The Middle East Peace Talks

Order Code IB91137
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Middle East Peace Talks
Updated May 18, 2006
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Role
Conference and Developments
Madrid
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians
Israel-Syria
Israel-Lebanon
Israel-Jordan
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition
Declaration of Principles
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron
Wye River Memorandum
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict
Agreement on Movement and Access
Role of Congress
Aid
Jerusalem
Compliance/Sanctions

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The Middle East Peace Talks
SUMMARY
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new
The international war against terrorism
peace process was begun, with Israel and the
after September 11, 2001, prompted renewed
Palestinians discussing a five-year period of
U.S. focus on a peace process. On June 24,
interim self-rule leading to a final settlement.
2002, President Bush declared, “peace re-
Israel and Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal
quires new and different Palestinian leader-
from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace.
ship so that a Palestinian state can be born.”
Israel and Jordan discussed relations. Israel
On April 30, 2003, the United States, the
and Lebanon focused on Israel’s withdrawal
U.N., European Union, and Russia (the Quar-
from its self-declared security zone in south
tet) presented a “Roadmap” to Palestinian
Lebanon and reciprocal Lebanese actions.
statehood within three years. It has not been
implemented. In December 2003, Sharon
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the
proposed to unilaterally disengage from the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestinians in Gaza and four small settle-
signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP),
ments in the West Bank. Palestinian Author-
providing for Palestinian empowerment and
ity (PA) Chairman/President Yasir Arafat died
some territorial control. Israeli Prime Minis-
on November 11, 2004, and, on January 9,
ter Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan signed
2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected to succeed
a Peace Treaty on October 26, 1994. Israel
him. On August 23, Israel completed its
and the Palestinians signed an Interim Self-
disengagement from the Gaza Strip and four
Rule in the West Bank/Oslo II accord on
West Bank settlements. Since Hamas won the
September 28, 1995. Israel continued
January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elec-
implementing it despite the November 4
tions, Israeli officials have set out plans to
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.
unilaterally disengage from more of the West
Bank.
Israel suspended talks with Syria in

February/March 1996. They resumed in De-
Congress is interested in the peace talks
cember 1999, but were postponed indefinitely
because of its oversight role in the conduct of
after January 2000. Israel withdrew from
U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and
south Lebanon on May 24, 2000.
keen constituent interest. It is concerned about
U.S. financial and other commitments and the
The Palestinians and Israelis signed
Palestinians’ fulfillment of their commitments
additional incremental accords in 1997, 1998,
to Israel. Congress has appropriated aid for
and 1999. From July 11 to 24, 2000, Presi-
the West Bank and Gaza, with conditions
dent Clinton held a summit with Israeli and
intended to ensure Palestinian compliance
Palestinian leaders at Camp David, but they
with agreements with Israel. Congress has
did not succeed in producing an accord. A
repeatedly endorsed Jerusalem as the undi-
Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in
vided capital of Israel, and many Members
September. Ariel Sharon was elected Prime
seek sanctions on the PLO and PA.
Minister of Israel on February 6, 2001. He
said that the results of Camp David and after-
wards were null and void.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On April 26, 2006, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas called for an immediate
international peace conference with himself as the Palestinian negotiator. He said that the
Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA) government elected in January is not an obstacle to
negotiations because the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which he heads, has the
mandate to negotiate as it had all previous agreements. He also has noted that he is
empowered as the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians. In response, an Israeli
spokesman cited the Road Map, which does not call for an international conference until its
final phase, as the best way to move forward.
Meanwhile, Hamas officials have said that for negotiations to begin, Israel must accept
withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem, recognition of the
refugees’ right to return, the release of prisoners, and the dismantling of the (security) wall.
Imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other leaders drafted a “National Accord Document” calling
for a Palestinian state on territories that Israel occupied in 1967 and for the “resistance” to
focus those lands. It says the President is responsible for negotiating an agreement with Israel
that should be put to a vote by the Palestinian National Council or a referendum. Abbas
accepted the document, but Hamas officials rejected any recognition of pre-1967 Israel.
On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to strive to
shape the permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic Jewish state, with a Jewish
majority. Although preferring to achieve this goal through negotiations, the government
would act to determine borders in their absence. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said that the
security fence will be adapted to conform to the borders in both east and west. The PLO
rejects the Olmert Plan as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people’s right to a state in
all territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade since the founding of Israel until the 1990s.
With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable. The
creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing
conflict made refugees of thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine, with
consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. The 1967 war ended with Israel
occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in
part, to regain their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist
incursions; it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile “security zone” that Lebanon sought
to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal throughout
the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli
negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
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U.S. Role
With the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the Arab-
Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a framework for
peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of “land
for peace.” Secretary of State Baker organized a peace conference in Madrid in October
1991 that launched almost a decade of the “Oslo process” efforts to achieve peace. It
continued under President Clinton, who said that only the region’s leaders can make peace
and vowed to be their partner. With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United
States seemed to become an indispensable and expected party to Israeli-Palestinian talks.
Clinton mediated the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States coordinated its
implementation. Clinton personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role, and Secretary
of State Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy. Since the September 11, 2001,
the Administration has focused on the peace process as part of the war on terrorism.
Secretary Rice also has not appointed a special envoy, asserting, “Not every effort has to be
an American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking
responsibility.” Nonetheless, she has actively encouraged Israelis and Palestinians to act and
mediated a November 2005 accord to reopen the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt.
Conference and Developments
Madrid. The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were represented
by 14-member delegations. A Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from
each. An unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). The United States, the Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the
European Community, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the table. The U.N., the Gulf
Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union were observers.
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians. (Incidents of violence are noted selectively.) In November
1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate Israel-Jordan and
Israel-Palestinians negotiating tracks, the latter to address a five-year period of interim
Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the third year, permanent status
negotiations were to begin. On August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a
PLO coordination committee, ending a charade that had distanced the PLO from the talks.
Secret talks in Oslo in 1993 produced an August 19 agreement on a Declaration of
Principles, signed September 13, 1993. (See Significant Agreements, below, for summaries
of and links to accords reached between 1993 and 2000.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Barak, and Palestinian Authority (PA)
Chairman Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24, 2000, to forge a
framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The parties had agreed that
there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved. Jerusalem was the major
obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians
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control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to
cede more than 90% of the West Bank, wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000
settlers lived, and offered to admit thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification
program. An international fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from
Arab countries. The Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the
Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East
Jerusalem, particularly the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims.
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces,
visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel responded
forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising began. On October 12, a mob in
Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on
Palestinian official sites. An international summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, on October
16 set up a commission under former Senator George Mitchell to look into the violence.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister.
Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, December 19-23. On December
23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram
al-Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip,
and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza.
Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount and
sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. Israeli forces would control
borders in the Jordan Valley for three to six years, and then be replaced by an international
force. The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.” (For text of speech, see the Israel
Policy Forum website at [http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=544].) Barak
said he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought
clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and
refugees’ right of return, among other issues. The talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister and vowed to retain united
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Sharon’s
associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and after Camp David were “null and
void.” The Bush Administration said that Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States
proposals.” Sharon sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian
refugees, or a Palestinian state and, on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.
On April 30, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending violence,
rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two sides agreed to CIA
Director Tenet’s plan to cement a cease-fire. On June 28, they agreed to a seven-day period
without violence followed by a six-week cooling-off period. Secretary Powell said Sharon
would determine if violence abated. On August 8, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated in
Jerusalem. On August 10, Israeli forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian
national activity in East Jerusalem, and then repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On
August 27, Israel killed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader.
On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one
else gave them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President Bush said, for the
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first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the
right of Israel to exist is respected.” The PFLP assassinated Israel’s Minister of Tourism on
October 17. On November 10, President Bush declared that the United States is “working
toward the day when two states — Israel and Palestine — live peacefully together within
secure and recognized borders....” Secretary Powell sent Anthony Zinni to work on a cease-
fire, but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat in Ramallah on December 3.
On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be reached with Arafat, “who is a real
terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and
perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza. Israel charged that Arafat was
“directly responsible” for the attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant....”
On January 3, 2002, Israel seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-commanded freighter,
carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell stated that Arafat “cannot engage
with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same time permit or tolerate continued
violence and terror.” At the White House on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that
pressure should be put on Arafat so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.

On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah unprecedentedly called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.” Sharon said that he was willing
to explore the idea but it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s
right to “secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On March 27, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded at a hotel in Netanya, killing 27 and
wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat “an enemy” and besieged his compound in Ramallah;
Israeli forces soon controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On May 2, the Quartet (i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian officials), proposed a
conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues. After a Hamas suicide bombing near
Tel Aviv, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror” before negotiations. After
meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions were not ripe for a conference
because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian government. On June 24, the President
called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not compromised by terror” and to build a
practicing democracy. Then the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state,
whose borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement.
He added, “as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and settlement activity must stop.” The
President foresaw a final settlement within three years. (For text of the speech online, see
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html].) On September 17,
the Quartet outlined a preliminary “Roadmap” to peace.
On March 7, 2003, Arafat named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister.
On April 14, Sharon allowed that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the
history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s
right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel. On
April 14, Israel submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap to U.S. officials. On April 30, the
“Quartet” presented the Roadmap. Abbas accepted it. On May 23, the Administration stated
that Israel had explained its concerns and that the United States shares the view “that these
are real concerns and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the
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Roadmap,” leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the Roadmap “with
reservations” on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared, “to keep 3.5 million people under
occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time.
On June 4, the President met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to
achieve the Palestinians’ goals by peaceful means. Sharon expressed understanding of “the
importance of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian state and promised to “remove
unauthorized outposts.” Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, with Palestinian
groups. On June 29, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations
against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. Israel was not party
to the accord, but began withdrawing forces from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release
Palestinian prisoners, remove roadblocks, withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow
Arafat free movement, and end construction of a security fence in the West Bank. Israel
demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist infrastructures and act against terrorists.
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide bomber
exploded in Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more than 130.
Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought Arafat’s support to
act against terrorists. Israel suspended talks with the Palestinians, halted plans to transfer
cities to their control, and resumed “targeted killings” of terrorist leaders, among other
measures. On September 6, Abbas resigned because of what he charged was lack of support
from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On September 7, Arafat named Palestinian
Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qureia, known as Abu Ala, to be Prime Minister.
On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing three
U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested members of
Popular Resistance Committees — disaffected former members of the Palestinian security
services and other groups. (They were freed in April 2004.)
Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating in the
signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement, (see
[http://www.heskem.org.il]), by Israeli opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on
December 1. On December 18, Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish and democratic
Israel,” he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by redeploying Israeli forces
and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and intensifying construction of the security
fence in the West Bank. On February 13, 2004, the White House said that an Israeli pullback
“could reduce friction,” but that a final settlement “must be achieved through negotiations.”
After an upsurge in violence, on March 22, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Shaykh
Ahmed Yassin and others.
On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters. (For text of letters,
see [http://www.whitehouse.gov].) The President welcomed the disengagement plan and
restated the U.S. commitment to the Roadmap. He noted the need to take into account
changed “realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,”
(i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” He said that a
solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian
state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting a “right of return.” He called for a Palestinian
state that is “viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.” Sharon presented his
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disengagement plan as independent of but “not inconsistent with the Roadmap.” He said that
the “temporary” security fence would not prejudice final status issues including borders. A
day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in Hebron that
Israel will retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the President’s “legitimization” of
settlements and prejudgement of final status. On April 19, Sharon’s chief of staff Dov
Weisglass gave National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to
dismantle illegal outposts.
On June 6, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby Israel
would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the northern West
Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the government’s right to build
the security fence, but struck down some land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian
rights and ordered the route to be changed. The government said that it would abide by the
ruling. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding, advisory
opinion that the wall violates international law. (For text, see [http://www.icj-cij.org].)
On October 6, Sharon’s aide Weisglass claimed that disengagement was aimed at
freezing negotiations in order to “prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and a
debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.”
Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and
a candidate for president. On January 9, 2005, Abbas won election as President of the PA.
He called for implementing the Roadmap while beginning discussion of final status issues
and cautioned against interim solutions designed to delay reaching a comprehensive solution.

Secretary of State Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7. She praised the Israelis’
“historic” disengagement decision, discussed the need to carry out obligations concerning
settlements and outposts, and warned them not to undermine Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen.
William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator and emphasized the importance of
Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. Rice did not attend a February 8 meeting of Sharon,
Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah II in Sharm al-
Shaykh, where Sharon and Abbas declared the end of violence and military operations.
On February 20, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security barrier closer
to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank to envelope
major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel handed Jericho over to PA control. On March
17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend a “calm” or informal truce until the end of the
year. On March 21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to PA control.
On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the building
of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem,
in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from
Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern and southern West Bank, and
prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary Rice asserted that the plan was “at
odds with American policy.” On April 11, when he met Sharon, the President conveyed his
“concern that Israel not undertake any activity that contravenes Roadmap obligations or
prejudices final status negotiations.” Sharon stated, “It is the position of Israel that the major
Israeli population centers will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status agreement” and
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declared that Ma’ale Adumim is a major population center, and therefore, Israel is interested
in contiguity between it and Jerusalem.
On April 15, the Quartet appointed outgoing World Bank President James Wolfensohn
to be their Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement. He would serve until April 30, 2006.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas at the White House and said that “changes to
the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.” He reaffirmed, “A viable two-state
solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not
work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the
position of the United States today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of
final status negotiations.” He also said, “The barrier being erected by Israel ... must be a
security, rather than political, barrier.” Abbas said that the boundaries of a future state should
be those of before the 1967 war and asserted, “there is no justification for the wall and it is
illegitimate.” He also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the Gaza disengagement
with Israel and called for moving immediately thereafter to final status negotiations.
PIJ claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and
injuring more than 90. Israeli forces launched operations against the PIJ, reoccupied
Tulkarem, and closed the West Bank. Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire
against settlements in Gaza and towns in southern Israel. Israel helicopters fired missiles at
targets in Gaza and the West Bank.
On July 22, Secretary Rice met Sharon and encouraged him to coordinate the
disengagement with the Palestinians. On August 4, an Israeli army deserter opposed to the
disengagement killed four Israeli Arabs and injured 13 on a bus in northern Israel. On
August 15, Defense Minister Mofaz said that Israel would keep the settlement blocs of
Ma’ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan
Shaqed — all are within or expected to be within the security barrier. He added that Israel
would retain the Jordan Rift Valley to guarantee Israel’s eastern border.
Israel evacuated all of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the
northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. (See CRS Report RS22000, Israel’s
Disengagement from Gaza, by Carol Migdalovitz.) On August 17, a settler opposed to the
disengagement shot four Palestinians at the West Bank settlement of Shiloh. On August 29,
Sharon declared that there would be no further unilateral or coordinated disengagements and
that the next step must be negotiations under the Road Map. He affirmed that while the large
blocs of settlements will remain in Israeli hands and linked territorially to Israel, not all West
Bank settlements will remain; but this will be decided in the final stage of negotiations.
After an upsurge in Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, the group announced
on September 25 that it would halt operations from Gaza, but on September 27, it claimed
responsibility for kidnaping and killing an Israeli settler in Ramallah. Israel responded with
air and artillery strikes, closure of charities linked to terror groups, mass arrests including
likely Hamas candidates, and targeted killings of terrorists. A Sharon advisor said, “we
might consider turning disengagement into a strategy. Israel would determine its borders
independently.” On September 29, Sharon insisted that Israel would work solely via the
Road Map and “(t)here will not be any further unilateral territorial moves.”
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On October 20, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to “confront the
threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,” but did not urge him to
prevent Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that candidates
renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to renounce violence after
election.
On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in Hadera, on
the Israeli coast. Sharon announced a “broad and relentless offensive” against terrorism. He
ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes “serious action” against armed groups.
On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her that
Israel would not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, but
it also would not coordinate with the PA or allow Hamas people to move around more. He
said if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it could
lead to the end of the Roadmap. Only if Hamas disarms and annuls its covenant which calls
for the destruction of Israel would Israel assist the elections and accept Hamas’s
participation. Rice asserted that it would be easier to compel Hamas to disarm after the
elections because the entire international community would then exert pressure. She added
that Abbas would lose U.S. and international support if he does not disarm Hamas. Rice
vowed that the United States would not hold contacts with an armed Hamas even if it is part
of the Palestinian administration. On November 15, she announced that Israel and the PA
had achieved an Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza Strip. On November
25, the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt reopened with EU monitors.
On December 5, PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Netanya, killing 5 and wounding
more than 50. On December 6, Israel barred Palestinian entry into Israel for one week,
arrested militants in the West Bank, and began air strikes in Gaza. Israeli officials suspended
talks with the PA about West Bank-Gaza bus convoys that were to begin on December 15.
On December 23, Israeli forces began to enforce a “no-go” zone in northern Gaza to prevent
rocket fire into Israel. PIJ claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings at an Israeli army
checkpoint in the northern West Bank on December 28, killing an Israeli soldier.
After Hamas victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections, speculation
increased about possible effects on the peace process if it achieved similar successes in
January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28, the “Quartet” stated that a
future Palestinian cabinet “should include no member who has not committed to the
principles of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence
and terrorism.” On January 11, Secretary Rice stated, “It remains the view of the United
States that there should be no place in the political process for groups or individuals who
refuse to renounce terror and violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.” Sharon
suffered an incapacitating stroke on January 4. Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert became
Acting Prime Minister, and on January 12, he told President Bush that peace efforts could
not progress if terrorist organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian government. On
January 19, PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30.
Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary election. It is a U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization, claims the entire land of Palestine, including Israel, “from
the river to the sea” as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo agreements of the 1990s, insists on
the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, and the right to “resistance,” which it
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claims forced Israel from the Gaza Strip. Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate
with a Palestinian administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its
destruction and demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the
destruction of Israel, and accept all prior agreements. President Bush said that the United
States would not deal with a political party “that articulates the destruction of Israel as part
of its platform” and, on January 31, called on Hamas to “recognize Israel, disarm, reject
terrorism, and work for a lasting peace.” On January 30, the Quartet stated that “future
assistance to any new (Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the
government’s commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and
acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map.” Hamas
countered that it will never recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a “long-term truce”
if Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners, destroyed all settlements, and
recognized the Palestinian refugees’ right to return (to Israel), and would create a state on
“any inch” of Palestinian territory without ceding another. Abbas remained committed to a
negotiated two-state solution and suggested continuing to use the PLO for this purpose.
On February 8, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the
Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major settlement
blocs, and the Jordan Valley. On March 5, his security advisor, Avi Dichter, asserted new
borders would consolidate isolated settlements into settlement blocs. He added that the
Israeli Defense Forces would retain control over territory to prevent terrorism. On March 8,
Olmert stated that he would wait a “reasonable” amount of time to see whether Hamas met
his conditions. He aimed to reach a national consensus on permanent borders by 2010 and
stated that the security barrier would be moved to those borders. Olmert also declared that
construction would begin in the E-1 corridor between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and
Jerusalem. No Hamas official accepted Olmert’s plan, but Prime Minister-designate Ismail
Haniyah declared, “Let them withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch
of liberated land....” Hamas Political Bureau chief Khalid Mish’al said that his group would
make no concessions to Israel and would “practice resistance side by side with politics as
long as the occupation continued.” On March 15, Israeli forces besieged a Palestinian prison
in Jericho to capture men wanted for the October 2001 killing of an Israeli minister,
indicating a lack of trust in a Hamas-led PA to keep a 2002 agreement to hold the prisoners.
After his party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary elections, Olmert said
that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish state with a permanent Jewish
majority and a democracy. He called for negotiations based on mutual recognition,
agreements already signed, the principles of the Road Map, a halt to violence, and the
disarming of terrorist organizations. He said he hoped to hear a similar announcement from
the PA, but “Israel will take its fate into its own hands” if the Palestinians do not act. On
March 30, Secretary Rice said, referring to Olmert’s plan, “I wouldn’t on the face of it just
say absolutely we don’t think there’s any value in what the Israelis are talking about.”
Palestinian Prime Minister Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to President
Abbas negotiating with Israel and that Hamas could redefine its position if the result serves
the people’s interests. In an op-ed in The Guardian on March 31, Haniyah labeled Olmert’s
unilateralism “a recipe for conflict” and a “plan to impose a permanent situation in which the
Palestinians end up with a homeland cut into pieces....” He appealed for no more talk about
recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” or ending resistance until Israel commits to withdraw
from the Palestinians’ lands and recognizes their rights. On April 1, PA Foreign Minister
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Mahmud al-Zahhar stated that he dreamed of a world map “which does not show Israel on
it.” On March 30, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claimed responsibility for a suicide
bombing near the Israeli settlement of Kedumim, killing four. The Palestinian Deputy Prime
Minister said that Hamas would never object to the Palestinians’ “self-defense” as long as
they were under occupation.
On April 9, 2006, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the
Hamas-led PA, which it called a “hostile entity.” Because it views the PA as “one authority
and not as having two heads,” the cabinet declared that there could be personal contacts, but
not negotiations, with President Abbas.
On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and wounding
60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as “despicable” and
counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an act of “self-defense.” Israel
did not respond militarily but revoked the Jerusalem residency of three Hamas officials
among other steps. Some Israelis maintain that Hamas’s repeated defense of bombings and
its appointment of a leader of the terrorist Popular Resistance Committees to head security
forces (despite Abbas’s veto) will serve to justify Israel’s unilateralism.
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square
miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law and
administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize.
Syria initially referred to its goal as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty,
preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and disdained separate agreements between
Israel and Arab parties. Israel emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic,
cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that 242 applies to all fronts. Syria submitted a draft declaration
of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement.” Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
accepted an undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.” On
September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange for total
withdrawal.” Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Asad announced interest
in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different speeds. In June,
Secretary of State Christopher said that the United States might be willing to guarantee
security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was
ready to talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides inched toward each
other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on
October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal.
On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military talks under U.S.
auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take
topographical features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal.
Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Golan
stations, but Syria insisted on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitor the other
from its own territory and received U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that Syria
demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin said that Israeli troops
must stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its
sovereignty, but government-controlled media accepted international or friendly forces in the
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stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were
suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
A new Israeli government called for negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to
Israel’s security and water needs and that retaining sovereignty would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967-
border (as opposed to the international border of 1923). Israeli negotiators say that Rabin
had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s security and normalization needs,
which Syria did not. An Israeli law passed on January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member
majority and a national referendum to approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
In June, Prime Minister-elect Barak and Asad exchanged compliments through a British
writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from “the point where they left off,” with
each side defining the point to its satisfaction. Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met
in Washington on December 15-16, 1999, and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10,
2000. President Clinton intervened. On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli
success in delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and
an early-warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the summary,
talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000, were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman
reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be productive for talks
to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance to withdraw
to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and
on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main
obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime
Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights. In a December
1 New York Times interview, Bashar Asad said that he was ready to resume negotiations
from where they broke off. Sharon responded that Syria first must stop supporting Hizballah
and Palestinian terror organizations. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S.
Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred Prados.) On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that this
is not the time to begin negotiations with Syria because it is collaborating with Iran, building
up Hizballah, and maintaining terrorist organizations’ headquarters in Damascus from which
terrorist attacks are ordered. Moreover, he observed that there was no reason to relieve the
pressure that France and the United States are putting on Syria.
Israel-Lebanon. Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought Israel’s
unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern Lebanon, and the end
of Israel’s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its shelling of villages that Israel
said were sites of Hizballah activity. Israel claimed no Lebanese territory, but said that it
would withdraw only when the Lebanese army controlled the south and prevented Hizballah
attacks on northern Israel. Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing
Israel’s security concerns. The two sides never agreed. Syria, which dominated Lebanon,
said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. Israel’s July 1993 assault on Hizballah
prompted 250,000 people to flee south Lebanon. Secretary of State Christopher arranged a
cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel again attacked Hizballah and Hizballah fired into
northern Israel. The two sides agreed to a cease-fire monitored by U.S., French, Syrian,
Lebanese, and Israeli representatives, but retained the right of self-defense.
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On January 5, 1998, Israel’s Defense Minister indicated readiness to withdraw from
southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the restoration of peace
and security in the region, were implemented. He and Prime Minister Netanyahu then
proposed withdrawal in exchange for security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and
Syria called for an unconditional withdrawal. As violence in northern Israel and southern
Lebanon increased later in 1998, the Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal. In
April 1999, however, Israel decreased its forces in Lebanon, and in June, the Israeli-allied
South Lebanese Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. New Israeli
Prime Minister Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by July 7, 2000.
On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the
“resistance” against the occupation, (i.e., Hizballah). He argued that Palestinian refugees
residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected their implantation
in Lebanon. He rejected Secretary of State Albright’s assertion that refugees will be a subject
of Israeli-Palestinian final status talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.
Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel unless Israel also
withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue. On April 17, Israel
informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon told the U.N. that Israel’s withdrawal
would not be complete unless it included Sheba’a farms. On May 23, the Secretary General
noted that most of Sheba’a is within the area of operations of the U.N. Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and
recommended proceeding without prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the SLA
collapsed, and on May 24 Israel completed its withdrawal. Hizballah took over the former
security zone. On June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had withdrawn. The
U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the border region
because the Lebanese army did not back them against Hizballah. (See CRS Report RL31078,
The Shib’a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred Prados.)
On October 7, Hizballah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli soldiers. On
October 16, Hizballah announced that it had captured an Israeli colonel. On November 13,
the Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take control of the area vacated by
Israel. On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hizballah attacked its soldiers in Sheba’a, Israel,
claiming that Syria controls Hizballah, bombed Syrian radar sites in Lebanon. In April, the
U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased
out. On January 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
In March 2003, Hizballah shelled Israeli positions in Sheba’a and northern Israel. Israel
responded with air strikes and concern about a possible second front in addition to the
intifadah. At its request, the Secretary General contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents
and, on April 8, Vice President Cheney called President Asad. In April, Secretary Powell
visited northern Israel and called on Syria to curb Hizballah. On January 30, 2004, Israel and
Hizballah exchanged 400 Palestinian and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and the
remains of 59 Lebanese for the Israeli colonel and the bodies of the three Israeli soldiers.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the withdrawal
of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon. Massive anti-Syrian demonstrations
occurred in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese Prime
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Minister Rafik Hariri. On March 5, Asad announced a phased withdrawal of Syrian troops
from Lebanon, which was completed on April 26. On December 28, Israeli jets attacked a
terrorist base south of Beirut after rockets fired from Lebanon hit a northern Israeli town;
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the
claim has not been verified.
On March 23, 2006, the Lebanese Foreign Minister said that Israel had withdrawn to
a self-declared line of withdrawal, not a border because, he asserted, Israel has no demarcated
borders recognized by international law.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian. Jordan
initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and economic
matters on September 14, 1993. A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See
Significant Agreements below). The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew from
Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
On March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the
peace process....” After Israeli agents failed to assassinate a Hamas official in Jordan on
September 25, 1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh Yassin,
which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the
detained agents. In December 1998, the King lambasted Netanyahu and called for Jordan-
Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian national
interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his son.
King Abdullah said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites in
Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that Jerusalem be an Israeli
and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. On November
21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of its new ambassador to Israel because of
“aggression” against the Palestinians. On March 18, 2004, the King met Sharon to discuss
Israel’s security fence and disengagement from Gaza. In February 2005, Jordan proposed
deploying about 1,500 Palestinian soldiers (Badr Brigade) from Jordan to the northern West
Bank, pending approval of the PA and Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz has said that
the Badr Brigade could train Palestinians in the West Bank. Jordan is training Palestinian
security force officers in Jordan. Also in February, Jordan sent an ambassador to Israel and,
in March, its foreign minister visited Israel for the first time in four years.
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, Arafat recognized Israel’s
right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East
peace process, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence
and undertook to prevent them, stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict
his commitments are invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National
Council, and called upon his people to reject violence. Rabin recognized the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it. (For text, see
[http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].)
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Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government
for the West Bank and Gaza, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, since January 1993.
Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho; transfer of
authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians; election of a
Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. During the interim
period, Israel is to be responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign
relations. Permanent status negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may
include Jerusalem. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm].)
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4, 1994,
provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the Palestinian Authority’s
(PA) responsibilities. The accord began the five-year period of interim self-rule. (For text,
see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].)
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal with
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation, and the release of prisoners. Negotiations on permanent status to
begin in May 1996. An 82-member Palestinian Council and Head of the Council’s Executive
Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense Force redeploy from Jenin, Nablus,
Tulkarm, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450 towns and villages. Israel will
redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for security of Israelis. Israel will be responsible
for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will be totally
responsible for Area “A,” the six cities. Israeli responsibility for overall security will have
precedence over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian towns
and villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas. Palestinian
Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within two months of the
Council’s inauguration. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm].)
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel and the
PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. Accompanying Israeli and
Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State Christopher to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. (For Protocol text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm].)
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps to
complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements accompanying the
Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian
security measures. The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for 40% of the West
Bank, of which it will have complete control of 18.2%. The PLO Executive and Central
Committees will reaffirm a January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that
specified articles of the Palestinian Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The
Palestine National Council will reaffirm these decisions. President Clinton will address this
conclave. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm].)
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on September 4,
1999. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm].)
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A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April
30, 2003, by the Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and
Russia). To achieve a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for
the Palestinians to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake
political reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with provisional
borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement and end of the conflict. (For
text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].)
Agreement on Movement and Access. From the Gaza Strip, reached on
November 15, 2005, calls for reopening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt with European
Union monitors on November 25, live closed circuit TV feeds of the crossing to Israel,
Palestinian bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza beginning December 15, exports
from Gaza into Israel, and construction of the Gaza seaport. (For text online, see
[http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+docu
ments+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm].)
Role of Congress
Aid. (See also CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East:
Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request; CRS Report RS22370, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians; and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, all
by Jeremy Sharp.) Unless the President certifies that it is in the national security interest,
P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005, prohibits aid for a Palestinian state and the PA unless its
leaders have not supported terrorism, been democratically elected, demonstrated their
commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel, taken measures to counter terrorism and
terrorism financing, and established security entities that cooperate with Israeli counterparts.
It also provides $150 million in ESF for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Legislation reacting to the Hamas victory in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary
elections includes S.Con.Res. 79, passed in both houses in February, expressed the sense of
Congress that no assistance should be provided directly to the PA if a party calling for the
destruction of Israel holds a majority of its parliamentary seats; H.R. 4939, the Emergency
Supplemental for Defense and other purposes, passed in the House on March 16 and in the
Senate on May 4, would prohibit assistance to the PA from prior appropriations until the
Secretary of State certifies that it has demonstrated its commitment to nonviolence, the
recognition of Israel, and the acceptance of previous agreements, including the Road Map;
H.R. 4681, ordered reported by the International Relations Committee by a vote of 36-2 on
April 6, (H.Rept. 109-462, May 11, 2006) would limit assistance to the PA until it meets a
number of specific conditions, withhold U.S. contributions to the U.N. proportionate to U.N.
aid to the PA; and impose visa and travel restrictions on PA and PLO officials, among other
measures; the Senate version of the bill is S. 2370 introduced on March 6. Other legislation
with similar effects also has been introduced.
After Hamas took power on March 30, Secretary Rice said, “We are not going to fund
a Hamas-led government. But we are going to look at what we can do to increase
humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people....” The Administration requested that the
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PA return $50 million in direct aid provided in 2005; as of April 7, $30 million had been
returned. On April 7, the Administration announced that it would provide $245 million for
basic human needs and democracy building, suspend or cancel $239 million for programs
related to the PA ($105 million of which will be redirected to human needs), and review
$165 million in other projects. It redirected about $100 million for humanitarian needs and
$42 million for civil society groups. (For details, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/
2006/64234.htm]. On May 9, the Quartet endorsed a temporary international mechanism to
be developed by the EU to ensure direct delivery of aid to the Palestinian people. The EU
hopes to have a mechanism ready by the end of June.
P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, appropriated $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel over
three years to be used only within its 1967 borders. In November 2003, the Administration
deducted $289.5 million from $3 billion in guarantees for the year for spending on the
security fence and settlements. Congress has extended the guarantees through 2008.
Jerusalem. Israel annexed the city in 1967 to be its eternal, undivided capital.
Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital. Successive U.S. Administrations have
maintained that the parties must determine its fate. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and
S.Con.Res. 21, May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must
remain the undivided capital of Israel. Congress prohibits official U.S. government business
with the PA in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to create U.S. government offices
in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows Israel to be recorded as the place of birth
of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem. (See P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005.) The State
Department does not recognize Jerusalem, Israel as a place of birth for passports because the
U.S. government does not recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel.
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the capital,
that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is unquestioned, and that
Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in Jerusalem. Opponents say a
move would undermine the peace process, U.S. credibility in the Islamic world and with
Palestinians, and prejudge final status. Only El Salvador and Costa Rica have embassies in
Jerusalem. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the embassy’s relocation by May
31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national security interest, to suspend
limitations on State Department expenditures that would be imposed if the embassy did not
open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the authority. The State Department
Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-228, September 30, 2002, urged the
President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy “immediately.” The President replied that the
provision would “if construed as mandatory ... impermissibly interfere with the president’s
constitutional authority to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.” The State Department
declared, “our view of Jerusalem is unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status issue to be
negotiated between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. The President signed the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold Syria
accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. On May 11, 2004, and
May 5, 2005, he issued executive orders to impose sanctions on Syria.

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