U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

February 7, 2022 – March 31, 2022 R47028

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
March 31, 2022
the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations
Peter J. Meyer
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
Specialist in Latin
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
American and Canadian
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Affairs
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since

the 1990s. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have
included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combatting drug

production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening security
and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering
long-term stability in Haiti, addressing security concerns in the Caribbean, and responding to the political and humanitarian
crises in Venezuela and their effects on the broader region. Since 2020, U.S. policymakers have sought to readjust U.S.
assistance efforts to respond to the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
FY2022 Budget Request
The Biden Administration requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean for
FY2022, which (in current dollars) would have been the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a
decade. If enacted, total State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-managed funding for
the region would have increased by $279.1 million (15.6%) compared with FY2021. The Administration’s FY2022 budget
request also would have provided $38.0 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign
assistance agency that supports community-led development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Administration asserted that it intended to use the assistance requested for FY2022 to address the socioeconomic effects
of the pandemic while continuing to respond to a variety of other challenges in the region. Much of the funding would have
supported implementation of the Administration’s four-year, $4.0 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root
causes of irregular migration from Central America. The FY2022 request included $860.6 million for Central America—a
$295.9 million (52.6%) increase compared with FY2021. With regard to other regional priorities, the Administration’s
FY2022 request would have provided $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for Haiti, $116.6 million for Mexico,
$66.0 million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and $55.0 million for Venezuela.
Legislative Developments
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2022 until several months into the fiscal
year. Although the House passed the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84), in July 2021 and the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced a foreign aid
appropriations bill (S. 3075) in October 2021, neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing
resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, P.L. 117-86, and P.L. 117-95) that funded foreign aid programs in the region at the
FY2021 level from October 1, 2021, until March 15, 2022, when President Biden signed into law the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103).
The act and accompanying explanatory statement do not specify the total amount of foreign assistance for Latin America and
Caribbean, but they designate funding levels for some specific U.S. initiatives. Among other appropriations, the act provides
“not less than” $471.4 million for Colombia, $80.0 million for the CBSI, $40.0 million for democracy programs in
Venezuela, and $42.0 million for the IAF. The explanatory statement also appears to designate $158.9 million for Mexico.
Overall funding for Central America is unclear, but the act includes “not less than” $61.5 million for anti-corruption activities
in Central America, $70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America and $100.0 million for
locally led development programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Congress considered a variety of policy issues during the FY2022 appropriations process, many of which may remain
subjects of debate as Congress considers the President’s FY2023 budget request and other foreign operations legislation.
Such issues include how to help Latin American and Caribbean countries respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19
pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration; and the challenges Department of Defense security
cooperation programs present for congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 26

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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

Introduction
Foreign assistance (also referred to as foreign aid in this report) is one of the tools the United
States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.1
The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. objectives. Current
aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region, as well as the broad range of
these countries’ ties to the United States (see Figure 1 for a map of Latin America and the
Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political,
socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating
democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive
traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared
security challenges, such as transnational crime. Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign
assistance funds for Latin America and the Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and
the executive branch agencies that administer them.
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

1 For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S.
Programs and Policy, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown.
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This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
examines trends in aid to the region; the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request for aid
administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and congressional action on FY2022 Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. It also analyzes several
issues that Congress considered during the appropriations process, including how to respond to
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic in the region, the effectiveness of foreign
assistance for managing migration, and the challenges Department of Defense (DOD) security
cooperation programs present for congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the
region.
Report Notes
To more accurately compare the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request with previous years’
appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State
Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries
or regional programs. Such assistance accounted for 62.8% of the total aid obligated by all U.S. agencies in Latin
America and the Caribbean in FY2019.
Many countries in the region are receiving additional assistance through of a series of supplemental appropriations
bil s Congress enacted to help countries worldwide respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those supplemental
resources are discussed in the “COVID-19 Response” section of this report but otherwise are excluded from this
analysis due to data inconsistencies.
Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign
assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and
Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department
of Defense, Mil ennium Challenge Corporation, and Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral organizations that the
United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the Pan American Health Organization, provide additional aid to the region. Except where indicated,
those accounts, agencies, and organizations are excluded from this analysis.
Source: USAID and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2019, the United States provided $93.8
billion ($194.5 billion in constant 2019 dollars) of assistance to the region.2 U.S. assistance to the
region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence
in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S.
assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support
to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies
from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-
1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil
conflicts (see Figure 2).

2 These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and
Caribbean countries (identified in Figure 1) and regional programs. U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2019
(obligations in billions of constant 2019 dollars)

Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S.
Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. Comprehensive data for FY2020 and FY2021
are not yet available.
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of
assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development
assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The
establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium
Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of
U.S. assistance.3 In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the
aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.
Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive
Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its
Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed
conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined
with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug
and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama
Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central

3 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
see CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther;
and CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.
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America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of
the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
Although U.S. assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have remained elevated
over the past two decades compared with the 1990s, the U.S. government has increasingly
concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to significant development
progress in much of the region. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in
poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.3% to 30.5%, due to stronger economic growth and
the implementation of more effective social policies.4 Health and education indicators also
improved significantly during that period. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to others in the region based on
their own development experiences.
Trends have reversed in the last decade, however, as countries in the region has struggled to
address a series of challenges.5 Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin
American and Caribbean countries around 2015 due to a decline in global commodity prices and
deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of
development gains (see “COVID-19 Response”). Political conditions also have deteriorated as
Venezuela and Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule and widespread corruption and
violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere. These challenges have generated
instability, including large-scale migration flows throughout the hemisphere.
Biden Administration’s FY2022 Foreign Assistance
Budget Request6
The Biden Administration requested nearly $2.1 billion of State Department- and USAID-
managed foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current
dollars) would have been the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a
decade. If enacted, funding for the region would have increased by $279.1 million, or 15.6%,
compared with FY2021 (see Table 1). The Administration’s proposed increase for the region
exceeded the 11.4% increase requested for SFOPS globally in FY2022.7

4 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America
2021, January 2022, p. 63.
5 For more information on recent challenges in the region, see CRS Report R46781, Latin America and the Caribbean:
U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
6 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/FY-2022-C-J-Appendix-2-FINAL-6-25-2021.pdf; and U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year
2023, March 28, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-
Justification_Final_03282022.pdf.
7 This calculation is based on enacted FY2021 levels, excluding emergency funding. For more information on the
global foreign operations request, see CRS Report R46935, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations, by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern.
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Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts8
The Administration’s FY2022 foreign aid budget proposal for Latin America and the Caribbean
requested $659.1 million (31.8% of the total) through the Development Assistance (DA) account,
which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-
income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as
agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental
protection. The FY2022 request would have continued to support long-term development efforts
while seeking to address the negative effects the pandemic has had on many of those sectors.
Compared with FY2021, DA funding for the region would have increased by $168.6 million
(34.4%), with the majority of the additional funding allocated to Central America to address root
causes of migration.
Another $455.3 million (22.0%) of the Administration’s request for the region would have been
provided through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, the primary purpose of which is to
promote special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs
generally aim to promote political and economic stability and are often indistinguishable from
programs funded through the DA account. If enacted, ESF assistance for the region would have
increased by $76.8 million (20.3%) compared with FY2021. The additional resources would have
supported rule of law and crime and violence prevention programs in Central America, economic
development efforts in southern Mexico, and democracy and human rights activities in
Venezuela.
The FY2022 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would have provided $248.5 million
(12.0% of the total) through the Global Health Programs (GHP) account. This amount included
$190.0 million requested for the State Department, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, and
$58.5 million requested for USAID to combat malaria and COVID-19 and support maternal and
child health, nutrition, and family planning programs.9 Under the FY2022 GHP request for the
region, funding for the State Department-managed subaccount would have declined by $5.0
million (2.6%), and funding for the USAID-managed subaccount would have increased by $3.0
million (5.5%) compared with FY2021.
The remaining $710.5 million (34.3%) of the Administration’s FY2022 request for Latin America
and the Caribbean would have supported security assistance programs, including the following:
 $570.4 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement
efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding
for the region would have increased by $17.4 million (3.1%) compared with
FY2021, with decreased aid to Colombia and Mexico offset by increased aid to
Central America.
 $31.0 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out
humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile
management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and

8 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
R40482, Department of State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts, by Nick M.
Brown and Cory R. Gill.
9 The region is receiving additional assistance to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
through previously enacted supplemental appropriations. See “COVID-19 Response.”
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enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding for the region would
have remained flat compared with FY2021.
 $14.1 million requested through the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military
personnel. IMET funding would have increased by $285,000 (2.1%) compared
with FY2021.
 $95.0 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account
to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region. FMF
funding for the region would have increased by $18.1 million (23.5%) compared
with FY2021, with the additional resources allocated to Colombia and regional
programs in Central America and the Caribbean.
Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account: FY2017-FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
Foreign Assistance
FY2017 FY2018a FY2019 FY2020b FY2021b
FY2022
% Change:
Account
(req.)
FY21-FY22
Development Assistance
484.4
386.2
385.3
457.8
490.6
659.1
+34.4%
Economic Support Fund
352.0c
419.1c
402.3c
377.6c
378.5c
455.3
+20.3%
Global Health Programs
64.4
63.4
53.3
53.3
55.5
58.5
+5.5%
(USAID)
Global Health Programs
117.7
136.7
170.5
157.7
195.0
190.0
-2.6%
(State)
International Narcotics
533.2
542.2
564.3
555.2
553.0
570.4
+3.1%
Control and Law
Enforcement
Nonproliferation, Anti-
25.4
23.5
25.8
27.3
31.0
31.0
—
terrorism, Demining, and
Related programs
International Military
13.4
11.2
9.9
13.1
13.8
14.1
+2.0%
Education and Training
Foreign Military
82.7
86.0
82.8
79.7
76.9
95.0
+23.5%
Financing
Total
1,673.2
1,668.4a
1,694.1
1,721.7b
1,794.3b
2,073.4
+15.6%
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2023, at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and https://www.state.gov/fy-
2023-international-affairs-budget/.
Notes: USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State = U.S. Department of State.
a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in
Latin America and the Caribbean region and the remainder to priorities outside the region.
b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency
appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19.
c. Congress appropriated an additional $9.0 mil ion of Economic Support Funds for the region each year from
FY2017 to FY2019 and an additional $5.0 mil ion for the region in FY2020 and FY2021. Those funds are not
included in this table because they were appropriated as multilateral assistance for the Organization of
American States.
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Major Country and Regional Programs
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request would have slightly reduced State
Department- and USAID-managed assistance for some countries and regional programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean while significantly increasing assistance for others (see Table 2).
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial
security cooperation, law enforcement support, border and port security, justice sector reform, and
crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.10 The FY2022 request included $66.0 million for the
CBSI, which would have been an $8.8 million (11.8%) cut compared with the FY2021
appropriation.
Central America. Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America
to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of
unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”)
arrived at the U.S. border in 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one
Administration to another.11 The Biden Administration developed a new U.S. Strategy for
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, and requested $860.6 million for
FY2022 to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic growth in the
subregion.12 Of that total, $833.1 million fell within the regional request for Latin America and
the Caribbean, and the remainder would have been drawn from global accounts.13 The
Administration’s budget requested about 39% of the Central America funding as bilateral
assistance for the seven nations of the isthmus (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama), with the vast majority allocated to the Northern Triangle
countries. It requested the other 61% as regional assistance through USAID’s Central America
Regional program and a new State Department Central America Regional program. If fully
funded, aid to Central America would have increased by $295.9 million (52.6%) compared with
FY2021.
Colombia. Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the
launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program, in FY2000. The focus of U.S. assistance
efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal
conflict.14 The FY2022 request included $453.9 million for Colombia, primarily to support the
Colombian government’s counternarcotics strategy and the continued implementation of its peace
accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The request also included
some funding for environmental conservation efforts and for maternal and child health programs
for Venezuelan migrants and their host communities. The Administration’s request was $11.2

10 For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan.
11 For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS Insight IN11603, Central America’s
Northern Triangle: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021; and CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American
Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy.
12 White House, “U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America,” July 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
13 The remainder includes $25.5 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, provided to
the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for Program Development and
Support, and $2 million of International Organizations and Programs funding for the U.N. Refugee Agency.
14 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S.
Relations, by June S. Beittel.
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million (2.4%) less than Colombia received in FY2021 due to a proposed reduction in INCLE
funding.
Haiti. The United States has provided Haiti significant aid to support the country’s recovery from
recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability.15 U.S. assistance spiked after a massive
earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 but has declined since then. The Administration’s FY2022
request would have provided $187.9 million to help Haiti address health challenges (particularly
HIV/AIDS), strengthen government and police capacity, increase agricultural production and
other economic development, and support natural resource management. The Administration’s
request would have reduced U.S. assistance to Haiti by $1.7 million (0.9%) compared with
FY2021.
Mexico. Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status,
but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the
Mérida Initiative in FY2008.16 The Administration’s FY2022 request included $116.6 million for
Mexico, primarily to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat
transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin and fentanyl
production. The request also included some funding to help Mexico reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and improve environmental conservation. The Administration’s request for Mexico
was $42.3 million (26.6%) lower than the FY2021 allocation due to proposed INCLE and FMF
cuts. However, the Administration requested an additional $35.0 million through the USAID
Latin America and Caribbean Regional program to support development in Southern Mexico and
to implement joint U.S.-Mexican aid projects in Central America.
Venezuela. The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for
nearly two decades and has increased such assistance over the past four years in response to the
authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided humanitarian support
for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the text box “Venezuela Regional
Crisis Response”).17 The Administration requested $55.0 million in FY2022 to support
democratic actors, human rights advocates, and other civil society organizations; increase food
security; and support access to health care in Venezuela. The request would have increased U.S.
aid to Venezuela by $17.0 million (44.7%) compared with FY2021.
Venezuela Regional Crisis Response
An estimated 6 mil ion Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis,
approximately 5 mil ion of whom are residing throughout 17 other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From
FY2017 to FY2021, U.S. agencies provided nearly $1.7 bil ion of humanitarian assistance to help countries in the
region respond to Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain
in Venezuela. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from
global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in Table 1, Table 2, or the
Appendix of this report.
For more information on the humanitarian response and allocations for particular countries, see USAID,
“Venezuela Regional Crisis – Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #2, Fiscal Year 2022,” March 23, 2022, at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-03-
23_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_2.pdf.

15 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Insight IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential
Assassination, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
16 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S.
Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Joshua Klein.
17 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Table 2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program: FY2017-FY2022
Request
(thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2017
FY2018a
FY2019
FY2020b
FY2021b
FY2022
%
(req.)
Change:
FY21-

FY22
Argentina
624
2,918
3,089
3,061
700
650
-7.1%
Bahamas
173
138
196
197
200
200
—
Belize
1,241
1,143
235
1,179
1,250
250
-80.0%
Brazil
11,690
11,423a
11,619
20,060
19,450
17,800
-8.5%
Chile
689
357
487
553
455
450
-1.1%
Colombia
384,248
384,312a
421,180
460,183
465,092
453,850
-2.4%
Costa Rica
5,718
5,725
8,180
8,225
8,225
725
-91.2%
Cuba
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
—
Dominican
13,736
20,174
36,777
28,569
29,405
28,500
-3.1%
Republic
Ecuador
1,789
1,789
12,000
19,450
23,750
28,800
+21.3%
El Salvador
72,759
57,656a
39,533
78,865
78,790
95,800
+21.6%
Guatemala
125,493
108,453a
80,351
95,887
98,049
127,450
+30.0%
Guyana
277
239
176
140
200
200
—
Haiti
164,552
181,319
193,752
172,361
189,577
187,855
-0.9%
Honduras
95,260
79,678a
56,906
73,365
74,002
95,800
+29.5%
Jamaica
10,597
1,335
1,598
8,206
18,071
1,600
-91.1%
Mexico
138,566
151,263
162,410
157,910
158,910
116,575
-26.6%
Nicaragua
9,679
10,000a
11,610
11,323
11,592
15,000
+29.4%
Panama
3,271
3,086
1,162
10,131
11,769
1,225
-89.6%
Paraguay
6,150
4,297
4,397
4,227
4,400
4,400
—
Peru
64,473
74,814a
75,396
78,342
85,535
86,870
+1.6%
Suriname
269
167
195
178
200
200
—
Trinidad and
343
341
326
2,058
2,874
300
-89.6%
Tobago
Uruguay
498
401
385
377
400
350
-12.5%
Venezuela
7,000
15,000a
22,500
38,452
38,000
55,000
+44.7%
Barbados and
26,629
24,027a
3,456
5,854
7,700
5,700
-26.0%
Eastern
Caribbean
USAID
3,000
4,000
4,000
10,000
13,300
10,000
-24.8%
Caribbean
Development
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FY2017
FY2018a
FY2019
FY2020b
FY2021b
FY2022
%
(req.)
Change:
FY21-

FY22
USAID
38,316
19,931a
4,600
5,000
5,000
73,085
+1,361.7%
Central
America
Regional
USAID South
14,000
18,065a
18,000
15,000
15,000
20,200
+34.7%
America
Regional
USAID Latin
26,700
51,600a
68,300
36,978
45,540
75,178
+65.1%
America and
Caribbean
Regional
State Central
—
—
—
—
—
423,765c
—c
America
Regionalc
State Western
425,471
414,795
431,313
355,610
366,909
125,660c
-65.8%c
Hemisphere
Regionalc
[CARSI]
[329,225]
[319,225]a
[290,000]
[270,000]
[256,040]
[342,665]
[+33.8%]
[CBSI]
[57,700]
[57,700]
[58,000]
[60,000]
[74,800]
[66,000]
[-11.8%]
Total
1,673,211 1,668,446a 1,694,129 1,721,741b 1,794,345b 2,073,438
+15.6%
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2023, at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and https://www.state.gov/fy-
2023-international-affairs-budget/. CARSI and CBSI totals for FY2021 are estimates drawn from “Explanatory
Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the
House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,”
Congressional Record, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), pp. H8793-H8794.
Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. USAID
and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives, including CARSI and CBSI, as well as
activities that cross borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the vast
majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries.
a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean region. This included $116.0 mil ion reprogrammed to Colombia, $87.1 mil ion
to Venezuela, $17.0 mil ion to Peru, $12.2 mil ion to USAID South America Regional, $10.0 mil ion to
Nicaragua, $10.0 mil ion to Barbados and Eastern Caribbean, $8.0 mil ion to Brazil, $3 mil ion to regional
anti-trafficking in persons programs, and $1 mil ion to USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional. The
remainder was allocated to priorities outside the region
b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency
appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19.
c. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request proposed a new State Department-managed Central America
Regional program, which would fund CARSI and other regional activities in Central America. CARSI was
funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere regional program in prior years.
Inter-American Foundation
In addition to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden
Administration requested $38.0 million for the IAF in FY2022 (see Table 3). The IAF is an
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independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign Assistance Act of
1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for community-led
development efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the agency after
conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region and
determining that programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted significant
social and civic change despite fostering economic growth.18 The IAF is active in 27 countries,
including several countries where USAID no longer has field missions. Among other initiatives,
the Administration requested funding in FY2022 to support the IAF’s ongoing efforts to address
the root causes of Central American migration; spur local economic activity; reduce food
insecurity; promote civic engagement; build resilience to crime, violence, natural disasters, and
extreme weather; and advance the social and economic inclusion of historically marginalized
populations.
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Appropriations: FY2017-FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
% Change
(req.)
FY21-FY22
22.5
22.5
22.5
37.5
38.0
38.0
—
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2022, at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/.
Note: The IAF received an additional $6.0 mil ion in FY2017, $10.0 mil ion in FY2018, and $10.0 mil ion in
FY2019 via congressionally directed interagency transfers from USAID for programs in Central America.
Legislative Developments
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2022 until
several months into the fiscal year. Although the House passed the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84), in July
2021 and the Senate Appropriations Committee introduced its SFOPS appropriations bill (S.
3075) in October 2021, neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing
resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, P.L. 117-86, and P.L. 117-95) that funded foreign aid
programs in the region at the FY2021 level from October 1, 2021, until March 15, 2022, when
President Biden signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103).
The act and accompanying explanatory statement do not specify an overall foreign assistance
appropriations total for Latin America and Caribbean, but they include funding directives and/or
restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region (see Table 4).

18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Report on H.R. 14580 to
Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World to
Achieve Development Within a Framework of Democratic, Economic, Social, and Political Institutions, and for Other
Purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57.
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Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives: FY2022
Appropriations Legislation
(millions of current U.S. dollars)

FY2021
FY2022 (req.) H.R. 4373 and
S. 3075 and
P.L. 117-103
H.Rept. 117-
draft
and
84
explanatory
explanatory
statement
statement
Caribbean Basin
74.8
66.0
80.0
74.5
80.0
Security
Initiative
Central
564.1
860.6
860.6
653.9
NA
America
Colombia
465.1
453.9
461.4
463.9
471.4
Haiti
189.6
187.9
NA
NA
NA
Inter-American
38.0
38.0
44.5
44.5
42.0
Foundation
Mexico
158.9
116.6
158.9
NA
158.9
Venezuela
38.0
55.0
50.0
50.0
40.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June 25, 2021; U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 28, 2022; H.R. 4373; H.Rept. 117-84; S. 3075; the Senate
Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement, available at https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF; P.L. 117-103; and Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro,
Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment
to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 42—Book IV (March 9,
2022), pp. H2992-H3027. The CBSI total for FY2021 is an estimate drawn from “Explanatory Statement
Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House
Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,” Congressional
Record, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794.
Note: NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation totals are not available.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. P.L. 117-103 provides “not less than” $80.0 million for the
CBSI, which is $14.0 million more than the Administration requested and $5.2 million more than
was appropriated for the initiative in FY2021.
Central America. P.L. 117-103 does not stipulate an overall assistance level for Central America.
However, it designates “not less than” $100.0 million for locally led development programs in the
Northern Triangle, $70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America,
$61.5 million for anti-corruption entities and activities in Central America, and $15.0 million for
democracy programs in Nicaragua. The accompanying explanatory statement also designates at
least $125.0 million for Honduras, $50.0 million for a new Central America Youth Empowerment
Program in the Northern Triangle, and $40.7 million for Costa Rica. Some of these activities may
overlap. Similar to prior years, the act requires the State Department to withhold 60% of ESF and
security assistance to support the central governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
until those governments meet a series of conditions related to corruption, human rights,
migration, and other congressional concerns. The act also prohibits FMF for those three countries.
Colombia. P.L. 117-103 provides “not less than” $471.4 million for Colombia, which is $17.5
million more than the Administration requested and $6.3 million more than the FY2021
allocation. Similar to prior years, the act requires the State Department to withhold 20% of FMF
appropriated for Colombia and 5% of INCLE to be provided to the Colombian National Police
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until the Colombian government meets certain human rights conditions. The act also requires the
State Department to withhold 20% of the total amount of INCLE appropriated for Colombia until
the Secretary of State certifies Colombia is implementing certain counternarcotics policies.
Haiti. P.L. 117-103 does not designate a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti. The
accompanying explanatory statement allocates $56.0 million of DA to Haiti, including $8.5
million for reforestation, and “not less than” $5.0 million to meet the sanitary, medical, and
nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act requires the State Department to withhold those
funds and any other assistance for Haiti until a new president and parliament have taken office
following free and fair elections or the Secretary of State determines a transitional government
broadly representative of Haitian society is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to provide
assistance. Notwithstanding those withholding requirements, the act allows U.S. agencies to
provide assistance to support elections, anti-gang police and justice administration, public health,
food security, water and sanitation, education, disaster relief and recovery, and other programs to
meet basic human needs. The act also prohibits funding for the armed forces of Haiti.
Inter-American Foundation. P.L. 117-103 provides $42.0 million for the IAF, which is $4
million more than the Administration requested or was appropriated for the agency in FY2021.
The explanatory statement notes that the act provides sufficient funds to support a pilot exchange
program between indigenous IAF grantees and Native American tribes.
Mexico. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103 states that the act “includes funds
sufficient to support levels for assistance for Mexico commensurate with those detailed” in
H.Rept. 117-84. That report designated $158.9 million for Mexico, which is $42.3 million more
than the Administration requested and equal to the FY2021 allocation. The explanatory statement
also directs U.S. agencies to comply with reporting requirements in H.Rept. 117-84. Among other
reports, the State Department is to assess the extent to which the Mexican government is
addressing certain human rights concerns and the State Department and USAID are to conduct a
comprehensive review of the Mérida Initiative.
Venezuela. P.L. 117-103 provides $40.0 million for democracy programs in Venezuela, which is
$10.0 million less than the Administration requested but $7.0 million more than the allocation for
such programs in FY2021. Neither the act nor the explanatory statement designate a funding level
for health programs in Venezuela; the Administration requested $5 million for health programs in
FY2022, which was the same as the FY2021 allocation for such programs. In addition to aid for
Venezuela, the act directs U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other Latin American
and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
Policy Issues for Congress
Congress examined a variety of policy issues during the FY2022 appropriations process, many of
which may remain subjects of debate as Congress considers the President’s FY2023 budget
request and other legislation related to foreign operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
These issues include how to help countries in the region respond to, and recover from, the
COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration; and the
challenges DOD security cooperation programs present for congressional efforts to guide security
assistance policy in the region.
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COVID-19 Response19
The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected socioeconomic conditions in Latin America
and the Caribbean. At the end of 2021, the region had registered nearly 1.6 million COVID-19
deaths, or 28.7% of such deaths worldwide while accounting for about 8.4% of the world’s
population.20 The pandemic and related containment efforts also contributed to a regional
economic contraction of 6.9% in 2020.21 Although some countries were able to mitigate the
impact of the economic downturn with emergency social assistance programs, Latin America’s
poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates increased to levels not seen for 10 and 20
years, respectively.22 Severe food insecurity also increased, with an estimated 53.8 million-66.1
million people (8.2%-10.1% of the region’s population) undernourished in 2020.23 The sharp
deterioration in living conditions has contributed to large-scale migration flows throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Through the end of 2021, Congress had provided some $17 billion in supplemental and
emergency international affairs funding to help countries worldwide respond to, and recover
from, the COVID-19 pandemic. This total includes funds enacted through the Coronavirus
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123); the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (P.L. 116-136); the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2021 (P.L. 116-260, Division K, Title IX); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-
2). As of November 2021, the United States had provided more than $614 million of
supplemental assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, with the vast majority implemented
by USAID (see Table 5).24 These funds are in addition to the base appropriations described
earlier in this report (see Table 1 and Table 2), some of which U.S. agencies have used to support
pandemic response and recovery. Among other activities, U.S. supplemental assistance has
funded efforts to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene; strengthen health systems; and address
economic and social impacts of the pandemic, such as food insecurity and gender-based violence.
Table 5. USAID-Managed Supplemental Assistance for the COVID-19 Response in
Latin America and the Caribbean: Total as of November 2021
(obligations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
Country or Region
U.S. Assistance
Bahamas
0.8
Belize
0.3
Bolivia
10.6

19 For more information on COVID-19 in the region, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean:
Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
20 Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” accessed January 1,
2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
21 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update: Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and
Higher Inflation, January 2022, p. 5. (Hereinafter: IMF, January 2022).
22 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022, p. 63.
23 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional
Overview of Food Security and Nutrition, 2021, p. 2.
24 Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International
Economic Policy, The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities for Latin America and the Caribbean, 117th Cong., 1st
sess., November 16, 2021.
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Country or Region
U.S. Assistance
Brazil
47.2
Colombia
89.5
Costa Rica
1.8
Dominican Republic
10.3
Ecuador
37.1
El Salvador
21.8
Guatemala
68.2
Haiti
35.7
Honduras
48.8
Jamaica
7.7
Nicaragua
2.8
Panama
4.8
Paraguay
11.5
Peru
56.7
St. Kitts and Nevis
0.5
Uruguay
1.0
Venezuela
40.0
Caribbean Regional
4.8
Central America Regional
3.2
South America Regional
0.8
Latin America and Caribbean Regional
1.4
Total
507.1
Source: USAID, “COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year 2022,
November 30, 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Regional_Fact_Sheet_3_-_LAC.pdf.
Notes: USAID figures represent obligations of supplemental assistance as of November 30, 2021. They do not
include any of the funds contributed to Gavi or base or reprogrammed foreign assistance funds used to respond
to COVID-19. The State Department has not released a country-by-country breakdown of its COVID-19
response.
The United States is also supporting vaccination efforts in the region. P.L. 116-260 included $4.0
billion as a contribution to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which supports the COVID-19 Vaccines
Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by global health organizations to
facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Within Latin America and the Caribbean,
22 countries have signed agreements to purchase vaccines through the facility, and 10 countries—
Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines—are eligible for donor-funded vaccines through the COVID-19
Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC).25 In December 2021, the State
Department announced it would contribute $75 million appropriated in P.L. 117-2 to the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO)—the specialized international health agency of the

25 Gavi, “COVAX,” May 12, 2021.
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Americas—to assist countries with vaccination implementation and monitoring.26 The Biden
Administration also has pledged to donate 1.2 billion vaccine doses globally, both bilaterally and
through the COVAX facility and COVAX AMC.27 As of March 29, 2022, the United States had
delivered more than 67.2 million doses to 30 countries in the Western Hemisphere.28
Nevertheless, the region continues to face significant challenges. Although South America is
among the most vaccinated regions in the world, 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries had
vaccination rates below 50% as of March 25, 2022.29 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimates that real gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by
6.8% in 2021, buoyed by global commodity price increases, but GDP per capita will remain
below pre-pandemic levels until 2023.30 Recovery may be particularly protracted for tourism-
dependent economies in the Caribbean and countries without widespread vaccine coverage. High
public debt levels have led many governments in the region to begin scaling back income support
programs, while their populations continue to contend with persistently weak labor markets. Such
shifts toward austerity have sparked protests in several countries and could contribute to further
instability should socioeconomic conditions deteriorate.
During the 117th Congress, Members have deliberated on whether to provide additional pandemic
response and recovery assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Given the region’s difficult
situation, its close ties to the United States, and the geopolitical challenge posed by China’s
provision of vaccines to countries throughout the hemisphere, some analysts and Members of
Congress argue the United States should prioritize Latin America and the Caribbean when
allocating vaccine donations and assistance.31 By contrast, some public health advocates have
warned the United States that allocating vaccines based on geopolitical considerations could
prevent vaccines from reaching the areas where they are the most needed; they argue that donors
should channel vaccines through a single mechanism, such as COVAX.32 The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103), did not specify priority regions for U.S. vaccine
donations, but another bill introduced in the House (H.R. 3236) would direct the President to
prioritize Western Hemisphere countries.
Separate from bilateral foreign assistance channels, Congress has considered measures to
influence the pandemic responses of international financial institutions. For example, a provision

26 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Announcement of ARPA – International Organizations and
Programs (IO&P) Funds,” Fact Sheet, December 21, 2021.
27 White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to Protect Americans Against the Delta and Omicron
Variants as We Battle COVID-19 This Winter,” press release, December 2, 2021.
28 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations,” at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/vaccine-
deliveries/#map_western.
29 As of March 25, 2022, the countries where less than half of the population had completed COVID-19 vaccination
schedules were Haiti (1.0%), Jamaica (22.5%), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (27.1%), St. Lucia (28.6%), Guatemala
(32.5%), Grenada (33.5%), Bahamas (39.3%), Suriname (40.0%), Dominica (40.3%), Guyana (45.6%), Paraguay
(45.9%), Honduras (47.5%), Bolivia (48.8%), St. Kitts and Nevis (48.9%), and Venezuela (49.8%). Pan American
Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” March 25, 2022, at https://ais.paho.org/imm/
IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp.
30 IMF, January 2022, p. 5; and IMF, Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook: A Long and Winding Road to
Recovery, October 2021.
31 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational
Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues, Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin
America and the Caribbean: The Importance of Engagement, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 2021.
32 Erin Banco, “‘It’s a Sore Spot for a Lot of People’: Why Officials Are Raising Questions About Biden’s Vaccine
Donations,” Politico Pro, December 8, 2021.
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of the House-passed FY2022 foreign operations appropriations measure (H.R. 4373) would have
directed the U.S. executive directors at each international financial institution to use the voice and
vote of the United States to support the suspension of all debt-service payments and the relaxation
of fiscal targets to ensure governments around the world have sufficient fiscal space to respond to
the pandemic. It also would have called for the U.S. executive director at the IMF to advocate for
the issuance of Special Drawing Rights to enable governments to access additional resources to
finance their pandemic responses.33 Those provisions were not included in P.L. 117-103. Other
bills (S. 1260, passed by the Senate in June 2021; H.R. 4521, as passed by the Senate in March
2022; and S. 616), would authorize a 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American
Development Bank to help Latin American and Caribbean countries achieve sustainable debt
structures and recover from the pandemic.
Migration Management
For nearly a decade, U.S. policymakers concerned about irregular migration from Central
America to the United States have sought to deter migrant flows with foreign assistance. As noted
above, the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request included $860.6 million “as a first step
toward the President’s four-year commitment of $4 billion to address the root causes of irregular
migration from Central America.”34 Many analysts are skeptical of such efforts, however, given
the limited data available regarding how previously appropriated aid affected migration trends.35
Academic research provides some evidence that foreign assistance can reduce migration, though
the impact is typically modest and the results vary depending on the type of assistance. For
example, a 2018 study found a 10% increase in assistance to help a country improve governance
and social services would lower that country’s emigration rate by 1.6%.36 Other studies have
found that governance and rural development aid are associated with slight decreases in
emigration rates, whereas other types of assistance are not.37 Alternatively, large and sudden drops
in foreign aid disbursements are associated with increased emigration from aid recipients.38 Fewer
scholars have examined the impact of foreign assistance on asylum trends, but a 2020 study found
a 10% increase in bilateral assistance to a low-income country was followed by a 0.6% reduction
in asylum applications the following year and a 3% decrease in such applications in the long
run.39

33 H.R. 4373, §7073. For additional information on Special Drawing Rights, see CRS In Focus IF11835, International
Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocation, by Martin A. Weiss and Rebecca M. Nelson.
34 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022,
June 25, 2021, p. 25.
35 See, for example, Greg Weeks, “USAID in Central America: Less Is Better,” Global Americans, January 10, 2022.
36 Mauro Lanati and Rainer Thiele, “Foreign Assistance and Migration Choices: Disentangling the Channels,”
Economics Letters, vol. 172 (November 2018), pp. 148-151. (Hereinafter: Lanati and Thiele, 2018).
37 Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Targeted Foreign Aid and International Migration: Is Development-Promotion
an Effective Immigration Policy?,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 2018), pp. 809-820; and
Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Rural Development Aid Reduce International Migration?,” World
Development, vol. 110 (October 2018), pp. 268-282.
38 Jonas Gamso, Jikuo Lu, and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Foreign Aid Volatility Increase International Migration?,”
Review of International Organizations, vol. 16 (2021), pp. 581-598.
39 Marina Murat, “Foreign Aid, Bilateral Asylum Immigration and Development,” Journal of Population Economics,
vol. 33, no. 1 (2020), pp. 79-114.
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Some research shows that economic development assistance is less effective than governance and
social services aid in deterring migration.40 Although observers often assume emigration is a
decision of last resort, studies have found that higher-income individuals are more likely to be
actively preparing to migrate than lower-income individuals in the same country. This appears to
be the result of comparatively poorer individuals facing financial barriers to emigration and many
higher-income individuals viewing emigration as a financial investment.41 Studies across
countries have found that emigration rates tend to increase along with economic growth until
countries reach a certain level of economic development—typically a per capita income of
roughly $10,000 (in purchasing power parity-adjusted 2011 U.S. dollars, 2011 PPP). This is
partially attributable to demographic changes, as economic development may initially spur a large
increase in the youth population, which later dissipates as fertility rates decline.42
These findings suggest foreign assistance alone is unlikely to resolve the challenge posed by
irregular migration from Central America. As of 2018, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador
had per capita GDPs (2011 PPP) of $5,042; $7,402; and $8,598, respectively.43 Whereas El
Salvador’s youth cohort has begun to shrink, those of Honduras and Guatemala will continue to
grow for the next 5-10 years.44 As a result, emigration rates in the region are likely to continue
increasing in the near term, assuming they follow the typical development pattern. A 53%
increase in assistance for Central America, as the Biden Administration proposed in FY2022,
could partially alleviate the situation, particularly if the aid is targeted toward the types of
governance, social services, and rural development programs that have been shown to be the most
effective. As noted previously, it is unclear whether the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022
(P.L. 117-103), fully funds the Administration’s request for Central America.
Some analysts argue that U.S. assistance programs in Central America should focus on mitigating
the impact of short-term shocks, which can spark sudden migration surges that strain U.S.
resources at the Southwest border.45 For example, U.S. policymakers could direct foreign
assistance funds toward preparing for and responding to natural disasters; alleviating food
insecurity; and preventing outbreaks of violence in the region. P.L. 117-103 includes some
funding for such efforts, including $50.0 million for a new Central America Youth Empowerment
Program in the Northern Triangle intended “to create measurable reductions in migration from
targeted communities in such countries by recruiting young people to engage in COVID–19
response, hurricane preparedness and recovery, and other community projects.” Others argue U.S.
assistance efforts in Central America should remain focused on long-term development objectives
and caution against evaluating programs based on short-term migration trends that are largely
outside U.S. agencies’ control.46

40 Lanati and Thiele, 2018.
41 Michael A. Clemens and Mariapia Mendola, Migration from Developing Countries: Selection, Income Elasticity, and
Simpson’s Paradox, Center for Global Development, Working Paper 539, August 2020; and Michael A. Clemens,
“Emigration Rises Along with Economic Development. Aid Agencies Should Face This, But Not Fear It,” Center for
Global Development Blog, August 18, 2020.
42 Michael A. Clemens, The Emigration Life Cycle: How Development Shapes Emigration from Poor Countries, Center
for Global Development, Working Paper 540, August 2020.
43 2018 is the most recent year for which data are available. Jotta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Maddison Project
Database, version 2020,” accessed on January 28, 2021.
44 Michael A. Clemens, “The Real Root Causes of Americas Border Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, June 7, 2021.
45 Ibid.
46 Sarah Rose et al., Addressing the ‘Root Causes’ of Irregular Migration from Central America: An Evidence Agenda
for USAID, Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 243, December 2021.
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In addition to foreign assistance efforts, U.S. policymakers could seek to reduce the challenges
posed by irregular migration with measures aimed at channeling asylum-seekers and other
migrants into legal pathways. As part of its Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, the
Biden Administration has reestablished and expanded the Central American Minors (CAM)
refugee and parole program, which reunites eligible children from the region with their parents in
the United States.47 The Administration also made available 6,000 supplemental H2B temporary
nonagricultural visas for nationals of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in FY2021, and it
has reserved 6,500 such visas for nationals of those countries and Haiti in the first half of
FY2022.48 Among other provisions, the U.S. Citizenship Act (H.R. 1177/S. 348) would establish
refugee-processing centers in Central America and would codify and expand refugee and
humanitarian parole programs for individuals from the region. Some Members of Congress view
such measures as counterproductive; these Members have introduced bills, such as H.R. 4199,
which would prohibit funding for the CAM program.
Congressional Guidance of Security Assistance
Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title 22 of the U.S.
Code (Foreign Relations) and has appropriated funding for such programs through State
Department-managed foreign assistance accounts in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation.
That approach has changed to a certain extent in recent decades, as Congress has provided
numerous security assistance authorities to DOD under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed
Services) and has appropriated funding for such activities (often referred to as “security
cooperation”) through annual DOD appropriations.49 For example, 10 U.S.C. §333 authorizes
DOD, with the State Department’s concurrence, to train and equip foreign security forces for
operations to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, and transnational
organized crime and to support maritime and border security, among other purposes.
As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean countries receive training, equipment, and other
support from DOD in addition to the security assistance provided through the SFOPS budget
examined earlier in this report. The U.S. Southern Command asserts that these security
cooperation programs allow the United States to remain engaged with partner militaries and help
these militaries identify and respond to shared threats, such as transnational crime and the malign
influence of external state actors.50 However, such programs may present challenges for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
Whereas the State Department requests and justifies most of its planned security assistance
expenditures in Latin America and the Caribbean on a country-by-country basis in annual budget
proposals, DOD does not. As part of a broad series of reforms enacted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), Congress required DOD to submit consolidated
budget requests for its planned security cooperation programs, including the specific country or

47 White House, “Collaborative Migration Management Strategy,” July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.
48 Ibid; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “For First Time, DHS to Supplement H-2B Cap with Additional
Visas in First Half of Fiscal Year,” press release, December 20, 2021.
49 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by
Christina L. Arabia.
50 Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command, “Statement Before the 117th Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 16, 2021.
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region where activities are to be conducted “to the extent practicable.”51 To date, DOD’s budget
requests have included planned expenditures by combatant command areas of responsibility but
no further details on planned activities or recipient countries. For FY2022, for example, DOD
requested $50.3 million for U.S. Northern Command, which covers Mexico and the Bahamas,
and $164.8 million for U.S. Southern Command, which covers the rest of the Latin American and
Caribbean region. That total is roughly twice as much funding as the Administration requested for
FMF and IMET assistance for the region, but it is unclear how DOD would expend those
resources. DOD asserts that it intends to provide country budgetary information in the future but
doing so “is not currently feasible.”52
This lack of detail regarding planned DOD expenditures may limit Congress’s ability to establish
security assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean during the appropriations
process. Whereas Congress typically designates specific funding levels for the region’s top
security assistance recipients and initiatives in annual SFOPS bills and explanatory statements,
DOD notifies Congress of its planned allocations in tranches over the course of each fiscal year.
Consequently, DOD assistance may significantly increase the total amount of security assistance
provided to some countries and may shift the relative proportion of U.S. assistance dedicated to
militaries versus civilian security forces in the region. At the same time, the lack of congressional
funding directives may provide DOD with the flexibility to respond to security threats and needs
in the region as they arise.
There also are differences in the conditions imposed on State Department-managed and DOD-
managed security assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries. For example, FY2021
SFOPS legislation (P.L. 116-260, Div. K) prohibited FMF assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras and conditioned 50% of other State Department-managed security assistance for
those countries on their governments combating corruption, protecting human rights, and
addressing a series of other congressional concerns.53 The legislation also tied 20% of FMF and
INCLE aid for Colombia and 25% of FMF aid for Mexico to certain human rights and
counternarcotics conditions.54 Neither the FY2021 Department of Defense Appropriations Act
(P.L. 116-260, Div. C) nor the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (NDAA; P.L. 116-
283) imposed any similar restrictions on DOD security cooperation programs in those countries,
with the exception of an NDAA provision requiring DOD to issue a certification prior to
transferring any vehicles to Guatemala.55
Such divergences may weaken the impact of legislative restrictions and may reduce recipient
nations’ incentives to comply with legislative conditions. For example, Congress prohibited FMF
for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and placed conditions on other security assistance for
those countries following a series of human rights violations and anti-democratic actions

51 10 U.S.C. §381.
52 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget, Justification
for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding, May 2021, p. 66.
53 P.L. 116-260, §7045(a).
54 P.L. 116-260, §7045(b)(2); and the Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House
Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, Congressional Record, vol. 166, part No. 218 - Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794.
55 P.L. 116-283, §1299K. In addition to the restrictions imposed in a given fiscal year, all State Department- and DOD-
managed security assistance is subject to the permanent “Leahy Laws,” which prohibit U.S. security assistance to
foreign security forces when there is credible information that a recipient unit has committed a “gross violation of
human rights.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting
(“Leahy Laws”), by Liana W. Rosen.
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committed by security forces in each country.56 Although the State Department has yet to certify
that the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras have met the conditions necessary
to release that assistance, DOD has continued to implement security cooperation programs in
those countries.57 At the same time, by attaching different legislative conditions to State
Department- and DOD-managed security assistance, Congress may be able to highlight its
concerns while allowing continued U.S. engagement with partner security forces in the region.
The 117th Congress has taken some steps to obtain increased information regarding DOD security
cooperation programs and to harmonize State Department-managed and DOD-managed security
assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries. The explanatory statement accompanying
the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103, Div. C) directs DOD to submit a spend plan
that details the amounts allocated to international security cooperation programs in the previous
two fiscal years and planned for FY2022 “by combatant command, country, and authority.” 58 The
explanatory statement also directs DOD to submit a similar document with requested amounts
concurrent with the FY2023 budget submission. A separate directive requires DOD, in
coordination with the State Department, to submit integrated security cooperation strategies for
Colombia and Mexico.59 The FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) does not subject DOD security
cooperation programs in the region to the withholding requirements included in FY2022 SFOPS
legislation for State Department-managed programs (see “Legislative Developments”).
Nevertheless, it advances some similar objectives by requiring a series of reports on U.S. security
cooperation with Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the extent to which such
programs promote the rule of law and human rights.60

56 For examples, see U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Honduras Election Protests Met with
Excessive and Lethal Force – UN Report,” press release, March 12, 2018; Associated Press, “U.S. Suspends Some
Military Aid to Guatemala over Vehicle Use,” March 14, 2019; and Nelson Renteria, “Backed by Soldiers, El
Salvador’s President Briefly Occupies Congress,” Reuters, February 9, 2020.
57 Testimony of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in U.S. Congress, House Committee
on Armed Services, National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America, 117th Cong.,
1st sess., April 14, 2021.
58 Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the
House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Congressional
Record, vol. 168, no. 42—Book III (March 9, 2022), p. H1944.
59 Ibid.
60 P.L. 117-81, §§1336 and 1337.
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Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean by Account and by Country or
Regional Program: FY2020-FY2022 Request
Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2020
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina
—
—
—
—
2.5
—
0.6
—
3.1
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
1.0
1.2
Brazil
15.0
—
—
4.3
—
—
0.8
—
20.1
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
—
0.6
Colombia
61.0
146.3
3.0
1.5
180.0
21.0
1.8
45.5
460.2
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
7.5
8.2
Cuba
—
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
Dominican Republic
7.0
—
—
21.2
—
—
0.4
—
28.6
Ecuador
12.2
—
—
—
7.0
—
0.3
—
19.5
El Salvador
70.0
—
—
6.2
—
—
0.8
1.9
78.9
Guatemala
65.7
—
13.0
16.5
—
—
0.8
—
95.9
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.1
—
0.1
Haiti
51.0
—
24.5
78.8
18.0
—
0.1
—
172.4
Honduras
65.0
—
—
7.6
—
—
0.8
—
73.4
Jamaica
1.0
—
—
6.7
—
—
0.5
—
8.2
Mexico
—
50.0
—
—
100.0
1.2
1.8
5.0
157.9
Nicaragua
10.0
—
—
1.3
—
—
—
—
11.3
Panama
—
—
—
7.1
—
0.5
0.5
2.0
10.1
Paraguay
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
4.2
Peru
34.8
—
—
1.2
40.0
—
0.6
1.8
78.3
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Trinidad and
—
—
—
1.8
—
—
0.3
—
2.1
Tobago
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
0.4
Venezuela
—
30.0
5.0
3.5
—
—
—
—
38.5
Barbados and
5.0
—
—
0.3
—
—
0.6
—
5.9
Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
7.0
3.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
Developmenta
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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
USAID Central
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
5.0
Americaa
USAID South
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
Americaa
USAID Latin
29.2
—
7.8
—
—
—
—
—
37.0
America and
Caribbeana
State Western
—
128.3
—
—
207.7
4.6
—
15.0
355.6
Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[—] [100.0]
[—]
[—]
[170.0]
[—]
[—]
[—]
[270.0]
[CBSI]a
[—]
[27.3]
[—]
[—]
[25.2]
[—]
[—]
[7.5]
[60.0]
Total
457.8
377.6b
53.3
157.7
555.2
27.3
13.1
79.7 1,721.7b
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June 25, 2021.
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs;
INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military
Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI =
Central America Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through
the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2020 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2021
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina
—
—
—
—
0.1
—
0.6
—
0.7
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
1.0
1.3
Brazil
17.0
—
—
1.8
—
—
0.7
—
19.5
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
—
0.5
Colombia
70.0
141.0
2.0
1.7
189.0
21.0
1.9
38.5
465.1
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
7.5
8.2
Cuba
—
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
Dominican Republic
5.6
—
—
23.3
—
—
0.5
—
29.4
Ecuador
11.5
—
—
—
7.0
—
0.3
5.0
23.8
El Salvador
70.0
—
—
8.1
—
—
0.7
—
78.8
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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Guatemala
65.7
—
13.0
18.6
—
—
0.8
—
98.0
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Haiti
52.0
—
24.5
99.8
13.0
—
0.3
—
189.6
Honduras
65.0
—
—
8.3
—
—
0.8
—
74.0
Jamaica
2.0
—
—
15.5
—
—
0.6
—
18.1
Mexico
—
50.0
—
—
100.0
1.2
1.8
6.0
158.9
Nicaragua
10.0
—
—
1.6
—
—
—
—
11.6
Panama
—
—
—
8.6
—
0.5
0.7
2.0
11.8
Paraguay
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
4.4
Peru
43.0
—
—
1.9
39.0
1.0
0.6
—
85.5
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Trinidad and Tobago
—
—
—
2.6
—
—
0.3
—
2.9
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
0.4
Venezuela
—
33.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
38.0
Barbados and
7.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
7.7
Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
13.3
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
13.3
Developmenta
USAID Central
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
5.0
Americaa
USAID South
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
Americaa
USAID Latin
34.5
—
11.0
—
—
—
—
—
45.5
America and
Caribbeana
State Western
—
134.5
—
3.2
204.9
7.4
—
16.9
366.9
Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[—] [101.0]
[—]
[—]
[155.0]
[—]
[—]
[—] [256.0]
[CBSI]a
[—]
[32.3]
[—]
[—]
[35.0]
[—]
[—]
[7.5]
[74.8]
Total
490.6
378.5b
55.5
195.0
553.0
31.0
13.8
76.9 1,794.3
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 28, 2022. CARSI and CBSI totals are estimates drawn from
“Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations,
Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2021,” Congressional Record, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), pp. H8793-H8794.
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. DA = Development
Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs;
IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America Regional Security
Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
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a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through
the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2021 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
Table A-3. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET
FMF
Total
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
0.7
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
—
0.3
Brazil
17.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
17.8
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
—
0.5
Colombia
70.0
141.0
5.0
—
175.0
21.0
1.9
40.0
453.9
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
0.7
Cuba
—
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
Dominican Republic
8.0
—
—
20.0
—
—
0.5
—
28.5
Ecuador
13.0
—
—
—
10.5
—
0.3
5.0
28.8
El Salvador
95.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
95.8
Guatemala
113.7
—
13.0
—
—
—
0.8
—
127.5
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Haiti
51.0
—
24.5
100.0
12.1
—
0.3
—
187.9
Honduras
95.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
95.8
Jamaica
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
—
1.6
Mexico
—
50.0
—
—
64.0
1.0
1.6
—
116.6
Nicaragua
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.7
—
1.2
Paraguay
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
4.4
Peru
39.0
—
—
—
46.2
1.0
0.7
—
86.9
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Trinidad and
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
—
0.3
Tobago
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
0.4
Venezuela
—
50.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
55.0
Barbados and
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
5.7
Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
10.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
Developmenta
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25

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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET
FMF
Total
USAID Central
73.1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
73.1
Americaa
USAID South
20.2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.2
Americaa
USAID Latin
29.2
35.0
11.0
—
—
—
—
—
75.2
America and
Caribbeana
State Central
—
131.0
—
43.6
219.7
2.0
—
27.5
423.8
Americaa
State Western
—
28.3
—
26.4
43.0
5.5
—
22.5
125.7
Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[—] [123.0]
[—]
[—]
[219.7]
[—]
[—]
[—] [342.7]
[CBSI]a
[—]
[27.0]
[—]
[—]
[29.0]
[—]
[—] [10.0]
[66.0]
Total
659.1
455.3
58.5
190.0
570.4
31.0
14.1
95.0 2,073.4
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June 25, 2021.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE
= International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing;
USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America
Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. The FY2022 request proposed
funding CARSI through the State Central America regional program and funding CBSI through the State
Western Hemisphere regional program.

Author Information

Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs

Congressional Research Service

26

U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

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