Updated February 6, 2019
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the
Communist Party-led political systems, providing a party-
United States and Vietnam in 1995, overlapping strategic
to-party channel for conducting relations, and contributing
and economic interests have led the two countries to expand
to often similar official world-views. China is Vietnam’s
relations across a wide spectrum of issues. The United
largest bilateral trading partner.
States is Vietnam’s 2nd largest bilateral trading partner
(after China), and Vietnam is the United States’ 16th largest
trading partner. Since 2010, the two countries have formed
partnerships on many regional strategic and security issues,
due in part to shared concerns about China’s increased
assertiveness in the region.
President Trump has had two meetings with Vietnam’s
leaders. In May 2017, in Washington, DC, Trump and
Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc pledged to
expand security cooperation and create a mechanism for
addressing economic issues. In November 2017, Trump
traveled to Vietnam and met with Vietnamese leaders. The
President, on February 5, announced that in late February
2019 he will travel to Vietnam for his second summit with
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
The pace and extent of the improvement in bilateral
relations is limited by several factors. First, Hanoi usually
does not undertake large-scale diplomatic moves—
especially with the United States—without first calculating
Beijing’s likely reaction. Second, though opinion polls
show the Vietnamese public holds positive views of the
United States, many Vietnamese officials remain suspicious
The Sino-Vietnamese relationship, however, is prone to
that the United States’ long-term goal is to see an end to the
tension. Land border disputes, sometimes bloody,
Vietnamese Communist Party’s monopoly on power
contributed to a severing of diplomatic relations between
through “peaceful evolution.” On the U.S. side, Vietnam’s
1979 and 1989. Over the past decade, tensions have
human rights record, which has deteriorated in recent years,
intensified over the two countries’ competing territorial
remains a challenge for improving the bilateral relationship.
claims in the South China Sea, leading Vietnam to expand
Although the Trump Administration generally has lowered
its maritime capabilities and boost relations with other
the priority placed on addressing Vietnam’s reported human
maritime powers, such as the United States, Japan, and
rights abuses, some Members of Congress have highlighted
India. Since 2007, China has taken a number of actions to
human rights conditions in Vietnam.
bolster its claims, which China asserts it has taken in
Vietnam’s Political Structure
response to moves by other claimants, including Vietnam.
Vietnam has protested China’s increased seizures of
Vietnam is a one-party, authoritarian state ruled by the
Vietnamese fishing boats, its reported warnings to Western
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). In practice, the CPV
energy companies not to work with Vietnam to explore or
sets the general direction for policy, while the day-to-day
drill in the disputed waters, and its extensive land
details of implementation generally are left to the state
reclamation on several features in the South China Sea.
bureaucracy, the legislature (the National Assembly), and
China has protested Vietnamese actions such as oil
the Vietnamese military. Nearly all the members of these
exploration and fishing in disputed waters, and seizures of
bodies are CPV members. The two top leadership posts are
Chinese fishing boats. Vietnam also has stepped up its
the CPV General Secretary (currently Nguyen Phu Trong)
presence in and near the disputed areas, including
and the Prime Minister. In a break from its decades-old
expanding offshore energy exploration and development to
tradition of dividing authority, in October 2018, the CPV
fuel growing energy demand. Vietnam has carried out its
chose Trong to serve concurrently as President.
own land reclamation projects, though these are on a much
Sino-Vietnam Relations and South China smaller scale than China’s reclamation efforts.
Sea Tensions
China’s actions in the South China Sea have led the United
Vietnam regards its relationship with China as its most
States and Vietnam to intensify collaboration in many
important bilateral relationship. The two countries have
security and maritime-related areas and fora. In 2016, the
https://crsreports.congress.gov
U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Obama Administration removed remaining U.S. restrictions
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
on sales of lethal weapons and related services to Vietnam.
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) went into effect for Vietnam,
Thus far few, if any, lethal defense articles have been sold
liberalizing trade and investment relations with Australia,
or transferred to Vietnam from the United States.
Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore.
Applications to export all defense items, lethal and non-
Economic models project the CPTPP will lead to a fall in
lethal, are subject to a case-by-case review by the State
U.S. exports to Vietnam, and a possible increase in
Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. In the
Vietnamese exports to the United States, thereby increasing
115th Congress, H.R. 5621, the Vietnam Human Rights Act,
the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with Vietnam.
was introduced, expressing the sense of Congress that sales
of U.S. lethal defense items, except those linked to U.S.
The Trump Administration appeared to make trade deficit
interests in the South China Sea, should be conditioned
reduction one of the top agenda items of the May 2017
upon steps to advance human rights.
Trump-Phuc meeting. The two leaders also stated they
would promote trade through their existing Trade and
Since 2014, the United States has increased maritime aid to
Investment Framework Agreement, though no significant
Vietnam, including several new coast guard patrol vessels
progress along those lines appears to have been
and the transfer of a decommissioned U.S. Coast Guard
accomplished in 2017 and 2018.
Hamilton-class cutter, under the Excess Defense Articles
program. The cutter is Vietnam’s largest coast guard ship.
Vietnam would like to have the United States officially
Cooperation has increased in other areas, as part of the
recognize it as a market economy. The United States’
Trump Administration’s conception of promoting a “free
designation of Vietnam as a non-market economy, which
and open Indo-Pacific.” In March 2018, the USS Carl
will expire in 2019, generally makes it more likely that
Vinson conducted a four-day visit to Da Nang, the first U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty cases would result in
aircraft carrier to visit Vietnam since the Vietnam War.
the Commerce Department issuing adverse rulings against
Vietnamese companies’ exports to the United States.
Human Rights
Vietnam also has complained about the United States’
The CPV maintains an extensive organization throughout
imposition of a stricter system for inspecting imports of
the country that allows it to monitor the daily activities of
Vietnamese catfish. (For more information, see CRS
Vietnamese citizens. For the past three decades, the VCP
Report R45172, U.S.-Vietnam Economic and Trade
appears to have followed a strategy of permitting many
Relations: Key Issues in 2018.)
forms of personal and religious expression, while
selectively and increasingly repressing individuals and
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Vietnam
organizations that it deems a threat to the party’s monopoly
The United States provided Vietnam $149.1 million in
on power. While the CPV has allowed people to engage in
foreign assistance in FY2018. The Trump Administration’s
private enterprise and religious observance, it has cracked
budget request for FY2019 would reduce Development
down harshly on what it deems to be anti-government
Assistance and Economic Support Fund support for
activity and on some unregistered religious groups
Vietnam by 63% compared to FY2017 (from $75.2 million
(Vietnamese law requires religious groups to be approved
to $27.5 million).
by and register with the state).
One legacy of the Vietnam War is the damage that Agent
Over the past several years, according to some observers,
Orange and its accompanying dioxin have done to the
repression against dissenters and protestors has worsened,
people and the environment of Vietnam. According to a
and the government has increased its legal and
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report and
technological capacity to monitor Vietnamese citizens’
several academic studies, the U.S. military sprayed Agent
social media activity. The government also increasingly has
Orange over nearly 10% of then-South Vietnam between
targeted bloggers and lawyers who represent human rights
1961 and 1971. The Vietnam Association of Victims of
and religious freedom activists, particularly those who
Agent Orange/Dioxin (VAVA) estimated that between 2.1
authorities allege are linked to pro-democracy activist
million and 4.8 million Vietnamese were directly exposed
networks or are critical of the government’s policy toward
to Agent Orange. Since 2007, Congress has appropriated
China. Additionally, protests over land seizures by
over $222 million for dioxin removal and related health
governmental authorities have emerged as what officials
care services. A joint cleanup project in Da Nang has been
regard as one of the country’s most sensitive problems.
completed, and the two governments are discussing terms
for a second, probably larger project in Bien Hoa. The
Economics and Trade
Vietnamese government has pushed the United States to do
Since the end of U.S. trade embargo on Vietnam in 1994,
more to remove dioxin from Vietnam and provide help for
bilateral trade has grown rapidly. According to U.S. trade
Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange. (For more
figures, bilateral trade topped $54 billion in 2017—more
information, see CRS Report R44268, U.S. Agent
than double 2012 levels. The U.S. bilateral trade deficit
Orange/Dioxin Assistance to Vietnam.)
with Vietnam in 2017 ($38 billion) was its 6th largest.
Vietnam was the second-largest source of U.S. clothing
Mark E. Manyin,
imports (after China), and a major source for electrical
Michael F. Martin,
machinery, footwear, and furniture. U.S. companies are
major investors in Vietnam, with over 700 projects in the
IF10209
country worth over $10 billion. On January 14, 2019, the
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U.S.-Vietnam Relations
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10209 · VERSION 9 · UPDATED