Order Code IB91137
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Middle East Peace Talks
Updated February 9, 2006
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Role
Conference and Developments
Madrid
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians
Israel-Syria
Israel-Lebanon
Israel-Jordan
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition
Declaration of Principles
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron
Wye River Memorandum
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict
Agreement on Movement and Access
Role of Congress
Aid
Jerusalem
Compliance/Sanctions
Other
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The Middle East Peace Talks
SUMMARY
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new
Israel on February 6, 2001. He said that the
peace process was begun, with Israel and the
results of Camp David and afterwards were
Palestinians discussing a five-year period of
null and void.
interim self-rule leading to a final settlement.
Israel and Syria discussed Israeli withdrawal
The international war against terrorism
from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace.
after September 11, 2001, prompted renewed
Israel and Jordan discussed relations. Israel
U.S. focus on a peace process. On June 24,
and Lebanon focused on Israel’s withdrawal
2002, President Bush declared, “peace re-
from its self-declared security zone in south
quires new and different Palestinian leader-
Lebanon and reciprocal Lebanese actions.
ship so that a Palestinian state can be born.”
On April 30, 2003, the United States, the
On September 13, 1993, Israel and the
U.N., European Union, and Russia (the Quar-
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
tet) presented a “Roadmap” to Palestinian
signed a Declaration of Principles (DOP),
statehood within three years. It has not been
providing for Palestinian empowerment and
implemented. In December 2003, Sharon
some territorial control. Israeli Prime Minis-
proposed to unilaterally disengage from the
ter Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan signed
Palestinians in Gaza and four small settle-
a Peace Treaty on October 26, 1994. Israel
ments in the West Bank. Palestinian Author-
and the Palestinians signed an Interim Self-
ity (PA) Chairman/President Yasir Arafat died
Rule in the West Bank/Oslo II accord on
on November 11, 2004, and, on January 9,
September 28, 1995. Israel continued
2005, Mahmud Abbas was elected to succeed
implementing it despite the November 4
him. On February 8, 2005, Abbas and Sharon
assassination of Prime Minister Rabin.
declared an end to violence. On August 23,
Israel completed its disengagement from the
Israel suspended talks with Syria in
Gaza Strip and four West Bank settlements.
February/March 1996. They resumed in De-
cember 1999, but were postponed indefinitely
Congress is interested in the peace talks
after January 2000. Israel withdrew from
because of its oversight role in the conduct of
south Lebanon on May 24, 2000.
U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and
keen constituent interest. It is concerned about
The Palestinians and Israelis signed
U.S. financial and other commitments and the
additional incremental accords in 1997, 1998,
Palestinians’ fulfillment of their commitments
and 1999. From July 11 to 24, 2000, Presi-
to Israel. Congress has appropriated aid for
dent Clinton held a summit with Israeli and
the West Bank and Gaza, with conditions
Palestinian leaders at Camp David, but they
intended to ensure Palestinian compliance
did not succeed in producing a framework
with agreements with Israel. Congress has
accord on final status issues. A Palestinian
repeatedly endorsed Jerusalem as the undi-
uprising or intifadah began in September.
vided capital of Israel, and many Members
Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of
seek sanctions on the PLO and PA.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Hamas won the January 25, 2006, Palestinian parliamentary election. It is a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, claims the entire land of Palestine, including
Israel, “from the river to the sea” as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo agreements of the
1990s, and claims that its “resistance” forced Israel from the Gaza Strip. Acting Israeli
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian
administration that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction and
demanded that Hamas disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel, and
accept all prior agreements. President Bush said that the United States would not deal with
a political party “that articulates the destruction of Israel as part of its platform” and, in his
State of the Union address on January 31, called on Hamas to “recognize Israel, disarm,
reject terrorism, and work for a lasting peace.” On January 30, the Quartet (representatives
of the United States, European Union (EU), United Nations, and Russia) stated that “future
assistance to any new (Palestinian) government would be reviewed by donors against the
government’s commitment to the principles of non-violence, recognition of Israel, and
acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Road Map,” delaying a
possible aid cut-off until a government is formed. Hamas countered that it will never
recognize Israel, would consider negotiating a “long-term truce” if Israel withdrew to its
1967 borders, and would create a state on “any inch” of Palestinian territory without ceding
another. Meanwhile, Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas remains committed to a
negotiated two-state solution, and both he and Hamas have suggested using the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), which is not officially part of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
government that Hamas will take over, for this purpose. However, Hamas also desires to
reform and lead the PLO. Olmert has said that Israel would maintain contact with Abbas and
the Palestinian government as long as it is not a Hamas government. Many believe, however,
that Israel will soon begin to determine its permanent borders unilaterally. On February 8,
while restating support for the Road Map, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a
separation from the Palestinians and permanent borders that would include a united
Jerusalem, major settlement blocs, and the Jordan Valley.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade since the founding of Israel until the 1990s.
With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable. The
creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing
conflict made refugees of thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine, with
consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. The 1967 war ended with Israel
occupying territory of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in
part, to regain their lands. In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist
incursions; it withdrew in 1985, but retained a 9-mile “security zone” that Lebanon sought
to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a U.S. and international diplomatic goal throughout
the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli
negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
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U.S. Role
With the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the Arab-
Israeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a framework for
peace based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of “land
for peace.” Secretary of State Baker organized a peace conference in Madrid in October
1991 that launched almost a decade of the “Oslo process” efforts to achieve peace. It
continued under President Clinton, who said that only the region’s leaders can make peace
and vowed to be their partner. With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United
States seemed to become an indispensable and expected party to Israeli-Palestinian talks.
Clinton mediated the 1998 Wye River Memorandum, and the United States coordinated its
implementation. Clinton personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The current Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role. Secretary of
State Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy, saying, “the United States stands
ready to assist, not insist.” Since the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States,
the Administration has focused on the peace process as part of the war on terrorism.
Secretary Rice also has not appointed a special envoy, asserting, “Not every effort has to be
an American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking
responsibility.” Nonetheless, she has actively encouraged Israelis and Palestinians to act and
mediated a November 2005 accord to reopen the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt.
Conference and Developments
Madrid. The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were represented
by 14-member delegations. A Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from
each. An unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO). The United States, the Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the
European Community, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the table. The U.N., the Gulf
Cooperation Council, and the Arab Maghreb Union were observers.
Bilateral Talks
Israel-Palestinians. (Incidents of violence are noted selectively because of space
constraints.) In November 1991, Israel and the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to
separate Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestinians negotiating tracks, the latter to address a
five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the third
year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators
were appointed to a PLO coordination committee, ending a charade that had distanced the
PLO from the talks. Secret talks in Oslo in 1993 produced an August 19 agreement on a
Declaration of Principles, signed September 13, 1993. (See Significant Agreements, below,
for summaries of and links to accords reached between 1993 and 2000.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Barak, and Palestinian Authority (PA)
Chairman Arafat held a summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24, 2000, to forge a
framework accord on final status issues. They did not succeed. The parties had agreed that
there would be no agreement unless all issues were resolved. Jerusalem was the major
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obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain united under its sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians
control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to
cede more than 90% of the West Bank, wanted to annex settlements where about 130,000
settlers lived, and offered to admit thousands of Palestinian refugees in a family unification
program. An international fund would compensate other refugees as well as Israelis from
Arab countries. The Palestinians reportedly were willing to accept Israeli control over the
Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought sovereignty over East
Jerusalem, particularly the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to Jews and Muslims.
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces,
visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel responded
forcefully. The second Palestinian intifadah or uprising began. On October 12, a mob in
Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on
Palestinian official sites. An international summit in Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, on October
16 set up a commission under former Senator George Mitchell to look into the violence.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister.
Further negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, December 19-23. On December
23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram
al-Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the Gaza Strip,
and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near Gaza.
Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount and
sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. Israeli forces would control
borders in the Jordan Valley for three to six years, and then be replaced by an international
force. The agreement would declare “an end to conflict.” (For text of speech, see the Israel
Policy Forum website at [http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/display.cfm?rid=544].) Barak
said he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so. Arafat sought
clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East Jerusalem, and
refugees’ right of return, among other issues. The talks concluded at Taba, Egypt.
On February 6, 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister and vowed to retain united
Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Sharon’s
associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and after Camp David were “null and
void.” The Bush Administration said that Clinton’s proposals “were no longer United States
proposals.” Sharon sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian
refugees, or a Palestinian state and, on April 13, said that he could accept a disarmed
Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.
On April 30, the Mitchell commission made recommendations for ending violence,
rebuilding confidence, and resuming negotiations. On June 12, the two sides agreed to CIA
Director Tenet’s plan to cement a cease-fire. On June 28, they agreed to a seven-day period
without violence followed by a six-week cooling-off period. Secretary Powell said Sharon
would determine if violence abated. On August 8, a Hamas suicide bomber detonated in
Jerusalem. On August 10, Israeli forces seized Orient House, the center of Palestinian
national activity in East Jerusalem, and then repeatedly entered Palestinian territory. On
August 27, Israel killed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s (PFLP) leader.
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On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one
else gave them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President Bush said, for the
first time, “The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the
right of Israel to exist is respected.” The PFLP assassinated Israel’s Minister of Tourism on
October 17. On November 10, President Bush declared that the United States is “working
toward the day when two states — Israel and Palestine — live peacefully together within
secure and recognized borders....” Secretary Powell sent Anthony Zinni to work on a cease-
fire, but violence impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat in Ramallah on December 3.
On December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be reached with Arafat, “who is a real
terrorist....” On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and
perpetrated two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza. Israel charged that Arafat was
“directly responsible” for the attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant....”
On January 3, 2002, Israel seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-commanded freighter,
carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell stated that Arafat “cannot engage
with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same time permit or tolerate continued
violence and terror.” At the White House on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that
pressure should be put on Arafat so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah unprecedentedly had called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including
Jerusalem, in exchange for full normalization of relations.” Sharon said that he was willing
to explore the idea but it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s
right to “secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On March 27, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded at a hotel in Netanya, killing 27 and
wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat “an enemy” and besieged his compound in Ramallah;
Israeli forces soon controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On May 2, the Quartet (i.e., U.S., EU, U.N., and Russian officials), proposed a
conference on reconstructing the PA and related issues. On May 8, President Bush
emphasized providing “the framework for the growth of a Palestinian state,” while Sharon
was reluctant to discuss a state before “real reform.” After a Hamas suicide bombing near
Tel Aviv, Sharon called for “the complete cessation of terror” before negotiations. After
meeting Sharon on June 9, President Bush said that conditions were not ripe for a conference
because “no one has confidence” in the Palestinian government. On June 24, the President
called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not compromised by terror” and to build a
practicing democracy. Then the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state,
whose borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be provisional until a final settlement.
He added, “as we make progress toward security, Israeli forces need to withdraw fully to
positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and settlement activity must stop.” The
President foresaw a final settlement within three years. (For text of the speech online, see
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html].) On September 17,
the Quartet outlined a preliminary “Roadmap” to peace. Six weeks of relative quiet ended
with two suicide bombings on September 19. On September 20-21, Israeli forces demolished
buildings in Arafat’s compound. Violence was at a high level.
On March 7, 2003, Arafat named Mahmud Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister.
On April 14, Sharon allowed that Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the
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history of the Jewish people, but insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s
right to its homeland and abandon their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel. On
April 14, Israel submitted 14 reservations on the Roadmap to U.S. officials. On April 30, the
“Quartet” presented the Roadmap. Abbas accepted it. On May 23, the Administration stated
that Israel had explained its concerns and that the United States shares the view “that these
are real concerns and will address them fully and seriously in the implementation of the
Roadmap,” leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept “steps defined” in the Roadmap “with
reservations” on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared, “to keep 3.5 million people under
occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation for the first time.
On June 4, the President met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to
achieve the Palestinians’ goals by peaceful means. Sharon expressed understanding of “the
importance of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian state and promised to “remove
unauthorized outposts.” Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, with Palestinian
groups. On June 29, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military operations
against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. Israel was not party
to the accord, but began withdrawing forces from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release
Palestinian prisoners, remove roadblocks, withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow
Arafat free movement, and end construction of a security fence in the West Bank. Israel
demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist infrastructures and act against terrorists.
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide bomber
exploded in Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more than 130.
Abbas cut contacts with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought Arafat’s support to
act against terrorists. Israel suspended talks with the Palestinians, halted plans to transfer
cities to their control, and resumed “targeted killings” of terrorist leaders, among other
measures. On September 6, Abbas resigned because of what he charged was lack of support
from Arafat, the United States, and Israel. On September 7, Arafat named Palestinian
Legislative Council Speaker Ahmed Qureia, known as Abu Ala, to be Prime Minister.
On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing three
U.S. security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested members of
Popular Resistance Committees — disaffected former members of the Palestinian security
services and other groups. (They were freed in April 2004.)
Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating in the
signing of the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement, (see
[http://www.heskem.org.il]), by Israeli opposition politicians and prominent Palestinians on
December 1. On December 18, Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish and democratic
Israel,” he would unilaterally disengage from the Palestinians by redeploying Israeli forces
and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip and intensify construction of the security fence
i n t h e W e s t B a n k . ( F o r t e x t o f h i s s p e e c h , s e e
[http://www.israelemb.org/current_events.html].) On February 13, 2004, the White House
said that an Israeli pullback “could reduce friction,” but that a final settlement “must be
achieved through negotiations.” After an upsurge in violence, on March 22, Israeli missiles
killed Hamas leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin and others.
On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters. (For text of letters,
see [http://www.whitehouse.gov].) The President welcomed the disengagement plan and
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restated the U.S. commitment to the Roadmap. He noted the need to take into account
changed “realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers,”
(i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status
negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” He said that a
solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian
state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting a “right of return.” He called for a Palestinian
state that is “viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.” Sharon presented his
disengagement plan as independent of but “not inconsistent with the Roadmap.” He said that
the “temporary” security fence would not prejudice final status issues including borders. A
day before, he had identified five large West Bank settlements and an area in Hebron that
Israel will retain and strengthen. Palestinians denounced the President’s “legitimization” of
settlements and prejudgement of final status. On April 19, Sharon’s chief of staff Dov
Weisglass gave National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to
dismantle illegal outposts. On April 17, Israeli missiles killed Hamas leader Abdel Aziz
Rantisi and two others.
On June 6, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby Israel
would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the northern West
Bank. On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the government’s right to build
the security fence, but struck down some land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian
rights and ordered the route to be changed. The government said that it would abide by the
ruling. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a non-binding, advisory
opinion that the wall violates international law and “cannot be justified by the requirements
of national security.” (For text, see [http://www.icj-cij.org].)
On October 6, Sharon’s aide Weisglass claimed that disengagement was aimed at
freezing negotiations in order to “prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and a
debate regarding refugees, borders, and Jerusalem.”
Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and
a candidate for president. On December 1, President Bush declared, “Achieving ... (t)wo
states, Israel and Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security ... can be reached only
by ... the path of democracy and reform and the rule of law.” On January 9, 2005, Abbas
won election as President of the PA. He called for implementing the Roadmap while
beginning discussion of final status issues and cautioned against “interim solutions designed
to delay reaching a full and comprehensive solution.” Hamas, the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,
and the Popular Resistance Committees jointly claimed responsibility for an attack at the
Israel-Gaza crossing on January 14. Sharon gave Abbas a chance to act, and he later
deployed security forces to Gaza and reached a one-month cease-fire accord with militant
groups. Israel said that it would halt military operations as long as calm continued.
Secretary of State Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7. She praised the Israelis’
“historic” disengagement decision, discussed the need to carry out obligations concerning
settlements and outposts, and warned them not to undermine Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen.
William Ward as Middle East Security Coordinator and emphasized the importance of
Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. Rice did not attend a February 8 meeting of Sharon,
Abbas, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian King Abdullah II in Sharm al-
Shaykh, where Sharon and Abbas declared the end of violence and military operations.
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On February 20, the Israeli cabinet adopted a revised route for the security barrier closer
to the pre-1967 border in some areas, taking about 7 to 8% of the West Bank to envelope
major settlement blocs. On March 16, Israel handed Jericho over to PA control. On March
17, 13 Palestinian groups agreed to extend the “calm” or informal truce until the end of the
year if Israel stops military operations against Palestinians and frees all prisoners. On March
21, Israeli forces transferred Tulkarem to PA control.
On March 20, it was reported that the Israeli defense minister had approved the building
of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem,
in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from
Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern and southern West Bank, and
prevent a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary Rice asserted that the plan was “at
odds with American policy.” On April 4, however, Sharon told a Knesset committee, “There
is a need to carry out construction in the E-1 corridor.” On April 11, when he met Sharon,
the President conveyed his “concern that Israel not undertake any activity that contravenes
Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.” Mr. Bush strongly supported
Israel’s plan to disengage from Gaza. He repeated that “new realities on the ground” make
it “unrealistic” to think that a final settlement would lead to a return to 1949 borders, but this
was to be agreed with the Palestinians. Sharon restated his support for a democratic
Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and his position that Israel would proceed with the
Roadmap only after the Palestinians act against terror. He stated, “It is the position of Israel
that the major Israeli population centers will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status
agreement” and declared that Ma’ale Adumim is a major population center, and therefore,
Israel is interested in contiguity between it and Jerusalem.
On April 15, the Quartet appointed outgoing World Bank President James Wolfensohn
to be their Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas at the White House and said that “changes to
the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to.” He reaffirmed, “A viable two-state
solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not
work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the
position of the United States today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of
final status negotiations.” He said, “Israel should not undertake any activity that contravenes
Roadmap obligations or prejudices final status negotiations.... Therefore, Israel must remove
unauthorized outposts and stop settlement expansion. The barrier being erected by Israel ...
must be a security, rather than political, barrier.” Abbas said that the boundaries of a future
state should be those of before the 1967 war. He asserted, “there is no justification for the
wall and it is illegitimate.” He also stated that the PA was ready to coordinate the Gaza
disengagement with Israel and called for moving immediately thereafter to final status
negotiations. President Bush noted that Israel’s disengagement “presents an opportunity to
lay the groundwork for a return to the Roadmap,” which is a phased process.
At a June 21 meeting with Abbas in Jerusalem, Sharon expressed disappointment with
the PA’s inaction against escalating violence. Israeli forces stepped up operations against
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Gen. Ward told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
the Palestinians did not yet have the ability to combat terrorism, while Assistant Secretary
of State Welch observed that Palestinian performance had been far from satisfactory.
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On July 10, the Israeli cabinet approved the final route of the security barrier around
Jerusalem, ensuring a Jewish majority in the city, while 55,000 Palestinian residents, or one-
quarter of the Arab population of East Jerusalem, are left outside and Ma’ale Adumim
remains on the Israeli side.
PIJ claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Netanya on July 12, killing 5 and
injuring more than 90. Israeli forces then launched operations against the PIJ, reoccupying
Tulkarem and closing the West Bank. Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire
against settlements in Gaza and towns in southern Israel. Israel helicopters fired missiles at
targets in Gaza and the West Bank.
On July 22, Secretary Rice met Sharon and encouraged him to coordinate the
disengagement with the Palestinians. On August 4, an Israeli army deserter opposed to the
disengagement killed four Israeli Arabs and injured 13 on a bus in northern Israel. On
August 15, Defense Minister Mofaz said that the settlement blocs to be kept include Ma’ale
Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan Shaqed —
all are within or expected to be within the security barrier. He added that Israel would retain
the Jordan Rift Valley to guarantee Israel’s eastern border.
Israel evacuated all of its settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the
northern West Bank between August 17 and August 23. (See CRS Report RS22000, Israel’s
Disengagement from Gaza, by Carol Migdalovitz.) On August 17, a settler opposed to the
disengagement shot four Palestinians at the West Bank settlement of Shiloh. On August 24,
the Israeli military ordered the seizure of Palestinian land to extend the security barrier in the
West Bank around Ma’ale Adumim and link it to Jerusalem. On August 29, Sharon declared
that there would be no further unilateral or coordinated disengagements and that the next step
must be negotiations under the Road Map. He affirmed that while the large blocs of
settlements will remain in Israeli hands and linked territorially to Israel, not all West Bank
settlements will remain; but this will be decided in the final stage of negotiations.
On September 15, the Israeli High Court of Justice ordered the government to
reconsider the route of the separation fence in the northern West Bank to better balance
security needs with Palestinians’ human rights. It held that the fence need not be built within
the 1967 borders, but could be built in the West Bank and connect settlements to Israel.
On September 19, Sharon told an American Jewish group that the United States had
“never supported” the building of or in settlements, but all Israeli governments had built
anyway. After an upsurge in Hamas rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel, the group
announced on September 25 that it would halt operations from Gaza, but on September 27,
it claimed responsibility for kidnaping and killing an Israeli settler in Ramallah. Israel
responded with week-long air and artillery strikes, closure of charities linked to terror groups,
and mass arrests, including likely Hamas candidates, and targeted killings of terrorists. On
September 27, a Sharon advisor said that if an impasse continues, “we might consider turning
disengagement into a strategy. Israel would determine its borders independently.” On
September 29, however, Sharon insisted that Israel would “work to advance the diplomatic
process solely via the Road Map. Any additional territorial changes will be discussed and
decided upon only in the framework of negotiations on a permanent agreement.... (T)here
will not be any further unilateral territorial moves.”
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On October 17, James Wolfensohn wrote to Quartet officials that “without a dramatic
improvement in Palestinian movement and access, without appropriate security arrangements
for Israel, the economic revival essential to resolution of the conflict will not be possible.”
On October 20, at the White House, President Bush pressed Abbas to “confront the
threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,” but did not publicly urge him
to prevent Hamas from participating in the parliamentary elections or to request that
candidates renounce violence. Abbas asserted that legislators should be asked to renounce
violence after election. A State Department spokesman later said that “how the Palestinian
political process unfolds ... is a question for the Palestinian people.”
On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in Hadera, on
the Israeli coast. Sharon announced a “broad and relentless offensive” against terrorism. He
ruled out talks with Abbas until Abbas takes “serious action” against armed groups.
On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her that
Israel would not interfere if Hamas participates in the January 2006 Palestinian elections, but
it also would not coordinate with the PA or allow Hamas people to move around more. He
said if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it could
lead to the end of the Roadmap. Only if Hamas disarms and annuls its covenant which calls
for the destruction of Israel would Israel assist the elections and accept Hamas’s
participation. In contrast, Rice asserted that it will be easier to compel Hamas to disarm after
the elections because the entire international community would then exert pressure. She
added that Abbas would lose U.S. and international support if he does not disarm Hamas.
Rice vowed that the United States would not hold contacts with an armed Hamas even if it
is part of the Palestinian administration. On November 15, she announced that Israel and the
PA had achieved an Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza Strip. On
November 25, the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt reopened with
EU monitors and without Israeli on-site security checks or veto power over entrants. The
Bush Administration named Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton to replace Lt. Gen. William Ward as
Middle East Security Coordinator.
On December 5, PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Netanya, killing 5 and wounding
more than 50. On December 6, Israel barred Palestinian entry into Israel for one week,
arrested militants in the West Bank, and began air strikes in Gaza. Israeli officials also
suspended talks with the PA concerning bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza that
were to begin on December 15. (The convoys still had not begun.) They demanded that the
PA act against terrorists and linked the suspension to dissatisfaction with Palestinian
monitoring of the Rafah crossing that, they said, was allowing terrorists to enter Gaza as well
as to fire rockets from Gaza into Israel. On December 23, Israeli forces began to enforce a
“no-go” zone in northern Gaza to prevent rocket fire into Israel. PIJ claimed responsibility
for two suicide bombings at an Israeli army checkpoint in the northern West Bank on
December 28, killing an Israeli soldier.
After Hamas victories in December 15, 2005, Palestinian municipal elections,
speculation increased about the possible effects on the peace process if it achieved similar
successes in January 25, 2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28, the “Quartet”
(United States, European Union, U.N., Russia) stated that a future Palestinian cabinet
“should include no member who has not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to exist
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in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.” On January 11,
Secretary Rice stated, “It remains the view of the United States that there should be no place
in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence,
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.” She cited President Abbas’s hope that
“democratic elections can be a prelude to policies embracing peace, excluding the advocates
of terror and violence, and implementing Roadmap obligations to dismantle the infrastructure
of terror.”
Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke on January 4, and Deputy Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert became Acting Prime Minister. On January 12, Olmert told President Bush that
peace efforts could not progress if terrorist organizations like Hamas joined the Palestinian
government after the elections.
On January 19, PIJ perpetrated a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, injuring 30.
Israel-Syria. Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square
miles of land along the border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law and
administration to the region in December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize.
Syria initially referred to its goal as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty,
preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, and disdained separate agreements between
Israel and Arab parties. Israel emphasized peace, defined as open borders, diplomatic,
cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that 242 applies to all fronts. Syria submitted a draft declaration
of principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement.” Israeli Prime Minister Rabin
accepted an undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s definition of “peace.” On
September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace in exchange for total
withdrawal.” Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Asad announced interest
in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different speeds. In June,
Secretary of State Christopher said that the United States might be willing to guarantee
security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was
ready to talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides inched toward each
other on a withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on
October 27 that he was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal.
On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military talks under U.S.
auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take
topographical features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal.
Israel offered Syria an early-warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Golan
stations, but Syria insisted on aerial surveillance only and that each country monitor the other
from its own territory and received U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed that Syria
demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin said that Israeli troops
must stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its
sovereignty, but government-controlled media accepted international or friendly forces in the
stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were
suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
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A new Israeli government called for negotiations, but said that the Golan is essential to
Israel’s security and water needs and that retaining sovereignty would be the basis for an
arrangement with Syria. Asad would not agree to talks unless Israel honored prior
understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967-
border (as opposed to the international border of 1923). Israeli negotiators say that Rabin
had suggested possible full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s security and normalization needs,
which Syria did not. An Israeli law passed on January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member
majority and a national referendum to approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
In June, Prime Minister-elect Barak and Asad exchanged compliments through a British
writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from “the point where they left off,” with
each side defining the point to its satisfaction. Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met
in Washington on December 15-16, 1999, and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10,
2000. President Clinton intervened. On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli
success in delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and
an early-warning station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over the leak of the summary,
talks scheduled to resume on January 19, 2000, were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman
reported “significant differences remain” and said that it would not be productive for talks
to resume. Barak indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance to withdraw
to the June 1967 border and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and
on the early-warning station. Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main
obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son, Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime
Minister of Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights. In a December
1 New York Times interview, Bashar Asad said that he was ready to resume negotiations
from where they broke off. Sharon responded that Syria first must stop supporting Hizballah
and Palestinian terror organizations. (See also CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S.
Relations and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred Prados.) On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that this
is not the time to begin negotiations with Syria because it is collaborating with Iran, building
up Hizballah, and maintaining terrorist organizations’ headquarters in Damascus from which
terrorist attacks are ordered. Moreover, he observed that there was no reason to relieve the
pressure that France and the United States are putting on Syria.
Israel-Lebanon. Citing Security Council Resolution 425, Lebanon sought Israel’s
unconditional withdrawal from the 9-mile “security zone” in southern Lebanon, and the end
of Israel’s support for Lebanese militias in the south and its shelling of villages that Israel
said were sites of Hizballah activity. Israel claimed no Lebanese territory, but said that it
would withdraw only when the Lebanese army controlled the south and prevented Hizballah
attacks on northern Israel. Lebanon sought a withdrawal schedule in exchange for addressing
Israel’s security concerns. The two sides never agreed. Syria, which dominated Lebanon,
said that Israel-Syria progress should come first. Israel’s July 1993 assault on Hizballah
prompted 250,000 people to flee south Lebanon. Secretary of State Christopher arranged a
cease-fire. In March/April 1996, Israel again attacked Hizballah and Hizballah fired into
northern Israel. The two sides agreed to a cease-fire monitored by U.S., French, Syrian,
Lebanese, and Israeli representatives, but retained the right of self-defense.
On January 5, 1998, Israel’s Defense Minister indicated readiness to withdraw from
southern Lebanon if the second part of Resolution 425, calling for the restoration of peace
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and security in the region, were implemented. He and Netanyahu then proposed withdrawal
in exchange for security, not peace and normalization. Lebanon and Syria called for an
unconditional withdrawal. As violence in northern Israel and southern Lebanon increased
later in 1998, the Israeli cabinet twice opposed unilateral withdrawal. In April 1999,
however, Israel decreased its forces in Lebanon, and in June, the Israeli-allied South
Lebanese Army (SLA) withdrew from Jazzin, north of the security zone. New Prime
Minister Barak promised to withdraw in one year, by July 7, 2000.
On September 4, 1999, the Lebanese Prime Minister confirmed support for the
“resistance” against the occupation, (i.e., Hizballah.) He argued that Palestinian refugees
residing in Lebanon have the right to return to their homeland and rejected their implantation
in Lebanon. He rejected Secretary of State Albright’s assertion that refugees will be a subject
of Israeli-Palestinian final status talks and insisted that Lebanon be a party to such talks.
On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet voted to withdraw from southern Lebanon by July.
Lebanon warned that it would not guarantee security for northern Israel unless Israel also
withdrew from the Golan and worked to resolve the refugee issue. On April 17, Israel
informed the U.N. of its plan. On May 12, Lebanon informed the U.N. that Israel’s
withdrawal would not be complete unless it included Sheba’a farms. On May 23, the
Secretary General noted that most of Sheba’a is within the area of operations of the U.N.
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) overseeing the 1974 Israeli-Syrian disengagement,
and recommended proceeding without prejudice to later border agreements. On May 23, the
SLA collapsed, and on May 24 Israel completed its withdrawal. Hizballah took over the
former security zone. On June 18, the U.N. Security Council agreed that Israel had
withdrawn. The U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) deployed only 400 troops to the
border region because the Lebanese army did not back them against Hizballah. (See CRS
Report RL31078, The Shib’a Farms Dispute and Its Implications, by Alfred Prados.)
On October 7, Hizballah shelled northern Israel and captured three Israeli soldiers. On
October 16, Hizballah announced that it had captured an Israeli colonel. On November 13,
the Security Council said that Lebanon was obliged to take control of the area vacated by
Israel. On April 16 and July 2, 2001, after Hizballah attacked its soldiers in Sheba’a, Israel,
claiming that Syria controls Hizballah, bombed Syrian radar sites in Lebanon. In April, the
U.N. warned Lebanon that unless it deployed to the border, UNIFIL would be cut or phased
out. On January 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to cut it to 2,000 by the end of 2002.
In March 2003, Hizballah shelled Israeli positions in Sheba’a and northern Israel. Israel
responded with air strikes, and concern about a possible second front (in addition to the
intifadah). At its request, the Secretary General contacted the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents
and, on April 8, Vice President Cheney called President Asad. In April, Secretary Powell
visited northern Israel and called on Syria to curb Hizballah. While in Lebanon and Syria,
he urged the cessation of attacks, which stopped briefly and then resumed intermittently, as
did Israeli retaliation. On January 30, 2004, Israel and Hizballah exchanged 400 Palestinian
and 29 Lebanese and other Arab prisoners, and the remains of 59 Lebanese for the Israeli
colonel and the bodies of the three Israeli soldiers.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, September 2, 2004, called for the withdrawal
of all foreign (meaning Syrian) forces from Lebanon. Massive anti-Syrian demonstrations
occurred in Lebanon after the February 14, 2005, assassination of former Lebanese Prime
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Minister Rafik Hariri. On March 5, Asad announced a phased withdrawal of Syrian troops
from Lebanon, which was completed on April 26. On December 28, Israeli jets attacked a
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command base south of Beirut after
rockets fired from Lebanon hit a northern Israeli town. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Al Qaeda
in Iraq claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks; the claim has not been verified.
Israel-Jordan. Of Jordan’s 3.4 million people, 55 to 70% are Palestinian. Jordan
initialed a June 1993 agenda with Israel on water, energy, environment, and economic
matters on September 14, 1993. A peace treaty was signed on October 26, 1994. (See
Significant Agreements below). The border was demarcated and Israel withdrew from
Jordanian land on February 9, 1995. More agreements followed.
On March 9, 1997, King Hussein charged that Netanyahu was “bent on destroying the
peace process....” After Israeli agents failed to assassinate a Hamas official in Jordan on
September 25, 1997, the King demanded that Israel release Hamas founder Shaykh Yassin,
which it did on October 1, with 70 Jordanian and Palestinian prisoners in exchange for the
detained agents. In December 1998, the King lambasted Netanyahu and called for Jordan-
Palestinian coordination, observing that many final status issues are Jordanian national
interests. King Hussein died on February 7, 1999, and was succeeded by his son.
King Abdullah said that the Palestinians should administer the Muslim holy sites in
Jerusalem, a traditional responsibility of his family, and proposed that Jerusalem be an Israeli
and a Palestinian capital, but rejected a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. On November
21, 2000, Jordan stopped accreditation of its new ambassador to Israel because of
“aggression” against the Palestinians. On March 18, 2004, the King met Sharon to discuss
Israel’s security fence and disengagement from Gaza. In February 2005, Jordan proposed
deploying about 1,500 Palestinian soldiers (Badr Brigade) from Jordan to the northern West
Bank, pending approval of the PA and Israel. Israeli Defense Minister Mofaz has said that
the Badr Brigade could train Palestinians in the West Bank. Jordan is training Palestinian
security force officers in Jordan. In February, Jordan sent an ambassador to Israel and, in
March, its foreign minister visited Israel for the first time in four years.
Significant Agreements and Documents
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition. On September 9, 1993, Arafat recognized Israel’s
right to exist, accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Middle East
peace process, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. He renounced terrorism and violence
and undertook to prevent them, stated that articles of the Palestinian Charter that contradict
his commitments are invalid, undertook to submit Charter changes to the Palestine National
Council, and called upon his people to reject violence. Rabin recognized the PLO as the
representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate with it. (For text, see
[http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22579.htm].)
Declaration of Principles. On August 29, 1993, Israel and the Palestinians
announced that they had agreed on a Declaration of Principles on interim self-government
for the West Bank and Gaza, after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, since January 1993.
Effective October 13, it called for Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho; transfer of
authority over domestic affairs in the West Bank and Gaza to Palestinians; election of a
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Palestinian Council with jurisdiction over the West Bank and Gaza. During the interim
period, Israel is to be responsible for external security, settlements, Israelis, and foreign
relations. Permanent status negotiations to begin in the third year of interim rule and may
include Jerusalem. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22602.htm].)
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. Signed on May 4, 1994,
provides for Israeli withdrawal from Gaza/Jericho, and describes the Palestinian Authority’s
(PA) responsibilities. The accord began the five-year period of interim self-rule. (For text,
see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22676.htm].)
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty. Signed on October 26, 1994.
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank — Gaza Strip. (Also
called the Taba Accords or Oslo II.) Signed on September 28, 1995. Annexes deal with
security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation, and the release of prisoners. Negotiations on permanent status to
begin in May 1996. An 82-member Palestinian Council and Head of the Council’s Executive
Authority will be elected after the Israeli Defense Force redeploy from Jenin, Nablus,
Tulkarm, Qalqilyah, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and 450 towns and villages. Israel will
redeploy in Hebron, except where necessary for security of Israelis. Israel will be responsible
for external security and the security of Israelis and settlements. Palestinians will be totally
responsible for Area “A,” the six cities. Israeli responsibility for overall security will have
precedence over Palestinian responsibility for public order in Area “B,” Palestinian towns
and villages. Israel will retain full responsibility in Area “C,” unpopulated areas. Palestinian
Charter articles calling for the destruction of Israel will be revoked within two months of the
Council’s inauguration. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22678.htm].)
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron. Initialed by Israel and the
PA on January 15, 1997. Details security arrangements. Accompanying Israeli and
Palestinian Notes for the Record and letter from Secretary of State Christopher to Prime
Minister Netanyahu. (For Protocol text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22680.htm].)
Wye River Memorandum. Signed on October 23, 1998. Delineated steps to
complete implementation of the Interim Agreement and of agreements accompanying the
Hebron Protocol. Israel will redeploy from the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian
security measures. The PA will have complete or shared responsibility for 40% of the West
Bank, of which it will have complete control of 18.2%. The PLO Executive and Central
Committees will reaffirm a January 22, 1998, letter from Arafat to President Clinton that
specified articles of the Palestinian Charter that had been nullified in April 1996. The
Palestine National Council will reaffirm these decisions. President Clinton will address this
conclave. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22694.htm].)
Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. (Also called Wye II.) Signed on September 4,
1999. (For text, see [http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm].)
A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Presented to Israel and the Palestinian Authority on April
30, 2003, by the Quartet (i.e., the United States, European Union, United Nations, and
Russia). To achieve a comprehensive settlement in three phases by 2005. Phase I calls for
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the Palestinians to unconditionally end violence, resume security cooperation, and undertake
political reforms, and for Israel to withdraw from areas occupied since September 28, 2000,
and to freeze all settlement activity. Phase II will produce a Palestinian state with provisional
borders. Phase III will end in a permanent status agreement and end of the conflict. (For
text, see [http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm].)
Agreement on Movement and Access. From the Gaza Strip, reached on
November 15, 2005, calls for reopening the Rafah border crossing to Egypt with European
Union monitors on November 25, live closed circuit TV feeds of the crossing to Israel,
Palestinian bus convoys between the West Bank and Gaza beginning December 15, exports
from Gaza into Israel, and construction of the Gaza seaport. (For text online, see
[http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Agreed+docu
ments+on+movement+and+access+from+and+to+Gaza+15-Nov-2005.htm].)
Role of Congress
Aid. (See also CRS Report RL32260, U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Middle East:
Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2006 Request, CRS Report RS22370, U.S.
Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, and CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, all
by Jeremy Sharp.) Unless the President certifies that it is in the national security interest,
P.L. 109-103, November 14, 2005, prohibits aid for a Palestinian state unless its leaders have
not supported terrorism, have been democratically elected, have demonstrated their
commitment to peaceful coexistence with Israel, have taken measures to counter terrorism
and terrorism financing, and have established security entities that cooperate with Israeli
counterparts, as well as aid to the PA. On July 9, 2003, and December 8, 2004, President
Bush waived a similar restriction and granted $20 million each time directly to the PA. On
February 2, 2005, President Bush pledged $350 million in aid for Palestinian democracy and
security programs. P.L. 109-13, the FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations Act, provided
$200 million in ESF, on top of a regular FY2005 ESF appropriation of $75 million.
Congress specified that $50 million of the funds should assist Israel in easing the movement
of Palestinian people and goods in and out of Israel and $5 million in ESF for evaluating
PA’s accounting procedures and an audit of its expenditures. In May 2005, President Bush
transferred $50 million of the FY2005 West Bank and Gaza ESF directly to the PA. P.L.
109-102, November 14, provides $150 million in ESF for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
On February 7, Secretary Rice had announced that $40 million in reprogrammed aid would
be provided via non-governmental organizations for Palestinian social and economic
programs. On July 8, the G-8 group of industrialized countries pledged to raise $3 billion
for the PA per year for three years, from 2006 to 2008. The U.S. share was not specified.
After Hamas won the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Rice said, “the
United States is not prepared to fund an organization that advocates the destruction of Israel”
but that humanitarian aid would be considered on a case-by-case basis.
P.L. 108-11, April 16, 2003, appropriated $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel over
three years to be used only within its 1967 borders. In November 2003, the Administration
deducted $289.5 million from $3 billion in guarantees for the year for spending on the
security fence and settlements. Congress has extended the guarantees through 2008.
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Jerusalem. Israel annexed the city in 1967 to be its eternal, undivided capital.
Palestinians seek East Jerusalem as their capital. Successive U.S. Administrations have
maintained that the parties must determine its fate. H.Con.Res. 60, June 10, 1997, and
S.Con.Res. 21, May 20, 1997, called on the Administration to affirm that Jerusalem must
remain the undivided capital of Israel. Congress prohibits official U.S. government business
with the PA in Jerusalem and the use of appropriated funds to create U.S. government offices
in Israel to conduct business with the PA and allows Israel to be recorded as the place of birth
of U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem. (See P.L. 109-102, November 14, 2005.) The State
Department does not recognize Jerusalem, Israel as a place of birth for passports because the
U.S. government does not recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel.
A related issue is the relocation of the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Proponents argue that Israel is the only country where a U.S. embassy is not in the capital,
that Israel’s claim to West Jerusalem, proposed site of an embassy, is unquestioned, and that
Palestinians must be disabused of their hope for a capital in Jerusalem. Opponents say a
move would undermine the peace process, U.S. credibility in the Islamic world and with
Palestinians, and prejudge final status. P.L. 104-45, November 8, 1995, provided for the
embassy’s relocation by May 31, 1999, but granted the President authority, in national
security interest, to suspend limitations on State Department expenditures that would be
imposed if the embassy did not open. Presidents Clinton and Bush each used the authority.
The State Department Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, P.L. 107-228, September 30,
2002, urged the President to begin relocating the U.S. Embassy “immediately.” The President
replied that the provision would “if construed as mandatory ... impermissibly interfere with
the president’s constitutional authority to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.” The State
Department declared, “our view of Jerusalem is unchanged. Jerusalem is a permanent status
issue to be negotiated between the parties.”
Compliance/Sanctions. The President signed the Syria Accountability and
Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, P.L. 108-175, on December 12, 2003, to hold Syria
accountable for its conduct, including actions that undermine peace. On May 11, 2004, and
May 5, 2005, he issued executive orders to impose sanctions on Syria.
Other. H.Res. 575, passed in the House on December 16, 2005, asserts, inter alia, that
terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, should not be permitted to participate in the January
25, 2006, Palestinian parliamentary elections.
Several pieces of legislation were introduced in reaction to Hamas’s election victory.
H.R. 4668, introduced on January 31, would limit assistance to the PA unless the President
certifies that it is not controlled by a foreign terrorist organization, recognizes Israel’s right
to exist, disarms militias, and renounces violence, etc. H.R. 4681, introduced on February
1, would limit assistance to the PA while demanding that it undertake specific anti-terrorism
measures. The bill also would withhold U.S. contributions to the U.N. proportionate to U.N.
aid to the PA and impose visa and travel restrictions on PA and PLO officials. S.Con.Res.
79, introduced on February 1, would express the sense of Congress that no assistance should
be provided directly to the PA if a party calling for the destruction of Israel holds a majority
of its parliamentary seats. S. 2237, introduced on February 1, would withhold assistance
until the PA takes specific anti-terrorism steps and Hamas amends its Covenant.
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