Figure 1. Israel: Map and Basic Facts

Figure 2. Israeli Knesset

Source: Economist.

Figure 32. Greater Jerusalem

Note: All locations and lines are approximate.

Figure 43. Jerusalem: Old City, U.S.-Relevant Sites, and Some Other Sites

Note: All locations and lines are approximate.

Figure C-1. Eastern Mediterranean Energy Resources Map

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of the Geographer, Geographic Information Unit.

Notes: Boundaries and locations are approximate and not necessarily authoritative.

Figure C-2. Israel's Primary Energy Consumption Mix

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2014.

Notes: The percentage figures in parentheses represent changes between 2012 and 2013 figures. The percentage figures outside parentheses represent the 2013 figures. In 2013, Israel's total primary energy consumption was 24.2 million tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe), compared with 24.8 mtoe in 2012.

Figure C-3. Israel's Natural Gas Production, Imports, and Consumption

Source: Cedigaz, Statistical Database, accessed on February 23, 2015.

Note: Production plus imports equals consumption, given that Israel does not presently export natural gas.

CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

For a figure showing the various strains in Israeli politics over time, see a table in "The evolution of Israeli politics," economist.com, March 15, 2015.

Haim Malka, Crossroads: The Future of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011, p. 19Kramer, op. cit.

Most of these Russian-speaking emigrants are Ashkenazi and tend to be secular, but are generally more sympathetic with right-leaning parties than with the old Ashkenazi elite. Now that post-Soviet emigration flows have largely ended, growth in the Russian-speaking population of Israel has slowed and the overall demographic trend may now be one of decline or approaching decline.

Military service remains compulsory for most Jewish Israeli young men and women, and most Jewish Israeli men remain on reserve duty until the age of 40 (for soldiers) or 45 (for officers).

For a profile of Rivlin, see "Profile: Israel's President-elect Reuven Rivlin," BBC News, June 10, 2014.

Much of the information for this textbox comes from Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, "Elections in Israel–February 2009," February 10, 2009. See also "A beginner's guide to Israel's elections," Ynetnews, February 5, 2015; Ruth Levush, "FALQs: Israel's Upcoming 2015 General Elections," Law Library of Congress, March 2, 2015.

For additional details on Israel's campaign finance laws, see Ruth Levush, "Campaign Finance: Israel," Law Library of Congress, July 25, 2012.

The law was reportedly intended to counter Israeli military officers' cultivation of civilian political connections and influence in anticipation of their possible career transitions.

According to one media report, "Under Israeli law, war must be approved by the full cabinet. But the security cabinet, whose secrecy is better enforced, can green-light more limited military 'missions'. Making that distinction depends on whether Israel's intelligence chiefs anticipate an escalation into protracted conflict." Dan Williams, "Netanyahu's new security cabinet may hesitate on any Iran war," ReutersReuters, March 19, 2013. Historically, Israeli prime ministers (including Netanyahu) have appeared to preferdemonstrated a preference for convening the smaller forum for consultative purposes when convening the larger one is not legally required. See, e.g., Eli Lake, "Meet the Israeli 'Octet' That Would Decide an Iran Attack," Daily Beast, March 9, 2012. For a primer on and historical overview of Israel's national security decision making process by a former Israeli security official, see Charles D. Freilich, Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 2012. For a more concise version of the same subject matter, see Charles D. Freilich, "National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Improving the Process," Middle East Journal, vol. 67, no. 2, spring 2013.

Toby Greene, "Opinion: How Netanyahu did it again," Jewish News Online (UK), March 18, 2015Mazal Mualem (translated from Hebrew), "How the once-moderate Likud was radicalized," Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, April 8, 2016.

See subtitled Hebrew-language video interview clip originally from Israel's NRG news outlet at http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000003575164/netanyahu-rules-out-palestinian-state.html"Herzog: Reports of progress toward unity government 'a complete lie,'" Times of Israel, October 4, 2016.

In June 2009, Netanyahu gave a speech at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv that contemplated the possibility of a demilitarized Palestinian state if the Palestinians recognized Israel as the state of the Jewish people and if Israel's security needs were guaranteed (http://www.pmo.gov.il/English/MediaCenter/Speeches/Pages/speechbarilan140609.aspx).

Jodi Rudoren and Michael D. Shear, "Israeli Leader Backs Off Stand on 2-State Option," New York Times, March 20, 2015.

However, the coalition might prove more durable than some observers assert, partly owing to a 2014 bill that increases the difficulty for governments in Israel to be toppled by a no-confidence vote. Neri Zilber, "Benjamin Netanyahu's Grade A Pork-Barrel Politics," foreignpolicy.com, May 26, 2015.

In addition to becoming finance minister, Kahlon heads the Israel Land Authority (transferred from the housing ministry) and the Planning Administration (transferred from the interior ministry), and his party also controls the housing and environment ministries and the Knesset's welfare committee.

J.J. Goldberg, "Bibi's Nightmare: Unruly Coalition Might Fall—or Worse, Survive," Jewish Daily Forward, May 7, 2015.

Shas also leads the religious affairs ministry, and UTJ leads the Knesset's finance and interior committees.

Nathan Guttman, "7 Things About Benjamin Netanyahu's New Cabinet," Jewish Daily Forward, May 7, 2015.

Much of the information in this textbox comes from Allyn Fisher-Ilan, "FACTBOX-Legislative plans under Netanyahu's coalition government," Reuters, May 8, 2015.

Guttman, op. cit.

Shaked, a secular politician who began her career as a software engineer, once worked with Naftali Bennett on Netanyahu's staff (during Netanyahu's time as opposition leader) from 2006-2008, and later worked with Bennett to establish the right-leaning Israeli social movement My Israel. She joined the Bennett-led Ha'bayit Ha'Yehudi list for the 2013 national elections, and has gained notoriety for her outspoken nationalistic views. For more on Shaked and her views, see Jodi Rudoren, "A Fast Riser on Israel's Far Right Learns to Shrug Off Her Critics," New York Times, May 16, 2015; Open Source Center Media Note, "Israel: Profiles of Jewish Home MKs Naftali Bennett, Uri Ari'el, Ayelet Shaqed," LIL2015051261896016, May 12, 2015.

Jonathan Lis, "Netanyahu assumes veto power over potential Knesset legislation," haaretz.com, May 31, 2015.

"Netanyahu's new majority: Wafer thin," Economist, May 9, 2015; Zilber, op. cit.

IMF World Economic Outlook database, April 2015.

Ibid.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Israel, generated May 27, 2015.

"How Netanyahu Went from Idealism to Pragmatism on Economic Policy," Knowledge@Wharton Blog, October 10, 2012.

OECD, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, 2015, p. 20.

OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2015: Going for Growth, pp. 223-226.

William Booth, "With Golan fence, Israel closer to surrounding itself with barriers," Washington Post, June 6, 2013; Sharona Schwartz, "Does a Border Fence Work? Check Out the Dramatic Change After Israel Put One Up," The Blaze, November 11, 2013. A proposed fence at Israel's border with Jordan is in the planning and budgeting stages, but given other military and domestic priorities, may take years to complete. Attila Somfalvi, "Can Israel afford Netanyahu's plan for massive border fence with Jordan?," Ynetnews, June 30, 2014; Yossi Melman, "A shared threat," Jerusalem Report, April 6, 2015.

Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut. A consensus among media and analysts' reports is that Israel possesses an arsenal of 80 to 200 nuclear weapons. See, e.g., Timothy McDonnell, "Nuclear pursuits: Non-P-5 nuclear-armed states, 2013," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 69(1), 2013.

Israeli Prime Minister's website, transcript of Netanyahu's remarks at the Jewish Federations of North America's General Assembly, November 11, 2014.

For background information on Iran and its nuclear program, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and archived CRS Report R42443, Israel: Possible Military Strike Against Iran's Nuclear Facilities, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

A nuclear weapons capability below the threshold of actual weapons production would entail an ability to combine, in a short period of time, fissile material with a nuclear warhead and an appropriate delivery vehicle.

See transcript of testimony from Natan Sachs of the Brookings Institution from the hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 16, 2014, at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA00/20140716/102496/HHRG-113-FA00-Transcript-20140716.pdf.

Netanyahu was invited to speak by Speaker of the House John Boehner, sparking debate over the propriety of both their actions vis-à-vis the White House given the contentiousness of the issue and that Israel was to hold national elections on March 17. Vice President Joe Biden, who would otherwise be entitled to attend the speech in his capacity as President of the Senate, was out of the country when the speech was given. Reportedly, 57 voting Members of Congress, including eight Senators, did not attend the speech.

Israeli Prime Minister's website, Transcript of Netanyahu's speech before a joint meeting of Congress, March 3, 2015.

Ben Caspit (translated from Hebrew), "Yadlin says Iran deal isn't a bad agreement," Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, April 3, 2015; Efraim Halevy, "Obama was right, Iran capitulated," Ynetnews, April 6, 2015.

"Israel and Iran: A Tough Deal to Swallow," Economist, April 8, 2015.

According to the Economist, "Many military chiefs, including the chief of staff, Lieutenant General Gadi Eizenkot, have serious misgivings; the efficacy of such an attack on dispersed underground nuclear plants is doubtful, and Israel can scarcely afford the diplomatic crisis such a brazen challenge to the international consensus would cause." "Israel and Iran: A Tough Deal to Swallow," op. cit.

For more information, see CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

In an April 30 speech, Vice President Biden defended the de-linking of the nuclear issue from other issues in the P5+1-Iran negotiations by drawing the following historical analogy, "Just like arms control talks with the Soviet Union—another regime we fundamentally disagreed with, whose rhetoric and actions were repugnant and unacceptable, whose proxies we forcibly countered around the world—we negotiated to reduce the nuclear threat to prevent nuclear war." Transcript of address by Vice President Biden at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Soref Symposium Gala Dinner, April 30, 2015. 

Questions available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4WmUpzDwUW2Zk5oWHJJT2hHcFpZSm9jcEtrNHAxcWR1SkJZ/edit?pli=1.

Thomas L. Friedman, "Iran and the Obama Doctrine," New York Times, April 5, 2015.

Ibid. In addition, to reportedly address legal requirements to maintain Israel's QME, newly-considered U.S. arms sales to Gulf Arab states will apparently not include certain high-performance items that Israel has purchased or plans to purchase, such as F-35 aircraft or GBU-28 bunker-busting munitions. John Hudson, "Israel: Go Ahead and Give the Gulfies Guns," foreignpolicy.com, May 13, 2015.

In an April 6 interview, President Obama said, "I've been very forceful in saying that our differences with Iran don't change if we make sure that they don't have a nuclear weapon—they're still going to be financing Hezbollah, they're still supporting Assad dropping barrel bombs on children, they are still sending arms to the Houthis in Yemen that have helped destabilize the country. There are obvious differences in how we are approaching fighting ISIL in Iraq, despite the fact that there's a common enemy there." "Transcript: President Obama's Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear Deal," April 7, 2015.

It is possible, though not certain, that Netanyahu's outspoken criticism of parameters announced in early November 2013—along with French objections—contributed to a toughening of an interim P5+1-Iran agreement reached then with regard to limiting activities connected with Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak. "Israeli PM urges France to resist pressure, hold to conditions on Iran's uranium and plutonium progress," theisraelproject.org, November 2013.

Matthew Lee, "US withholding details of Iran nuke talks from Israel," Associated Press, February 18, 2015.

The sources for this paragraph are Amos Harel, "Washington, Jerusalem discussing massive compensation for Iranian nuclear deal," haaretz.com, May 20, 2015; and Leslie Susser, "The Challenge: Getting the US Back in Israel's Corner," Jerusalem Report, May 18, 2015. On May 19, 2015, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency published a notification of a proposed U.S. sale to Israel of $1.879 billion worth of munitions and associated parts. Amid speculation that the timing of the sale might connect it either to Iran nuclear negotiations or to the replenishment of Israel's stocks following the July-August 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, an Israeli defense ministry source reportedly denied that the proposed sale is related to nuclear talks or any "conflict in the Gulf region." Avi Lewis, "Pentagon approves massive $1.9 billion arms sale to Israel," Times of Israel, May 20, 2015.

For background information on Syria and Iraq, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics and Governance, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed] et al.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel's Northern Border Poses Challenges," Defense News, May 3, 2015.

Israeli officials have expressed concern about spillover threats to the Golan Heights border area. For basic information on the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) that has monitored this area since the Israel-Syria cease-fire in 1974, but now operates from within Israeli-controlled territory after facing multiple attacks in the area beyond Israeli-controlled territory that it had once patrolled, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/facts.shtml.

Amos Harel and Gili Cohen, "Israel attacked Syrian base in Latakia, Lebanese media reports," haaretz.com, January 27, 2014; Tom Vanden Brook, "Officials: Israeli airstrike inside Syria," USA Today, October 31, 2013; Liz Sly and Susan Haidamous, "Hezbollah warns Israel of retaliation for attack," Washington Post, February 26, 2014.

The initial Israeli strike killed six Hezbollah fighters and an Iranian general traveling with them. Hezbollah retaliatory fire from Lebanon killed two Israeli soldiers, and the Israeli return fire inadvertently killed a U.N. peacekeeper (from Spain) in Lebanon.

Opall-Rome, op. cit.

Isabel Kershner, "Israel Says Hezbollah Military Sites Put Lebanese Civilians at Risk," New York Times, May 13, 2015.

Amos Harel, "Israel's secret weapon in the war against Hezbollah: The New York Times," haaretz.com, May 16, 2015.

Yaroslav Trofimov, "Middle East Crossroads: Syria War Pulls the U.S. and Israel Apart," Wall Street Journal, March 13, 2015. Since the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011, Israeli officials have demonstrated ambivalence as to the outcomes they desire in Syria and the possibility of U.S.-led intervention. Though Israel welcomed the late 2013 Russian proposal for the Asad regime to give up its chemical weapons under international auspices, some Israeli analysts have asserted that lack of significant military action in support of President Obama's "red line" on chemical weapons contributed to uncertainty regarding the regional credibility and influence of the United States and its allies or partners.

"Brussels Jewish Museum killings: Suspect 'admitted attack,'" BBC News, June 1, 2014.

For background information on Egypt, see CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

CRS Insight IN10199, The Islamic State in Egypt: Implications for U.S.-Egyptian Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

Avi Isaacharoff, "Egypt to expand Gaza buffer zone to up to 2 kilometers," Times of Israel, January 6, 2015.

Sinai-based attacks across the border into Israeli territory in 2011 and 2012 highlighted the threat posed by various terrorist groups, including those with links to Palestinian Islamists and global jihadists. Yossi Melman, "The Sinai Imbroglio," Jerusalem Report, August 12, 2013. Additional border incursions have subsequently occurred, and rockets have periodically been fired from Sinai into Israel. Melman, "A shared threat," op. cit.

For information on Hezbollah's capabilities, see CRS Report R42816, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]; "Hizbullah," Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism, May 8, 2015; Isabel Kershner, "Israel Says Hezbollah Military Sites Put Lebanese Civilians at Risk," New York Times, May 13, 2015; Yaakov Lappin, "'Iran is placing guided warheads on Hezbollah rockets,'" jpost.com, March 31, 2015; Yossi Yehoshua, "A ticking bomb awaits Israel on its northern border," Ynetnews, April 26, 2015. For information on Palestinian militants' capabilities in Gaza, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

Ben Caspit (translated from Hebrew), "Israel eases Gaza blockade, hopes for Hamas stability," Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, April 30, 2015.

Ben Birnbaum and Amir Tibon, "The Explosive, Inside Story of How John Kerry Built an Israel-Palestine Peace Plan—and Watched It Crumble," New Republic, July 20, 2014; Edward Isaac-Dovere, "How the Obama peace process went 'poof,'" Politico, April 13, 2014; Nathan Thrall, "Faith-Based Diplomacy," Matter, September 18, 2014.

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs occupied Palestinian territory (UN-OCHA opt), Humanitarian Bulletin, April 2015, Annex: Monthly Indicator Tables, "Conflict-related casualties and violence."

Nir Hasson, "Two Israeli police officers lightly wounded in suspected East Jerusalem terror attack," haaretz.com, May 20, 2015.

Netanyahu has pledged that any peace deal involving possible military withdrawals would be subject to a popular referendum. Additionally, in March 2014, the Knesset unanimously voted to create a new quasi-constitutional Basic Law requiring a popular referendum to approve any peace plan that would relinquish control over East Jerusalem or the Golan Heights.

Akiva Eldar, "Israel's New Politics and the Fate of Palestine," The National Interest, July/August 2012; Peter Beinart, The Crisis of Zionism, New York: Times Books, 2012.

Considerable public debate in Israel takes place regarding Jewish-Arab demographics in Israel-West Bank-Gaza Strip; their potential domestic, regional, and international implications; and possible Israeli options. See, e.g., Leslie Susser, "The Right Touts a One-State Solution," Jerusalem Report, July 29, 2013; PowerPoint presentation dated October 9, 2014, from former Israeli diplomat Yoram Ettinger, available at http://www.theettingerreport.com/Demographic-Scare/From-Demographic-Fatalism-to-Demographic-Optim-(2).aspx.

See, e.g., Gili Cohen, "Top Israeli think tank: If talks fail, Israel should withdraw from 85% of West Bank," haaretz.com, January 28, 2014; Raphael Ahren, "If peace talks fail: Michael Oren's Plan B," Times of Israel, February 26, 2014. This option first gained popularity under late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in the mid-2000s, and was the basis for Israel's 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, but was sidetracked after Sharon's debilitating stroke in 2006 and a number of subsequent security-related and political developments.

Amy Teibel, "Netanyahu Wants Separation from Palestinians, Official Says," Bloomberg, June 6, 2014. During his time as opposition leader in the mid-2000s, Netanyahu had strenuously objected to the idea and supported popular views blaming threats from the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon on previous Israeli military withdrawals.

David Horovitz, "Netanyahu finally speaks his mind," Times of Israel, July 13, 2014.

"'A Palestinian state in the heart of Israel is crazy,'" Washington Post, May 31, 2015. See also Naftali Bennett, "For Israel, Two-State Is No Solution," New York Times, November 6, 2014. Bennett supports the annexation of areas of the West Bank under current Israeli security and administrative control—known as "Area C" in reference to a 1995 Israel-PLO agreement and comprising approximately 60% of the West Bank's territory. "Bennett calls to annex 60 percent of West Bank," Times of Israel, April 27, 2014. See map in CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

See, e.g., Henry Siegman, "Obama's Slim Chance for Mideast Peace," New York Times, May 20, 2015.

"Us and them," Economist, August 2, 2014.

See, e.g., Jodi Rudoren, "Netanyahu Calls International Criticism an Effort to 'Delegitimize Israel," New York Times, June 1, 2015.

Ibid.

U.N. Press Release: "Resolution in Security Council to Impose 12-Month Deadline on Negotiated Solution to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Unable to Secure Nine Votes Needed for Adoption," December 30, 2014. Among other issues, the draft resolution would have affirmed "the urgent need" to attain a negotiated two-state solution within 12 months, and would have "decided" that the solution was to be based on a number of parameters, including "a full and phased withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces, which will end the occupation that began in 1967 over an agreed transition period in a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed the end of 2017." See the text of the draft resolution at http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/a12252711015996d85257dbf00536b1c?OpenDocument.

See CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

ICC Press Release, "The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine," January 16, 2015.

Joel Greenberg, "Netanyahu blasts international court over preliminary probe of war crimes claims," McClatchyDC, January 17, 2015.

It is unclear how the investigation and its findings will be similar to or differ from the UNHRC-mandated investigations undertaken following the December 2008-January 2009 Israel-Gaza conflict, known as the "Goldstone Report" and available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf.

Israel's military has opened a number of criminal investigations into incidents during the conflict in which Palestinian civilians were killed, possibly facilitating potential Israeli efforts to respond to the work of the UNHRC-appointed commission and to forestall potential ICC prosecution. Jeffrey Heller and Dan Williams, "Israel's military opens eight new probes into its Gaza war conduct," Reuters, December 7, 2014; Amos Harel and Gili Cohen, "Top IDF attorney: I will never call IDF the most moral army in the world," haaretz.com, April 9, 2015. William Schabas, the Canadian law professor who was initially selected to head the commission, resigned his place in February 2015 after Israel provided evidence that he had previously done paid work for the PLO. U.S. jurist Mary McGowan Davis was named to replace Schabas. "Schabas resigns as head of U.S. Gaza inquiry panel," JTA, February 3, 2015.

"Israel, US boycott UN human rights inquiry on Gaza, West Bank," Deutsche Welle, March 23, 2015.

Text of the summary and cover letter available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.nsf/22f431edb91c6f548525678a0051be1d/554e1cc298b3bfef85257e44005abd18.

See the original July 2005 "call" for BDS from various Palestinian civil society groups at http://www.bdsmovement.net/call. See also Sean F. McMahon, "The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Campaign: Contradictions and Challenges," Race & Class, vol. 55, issue 4, July-September 2014; Marc Tracy, "With All the Boycott Israel Talk, What Is BDS?," newrepublic.com, February 2, 2014;

See, e.g., Jennifer Medina and Tamar Lewin, "Views on Israel Drive a Wedge in Campus Life," New York Times, May 10, 2015; David Makovsky and Raquel Saxe, "BDS's Useless Politics of Confrontation," Times of Israel, May 22, 2015.

See, e.g., Rudoren, "Netanyahu Calls International Criticism an Effort to 'Delegitimize Israel," op. cit.; Peter Beinart, "To Save Israel, Boycott the Settlements," New York Times, March 18, 2012.

Madison Marriage and John Reed, "US pension funds to divest from Israel boycotters," ft.com, May 31, 2015.

Rudoren, "Netanyahu Calls International Criticism an Effort to 'Delegitimize Israel,'" op. cit.

H.R. 4009 (The Protect Academic Freedom Act) from the 113^th Congress would have prohibited institutions of higher education from receiving federal funds if they participate in boycotts of Israeli institutions or scholars.

Marriage and Reed, op. cit.; Sean Savage, "Tennessee General Assembly Becomes First State Legislature to Condemn BDS," JNS.org, April 21, 2015.

Leslie Susser, "European Arm-Twisting," Jerusalem Report, November 17, 2014.

Raphael Ahren, "EU Offers 'Unprecedented' Aid to Israelis, Palestinians for Peace Deal," Times of Israel, December 16, 2013; "Us and them," op. cit.

The United States and Israel both urged the EU to maintain its sanctions against Hamas. In addition to having listed Hamas's military wing on its common terrorist list since 2001, the EU has listed its political wing since 2003. In addition, the EU common terrorist list includes two charities that are believed to be related to Hamas: the U.S.-based Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development; and Al-Aqsa, e.V. (or the Al-Aqsa Foundation), located throughout Europe.

Adrian Croft, "EU to appeal ruling that Hamas should be off terror list," Reuters, January 19, 2015.

Jim Yardley, "Europe's Anti-Semitism Comes Out of the Shadows," New York Times, September 23, 2014.

Bernard Avishai, "Sorry, Bibi. Europe's Jews won't be rushing to Israel anytime soon," Washington Post, February 22, 2015.

"Fear of a new darkness," Economist, February 21, 2015.

"A campaign that is gathering weight," Economist, February 8, 2014. See footnote 223 for information on Israel-EU trade as a percentage of Israel's total trade volume.

Andrew Rettman, "EU states promote settler boycott amid Israel crisis," EUObserver, July 4, 2014.

Susser, "European Arm-Twisting," op. cit.

Prepared testimony of David Pollock, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, "Threats to Israel: Terrorist Funding and Trade Boycotts," House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation, March 5, 2014.

Andrew Rettman, "Mogherini makes light of leaked EU paper on Israel sanctions," EUObserver, November 18, 2014.

Barak Ravid, "European FMs urge policy chief: Label West Bank settlement products," haaretz.com, April 16, 2015.

Sarah Saadoun, "Don't protect Israeli settlement trade," The Hill, May 15, 2015; Melissa Apter, "Home Run for Cardin," Baltimore Jewish Times, April 30, 2015.

Summary of conversation between Netanyahu and Erdogan from Israeli Prime Minister's Office website, March 22, 2013. The May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident involved the boarding in international waters by Israeli commandos of a ship that was commissioned by a Turkish Islamist nongovernmental organization to carry goods to the Israeli-blockaded Gaza Strip. Under disputed circumstances, the commandos reportedly killed nine Turks and an American of Turkish ancestry and injured several others. To normalize relations, Turkey demanded that Israel apologize for its role in the incident, provide agreeable compensation to the victims' families, and lift its closure regime on the movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza. In addition to Netanyahu's apology to Erdogan, negotiations have been conducted regarding compensation, and Turkish officials previously indicated that they might interpret Israel's allowance of Turkish humanitarian aid shipments to Gaza as a lifting of the closure regime.

See transcript of House Foreign Affairs Committee joint subcommittee hearing, September 9, 2014, at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20140909/102629/HHRG-113-FA13-Transcript-20140909.pdf.

David Ignatius, "Turkey blows Israel's cover for Iranian spy ring," Washington Post, October 16, 2013.

Ora Coren, "Israeli trade with Turkey on track to reach record," haaretz.com, July 4, 2014.

"The 'Missed Opportunity' in Israeli-Turkish Trade Relations," Knowledge@Wharton Blog, September 9, 2014. Since the outbreak of conflict in Syria, Turkey has relied on Israel's port in Haifa to help re-route trade traffic that had previously traversed Syrian territory. Lior El-Hai, "Israel has become bridge between Turkey, Jordan," Ynetnews, April 25, 2013.

Malka, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

See, e.g., Michael Eisenstadt, "Resetting the U.S.-Israel Alliance," War on the Rocks, February 5, 2015. But see Richard Klass, "Is Israel Becoming a Strategic Liability," War on the Rocks, January 28, 2015.

Bruck, op. cit.

According to a 2011 report, some U.S. military officers and analysts, including "senior Pentagon officials, generals and independent defense strategists," weigh the "direct military benefits the United States receives from its partnership with Israel … against the geopolitical costs the relationship imposes on Washington in its dealings with the broader Arab and Muslim world; some suggest a net negative outcome for Washington in the equation." Nathan Guttman, "Israel Is Strategic Asset After All," Jewish Daily Forward, November 18, 2011.

See, e.g., Uriel Heilman, "Why the U.S. and Israel are not getting along," JTA, September 2, 2014.

In a February 2015 interview, National Security Advisor Susan Rice said that the scheduling of Netanyahu's March 3 congressional address injected the U.S.-Israel relationship with "a degree of partisanship, which is not only unfortunate, I think it's destructive of the fabric of the relationship." In the same interview, however, Rice also said that Israel is the closest U.S. ally in the region and that the Administration wants the bilateral relationship to be "unquestionably strong, immutable, regardless of political seasons in either country and regardless of which party is in control in either country." Transcript of remarks by National Security Advisor Rice on PBS: The Charlie Rose Show, February 24, 2015.

Sam Stein, "Obama Details His Disappointment With Netanyahu In First Post-Election Comments," Huffington Post, March 21, 2015.

Ibid.

Helene Cooper and Michael D. Shear, "White House Ties May Be Past Mending," New York Times, March 19, 2015.

Stewart Ain, "Congressional Push To Get U.S., Israel To 'Dial It Down,'" New York Jewish Week, April 1, 2015.

Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-4646226?0.

Transcript available at http://www.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-4663248?5.

Transcript of remarks by Under Secretary Sherman at the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism Biennial Leadership Policy Conference, Arlington, VA, April 27, 2015.

The Jewish Virtual Library maintains a page that contains hyperlinked documents, speeches, and reports under the heading "U.S.-Israel Relations: Strategic & Military Cooperation," available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/strattoc.html.

For information on the War Reserves Stock Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) program, under which the United States maintains munitions stockpiles for its own use and for Israel's use in some situations with U.S. permission, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by [author name scrubbed].

For information on the STA licensing exception, see Export Control Reform Initiative Factsheet #4: License Exception "Strategic Trade Authorization" (STA). Available at http://new.export.gov/cms_files/ECR%20Factsheet%204%20-%20STA_Latest_eg_main_047475.pdf. Israel, along with seven other countries, currently has a more limited form of the STA licensing exception.

For more information, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by [author name scrubbed].

Ben Caspit, "Is Bibi's massive fundraising network about to collapse?" Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, July 20, 2016. According to one source, "Ehud Olmert, Mr Netanyahu's predecessor as prime minister, was forced to resign in 2009 over bribery allegations and is now serving a 19-month sentence in prison, while possibly facing further convictions." "Israel's prime minister: The law looms larger," Economist, July 16, 2016:

"Israeli military finds its independent voice under attack," Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 2016.

The shooter, Sgt. Elor Azaria, is being tried for manslaughter in an Israeli military court amid controversy over whether the shooter might have reasonably believed that the wounded Palestinian presented a threat.

"Israel Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon Quits, Says Can't Trust PM Netanyahu," Associated Press, May 20, 2016.

Judah Ari Gross, "Barak flogs Netanyahu, laments 'budding fascism' in Israel," Times of Israel, June 16, 2016.

"After contentious debate, Knesset passes NGO law," Times of Israel, July 12, 2016.

Ruth Levush, "Israel: Laws Authorize Expulsion of Lawmakers Engaged in Incitement to Racism or Support of Armed Struggle Against the State," Law Library of Congress Global Legal Monitor, July 21, 2016.

"Knesset passes law allowing expulsion of lawmakers," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 20, 2016.

Based on data from the International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook Database, April 2016.

Ibid.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Israel, generated September 6, 2016.

OECD, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All, 2015, p. 20; OECD, Economic Policy Reforms 2015: Going for Growth, pp. 223-226.

Ibid.

See, e.g., Neri Zilber, "A Nice, Relaxing Weekend in the Sights of Hezbollah," Tablet, July 12, 2016; Avi Isaacharoff, "10 years after the Second Lebanon War, Israel isn't in Hezbollah's sights," Times of Israel, July 14, 2016; William Booth, "Ten years after last Lebanon war, Israel warns next one will be far worse," Washington Post, July 23, 2016.

For information on various potential threats to Israel's security, see testimony from a House Foreign Affairs Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee hearing dated April 19, 2016, available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-israel-imperiled-threats-to-the-jewish-state/; and Robert M. Danin, "Israel Among the Nations," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016.

Yossi Melman, "Intelligence Report: Israel's strategic position has improved," Jerusalem Report, March 5, 2016.

Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or amimut. A 2014 report examining data from a number of sources through the years estimated that Israel possesses an arsenal of around 80 nuclear weapons. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 70(6), 2014, pp. 97-115. The United States has countenanced Israel's nuclear ambiguity since 1969, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and U.S. President Richard Nixon reportedly reached an accord whereby both sides agreed never to acknowledge Israel's nuclear arsenal in public. Eli Lake, "Secret U.S.-Israel Nuclear Accord in Jeopardy," Washington Times, May 6, 2009.

Kristensen and Norris, op. cit.; "Strategic Weapon Systems," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment – Eastern Mediterranean, March 11, 2016; "Operation Samson: Israel's Deployment of Nuclear Missiles on Subs from Germany," Der Spiegel, June 4, 2012.

"Israel Defence Budget," Jane's Defence Budgets, January 21, 2016. For purposes of comparison, IHS Jane's reports that the U.S. defense budget totals close to $625 billion annually, constituting approximately 3.3% of total GDP.

"Israel approves additional section of Jordan border fence: report," i24news, July 19, 2016; Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel Invests Billions in Border Barricades," Defense News, September 7, 2015.

Michael Herzog, "Israel Confronts the Iran Nuclear Deal," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2455, July 24, 2015.

Danin, op. cit.

David E. Sanger, "A Year Later, a Mixed Record for the Iran Accord," New York Times, July 14, 2016.

Carmit Valensi and Udi Dekel, "The Current Challenges in the Middle East Demand a Joint United States-Israel Strategy," Strategic Assessment, vol. 19, no. 1, April 2016. See also Sanger, op. cit.

U.S. Treasury Department Press Release, "Treasury Sanctions Those Involved in Ballistic Missile Procurement For Iran," January 17, 2016.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Experts: Israel Lacks Leverage Against Iranian Missile Tests," Defense News, March 14, 2016.

Valensi and Dekel, op. cit.

Joe Gould, "US Lawmakers Urge Action on Jet Sales to Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain," Defense News, July 12, 2016.

Parisa Hafezi, "Iran deploys Russian-made S-300 missiles at its Fordow nuclear site: TV," Reuters, August 29, 2016.

See, e.g., Yuval Azulai, "Israel, US conduct joint missile defense trial," Globes, July 6, 2016.

See, e.g., "Israel has hit 'dozens' of Hezbollah arms transfers, Netanyahu says," Times of Israel, April 11, 2016; Anne Barnard, "Lebanon: New Skirmish Between Israel and Hezbollah in Disputed Territory," New York Times, January 5, 2016.

Isabel Kershner, "Netanyahu Welcomes Cease-Fire in Syria, but Adds a Warning," New York Times, February 29, 2016.

See, e.g., Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel, Russia Conclude First Round of Deconfliction Talks," Defense News, October 7, 2015.

Barak Ravid, "Israel Asks Russia to Revise Military Coordination Due to New Russian S-300 Missiles in Syria," haaretz.com, October 17, 2016; Amos Harel, "Without Effort, Russia Restricted the Strongest Air Force in the Middle East," haaretz.com, October 23, 2016.

Nazir Majli, "Russia Admits Drone Entered Israeli Airspace," Asharq al Awsat Online, August 8, 2016.

Micah Halpern, "Swaggering Syria Shoots at Israeli Jets, Flying Toward War?" observer.com, September 15, 2016.

William Booth, "Ten years after last Lebanon war, Israel warns next one will be far worse," washingtonpost.com, July 23, 2016; Identical letters dated May 27, 2015, from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, U.N. Document S/2015/382, May 27, 2015; Isabel Kershner, "Israel Says Hezbollah Military Sites Put Lebanese Civilians at Risk," New York Times, May 13, 2015. Adam Entous, et al., "Hezbollah Upgrades Missile Threat to Israel," Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2014.

See, e.g., Booth, "Ten years after last Lebanon war…," op. cit.; Neri Zilber, "Hezbollah Claims a 'Nuclear Option' in Tense Standoff with Israel," Daily Beast, March 3, 2016; Amos Harel, "Israel's Unlikely Place in a Rapidly Changing Middle East," haaretz.com, March 7, 2016.

Harel, "Without Effort, Russia Restricted the Strongest Air Force in the Middle East," op. cit.; Nour Samaha, "Hezbollah's Death Valley," foreignpolicy.com, March 3, 2016.

Isabel Kershner, "Beyond Borders, Israel Sees a New World of Chaos, Tunnels and Terror," New York Times, February 12, 2016; "Israel and Islamic State: The caliphate eyes the holy land," Economist, January 23, 2016; David Ignatius, "In Middle East, a Serious Game of War," Washington Post, January 27, 2016.

See footnote 29.

See, e.g., Alex Fishman, "Hamas is funding Islamic State in Sinai," Ynetnews, December 14, 2015; Ronen Bergman, "The battle over Sinai: ISIS's next strong force," Ynet Magazine, December 25, 2015.

See, e.g., "Kosher Copenhagen deli targeted in anti-Semitic attack," Times of Israel, April 9, 2015; "Brussels Jewish Museum killings: Suspect 'admitted attack,'" BBC News, June 1, 2014.

"Islamic State head: 'Palestine will be graveyard' for Jews," Times of Israel, December 26, 2015; jpost.com, "ISIS in Sinai threatens Jews, Israel and Rome in new video," August 3, 2016.

See, e.g., Will McCants, "ISIS and Israel," jihadica.com, November 6, 2015; Isabel Kershner and Diaa Hadid, "5 Palestinian Israelis, Said to Be ISIS Supporters, Are Held," New York Times, December 10, 2015.

Avi Isaacharoff, "Egypt to expand Gaza buffer zone to up to 2 kilometers," Times of Israel, January 6, 2015. Albaraa Abdullah, "Did Egypt flood tunnels at Israel's request?" Al-Monitor Egypt Pulse, February 24, 2016.

See, e.g., David Wainer, et al., "Old Mideast Foes Unite Over Gas Deals and Fighting Militants," Bloomberg, July 10, 2016.

In April 2016, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter notified Israel and Egypt that the United States was reviewing its participation in the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai Peninsula. Currently, there are about 700 U.S. personnel serving in the MFO out of an approximate total of 1,600. Richard Sisk, "US Reviewing Troop Presence in Sinai amid Increasing ISIS Threats," military.com, April 12, 2016.

For information on Palestinian militants' capabilities in Gaza, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

World Vision has raised concerns regarding the process and substance of the legal proceedings against its employee, while Amnesty International has said that there have been allegations that the World Vision employee confessed under duress. Joe Dyke, "World Vision urges Israel to try 'Hamas aid' case in public," Agence France Presse, August 30, 2016.

"Israel Kills Palestinian Who Wounded Soldier in West Bank," Voice of America, September 17, 2016. Some U.S. citizens have been killed or injured, prompting the State Department to issue an August 23, 2016, security message to U.S. citizens for Israel, Jerusalem, and the West Bank (https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/israel-travel-warning.html).

Yoav Zitun, "Attack highlights West Bank infiltrators," Ynetnews, June 9, 2016.

Israeli Prime Minister's Office, "PM Netanyahu Orders that Palestinian Authority Payments to Terrorists and their Families be Deducted from Tax Revenue Transfers to the PA," July 1, 2016. Israel periodically delays or withhold tax revenue transfers to the PA over security or political concerns or disputes. Palestinians and some international observers assert that the 1994 Paris Protocol governing such transfers does not permit Israeli delays or withholding. The PA transfers alluded to by the prime minister's office presumably refer to Palestinian payments to persons imprisoned by Israel for terrorism and those persons' families.

In 2014, the Palestinians reportedly shifted the responsibility for making these payments from the PA to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) budget, largely in order to defuse concerns among the PA's international donors about perceptions that the donors might be indirectly associated with the prisoner-related payments. CRS Report RS22967, U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by [author name scrubbed].

Yoav Zitun and Tova Tzimuki, "Lieberman unveils 'carrot and stick' plan against terror," Ynetnews, August 17, 2016.

See, e.g., Uri Savir, "'Delegitimization war' heats up between Israel, Palestine," Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, August 28, 2016.

Ruthie Blum, "Israel's Outgoing Foreign Ministry Chief Dispels 'Myth' of Jewish State's Diplomatic Isolation," Algemeiner, October 20, 2016.

See, e.g., Lahav Harkov, "Netanyahu says Israel's image improving as he defends Foreign Ministry's diplomatic efforts," Jerusalem Post, July 26, 2016.

In the incident, Israeli special forces boarded a private Turkish vessel (the Mavi Marmara) that was en route to Gaza to symbolically challenge Israel's blockade, and killed nine passengers in international waters (a tenth died later from his injuries) under disputed circumstances.

CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Many analysts assert that a Turkey-Israel pipeline would probably traverse Cypriot waters, thus necessitating an improvement in Turkish-Cypriot relations, if not a resolution to the decades-long dispute between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Discussion of a pipeline may also attract the attention of Russia, currently Turkey's largest natural gas supplier.

"Israel and Turkey: Let's try again," Economist, July 2, 2016.

Yossi Melman, "A long way off," Jerusalem Report, August 8, 2016.

Yaroslav Trofimov, "Israel Changes Tack to Regain Friends," Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2016.

See, e.g., Jonathan Greenblatt, "US military aid to Israel makes sense for both countries," September 15, 2016. But see Richard Klass, "Is Israel Becoming a Strategic Liability?" War on the Rocks, January 28, 2015.

See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Israel's Religiously Divided Society, March 8, 2016, available at http://www.pewforum.org/files/2016/03/Israel-Survey-Full-Report.pdf.

Military service remains compulsory for most Jewish Israeli young men and women, and most Jewish Israeli men remain on reserve duty until the age of 40 (for soldiers) or 45 (for officers).

"Netanyahu at War," PBS Frontline, January 4, 2016; Jason M. Breslow, "Dennis Ross: Obama, Netanyahu Have a 'Backdrop of Distrust,'" PBS Frontline, January 6, 2016; Sarah Moughty, "Michael Oren: Inside Obama-Netanyahu's Relationship," PBS Frontline, January 6, 2016.

Dana H. Allin and Steven N. Simon, Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the Future of the U.S.-Israel Alliance, New York: PublicAffairs, 2016.

See, e.g., Susser, "Living in a post-American Middle East," op. cit.; Martin Kramer, "Israel and the Post-American Middle East," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016; Dennis Ross, "Why Middle Eastern Leaders Are Talking to Putin, Not Obama," Politico, May 8, 2016.

See, e.g., William Booth and Carol Morello, "Biden arrives in Israel to talk billions in military aid — and try to patch things up," washingtonpost.com, March 8, 2016; Greg Jaffe and Juliet Eilperin, "Obama's gulf gambit: More military aid to allies could ease regional rifts with Iran," washingtonpost.com, April 21, 2016.

According to the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade, for 2014 the countries of the European Union accounted for 30.2% of Israel's total trade volume, while the United States accounted for 20.5%. Document available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113402.pdf.

Statistics on Israel's status relative to other U.S. trading partners compiled by the U.S. International Trade Commission, available at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/cy_m3_run.asp.

Statistics compiled by Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5081.html.

CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by [author name scrubbed].

The Jewish Virtual Library maintains a page that contains hyperlinked documents, speeches, and reports under the heading "U.S.-Israel Relations: Strategic & Military Cooperation," available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/strattoc.html.

See, e.g., Yossi Melman, "High Stakes Poker," Jerusalem Report, May 2, 2016.

§36(h) of the Arms Export Control Act, which contains the "qualitative military edge" requirement, was added by §201(d) of the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-429). The act defines QME as "the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual state or possible coalition of states or from nonstate actors, while sustaining minimal damages and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or nonstate actors." The details of official U.S. assessments of QME are generally classified.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israeli Brass Decry U.S. Arms Sales to Arab States," Defense News, January 23, 2012. According to this article, the U.S. side of the working group is led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, while the Israeli side is led by the Defense Ministry's policy chief and the Israel Defense Forces director of planning.

Eli Lake (citing Duty by Robert Gates), "In Gates Book, Details of Israel's Hard Bargaining Over Saudi Arms," Daily Beast, January 10, 2014. Gates recounted that he told Prime Minister Netanyahu and then Defense Minister Ehud Barak that they should welcome the sale to Saudi Arabia because of a common Israeli-Saudi interest in countering Iran, and that if the Saudis did not purchase U.S. arms, they might purchase arms from countries (such as France or Russia) that would not include Israel's QME in their calculations. A former senior Pentagon official was cited as saying that Israel's concerns were based on "worries about what might happen if the House of Saud lost power to a more radical regime." Ibid.

Israel Confident F-35 Won't Be Sold To Gulf In Near-Term," Defense News, April 25, 2016; John Hudson, "Israel: Go Ahead and Give the Gulfies Guns," foreignpolicy.com, May 13, 2015.

See, e.g., Dov Zakheim, "Summit to Nowhere," foreignpolicy.com, May 15, 2015.

Ran Dagoni, "Gulf states gain from new US-Israel aid package," Globes, September 19, 2016.

Text of letters available at http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senate-armed-services-committee-members-call-for-urgent-support-to-jordan-in-fight-against-isil. See also Julian Pecquet, "Congress may re-examine special arms deals with Israel," Al-Monitor Congress Pulse, February 5, 2015.

The United States and Israel do, however, have a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (TIAS 2675, dated July 23, 1952) in effect regarding the provision of U.S. military equipment to Israel (see "End-Use Monitoring"), and have entered into a range of stand-alone agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other arrangements varying in their formality.

President Obama, in a February 5, 2012, NBC interview, said while responding to questions regarding a possible Israeli military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities: "I will say that we have closer military and intelligence consultation between our two countries than we ever have. And my number one priority continues to be the security of the United States, but also the security of Israel."an April 2015 interview defending the terms of the upcoming JCPOA, said, "Number one, this is our best bet by far to make sure Iran doesn't get a nuclear weapon, and number two, what we will be doing even as we enter into this deal is sending a very clear message to the Iranians and to the entire region that if anybody messes with Israel, America will be there." Thomas L. Friedman, "Iran and the Obama Doctrine," New York Times, April 5, 2015. In a March 2006 speech against the backdrop of Iran's hostile rhetoric toward Israel and pursuit of a nuclear program, President George W. Bush said, "I made it clear, I'll make it clear again, that we will use military might to protect our ally Israel." Seymour M. Hersh, "The Iran Plans," New Yorker, April 17, 2006.

Additionally, in response to Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel during the 1991 Gulf War, both the House (H.Con.Res. 41) and Senate (S.Con.Res. 4) unanimously passed January 1991 resolutions "reaffirming America's continued commitment" to provide Israel with the means to maintain its freedom and security.

Shmuel Even, "The Debate over Israel's Defense Budget," Strategic Assessment, March-April 2015.

Josh Rogin, "U.S.-Israel deal held up over dispute with Lindsey Graham," washingtonpost.com, September 11, 2016.

"Israel, US said to resolve key sticking points on aid deal," Times of Israel, August 1, 2016.

White House, "FACT SHEET: Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel," September 14, 2016.

Nathan Guttman, "ANALYSIS: $38B Israel Aid Deal Is Political Boon for Benjamin Netanyahu — and Barack Obama," Jewish Daily Forward, September 15, 2016. For information on debate regarding the MOU in Israel, see Yossi Melman, "An Unprecedented Deal?" Jerusalem Report, October 16, 2016.

"Israel, US said to resolve key sticking points on aid deal," Times of Israel, August 1, 2016.

Guttman, op. cit.; Peter Baker and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "U.S. and Israel Seal Huge Military Aid Deal," New York Times, September 14, 2016.

Josh Rogin, "Obama and Israel cut Congress out of the aid game," washingtonpost.com, September 14, 2016.

"Israel announces purchase of 14 more F-35 fighter jets," Associated Press, February 22, 2015.

"Israel Set to Build Wings for Some 800 F-35s," Reuters, August 30, 2010. According to UPI, "Israel Aerospace Industries produces wings, Elbit Systems Ltd. works on the Generation III helmet-mounted display system and the F-35 center fuselage composite components." Richard Tomkins, "Work underway on F-35 for Israel," United Press International, January 11, 2016.

Yossi Melman, "Expensive War Toy," Jerusalem Report, August 22, 2016.

Aharon Lapidot, "After F-35 makes aliyah, it will get new Israeli identity," Israel Hayom, May 2, 2016. "Adir" is a Hebrew expression for "mighty" or "powerful."

See the Joint Explanatory Statement for Defense accompanying P.L. 114-113 at page 119-A, available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/RU/RU00/20151216/104298/HMTG-114-RU00-20151216-SD004.pdf.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel Eyes US Funding To Detect, Destroy Hamas Tunnels," Defense News, April 18, 2016.

"India Chooses Israel Over US for $525M Missile Deal, Sources Say," Agence France Presse, October 26, 2014.

Jen Judson, "Poland Wants Patriot With Different Battle Command System," Defense News, September 6, 2016.

Sean McCormack, U.S. Department of State Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, January 29, 2007. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) significantly restricted the export of U.S.-manufactured cluster munitions. Restrictions on cluster munitions exports have been carried forward to apply to appropriations in subsequent years as well. Since 2008, Israel has been acquiring domestically manufactured cluster munitions.

Some Palestinian groups and other Arab and international governments, along with at least one Member of Congress, have characterized Israeli military operations against Palestinians (such as Israel's 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead, which was directed against Hamas in the Gaza Strip) as acts of aggression. During the 111^th Congress, the Senate and the House overwhelmingly passed resolutions during the week of January 5, 2009 in connection with Operation Cast Lead that supported Israel's right to defend itself (S.Res. 10, H.Res. 34). Representative Dennis Kucinich, however, submitted a letter to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arguing that "Israel's most recent attacks neither further internal security nor do they constitute 'legitimate' acts of self-defense." Office of Representative Dennis J. Kucinich, "Press Release: Israel May Be in Violation of Arms Export Control Act," January 6, 2009.

For background on the Leahy Law, see CRS Report R43361, "Leahy Law" Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

See the text of the Members' February 17, 2016, letter to Secretary of State John Kerry at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000153-c56c-d662-a75b-cfecc6be0000.

See the text of Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifield's April 18, 2016, response letter to Representative Henry C. Johnson at http://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000154-7c2f-d905-a357-7c7f04750000.

Richard N. Rosecrance and Chuck Freilich, "Confronting Iran: A US Security Guarantee for Israel?" bitterlemons-international.org, July 6, 2006. See also Chuck Freilich, Speaking About the Unspeakable: U.S.-Israeli Dialogue on Iran's Nuclear Program, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyFocus #77, December 2007; Malka, op. cit., pp. 84-89.

One Israeli report states figures indicating that approximately 16% (10.2 billion shekels, roughly equal to $2.56 billion) of Israel's total 2014 defense expenditures, which includes expenditures on all security forces (i.e., military, Mossad, Israel Security Agency or Shin Bet) were purchases in foreign currency, funded mainly by U.S. aid. The report stated that Israeli defense consumption for 2014 was about 5.7% of GDP, and that local consumption (defense expenditures not counting foreign currency expenditures) equaled about 4.6% of GDP. Shmuel Even, "The Debate over Israel's Defense Budget," Strategic Assessment, March-April 2015.

"Israel announces purchase of 14 more F-35 fighter jets," Associated Press, February 22, 2015.

Luis Martinez, "U.S. Has Sold Ammunition to Israel Since Start of Gaza Conflict," ABC News, July 30, 2014. WRSA-I stockpiles located in Israel are in excess to U.S. military requirements, and an unnamed U.S. defense official was cited as saying that "the requested ammunition was approaching the end of its shelf life at the stockpile and would have needed to be restocked anyway." Israel supposedly requested the sale on July 20, days after it began its ground operations in Gaza, but the sale was reportedly not requested on an emergency basis, as was a sale from the U.S. stockpile during Israel's 2006 conflict with Hezbollah. See also David Schenker, "Best Friends Don't Have to Ask," Politico, August 14, 2014, claiming that the late July purchase was for "training rather than operational purposes."

Adam Entous, "Gaza Crisis: Israel Outflanks the White House on Strategy," Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2014. According to one report, the Hellfire missile transfer later resumed. "U.S. resumes transfer of Hellfire missiles to Israel after summer holdup," JNS.org, September 30, 2014.

Reports based on Israeli military sources indicate that Iron Dome has had a high rate of success in intercepting short-range rockets fired from Gaza. It is unknown if the United States or another third party has independently verified Israeli claims, and some analysts have debated the claims' validity. For analyses of Iron Dome, see Peter Dombrowski, et al., "Demystifying Iron Dome," National Interest, July-August 2013; Mark Stout, "Israel's Iron Maginot Line System," War on the Rocks, August 4, 2014; Inbal Orpaz et al., "Meet Israel's home-front hero: Iron Dome," haaretz.com, July 18, 2014; David Axe, "Israel's Iron Dome is more like an iron sieve," blogs.reuters.com, July 25, 2014. Although Iron Dome is costly in comparison with the Gaza-based rockets it has intercepted, analysts debate whether the system's cost-effectiveness is better measured by armament attrition or by comparing the system's costs with estimates of damage that would likely occur in its absence. See, e.g., Philip Giraldi, "Is Iron Dome the Maginot Line?" theamericanconservative.com, December 3, 2012; Matthew Fargo, "Iron Dome–A Watershed for Missile Defense?" csis.org/blog, December 3, 2012. For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by [author name scrubbed].

Text of letter from Secretary Hagel to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/234880111/Hagel-to-Reid-Iron-Dome.

"Hackers Plundered Israeli Defense Firms that Built 'Iron Dome' Missile Defense System," KrebsonSecurity, July 28, 2014.

Samuel Gibbs, "Chinese hackers steal Israel's Iron Dome missile data," theguardian.com, July 29, 2014; "Companies Behind Israel's Iron Dome Hacked by China: Report," Reuters, July 29, 2014.

Egypt and Jordan have been routinely held out as examples showing that even if making peace with Israel was unpopular with the countries' populations, their autocratic or monarchical leaders could normalize and maintain relations with Israel without significantly losing their capacity or legitimacy to rule. Israeli concerns may have been mitigated somewhat after the July 2013 ouster of Mohammed Morsi as Egypt's president, but even given Israel's generally positive relations with President Abdel Fattah al Sisi, Israel's leaders may remain more sensitive than before 2011 to the possibility of regional political change.

Azulai, op. cit.

Dan Williams, "Israel to Deploy New 'David's Sling' Missile Shield in Mid-2016," Reuters, December 21, 2015.

Azulai, op. cit. The trial reportedly included such Israeli missile defense assets as David's Sling, Arrow 2, and Arrow 3; and such U.S. assets as Patriot (of which, some batteries have been acquired by Israel), Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and the radar station located in Israel's Negev Desert. The trial was a follow-up to the biennial bilateral "Juniper Cobra" joint military exercise.

Conference report language accompanying P.L. 112-239, the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act; Section 234 of P.L. 113-66, the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel Claims Intercept Success with Sea-Based Iron Dome," Defense News, May 18, 2016.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Still No Sales for Israel's Iron Dome," Defense News, June 14, 2016. See also Yaakov Lappin and Daniel Wasserbly, "US Army trials Israel's Iron Dome interceptor for new air defence system," IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, April 21, 2016.

Singapore Ministry of Defense, "Reply to Media Queries on RSAF's MMR," April 11, 2016.

Ben Makuch, "Canada Just Bought Israel's Iron Dome Radar Technology," Vice, July 29, 2015.

Opall-Rome, "Still No Sales for Israel's Iron Dome," op. cit.

Kristina Wong, "Tim Kaine backs call to boost funding for Israeli missile defense," The Hill, July 26, 2016.

Both the House and the Senate versions would increase funding from Administration requested levels for Iron Dome from $42 million to $62 million, for David's Sling from $37.2 million to $266.5 million, for Arrow 2 from $10.8 million to $67.3 million, and for Arrow 3 from $55.8 million to $204.9 million. For some information on the Congress-Administration dynamics of the process regarding FY2017 funding, see Julian Pecquet, "Obama, Congress hurtle toward showdown over Israel missile defense," Al-Monitor Congress Pulse, April 27, 2016.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr5293r_20160614.pdf?elqTrackId=6EC9CEC95DE185EB4389F47C7BDB2988&elq=b8956db884d14431acb7ea48bb94f526&elqaid=19132&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=11805.

See, e.g., Michael Wilner, "The White House missile aid objection: An MOU negotiating tactic?" jpost.com, June 19, 2016.

22 U.S.C. §2785.

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1996. The 1997 edition of this report said that the design for China's J-10 fighter (also known as the F-10—the designation used in the report) "had been undertaken with substantial direct assistance, primarily from Israel and Russia, and with indirect assistance through access to U.S. technologies." ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1997. See also Robert Hewson, "Chinese J-10 'benefited from the Lavi project,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, May 16, 2008; Duncan L. Clarke and Robert J. Johnston, "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to China, Chinese Behavior, and the Israel Factor: Effective Controls?" Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2, March-April 1999. The Lavi fighter (roughly comparable to the U.S. F-16) was developed in Israel during the 1980s with approximately $1.5 billion in U.S. assistance, but did not get past the prototype stage. In 2000, a planned Israeli sale to China of the Phalcon airborne radar system was canceled under U.S. pressure.

"U.S. Israel Agree to Consult on Future Israeli Weapons Sales - Nations Affirm Joint Commitment to Address Global Security Challenges," U.S. State Department Press Release, August 17, 2005.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S. OKs Israel-China Spy Sat Deal," Defense News, October 12, 2007. This article quotes a U.S. official as saying, "We don't officially acknowledge our supervisory role or our de facto veto right over their exports.... It's a matter of courtesy to our Israeli friends, who are very serious about their sovereignty and in guarding their reputation on the world market."

The most prominent espionage case is that of Jonathan Pollard, who pled guilty in 1986 with his then wife Anne to selling classified documents to Israel. Israel later acknowledged that Pollard had been its agent, granted him citizenship, and began petitioning the United States for his release. Pollard was released on parole in November 2015. The second case is that of Department of Defense analyst Lawrence Franklin, who pled guilty in 2006 to disclosing classified information to an Israeli diplomat and to two lobbyists from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The third case is that of Ben-Ami Kadish, who had worked at the U.S. Army's Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center in Dover, New Jersey. Kadish pled guilty in 2009 to one count of conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Israel.

Jeff Stein, "Israel Won't Stop Spying on the U.S.," Newsweek, May 6, 2014; Calev Ben-David, "Israel Visa Flap With U.S. Stirs Up Spy Charges, Profiling Claim," Bloomberg, May 8, 2014.

"Only Four of 20 Israeli Ministers Openly Declare Support of Two-state Solution," haaretz.com, June 27, 2016.

Jonathan Lis, "Labor Adopts Herzog's Plan for Separation from Palestinians as Party Platform," haaretz.com, February 8, 2016.

The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and provide for the "[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194." The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia, adopted by the 22-member Arab League (which includes the PLO), and later accepted by the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. The text of the initiative is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.

Netanyahu accepted the idea of a two-state solution in principle, but insisted that any Palestinian state would need to be demilitarized and remain subject to indefinite Israeli control of its airspace, the electromagnetic spectrum used for telecommunications, and the Jordan Valley. President Obama's May 2011 speeches calling for renewed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations focused on the issues of borders and security parameters. Netanyahu complained that Obama's proposal to use the Green Line as the reference point for border negotiations did not properly take into account historical Israeli security concerns regarding defensibility of territory.

138 member states voted in favor of Resolution 67/19, nine voted against (including the United States and Israel), and 41 abstained. The PLO has had permanent observer status at the United Nations since 1974. "Palestine" maintains many of the capacities it had as an observer entity—including participation in General Assembly debates and the ability to co-sponsor draft resolutions and decisions related to proceedings on Palestinian and Middle East issues. However, it is not a member of the United Nations, and does not have the right to vote or to call for a vote in the General Assembly. For more information on this resolution and various Palestinian international initiatives, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]; CRS Report R43614, Membership in the United Nations and Its Specialized Agencies, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report R42999, The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

However, the PLO's fall 2011 application to obtain membership in the United Nations has not cleared the U.N. Security Council's membership committee. U.N. Security Council, "Report of the Committee on the Admission of New Members concerning the application of Palestine for admission to membership in the United Nations," S/2011/705, November 11, 2011.

U.N. Press Release: "Resolution in Security Council to Impose 12-Month Deadline on Negotiated Solution to Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Unable to Secure Nine Votes Needed for Adoption," December 30, 2014. Among other issues, the draft resolution would have affirmed "the urgent need" to attain a negotiated two-state solution within 12 months, and would have "decided" that the solution was to be based on a number of parameters, including "a full and phased withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces, which will end the occupation that began in 1967 over an agreed transition period in a reasonable timeframe, not to exceed the end of 2017." See the text of the draft resolution at http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/5ba47a5c6cef541b802563e000493b8c/a12252711015996d85257dbf00536b1c?OpenDocument.

Israel's insistence on this explicit recognition has reportedly gained in emphasis over time, and Palestinian officials claim that the demand is a "new addition" to negotiations that was not included at the time the Oslo process began in the 1990s. See, e.g., Dan Perry, "Israeli demand sparks 'Jewish state' debate," Associated Press, February 21, 2014; Jodi Rudoren, "Sticking Point in Peace Talks: Recognition of a Jewish State," New York Times, January 1, 2014. In May 8, 2014, remarks, then U.S. Special Envoy for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Martin Indyk said that Israeli insistence on recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people was introduced into an Israeli-Palestinian negotiating context by Tzipi Livni when she was Israeli foreign minister during the 2007-2008 Annapolis process. The Pursuit of Middle East Peace: A Status Report, Ambassador Martin Indyk, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 8, 2014.

Elhanan Miller, "Arab ministers back Abbas in rejecting 'Jewish' Israel," Times of Israel, January 13, 2014. The United States sometimes seeks regional Arab support on certain positions that are domestically unpopular with Palestinians, probably in order to create political space for PLO leaders to more seriously consider accepting these positions or to apply pressure on them to do so. In April 2013, representatives of the Arab League agreed that land swaps could be an element of a conflict-ending agreement between Israel and the PLO. For information on the Arab Peace Initiative, see footnote 151138.

See, e.g., "Don't forget what we lost, too," Economist, February 15, 2014. In the 112^th Congress, Representative Jerrold Nadler sponsored H.R. 6242 ("To direct the President to submit to Congress a report on actions the executive branch has taken relating to the resolution of the issue of Jewish refugees from Arab countries."). The bill garnered 10 co-sponsors.

In a January 2014 interview for a conference held by Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, Abbas said that he could accept a "transitional period" (presumably applying to Jordan Valley security) of no more than three years for Israel to gradually withdraw, at which point a third party—Abbas proposed NATO—could take Israel's place as a security guarantor. Footage with English translation available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cx9tY8JU1kQ&list=PLCapdZwzDpNlwSoHcbkXL9sMVbQcQMaQ-.

Shimon Shiffer, "Ya'alon: Kerry should win his Nobel and leave us alone," Ynetnews, January 14, 2014. Israeli Defense Minister Ya'alon reportedly responded to proposals by the Kerry-Allen team as follows: "You presented us with a plan that is based on sophisticated technology, on satellites, sensors, war rooms with television screens—without a presence of our troops on the ground. And I ask you—how will technology respond when a Salafist or Islamic Jihad cell tries to commit a terror attack against Israeli targets? ... Which satellites will handle the rocket industry developing today ... that will be fired at Tel Aviv and central Israel?" Josef Federman, "Israeli defense chief comments spark spat with US," Associated Press, January 14, 2014.

William Booth, "Israel says Palestinians push a 'culture of hate' that could undermine talks," Washington Post, January 7, 2014.

Nahum Barnea, "Netanyahu's secret peace offer concessions to Palestinians revealed," Ynetnews, March 6, 2015. Its partial publication may have at least partly motivated Netanyahu's skeptical remarks regarding prospects for a two-state solution near the end of the campaign.

An unnamed senior official in Netanyahu's office was cited as saying that the document leaked reflected American positions, not Netanyahu's. Linda Gradstein, "Netanyahu rules out Palestinian state based out '67 borders with swaps in order to shore up right flank," Media Line, March 9, 2015.

Jack Khoury and Barak Ravid, "Palestinians reject Netanyahu's proposal to discuss settlement borders," haaretz.com, May 26, 2015.

For more information on the consensus PA government, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed].

Philip Gordon, "Netanyahu, not Obama, has the power to make peace," Financial Times, May 7, 2015.

Barak Ravid, citing French daily Le Figaro, in "Report: French UN resolution sets 18-month deadline for Israeli-Palestinian deal," haaretz.com, May 20, 2015.

David Makovsky, "Netanyahu Loses Leverage in Forming New Government," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 2421, May 8, 2015.

See, e.g., Neri Zilber, "What Will Happen If the Palestinians Really End Security Cooperation?," The Tower, April 2015; Ghaith al Omari, "Preserving Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 10, 2015.

Nadia Bilbassy, "Full transcript of President Obama's TV interview with Al Arabiya," Al Arabiya, May 17, 2015.

Ibid. In a separate May interview, Obama emphasized the importance of "reinvigorating Gaza's connection with the West Bank and reestablishing [the Palestinians'] strong commercial links with Israel and the global economy." "Obama: We are prepared to use all elements of our power to secure our interests in the Middle East," Asharq Al-Awsat Online, May 13, 2015.

White House, Statement by the President on the Memorandum of Understanding Reached with Israel, September 14, 2016.

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, "Obama Prods Netanyahu After Signing of U.S.-Israel Deal," New York Times, September 15, 2016.

The text of the letter is available at https://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/senators-gillibrand-and-rounds-lead-bipartisan-initiative-urging-president-obama-to-reject-and-if-needed-veto-any-one-sided-resolutions-at-the-united-nations. 394 Representatives signed a similar letter to President Obama in April 2016. Its text is available at http://kaygranger.house.gov/sites/granger.house.gov/files/Letter%20to%20President%20Obama%20supporting%20direct%20negotiations%20%E2%80%93%20signed%20by%20394%20Members%20of%20Congress_1.pdf.

Zvi Magen and Udi Dekel, "Russia's Initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian Process: Another Move to Regain Influence in the Middle East," Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 853, September 13, 2016.

Susser, "The Netanyahu enigma," op. cit.

See, e.g., Uri Savir (translated from Hebrew), "Have Arab leaders forgotten about Palestine?" Al-Monitor Israel Pulse, July 10, 2016.

See, e.g., Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "How far can they go?," Jerusalem Report, June 27, 2016. The Arab Peace Initiative offers a comprehensive Arab peace with Israel if Israel were to withdraw fully from the territories it occupied in 1967, agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state with a capital in East Jerusalem, and provide for the "[a]chievement of a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194." The initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia, adopted by the 22-member Arab League (which includes the PLO), and later accepted by the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference (now the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) at its 2005 Mecca summit. The text of the initiative is available at http://www.bitterlemons.org/docs/summit.html.

Adnan Abu Amer (translated from Arabic), "Is the PA coordinating arrests with Israel?," Al-Monitor Palestine Pulse, April 28, 2016; Joshua Davidovich, "Days of death and destruction," Times of Israel, July 3, 2016.

Ben Lynfield, "Creating chaos," Jerusalem Report, September 5, 2016.

Jordan had occupied these areas militarily since 1948, and unilaterally annexed them and the entire West Bank in 1950. It only ceded its claims in 1988—to the PLO.

In 1980, under the first Likud Party government, the Israeli Knesset passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem—Capital of Israel, which declares "Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel." See http://www.mfa.gov.il for the complete text of the Basic Law. Israel had first declared Jerusalem to be its capital in 1950.

For information on the legal status of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, see http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/legal_status.

Wendy Pullan, et al., The Struggle for Jerusalem's Holy Places, Routledge: New York, 2013, p. 15; Ir Amim and Keshev, Dangerous Liaison: The Dynamics of the Rise of the Temple Movements and Their Implications, March 1, 2013, pp. 12-15.

Jeremy Sharon, "Chief Rabbis reimpose ban on Jews visiting Temple Mount," jpost.com, December 2, 2013.

Pullan, op. cit., p. 37.

See, e.g., Nathan Thrall, "Rage in Jerusalem," London Review of Books, December 4, 2014 (initially published online November 21, 2014)State Department 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom, Israel and the Occupied Territories; Tova Dvorin, "Jordan Pushes Full Control Over Temple Mount, Israel Rejects," Arutz Sheva, October 19, 2015.

See, e.g., "Undivided and eternal unhappiness," Economist, November 8, 2014

Herb Keinon, "Poll: 3 in 4 Israeli Jews oppose a Palestinian state if it means dividingFor text of the Executive Board resolution, see http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002462/246215e.pdf. For information about the World Heritage Committee resolution, see Barak Ravid, "UNESCO Adopts Another Contentious Resolution on Jerusalem," haaretz Jerusalem," jpost.com, October 20, 201426, 2016.

Gil Ronen, "PM Calms Jordan: No Change in Temple Mount 'Status-Quo,'" Arutz Sheva, October 22, 2014Raoul Wootliff, "UNESCO's executive board adopts Jerusalem resolution," Times of Israel, October 18, 2016.

For information on the legal status of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, see http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/legal_status.

"Murder in the synagogue," Economist, November 22, 2014.

The DC Circuit's July 2013 opinion is available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/C8DC59BCC7D10E6D85257BB10051786D/$file/07-5347-1447974.pdf. For more information, see CRS Report R43773, Zivotofsky v. Kerry: The Jerusalem Passport Case, by [author name scrubbed].

State Department 2015 Report on International Religious Freedom, Israel and the Occupied Territories; David Hulme, "Insight: Two Men, One City," Vision, Spring 2007; Herb Keinon, "Abbas denies the Jewish connection to Jerusalem," jpost.com, August 22, 2012; Amir Shoan, "Is Israel losing Temple Mount war?" Ynetnews, February 25, 2012.

See, e.g., "Undivided and eternal unhappiness," Economist, November 8, 2014

Herb Keinon, "Poll: 3 in 4 Israeli Jews oppose a Palestinian state if it means dividing Jerusalem," jpost.com, October 20, 2014.

Gil Ronen, "PM Calms Jordan: No Change in Temple Mount 'Status-Quo,'" Arutz Sheva, October 22, 2014.

For more about the case, see CRS Report R43773, Zivotofsky v. Kerry: The Jerusalem Passport Case and Its Potential Implications for Congress's Foreign Affairs Powers, by [author name scrubbed].

Figures downloadable from Peace Now website at http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/settlements-and-outposts. For information on the planning and permitting process for settlement construction, see http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/planningprocess.

CIA World Factbook estimates as of July 2014.

Jodi Rudoren and Jeremy Ashkenas, "Netanyahu and the Settlements," nytimes.com, March 12, 2015.

For more information on the history of the settlements and their impact on Israeli society, see Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar, Lords of the Land: The War for Israel's Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007, New York: Nation Books, 2007; Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967-1977, New York: Times Books, 2006.

The most-cited international law pertaining to Israeli settlements is the Fourth Geneva Convention, Part III, Section III, Article 49 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, which states in its last sentence, "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." Israel insists that the West Bank does not fall under the international law definition of "occupied territory," but is rather "disputed territory" because the previous occupying power (Jordan) did not have an internationally recognized claim to it, and given the demise of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I and the end of the British Mandate in 1948, Israel claims that no international actor has superior legal claim to it.

"Israel's West Bank housing policy by numbers," Agence France Presse, May 10, 2015, quoting Rabbis for Human Rights.

In a July 2004 International Court of Justice advisory opinion, the barrier's construction was deemed illegal by the International Court of Justice. The text of the opinion is available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pr=71&code=mwp&p1=3&p2=4&p3=6.

See, e.g., Rudoren and Ashkenas, op. cit., quoting Hagit Ofran of Peace Now; Abrams and Sadot, op. cit.

See, e.g., Joel Greenberg, "Israeli settlers evacuated from West Bank outpost following court order," Washington Post, September 2, 2012.

Daniel Kurtzer, "Do Settlements Matter? An American Perspective," Middle East Policy, vol. 16, issue 3, fall 2009.

Nicholas Rostow, "Are the Settlements Illegal?" The American Interest, March/April 2010.

Aaron David Miller, "The Inside Story of U.S. Meddling in Israel's Elections," Daily Beast, December 4, 2014.

For more information on this issue, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by [author name scrubbed].

U.S. and Israeli leaders publicly differed on whether Obama's expectations of Israel contradicted statements that the George W. Bush Administration had made. Some Israeli officials and former Bush Administration officials said that the United States and Israel had reached an unwritten understanding that "Israel could add homes in settlements it expected to keep [once a final resolution with the Palestinians was reached], as long as the construction was dictated by market demand, not subsidies." Glenn Kessler and Howard Schneider, "U.S. Presses Israel to End Expansion," Washington Post, May 24, 2009. This article quotes former Bush Administration deputy national security advisor Elliott Abrams as saying that the United States and Israel reached "something of an understanding." The accounts of former Bush Administration officials diverge in their characterization of U.S.-Israel talks on the subject, but the Obama Administration has insisted that if understandings ever existed, it iswas not bound by them. Ethan Bronner, "Israelis Say Bush Agreed to West Bank Growth," New York Times, June 3, 2009.

"United States vetoes Security Council resolution on Israeli settlements," UN News Centre, February 18, 2011.

White House Press Briefing, December 5, 2014.

See, e.g., a presidential signing statement for P.L. 114-125 (H.R. 644) at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/25/signing-statement-hr-644. For more information, see CRS Report R44281, Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

The report, dated July 1, 2016, is available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/259262.htm. It also lamented terrorist attacks against civilians and Palestinian incitement to violence.

The statement is available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/09/262344.htm.

See, e.g., Isabel Kershner, "Bracing for Battle in a West Bank Outpost," New York Times, October 7, 2016.

Text of letter available at http://meadows.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/meadows-authors-letter-to-president-demanding-answers-on-israel.

This report relied on unnamed "senior Israeli officials" as sources, and said that a "few American officials" later approached did not deny that a meeting had taken place. Barak Ravid, "U.S. mulls harsher action against settlement construction," haaretz.com, December 4, 2014. Possible steps reportedly discussed apparently included the United States potentially refraining from "vetoing condemnatory resolutions against the settlements in the UN Security Council," or potentially issuing "clearer instructions to American officials about the ban on cooperating with the settlements or funding activity in them." Ibid. When asked about the reports at the December 5 White House press briefing, White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest refused to discuss internal deliberations while stating that Israel is a "close and strategic partner" of the United States, that the two countries have "strong and unshakable bonds," and that the United States maintains an "exceedingly strong commitment" to Israel's security.

Elliott Abrams and Uri Sadot, "Settling Settlements," foreignaffairs.com, April 16, 2015.

Report available at http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/ConstructionReport2014Eng_0.pdf. The report documents 3,100 construction starts from June 2013 to September 2014, and 2,243 starts from March 2012 to May 2013 (a 38% increase from one period to the next). The reporting periods are determined by the intervals of time that lapse between Peace Now's receipt of new sets of aerial photos depicting construction.

See, e.g., Rudoren and Ashkenas, op. cit., quoting Hagit Ofran of Peace Now; Abrams and Sadot, op. cit.

Joel Greenberg, "Israeli settlers evacuated from West Bank outpost following court order," Washington Post, September 2, 2012.

22 U.S.C. §2785.

Other customers for Israeli arms include Germany, Spain, France, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Singapore, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Azerbaijan, and Romania. Israel is also reportedly seeking to expand arms exports to Latin America.

Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1996. The 1997 edition of this report said that the design for China's J-10 fighter (also known as the F-10—the designation used in the report) "had been undertaken with substantial direct assistance, primarily from Israel and Russia, and with indirect assistance through access to U.S. technologies." ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, 1997. See also Robert Hewson, "Chinese J-10 'benefited from the Lavi project,'" Jane's Defence Weekly, May 16, 2008; Duncan L. Clarke and Robert J. Johnston, "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to China, Chinese Behavior, and the Israel Factor: Effective Controls?" Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 2, March-April 1999. The Lavi fighter (roughly comparable to the U.S. F-16) was developed in Israel during the 1980s with approximately $1.5 billion in U.S. assistance, but did not get past the prototype stage. In 2000, a planned Israeli sale to China of the Phalcon airborne radar system was canceled under U.S. pressure.

"U.S. Israel Agree to Consult on Future Israeli Weapons Sales - Nations Affirm Joint Commitment to Address Global Security Challenges," U.S. State Department Press Release, August 17, 2005.

Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S. OKs Israel-China Spy Sat Deal," Defense News, October 12, 2007. This article quotes a U.S. official as saying, "We don't officially acknowledge our supervisory role or our de facto veto right over their exports.... It's a matter of courtesy to our Israeli friends, who are very serious about their sovereignty and in guarding their reputation on the world market."

Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel Replaces Export Control Chief After Tech Transfer to China," DefenseNews, January 3, 2014.

Yaakov Lappin, "Report finds failings in defense export supervision," Jerusalem Post, July 18, 2013.

Vivek Raghuvanshi, "India, Israel to Build Missile Defense System," Defense News, February 26, 2015. India faces potential missile threats from Pakistan and China.

"India Chooses Israel Over US for $525M Missile Deal, Sources Say," Agence France Presse, October 26, 2014.

Sean McCormack, U.S. Department of State Spokesman, Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, January 29, 2007. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161) significantly restricted the export of U.S.-manufactured cluster munitions. Restrictions on cluster munitions exports have been carried forward to apply to appropriations in subsequent years as well. Since 2008, Israel has been acquiring domestically manufactured cluster munitions.

Some Palestinian groups and other Arab and international governments, along with at least one Member of Congress, have characterized Israeli military operations against Palestinians (such as Israel's 2008-2009 Operation Cast Lead, which was directed against Hamas in the Gaza Strip) as acts of aggression. During the 111^th Congress, the Senate and the House overwhelmingly passed resolutions during the week of January 5, 2009 in connection with Operation Cast Lead that supported Israel's right to defend itself (S.Res. 10 and H.Res. 34). Representative Dennis Kucinich, however, submitted a letter to then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arguing that "Israel's most recent attacks neither further internal security nor do they constitute 'legitimate' acts of self-defense." Office of Representative Dennis J. Kucinich, "Press Release: Israel May Be in Violation of Arms Export Control Act," January 6, 2009.

Jeff Stein, "Israel Won't Stop Spying on the U.S.," Newsweek, May 6, 2014; Calev Ben-David, "Israel Visa Flap With U.S. Stirs Up Spy Charges, Profiling Claim," Bloomberg, May 8, 2014.

The second case is that of Department of Defense analyst Lawrence Franklin, who pled guilty in 2006 to disclosing classified information to an Israeli diplomat and to two lobbyists from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). The third case is that of Ben-Ami Kadish, who had worked at the U.S. Army's Armament Research, Development, and Engineering Center in Dover, New Jersey. Kadish pled guilty in 2009 to one count of conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Israel.

Tom Cohen, "27 years later, Jonathan Pollard case remains a diplomatic thorn," cnn.com, April 1, 2014.

For information on Israel's nuclear activities, see CRS Report R40439, Nuclear Weapons R&D Organizations in Nine Nations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].

See footnote 32.

Eli Lake, "Secret U.S.-Israel Nuclear Accord in Jeopardy," Washington Times, May 6, 2009.

Barak Ravid, "Israel opts to stay vague on chemical arms policy in wake of Syria disarmament," haaretz.com, October 31, 2013.

Dan Williams, "Eyeing Arab ties, Israel to observe nuclear pact meeting," Reuters, April 26, 2015.

"U.S. blocks NPT conference statement over Israeli objections," haaretz.com, May 23, 2015.

According to the European Commission's Directorate General for Trade, for 2013 the countries of the European Union accounted for 30.9% of Israel's total trade volume, while the United States accounted for 18.6%. Document available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113402.pdf.

Statistics on Israel's status relative to other U.S. trading partners compiled by the U.S. International Trade Commission, available at http://dataweb.usitc.gov/SCRIPTS/cy_m3_run.asp.

Statistics compiled by Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5081.html.

CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by [author name scrubbed].

This appendix was co-authored with [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Energy Policy.

USGS, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, March 2010.

The Leviathan field, located off Israel's northern coast, has an estimated resource base of 21.9 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Tamar holds approximately 10 tcf. Both fields were discovered by U.S.-based company Noble Energy. See Noble Energy's "Eastern Mediterranean" portal at http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/operations/international/eastern-mediterranean-128.html.

Cedigaz, Statistical Database, accessed on February 23, 2015. The imported amount was from Trinidad and Tobago, redirected cargos from Spain, and Nigeria. The imports arrived via a temporary floating regasification import terminal.

Noble Energy website, accessed November 7, 2014, http://investors.nobleenergyinc.com/.

Hedy Cohen, "Regulators present Israel gas compromise to Delek, Noble," Globes, May 12, 2015.

Avi Bar-Eli and Zvi Zrahiya, "Kahlon drops natural gas hot potato, citing conflict of interest," haaretz.com, May 27, 2015.

In June 2013, Israel's government announced that it planned to dedicate 60% of gas produced in Israel to domestic consumption, leaving 40% for exports

"Israel's top court gives government 15 days to respond to appeal against gas exports," Platts, June 25, 2013, online.

John Reed, "Woodside backs out of $2.7 bn Israel gas project," Financial Times, May 21, 2014.

James Paton, "Woodside Scraps $2.6 Billion Israeli Gas Deal as Talks Fail," Bloomberg, May 21, 2014. Noble Energy and its Israeli partners in the Leviathan consortium have explored the possibility of building a liquefaction facility—possibly in Cyprus—to prepare Cypriot gas and Israeli gas piped to the facility for export to Europe and/or Asia in a cost effective way. It remains too early to determine the feasibility of such a project, although a recent downgrade to the gas reserves in Cyprus's offshore Aphrodite field may have decreased the viability or attractiveness of a liquefaction facility. In late June 2013, Cyprus and the Leviathan consortium signed a memorandum of understanding to build natural gas facilities for both domestic consumption and export. Although developments in early 2014 suggested that talks had not progressed on the initial understanding, they are ongoing while a joint venture between Eni (Italy) and Kogas (South Korea) is trying to find additional sources of Cypriot gas for possible liquefaction. "Cyprus to start LNG export terminal discussions with Eni/Kogas, Total," Platts, August 25, 2014.

For discussions of these issues, see Michael Hochberg, "Israel's Natural Gas Sector: A Regional Perspective," mei.edu, April 24, 2014; and Simon Henderson, Natural Gas Export Options for Israel and Cyprus, German Marshall Fund of the United States, September 2013.

Tom Pepper, "Partners in Israeli Gas Field Sign Deal with Palestinians," International Oil Daily, January 7, 2014.

A venture led by BG Group (formerly British Gas) discovered the Marine field in 2000. It has an estimated resource base of 1 tcf. Development of Marine could contribute to greater Palestinian economic and political self-sufficiency, perhaps freeing up Israeli energy resources for domestic consumption or export to other places. Simon Henderson, "Natural Gas in the Palestinian Authority: The Potential of the Gaza Marine Offshore Field," German Marshall Fund of the United States, March 2014. Reduced Palestinian dependence on Israel could either heighten or reduce Israeli-Palestinian tensions.

Shoshanna Solomon and Calev Ben-David, "Israel Sees Gas as Key to Transforming Mideast Relations," Bloomberg, October 14, 2014.

"Noble, Partners Sign Jordan Gas Deal," Oil Daily, February 20, 2014.

"Jordan said to suspend talks with Israel over huge gas deal," Times of Israel, January 4, 2015.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Jordan is pursuing several pipeline deals, notably with Iraq, to help bolster its energy security. One proposal would send Iraqi oil from the area around Basra to the Jordanian port of Aqaba on the Red Sea. If constructed, the pipeline would initially carry up to [1 Mb/d] of oil, including more than 100,000 [b/d] available for use inside Jordan. The plan also calls for a natural gas pipeline to run along the same route as the oil pipeline, with up to 100 million cubic feet per day (MMcf/d) being allocated to help meet Jordanian demand."

John Reed, "Israel gas supply deals to Egypt and Jordan draw closer," Financial Times, May 21, 2014.

Royal Dutch Shell announced plans in 2015 to acquire BG Group.

Summer Said, "Egypt Would Approve BG's Israel Gas Deal If Local Demand is Met," wsj.com, July 7, 2014.

Ibid.

Whether the deal will involve the use of the pipeline that previously provided gas to Israel from Egypt—and fell prey to sabotage in the Sinai Peninsula on multiple occasions—is unclear, due to denials from the company that owns the pipeline. Sharon Udasin, "Eastern Mediterranean Gas: Egyptian pipeline not part of Tamar partners, Dolphinus gas deal," jpost.com, March 23, 2015.

"Fuelling Unhappiness," Economist, May 24, 2014.

Turkey downgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel in the aftermath of the so-called Gaza flotilla incident of May 2010. For more information, see footnote 110.

Solomon and Ben-David, op. cit.

See CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations, by [author name scrubbed]. See also, e.g., Günther Jileki and Kemal Silay, "'Spawn of Israel': Erdogan's anti-Semitic obsessions," Ha'aretz, May 22, 2014.

This section was co-authored with [author name scrubbed], Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs.

Tia Goldenberg, "Israel faces geopolitical tangle with natural gas," Daily Star (Lebanon), March 29, 2013.

The armistice line is not the final agreed border between Lebanon and Israel, but coastal points on the line appear likely to be incorporated into any future Lebanon-Israel border agreement.

For additional information, see CRS Report R42816, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]. See also James Stocker, "No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern Mediterranean," Middle East Journal, vol. 66, no. 4 (autumn 2012), pp. 579-597.