectrum of issues. Particularly since
Under Trong and Chinh, the VCP and government are
2010, the two governments have formed partnerships on
continuing the anti-corruption campaign Trong first
many regional security and economic issues, prompted in
launched a decade ago. Vietnam’s leaders have tried to
part by shared concerns about China’s increased
diversify the country’s export markets and sources of
assertiveness in the region. In 2022, the United States was
foreign direct investment (FDI) as they pursue stated goals
Vietnam’s second largest trading partner (after China), and
of becoming an upper middle-income economy by 2030
Vietnam was the United States’ ninth largest trading
and a high-income developed country by 2045. On foreign
partner. A potential agreement under the U.S.-led, 14-
policy, Vietnam’s approach has included boosting its
country Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity
defense capabilities and expanding its security relationship
(IPEF) initiative, which includes Vietnam, may further
with the United States—as well as with Japan, India, and
deepen U.S.-Vietnam economic ties. There is growing
Australia—as a hedge against China’s increasing influence.
speculation that Vietnam’s top leader, Vietnamese
Communist Party (VCP) Secretary-General Nguyen Phu
A stated principle of Vietnam’s foreign policy since the late
Trong, may visit President Joseph Biden in the United
1980s has been to maximize its freedom of action by
States in 2023 to expand bilateral cooperation.
avoiding an over-dependence on any one country or group
of countries. This pursuit of balance, combined with a
The pace and extent of the improvement in bilateral
wariness of alarming China, has resulted in Vietnam
relations is limited by several factors, however. First,
expanding relations with the United States incrementally
Vietnam usually does not undertake large-scale diplomatic
and in a non-linear fashion. Many analysts argue that an
moves—especially with the United States—without first
early 2023 leadership shakeup, in which the sitting
calculating China’s likely reaction. For instance, Trong’s
President and two deputy prime ministers resigned, is
visit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2022 likely provides
unlikely to fundamentally alter the general direction of
room for him to visit Biden in 2023. Second, although
Vietnam’s foreign policy and domestic economic policy.
opinion polls show the Vietnamese public holds positive
views of the United States, many Vietnamese officials
suspect that the United States’ goal is to end the
Vietnamese Communist Party’s monopoly on power though
“peaceful evolution.” Third, U.S. concerns about Vietnam’s
human rights record, which has deteriorated over the past
decade, have historically limited the types of cooperation
the U.S. government is willing to undertake, particularly in
the security sector.
Congress has played a significant role in charting the course

of U.S.-Vietnam relations during the more than three
Source: Map, CRS; Other information, Central Intelligence Agency,
decades since the two began normalizing relations in the
The World Factbook, 2022.
early 1990s. Members have been at the forefront of efforts
to improve relations, highlight human rights conditions, and
China-Vietnam Relations
address unresolved issues from the Vietnam War.
China represents Vietnam’s most important bilateral
Vietnam’s Political Structure
relationship. The two countries have Communist Party-led
political systems that provide a party-to-party channel for
Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the
communication and engender similar official world-views.
Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). In practice, the VCP
China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner. The Sino-
sets the general direction for policy, leaving most of the
Vietnamese relationship, however, is prone to occasional
day-to-day implementation to the government. The two top
tension. For over a decade, disagreements have flared over
leadership posts are the VCP General Secretary and the
the two countries’ competing claims in the South China
Prime Minister, positions currently held by Trong (age 79)
Sea, particularly China’s claims to much of Vietnam’s
and Pham Minh Chinh (64), respectively. Trong has been
claimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China’s actions
General Secretary since 2011, making him the longest-
in the South China Sea prompted the VCP at its 2021 Party
serving leader of the VCP since the 1980s. The President
Congress to initiate a thorough modernization of Vietnam’s
military forces. Vietnam also has sought to boost relations
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U.S.-Vietnam Relations
with other maritime powers. The U.S. government has
semiconductors, soybeans, and various agricultural goods.
sought to improve Vietnam’s ability to maintain maritime
The United States maintains a surplus in bilateral services
domain awareness and patrol its coastal waters. The
trade, which in 2022 was around $1.6 billion.
Obama, Trump, and Biden Administrations have provided
Vietnam with 24 new coast guard patrol vessels, unmanned
U.S. business interest in Vietnam as an alternative supplier
aircraft systems, coastal radar, and two decommissioned
to China has grown, based largely on the following trends:
U.S. Coast Guard Hamilton-class cutters, Vietnam’s largest
rising production costs in China; ongoing U.S.-China trade
coast guard ships.
tensions and supply chain vulnerabilities; and the entry into
force of regional trade agreements among Vietnam and key
Vietnam and the War in Ukraine
trading partners in the Asia-Pacific. Vietnam’s relatively
Vietnam has maintained a low-profile position on Russia’s
low wages, recent economic reforms, and political stability
2022 invasion of Ukraine and has abstained on votes at the
make the country an attractive place for FDI. U.S.
United Nations to condemn Russian aggression. Russia
companies are among the largest sources of FDI in
supplied around 80% of Vietnam’s arms imports from 2000
Vietnam. At the same time, some U.S. business leaders
to 2021. Moreover, straining relations with Moscow could
assert that Vietnam’s weak infrastructure, lack of regulatory
violate Hanoi’s strategic commitment to maintaining
transparency, weak labor rights, inadequate protection of
balance in its relations with the world’s major powers.
intellectual property rights, restrictive data policies, and
Despite Vietnam’s purchases of Russian defense articles,
other trade barriers poses challenges.
neither the Trump nor Biden Administration has determined
that Vietnam has engaged in a “significant transaction” with
The U.S.-Vietnam 2007 Trade and Investment Framework
Russia’s security sector, a determination that under U.S.
Agreement (TIFA) is the primary bilateral platform for
law would require the President to impose sanctions.
discussing bilateral trade and investment issues. The IPEF,
launched in 2022, could provide another such forum. In
Human Rights
2020, the Trump Administration launched investigations of
The VCP maintains an extensive country-wide organization
Vietnam’s timber trade and designated Vietnam as a
that allows it to monitor the daily activities of citizens. For
currency manipulator. The two governments have since
the past three decades, the VCP appears to have followed a
reached agreements on both matters. Vietnamese
strategy of permitting many forms of personal and religious
companies have accused the United States of discriminatory
expression, while selectively repressing individuals and
trade restrictions designed to reduce Vietnam’s exports to
organizations that it deems a threat to the party’s monopoly
the United States. U.S. labeling regulations, along with U.S.
on power. While the VCP has allowed people to engage in
antidumping and countervailing duties on imports of
private enterprise and religious observance, it has cracked
Vietnamese catfish, are a long-standing source of friction,
down on what it labels as anti-government activity. Over
and the subject of ongoing dispute settlement at the World
the past several years, according to many observers,
Trade Organization (WTO).
repression against dissenters and protestors has worsened,
and the government has increased its legal and
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Vietnam
technological capacity to monitor Vietnamese citizens’
Congress appropriated over $197 million in U.S. assistance
social media activity. In the 118th Congress, the Vietnam
for Vietnam for FY2023, about $12 million more than it
Human Rights Act (H.R. 3172) would, among other things,
appropriated in FY2022 ($185 million). One aim of this
prohibit U.S. assistance to Vietnam’s Ministry of Public
assistance is remediating the Vietnam War-era damage
Security, and require the executive branch to put more
from the U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange and its
emphasis on ensuring internet freedom in Vietnam.
accompanying dioxin defoliant over Vietnam between 1961
and 1971. A 2003 study estimated 2.1 to 4.8 million
In its 2023 Trafficking in Persons Report, the State
Vietnamese were exposed to Agent Orange and/or dioxin.
Department upgraded Vietnam from “Tier 3,” the lowest
Since 2007, Congress has appropriated over $380 million
level, to “Tier 2 Watch List” for making “key
for dioxin removal and related health care services. About
achievements” in its efforts to eliminate trafficking,
70% has been used for dioxin removal. A joint dioxin
including more investigations, prosecutions, and
cleanup project in Da Nang was completed in 2017. In
convictions.
2020, the two governments developed a 10-year
remediation plan for cleaning up the Bien Hoa airbase, with
Economics and Trade
an estimated cost of up to $450 million. The Vietnamese
Over the last decade, Vietnam has emerged as a major
government has pressed the United States to do more to
manufacturing center and has risen to become one of the
remove dioxin and help victims of Agent Orange.
United States’ top 10 trading partners. Based on U.S.
Census Bureau data, bilateral trade in goods was nearly
Bilateral cooperation in locating U.S. military personnel
$139 billion in 2022, up 22% from 2021. The United
missing in action (MIA), a program that has been in
States’ bilateral trade deficit in goods with Vietnam in 2022
operation for over three decades, has been one of the
($116 billion) was the United States’ third largest. Vietnam
centerpieces of the bilateral relationship. Since 2020,
is a major source for consumer electronics, furniture,
Congress has appropriated $7 million for the Defense
semiconductor and other components, apparel, and
Department to help Vietnam’s Defense Ministry account
footwear imports. Notably, it is the second-largest source of
for some of the approximately 300,000 Vietnam War-era
U.S. clothing imports, after China. Top U.S. goods exports
Vietnamese MIA personnel.
to Vietnam are cotton, civilian aircrafts and parts,
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U.S.-Vietnam Relations

Liana Wong, Analyst in International Trade and Finance
IF10209
Mark E. Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10209 · VERSION 16 · UPDATED