Order Code IB91137
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Middle East Peace Talks
Updated July 9, 2003
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Changed International and Regional Scenes
Role of the United States
Conference Format and Developments
Madrid
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians
Israel-Syria
Israel-Lebanon
Israel-Jordan
Significant Agreements
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition
Declaration of Principles
Israel-Jordan Agenda
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
The Washington Declaration
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron
Wye River Memorandum
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict
Role of Congress
Aid
Jerusalem
Compliance/Sanctions

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The Middle East Peace Talks
SUMMARY
The end of the Cold War, the decline of
Israel withdrew from south Lebanon on
the Soviet Union, and the U.S.-led victory in
May 24, 2000. From July 11-24, President
the Gulf war facilitated the beginning of a new
Clinton held a summit with Israeli and Pales-
peace process in 1991. Israel and the Palestin-
tinian leaders at Camp David to reach a frame-
ians discussed a 5-year period of interim self-
work accord, but they did not succeed. A
rule leading to a final settlement. Israel and
Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in
Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal from the
September. On December 23, President
Golan Heights in exchange for peace. Israel
Clinton presented bridging proposals.
and Jordan discussed relations. Israel and
Lebanon focused on Israel’s withdrawal from
Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister
its self-declared security zone in south Leba-
of Israel on February 6, 2001. He said that the
non and reciprocal Lebanese actions.
results of Camp David and subsequent talks

were null and void. The international war
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the
against terrorism after September 11, 2001
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
prompted renewed U.S. focus on ending the
signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP),
violence and resuming the peace process. Yet
providing for Palestinian empowerment and
the situation degenerated with suicide bomb-
some territorial control. Israel and Jordan
ings and countermeasures. On June 24, 2002,
signed a peace treaty agenda on September 14,
President Bush declared, “peace requires new
1993; Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein
and different Palestinian leadership so that a
affirmed the end of the state of belligerency
Palestinian state can be born.” The United
between Israel and Jordan on July 25; a Peace
States, the U.N., European Union, and Russia
Treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. Israel
(the Quartet) developed a “road map” to
and the Palestinians signed an Interim Self-
Palestinian statehood within three years, and
Rule in the West Bank/Oslo II accord on
presented it on April 30, 2003, after a new
September 28, 1995. Israel continued
Palestinian government was installed. On
implementing it despite the November 4
June 3 and 4, President Bush held summits in
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.
Egypt and Jordan to move the peace process
forward.
Israel suspended talks with Syria after
terror attacks in February/March 1996. They
Congress is interested in the peace talks
resumed in December 1999, but were “post-
because of its oversight role in the conduct of
poned indefinitely” after January 2000.
U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and
keen constituent interest. It is concerned about
A January 1997 protocol produced Israeli
U.S. financial and other commitments and
redeployment from Hebron. An October 15-
Palestinian fulfillment of commitments.
23, 1998, summit resulted in the Wye River
Congress has appropriated aid for the West
Memorandum on implementation of earlier
Bank and Gaza, with conditions intended to
agreements. The Israeli cabinet froze imple-
ensure Palestinian compliance with agree-
mentation on December 20.
On September
ments with Israel. Congress repeatedly en-
4, 1999, Israeli Prime Minister Barak and
dorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of
Palestinian leader Arafat signed the Sharm al-
Israel, and many Members seek sanctions on
Shaykh Memorandum on implementing Wye.
the PLO and PA.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On June 29, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations
against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. On the same day,
Israeli forces began withdrawing from Gaza, turning over responsibility for security to
Palestinian forces. Israeli officials said that they would give intelligence about imminent
attacks to the Palestinians and only act if they did not after informing U.S. monitors. On
June 30, when she visited the region, National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice called for
the dismantlement of terrorist organizations and asked Israel to restrain its military actions
and to reconsider construction of a security fence in the West Bank. Israel refused to
compromise on the fence, which it views as a defensive measure. (See CRS Report
RS21564, Israel’s Security Fences, Separating Israel from the Palestinians.
On July 2, Israel handed over security control for Bethlehem to the Palestinians. That
day, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and Palestinian Prime Minister Abbas, and some of their
ministers, met and reiterated their commitment to peace. They agreed to form committees
to discuss trade, security, incitement, and prisoners. Israel has said that it would release about
300 Palestinian prisoners, not Hamas or PIJ members or those implicated in violence, which
disappointed the Palestinians. U.S. envoy John Wolf is encouraging Israel to expand its
gestures. Abbas is engaged in a test of wills with the Fatah Central Committee and
Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat over negotiations with Israel. The State
Department approved a $20 million grant for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to fund basic
services and bolster Abbas. Incidents of violence continue to occur.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Since the founding of Israel, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade until the 1990s.
With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable. The
creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing
conflict made refugees of thousands of Arab residents of the formerly British Palestine, with
consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. The 1967 war ended with Israel
occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in
part, to regain their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist
incursions; it withdrew in 1985, retaining control of a 9-mile “security zone” over which
Lebanon seeks to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic
goal throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct
Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
Changed International and Regional Scenes
In 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein offered to withdraw from Kuwait if Israel
withdrew from Arab territories it occupied. The United States and others denied a linkage,
but on the day after the Gulf war began, January 18, 1991, President Bush declared, “When
all this is over, we want to be the healers ....” On March 6, he defined U.S. postwar goals to
include finding solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Lebanon situation, and sent
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Secretary of State Baker to the Middle East to organize a conference. The end of the Cold
War and the decline of the Soviet Union aided him. The Soviets needed Western aid and
agreed with U.S. initiatives. They also were unable to continue diplomatic, military, and
financial aid to Iraq, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The failed
August 1991 Moscow coup sidelined hard-liners. U.S. policymakers no longer viewed the
Soviet Union as obstructionist and sought it to cosponsor of a peace conference.
Arab states, whose unity was damaged in the Gulf war, recognized the United States as
the remaining superpower. Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain,
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman) joined the anti-Iraq coalition. Gulf regimes depend
on U.S. and allied military might. Since Camp David, Egypt has been the second largest
recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Syria, opposed to Saddam Hussein and seeking benefactors,
sent troops to defend Saudi Arabia. The PLO and Jordan, however, were sympathetic to Iraq
and debilitated by the choice. European and other sympathy for the Palestinian cause eroded
temporarily as Iraqi missiles hit Israeli civilian sites. Meanwhile, in the West Bank and
Gaza, moderates argued for negotiations to ease the plight of the people. Thus, each party
to the peace conference sought U.S. support: Egypt as a consequence of Camp David; Syria
to replace lost Soviet patronage; Jordan to reclaim lost goodwill, aid, and trade; the
Palestinians for some gain after years of loss; Israel because of its dependence on external,
especially U.S., aid and resources.
Role of the United States
On March 6, 1991, President George H.W. Bush outlined a framework for peace:
grounded in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of “territory
for peace,” providing for Israel’s security and recognition of Palestinian political rights.
Secretary of State Baker avoided declaring U.S. positions, but provided Israel, Syria,
Lebanon, and the Palestinians non-binding letters of assurance that have not been released
officially. He reportedly accepted Israel’s view that 242 is subject to interpretation, stated
that the United States would not support creation of an independent Palestinian state, and that
the United States would give “considerable weight” to Israel’s view that the Golan Heights
are important to its security. He reportedly assured Syria that the United States believes 242
applies to all fronts and gave Lebanon a commitment to its territorial integrity within its
internationally recognized borders. He told the Palestinians that the United States wanted
their legitimate political rights and opposed Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem.
President Clinton said that only the region’s leaders can make peace, and vowed to be
their partner. In February 1993, Secretary of State Christopher defined full partner as an
intermediary or an honest broker, to “probe positions, clarify responses, help define common
ground, offer what may be bridging ideas.” With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, the United
States became an indispensable party to Israeli-Palestinian talks. Clinton mediated the
October 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States undertook to coordinate its
implementation. Clinton personally led negotiations at Camp David in July 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role. In March 2001,
Secretary of State Powell said that he would not appoint a special Middle East envoy to
Arab-Israeli negotiations and that “the United States stands ready to assist, not insist. Only
the parties themselves can determine the pace and scope and content of any negotiations ....”
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After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the Administration
focused on the peace process to ensure Arab support for the war on terrorism.
Conference Format and Developments
Madrid. On October 30, 1991, the conference opened. Parties were represented by 14-
member delegations. A Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from each.
An unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the PLO. The United States, the
Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the EC, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the table.
The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union were observers.
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians. (Note: Because of space constraints, incidents of violence,
terror, reprisals, and casualties are noted selectively.) On November 3, 1991, Israel and the
Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestinians
negotiating tracks, the latter to address a 5-year period of interim self-rule for Palestinians
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to
begin. On August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination
committee, ending a charade that had distanced the PLO from the talks. Secret talks in Oslo
since January 1993 produced an August 19 agreement on a Declaration of Principles, signed
September 13, 1993. (For summaries of most accords, see Agreements, below.) Talks begun
in October 1993 produced An Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area on May 4,
1994, which incorporated A Protocol on Economic Relations. It officially began the 5-year
period of interim Palestinian self-rule. On September 28, 1995, Israel and the Palestinians
signed an Interim Agreement. Israel began redeploying from the West Bank on October 10.
Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated on November 4; Foreign Minister Peres
succeeded him and redeployed from six cities, and from areas around Hebron by December.
On January 20, 1996, Palestinians elected an 88-member Council and Yasir Arafat as
Chairman. On April 24, the Palestine National Council (PNC) amended the Palestinian
Charter by canceling “articles contrary to letters exchanged between the PLO and Israel in
September 1993,” i.e., those calling for the destruction of Israel. Final status talks on
borders, security, settlements, refugees, water, and Jerusalem began ceremonially on May 5.
Binyamin Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister of Israel on May 29, 1996. His
coalition’s guidelines called for negotiations on a permanent arrangement only if the
Palestinians fulfilled all commitments fully, opposed the establishment of a Palestinian state
west of the Jordan River, vowed to ensure the existence and security of Jewish settlements,
and to keep Jerusalem under Israel’s sovereignty. On August 2, his cabinet abolished most
restraints on settlements. In September 1996, Palestinians protested violently against Israel’s
opening of an archaeological tunnel at the base of Jerusalem holy sites. The two sides later
resumed talks and initialed a Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron on January
15, 1997. Israel redeployed from about 80% of Hebron.
On February 26, 1997, Israel approved construction of housing at Har Homa/Jabal Abu
Ghneim in south East Jerusalem. On March 18, Israel broke ground at Har Homa. On July
30, a double suicide bombing in Jerusalem killed 13, including one American, and wounded
168. The President and Secretary of State called on the PA to make a 100% effort on
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security and sent Special Envoy Dennis Ross to the region. Israel and the PA agreed to
report on the bombing to a panel including the CIA.
U.S. officials’ efforts in September and October 1998 to complete implementation of
the Interim Accord culminated in the Wye River Memorandum of October 23. The Israeli
cabinet approved the Memorandum, but said that redeployments depended on the abrogation
of Palestinian Charter articles; that a third redeployment should not be from more than 1%
of territory before a final agreement; and that if the Palestinians unilaterally declare a state,
then Israel reserved the right to apply Israeli law to the rest of the West Bank. On December
14, the PNC and others voted to annul the Charter articles. On December 20, Israel froze
Wye implementation until the Palestinians abandoned their call for a state with Jerusalem
as its capital, curbed violence and incitement, accepted Israeli prisoner releases, collected and
destroyed illegal weapons, and resumed security cooperation. Europe and the United States
forestalled a Palestinian declaration of statehood on May 4, 1999. The European Union (EU)
reaffirmed the “Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state ....” On
April 26, President Clinton wrote, “We support the aspirations of the Palestinian people to
determine their own future on their land.”
Ehud Barak defeated Netanyahu in the May 17, 1999 election. Barak and Arafat signed
the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum on September 4, 1999. Final status talks resumed
ceremonially on September 13. The Palestinians gave Israel 30,000 police officers’ names.
Israel released prisoners, opened a safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza and a
major road in Hebron, and redeployed from more territory. In May 2000, Israeli soldiers
fought Palestinian demonstrators and police.
Clinton, Barak, and Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July11 to July 24,
2000, to forge a framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The parties
had agreed that there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved. Jerusalem was
the major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its sovereignty, leaving the
Palestinians control over East Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede
more than 90% of the West Bank, wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers
live, and offered to admit thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification program.
An international fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab
countries. The Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the Jewish
quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall but sought sovereignty over East Jerusalem,
particularly the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims. (See CRS
Report RS20648, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: Camp David Negotiations.)
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces,
visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel responded
forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising began. On October 12, a mob in
Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on
Palestinian official sites. U.S. and other diplomats called a summit in Sharm al-Shaykh on
October 16 and set up an international fact-finding committee under former Senator George
Mitchell to look into the violence.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister.
Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, December 19-23. On December
23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram
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al-Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip,
and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza.
Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount and
sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. Israeli forces would remain in
the Jordan Valley for 3 to 6 years to control borders, and then be replaced by an international
force. The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.” Barak said he would accept the
plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought clarifications on contiguity of
Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and refugees’ right of return, among
other issues. The talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister. He vowed to retain united
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley and other security areas. Sharon’s associates
asserted that the results of negotiations at and since Camp David were “null and void.” The
Bush Administration said that Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States proposals.”
Sharon said that he sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian
refugees, or a Palestinian state. On April 13, Sharon said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank, about 2% more than the Palestinians control.
Palestinians insisted that talks restart from where they left off at Taba.
On April 30, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending violence,
rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two sides agreed to CIA
Director Tenet’s plan to cement the cease-fire and restore security cooperation. On June 28,
they agreed to a 7-day period without violence followed by a 6-week cooling-off period.
Secretary Powell said Sharon would determine if violence abated.
On August 8, Hamas detonated a suicide bomb in Jerusalem. On August 10, Israeli
forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian national activity in East Jerusalem, and
then repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On August 27, Israel killed the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader. On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel
wants to give the Palestinians what no one else gave them before, the possibility of a state.”
On October 2, President Bush said for the first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has
always been part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected.” Israel eased
its blockade of Palestinian areas but stopped after the PFLP assassinated its Minister of
Tourism on October 17.
On November 10, President Bush declared that the United States is “working toward
the day when two states — Israel and Palestine — live peacefully together within secure and
recognized borders....” Secretary Powell sent Anthony Zinni to work on a cease-fire to
revive peacemaking, but violence impeded the short-lived mission. Israel confined Arafat
in Ramallah on December 3. On December 7, Sharon doubted that an agreement could be
reached with Arafat, “who is a real terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed an
Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza.
The Israeli security cabinet charged that Arafat was “directly responsible” for the attacks ...
“and therefore is no longer relevant ....”
On January 3, 2002, Israel seized a Palestinian-commanded freighter, the Karine A, in
the Red Sea carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. On February 5, Secretary Powell
stated that Arafat “cannot engage with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same
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time permit or tolerate continued violence and terror.” When Sharon visited the White House
on February 7, he said that he believed that pressure should be put on Arafat so that an
alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
On February 28, Israeli forces launched an assault on West Bank refugee camps, “bases
of terror infrastructure,” beginning a three-week reoccupation of Palestinian areas. Al Aqsa,
the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and the PFLP continued to exact a high toll on
Israelis. On March 14, President Bush said that Israel’s reoccupation was “not helpful.”
Israel withdrew by March 19. After March 20, there were daily suicide bombings.

On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah had called for “full withdrawal from all
occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including Jerusalem, for full
normalization of relations.” Sharon said that he was willing to explore the idea but it would
be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s right to “secure and recognized
borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. On March 27, the Arab League summit
Beirut Declaration endorsed Abdullah’s offer of “normal relations and security for Israel in
exchange for full withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, recognition of an
independent Palestinian state with al-Quds al-Sharif (Noble Jerusalem) as its capital, and the
return of refugees.” The summit communique saluted the Palestinian intifadah and called
for stopping the establishment of ties with Israel.
Also on March 27, a Hamas suicide bomber attacked an Israeli hotel in Netanya, killing
27 and wounding 130. The Israeli cabinet declared Arafat “an enemy” and, on March 29,
troops besieged his compound in Ramallah. Within a week, Israeli forces controlled all
major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On April 4, President Bush chastised Arafat, Arab nations, and Israel, and urged Israel
to begin withdrawing from Palestinian areas. On April 6, he emphasized that Israel must
withdraw “without delay.” Secretary Powell met moderate Arab, U.N., and EU leaders and
representatives before arriving in Israel on April 10. During his visit, there were suicide
bombings in Haifa and Jerusalem. On May 2, the Quartet, i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian
officials, proposed a foreign ministers’ conference on reconstructing the PA and related
issues. At Sharon’s May 8 visit, the President emphasized providing “the framework for the
growth of a Palestinian state,” while Sharon was reluctant to discuss a state before “real
reform.” During the meeting, a Hamas suicide bombing occurred south of Tel Aviv.
On May 14, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror, violence, and
incitement, and basic structural reforms in all areas of the Palestinian Authority” before
negotiations for a settlement in stages. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs
Burns and CIA Director Tenet traveled to the region as part of what President Bush termed
a strategy to combine security and democratization as underpinnings of a Palestinian state.
After meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions were not ripe for an
international conference because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian government.
On June 24, President Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not
compromised by terror” and to build a practicing democracy. (See White House press release
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html].) He said that when
the Palestinians have new leaders, new institutions, and new security arrangements with their
neighbors, then the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state, whose
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borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement. He
added, “as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and settlement activity must stop.” The
President envisaged a final settlement within 3 years negotiated by the parties “based on U.N.
Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.” On July
31, Hamas set off a bomb at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, killing 7, including 5
Americans, and wounding 80.
On August 18, the Israeli Defense Minister and the Palestinian Interior Minister agreed
that Israel would cede responsibility for the security of Bethlehem and parts of Gaza to the
Palestinian police. If the police prevented terrorism, then Israeli forces would withdraw from
other areas. On August 19, Israeli troops withdrew from Bethlehem but kept a blockade
around it. The process then stalled. Hamas, PIJ, and Damascus-based Palestinian groups
denounced the accord and vowed to continue attacks.
On September 17, the Quartet outlined a preliminary “roadmap” to peace. (See
Agreements below for link to final version.) But, more than six weeks of relative quiet
ended with two suicide bombings in 24 hours on September 19. On September 20-21, Israeli
forces demolished buildings at Arafat’s headquarter. On September 24, the United States
abstained from U.N. Security Council Resolution1435, which demanded an immediate end
to Israel’s reoccupation of Arafat’s headquarters and expeditious withdrawal from Palestinian
cities; it also condemned terror attacks against civilians. Israel lifted its siege of Arafat’s
compound on September 29.
In October and November, violence escalated. In December, Secretary Powell suggested
waiting until after the January 28, 2003, Israeli election to make the roadmap public.
President Bush and the Quartet issued a joint statement on December 21, condemning
Palestinian terror attacks and the killing of innocent Palestinian civilians and calling for an
immediate cease-fire and “as calm is established, Israeli forces should withdraw from
Palestinian areas and the pre-intifadah status quo on the ground should be restored.”
On January 5, 2003, two Palestinian suicide bombers killed 23 and wounded 100 in Tel
Aviv. Israel imposed a travel ban on the territories, which included barring Palestinians from
attending a conference on reform with the Quartet, Egyptian, Saudi, and Jordanian officials
on January 14-15 at the invitation of British Prime Minister Blair. On January 20, Sharon
told an interviewer, “the Quartet is nothing! Don’t take it seriously.” Secretary Powell
responded that Washington remained “fully supportive of the Quartet, which we helped
create.” On January 26, Israeli forces made a deep incursion into Gaza City to target weapons
factories, killing 12 and injuring more than 40. A landmine destroyed an Israeli tank and
killed its crew on February 15; the Israeli military then began persistent operations against
Hamas in the Gaza Strip and later blocked two main roads in the Gaza Strip. They continued
to make incursions into West Bank cities. On March 5, a suicide bomber destroyed a bus in
Haifa, killing 16, including one American, and wounding about 55. Israeli forces then raided
a Gaza refugee camp, killing 11, and reoccupied an area of northern Gaza.
On February 24, Sharon formed a coalition government with a party that advocates
settlements and opposes a Palestinian state, and another party that favors, with changes, the
roadmap, but without Arafat and the refugees’ right of return. A third party favors expelling
Palestinians from and annexing the territories. The government’s guidelines call for reaching
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interim agreements when violence ends and declare settlement an important national project.
Negotiations on statehood require cabinet approval. On February 27, President Bush said
that, as the terror threat is removed and security improves, Israel will be expected to support
the creation of a viable Palestinian state and to work quickly for a final status agreement. “As
progress is made toward peace,” settlement activity must end. The President gave his
personal commitment to implement the roadmap.
On March 7, Arafat named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister. On
March 14, President Bush declared that the roadmap would be given to the Palestinians and
the Israelis “immediately upon confirmation” of a prime minister “of real authority.” On
April 14, Sharon acknowledged that Israel would have to part with some places (in the West
Bank) bound up in the history of the Jewish people. He insisted that the Palestinians had to
recognize the Jewish people’s right to its homeland. This is the reason that he insisted the
Palestinians first abandon their claim of a right of return. On April 14, Israel submitted 14
reservations on the roadmap to U.S. officials. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a
March 30 suicide bombing that wounded 49 people in Netanya.
On April 30, the same day that Abbas’s appointment was approved, the “Quartet’
presented the roadmap to Israel and the PA. Abbas accepted the roadmap and rejected
Israel’s preconditions for implementing it. Secretary Powell met with Abbas and Sharon
separately on May 11. Sharon offered humanitarian gestures but did not “accept” the
roadmap. On May 14, Sharon stated that settlements, which are to be frozen in the first stage
of the roadmap, “is not an issue on the horizon right now.” Sharon and Abbas met on May
17. Five suicide bombings bracketed their meeting, and Sharon postponed a visit to
Washington because of the security situation. President Bush telephoned Abbas for the first
time on May 20 and met Palestinian Finance Minister Salam Fayyad on May 22.
On May 23, the Administration said that Israel had explained “its significant concerns
about the roadmap” and that the United States shares the view “that these are real concerns
and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the roadmap.” The U.S.
assurances led Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the roadmap, “with
reservations,” on May 25. The next day, Sharon told his party, “to keep 3.5 million people
under occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time.
Sharon and Abbas met on May 29.
On June 3, President Bush met Abbas and leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Bahrain in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt. The President declared, “All progress towards peace
requires the rejection of terror “ and asked the Arabs to help Abbas by cutting off arms and
financing to terrorist groups. On June 4, the President met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba,
Jordan. The President gave his personal commitment to “ move the process forward.” Abbas
vowed to end “the militarization of the intifadah” and to achieve the Palestinians’ goals by
peaceful means; he denounced “violence against Israelis wherever they are.” Sharon
expressed understanding of “the importance of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian
state and promised to “immediately begin to remove unauthorized outposts.” The President
named National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice as his personal representative.
On June 6, Hamas and Islamic Jihad withdrew from cease-fire talks until Abbas
retracted his Aqaba speech. The next day, Hamas, Jihad, and the Al Aqsa Brigades claimed
credit for a joint attack, killing four Israeli soldiers. Israel dismantled 10 unoccupied
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outposts, but new ones reportedly were set up. On June 10, an Israeli missile attack failed
to kill Hamas leader Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi but killed and wounded others. Abbas said that
he will use dialogue, not force, with the Palestinian groups. On June 11, a Hamas suicide
bombing on a Jerusalem bus killed 17 and wounded scores of others. On June 13, an Israeli
air strike killed a Hamas militant and wounded 26 others. On June 15, U.S. Ambassador
John Wolf and a 10-person team arrived in Israel to coordinate, monitor, and promote
implementation of the roadmap. On June 20, Secretary Powell met Sharon and Abbas
separately.
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square
miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law and
administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize.
Syria initially referred to its goal as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty,
preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and disdained separate agreements between
Israel and Arab parties. Israel emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic,
cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that 242 applies to all fronts. Syria submitted a draft declaration
of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement.” Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
accepted withdrawal on the Golan, without defining it, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.”
On September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange for
total withdrawal.” Israel offered only “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Asad
announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different
speeds. In June, Secretary Christopher said that the United States might be willing to
guarantee security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was
ready for talks about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides inched toward each
other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on
October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal.
Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff met in December.
On March 20, 1995, ambassadorial talks resumed. On May 24, Israel and Syria
announced terms of reference for senior military experts to meet under U.S. auspices. Syria
reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take topographical
features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal. Chiefs of staff
discussed principles for security arrangements. Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground
station in northern Israel in exchange for Golan stations, but Syria insisted on aerial
surveillance only and that each country monitor the other from its own territory and receive
U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6
miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin said that Israeli troops must man early-warning stations on
the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its sovereignty, but
a government-controlled media commentary accepted international or friendly forces in the
stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were
suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
The new Israeli government called for negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential
to Israel’s security and water needs and that retaining sovereignty would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
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understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967
border (as opposed to the international border of 1923). Israeli negotiators contend that Rabin
had suggested full withdrawal was possible only if Syria met Israel’s security and
normalization needs and those needs were not met. On January 26, 1999, the Israeli Knesset
passed a law requiring a 61-member majority and a national referendum to approve the return
of any part of the Golan Heights to Syria.
In June, Prime Minister-elect Barak and Asad exchanged compliments through a British
writer. In July, the Syrian Vice President told radical Palestinian groups to end their armed
struggle against Israel and Syria prevented Hizballah from firing into Israel, but not from
targeting Israeli forces in south Lebanon. Israel and Syria agreed to restart talks from “the
point where they left off,” with each side defining the point to its satisfaction. Barak and the
Syrian Foreign Minister met in Washington on December 15-16, 1999, and in
Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10, 2000. President Clinton intervened. On January
7, the United States summarized points of accord and discord. As reported, it revealed Israeli
success in delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and
an early-warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the document,
talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000, were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman
reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be productive for talks
to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance to withdraw
to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and
on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main
obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime
Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights.

Israel-Lebanon. As called for by Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought
unconditional Israeli military withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern
Lebanon and the end of Israel’s support for militias in the south and of shelling of villages
that Israel claimed were sites of Hizballah activity. Israel claimed no Lebanese territory but
sought security and said that it would withdraw when the Lebanese army controlled the south
and prevented Hizballah attacks on northern Israel. Lebanon repeatedly sought a withdrawal
schedule in exchange for addressing Israel’s security concerns. The two sides never agreed.
Syria, which dominates Lebanon, said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. In July
1993, Israel conducted a large assault to stop Hizballah attacks; 250,000 people fled south
Lebanon. Secretary of State Christopher arranged a cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel
again attacked Hizballah targets, and Hizballah fired rockets into northern Israel. An April
26 cease-fire accord barred Hizballah attacks into Israel and Israeli attacks on civilian targets
in Lebanon and all attacks on civilians or civilian areas. Each side retained the right of self-
defense. U.S., French, Syrian, Lebanese, and Israeli representatives monitored the cease-fire.
On January 5, 1998, Defense Minister Mordechai said that Israel was ready to withdraw
from southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the restoration of
peace and security in the region, were implemented. He and Netanyahu then proposed that
Israel withdraw in exchange for security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria
called for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal. Violence in northern Israel and southern
Lebanon increased in November and December, prompting the Israeli cabinet to reaffirm its
opposition to a unilateral withdrawal twice. In April 1999, Israel “downsized” its force in
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Lebanon. In June, the Israeli-allied South Lebanese Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin,
north of the security zone. New Prime Minister Barak promised to withdraw from southern
Lebanon in one year, or by July 7, 2000, while maintaining security for northern Israel.
On September 4, 1999, Lebanese Prime Minister Al-Hoss confirmed his country’s
commitment to 425 and support for the “resistance” against the occupation, i.e., Hizballah.
He argued that Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their
homeland, and rejected their implantation in Lebanon. Al-Hoss did not accept Secretary of
State Albright’s statement that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will be a subject of Israeli-
Palestinian final status talks, insisting that Lebanon should be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.
Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel unless Israel also
withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue. On April 17, Israel
informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon informed the U.N. that Israel’s
withdrawal would not be complete unless it included Sheba’a farms near the Golan. On May
23, the U.N. Secretary General noted that almost all of Sheba’a is within the area of
operations of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing the 1974
Israeli-Syrian disengagement, and recommended proceeding without prejudice to later border
agreements. On May 23, the SLA collapsed, and on May 24 Israel completed its withdrawal.
Hizballah took over the former security zone. On June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed
that Israel had withdrawn. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400
troops to the border region by July, because the Lebanese army did not back them against
Hizballah. (See CRS Report RL31078, The Shi’ba Farms Dispute and Its Implications.)
On October 7, Hizballah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli soldiers.
(Israel has since declared them to be dead.) On October 16, Hizballah announced that it had
captured an Israeli colonel. On November 13, U.N. Security Council members said that
Lebanon was obliged to “take effective control of the whole area vacated by Israel ....” On
April 16 and July 2, 2001, Israel, claiming Syria controls Hizballah, bombed Syrian radar
sites in Lebanon after Hizballah attacked its soldiers in Sheba’a. In April, the U.N. warned
Lebanon that unless it deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be diminished or phased out.
On January 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to cut UNIFIL to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
During Israel’s military operations against Palestinian-ruled areas, on March 29 and
subsequently, Hizballah shelled Israeli positions in Sheba’a and northern Israel. Israel
responded with air strikes, and concern about a possible second front. At its request, U.N.
Secretary General Annan contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents, and on April 8, Vice
President Cheney called President Asad to warn him that the situation could spiral out of
control. Syria denied that it or Lebanon is interested in opening a second front. In April,
Secretary Powell visited Israel’s northern command and called on Syria to curb Hizballah,
and while in Lebanon and Syria urged them to stop the attacks immediately. The shelling
stopped briefly and then resumed. There is a dispute over Lebanon’s plan to pump water
from the Wazzani River, which Israel said would reduce the flow of water into the Galilee.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian; government
figures acknowledge 40%. An estimated 300,000 Palestinians displaced by the Gulf War
fled to Jordan. Jordan hoped an Israel-Palestinian accord would ease its economic problems
by producing international aid. Jordan would not ratify a June 1993 agenda on water, energy,
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environment, and economic matters before other Arab parties reached accords. It was
initialed on September 14, 1993, after the Israeli-Palestinian DOP was signed.
Rabin reportedly met King Hussein secretly on September 26, 1993. On October 1,
Crown Prince Hassan, Foreign Minister Peres, and President Clinton agreed to set up a
Trilateral Economic Committee. In June 1994, Israel and Jordan held talks on boundaries,
water, energy, moving talks to the region, and trade and economic relations. Rabin and King
Hussein opened a border crossing for third country tourists on August 8. A peace treaty was
signed on October 26 (see Agreements below). The border was demarcated and Israel
withdrew from Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
On March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the
peace process....” On September 25, 1997, Israeli agents failed to assassinate a Hamas
official in Jordan. King Hussein demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh
Yasmin, which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange
for the detained agents. On December 5, 1998, the King again lambasted Netanyahu. He
called for Jordan-Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are
Jordanian national interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999.
On February 28, 1999, Netanyahu and King Abdullah II reaffirmed their dedication to
peace. Abdullah has said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites in
Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of the Jordanian royal family, but rejected a Jordanian-
Palestinian confederation. He said that warmer relations with Israel depend upon progress
toward peace with the Palestinians and Syria, and proposed that Jerusalem be an Israeli and
a Palestinian capital. On November 21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of its new
ambassador to Israel because of Israel’s “aggression” against the Palestinians.
Significant Agreements
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, Arafat recognized Israel’s
right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East
peace process, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence
and undertook to prevent them, stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict
his commitments are invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National
Council, and called upon his people to reject violence. Rabin recognized the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it.
Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government
for the West Bank and Gaza on August 19, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, since
January 1993. Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho;
transfer of authority over education, culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and
tourism in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians; election in 9 months of a Palestinian
Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza; Palestinian residents of East
Jerusalem will vote; Israeli troops to redeploy from Palestinian population centers before the
election and further as Palestinian police assume responsibility for public order; joint Israeli-
Palestinian committees for issues such as economic cooperation and dispute resolution; the
parties to invite Jordan and Egypt to establish cooperative arrangements that will decide
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modalities of admission of persons displaced in 1967, etc. During the interim period, Israel
responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign relations. Permanent
status negotiations will begin in the third year of interim rule and may include Jerusalem.
Israel-Jordan Agenda. Initialed on September 14, 1993, with sections on security,
water, refugees and displaced persons, borders and territorial matters, bilateral cooperation
on natural and human resources, infrastructure, and economic areas. Reaffirms the 1967
international border; Israel to withdraw from two small strips of land seized in 1968.
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4, 1994,
provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho. Israel to evacuate all military bases, hand
them over to Palestinian police, and redeploy to settlements and military installations.
Israelis may use roads within Gaza/Jericho and Palestinians may use public roads crossing
settlements. Palestinian police to be responsible for public order and internal security.
Authority to be transferred from the Israeli military government and civil administration to
the PA. The PA will consist of 24 members with legislative and executive powers and
administrative units. The Authority’s territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil, and
territorial waters. Israel retains jurisdiction over foreign relations, external security, and
security of settlements. The PLO may conclude economic, assistance, and development
agreements with international organizations and foreign states. The PA may promulgate
laws, regulations, and other legislative acts. The Palestinians may have a police force, but
not other armed forces. The parties agree to a Temporary International Presence of 400 for
6 months. The accord began the 5-year period of interim self-rule.
The Washington Declaration. Signed on July 25, 1994. Terminates state of
belligerency; King Hussein declared an end to the state of war at the signing ceremony.
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994. An international
boundary will be delimited within 9 months. Each party will refrain from threats or use of
force against the other and from joining alliances hostile to the other and will remove
restrictions from normal economic relations and terminate economic boycotts. Problems of
displaced persons (from 1967) will be resolved in a committee with Egypt and the
Palestinians and of refugees (from 1948) in the multilateral framework. Israel respects
Jordan’s role in the mosques in Jerusalem and will give it high priority in permanent status
negotiations. Unrevealed annexes reportedly called for Jordan to lease one sq. mi. to Israelis
for a renewable 25-year period and for Israel to provide Yarmuk River water and desalinized
water to Jordan; dams will be built on the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers to yield more water.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal with
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation, and the release of Palestinian prisoners. Negotiations on permanent
status and relations with neighboring countries will begin in May 1996. An 82-member
Palestinian Council and Head of the Council’s Executive Authority will be elected after
Israeli redeployment from populated areas in the West Bank. Palestinian residents of
Jerusalem will participate in the elections by mail and may stand for election if they have a
second address in the West Bank or Gaza. The Israeli Defense Force will redeploy from
Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450 towns and villages.
Israel will redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for security of Israelis. Israel will be
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responsible for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will
be totally responsible for Area “A,” the six cities. Israeli responsibility for overall security
will have precedence over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian
towns and villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas.
Further redeployments will take place in 6-month intervals following the Council’s
inauguration, with Palestinians gaining territorial jurisdiction over more of Area C, subject
to land rights of Israelis and provision of services to settlements. Palestinian Charter articles
calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within two months of the Council’s
inauguration. Israel and the Palestinians will cooperate against terrorism. Palestinians will
have a police force of 12,000, issue arms’ permits, and confiscate illegal arms. Israelis may
not be arrested by Palestinian police. Responsibility for religious sites will be transferred to
the Palestinians, with freedom of access and of worship guaranteed. Israel will increase
water allocated to Palestinians. Further increases to be based on increases in resources
developed though international funding and channels, including the U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli
forum. Israel will release Palestinian prisoners in three stages: upon signing of the
agreement, on the eve of elections, and according to other principles to be established.
Economic Annex of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, with minor changes, is incorporated.
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel and the
PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. In Notes for the Record, Israel
agreed to prisoner release and to resume negotiations on safe passage between Gaza and the
West Bank, Gaza Airport and port, economic, and other issues. The Palestinians reaffirmed
their commitment to revise their Charter, to fight terror, and to keep police force size in line
with the Interim accord. Permanent status negotiations were to resume within two months
after implementation of the Protocol. Christopher wrote a letter to Netanyahu, stating that
it remains U.S. policy to promote full implementation of the Interim Agreement and that he
had advised Arafat that Israeli redeployments would be completed no later than mid-1998
— defined by U.S. Special Envoy Ross as August 1998.
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps to
complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements specified in Notes for
the Record that accompanied the Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from territories in
the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian security measures. The PA will have complete
or shared responsibility for 40% of the West Bank, of which it will have complete control
of 18.2%. Palestinians ensure systematic combat of terrorist organizations and their
infrastructure. Their work plan will be shared with the United States. A U.S.-Palestinian
committee will review steps to counter terrorism. The Palestinians will prohibit illegal
weapons. The Palestinians will prohibit incitement to violence and terror and establish
mechanisms to act against provocateurs. A U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee will monitor
incitement and recommend how to prevent it. Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation will
be full, continuous, and comprehensive. A trilateral committee will meet not less than
biweekly to assess threats and deal with impediments to cooperation. The Palestinians will
provide a list of their policemen to the Israelis. The PLO Executive and Central Committees
will reaffirm the January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that specified
articles of the Palestinian Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The Palestine
National Council will reaffirm these decisions. President Clinton will address this conclave.
The two sides agreed on a Gaza industrial estate and on a protocol for opening the Gaza
airport. They agreed to work to agree on safe passage between the Gaza Strip and West Bank
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and on a Gaza seaport. Permanent status talks will resume when the Memorandum takes
effect. A time line is an “integral attachment” to the Memorandum. U.S. officials provided
both sides with letters of assurance regarding U.S. policies. (See CRS Report 98-911, Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Process: The Wye River Memorandum.)
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on September 4,
1999. Agreed to resume permanent status negotiations in an accelerated manner to make a
determined effort to conclude a framework agreement on permanent status issues and to
conclude a comprehensive agreement on permanent status by September 13, 2000. They also
agreed on other Wye issues. (See CRS Report RS20341, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process:
The Sharm el Sheikh Memorandum.)
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on August
30, 2003, by the Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia).
To achieve a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for the
Palestinians to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake
political reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with provisional
borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement and end of the conflict. (For
text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/1003/20062.htm].)
Role of Congress
Aid. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB85066, Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance.) The Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act (MEPFA) (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994, Title X) granted the
President authority to suspend provisions of laws affecting the PLO in the national interest
and if the PLO is abiding by commitments made in letters to Israel and Norway and under
the DOP. The State Department reported that the PLO honored its commitments, with
shortcomings, and asserted that suspensions were in the U.S. national interest, enabling U.S.
support for the peace process and interaction with all parties. MEPFA was extended with
additional requirements, until August 12, 1997, and then included in foreign operations
appropriations legislation. P.L. 108-1, February 20, 2003, prohibits funding to support a
Palestinian state unless it has leaders who have not supported terrorism, have been
democratically elected, have demonstrated their commitment to peaceful coexistence with
Israel, have taken measures to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and have
established security entities that cooperate with Israeli counterparts. An exemption is
provided for aid to reform the PA and waiver is provided for national security interests.
Funding for the PA is prohibited. P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, the wartime supplemental
appropriations act, appropriates $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel; funds may be used
only within its 1967 borders. H.R. 1823, introduced on April 11, would prohibit U.S. aid to
the PA and for programs, projects, and activities in the West Bank and Gaza. H.R. 1950, the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2004 and 2004, introduced on May 5, Title XVII,
and S.1029, introduced on May 8, The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Enhancement Act of 2003,
prohibits assistance to a Palestinian state unless the President certifies that a binding peace
agreement exists between Israel and the Palestinians and the Palestinian government has
taken certain steps or the President waives the prohibition in the national interest.
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Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a subject for final status negotiations. Israel annexed the city
in 1967 to be its eternal, undivided capital. Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital.
Successive U.S. Administrations have maintained that the parties must determine its fate.
H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and S.Con.Res. 21, May 20, 1997, called on the
Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must remain the undivided capital of Israel.
Congress prohibits official U.S. government business with the PA in Jerusalem and the use
of appropriated funds to create U.S. government offices in Israel to conduct business with
the PA. (See P.L. 108-7, February 20, 2003.) H.R. 167, introduced on January 7, 2003,
calls for the U.S. consulate in Jerusalem to operate under the supervision of the ambassador,
for Jerusalem to be identified as the capital of Israel in official documents, and for Israel to
be recorded as the place of birth of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the capital,
that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is unquestioned, and that
Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in Jerusalem. Opponents say a
move would undermine the peace process, U.S. credibility in the Islamic world and with
Palestinians, and prejudge final status. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the
relocation of the embassy by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national
security interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the authority.
The President signed H.R. 1646, the State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-2003,
into law as P.L. 107-228, September 30, 2002. It urges the President to begin relocating the
U.S. Embassy “immediately,” and contains the same provisions as H.R. 167 noted above.
The President charged that the provision would “if construed as mandatory rather than
advisory, impermissibly interfere with the president’s constitutional authority to conduct the
nation’s foreign affairs.” The State Department declared, “our view of Jerusalem is
unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status issue to be negotiated between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. S.Con.Res. 88 and H.Con.Res. 280, both passed on
December 5, 2001, demand that the PA act against terrorists and urge the President to
suspend relations with Arafat and the PA if it does not. P.L. 107-115, January 10, 2002, Sec.
566 left it to the President to assess PLO/PA compliance with its 1993 commitments and, if
there is none, to impose sanctions. A November 9, 2002 State Department report, mandated
by the PLO Commitments Compliance Act (P.L. 101-246), noted the PLO and PA failed to
act against, and in some cases provided support for, terrorist groups and cited other
noncompliance. It imposed the sanction of downgrading the status of the PLO office in the
United States but waived the sanction in the interest of national security. H.R. 1828 (Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act), introduced on April 12, 2003,
and S. 982 (Syria Accountability Act of 2003), introduced on May 1, would hold Syria
accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. Secretary Powell told
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Act “would not be helpful....”
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