Contents

• Overview and Bilateral Relations
• U.S.-Kuwaiti Defense Relations
• U.S.-Kuwaiti Economic Relations
• Congress and Kuwait
• Kuwait's History and Politics
• Political System
• 2023 Succession, 2024 Election, and Assembly Suspension
• Human Rights
• Women's Rights
• Trafficking in Persons
• Religious Freedom and Tolerance
• Kuwait's Foreign Policy
• Kuwait and Russia's War against Ukraine
• Kuwait and China
• Kuwait and its Neighbors
• Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues
• Resources and Climate Change
• Outlook

Summary

The Persian Gulf emirate of Kuwait derives its global influence from its large oil and natural gas reserves, its sizeable sovereign financial resources, its strategic location, and its diplomatic outreach and posture in international and regional organizations. Kuwait's oil reserves amount to more than 7% of global proven reserves, and at current production rates, its reserves would last through this century. Kuwait's 1.3 million citizens are mostly Sunni Muslim, and its Shia Muslim minority (~30%) has participated peacefully in politics.

Kuwait's Emir (Head of State), Shaykh Mishaal al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah (born 1940), succeeded his late half-brother in December 2023. The Al Sabah family has exercised authority in Kuwait since the 18^th century. A succession in 2006 rebalanced power in the Al Sabah family, and future succession arrangements are uncertain. Kuwait's politics have been under strain for years, amid differences between the executive and legislative branches of government, within the ruling family, and among different constituencies. Kuwait's National Assembly has long been the most constitutionally empowered and politically influential legislative body among the Arab Gulf states, and Kuwaiti citizens have been more politically engaged and active relative to their Gulf counterparts.

On May 10, 2024, the Emir issued a decree dissolving the elected National Assembly and suspending several articles of the 1962 constitution for a period of up to four years, citing perceived challenges to his authority and long-standing executive-legislative impasses. The decree further called for a review of the practice of democracy in Kuwait. Previous emirs took similar steps twice in the past, suspending the legislature and specific constitutional articles from 1976 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1992. The current Emir's order suspends additional articles that may enable the government to rule by decree, amend or issue laws, and implement executive decisions without future legislative review. The decree may allow Kuwaiti leaders to enact economic and public sector reforms while adapting the constitution to current conditions. However, Kuwaiti leaders may face domestic opposition and international scrutiny if changes erode the rights and responsibilities that Kuwaiti citizens have long maintained under the country's unique consultative system. The Emir has tasked the government he appointed following the Assembly's suspension with implementing development, fiscal reform, anticorruption, and service improvement measures. On June 1, 2024, Emir Sheikh Mishal Al Ahmad Al Jaber Al Sabah appointed Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Sabah as Crown Prince and heir apparent.

U.S. relations with the State of Kuwait have been close since the United States led a multinational coalition that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi forces in 1991. Defense cooperation serves as the centerpiece of U.S.-Kuwaiti partnership. The United States has U.S. military personnel deployed in Kuwait on a lasting and rotational basis, along with forward operational commands and U.S. military equipment pursuant to a bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement and an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Germany, Japan, and South Korea are the only countries that host more U.S. forces than Kuwait, if rotational forces are included. The Kuwaiti government pays some of the cost of the U.S. military presence in Kuwait.

U.S. foreign and defense assistance to Kuwait has been limited, and since the 1990s, Congress has considered legislation addressing bilateral relations relatively infrequently. President George W. Bush designated Kuwait as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2004, making Kuwait eligible to purchase certain U.S. arms, receive excess defense articles (EDA), and engage in defense research cooperation with the United States. Proposed U.S. foreign military sales to Kuwait since 2020 have included U.S. construction services for the Ministry of Defense headquarters, Patriot missile system upgrades, Apache AH-64 helicopters, and land and air force munitions. The Biden Administration notified the 118^th Congress of more than $2 billion in proposed foreign military sales to Kuwait.

Kuwait has responded to the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks on Israel and ensuing Israel-Hamas war by reiterating its solidarity with Palestinians, criticizing Israeli military actions, calling for an immediate ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access, and restating support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Members of Congress may review developments in Kuwait and U.S.-Kuwait relations in the context of overseeing U.S. diplomacy and defense policy, including efforts to ensure security of the global energy supply, deter aggression, promote accountable governance and human rights, respond to humanitarian crises, and deescalate conflicts in the Middle East region.

Overview and Bilateral Relations

The U.S. Department of State has described the U.S.-Kuwait relationship as warm and multifaceted.¹ Bilateral ties have remained close since the U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait in the 1991 Gulf War (see text box below). The United States and Kuwait hosted the sixth U.S.-Kuwait Strategic Dialogue virtually in December 2024.² In October 2023, the U.S. Senate confirmed Karen Sasahara as U.S. Ambassador to Kuwait. During the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Kuwait chartered flights from its national airline to assist in the evacuation of U.S. personnel and Afghan employees from Afghanistan and facilitated the onward transit of 5,000 Afghans through its territory.³ Kuwaiti-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation has deepened since the early 2000s. According to the Institute of International Education, approximately 5,100 Kuwaiti students enrolled in U.S. higher education institutions during the 2023/2024 academic year, a roughly 14% decline since the 2021/2022 period.⁴

Figure 1. Map of Kuwait

Source: CRS, using State Department and ESRI data. Note: Energy fields and boundaries approximate.

U.S.-Kuwaiti Defense Relations

As of 2025, thousands of U.S. military personnel are in Kuwait at the invitation of the Kuwaiti government, which pays some of the cost of the U.S. military presence.⁵ On January 20, 2025, the U.S. State Department reported that "approximately 13,500 U.S. forces are based in Kuwait, primarily at Camp Arifjan and Ali al-Salem Air Base."⁶ Kuwait hosts the forward headquarters of U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT) and the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR), which supports Iraqi and Syrian partner forces in operations against the remnants of the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) organization. When rotational forces are included in the count, only Germany, Japan, and South Korea currently host more U.S. forces than Kuwait. A bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement is in place. The U.S.-Kuwait Joint Military Committee, met in Kuwait in May 2024.

U.S. forces affiliated with Task Force Spartan/Operation Spartan Shield also operate in Kuwait, for deterrence purposes and to build regional partner capacity. The 401^st Army Field Support Battalion–Kuwait manages pre-positioned U.S. Army stocks in Kuwait, and Kuwait-based stockpiles have been used to support Ukraine under drawdown authorities. Proposed U.S. foreign military sales to Kuwait since 2020 have included U.S. construction services for the Ministry of Defense headquarters, various Patriot missile system upgrades, Apache AH-64 helicopters, and land and air force munitions, follow-on support, and services.

In March 2025, Kuwait released 10 U.S. nationals who had been imprisoned, including some former U.S. defense contractors convicted on drug related charges. The State Department welcomed the release and said, "Kuwait is a vital ally in the region, and we look forward to continuing to work with Kuwait and other partners in these efforts across the world."⁷

U.S.-Kuwaiti Economic Relations

The United States and Kuwait signed a Trade Investment Framework Agreement in 2004. In 2024, U.S. exports to Kuwait were valued at $2.41 billion and U.S. imports from Kuwait were valued at $1.64 billion.⁸ The overall value of bilateral trade has declined since 2015, reflecting lower prices and volumes of Kuwaiti oil exports to the United States and fewer U.S. exports to Kuwait.

Congress and Kuwait

Congress has considered legislation addressing U.S. relations with Kuwait relatively infrequently since the 1990s, but Members of Congress frequently visit U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait. In 2022, Congress designated U.S. veterans who served on active duty in Kuwait on or after August 2, 1990, as "covered veterans" under the Honoring our Promise to Address Comprehensive Toxics (PACT) Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-168), which expands health care eligibility for veterans subject to toxic exposure.

The 1990-1991 Invasion of Kuwait and its Aftermath In August 1990, Iraq's then-dictator Saddam Hussein ordered the Iraqi military to invade neighboring Kuwait.9 The subsequent Iraqi occupation of Kuwait led to the displacement of Kuwait's government; the death, disappearance, and injury of thousands of Kuwaitis; and extensive damage to Kuwait's natural resources and environment. President George H.W. Bush quickly dispatched U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further advances by Iraqi forces. The 101st Congress condemned the Iraqi invasion immediately (S.Res. 318 and H.R. 5431) and authorized and appropriated supplemental funds for Operation Desert Shield (P.L. 101-403, P.L. 101-510, and P.L. 101-511). In January 1991, the 102nd Congress authorized the President to use military force (P.L. 102-1) pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), which called on UN Member States to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement" related Security Council resolutions and restore international peace and security in the area. A U.S.-led multinational military campaign (Operation Desert Storm) to evict Iraqi forces began on January 17, 1991. Coalition forces liberated Kuwait by the end of February. Saddam Hussein's regime was weakened, and U.S. and partner forces established and maintained no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq over the next decade, amid UN-backed sanctions and global scrutiny of Iraq's suspected weapons of mass destruction programs. The U.S. military and U.S. national security decisionmakers continue to study the 1990-1991 crisis and U.S. decisions for lessons to inform current policy and future planning.10 The 117th Congress considered but did not enact a Biden Administration-supported proposal to repeal the 1991 Iraq authorization for use of military force (AUMF, P.L. 102-1).11 In March 2023, the Senate adopted S. 316 to repeal the 1991 and 2002 Iraq AUMFs. The after-effects of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Kuwait's liberation have influenced the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy for more than three decades. U.S. confrontation with Saddam Hussein's Iraq culminated in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The disorder and violence that followed destabilized Iraq and arguably altered the regional balance of power in Iran's favor. More than 30 years after U.S. forces first fought alongside partners to free Kuwait from Iraqi forces, U.S. and partner militaries remain in both countries, maintaining pre-positioned equipment, conducting training and supporting deterrence operations in Kuwait while providing security advice and assistance to Iraq's post-2003 government. The military presence that the United States established and maintained in the Gulf in the wake of the 1991 war cemented a role for the United States as a de facto guarantor of the Gulf's security that has endured. The global economy's reliance on the free flow of energy resources from the Persian Gulf similarly has evolved since the 1990s but persists. U.S. and host country decisions about the future presence and role of U.S. forces in the region thus remain a question of significant regional and global interest. In 2022, the UN Compensation Commission that processed and paid compensation claims related to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait announced the completion of the 31-year compensation process.12 Under a series of UN Security Council resolutions, a portion of proceeds from Iraq's oil sales were allocated to fund the $52.4 billion in compensation claims paid over the life of the program. Congress may consider how the development and implementation of this claims-compensation process might inform arrangements to secure and administer compensation for claims arising from Russia's invasion of Ukraine or other cases of state aggression. Photo Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Kuwait 1991.

The FY2024 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act (Section 8108 of Division A, P.L. 118-47) authorizes the Department of Defense to incur obligations not to exceed $350 million during the fiscal year "in anticipation of receipt of contributions, only from the Government of Kuwait." Section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (P.L. 118-31) directed the Secretary of Defense to review and report on "the legal protections afforded by bilateral agreements" between the United States and Kuwait and "how the rights and privileges afforded under such agreements may differ from United States law." The act also authorized $18.85 million for an Energy Resilience and Conservation Investment Program (ECRIP) power generation and microgrid project at Camp Buehring and $8.2 million to complete a previously authorized ECRIP project at Camp Arifjan. The FY2025 NDAA (P.L. 118-159) did not contain provisions addressing Kuwait.

Kuwait's History and Politics

Coastal Kuwait grew gradually as a trading center in the northern Gulf region as the Al Sabah family and others gained influence there after migrating to the area in the late 17^th and early 18^th centuries. Kuwait's interior was home to then-nomadic tribal groups, and urban-rural differences and tribal identities and relations have remained influential in Kuwaiti society and politics.¹³ The Al Sabah family's leadership and administrative roles in Kuwait deepened during the 18^th century. At the end of the 19^th century, the Al Sabah family sought British protection from the Ottoman Empire, trading Kuwait's sovereignty by treaty for security guarantees. Kuwait's citizenry includes Sunni and Shia Muslims and descendants of settled and nomadic communities, all of which have experienced considerable social and economic change since the discovery of oil in 1938. Kuwait regained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961, developing rapidly with an influx of oil revenue and foreign labor. Under a constitution adopted in 1962 and renewed following the 1991 U.S.-led liberation of Kuwait from occupation by neighboring Iraq, the Al Sabah family has shared some power with Kuwait's diverse citizenry. Together they have forged a global profile for their small, energy-rich emirate (Figure 2).

Kuwait's political environment has been strained for years with questions about leadership succession and debates over public finances, services, social issues, and alleged corruption. Disagreements between successive governments and members of the elected National Assembly created legislative deadlock and fueled political confrontation, leading to the election and dismissal of several Assemblies and resignations of several cabinets (see Chronology in Appendix).¹⁴ Some observers have described tensions in Kuwaiti politics over the last two decades as reflecting "conflict over policy with disputes over the rules of the game," and, at times, "an overzealous utilization of oversight tools, such as the repeated questioning of ministers followed by votes of no confidence."¹⁵ The Emir's May 2024 dissolution of the National Assembly and suspension of constitutional articles appears to have left Kuwaitis weighing options for preserving their system's relative openness and consultative nature, pursuing efficient governance and change, and ending paralysis and confrontation.

Political System

Figure 2. Kuwait: Basic Facts

Source: CRS, using data from the U.S. State Department, Esri, the Central Intelligence Agency, International Monetary Fund, and Government of Kuwait.

Kuwait's 1962 constitution recognizes the Emir as head of state and ruler, with power as commander-in-chief of the military and authority to appoint all judges and to dismiss or suspend Kuwait's unicameral legislature. The Emir appoints a prime minister as head of government, who in turn selects the cabinet. The prime minister has always been a member of the Al Sabah family, and Al Sabah family members have often held key cabinet portfolios such as defense, interior, foreign affairs, and finance.

Plans for succession within the ruling Al Sabah family are uncertain, and the National Assembly would under normal circumstances be required to confirm the Emir's designee for the position of crown prince.¹⁶ Until 2006, the main branches of the family (Al Jaber and Al Salem) generally had alternated in holding the positions of Emir and Crown Prince.¹⁷ In 2006, Assembly members and other leading figures questioned the suitability of the successor from the Al Salem branch on health grounds and recommended his replacement through a negotiated transition. From that time until 2024, members of the Al Jaber branch of the Al Sabah family served as Emir and Crown Prince.¹⁸

Kuwait's National Assembly has been the longest-established elected body among the Gulf Arab states and, under the 1962 constitution, the Assembly has had a greater scope of authority than any other Gulf Arab legislature or consultative body. Under normal circumstances, eligible voters elect 50 Assembly members, with up to 15 members of the cabinet eligible to serve and vote in the Assembly ex-officio.¹⁹ The Assembly's members have been empowered to draft legislation and act on legislation proposed by the government. The Assembly has not voted to confirm cabinet nominees, but its members have frequently questioned ministers (a process known as interpellation or colloquially as "grilling"), and the Assembly has had the power to remove ministers by a vote of no confidence. The Assembly has had the power to remove the prime minister by voting to declare the Assembly's inability to cooperate with the prime minister. Prior to its May 2024 suspension, the Assembly had been suspended twice before: from 1976 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1992.

The Assembly's membership has reflected Kuwait's political and social diversity over time, including Sunni and Shia Muslims, social liberals and conservatives, younger and older Kuwaitis, urban and more rural citizens, and supporters and critics of the prevailing constitutional order. The country's majority expatriate population, which remains critical to its economy and includes individuals holding public sector positions, has not had political representation. Authorities announced plans to carry out "unprecedented" measures in 2024 against expatriates living illegally in Kuwait, and said by January 2025 that they had deported more than 35,000 expatriates in 2024.²⁰ In March 2025, authorities announced that the Kuwaiti citizenship of more than 42,000 dual nationals had been revoked since August 2024.²¹

Some religious and social conservatives have opposed women's rights as candidates and members of the Assembly since the state recognized those rights in 2005 (see Women's Rights, below). Opposition activism in Kuwait over the last two decades has featured critiques of alleged government corruption, advocacy for stronger legislative authority and greater checks on executive power, rejection of electoral system changes, and, in some instances, demands that the state implement more religiously and socially conservative policies.²² The legacy of disputes since 2006 over Kuwait's electoral system has continued to shape Kuwaiti politics and appeared to contribute to the impasses that preceded the Emir's 2024 decision to suspend the National Assembly and articles of Kuwait's constitution (see Chronology in Appendix).

2023 Succession, 2024 Election, and Assembly Suspension

On December 16, 2023, Emir Shaykh Nawaf al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah died at age 86 after a long period of reported ill health. He was succeeded by his half-brother, former Crown Prince Shaykh Mishaal al Ahmed al Jaber Al Sabah (born 1940).

On February 15, 2024, Emir Mishaal issued an order dissolving the National Assembly pursuant to the constitution after a legislator used language deemed offensive to the Emir and the Assembly voted not to remove the statement from its record.²³ An election, the fourth since 2020, was held on April 10, 2024. Authorities disqualified some candidates for participating in so-called tribal elections, which are informal primaries among tribal groups to select a group-affiliated candidate. The April 2024 election returned 29 opposition members to the legislature, largely mirroring the parliament elected in 2023. Among those elected were one woman legislator and eight members of the country's Shia minority.

Analysts expected that the election result meant that confrontation between the executive and legislative branches was set to continue.²⁴ The Emir designated his nephew Shaykh Ahmad Abdullah Al Ahmed Al Jaber Al Sabah as Prime Minister and issued a decree delaying the first session of the new Assembly until May 15. On May 10, the Emir issued a decree dissolving the Assembly and suspending articles of the constitution, including Article 107, which calls for the election of a replacement assembly within two months. The Emir suspended articles beyond those suspended in previous suspension decrees in 1976 and 1981, which appear to enable the executive branch to issue laws and amend the constitution during the Assembly's suspension without future legislative review.²⁵ The U.S. government did not immediately comment on the Emir's decree.²⁶

The Emir had until December 2024 to appoint an heir apparent as Crown Prince. Prior to the decision to suspend the National Assembly, the heir apparent appointment would have required the approval of a majority of the National Assembly. In February 2024, the prime minister acknowledged intra-family differences, but said they stopped short of disruptive conflict.²⁷ On June 1, 2024, Sheikh Sabah Khaled Al Sabah was named as the new Crown Prince and heir apparent. He previously served as Prime Minister from 2019 to 2022 and before that as Foreign Minister from 2011 to 2019.²⁸ Sheikh Sabah's appointment marked a shift from post-1991 leadership decisions that had chosen the Crown Prince and Emir from the main branches of the ruling family (the Al Jaber and Al Salem lines). The State Department congratulated the new Crown Prince on his appointment and said, the United States government "values our strategic partnership with the State of Kuwait."²⁹

Human Rights

Kuwait's government, like those of some other Gulf countries, publicly rejects foreign criticism of human rights practices, dismissing such critiques as interference in Kuwait's internal affairs. Amid foreign and domestic attention to the execution of seven individuals convicted of murder and other offenses in November 2022, Kuwait's Foreign Minister said, "The decisions of our judicial apparatus are independent without any interference from inside or outside Kuwait."³⁰

The 2023 U.S. State Department report on human rights conditions in Kuwait found

credible reports of: torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by government agents; arbitrary arrest or detention; political prisoners and detainees; serious restrictions on free expression and media freedom, including censorship and the existence of criminal libel laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; restrictions on freedom of movement and residence within the territory of a state and the right to leave the country; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic and international human rights organizations; extensive gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence sexual violence, workplace violence, and other forms of such violence; trafficking in persons, including forced labor; laws criminalizing consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, which were enforced; and crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex persons.

The government took credible steps in some cases to prosecute and punish officials who may have committed human rights abuses.³¹

According to the report, "Numerous activists representing stateless persons of Arab heritage—known as Bidoon—reported mistreatment at the hands of authorities while in detention."³² The Bidoon community consists of approximately 100,000 residents of Kuwait who lack or have been denied registration as Kuwaiti citizens, which limits their access to employment, social benefits, and political rights. Kuwait's government historically has declined to recognize claims from members of the Bidoon community to citizenship based on questions about the timing, circumstances, and purpose of individuals' migration to Kuwait. Kuwaiti authorities separately are pursuing initiatives to reduce the expatriate population and create more public and private sector employment opportunities for Kuwaiti nationals.

Kuwait's government limits freedom of speech and association.³³ The state has not outlawed political parties, but authorities effectively ban them. The government has outlawed informal primaries among tribal groups, though one study released in 2021 found "electoral returns offer evidence of growing tribal coordination intended to ensure representation within the National Assembly, albeit one disrupted by changes in electoral laws."³⁴ In March 2024, Kuwait's security officials reaffirmed a ban on all unauthorized public gatherings or the advertising of such gatherings in rallies amid calls on social media for demonstrations in solidarity with Palestinians.³⁵

Women's Rights

The Emir recognized women's political rights in 2005 after the National Assembly blocked an earlier initiative to do so. According to a 2024 State Department assessment, women in Kuwait face "cultural, social, and financial barriers to full political participation."³⁶ No women won seats in the National Assembly election of 2020, but an appointed woman cabinet member had the right to vote on Assembly decisions during its tenure. Two women won Assembly seats in the September 2022 election and one woman won a seat in the June 2023 election. The cabinet appointed in January 2024 has one woman member.

The State Department reports that in 2023, Kuwaiti law did "not provide women the same legal status, rights, and inheritance provisions as men," and found that "women experienced discrimination in most aspects of family law, including divorce and child custody, as well as in the basic rights of citizenship, the workplace, and in certain circumstances the value of their testimony in court."³⁷ Some Kuwaiti social and religious conservatives oppose changes in gender relations and women's participation in politics and the work force introduced since the late 1990s.

In March 2025, a decree abolished Article 153 of Kuwait's penal code: that article had provided leniency for so-called honor killings of women by men in some circumstances.³⁸ Authorities also announced the amendment of Article 26 of Kuwait's family law to prohibit marriage under the age of 18.³⁹

Trafficking in Persons

The 2024 State Department report on trafficking in persons found Kuwait's visa sponsorship system "continued to render migrant workers highly vulnerable to exploitation, specifically trafficking."⁴⁰ Kuwait is a Tier 2 Watch List country, meaning that the State Department judges that Kuwait "does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so."

Religious Freedom and Tolerance

According to the State Department, the Kuwaiti government has official initiatives to promote religious tolerance and provides for limited freedom of religious practice.⁴¹ Shia Muslims and religious minorities report some discrimination. The state regulates and directs the content presented by Sunni religious leaders.⁴² Under a National Plan to Reinforce Moderation, Kuwait's Ministry of Information and Ministry of Religious Endowments have supported programs to combat religious radicalization and promote religious tolerance.⁴³ In 2015, the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL/Daesh) group claimed a major terrorist attack against a Kuwaiti Shia mosque. Kuwait is a member of the Global Coalition against the Islamic State and periodically announces security actions against suspected IS-supporters in the country.

Kuwait's Foreign Policy

Kuwait's experiences of military occupation and liberation in 1990 and 1991 shape its foreign policy, which generally promotes neutrality, balanced relations with major powers, respect for international law, and diplomatic resolution of conflicts. Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. As a major oil producer, Kuwait is a member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and coordinates with OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers by agreement under the auspices of the OPEC+ group.

Kuwait and Russia's War against Ukraine

Kuwaiti officials have spoken out against military aggression and violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity since Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Kuwait has voted to condemn Russian aggression and violations of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity but joined other Arab Gulf states in abstaining on a 2022 resolution to suspend Russia's membership in the UN Human Rights Council.⁴⁴ During 2022, Kuwait's military delivered more than 70 tons of food and medical supplies for Ukrainians, and Kuwait pledged $2 million for Ukraine programs to the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Department of Defense Inspector General reported in May 2023 that artillery and vehicles withdrawn from pre-positioned U.S. Army stocks in Kuwait for drawdown transfer to Ukraine had not been maintained properly by Kuwait-based contractors, requiring costly repairs prior to their transfer.⁴⁵

Kuwait and China

Kuwait's economic and political relationships with the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) have been limited, though China is a leading importer of Kuwaiti oil and a series of announcements since 2024 suggest closer ties are developing. Under the banner of China's Belt and Road Initiative, PRC-based entities have engaged with Kuwaiti partners on Kuwait's planned Silk City, Five Islands, and Mubarak Al Kabeer port megaprojects, which may develop areas of northern Kuwait into a logistics hub.⁴⁶ Kuwaiti telecom providers Zain and VIVA have partnered with PRC-firm Huawei in developing their fifth generation (5G) mobile communications networks.⁴⁷ In his capacity as Crown Prince, the current Emir visited China in September 2023 and met with PRC leader Xi Jinping. The countries signed memoranda of understanding on the completion of the Mubarak al Kabeer port, housing projects, and renewable energy cooperation.⁴⁸

In 2025, Kuwait has signed agreements with the PRC Ministry of Transport affiliate China State Construction and Communications Corporation Limited to implement, manage, and operate the Mubarak al Kabeer port.⁴⁹ Also in March 2025, China and Kuwait reached an agreement for China to expand the capacity of Kuwait's solar energy production facilities at Al Shagaya and Al Abdiliya.⁵⁰

Kuwait and its Neighbors

Kuwait's preference for multilateralism and diplomatic outreach has been evident in its officials' mediation efforts in the Middle East region and beyond since 2015.

Gulf Cooperation Council and Yemen. Kuwaiti leaders contributed to rapprochement between Qatar and its critics in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates from 2017 to 2021, when those counties ended their isolation of Qatar. In 2016, Kuwait hosted peace talks between Yemeni government officials and representatives of the Ansar Allah (aka Houthi) movement.⁵¹ Kuwait also has sent military forces to support the Yemeni government as part of the military coalition led by neighboring Saudi Arabia.

Iran. Kuwaiti officials continue to engage with counterparts from neighboring Iran on a range of issues and generally support dialogue between Iran and its Arab neighbors. Unresolved maritime boundaries between Kuwait and Iran may have implications for the development of maritime energy resources and for commercial and military navigation in the northern Persian Gulf. In July 2023, Kuwait's Oil Minister asserted exclusive Kuwaiti/Saudi rights to develop the offshore Dorra/Arash gas field after an Iranian official preliminary consideration of development had begun.⁵² After Iranian and Kuwaiti officials indicated they would each pursue their own rival development projects, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reasserted their position that they have an exclusive right to do so.⁵³ An Iranian official said in March 2024 that Iran views the Dorra/Arash field as shared.⁵⁴ In August 2024, the Khafji Joint Operations Company, a joint company of Saudi Aramco Gulf Operations Company and Kuwait Gulf Oil Company, issued tenders related to the development of the Dorra Gas field. As of March 2025, companies reportedly were preparing bids for the project.⁵⁵

Israel and the Palestinians. Kuwait's leaders have chosen not to recognize or engage with Israel to date, though some other Arab states' recognition of Israel under the Abraham Accords prompted Kuwaiti press discussion of normalization with Israel. Some Kuwaitis remain vocally opposed to recognition of Israel, and Kuwait's National Assembly and government have endorsed some anti-normalization measures since 2020. Kuwait's government participates in the Arab boycott of Israel and supported the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative.

Kuwait's government has responded to the Israel-Hamas war by condemning and denouncing Israel's military actions, calling for accountability for alleged violations of international humanitarian law, and demanding an immediate ceasefire and unimpeded provision of humanitarian aid.⁵⁶ Kuwait's initial response to the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack on Israel said the attack came as a result of Israeli violations and attacks on Palestinians.⁵⁷ Kuwait has joined other Arab states in calling for "a comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian cause that includes an independent state on the 1967 border with East Jerusalem being its capital."⁵⁸ Kuwait Specialized Hospital has operated with Kuwaiti state support in Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, and had its operations disrupted by Israeli military operations in May 2024.

Kuwait joined other Arab states in rejecting President Donald Trump's statements in 2025 calling for the relocation of Gaza's population and the territory's redevelopment under U.S. auspices, and said "any efforts to encourage the transfer or uprooting of Palestinians from their land … threaten the region's stability, risk expanding the conflict, and undermine prospects for peace and coexistence among its peoples."⁵⁹ Kuwait joined other Arab League states in endorsing an Egyptian counterproposal in March 2025.⁶⁰

In May 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Kuwait-based Jordanian national Abdallah Yusuf Faisal Sabri for sanctions, stating that Sabri had "managed Hamas's operational expenses" since 2018.⁶¹ Press reports citing former U.S. officials have focused on allegations that Kuwait-based entities since October 2023 have used crowdfunding mechanisms to solicit funding that benefits Hamas.⁶² Kuwaiti officials have revoked the fundraising licenses of some charitable entities since December 2023 and have underscored requirements for fundraising to abide by Kuwaiti law.⁶³

Iraq. Kuwait's land border with Iraq was delineated by a United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission following the 1990-1991 Gulf War and endorsed by the UN Security Council in Resolution 833 (1993). The delineation of maritime boundaries remains a subject of Kuwaiti-Iraqi discussion—both Kuwait and Iraq are developing large capacity ports on the Khor Abdullah waterway (see Figure 1).⁶⁴ In September 2023, Iraq's Federal Supreme Court invalidated the Iraqi parliament's 2013 endorsement of a 2012 agreement on the partial delineation of the Iraq-Kuwait maritime border, citing lack of two-thirds majority support for the implementing law. In December 2024, the United States and Kuwait "called for the complete demarcation of the maritime border between Kuwait and Iraq beyond Boundary Marker 162, in line with international law and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)" and said, "Iraq was called upon to ensure the 2012 Kuwait-Iraq Agreement to regulate maritime navigation in Khor Abdullah remains in force."⁶⁵ Rejection or reopening of the 2012 agreement could affect both countries' ability to use the waterway and affect their relative rights regarding maritime boundary and resource claims in northern Persian Gulf waters adjacent to Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials reportedly resumed talks on outstanding border issues in December 2024, and in February reiterated that they intend for joint technical committees to review outstanding issues.⁶⁶ Kuwait and Iraq have agreed on managing oil fields that transcend the Iraq-Kuwaiti border.

Syria. Kuwait has congratulated Syria's interim leaders following the ouster of former president Bashar al Asad in December 2024. Kuwait's Foreign Minister has visited Syria and Kuwaiti officials have expressed Kuwait's support for the transition steps announced by interim authorities and for Syria's reconstruction, stability, and territorial integrity.⁶⁷ Kuwaiti official statements have criticized Israeli military operations inside Syria since December 2024, saying they amount to "a flagrant violation of international law and the UN Charter."⁶⁸ Kuwait has joined other Gulf Cooperation Council states in calling for the lifting of international sanctions on Syria.⁶⁹

Kuwait closed its embassy in Syria in 2012 but maintained diplomatic relations with the Asad government. Some Kuwaiti citizens raised funds for groups opposed to the Asad regime.⁷⁰ Kuwait's Foreign Ministry in April 2023 said that Kuwait would support Arab states' consensus on Syria, and Kuwait did not officially oppose Syria's readmission to the League of Arab States in May 2023. Kuwait supported the statement of the May 2024 Arab League summit in Bahrain, which among other things called for "the lifting of unilateral coercive measures imposed on Syria."⁷¹

Fiscal, Economic, and Energy Issues

Kuwait's state finances remain almost completely dependent on oil revenue and investment income, but authorities are engaged in efforts to expand non-oil revenue sources and promote private sector economic activity under the national New Kuwait/Vision 2040 initiative.⁷² Relative to other GCC members pursuing similar economic transformation initiatives, Kuwait's efforts appear nascent and the country's political stalemates arguably have constrained them. The endorsement by Kuwait's cabinet of a draft law providing for government borrowing may provide new sources of funding for long-planned programs. In considering the state budget for 2025-2026, a Kuwaiti official estimated that wages and subsidies account for more than 79% of public spending, with more than 9% allocated to capital investments.⁷³ Kuwait expects to operate with a deficit in the coming year. Oil export revenue provides more than 90% of state revenue, and the budget assumes a break-even oil price of $90.50 per barrel.⁷⁴

Kuwait's oil reserves amount to more than 7% of global proven reserves, and at current production rates, would last through this century. (For a map of Kuwaiti energy resources, see Figure 1.) Kuwait plans to expand its oil production capacity, but has limited spare capacity at present. Kuwait has considerable natural gas reserves, but its gas production infrastructure is less developed. Kuwait imports natural gas for domestic consumption even as it continues to flare associated gas from oil production.

As of 2022, the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) managed $769 billion in sovereign wealth assets between the $700 billion Future Generations Fund (FGF) and the smaller General Reserve Fund (GRF).⁷⁵ Prior to the suspension of the National Assembly, the executive had been constrained from issuing debt or accessing FGF assets without parliamentary approval, and had used GRF funds and existing authority to transfer stakes in state entities to the KIA in exchange for funds to cover successive budget deficits.

Executive-legislative impasses over public spending, corruption allegations, proposed reforms to public sector employment and benefits, service costs, and financing for new economic initiatives contributed to political discord in the lead up to the 2024 suspension of the National Assembly.⁷⁶ In 2021, the state drew down GRF assets during a deficit-driven liquidity crisis, and parliament refused to authorize borrowing.⁷⁷ Higher oil prices have offered fiscal respite after 2022, but underlying differences remained unresolved, limiting progress toward goals set out under the New Kuwait program.⁷⁸ In 2022, the U.S. government country commercial guide for Kuwait, observed that authorities had then responded to fiscal pressures and executive legislative-impasses by "postponing major infrastructure projects and putting other projects on hold until further notice."⁷⁹ The 2024 U.S. government Investment Climate Statement states the Kuwait's latest national development plan "speaks to a commitment to reshape its society into a financial, commercial, and sustainable hub by 2040."⁸⁰

In December 2024, the International Monetary Fund reported that Kuwaiti authorities "expressed their intention to implement fiscal and structural reforms to diversify the economy away from oil, given the window of opportunity afforded by the resolution of the political gridlock."⁸¹

Resources and Climate Change

Kuwait is highly vulnerable to the projected effects of global climate change, including sea level rise and increased average temperatures, which already are consistently among the highest in the Gulf.⁸² Kuwait's water resources are extremely limited, and the state burns fossil fuels to generate power for water desalination, air conditioning, and other essential services. In 2023 and 2024, summer power demand, driven by air conditioning needs, exceeded available supply, creating some power outages.⁸³

Kuwait is a major oil producer and exporter, and as such, a potential global energy transition away from fossil fuel consumption may affect Kuwait's fiscal outlook. In November 2022, Kuwait made what its then-Foreign Minister described as "a solid serious pledge" to achieve carbon neutrality in oil and gas operations by 2050 and nationwide by 2060.⁸⁴

Outlook

Kuwaiti-U.S. security cooperation appears likely to continue to anchor the bilateral relationship, while the pace of implementation of Kuwaiti plans for economic transformation may determine opportunities for deeper bilateral economic partnership. Congress may conduct oversight of the U.S. military's presence and programs in Kuwait and may monitor Kuwaiti government decision making on a range of foreign and domestic policy topics. These may include Kuwait's oil production, Kuwaiti engagement with China, Kuwait's policy toward Israel and the Palestinians (including Hamas), Kuwait's relations with its Arab and non-Arab neighbors, developments in Kuwaiti politics, alleged support by Kuwaiti nationals or residents for terrorist groups, and the Kuwaiti government's protection of human rights, including women's rights and religious freedom.

Appendix. Political Developments 2006-2023

The legacy of disputes since 2006 over Kuwait's electoral system, succession, fiscal matters, and other issues has continued to shape Kuwaiti politics and appeared to contribute to the impasses that preceded the Emir's 2024 decision to suspend the National Assembly and articles of Kuwait's constitution.

Footnotes