Order Code IB91137
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Middle East Peace Talks
Updated September 24, 2002
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Changed International and Regional Scenes
Role of the United States
Conference Format and Developments
Madrid
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians
Israel-Syria
Israel-Lebanon
Israel-Jordan
Significant Agreements
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition
Declaration of Principles
Israel-Jordan Agenda
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
The Washington Declaration
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron
Wye River Memorandum
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum
Role of Congress
Aid
Jerusalem
Compliance/Sanctions

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The Middle East Peace Talks
SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War, the decline of
On September 4, 1999, Israeli Prime
the Soviet Union, and the U.S.-led victory in
Minister Barak and Palestinian leader Arafat
the Gulf war facilitated the beginning of a new
signed the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum on
peace process in 1991. Israel and the Palestin-
implementing Wye. Israel withdrew from
ians discussed a 5-year period of interim self-
south Lebanon on May 24, 2000. From July
rule leading to a final settlement. Israel and
11-24, President Clinton convened a summit
Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal from the
with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp
Golan Heights in exchange for peace. Israel
David to reach a framework accord, but they
and Jordan discussed relations. Israel and
did not succeed. A Palestinian uprising or
Lebanon focused on Israel’s withdrawal from
intifadah began in September and continues.
its self-declared security zone in south Leba-
On December 23, President Clinton presented
non and reciprocal Lebanese actions.
bridging proposals.

On September 13, 1993, Israel and the
Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
of Israel on February 6, 2001. He said that the
signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP),
results of Camp David and subsequent talks
providing for Palestinian empowerment and
are null and void. The international war
some territorial control. Israel and Jordan
against terrorism after September 11 prompted
signed a peace treaty agenda on September 14,
renewed U.S. focus on ending the violence
1993; Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein
and resuming the peace process. Yet the
affirmed the end of the state of belligerency
situation degenerated with suicide bombings
between Israel and Jordan on July 25; a Peace
and countermeasures. On June 24, 2002,
Treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. Israel
President Bush declared, “peace requires new
and the Palestinians signed an Interim Self-
and different Palestinian leadership so that a
Rule in the West Bank/Oslo II accord on
Palestinian state can be born.”
September 28, 1995. Israel continued

implementing it despite the November 4
Congress is interested in the peace talks
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.
because of its oversight role in the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and
Israel suspended talks with Syria after
keen constituent interest. It is concerned about
terror attacks in February/March 1996. They
U.S. financial and other commitments and
resumed in December 1999, but were “post-
Palestinian fulfillment of commitments.
poned indefinitely” after January 2000.
Congress has appropriated aid for the West
Bank and Gaza, with conditions intended to
A January 1997 protocol produced Israeli
ensure PLO compliance with agreements with
redeployment from Hebron. In 1998, the
Israel. Congress repeatedly endorsed Jerusa-
United States intensively mediated. An Octo-
lem as the undivided capital of Israel, and
ber 15-23 summit resulted in the Wye River
many Members seek sanctions on the PLO
Memorandum on implementation of earlier
and PA.
agreements. The Israeli cabinet froze imple-
mentation on December 20.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
More than six weeks of relative quiet ended with two suicide bombings in 24 hours
claimed by both Hamas and Islamic Jihad, including one in Tel Aviv on September 19 that
killed 6 and wounded about 50. On September 20-21, Israeli forces demolished several
buildings at Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah to
isolate him or force him to leave and demanded the surrender of “wanted men” in the
compound and a list of all in the compound. Palestinians demonstrated in support of Arafat
in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. The White House criticized Israel’s actions as
contrary to the cause of Palestinian reform. On September 24, the United States abstained
from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1435, which demands an immediate end to Israel’s
reoccupation of Arafat’s headquarters and expeditious withdrawal from Palestinian cities
and condemns terror attacks against civilians. Meanwhile, to crack down on Hamas, Israel
launched its largest raid into Gaza in recent years, killing 9 and injuring 24.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Since the founding of Israel, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade until the 1990s.
With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable. The
creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing
conflict made refugees of thousands of Arab residents of the formerly British Palestine, with
consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. The 1967 war ended with Israel
occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in
part, to regain their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist
incursions; it withdrew in 1985, retaining control of a 9-mile “security zone” over which
Lebanon seeks to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic
goal throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct
Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
Changed International and Regional Scenes
At the height of the crisis he provoked in 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn offered
to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from Arab territories it occupied. The United
States and others denied a linkage, but on the day after the Gulf war began, January 18, 1991,
President Bush declared, “When all this is over, we want to be the healers ....” On March 6,
he defined U.S. postwar goals to include finding solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the
Lebanon situation, and sent Secretary of State Baker to the Middle East to organize a
conference. The end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union aided him. During
the Gulf war, the Soviets did not use their U.N. veto to prevent action and banned arms
exports to Iraq. They needed Western aid and agreed with U.S. initiatives. They also were
unable to continue diplomatic, military, and financial aid to Iraq, Syria, and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO). The failed August 1991 Moscow coup sidelined hard-liners.
U.S. policymakers no longer viewed the Soviet Union as obstructionist and sought it to
cosponsor of a peace conference.
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Arab states, whose unity was damaged in the Gulf war, recognized the United States as
the remaining superpower. Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman) joined the anti-Iraq coalition. Gulf regimes depend
on U.S. and allied military might. Since Camp David, Egypt has been a U.S. ally and the
second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Syria, opposed to Saddam Husayn and seeking
benefactors, sent troops to defend Saudi Arabia. The PLO and Jordan, however, were
sympathetic to Iraq and debilitated by the choice. The Gulf states ended aid for Jordan and
the PLO as Palestinians fled the Gulf, inundating Jordan. European and other sympathy for
the Palestinian cause eroded temporarily as Iraqi missiles hit Israeli civilian sites.
Meanwhile, in the West Bank and Gaza, moderates argued for negotiations to ease the plight
of the people. Thus, each party to the peace conference sought U.S. support: Egypt as a
consequence of Camp David; Syria to replace lost Soviet patronage; Jordan to reclaim lost
goodwill, aid, and trade; the Palestinians for some gain after years of loss; Israel because of
its dependence on external, especially U.S., aid and resources.
Role of the United States
On March 6, 1991, President Bush outlined a framework for peace: grounded in U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of “territory for peace,”
providing for Israel’s security and recognition of Palestinian political rights. Secretary of
State Baker avoided declaring U.S. positions, but provided Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and the
Palestinians non-binding letters of assurance that have not been released officially. He
reportedly accepted Israel’s view that 242 is subject to interpretation, stated that the United
States would not support creation of an independent Palestinian state, and assured Israel that
the United States would give “considerable weight” to Israel’s view that the Golan Heights
are important to its security. He reportedly assured Syria that the United States believes 242
applies to all fronts and gave Lebanon a commitment to its territorial integrity within its
internationally recognized borders. He told the Palestinians that the United States wanted
their legitimate political rights and opposed Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem.
President Clinton said that only the region’s leaders can make peace, and vowed to be
their partner. In February 1993, Secretary of State Christopher defined full partner as an
intermediary or an honest broker, to “probe positions, clarify responses, help define common
ground, offer what may be bridging ideas.” With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, the United
States became an indispensable party to Israeli-Palestinian talks. Clinton mediated the
October 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States undertook to coordinate its
implementation. Clinton personally led negotiations at Camp David in July 2000.
The Bush Administration sought a less prominent role. In March 2001, Secretary of
State Powell said that he would not appoint a special Middle East envoy to Arab-Israeli
negotiations and that “the United States stands ready to assist, not insist. Only the parties
themselves can determine the pace and scope and content of any negotiations ....” After the
September 11, 2002 terrorist attacks on the United States, however, the Administration
focused on the peace process because it needed to ensure Arab support for the war on
terrorism. Nonetheless, the Administration still appears reluctant to become as deeply
immersed in the peace process in as detailed a manner as its predecessor.
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Conference Format and Developments
Madrid. On October 30, 1991, the conference opened. Parties were represented by 14-
member delegations. A Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from each.
An unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the PLO. The United States, the
Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the EC, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the table.
The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union were observers.
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians. (Note: Because of space constraints, only selected incidents of
violence, terror, and reprisals are noted.) On November 3, 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/
Palestinian delegation agreed to separate Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestinians negotiating
tracks, the latter to address a 5-year period of interim self-rule for Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to begin.
On August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination
committee, ending a charade that had distanced the PLO from the talks. Israel and the PLO
announced that secret talks in Oslo since January 1993 had produced an August 19
agreement on a Declaration of Principles, signed September 13, 1993. (For summaries of
most accords, see Agreements, below.) Talks begun in October 1993 produced An
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area on May 4, 1994, which incorporated A
Protocol on Economic Relations. It officially began the 5-year period of interim Palestinian
self-rule. On September 28, 1995, Israel and the Palestinians signed an Interim Agreement.
Israel began redeploying on October 10. Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated on
November 4; Foreign Minister Shimon Peres succeeded him and redeployed from six cities,
and from areas around Hebron by December. On January 20, 1996, Palestinians elected an
88-member Council and Arafat as Chairman. On April 24, the Palestine National Council
(PNC) amended the Palestinian Charter by canceling “articles contrary to letters exchanged
between the PLO and Israel in September 1993,” i.e., those calling for the destruction of
Israel. Final status talks on borders, security, settlements, refugees, water, and Jerusalem
began ceremonially on May 5.
Binyamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of Israel on May 29, 1996. His
coalition’s guidelines called for negotiations to reach a permanent arrangement only if the
Palestinians fulfill all commitments fully, opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state
west of the Jordan River, vowed to ensure the existence and security of Jewish settlements,
and to keep Jerusalem under Israel’s sovereignty. On August 2, his cabinet abolished most
restraints on settlements. In September 1996, Palestinians protested violently against Israel’s
opening of an archaeological tunnel at the base of Jerusalem holy sites. After an October 1-2
summit, the two sides resumed talks and initialed a Protocol Concerning the Redeployment
in Hebron on January 15, 1997. Israel redeployed from about 80% of Hebron.
On February 26, 1997, Israel approved construction of housing at Har Homa/Jabal Abu
Ghneim in south East Jerusalem. On March 7, Israel announced the first of three further
redeployments, which fell far short of the Palestinians’ demands. On March 18, Israel broke
ground at Har Homa. On July 30, a double suicide bombing in Jerusalem killed 13,
including one American, and wounded 168. The President and Secretary of State called on
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the PA to make a 100% effort on security and sent Special Envoy Dennis Ross to the region.
Israel and the PA agreed to report on the bombing to a panel including the CIA.
In September and October 1998, U.S. officials made a concerted effort to complete
implementation of the Interim Accord, culminating in the Wye River Memorandum of
October 23. The Israeli cabinet approved the Memorandum but said that redeployments
depended on the abrogation of Palestinian Charter articles; that a third redeployment should
not be from more than 1% of territory before a final agreement; and that if the Palestinians
unilaterally declare a state, then Israel reserves the right to apply Israeli law to the rest of the
West Bank. On November 20, Israel completed the first stage of the second redeployment
and released 250 Palestinian prisoners.
On December 14, the PNC and others voted to annul the Charter articles. On December
20, Israel froze Wye implementation until the Palestinians abandoned their call for a state
with Jerusalem as its capital, curbed violence and incitement, accepted Israeli prisoner
releases, collected and destroyed illegal weapons, and resumed security cooperation. Europe
and the United States forestalled a Palestinian declaration of statehood on May 4, 1999. In
March, the European Union (EU) reaffirmed the “Palestinian right to self-determination
including the option of a state ....” On April 26, President Clinton wrote, “We support the
aspirations of the Palestinian people to determine their own future on their land.”
Ehud Barak defeated Netanyahu in the May 17, 1999 election. Barak and Arafat signed
the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum on September 4, 1999. Israel released prisoners, and
transferred more of the West Bank to the Palestinians’ civilian control. Final status talks
resumed ceremonially on September 13. The Palestinians gave Israel 30,000 police officers’
names. Israel released prisoners, opened a safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza and
a major road in Hebron, and redeployed from more territory. On March 8, Barak and Arafat
agreed to resume negotiations. Israel transferred still more territory to complete the second
redeployment. In May, Israeli soldiers fought Palestinian demonstrators and police.
Clinton, Barak, and Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July11 to July 24, to
forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The parties had
agreed that there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved. Jerusalem was the
major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its sovereignty, leaving the
Palestinians control over East Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede
more than 90% of the West Bank, wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers
live, and offered to admit thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program.
An international fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab
countries. The Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish
quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem,
particularly the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims. (See CRS
Report RS20648, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Camp David Negotiations.)
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces,
visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel responded
forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising began. On October 12, a mob in
Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on
Palestinian official sites. U.S. and other diplomats called a summit in Sharm al-Shaykh on
October 16 and set up an international fact-finding committee to look into the violence.
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Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister.
Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, December 19-23. On December
23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram
al-Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem and 96% of the West Bank and all of the
Gaza Strip, and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land
near Gaza. Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede
the right of refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple
Mount and sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. Israeli forces would
remain in the Jordan Valley for 3 to 6 years to control borders, and then be replaced by an
international force. The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.” Barak said he would
accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought clarifications on
contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and refugees’ right
of return, among other issues. The talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister. He vowed to retain
united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley and other security areas. Sharon’s
associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and since Camp David were “null and
void.” The Bush Administration said that Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States
proposals.” Sharon said that he sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem,
Palestinian refugees, or a Palestinian state. On April 13, Sharon said that he could accept a
disarmed Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank, about 2% more than the Palestinians
control. Palestinians insisted that talks restart from where they left off at Taba.
On April 30, the international fact-finding commission led by former Senator George
Mitchell submitted a report [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm] on the causes
of the violence and made recommendations for ending it, rebuilding confidence, and
resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two sides agreed to CIA Director Tenet’s work plan
to cement the cease-fire and restore security cooperation. On June 28, Israel and Palestinians
agreed to a 7-day period without violence to be followed by a 6-week cooling-off period.
Secretary of State Powell said that it was up to Sharon to determine if violence abated.
On August 8, Hamas detonated a suicide bomb in Jerusalem, killing 15 and wounding
over 100. On August 10, Israeli forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian
national activity in East Jerusalem, and repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On August
27, Israel killed the head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). On
September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one else gave
them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President Bush said for the first time,
“The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel
to exist is respected.” Israel began to ease its blockade of Palestinian areas but stopped after
the PFLP assassinated its Minister of Tourism on October 17.
On November 10, President Bush told the U.N. General Assembly that the United States
is “working toward the day when two states – Israel and Palestine – live peacefully together
within secure and recognized borders....” On November 19, Secretary of State Powell
announced that he was sending retired General Anthony Zinni to work on a durable cease-
fire to revive peacemaking. Violence escalated before and surged after Zinni arrived on
November 26. Israel confined Arafat in Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon
said that “it’s hard to believe that one can get into an agreement with Arafat, who is a real
terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and
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perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza. The Israeli security cabinet charged
that Arafat was “directly responsible” for the attacks ... “and therefore is no longer relevant
....” On December 16, Zinni was recalled. On the same day, Arafat called for “a
comprehensive cessation of all armed activities ... especially suicide attacks.” The Israeli
military reported a sharp decrease in violence after Arafat’s speech.
On January 3, 2002, Israel seized a Palestinian-commanded freighter, the Karine A, in
the Red Sea carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. On February 5, Secretary Powell told
a Senate committee that Arafat “cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and
at the same time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror.” When Sharon visited the
White House on February 7, he said that he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat
so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
In remarks to a New York Times columnist published on February 17, Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah called for “full withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N.
resolutions, including Jerusalem, for full normalization of relations.” Sharon said that he
was willing to explore the proposals but it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions
regarding Israel’s right to “secure and recognized borders” with a demand for a total
withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On February 28, Israeli ground forces launched an assault on West Bank refugee camps
that they said were “bases of terror infrastructure,” beginning a three-week reoccupation of
Palestinian areas. Suicide bombers and gunmen from Al Aqsa, the PIJ, Hamas, and the
PFLP continued to exact a high toll on Israelis. President Bush sent General Zinni back to
the region. On March 14, President Bush said, “it’s not helpful what the Israelis have recently
done (reoccupy Palestinian-controlled areas) in order to create conditions for peace.” Israel
withdrew by March 19. After March 20, Hamas or the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades again
perpetrated daily suicide bombings.
On March 27, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah proposed that the Arab League summit
offer “normal relations and security for Israel in exchange for full withdrawal from the
occupied Arab territories, recognition of an independent Palestinian state with al-Quds al
Sharif (Noble Jerusalem) as its capital, and the return of refugees.” The summit’s Beirut
Declaration [http://www.Saudiembassy.net/press_release/statements/02-ST-0328-Beirut.htm]
endorsed the plan. The summit communique also saluted the Palestinian intifadah against
occupation and called for stopping the establishment of ties with Israel.
Also on March 27, a Hamas suicide bomber attacked an Israeli hotel in Netanya, killing
27 and wounding 130. The Israeli cabinet declared Arafat “an enemy” and, on March 29,
sent troops to besiege his compound in Ramallah, beginning war on the “terrorist
infrastructure.” Within a week, Israeli forces controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West
Bank cities. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1402, March 30, called on the parties to move
immediately to a meaningful cease-fire and on Israel to withdraw.
On April 4, President Bush delivered a speech on the Middle East
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020404-1.html], chastising Arafat,
Arab nations, and Israel, and urging Israel to begin withdrawing from Palestinian areas. On
April 6, President Bush emphasized that Israel must withdraw its forces “without delay.”
Secretary Powell met moderate Arab, U.N., and EU leaders and representatives before
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arriving in Israel on April 10. During his visit, there were suicide bombings in Haifa and
Jerusalem. On April 14, Sharon proposed that the United States host a regional conference
to which Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, and “Palestinian representatives,” but
not Arafat, would be invited. On April 15, Powell said that a conference might be a way to
get to a political track quickly and that it could be held on a ministerial, not head of state,
level. Before he left Israel on April 18, Powell emphasized a “comprehensive strategy”:
security and freedom from terror and violence, serious and accelerated negotiations leading
to a political settlement, and economic humanitarian assistance for the Palestinians.
On May 2, Secretary Powell, EU, U.N., and Russian officials (the “quartet”) proposed
holding a foreign ministers’ conference in the summer to discuss how the PA reconstructs
itself and economic and humanitarian issues. At Sharon’s May 8 White House visit, the
President emphasized the need to “provide the framework for the growth of a Palestinian
state,” while Sharon said that it is premature to discuss a Palestinian state until he sees “real
reform.” During the meeting, a Hamas suicide bomb went off south of Tel Aviv.
On May 14, Sharon again called for “the complete cessation of terror, violence, and
incitement, and basic structural reforms in all areas of the Palestinian Authority” before
negotiations for a settlement in stages, “including a lengthy intermediate stage in which
relations between us and the Palestinians will be determined.” On May 15, Arafat called for
“speedy preparations” to hold elections and for the restructuring of the PA “to fulfill the
principle of separation of powers” and called “for a reevaluation of all our administrative and
ministerial bodies, the security apparatuses....”
Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Burns arrived in Israel on May 29 to
consult regional leaders about reform of the PA and its leadership. CIA Director Tenet
arrived in Israel on June 3 to discuss security with the Palestinians. President Bush indicated
that the visits were part of a strategy to combine security and democratization as the
underpinnings of a Palestinian state. After meeting Sharon again on June 9, President Bush
said that conditions were not ripe for a ministerial meeting because “no one has confidence
in the emerging Palestinian government.”
On June 24, President Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not
compromised by terror” and to build a practicing democracy. (See White House press release
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html].) He said that when
the Palestinians have new leaders, new institutions, and new security arrangements with their
neighbors, then the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose
borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He
added, “as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and settlement activity must stop.” The
President envisaged a final settlement within 3 years negotiated by the parties “based on U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.”
On July 16, Secretary of State Powell met with U.N., European Union, and Russian
envoys. Under their auspices, an International Task Force on Reform, also including
representatives of Japan, Norway, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, will
“develop and implement a comprehensive action plan for reform.” Meanwhile, violence
continued, including a Hamas bombing on July 31 at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem,
killing 7, including 5 Americans, and wounding 80.
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On August 8, in the highest level U.S. contacts since President Bush called for new
Palestinian leadership on June 24, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice and Secretary
of State Powell separately met three Palestinian cabinet ministers. A Department spokesman
noted that all three Arafat appointees had expressed a commitment to reform and met
previously with Israeli leaders. On August 9, Arafat said that there was an agreement for
the United States, Egypt, and Jordan to train Palestinian security forces. On August 10, CIA
Director Tenet met the new Palestinian Interior Minister to discuss plans to reconstruct
security forces. (The CIA began to train 40 Palestinian security officers in Jericho on
September 17.)
On August 18, the Israeli Defense Minister and the Palestinian Interior Minister agreed
that Israel would cede responsibility for the security of Bethlehem and parts of Gaza to the
Palestinian police. If the police succeed in preventing terrorism from these areas, then Israeli
forces would withdraw from other West Bank areas. Israel also said that it would “ease
conditions of the Palestinian population....” On August 19, Israeli troops withdrew from
Bethlehem but kept a blockade around it. The process then stalled. Hamas, Islamic Jihad,
and Damascus-based Palestinian groups denounced the accord and vowed to continue
attacks.
The Palestine Legislative Council met from September 9-12. After legislators indicated
that they would not ratify cabinet appointments Arafat had made in June, the cabinet resigned
on September 11. This development was considered evidence of internal demands for
reform. Arafat announced that presidential and legislative elections would be held on
January 20. On September 17, Secretary Powell, EU, U.N., and Russian officials (the
“quartet”) outlined a general plan; the first phase would see Palestinian security reform,
Israeli withdrawals and support for Palestinian elections to be held in early 2003. The second
phase, in 2003, would focus on creating a Palestinian state with provisional borders and
based on a new constitution. Finally, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2004 to mid-2005
would lead to a permanent settlement.
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square
miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law and
administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize.
Syria initially referred to its goal as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty,
preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and disdained separate agreements between
Israel and Arab parties. Israel emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic,
cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that 242 applies to all fronts. Syria submitted a draft declaration
of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement.” Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
accepted withdrawal on the Golan, without defining it, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.”
On September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange for
total withdrawal.” Israel offered only “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Asad
announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different
speeds. In June, Secretary Christopher said that the United States might be willing to
guarantee security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was
ready for talks about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides inched toward each
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other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on
October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal.
Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff met in December.
On March 20, 1995, ambassadorial talks resumed. On May 24, Israel and Syria
announced terms of reference for senior military experts to meet under U.S. auspices. Syria
reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take topographical
features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal. Chiefs of staff
discussed principles for security arrangements. Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground
station in northern Israel in exchange for Golan stations, but Syria insisted on aerial
surveillance only and that each country monitor the other from its own territory and receive
U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6
miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin said that Israeli troops must man early-warning stations on
the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its sovereignty, but
a government-controlled media commentary accepted international or friendly forces in the
stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were
suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
The new Israeli government called for negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential
to Israel’s security and water needs and that retaining sovereignty would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Netanyahu suggested a Lebanon-first approach. Asad refused, and
would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior understandings, claiming that Rabin had
promised total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 border (as opposed to the international border
of 1923). Israeli negotiators contend that Rabin had suggested full withdrawal was possible
only if Syria met Israel’s security and normalization needs and those needs were not met.
On January 26, 1999, the Israeli Knesset passed a law requiring a 61-member majority and
a national referendum to approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights to Syria.
In June, Prime Minister-elect Barak and Asad exchanged compliments through a British
writer. In July, Syrian Vice President Khaddam told radical Palestinian groups to end their
armed struggle against Israel and Syria prevented Hizballah from firing rockets into Israel,
but not from targeting Israeli forces in south Lebanon. Israel and Syria agreed to restart talks
from “the point where they left off,” with each side defining the point to its satisfaction.
Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Shar’a led delegations which met in Washington on
December 15-16, 1999, and in Shepherdstown, WV from January 3-10, 2000. President
Clinton intervened. On January 7, the United States presented a summary of points of accord
and discord. As published by an Israeli newspaper, it revealed Israel’s apparent success in
delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and an early-
warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the document, talks
scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000, were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman
reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be productive for talks
to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance to withdraw
to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and
on the early-warning station. Shar’a agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main
obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became
Prime Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights.
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Israel-Lebanon. As called for by Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought
unconditional Israeli military withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern
Lebanon and the end of Israel’s support for militias in the south and of shelling of villages
that Israel claimed were sites of Hizballah activity. Israel claimed no Lebanese territory but
sought security and said that it would withdraw when the Lebanese army controlled the south
and prevented Hizballah attacks on northern Israel. Lebanon repeatedly sought a withdrawal
schedule in exchange for addressing Israel’s security concerns. The two sides never agreed.
Syria, which dominates Lebanon, said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. In July
1993, Israel conducted a large assault to stop Hizballah attacks; 250,000 people fled south
Lebanon. Secretary of State Christopher arranged a cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel
again attacked Hizballah targets, and Hizballah fired rockets into northern Israel. An April
26 cease-fire accord barred Hizballah attacks into Israel and Israeli attacks on civilian targets
in Lebanon and all attacks on civilians or civilian areas. Each side retained the right of self-
defense. U.S., French, Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli representatives monitored the cease-fire.
On January 5, 1998, Defense Minister Mordechai said that Israel was ready to withdraw
from southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the restoration of
peace and security in the region, were implemented. He and Netanyahu then proposed that
Israel withdraw in exchange for security, not peace and normalization. On April 1, the Israeli
cabinet accepted 425. Lebanon and Syria called for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal.
Violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased in November and December,
prompting the Israeli cabinet to reaffirm its opposition to a unilateral withdrawal twice. In
April 1999, Israel “downsized” its force in Lebanon. In June, the Israeli-allied South
Lebanese Army withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. New Prime Minister
Barak promised to withdraw from southern Lebanon in one year, or by July 7, 2000, while
maintaining security for northern Israel.
On September 4, 1999, Lebanese Prime Minister Al-Hoss confirmed his country’s
commitment to 425 and support for the “resistance” against the occupation, i.e., Hizballah.
He argued that Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their
homeland, and rejected their implantation in Lebanon. Al-Hoss did not accept Secretary of
State Albright’s statement that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will be a subject of Israeli-
Palestinian final status talks, insisting that Lebanon should be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.
Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel unless Israel also
withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue. On April 17, Israel
informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon informed the U.N. that Israel’s
withdrawal would not be complete unless it included Sheba’a farms near the Golan. On May
23, the U.N. Secretary General noted that almost all of Sheba’a is within the area of
operations of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing the 1974
Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and recommended proceeding without prejudice to later border
agreements. On May 23, the SLA collapsed, and on May 24 Israel completed its withdrawal.
Hizballah took over the former security zone. On June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed
that Israel had withdrawn. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) began to deploy to
the border region in July, but only 400 U.N. troops deployed by December because the
Lebanese army had failed to back them against Hizballah. (See CRS Report RL31078, The
Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications.)
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On October 7, Hizballah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli soldiers.
(Israel has since declared them to be dead.) On October 16, Hizballah announced that it had
captured an Israeli colonel. On November 13, U.N. Security Council members said that
Lebanon was obliged to “take effective control of the whole area vacated by Israel ....” On
April 16 and July 2, 2001, Israel, claiming Syria controls Hizballah, bombed Syrian radar
sites in Lebanon after Hizballah attacked its soldiers in Sheba’a. In April, the U.N. warned
Lebanon that unless it deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be diminished or phased out.
On January 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to cut UNIFIL to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
During Israel’s massive military operations against Palestinian-ruled areas, on March
29 and subsequently, Hizballah shelled Israeli positions in Sheba’a and northern Israel. Israel
responded with air strikes, and was concerned about a possible second front. At Israel’s
request, U.N. Secretary General Annan contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents, and
on April 8, Vice President Cheney called President Asad to warn him that the situation could
spiral out of control. Syria denied that it or Lebanon is interested in opening a second front.
On April 12, Secretary Powell visited Israel’s northern command and called on Syria to curb
Hizballah. On April 15, Powell visited Lebanon and Syria to urge them to act immediately
to stop the attacks. The shelling stopped for some days and then resumed. A dispute has
developed over Lebanon’s plan to pump water from the Wazzani River, which Israel said
would reduce the flow of water into the Sea of Galilee. The U.S. Agency for International
Development sent a four-man team to inspect the site on September 16.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian; government
figures acknowledge 40%. An estimated 300,000 Palestinians displaced by the Gulf War
fled to Jordan. Jordan hoped an Israel-Palestinian accord would ease its economic problems
by producing international aid. Jordan would not ratify a June 1993 agenda on water, energy,
environment, and economic matters before other Arab parties reached accords. It was
initialed on September 14, 1993, after the Israeli-Palestinian DOP was signed.
Rabin reportedly met King Hussein secretly on September 26, 1993. On October 1,
Crown Prince Hassan, Foreign Minister Peres, and President Clinton agreed to set up a
Trilateral Economic Committee. In June 1994, Israel and Jordan held talks on boundaries,
water, energy, moving talks to the region, and trade and economic relations. Rabin and King
Hussein opened a border crossing for third country tourists on August 8. A peace treaty was
signed on October 26 (see Agreements below). The border was demarcated and Israel
withdrew from Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
On March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the
peace process....” On September 25, 1997, Israeli agents failed to assassinate a Hamas
official in Jordan. King Hussein demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh
Yasmin, which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange
for the detained agents. On December 5, 1998, the King again lambasted Netanyahu. He
called for Jordan-Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are
Jordanian national interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999.
On February 28, 1999, Netanyahu and King Abdullah II reaffirmed their dedication to
peace. Abdullah has said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites in
Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of the Jordanian royal family, but rejected a Jordanian-
Palestinian confederation. He indicated that warmer relations with Israel depend upon
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progress toward peace with the Palestinians and Syria, and proposed that Jerusalem be an
Israeli and a Palestinian capital. On November 21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of
its new ambassador to Israel because of Israel’s “aggression” against the Palestinians.
Significant Agreements
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, Arafat recognized Israel’s
right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East
peace process, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence
and undertook to prevent them, stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict
his commitments are invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National
Council, and called upon his people to reject violence. Rabin recognized the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it.
Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government
for the West Bank and Gaza on August 19, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, since
January 1993. Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho;
transfer of authority over education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and
tourism in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians; election in 9 months of a Palestinian
Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza; Palestinian residents of East
Jerusalem will vote; Israeli troops to redeploy from Palestinian population centers before the
election and further as Palestinian police assume responsibility for public order; joint Israeli-
Palestinian committees for issues such as economic cooperation and dispute resolution; the
parties to invite Jordan and Egypt to establish cooperative arrangements that will decide
modalities of admission of persons displaced in 1967, etc. During the interim period, Israel
responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations. Permanent
status negotiations will begin in the third year of interim rule and may include Jerusalem.
Israel-Jordan Agenda. Initialed on September 14, 1993, with sections on security,
water, refugees and displaced persons, borders and territorial matters, bilateral cooperation
on natural and human resources, infrastructure, and economic areas. Reaffirms the 1967
international border; Israel to withdraw from two small strips of land seized in 1968.
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4, 1994,
provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho to begin immediately and to be complete
within three weeks. Israel to evacuate all military bases, hand them over to Palestinian
police, and redeploy to settlements and military installations. Israelis may use roads within
Gaza/Jericho and Palestinians may use public roads crossing settlements. Palestinian police
to be responsible for public order and internal security. Authority to be transferred from the
Israeli military government and civil administration to the PA. The PA will consist of 24
members with legislative and executive powers and established administrative units. The
Authority’s territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil, and territorial waters. Israel retains
jurisdiction over foreign relations, external security, and security of settlements. The PLO
may conclude economic, assistance, and regional development agreements with international
organizations and foreign states. The PA may promulgate laws, regulations, and other
legislative acts. The Palestinians may have a police force, but not other armed forces. Israel
is to release 5,000 Palestinian prisoners within five weeks and negotiate release of others.
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The parties agree to a Temporary International Presence of 400 for 6 months. The accord
began the 5-year period of interim self-rule.
The Washington Declaration. Signed on July 25, 1994. Terminates state of
belligerency; King Hussein declared an end to the state of war at the signing ceremony.
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994. An international
boundary will be delimited within 9 months with reference to that of the former British
Mandate. Each party will refrain from threats or use of force against the other and from
joining alliances hostile to the other and will remove restrictions from normal economic
relations and terminate economic boycotts. Problems of displaced persons (from 1967) will
be resolved in a committee with Egypt and the Palestinians and of refugees (from 1948) in
the multilateral framework. Israel respects Jordan’s role in the mosques in Jerusalem and
will give it high priority in permanent status negotiations. Unrevealed annexes reportedly
called for Jordan to lease one sq. mi. to Israelis for a renewable 25-year period and for Israel
to provide Yarmuk River water and desalinized water to Jordan; dams will be built on the
Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers to yield more water.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal with
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation, and the release of Palestinian prisoners. Negotiations on permanent
status and relations with neighboring countries will begin in May 1996. An 82-member
Palestinian Council and Head of the Council’s Executive Authority will be elected after
Israeli redeployment from populated areas in the West Bank. Palestinian residents of
Jerusalem will participate in the elections by mail and may stand for election if they have a
second address in the West Bank or Gaza. The Israeli Defense Force will redeploy from
Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450 towns and villages.
Israel will redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for security of Israelis. Israel will be
responsible for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will
be totally responsible for Area “A,” the six cities. Israeli responsibility for overall security
will have precedence over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian
towns and villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas.
Further redeployments will take place in 6-month intervals following the Council’s
inauguration, with Palestinians gaining territorial jurisdiction over more of Area C, subject
to land rights of Israelis and provision of services to settlements. Palestinian Charter articles
calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within two months of the Council’s
inauguration. Israel and the Palestinians will cooperate against terrorism. Palestinians will
have a police force of 12,000, issue arms’ permits, and confiscate illegal arms. Israelis may
not be arrested by Palestinian police. Responsibility for religious sites will be transferred to
the Palestinians, with freedom of access and of worship guaranteed. Israel will increase
water allocated to Palestinians. Further increases to be based on increases in resources
developed though international funding and channels, including the U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli
forum. Israel will release Palestinian prisoners in three stages: upon signing of the
agreement, on the eve of elections, and according to other principles to be established.
Economic Annex of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, with minor changes, is incorporated.
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Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel and the
PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. In Notes for the Record, Israel
agreed to prisoner release in accordance with the Interim Agreement (above) and to resume
negotiations on safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, Gaza Airport and port,
economic, and other issues. The Palestinians reaffirmed their commitment to revise their
Charter, to fight terror, and to keep police force size in line with the Interim accord.
Permanent status negotiations were to resume within two months after implementation of the
Protocol. Christopher wrote a letter to Netanyahu, stating that it remains U.S. policy to
promote full implementation of the Interim Agreement and that he had advised Arafat that
Israeli redeployments would be completed no later than mid-1998– defined by U.S. Special
Envoy Ross as August 1998.
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineates steps to be
taken over a 12-week period to complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of
agreements specified in Notes for the Record that accompanied the Hebron Protocol. Israel
will redeploy from territories in the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian security
measures. The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for 40% of the West Bank,
of which it will have complete control of 18.2%. Palestinians ensure systematic combat of
terrorist organizations and their infrastructure. Their work plan will be shared with the
United States. A U.S.-Palestinian committee will review steps to counter terrorism. The
Palestinians will prohibit illegal weapons. The Palestinians will prohibit incitement to
violence and terror and establish mechanisms to act against provocateurs.
A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will monitor incitement and recommend how to
prevent it. Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation will be full, continuous, and
comprehensive. A trilateral committee will meet not less than biweekly to assess threats and
deal with impediments to cooperation. The Palestinians will provide a list of their policemen
to the Israelis. The PLO Executive and Central Committees will reaffirm the January 22,
1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that specified articles of the Palestinian Charter
that had been nullified in April 1996. The Palestine National Council will reaffirm these
decisions. President Clinton will address this conclave. The two sides agreed on a Gaza
industrial estate and on a protocol for opening the Gaza airport. They agreed to work to
agree on safe passage between the Gaza Strip and West Bank and on a Gaza seaport.
Permanent status talks will resume when the Memorandum takes effect. A time line is an
“integral attachment” to the Memorandum. U.S. officials provided both sides with letters of
assurance regarding U.S. policies. (See CRS Report 98-911, Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Process: The Wye River Memorandum.)
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on September 4,
1999. Agreed to resume permanent status negotiations in an accelerated manner by
September 13, to make a determined effort to conclude a framework agreement on permanent
status issues in five months, and to conclude a comprehensive agreement on permanent status
within one year or by September 13, 2000. They also agreed on other Wye issues. (See CRS
Report RS20341, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum.)
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Role of Congress
Aid. (See also CRS Report RS20895, Palestinians: U.S. Assistance, and RL31342,
Middle East: U.S. Foreign Assistance, FY2001, FY2002, and FY2003 Request.) In 1993,
President Clinton said that the United States would compensate Israel for risks involved in
peace and would provide “seed money” for the PA. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act
(MEPFA) (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994, Title X) granted the President authority to suspend
provisions of laws affecting the PLO in the national interest and if the PLO is abiding by
commitments made in letters to Israel and Norway and under the DOP. The State
Department reported that the PLO honored its commitments, with shortcomings, and asserted
that suspensions were in the U.S. national interest, enabling U.S. support for the peace
process and interaction with all parties. MEPFA was extended with additional requirements,
until August 12, 1997, then it was included in annual foreign operations appropriations
legislation. P.L. 107-115, January 10, 2002, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for
2002, prohibits the provision of funds to the PA unless the President certifies that it is
important to U.S. national security interests. S. 2779 (S.Rept. 107-219, July 24, 2002), the
Foreign Operations bill for FY2003, contains the same conditions regarding aid to the
Palestinians as in prior years. On February 7, 2002, President Bush said that he had budgeted
$300 million for non-governmental organizations to improve the conditions of Palestinians
who are not involved in terror. P.L. 107-206, August, 2, 2002, a supplemental appropriation
for FY2002 provides $200 million in aid to Israel to combat terrorism and $50 million in
humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, not to the PA. S. 2432, introduced on May 1, would
prohibit the use of FY2003 funds to support the PA or any private voluntary organization for
projects related to the PA or located in Palestine that would otherwise be undertaken by the
PA pending cessation of terrorist activities by the PA. H.R. 5410 (H.Rept. 107-66,
September 19, 2002), foreign operations appropriations for 2003, includes restrictions on aid
to the Palestinians as in prior years, but Sec. 560 is new. It states that no funds may support
a Palestinian state unless the Secretary of State determines and certifies that new leadership
has been democratically elected, is committed to peaceful coexistence with Israel, is
countering terrorism and cooperating with Israel on security, and is working toward a
comprehensive peace.
Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a subject for final status negotiations. Israel annexed the city
in 1967 to be its eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital.
U.S. Administrations have maintained that it is up to the parties to determine its fate.
H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and S.Con.Res. 21, May 20, 1997, called on the
Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must remain the undivided capital of Israel.
Congress prohibits official U.S. government business with the PA in Jerusalem and the use
of appropriated funds to create U.S. government offices in Israel to conduct business with
the PA. (See, P.L. 107-115, January 10, 2002.)
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the capital,
that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is unquestioned, and that
Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in Jerusalem. Opponents say a
move would undermine the peace process, U.S. credibility in the Islamic world and with
Palestinians, and prejudge final status. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the
relocation of the embassy by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national
security interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
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imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the authority
three times. (See CRS Report RS20339, Jerusalem: The U.S. Embassy and P.L. 104-45.)
H.Con.Res 30, introduced on February 13, 2001, urges the President to begin the relocation
process, as does H.R. 1646, passed in the House on May 16.
Compliance/Sanctions. S.Con.Res. 88 and H.Con.Res. 280, both passed on
December 5, 2001, demand that the PA act against terrorists and urge the President to
suspend relations with Arafat and the PA if it does not. P.L. 107-115, January 10, 2002, Sec.
566 left it to the President to assess PLO/PA compliance with its 1993 commitments and, if
there has not been compliance, to impose sanctions for 6 months. On May 7, the State
Department transmitted to Congress a report mandated by the PLO commitments
Compliance Act (P.L. 101-246), that contained information relevant to P.L. 107-115, Section
566. The Department said that because “an explicit determination at this time would not
serve the national security interests,” it did not make one. The report covered July 20 to
December 13, 2001, and concluded that the Palestinians’ record regarding its commitments
is mixed, while describing PLO/PA actions and inactions negatively. H.R. 3624, introduced
on January 24, 2002, would prohibit direct or indirect assistance to the PA or any
instrumentality of the PA. H.R. 3743, introduced on February 13, would impose restrictions
on PLO diplomats in the United States. House Members urged President Bush to label Al
Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Tanzim, and Force 17 “foreign terrorist organizations” (FTO). The
Administration designated Al Aqsa an FTO. S. 2194, introduced on April 18, would hold
the PLO and PA accountable, by denying visas to Arafat and Palestinian officials,
downgrading PLO representation in the United States, imposing travel restrictions on the
PLO U.N. representative, and seizing PLO assets. Secretary Powell convinced Senators to
postpone consideration of the S. 2194. H.R. 4693, introduced on May 9, contains the same
provisions as S. 2194. On July 11, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Satterfield advised
Members against punishing Arafat and the PA because it would undermine U.S. relations
with Arab allies. H.R. 4483 and S. 2215, the Syria Accountability Act of 2002, both
introduced on April 18, express the sense of Congress that until Syria ends its support for
terrorism and its restrictions on Lebanon’s sovereignty, it should be subject to specified
penalties. The Administration argues that the Act “could complicate or even undermine the
efforts of the State Department.”
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