U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

Changes from February 23, 2022 to March 31, 2022

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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
~~February 23~~March 31, 2022 , 2022
the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations
Peter J. Meyer
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
American and Canadian American and Canadian
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Affairs Affairs
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since

the 1990s. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have the 1990s. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have
included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combatting drug included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combatting drug

production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening security production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening security
and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering
long-term stability in Haiti, addressing security concerns in the Caribbean, and responding to the political and humanitarian long-term stability in Haiti, addressing security concerns in the Caribbean, and responding to the political and humanitarian
crises in Venezuela and their effects on the broader region. crises in Venezuela and their effects on the broader region.
~~Congress may assess how the region’s assistance needs have changed due~~Since 2020, U.S. policymakers have sought to readjust U.S. assistance efforts to respond to the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 to the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019
~~(COVID-19) pandemic. At the end of 2021, Latin American and Caribbean countries, which are home to about 8.4% of the~~
~~world’s population, accounted for 28.7% of COVID-19 deaths globally. The region’s economy as a whole contracted by~~
~~6.9% in 2020, increasing Latin America’s poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates to levels not seen for 10 and~~
~~20 years, respectively. Economic recovery may be protracted, as many countries are facing high levels of debt and some may~~
~~not achieve widespread vaccination until 2023. Political and security conditions also have deteriorated in portions of the~~
~~region during the pandemic, as governments have rolled back political rights and civil liberties and criminal organizations~~
~~have extended their territorial control and influence.~~
(COVID-19) pandemic. FY2022 Budget Request
The Biden Administration The Biden Administration ~~has~~ requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean for requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean for
FY2022, which (in current dollars) would FY2022, which (in current dollars) would behave been the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If
enacted, total State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-managed funding for the region enacted, total State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-managed funding for the region
would would ~~increase by $278.2~~have increased by $279.1 million (15. million (15.56%) compared with FY2021%) compared with FY2021 ~~estimated levels~~. The Administration’s FY2022 budget . The Administration’s FY2022 budget
request also would request also would ~~provide~~have provided $38.0 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance $38.0 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance
agency that supports community-led development in Latin America and the Caribbean. agency that supports community-led development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Administration The Administration ~~states~~asserted that it that it ~~intends~~intended to use the assistance requested for FY2022 to address the socioeconomic effects of to use the assistance requested for FY2022 to address the socioeconomic effects of
the pandemic while continuing to respond to a variety of other challenges in the region. Much of the funding would the pandemic while continuing to respond to a variety of other challenges in the region. Much of the funding would ~~support~~
have supported implementation of the Administration’s four-year, $4.0 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of implementation of the Administration’s four-year, $4.0 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of
irregular migration from Central America. The FY2022 request irregular migration from Central America. The FY2022 request ~~includes~~included $860.6 million for Central America—a $860.6 million for Central America—a ~~$298.0~~
~~million (53.0~~$295.9 million (52.6%) increase compared with %) increase compared with ~~the FY2021 estimate~~FY2021. With regard to other regional priorities, the Administration’s . With regard to other regional priorities, the Administration’s
FY2022 request would FY2022 request would ~~provide~~have provided $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for Haiti, $116.6 million for Mexico, $66.0 $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for Haiti, $116.6 million for Mexico, $66.0
million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and $55.0 million for Venezuela. million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and $55.0 million for Venezuela.
Legislative Developments
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2022 until several months into the fiscal year. Although the~~Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2022 appropriations. The~~ House passed the Department of State, Foreign House passed the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84)Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84), in July 2021 in July 2021, and the Senate and the Senate
Appropriations Committee introduced a foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) in October 2021Appropriations Committee introduced a foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) in October 2021~~. Neither bill would specify~~
~~comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country. Nevertheless, the House-passed~~
~~measure would designate funding levels for Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and the CBSI that match or exceed the~~
~~Administration’s request. The bill introduced in the Senate would provide slightly more assistance than the Administration~~
~~requested for Colombia and the CBSI but $206.7 million less than the Administration requested for Central America. Three~~
~~continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, and P.L. 117-86) have funded foreign aid programs in the region at the~~
~~FY2021 level since October 1, 2021. P.L. 117-86 extends appropriations through March 11, 2022.~~
~~Congress may consider various policy issues as it continues the appropriations process.~~ , neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, P.L. 117-86, and P.L. 117-95) that funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2021 level from October 1, 2021, until March 15, 2022, when President Biden signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103). The act and accompanying explanatory statement do not specify the total amount of foreign assistance for Latin America and Caribbean, but they designate funding levels for some specific U.S. initiatives. Among other appropriations, the act provides “not less than” $471.4 million for Colombia, $80.0 million for the CBSI, $40.0 million for democracy programs in Venezuela, and $42.0 million for the IAF. The explanatory statement also appears to designate $158.9 million for Mexico. Overall funding for Central America is unclear, but the act includes “not less than” $61.5 million for anti-corruption activities in Central America, $70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America and $100.0 million for locally led development programs in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Congress considered a variety of policy issues during the FY2022 appropriations process, many of which may remain subjects of debate as Congress considers the President’s FY2023 budget request and other foreign operations legislation. Such issues include how to help Latin Such issues include how to help Latin
American and Caribbean countries respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign American and Caribbean countries respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign
assistance for managing migration; and the challenges Department of Defense security cooperation programs present for assistance for managing migration; and the challenges Department of Defense security cooperation programs present for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region. congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
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Contacts
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U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

Introduction
Foreign assistance (also referred to as Foreign assistance (also referred to as foreign aid in this report) is one of the tools the United in this report) is one of the tools the United
States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.1 States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.1
The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. objectives.The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. objectives.2
Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region, as well as the broad Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region, as well as the broad
range of these countries’ ties to the United States (range of these countries’ ties to the United States (seesee Figure 1 for a map of Latin America and for a map of Latin America and
the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political, the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political,
socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating
democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive
traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared
security challenges, such as transnational crime.security challenges, such as transnational crime.
Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funds for Latin America and the Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that administer them. Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

1 For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, 1 For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S.
Programs and Policy, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown.
~~2 For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R46781,~~ ~~Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S.~~
~~Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan~~. .
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~~Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funds for Latin America and the~~
~~Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that~~
~~administer them. The 117th Congress is currently assessing the Biden Administration’s FY2022~~
~~foreign assistance request for the region as well as a variety of related bills. These bills include~~
~~measures to authorize certain U.S. assistance activities in the Caribbean (H.R. 4133) and Central~~
~~America (H.R. 1177/S. 348 and H.R. 4017/S. 2003), and to evaluate the past decade of U.S.~~
~~recovery and development efforts in Haiti (H.R. 2471, passed by the House in June 2021 and by~~
~~the Senate, with an amendment, in January 2022).~~
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
examines trends in aid to the region; the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request for aid examines trends in aid to the region; the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request for aid
administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and congressional action on FY2022 Department of and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and congressional action on FY2022 Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. It also analyzes several State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. It also analyzes several
issues that Congress issues that Congress ~~may consider as it deliberates on FY2022 appropriations and other~~
~~legislation. These issues include~~considered during the appropriations process, including how to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) how to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic in the region, the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration, and the pandemic in the region, the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration, and the
challenges Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation programs present for challenges Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation programs present for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region. congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
Report Notes
To more accurately compare the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request with previous years’ To more accurately compare the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request with previous years’
appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State
Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries
or regional programs. Such assistance accounted for 62.8% of the total aid obligated by all U.S. agencies in Latin or regional programs. Such assistance accounted for 62.8% of the total aid obligated by all U.S. agencies in Latin
America and the Caribbean in FY2019. America and the Caribbean in FY2019.
Many countries in the region are receiving additional assistance through of a series of supplemental appropriations Many countries in the region are receiving additional assistance through of a series of supplemental appropriations
bil s Congress enacted to help countries worldwide respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those supplemental bil s Congress enacted to help countries worldwide respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those supplemental
resources are discussed in the resources are discussed in the “COVID-19 Response” section of this report but otherwise are excluded from this section of this report but otherwise are excluded from this
analysis due to data inconsistencies. analysis due to data inconsistencies.
Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign
assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and
Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department
of Defense, Mil ennium Challenge Corporation, and Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral organizations that the of Defense, Mil ennium Challenge Corporation, and Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral organizations that the
United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the Pan American Health Organization, provide additional aid to the region. Except where indicated, Bank, and the Pan American Health Organization, provide additional aid to the region. Except where indicated,
those accounts, agencies, and organizations are excluded from this analysis. those accounts, agencies, and organizations are excluded from this analysis.
Source: USAID and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/. USAID and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2019, the United States provided $93.8 America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2019, the United States provided $93.8
billion ($194.5 billion in constant 2019 dollars) of assistance to the region.billion ($194.5 billion in constant 2019 dollars) of assistance to the region.32 U.S. assistance to the U.S. assistance to the
region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s

~~3 These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and~~
~~Caribbean countries (identified in Figure 1) and regional programs. U.S. Agency for International Development~~
~~(USAID) and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence
in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S. in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S.
assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support
to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies
from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-
1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil
conflicts (seeconflicts (see Figure 2).
2 These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and Caribbean countries (identified in Figure 1) and regional programs. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/. Congressional Research Service 2 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2019
(obligations in billions of constant 2019 dollars) (obligations in billions of constant 2019 dollars)

Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S.
Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. Comprehensive data for FY2020 and FY2021 Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. Comprehensive data for FY2020 and FY2021
are not yet available. are not yet available.
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of 1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of
assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development
assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The
establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium
Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of
U.S. assistance.U.S. assistance.43 In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the
aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010. aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.

~~4 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,~~
~~see CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther;~~
~~and CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.~~
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Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S. Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive
Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its
Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed
conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined
with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug
and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama
Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central
3 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, see CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther; and CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown. Congressional Research Service 3 link to page 18 link to page 10 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of
the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
Although U.S. assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have remained elevated Although U.S. assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have remained elevated
over the past two decades compared with the 1990s, the U.S. government has increasingly over the past two decades compared with the 1990s, the U.S. government has increasingly
concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to significant development concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to significant development
progress in much of the region. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in progress in much of the region. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in
poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.3% to 30.5%, due to stronger economic growth and poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.3% to 30.5%, due to stronger economic growth and
the implementation of more effective social policies.the implementation of more effective social policies.54 Health and education indicators also Health and education indicators also
improved significantly during that period. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, improved significantly during that period. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to others in the region based on Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to others in the region based on
their own development experiences. their own development experiences.
Trends have reversed in the last decade, however, as countries in the region has struggled to Trends have reversed in the last decade, however, as countries in the region has struggled to
address a series of challenges.address a series of challenges.5 Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin
American and Caribbean countries around 2015 due to a decline in global commodity prices and American and Caribbean countries around 2015 due to a decline in global commodity prices and
deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of
development gains (see development gains (see “COVID-19 Response”). Political conditions also have deteriorated as . Political conditions also have deteriorated as
Venezuela and Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule and widespread corruption and Venezuela and Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule and widespread corruption and
violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere. These challenges have generated violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere. These challenges have generated
instability, including large-scale migration flows throughout the hemisphere. instability, including large-scale migration flows throughout the hemisphere.
Biden Administration’s FY2022 Foreign Assistance
Budget Request6
The Biden Administration The Biden Administration ~~has~~ requested nearly $2.1 billion of State Department- and USAID-requested nearly $2.1 billion of State Department- and USAID-
managed foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current managed foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current
dollars) would dollars) would behave been the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If
enacted, funding for the region would enacted, funding for the region would ~~increase by $278.2~~have increased by $279.1 million, or 15. million, or 15.56%, compared with %, compared with
~~FY2021 estimated levels~~ FY2021 (see(see Table 1). The Administration’s proposed increase for the region . The Administration’s proposed increase for the region
~~exceeds~~exceeded the 11.4% increase requested for SFOPS globally in FY2022.7 the 11.4% increase requested for SFOPS globally in FY2022.7

54 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America
2021, January 2022, p. 63, January 2022, p. 63. 5 For more information on recent challenges in the region, see CRS Report R46781, Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan. .
6 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, 6 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/wp-, June 25, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/FY-2022-C-J-Appendix-2-FINAL-6-25-2021.pdf; and U.S. Department of State, content/uploads/2021/06/FY-2022-C-J-Appendix-2-FINAL-6-25-2021.pdf; and U.S. Department of State, ~~FY2021~~
~~estimate data, June 15, 2021~~Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 28, 2022, at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FY-2023-Congressional-Budget-Justification_Final_03282022.pdf. .
7 This calculation is based on enacted FY2021 levels, excluding emergency funding. For more information on the 7 This calculation is based on enacted FY2021 levels, excluding emergency funding. For more information on the
global foreign operations request, see CRS Report R46935, global foreign operations request, see CRS Report R46935, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations, by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern. , by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern.
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Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts8
The Administration’s The Administration’s ~~proposed~~ FY2022 foreign aid budget FY2022 foreign aid budget proposal for Latin America and the Caribbean for Latin America and the Caribbean
~~requests~~requested $659.1 million (31.8% of the total) through the Development Assistance (DA) account, $659.1 million (31.8% of the total) through the Development Assistance (DA) account,
which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-
income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as
agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental
protection. The FY2022 request would protection. The FY2022 request would ~~continue~~have continued to support long-term development efforts while to support long-term development efforts while
seeking to address the negative effects the pandemic has had on many of those sectors. seeking to address the negative effects the pandemic has had on many of those sectors. Compared with FY2021~~Compared~~
~~with the FY2021 estimate~~, DA funding for the region would , DA funding for the region would ~~increase~~have increased by $168.6 million (34.4%), by $168.6 million (34.4%),
with the majority of the additional funding allocated to Central America to address root causes of with the majority of the additional funding allocated to Central America to address root causes of
migration. migration.
Another $455.3 million (22.0%) of the Administration’s request for the region would Another $455.3 million (22.0%) of the Administration’s request for the region would be have been provided provided
through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, the primary purpose of which is to promote through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, the primary purpose of which is to promote
special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs generally aim to special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs generally aim to
promote political and economic stability and are often indistinguishable from programs funded promote political and economic stability and are often indistinguishable from programs funded
through the DA account. If enacted, ESF assistance for the region would through the DA account. If enacted, ESF assistance for the region would ~~increase~~have increased by $76.8 by $76.8
million (20.million (20.23%) compared with %) compared with ~~the FY2021 estimate~~FY2021. The additional resources would . The additional resources would ~~support~~
have supported rule of law and crime and violence prevention programs in Central America, economic rule of law and crime and violence prevention programs in Central America, economic
development efforts in southern Mexico, and democracy and human rights activities in development efforts in southern Mexico, and democracy and human rights activities in
Venezuela. Venezuela.
The FY2022 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would The FY2022 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would ~~provide~~have provided $248.5 million (12.0% $248.5 million (12.0%
of the total) through the Global Health Programs (GHP) account. This amount of the total) through the Global Health Programs (GHP) account. This amount ~~includes~~ included $190.0 $190.0
million requested for the State Department, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, and $58.5 million requested for the State Department, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, and $58.5
million requested for USAID to combat malaria and COVID-19 and support maternal and child million requested for USAID to combat malaria and COVID-19 and support maternal and child
health, nutrition, and family planning programs.9 Under the FY2022 GHP request for the region, health, nutrition, and family planning programs.9 Under the FY2022 GHP request for the region,
funding for the State Department-managed subaccount would funding for the State Department-managed subaccount would ~~decline by $5.9 million (3.0~~have declined by $5.0 million (2.6%), and %), and
funding for the USAID-managed subaccount would funding for the USAID-managed subaccount would ~~increase~~have increased by $3.0 million (5.5%) compared by $3.0 million (5.5%) compared
~~with the FY2021 estimate~~with FY2021. .
The remaining $710.5 million (34.3%) of the Administration’s FY2022 request for Latin America The remaining $710.5 million (34.3%) of the Administration’s FY2022 request for Latin America
and the Caribbean would and the Caribbean would ~~support~~have supported security assistance programs, including the following: security assistance programs, including the following:
 $570.4 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law  $570.4 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement Enforcement (INCLE) account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement
efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding
for the region would for the region would ~~increase~~have increased by $17.4 million (3.1%) compared with by $17.4 million (3.1%) compared with ~~the~~
~~FY2021 estimate~~FY2021, with decreased aid to Colombia and Mexico offset by , with decreased aid to Colombia and Mexico offset by
increased aid to Central America. increased aid to Central America.
 $31.0 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,  $31.0 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out
humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile
management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and

8 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report 8 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
R40482, R40482, Department of State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts, by Nick M. , by Nick M.
Brown and Cory R. Gill. Brown and Cory R. Gill.
9 The region is receiving additional assistance to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic 9 The region is receiving additional assistance to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
through previously enacted supplemental appropriations. See through previously enacted supplemental appropriations. See “COVID-19 Response.”
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enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding for the region would enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding for the region would
~~remain~~have remained flat compared with flat compared with ~~the FY2021 estimate~~FY2021. .
 $14.1 million requested through the International Military Education and  $14.1 million requested through the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military
personnel. IMET funding would personnel. IMET funding would ~~increase~~have increased by $285,000 (2.1%) compared by $285,000 (2.1%) compared with FY2021~~with the~~
~~FY2021 estimate~~. .
 $95.0 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account  $95.0 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account
to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region. FMF to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region. FMF
funding for the region would funding for the region would ~~increase~~have increased by $18.1 million (23.5%) compared by $18.1 million (23.5%) compared ~~with~~
~~the FY2021 estimate~~with FY2021, with the additional resources allocated to Colombia and , with the additional resources allocated to Colombia and
regional programs in Central America and the Caribbean. regional programs in Central America and the Caribbean.
Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account: FY2017-FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars) (millions of current U.S. dollars)
Foreign Assistance
FY2017 FY2018a FY2019 FY2020b
~~FY2021~~ FY2021b
FY2022
% Change:
Account
(~~est.)~~b
(req.)
FY21-FY22
Development Assistance Development Assistance
484.4 484.4
386.2 386.2
385.3 385.3
457.8 457.8
490.6 490.6
659.1 659.1
+34.4% +34.4%
Economic Support Fund Economic Support Fund
352. 352.0c
419. 419.1c
402. 402.3c
377. 377.6c
378 378..5c
455.3 455.3
+20.3% +20.3%
Global Health Programs Global Health Programs
64.4 64.4
63.4 63.4
53.3 53.3
53.3 53.3
55.5 55.5
58.5 58.5
+5.5% +5.5%
(USAID) (USAID)
Global Health Programs Global Health Programs
117.7 117.7
136.7 136.7
170.5 170.5
157.7 157.7
195. 195.90
190.0 190.0
- -~~3.0~~2.6% %
(State) (State)
International Narcotics International Narcotics
533.2 533.2
542.2 542.2
564.3 564.3
555.2 555.2
553.0 553.0
570.4 570.4
+3.1% +3.1%
Control and Law Control and Law
Enforcement Enforcement
Nonproliferation, Anti- Nonproliferation, Anti-
25.4 25.4
23.5 23.5
25.8 25.8
27.3 27.3
31.0 31.0
31.0 31.0
— —
terrorism, Demining, terrorism, Demining,
and Related programs and Related programs
International Military International Military
13.4 13.4
11.2 11.2
9.9 9.9
13.1 13.1
13.8 13.8
14.1 14.1
+2.0% +2.0%
Education and Training Education and Training
Foreign Military Foreign Military
82.7 82.7
86.0 86.0
82.8 82.8
79.7 79.7
76.9 76.9
95.0 95.0
+23.5% +23.5%
Financing Financing
Total
1,673.2
1,668.4a
1,694.1
1,721.7b
1,~~795.2~~794.3b
2,073.4
+15.56%
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, , Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-~~FY2022~~FY2023, at , at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and ~~U.S. Department of State,~~
~~FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021~~https://www.state.gov/fy-2023-international-affairs-budget/. .
Notes: USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State = U.S. Department of State. USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State = U.S. Department of State.
a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El subsequently reprogrammed approximately $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in
Latin America and the Caribbean region and the remainder to priorities outside the region. Latin America and the Caribbean region and the remainder to priorities outside the region.
b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency
appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19. appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19.
c. Congress appropriated an additional $9.0 mil ion of Economic Support Funds for the region each year from c. Congress appropriated an additional $9.0 mil ion of Economic Support Funds for the region each year from
FY2017 to FY2019 and an additional $5.0 mil ion for the region in FY2020 and FY2021. Those funds are not FY2017 to FY2019 and an additional $5.0 mil ion for the region in FY2020 and FY2021. Those funds are not
included in this table because they were appropriated as multilateral assistance for the Organization of included in this table because they were appropriated as multilateral assistance for the Organization of
American States. American States.
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Major Country and Regional Programs
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request would The Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request would have slightly slightly ~~reduce~~reduced State Department- and State Department- and
USAID-managed assistance for some countries and regional programs in Latin America and the USAID-managed assistance for some countries and regional programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean while significantly increasing assistance for others (seeCaribbean while significantly increasing assistance for others (see Table 2). .
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial
security cooperation, law enforcement support, border and port security, justice sector reform, and security cooperation, law enforcement support, border and port security, justice sector reform, and
crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.10 The FY2022 request crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.10 The FY2022 request ~~includes~~included $66.0 million for the $66.0 million for the
CBSI, which would CBSI, which would ~~be a $3~~have been an $8.8 million (.8 million (~~5.4~~11.8%) cut compared with the FY2021 %) cut compared with the FY2021 ~~estimate~~appropriation. .
Central America. Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America
to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of
unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”) unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”)
arrived at the U.S. border in 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one arrived at the U.S. border in 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one
Administration to another.11 The Biden Administration Administration to another.11 The Biden Administration ~~has~~ developed a new U.S. Strategy for developed a new U.S. Strategy for
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, and Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, and ~~has~~ requested $860.6 million requested $860.6 million
for FY2022 to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic growth in the for FY2022 to support improved governance, security, and broad-based economic growth in the
subregion.12 Of that total, $833.1 million subregion.12 Of that total, $833.1 million ~~falls~~fell within the regional request for Latin America and within the regional request for Latin America and
the Caribbean, and the remainder would the Caribbean, and the remainder would behave been drawn from global accounts.13 The Administration’s drawn from global accounts.13 The Administration’s
budget budget ~~requests~~requested about 39% of the Central America funding as bilateral assistance for the seven about 39% of the Central America funding as bilateral assistance for the seven
nations of the isthmus (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and nations of the isthmus (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama), with the vast majority allocated to the Northern Triangle countries. It Panama), with the vast majority allocated to the Northern Triangle countries. It ~~requests~~requested the other the other
61% as regional assistance through USAID’s Central America Regional program and a new State 61% as regional assistance through USAID’s Central America Regional program and a new State
Department Central America Regional program. If fully funded, aid to Central America would Department Central America Regional program. If fully funded, aid to Central America would
~~increase by $298.0 million (53.0~~have increased by $295.9 million (52.6%) compared with %) compared with ~~the FY2021 estimate~~FY2021. .
Colombia. Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the . Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the
launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program, in FY2000. The focus of U.S. assistance launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program, in FY2000. The focus of U.S. assistance
efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal
conflict.14 The FY2022 request conflict.14 The FY2022 request ~~includes~~included $453.9 million for Colombia, primarily to support the $453.9 million for Colombia, primarily to support the
Colombian government’s counternarcotics strategy and the continued implementation of its peace Colombian government’s counternarcotics strategy and the continued implementation of its peace
accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The request also accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The request also ~~includes~~included
some funding for environmental conservation efforts and for maternal and child health programs some funding for environmental conservation efforts and for maternal and child health programs
for Venezuelan migrants and their host communities. The Administration’s request for Venezuelan migrants and their host communities. The Administration’s request ~~is $9.5 million~~
~~(2.0%) lower than the FY2021 estimate due to a proposed reduction in INCLE funding.~~was $11.2

10 For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, 10 For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan. , by Mark P. Sullivan.
11 For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS Insight IN11603, 11 For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS Insight IN11603, Central America’s
Northern Triangle: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021; and CRS In Focus IF11151, ; and CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American
Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy. .
12 White House, “U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America,” July 2021, at 12 White House, “U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America,” July 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
13 The remainder includes $25.5 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, provided to 13 The remainder includes $25.5 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, provided to
the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for Program Development and the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for Program Development and
Support, and $2 million of International Organizations and Programs funding for the U.N. Refugee Agency. Support, and $2 million of International Organizations and Programs funding for the U.N. Refugee Agency.
14 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, 14 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S.
Relations, by June S. Beittel. , by June S. Beittel.
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~~Haiti. For many years, the~~million (2.4%) less than Colombia received in FY2021 due to a proposed reduction in INCLE funding. Haiti. The United States has provided Haiti significant aid to support the United States has provided Haiti significant aid to support the
country’s recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability.15 U.S. country’s recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability.15 U.S.
assistance spiked after a massive earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 but has declined since then. The assistance spiked after a massive earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 but has declined since then. The
Administration’s FY2022 request would Administration’s FY2022 request would ~~provide~~have provided $187.9 million to help Haiti address health $187.9 million to help Haiti address health
challenges (particularly HIV/AIDS), strengthen government and police capacity, increase challenges (particularly HIV/AIDS), strengthen government and police capacity, increase
agricultural production and other economic development, and support natural resource agricultural production and other economic development, and support natural resource
management. The Administration’s management. The Administration’s ~~request, if funded, would represent a $0.7 million (0.4%)~~
~~decline in U.S. assistance to Haiti compared with the FY2021 estimate~~request would have reduced U.S. assistance to Haiti by $1.7 million (0.9%) compared with FY2021. .
Mexico. Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status, . Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status,
but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the
Mérida Initiative in FY2008.16 The Administration’s FY2022 request Mérida Initiative in FY2008.16 The Administration’s FY2022 request ~~includes~~included $116.6 million for $116.6 million for
Mexico, primarily to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat Mexico, primarily to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat
transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin and fentanyl transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin and fentanyl
production. The request also production. The request also ~~includes~~included some funding to help Mexico reduce greenhouse gas some funding to help Mexico reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and improve environmental conservation. The Administration’s request for Mexico emissions and improve environmental conservation. The Administration’s request for Mexico is
was $42.3 million (26.6%) lower than the FY2021 $42.3 million (26.6%) lower than the FY2021 ~~estimate~~allocation due to proposed INCLE and FMF cuts. due to proposed INCLE and FMF cuts.
However, the Administration However, the Administration ~~has~~ requested an additional $35requested an additional $35.0 million through the USAID Latin million through the USAID Latin
America and Caribbean Regional program to support development in Southern Mexico and to America and Caribbean Regional program to support development in Southern Mexico and to
implement joint U.S.-Mexican aid projects in Central America. implement joint U.S.-Mexican aid projects in Central America.
Venezuela. The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for . The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for
nearly two decades and has increased such assistance over the past four years in response to the nearly two decades and has increased such assistance over the past four years in response to the
authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided humanitarian support authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided humanitarian support
for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the text box “Venezuela Regional for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the text box “Venezuela Regional
Crisis Response”).17 The Administration Crisis Response”).17 The Administration ~~has~~ requested $55.0 million in FY2022 to support requested $55.0 million in FY2022 to support
democratic actors, human rights advocates, and other civil society organizations; increase food democratic actors, human rights advocates, and other civil society organizations; increase food
security; and support access to health care in Venezuela. The request would security; and support access to health care in Venezuela. The request would ~~increase~~have increased U.S. aid to U.S. aid to
Venezuela by $17.0 million (44.7%) compared with Venezuela by $17.0 million (44.7%) compared with ~~the FY2021 estimate~~FY2021. .
Venezuela Regional Crisis Response
An estimated 6 An estimated 6.1 mil ion Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis, mil ion Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis,
approximately 5 mil ion of whom are residing throughout 17 other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From approximately 5 mil ion of whom are residing throughout 17 other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From
FY2017 to FY2021, U.S. agencies provided nearly $1.7 bil ion of humanitarian assistance to help countries in the FY2017 to FY2021, U.S. agencies provided nearly $1.7 bil ion of humanitarian assistance to help countries in the
region respond to Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain region respond to Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain
in Venezuela. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from in Venezuela. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from
global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found inglobal humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in Table 1, Table 2, or the r the
Appendix of this report. of this report.
For more information on the humanitarian response and allocations for particular countries, see USAID, For more information on the humanitarian response and allocations for particular countries, see USAID,
“Venezuela Regional Crisis – Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #“Venezuela Regional Crisis – Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #12, Fiscal Year 2022,” , Fiscal Year 2022,” ~~January 11~~March 23, 2022, at , 2022, at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-~~01-~~
~~11_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_1~~03-23_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_2.pdf..pdf.

15 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Insight IN11699, 15 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Insight IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential
Assassination, by Maureen Taft-Morales. , by Maureen Taft-Morales.
16 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS 16 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS ~~In Focus IF10578,~~ ~~Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida~~
~~Initiative, FY2008-FY2022~~Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Joshua Klein. .
17 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, 17 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke. , coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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FY2017
FY2018a
FY2019
FY2020b
~~FY2021~~
~~FY2022~~
%
~~(est.)~~bFY202 1 b FY2022 %
(req.)
Change:
FY21-

FY22
USAID USAID
38,316 38,316
19,93 19,931a
4,600 4,600
5,000 5,000
5,000 5,000
73,085 73,085
+1,361.7% +1,361.7%
Central Central
America America
Regional Regional
USAID South USAID South
14,000 14,000
18,06 18,065a
18,000 18,000
15,000 15,000
15,000 15,000
20,200 20,200
+34.7% +34.7%
America America
Regional Regional
USAID Latin USAID Latin
26,700 26,700
51,60 51,600a
68,300 68,300
36,978 36,978
~~54,200~~45,540
75,178 75,178
+ +~~38.7~~65.1% %
America and America and
Caribbean Caribbean
Regional Regional
State Central State Central
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
423,76 423,765c
—c
America America
RegionRegionalc
State State
Western 425,471 425,471
414,795 414,795
431,313 431,313
355,610 355,610
~~436,390~~366,909
125,66 125,660c
- -~~71.2%c~~
~~Western~~
65.8%c Hemisphere Hemisphere
RegionRegionalc
[CARSI]
[329,225]
[319,225]a
[290,000]
[270,000]
[256,040]
[342,665]
[+33.8%]
[CBSI]
[57,700]
[57,700]
[58,000]
[60,000]
[6974,800]
[66,000]
[-~~5.4~~11.8%]
Total Total
1,673,211 1,668,446a 1,694,129 1,721,741b 1,~~795,192~~794,345b 2,073,438
+15.56%
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, ~~FY2018-FY2021~~FY2019-FY2023, at , at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and ~~U.S. Department of State,~~
~~FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021~~https://www.state.gov/fy-2023-international-affairs-budget/. CARSI and CBSI totals for FY2021 are estimates drawn from “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,” Congressional Record, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), pp. H8793-H8794. .
Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. USAID CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. USAID
and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives, including CARSI and CBSI, as well as and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives, including CARSI and CBSI, as well as
activities that cross borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the vast activities that cross borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the vast
majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries.
a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El Salvador, subsequently reprogrammed $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in Latin Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean region. This included $116.0 mil ion reprogrammed to Colombia, $87.1 mil ion America and the Caribbean region. This included $116.0 mil ion reprogrammed to Colombia, $87.1 mil ion
to Venezuela, $17.0 mil ion to Peru, $12.2 mil ion to USAID South America Regional, $10.0 mil ion to to Venezuela, $17.0 mil ion to Peru, $12.2 mil ion to USAID South America Regional, $10.0 mil ion to
Nicaragua, $10.0 mil ion to Barbados and Eastern Caribbean, $8.0 mil ion to Brazil, $3 mil ion to regional Nicaragua, $10.0 mil ion to Barbados and Eastern Caribbean, $8.0 mil ion to Brazil, $3 mil ion to regional
anti-trafficking in persons programs, and $1 mil ion to USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional. The anti-trafficking in persons programs, and $1 mil ion to USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional. The
remainder was allocated to priorities outside the region remainder was allocated to priorities outside the region
b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency
appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19. appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19.
c. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request c. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request ~~would establish~~proposed a new State Department-managed Central a new State Department-managed Central
America America Regional program, which would fund CARSI and other regional activities in Central America. Regional program, which would fund CARSI and other regional activities in Central America.
CARSI was funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere regional program in prior years. CARSI was funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere regional program in prior years.
Inter-American Foundation
In addition to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden In addition to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden
AdministrationAdministration~~’s FY2022 budget request would provide~~ requested $38.0 million $38.0 million tofor the IAF the IAF in FY2022 (see(see Table 3). .
~~The IAF is an~~ The IAF is an Congressional Research Service 10 link to page 16 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for Assistance Act of 1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f) to provide grants and other targeted assistance for
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community-led development efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the community-led development efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean. Congress created the
agency after conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region agency after conducting a comprehensive review of previous assistance activities in the region
and determining that programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted and determining that programs at the government-to-government level had not promoted
significant social and civic change despite fostering economic growth.18 The IAF is active in 27 significant social and civic change despite fostering economic growth.18 The IAF is active in 27
countries, including several countries where USAID no longer has field missions. Among other countries, including several countries where USAID no longer has field missions. Among other
initiatives, initiatives, the Administration requested funding in FY2022 to~~the FY2022 request would~~ support the IAF’s ongoing efforts to address the root causes support the IAF’s ongoing efforts to address the root causes
of Central American migration; spur local economic activity; reduce food insecurity; promote of Central American migration; spur local economic activity; reduce food insecurity; promote
civic engagement; build resilience to crime, violence, natural disasters, and extreme weather; and civic engagement; build resilience to crime, violence, natural disasters, and extreme weather; and
advance the social and economic inclusion of historically marginalized populations. advance the social and economic inclusion of historically marginalized populations.
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Appropriations: FY2017-FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars) (millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
% Change
(req.)
FY21-FY22
22.5 22.5
22.5 22.5
22.5 22.5
37.5 37.5
38.0 38.0
38.0 38.0
— —
Source: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2022, at , at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/. https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/.
Note: The IAF received an additional $6.0 mil ion in FY2017, $10.0 mil ion in FY2018, and $10.0 mil ion in The IAF received an additional $6.0 mil ion in FY2017, $10.0 mil ion in FY2018, and $10.0 mil ion in
FY2019 via congressionally directed interagency transfers from USAID for programs in Central America. FY2019 via congressionally directed interagency transfers from USAID for programs in Central America.
Legislative Developments
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2022 until several months into the fiscal year. Although the~~Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2022 SFOPS appropriations. The~~ House passed the House passed the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R.
4373/H.Rept. 117-84), in July 20214373/H.Rept. 117-84), in July 2021, and the Senate and the Senate~~’s SFOPS~~ Appropriations Committee introduced its SFOPS appropriations bill (S. bill (S. 3075) in October 2021, neither was enacted. Instead, Congress passed a series of ~~3075) was introduced in~~
~~October 2021. Congress has not taken further action on either bill. Instead, it has enacted three~~
continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43, P.L. 117-70, P.L. 117-86, and P.L. 117-and P.L. 117-8695) that ) that ~~have~~ funded foreign aid funded foreign aid
programs in the region at the FY2021 level programs in the region at the FY2021 level ~~since~~from October 1, 2021, until March 15, 2022, when President Biden signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103). The act and accompanying explanatory statement do not specify an overall foreign assistance appropriations total for Latin America and Caribbean, but they ~~October 1, 2021. P.L. 117-86 extends~~
~~appropriations through March 11, 2022.~~
~~Neither H.R. 4373 nor S. 3075 specifies comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin~~
~~American and Caribbean country. Nevertheless, the measures do~~ include funding directives include funding directives
and/or restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region (seeand/or restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region (see Table 4).
~~Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives: FY2022~~
~~Appropriations Legislation~~
~~(millions of current U.S. dollars)~~

~~FY2021 (est.)~~
~~FY2022 (req.)~~
~~H.R. 4373 and~~
~~S. 3075 and draft~~
~~H.Rept. 117-84~~
~~explanatory~~
~~statement~~
~~Caribbean Basin~~
~~69.8~~
~~66.0~~
~~80.0~~
~~74.5~~
~~Security Initiative~~
~~Central America~~
~~562.6~~
~~860.6~~
~~860.6~~
~~653.9~~

18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, , Report on H.R. 14580 to
Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World to
Achieve Development Within a Framework of Democratic, Economic, Social, and Political Institutions, and for Other
Purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57. , 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57.
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Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives: FY2022 Appropriations Legislation (millions of current U.S. dollars) FY2021
~~FY2021 (est.)~~
FY2022 (req.)
H.R. 4373 and
S. 3075 and ~~draft~~
~~H.Rept. 117-84~~
~~explanatory~~
~~statement~~
~~Colombia~~
~~463.3~~
~~453.9~~
~~461.4~~
~~463.9~~
~~Haiti~~
~~188.6~~
~~187.9~~
NA
NA
~~Inter-American~~
~~38.0~~
~~38.0~~
~~44.5~~
~~44.5~~
~~Foundation~~
~~Mexico~~
~~158.9~~
~~116.6~~
~~158.9~~
NA
~~Venezuela~~
~~38.0~~
~~55.0~~
~~50.0~~
~~50.0~~
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021; U.S. Department of State,
~~Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021~~ P.L. 117-103 H.Rept. 117- draft and 84 explanatory explanatory statement statement Caribbean Basin 74.8 66.0 80.0 74.5 80.0 Security Initiative Central 564.1 860.6 860.6 653.9 NA America Colombia 465.1 453.9 461.4 463.9 471.4 Haiti 189.6 187.9 NA NA NA Inter-American 38.0 38.0 44.5 44.5 42.0 Foundation Mexico 158.9 116.6 158.9 NA 158.9 Venezuela 38.0 55.0 50.0 50.0 40.0 Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021; U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 28, 2022; H.R. 4373; H.Rept. ; H.R. 4373; H.Rept.
117-84; S. 3075; 117-84; S. 3075; ~~and~~ the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement, available at the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement, available at
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/ imo/media/doc/SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF; P.L. 117-103; and Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 42—Book IV (March 9, 2022), pp. H2992-H3027. The CBSI total for FY2021 is an estimate drawn from “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,” Congressional Record, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794. Note: NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation totals are not available. Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. P.L. 117-103 provides “not less than” $80.0 million for the CBSI, which is $14.0 million more than the Administration requested and $5.2 million more than was appropriated for the initiative in FY2021. Central America. P.L. 117-103 does not stipulate an overall assistance level for Central America. However, it designates “not less than” $100.0 million for locally led development programs in the Northern Triangle, $70.0 million to reduce violence against women and girls in Central America, $61.5 million for anti-corruption entities and activities in Central America, and $15.0 million for democracy programs in Nicaragua. The accompanying explanatory statement also designates at least $125.0 million for Honduras, $50.0 million for a new Central America Youth Empowerment Program in the Northern Triangle, and $40.7 million for Costa Rica. Some of these activities may overlap. Similar to prior years, the act requires~~imo/media/doc/SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF.~~
Note: NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation totals are not available.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Both measures would provide more funding for the CBSI
~~than the Administration requested. H.R. 4373 would provide “not less than” $80.0 million for the~~
~~CBSI, and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement would recommend~~
~~$74.5 million for the initiative.~~
Central America. The House and Senate bills diverge on aid to Central America. H.R. 4373
~~would fully fund the Administration’s request, providing “up to” $860.6 million for the~~
~~subregion. S. 3075 would provide “not less than” $653.9 million for Central America, or 24.0%~~
~~less than the Administration requested. As in prior years, both bills would require~~ the State the State
Department to withhold Department to withhold ~~some~~60% of ESF and security assistance to support the central governments of El Salvador, assistance to support the central governments of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras until those governments meet a series of conditions related to Guatemala, and Honduras until those governments meet a series of conditions related to
corruption, human rights, migration, and other congressional concerns. corruption, human rights, migration, and other congressional concerns. ~~Both bills also would~~
~~prohibit~~The act also prohibits FMF for those three countries. Colombia. P.L. 117-103 provides “not less than” $471.4 million for Colombia, which is $17.5 million more than the Administration requested and $6.3 million more than the FY2021 allocation. Similar to prior years, the act requires the State Department to withhold 20% of FMF appropriated for Colombia and 5% of INCLE to be provided to the Colombian National Police Congressional Research Service 12 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations until the Colombian government meets certain human rights conditions. The act also requires the State Department to withhold 20% of the total amount of INCLE appropriated for Colombia until the Secretary of State certifies Colombia is implementing certain counternarcotics policies. Haiti. P.L. 117-103 does not designate a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti. The accompanying explanatory statement allocates $56 ~~FMF for those three countries.~~
Colombia. Both bills would provide slightly more funding for Colombia than the Administration
~~requested. H.R. 4373 would provide $461.4 million for Colombia, and S. 3075 would provide~~
~~$463.9 million. As in prior years, both bills would require the State Department to withhold some~~
~~security assistance until the Colombian government meets certain human rights conditions. S.~~
~~3075 also would tie a portion of the security assistance funding to Colombia’s counternarcotics~~
~~policies.~~
Haiti. Neither measure would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti. H.Rept.
~~117-84 would allocate $56.0 million of DA to Haiti, including $8.5 million for reforestation; H.R.~~
~~4373 would require the State Department to withhold those funds and any ESF for Haiti until the~~
~~Haitian government takes steps to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption, increase~~
~~government revenues, and resolve commercial disputes with U.S. entities. The Senate~~
~~Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement would allocate $57~~.0 million of DA to .0 million of DA to
Haiti, including $8.5 million for reforestation, and Haiti, including $8.5 million for reforestation, and ~~would recommend~~ “not less than” $5.0 million “not less than” $5.0 million
~~to address inhumane penitentiary conditions. S. 3075 would require~~to meet the sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of Haitian prisoners. The act requires the State Department to the State Department to
~~withhold aid to the Haitian government~~withhold those funds and any other assistance for Haiti until a new president and parliament until a new president and parliament ~~take~~have taken office following office following
~~free and fair elections or a broadly representative transitional government is in place.~~
Inter-American Foundation. Both bills would provide $44.5 million for the IAF, which would
~~exceed the Administration’s request and prior year appropriations. H.Rept. 117-84 would direct~~
~~the IAF to use the additional resources to assist Venezuelan migrants, build disaster resiliency in~~
~~the Caribbean, strengthen civil society and livelihoods in Haiti, support conflict recovery and~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

~~historically marginalized groups in Colombia, and implement~~free and fair elections or the Secretary of State determines a transitional government broadly representative of Haitian society is in place and it is in the U.S. interest to provide assistance. Notwithstanding those withholding requirements, the act allows U.S. agencies to provide assistance to support elections, anti-gang police and justice administration, public health, food security, water and sanitation, education, disaster relief and recovery, and other programs to meet basic human needs. The act also prohibits funding for the armed forces of Haiti. Inter-American Foundation. P.L. 117-103 provides $42.0 million for the IAF, which is $4 million more than the Administration requested or was appropriated for the agency in FY2021. The explanatory statement notes that the act provides sufficient funds to support a pilot exchange program between a pilot exchange program between
indigenous IAF grantees and Native American tribes. indigenous IAF grantees and Native American tribes.
Mexico. The The ~~House and Senate measures differ on aid to Mexico. H.Rept. 117-84 would provide~~
~~$158.9 million for Mexico, which is the same as the FY2021 estimate but~~ explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 117-103 states that the act “includes funds sufficient to support levels for assistance for Mexico commensurate with those detailed” in H.Rept. 117-84. That report designated $158.9 million for Mexico, which is $42.3 million more $42.3 million more
than the Administration requestedthan the Administration requested~~. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft~~ and equal to the FY2021 allocation. The explanatory explanatory
~~statement would not designate a comprehensive funding level for Mexico but would recommend~~
~~$80.0 million of INCLE aid. Both reports would direct the State Department and USAID to~~
statement also directs U.S. agencies to comply with reporting requirements in H.Rept. 117-84. Among other reports, the State Department is to assess the extent to which the Mexican government is addressing certain human rights concerns and the State Department and USAID are to conduct a comprehensive review of the Mérida Initiative. conduct a comprehensive review of the Mérida Initiative.
Venezuela. . ~~Both bills would provide $50.0 million of ESF for democracy programs in Venezuela.~~
~~Both bills also would direct~~P.L. 117-103 provides $40.0 million for democracy programs in Venezuela, which is $10.0 million less than the Administration requested but $7.0 million more than the allocation for such programs in FY2021. Neither the act nor the explanatory statement designate a funding level for health programs in Venezuela; the Administration requested $5 million for health programs in FY2022, which was the same as the FY2021 allocation for such programs. In addition to aid for Venezuela, the act directs U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other Latin American U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other Latin American
and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees. and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
Policy Issues for Congress
Congress Congress ~~may examine various policy issues as it considers the President’s FY2022~~examined a variety of policy issues during the FY2022 appropriations process, many of which may remain subjects of debate as Congress considers the President’s FY2023 budget budget
request and other legislation related to foreign operations in Latin America and the Caribbean. request and other legislation related to foreign operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
These issues These issues ~~may~~ include how to help countries in the region respond to, and recover from, the include how to help countries in the region respond to, and recover from, the
COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration; and the COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration; and the
challenges DOD security cooperation programs present for congressional efforts to guide security challenges DOD security cooperation programs present for congressional efforts to guide security
assistance policy in the region. assistance policy in the region.
Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 18 link to page 10 link to page 13 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations COVID-19 Response19
The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected socioeconomic conditions in Latin America The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected socioeconomic conditions in Latin America
and the Caribbean. At the end of 2021, the region had registered nearly 1.6 million COVID-19 and the Caribbean. At the end of 2021, the region had registered nearly 1.6 million COVID-19
deaths, or 28.7% of such deaths worldwide while accounting for about 8.4% of the world’s deaths, or 28.7% of such deaths worldwide while accounting for about 8.4% of the world’s
population.20 The pandemic and related containment efforts also contributed to a regional population.20 The pandemic and related containment efforts also contributed to a regional
economic contraction of 6.9% in 2020.21 Although some countries were able to mitigate the economic contraction of 6.9% in 2020.21 Although some countries were able to mitigate the
impact of the economic downturn with emergency social assistance programs, Latin America’s impact of the economic downturn with emergency social assistance programs, Latin America’s
poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates increased to levels not seen for 10 and 20 poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates increased to levels not seen for 10 and 20
years, respectively.22 Severe food insecurity also increased, with an estimated 53.8 million-66.1 years, respectively.22 Severe food insecurity also increased, with an estimated 53.8 million-66.1
million people (8.2%-10.1% of the region’s population) undernourished in 2020.23 The sharp million people (8.2%-10.1% of the region’s population) undernourished in 2020.23 The sharp
deterioration in living conditions has contributed to large-scale migration flows throughout Latin deterioration in living conditions has contributed to large-scale migration flows throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean. America and the Caribbean.
~~To date~~Through the end of 2021, Congress , Congress ~~has~~had provided some $17 billion in supplemental and emergency international provided some $17 billion in supplemental and emergency international
affairs funding to help countries worldwide respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19 affairs funding to help countries worldwide respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19
pandemic. This total includes funds enacted through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response pandemic. This total includes funds enacted through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123); the Coronavirus Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123); the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic ~~Aid, Relief, and Economic~~

~~19 For more information on COVID-19 in the region, see CRS In Focus IF11581,~~ ~~Latin America and the Caribbean:~~
~~Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.~~
~~20 Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” accessed January 1,~~
~~2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.~~
~~21 International Monetary Fund,~~ ~~World Economic Outlook Update: Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and~~
~~Higher Inflation, January 2022, p. 5. (Hereinafter: IMF, January 2022).~~
~~22 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022, p. 63.~~
~~23 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al.,~~ ~~Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional~~
~~Overview of Food Security and Nutrition, 2021, p. 2.~~
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Security Act (P.L. 116-136); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260, Division Security Act (P.L. 116-136); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260, Division
K, Title IX); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2). As of November 2021, K, Title IX); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2). As of November 2021,
~~according to the State Department,~~ the United States had provided more than $614 million of the United States had provided more than $614 million of
supplemental assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, with the vast majority implemented supplemental assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, with the vast majority implemented
by USAID (seeby USAID (see Table 5).24 These funds are in addition to the base appropriations described 24 These funds are in addition to the base appropriations described
earlier in this report (earlier in this report (seesee Table 1 aand Table 2), some of which U.S. agencies have used to support , some of which U.S. agencies have used to support
pandemic response and recovery. Among other activities, U.S. supplemental assistance has pandemic response and recovery. Among other activities, U.S. supplemental assistance has
funded efforts to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene; strengthen health systems; and address funded efforts to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene; strengthen health systems; and address
economic and social impacts of the pandemic, such as food insecurity and gender-based violence. economic and social impacts of the pandemic, such as food insecurity and gender-based violence.
Table 5. USAID-Managed Supplemental Assistance for the COVID-19 Response in
Latin America and the Caribbean: Total as of November 2021
(obligations in millions of current U.S. dollars) (obligations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
Country or Region
U.S. Assistance
Bahamas Bahamas
0.8 0.8
Belize Belize
0.3 0.3
Bolivia Bolivia
10.6 10.6
19 For more information on COVID-19 in the region, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer. 20 Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” accessed January 1, 2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. 21 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update: Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and Higher Inflation, January 2022, p. 5. (Hereinafter: IMF, January 2022). 22 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022, p. 63. 23 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional Overview of Food Security and Nutrition, 2021, p. 2. 24 Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International Economic Policy, The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities for Latin America and the Caribbean, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations Country or Region U.S. Assistance Brazil Brazil
47.2 47.2
Colombia Colombia
89.5 89.5
Costa Rica Costa Rica
1.8 1.8
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
10.3 10.3
Ecuador Ecuador
37.1 37.1
El Salvador El Salvador
21.8 21.8
Guatemala Guatemala
68.2 68.2
Haiti Haiti
35.7 35.7
Honduras Honduras
48.8 48.8
Jamaica Jamaica
7.7 7.7
Nicaragua Nicaragua
2.8 2.8
Panama Panama
4.8 4.8
Paraguay Paraguay
11.5 11.5
Peru Peru
56.7 56.7
St. Kitts and Nevis St. Kitts and Nevis
0.5 0.5
Uruguay Uruguay
1.0 1.0
Venezuela Venezuela
40.0 40.0
Caribbean Regional Caribbean Regional
4.8 4.8
Central America Regional Central America Regional
3.2 3.2
South America Regional South America Regional
0.8 0.8

~~24 Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, in U.S. Congress, House~~
~~Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International~~
~~Economic Policy, The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities for Latin America and the Caribbean, 117th Cong., 1st~~
~~sess., November 16, 2021.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

~~Country or Region~~
~~U.S. Assistance~~
Latin America and Caribbean Regional Latin America and Caribbean Regional
1.4 1.4
Total Total
507.1 507.1
Source: USAID, “COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year 2022, USAID, “COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year 2022,
November 30, 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Regional_Fact_Sheet_3_-_LAC.pdf. November 30, 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Regional_Fact_Sheet_3_-_LAC.pdf.
Notes: USAID figures represent obligations of supplemental assistance as of November 30, 2021. They do not USAID figures represent obligations of supplemental assistance as of November 30, 2021. They do not
include any of the funds contributed to Gavi or base or reprogrammed foreign assistance funds used to respond include any of the funds contributed to Gavi or base or reprogrammed foreign assistance funds used to respond
to COVID-19. The State Department has not released a country-by-country breakdown of its COVID-19 to COVID-19. The State Department has not released a country-by-country breakdown of its COVID-19
response. response.
The United States is also supporting vaccination efforts in the region. P.L. 116-260 included $4.0 The United States is also supporting vaccination efforts in the region. P.L. 116-260 included $4.0
billion as a contribution to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which supports the COVID-19 Vaccines billion as a contribution to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which supports the COVID-19 Vaccines
Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by global health organizations to Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by global health organizations to
facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Within Latin America and the Caribbean, facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Within Latin America and the Caribbean,
22 countries have signed agreements to purchase vaccines through the facility, and 10 countries—22 countries have signed agreements to purchase vaccines through the facility, and 10 countries—
Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St. Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines—are eligible for donor-funded vaccines through the COVID-19 Vincent and the Grenadines—are eligible for donor-funded vaccines through the COVID-19
Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC).25 In December 2021, the State Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC).25 In December 2021, the State
Department announced it would contribute $75 million appropriated in P.L. 117-2 to the Pan Department announced it would contribute $75 million appropriated in P.L. 117-2 to the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO)—the specialized international health agency of the American Health Organization (PAHO)—the specialized international health agency of the
25 Gavi, “COVAX,” May 12, 2021. Congressional Research Service 15 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations Americas—to assist countries with vaccination implementation and monitoring.26 The Biden Americas—to assist countries with vaccination implementation and monitoring.26 The Biden
Administration also has pledged to donate 1.2 billion vaccine doses globally, both bilaterally and Administration also has pledged to donate 1.2 billion vaccine doses globally, both bilaterally and
through the COVAX facility and COVAX AMC.27 As of through the COVAX facility and COVAX AMC.27 As of ~~February 3~~March 29, 2022, the United States had , 2022, the United States had
delivered more than delivered more than 5767.2 million doses to million doses to ~~29 Latin American and Caribbean countries~~30 countries in the Western Hemisphere.28 .28
Nevertheless, the region continues to face significant challenges. Although South America is Nevertheless, the region continues to face significant challenges. Although South America is
among the most vaccinated regions in the world, among the most vaccinated regions in the world, 1615 Latin American and Caribbean countries had Latin American and Caribbean countries had
vaccination rates below 50% as of vaccination rates below 50% as of ~~February 18~~March 25, 2022.29 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) , 2022.29 The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
estimates that real gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by estimates that real gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by
6.8% in 2021, buoyed by global commodity price increases, but GDP per capita will remain 6.8% in 2021, buoyed by global commodity price increases, but GDP per capita will remain
below pre-pandemic levels until 2023.30 Recovery may be particularly protracted for tourism-below pre-pandemic levels until 2023.30 Recovery may be particularly protracted for tourism-

~~25 Gavi, “COVAX,” May 12, 2021.~~
~~26 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Announcement of ARPA – International Organizations and~~
~~Programs (IO&P) Funds,” Fact Sheet, December 21, 2021.~~
~~27 White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to Protect Americans Against the Delta and Omicron~~
~~Variants as We Battle COVID-19 This Winter,” press release, December 2, 2021.~~
~~28 Testimony of USAID Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean Marcela X.~~
~~Escobari, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,~~ ~~Overview of U.S. Priorities in the Western~~
~~Hemisphere: Opportunities, Challenges and the Path Ahead, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 2022. The U.S.~~
~~Department of State provides additional information on vaccine donations~~dependent economies in the Caribbean and countries without widespread vaccine coverage. High public debt levels have led many governments in the region to begin scaling back income support programs, while their populations continue to contend with persistently weak labor markets. Such shifts toward austerity have sparked protests in several countries and could contribute to further instability should socioeconomic conditions deteriorate. During the 117th Congress, Members have deliberated on whether to provide additional pandemic response and recovery assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Given the region’s difficult situation, its close ties to the United States, and the geopolitical challenge posed by China’s provision of vaccines to countries throughout the hemisphere, some analysts and Members of Congress argue the United States should prioritize Latin America and the Caribbean when allocating vaccine donations and assistance.31 By contrast, some public health advocates have warned the United States that allocating vaccines based on geopolitical considerations could prevent vaccines from reaching the areas where they are the most needed; they argue that donors should channel vaccines through a single mechanism, such as COVAX.32 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103), did not specify priority regions for U.S. vaccine donations, but another bill introduced in the House (H.R. 3236) would direct the President to prioritize Western Hemisphere countries. Separate from bilateral foreign assistance channels, Congress has considered measures to influence the pandemic responses of international financial institutions. For example, a provision 26 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Announcement of ARPA – International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) Funds,” Fact Sheet, December 21, 2021. 27 White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to Protect Americans Against the Delta and Omicron Variants as We Battle COVID-19 This Winter,” press release, December 2, 2021. 28 U.S. Department of State, “COVID-19 Vaccine Donations,” at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/ at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/
vaccine-deliveries/#map_western. vaccine-deliveries/#map_western. ~~This website does not note U.S. vaccine donations to the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and~~
~~Trinidad and Tobago.~~
~~29 As of February 18~~ 29 As of March 25, 2022, the countries where less than half of the population had completed COVID-19 vaccination , 2022, the countries where less than half of the population had completed COVID-19 vaccination
schedules were Haiti (schedules were Haiti (~~0.9~~1.0%), Jamaica (%), Jamaica (~~21.6~~22.5%), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (%), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2627.1%), St. Lucia (28..1%), St. Lucia (28.16%), Guatemala %), Guatemala
((~~30.2~~32.5%), Grenada (33.%), Grenada (33.05%), Bahamas (%), Bahamas (~~38.6%), Dominica (39.6%), Suriname (39.6%), Paraguay (43.9%), Guyana~~
~~(44.0%), Honduras (45.3%), Bolivia (46.6~~39.3%), Suriname (40.0%), Dominica (40.3%), Guyana (45.6%), Paraguay (45.9%), Honduras (47.5%), Bolivia (48.8%), St. Kitts and Nevis (48.%), St. Kitts and Nevis (48.~~5%), Venezuela (49.8%), and Trinidad~~ 9%), and Venezuela~~and~~
~~Tobago~~ (49.8%). Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” (49.8%). Pan American Health Organization, “COVID-19 Vaccination in the Americas,” ~~February 18~~March 25, 2022, at , 2022, at
https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp. https://ais.paho.org/imm/IM_DosisAdmin-Vacunacion.asp.
30 IMF, January 2022, p. 5; and IMF, 30 IMF, January 2022, p. 5; and IMF, Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook: A Long and Winding Road to
Recovery, October 2021. , October 2021.
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~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

~~dependent economies in the Caribbean and countries without widespread vaccine coverage. High~~
~~public debt levels have led many governments in the region to begin scaling back income support~~
~~programs, while their populations continue to contend with persistently weak labor markets. Such~~
~~shifts toward austerity have sparked protests in several countries and could contribute to further~~
~~instability should socioeconomic conditions deteriorate.~~
~~As the appropriations process continues, Congress may consider providing additional pandemic~~
~~response and recovery assistance to~~31 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues, Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin Latin America and the Caribbean: The Importance of Engagement, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 2021. 32 Erin Banco, “‘It’s a Sore Spot for a Lot of People’: Why Officials Are Raising Questions About Biden’s Vaccine Donations,” Politico Pro, December 8, 2021. Congressional Research Service 16 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations of the House-passed FY2022 foreign operations appropriations measure (H.R. 4373) would have directed~~America and the Caribbean. Given the region’s difficult~~
~~situation, its close ties to the United States, and the geopolitical challenge posed by China’s~~
~~provision of vaccines to countries throughout the hemisphere, some analysts and Members of~~
~~Congress argue the United States should prioritize Latin America and the Caribbean when~~
~~allocating vaccine donations and assistance.31 By contrast, some public health advocates have~~
~~warned the United States that allocating vaccines based on geopolitical considerations could~~
~~prevent vaccines from reaching the areas where they are the most needed; they argue that donors~~
~~should channel vaccines through a single mechanism, such as COVAX.32 Neither of the FY2022~~
~~SFOPS measures (H.R. 4373 or S. 3075) would specify priority regions for U.S. vaccine~~
~~donations, but another bill introduced in the House (H.R. 3236) would direct the President to~~
~~prioritize Western Hemisphere countries.~~
~~Separate from bilateral foreign assistance channels, Congress also could consider measures to~~
~~influence the pandemic responses of international financial institutions. For example, a provision~~
~~of H.R. 4373 would direct~~ the U.S. executive directors at each international financial institution to the U.S. executive directors at each international financial institution to
use the voice and vote of the United States to support the suspension of all debt-service payments use the voice and vote of the United States to support the suspension of all debt-service payments
and the relaxation of fiscal targets to ensure governments around the world have sufficient fiscal and the relaxation of fiscal targets to ensure governments around the world have sufficient fiscal
space to respond to the pandemic. It also would space to respond to the pandemic. It also would ~~call~~have called for the U.S. executive director at the IMF to for the U.S. executive director at the IMF to
advocate for the issuance of Special Drawing Rights to enable governments to access additional advocate for the issuance of Special Drawing Rights to enable governments to access additional
resources to finance their pandemic responses.33 resources to finance their pandemic responses.33 Those provisions were not included in P.L. 117-103. Other bills (S. 1260, passed by the Senate in Other bills (S. 1260, passed by the Senate in
June 2021June 2021,; H.R. 4521, as passed by the Senate in March 2022; and S. 616), would authorize a 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American and S. 616), would authorize a 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American
Development Bank to help Latin American and Caribbean countries achieve sustainable debt Development Bank to help Latin American and Caribbean countries achieve sustainable debt
structures and recover from the pandemic. structures and recover from the pandemic.
Migration Management
For nearly a decade, U.S. policymakers concerned about irregular migration from Central For nearly a decade, U.S. policymakers concerned about irregular migration from Central
America to the United States have sought to deter migrant flows with foreign assistance. As noted America to the United States have sought to deter migrant flows with foreign assistance. As noted
above, the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request above, the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request ~~includes~~included $860.6 million “as a first step toward the President’s four-year commitment of $4 billion to address the root causes of irregular migration from Central America.”34 Many analysts are skeptical of such efforts, however, given the limited data available regarding how previously appropriated aid affected migration trends.35 Academic research provides some evidence that foreign assistance can reduce migration, though the impact is typically modest and the results vary depending on the type of assistance. For example, a 2018 study found a 10% increase in assistance to help a country improve governance and social services would lower that country’s emigration rate by 1.6%.36 Other studies have found that governance and rural development aid are associated with slight decreases in emigration rates, whereas other types of assistance are not.37 Alternatively, large and sudden drops in foreign aid disbursements are associated with increased emigration from aid recipients.38 Fewer scholars have examined the impact of foreign assistance on asylum trends, but a 2020 study found a 10% increase in bilateral assistance to a low-income country was followed by a 0.6% reduction in asylum applications the following year and a 3% decrease in such applications in the long run.39 33 H.R. 4373, §7073. For additional information on Special Drawing Rights, see CRS In Focus IF11835, International Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocation, by Martin A. Weiss and Rebecca M. Nelson. 34 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021, p. 25. 35 See, for example, Greg Weeks, “USAID in Central America: Less Is Better,” Global Americans, January 10, 2022. 36 Mauro Lanati and Rainer Thiele, “Foreign Assistance and Migration Choices: Disentangling the Channels,” Economics Letters, vol. 172 (November 2018), pp. 148-151. (Hereinafter: Lanati and Thiele, 2018). 37 Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Targeted Foreign Aid and International Migration: Is Development-Promotion an Effective Immigration Policy?,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 2018), pp. 809-820; and Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Rural Development Aid Reduce International Migration?,” World Development, vol. 110 (October 2018), pp. 268-282. 38 Jonas Gamso, Jikuo Lu, and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Foreign Aid Volatility Increase International Migration?,” Review of International Organizations, vol. 16 (2021), pp. 581-598. 39 Marina Murat, “Foreign Aid, Bilateral Asylum Immigration and Development,” Journal of Population Economics, vol. 33, no. 1 (2020), pp. 79-114. Congressional Research Service 17 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations Some research shows that economic development assistance is less effective than governance and social services aid in deterring migration.40 ~~$860.6 million “as a first step~~
~~toward the President’s four-year commitment of $4 billion to address the root causes of irregular~~
~~migration from Central America.”34 Similarly, the SFOPS measures passed by the House (H.R.~~
~~4373) and introduced in the Senate (S. 3075) would once again direct the Administration to use~~
~~foreign assistance appropriated for Central America to address “factors that contribute to irregular~~

~~31 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational~~
~~Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues,~~ ~~Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin~~
~~America and the Caribbean: The Importance of Engagement, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 2021.~~
~~32 Erin Banco, “‘It’s a Sore Spot for a Lot of People’: Why Officials Are Raising Questions About Biden’s Vaccine~~
~~Donations,” Politico Pro, December 8, 2021.~~
~~33 H.R. 4373, §7073. For additional information on Special Drawing Rights, see CRS In Focus IF11835,~~ ~~International~~
~~Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocation, by Martin A. Weiss and Rebecca M. Nelson.~~
~~34 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022,~~
~~June 25, 2021, p. 25.~~
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~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

~~migration.”35 Many analysts are skeptical of such efforts, given the limited data available~~
~~regarding how previously appropriated aid affected migration trends.36~~
~~Academic research provides some evidence that foreign assistance can reduce migration, though~~
~~the impact is typically modest and the results vary depending on the type of assistance. For~~
~~example, a 2018 study found a 10% increase in assistance to help a country improve governance~~
~~and social services would lower that country’s emigration rate by 1.6%.37 Other studies have~~
~~found that governance and rural development aid are associated with slight decreases in~~
~~emigration rates, whereas other types of assistance are not.38 Alternatively, large and sudden drops~~
~~in foreign aid disbursements are associated with increased emigration from aid recipients.39 Fewer~~
~~scholars have examined the impact of foreign assistance on asylum trends, but a 2020 study found~~
~~a 10% increase in bilateral assistance to a low-income country was followed by a 0.6% reduction~~
~~in asylum applications the following year and a 3% decrease in such applications in the long~~
~~run.40~~
~~Some research shows that economic development assistance is less effective than governance and~~
~~social services aid in deterring migration.41~~ Although observers often assume emigration is a Although observers often assume emigration is a
decision of last resort, studies have found that higher-income individuals are more likely to be decision of last resort, studies have found that higher-income individuals are more likely to be
actively preparing to migrate than lower-income individuals in the same country. This appears to actively preparing to migrate than lower-income individuals in the same country. This appears to
be the result of comparatively poorer individuals facing financial barriers to emigration and many be the result of comparatively poorer individuals facing financial barriers to emigration and many
higher-income individuals viewing emigration as a financial investment.higher-income individuals viewing emigration as a financial investment.4241 Studies across Studies across
countries have found that emigration rates tend to countries have found that emigration rates tend to increase along with economic growth until along with economic growth until
countries reach a certain level of economic development—typically a per capita income of countries reach a certain level of economic development—typically a per capita income of
roughly $10,000 (in purchasing power parity-adjusted 2011 U.S. dollars, 2011 PPP). This is roughly $10,000 (in purchasing power parity-adjusted 2011 U.S. dollars, 2011 PPP). This is
partially attributable to demographic changes, as economic development may initially spur a large partially attributable to demographic changes, as economic development may initially spur a large
increase in the youth population, which later dissipates as fertility rates decline.increase in the youth population, which later dissipates as fertility rates decline.4342
These findings suggest foreign assistance alone is unlikely to resolve the challenge posed by These findings suggest foreign assistance alone is unlikely to resolve the challenge posed by
irregular migration from Central America. As of 2018, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador irregular migration from Central America. As of 2018, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador
had per capita GDPs (2011 PPP) of $5,042; $7,402; and $8,598, respectively.had per capita GDPs (2011 PPP) of $5,042; $7,402; and $8,598, respectively.~~44 Whereas El~~

~~35 H.R. 4373, §7045(a)(1) and S. 3075, §7045(a)(1).~~
~~36 See, for example, Greg Weeks, “USAID in Central America: Less Is Better,” Global Americans, January 10, 2022.~~
~~37 Mauro Lanati and Rainer Thiele, “Foreign Assistance and Migration Choices: Disentangling the Channels,”~~
Economics Letters, vol. 172 (November 2018), pp. 148-151. (Hereinafter: Lanati and Thiele, 2018).
~~38 Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Targeted Foreign Aid and International Migration: Is Development-Promotion~~
~~an Effective Immigration Policy?,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 2018), pp. 809-820; and~~
~~Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Rural Development Aid Reduce International Migration?,”~~ ~~World~~
~~Development, vol. 110 (October 2018), pp. 268-282.~~
~~39 Jonas Gamso, Jikuo Lu, and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Foreign Aid Volatility Increase International Migration?,”~~
Review of International Organizations, vol. 16 (2021), pp. 581-598.
~~40 Marina Murat, “Foreign Aid, Bilateral Asylum Immigration and Development,” Journal of Population Economics,~~
~~vol. 33, no. 1 (2020), pp. 79-114.~~
~~41 Lanati and Thiele, 2018.~~
4243 Whereas El Salvador’s youth cohort has begun to shrink, those of Honduras and Guatemala will continue to grow for the next 5-10 years.44 As a result, emigration rates in the region are likely to continue increasing in the near term, assuming they follow the typical development pattern. A 53% increase in assistance for Central America, as the Biden Administration proposed in FY2022, could partially alleviate the situation, particularly if the aid is targeted toward the types of governance, social services, and rural development programs that have been shown to be the most effective. As noted previously, it is unclear whether the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103), fully funds the Administration’s request for Central America. Some analysts argue that U.S. assistance programs in Central America should focus on mitigating the impact of short-term shocks, which can spark sudden migration surges that strain U.S. resources at the Southwest border.45 For example, U.S. policymakers could direct foreign assistance funds toward preparing for and responding to natural disasters; alleviating food insecurity; and preventing outbreaks of violence in the region. P.L. 117-103 includes some funding for such efforts, including $50.0 million for a new Central America Youth Empowerment Program in the Northern Triangle intended “to create measurable reductions in migration from targeted communities in such countries by recruiting young people to engage in COVID–19 response, hurricane preparedness and recovery, and other community projects.” Others argue U.S. assistance efforts in Central America should remain focused on long-term development objectives and caution against evaluating programs based on short-term migration trends that are largely outside U.S. agencies’ control.46 40 Lanati and Thiele, 2018. 41 Michael A. Clemens and Mariapia Mendola, Michael A. Clemens and Mariapia Mendola, Migration from Developing Countries: Selection, Income Elasticity, and
Simpson’s Paradox, Center for Global Development, Working Paper 539, August 2020; and Michael A. Clemens, , Center for Global Development, Working Paper 539, August 2020; and Michael A. Clemens,
“Emigration Rises Along with Economic Development. Aid Agencies Should Face This, But Not Fear It,” “Emigration Rises Along with Economic Development. Aid Agencies Should Face This, But Not Fear It,” Center for
Global Development Blog, August 18, 2020. , August 18, 2020.
4342 Michael A. Clemens, Michael A. Clemens, The Emigration Life Cycle: How Development Shapes Emigration from Poor Countries, Center , Center
for Global Development, Working Paper 540, August 2020. for Global Development, Working Paper 540, August 2020.
4443 2018 is the most recent year for which data are available. Jotta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Maddison Project 2018 is the most recent year for which data are available. Jotta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Maddison Project
Database, version 2020,” accessed on January 28, 2021. Database, version 2020,” accessed on January 28, 2021.
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~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

~~Salvador’s youth cohort has begun to shrink, those of Honduras and Guatemala will continue to~~
~~grow for the next 5-10 years.45 As a result, emigration rates in the region are likely to continue~~
~~increasing in the near term, assuming they follow the typical development pattern. The Biden~~
~~Administration’s proposed 53% increase in assistance for Central America in FY2022 could~~
~~partially alleviate the situation, particularly if the aid is targeted toward the types of governance,~~
~~social services, and rural development programs that have been shown to be the most effective.~~
~~Some analysts argue that U.S. assistance programs in Central America should focus on mitigating~~
~~the impact of short-term shocks, which can spark sudden migration surges that strain U.S.~~
~~resources at the Southwest border.46 For example, Congress could direct foreign assistance funds~~
~~toward preparing for and responding to natural disasters; alleviating food insecurity; and~~
~~preventing outbreaks of violence in the region. Others argue U.S. assistance efforts in Central~~
~~America should remain focused on long-term development objectives and caution against~~
~~evaluating programs based on short-term migration trends that are largely outside U.S. agencies’~~
~~control.47~~
~~Congress also~~44 Michael A. Clemens, “The Real Root Causes of Americas Border Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, June 7, 2021. 45 Ibid. 46 Sarah Rose et al., Addressing the ‘Root Causes’ of Irregular Migration from Central America: An Evidence Agenda for USAID, Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 243, December 2021. Congressional Research Service 18 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations In addition to foreign assistance efforts, U.S. policymakers could seek to reduce the challenges posed by irregular migration with measures could seek to reduce the challenges posed by irregular migration with measures
aimed at channeling asylum-seekers and other migrants into legal pathways. As part of its aimed at channeling asylum-seekers and other migrants into legal pathways. As part of its
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, the Biden Administration has reestablished and Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, the Biden Administration has reestablished and
expanded the Central American Minors (CAM) refugee and parole program, which reunites expanded the Central American Minors (CAM) refugee and parole program, which reunites
eligible children from the region with their parents in the United States.eligible children from the region with their parents in the United States.4847 The Administration also The Administration also
made available 6,000 supplemental H2B temporary nonagricultural visas for nationals of El made available 6,000 supplemental H2B temporary nonagricultural visas for nationals of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in FY2021, and it has reserved 6,500 such visas for nationals Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in FY2021, and it has reserved 6,500 such visas for nationals
of those countries and Haiti in the first half of FY2022.of those countries and Haiti in the first half of FY2022.4948 Among other provisions, the U.S. Among other provisions, the U.S.
Citizenship Act (H.R. 1177/S. 348) would establish refugee-processing centers in Central Citizenship Act (H.R. 1177/S. 348) would establish refugee-processing centers in Central
America and would codify and expand refugee and humanitarian parole programs for individuals America and would codify and expand refugee and humanitarian parole programs for individuals
from the region. Some Members of Congress view such measures as counterproductive; these from the region. Some Members of Congress view such measures as counterproductive; these
Members have introduced bills, such as H.R. 4199, which would prohibit funding for the CAM Members have introduced bills, such as H.R. 4199, which would prohibit funding for the CAM
program. program.
Congressional Guidance of Security Assistance
Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title 22 of the Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title 22 of the U.S.
Code (Foreign Relations) and has appropriated funding for such programs through State (Foreign Relations) and has appropriated funding for such programs through State
Department-managed foreign assistance accounts in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation. Department-managed foreign assistance accounts in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation.
That approach has changed to a certain extent in recent decades, as Congress has provided That approach has changed to a certain extent in recent decades, as Congress has provided
numerous security assistance authorities to DOD under Title 10 of the numerous security assistance authorities to DOD under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed (Armed
Services) and has appropriated funding for such activities (often referred to as “security Services) and has appropriated funding for such activities (often referred to as “security
cooperation”) through annual DOD appropriations.cooperation”) through annual DOD appropriations.5049 For example, 10 U.S.C. §333 authorizes ~~For example, 10 U.S.C. §333 authorizes~~

~~45 Michael A. Clemens, “The Real Root Causes of Americas Border Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, June 7, 2021.~~
~~46 Ibid.~~
~~47 Sarah Rose et al.,~~ ~~Addressing the ‘Root Causes’ of Irregular Migration from Central America: An Evidence Agenda~~
~~for USAID, Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 243, December 2021.~~
~~48 White House, “Collaborative Migration Management Strategy,” July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-~~
~~content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.~~
~~49 Ibid; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “For First Time, DHS to Supplement H-2B Cap with Additional~~
~~Visas in First Half of Fiscal Year,” press release, December 20, 2021.~~
~~50 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by~~
~~Christina L. Arabia.~~
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DOD, with the State Department’s concurrence, to train and equip foreign security forces for DOD, with the State Department’s concurrence, to train and equip foreign security forces for
operations to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, and transnational operations to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, and transnational
organized crime and to organized crime and to support maritime and border security, among other purposes. maritime and border security, among other purposes.
As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean countries receive training, equipment, and other As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean countries receive training, equipment, and other
support from DOD in addition to the security assistance provided through the SFOPS budget support from DOD in addition to the security assistance provided through the SFOPS budget
examined earlier in this report. The U.S. Southern Command asserts that these security examined earlier in this report. The U.S. Southern Command asserts that these security
cooperation programs allow the United States to remain engaged with partner militaries and help cooperation programs allow the United States to remain engaged with partner militaries and help
these militaries identify and respond to shared threats, such as transnational crime and the malign these militaries identify and respond to shared threats, such as transnational crime and the malign
influence of external state actors.influence of external state actors.5150 However, such programs may present challenges for However, such programs may present challenges for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region. congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
Whereas the State Department requests and justifies most of its planned security assistance Whereas the State Department requests and justifies most of its planned security assistance
expenditures in Latin America and the Caribbean on a country-by-country basis in annual budget expenditures in Latin America and the Caribbean on a country-by-country basis in annual budget
proposals, DOD does not. As part of a broad series of reforms enacted in the National Defense proposals, DOD does not. As part of a broad series of reforms enacted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), Congress required DOD to submit consolidated Authorization Act for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), Congress required DOD to submit consolidated
budget requests for its planned security cooperation programs, including the specific country or budget requests for its planned security cooperation programs, including the specific country or
47 White House, “Collaborative Migration Management Strategy,” July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf. 48 Ibid; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “For First Time, DHS to Supplement H-2B Cap with Additional Visas in First Half of Fiscal Year,” press release, December 20, 2021. 49 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by Christina L. Arabia. 50 Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command, “Statement Before the 117th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service 19 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations region where activities are to be conducted “to the extent practicable.”51~~region where activities are to be conducted “to the extent practicable.”52~~ To date, DOD’s budget To date, DOD’s budget
requests have included planned expenditures by combatant command areas of responsibility but requests have included planned expenditures by combatant command areas of responsibility but
no further no further ~~detail~~details on planned activities or recipient countries. For FY2022, for example, DOD on planned activities or recipient countries. For FY2022, for example, DOD
requested $50.3 million for U.S. Northern Command, which covers Mexico and the Bahamas, requested $50.3 million for U.S. Northern Command, which covers Mexico and the Bahamas,
and $164.8 million for U.S. Southern Command, which covers the rest of the Latin American and and $164.8 million for U.S. Southern Command, which covers the rest of the Latin American and
Caribbean region. That total is roughly twice as much funding as the Administration requested for Caribbean region. That total is roughly twice as much funding as the Administration requested for
FMF and IMET assistance for the region, but it is unclear how DOD would expend those FMF and IMET assistance for the region, but it is unclear how DOD would expend those
resources. DOD asserts that it intends to provide country budgetary information in the future but resources. DOD asserts that it intends to provide country budgetary information in the future but
doing so “is not currently feasible.”doing so “is not currently feasible.”53
52 This lack of detail regarding planned DOD expenditures may limit Congress’s ability to establish This lack of detail regarding planned DOD expenditures may limit Congress’s ability to establish
security assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean during the appropriations security assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean during the appropriations
process. Whereas Congress typically designates specific funding levels for the region’s top process. Whereas Congress typically designates specific funding levels for the region’s top
security assistance recipients and initiatives in annual SFOPS bills and explanatory statements, security assistance recipients and initiatives in annual SFOPS bills and explanatory statements,
DOD notifies Congress of its planned allocations in tranches over the course of each fiscal year. DOD notifies Congress of its planned allocations in tranches over the course of each fiscal year.
Consequently, DOD assistance may significantly increase the total amount of security assistance Consequently, DOD assistance may significantly increase the total amount of security assistance
provided to some countries and may shift the relative proportion of U.S. assistance dedicated to provided to some countries and may shift the relative proportion of U.S. assistance dedicated to
militaries versus civilian security forces in the region. At the same time, the lack of congressional militaries versus civilian security forces in the region. At the same time, the lack of congressional
funding directives may provide DOD with the flexibility to respond to security threats and needs funding directives may provide DOD with the flexibility to respond to security threats and needs
in the region as they arise. in the region as they arise.
There also are differences in the conditions imposed on State Department-managed and DOD- There also are differences in the conditions imposed on State Department-managed and DOD-
managed security assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries. For example, FY2021 managed security assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries. For example, FY2021
SFOPS legislation (P.L. 116-260, Div. K) prohibited FMF assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala, SFOPS legislation (P.L. 116-260, Div. K) prohibited FMF assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras and conditioned 50% of other State Department-managed security assistance for and Honduras and conditioned 50% of other State Department-managed security assistance for
those countries on their governments combating corruption, protecting human rights, and those countries on their governments combating corruption, protecting human rights, and
addressing a series of other congressional concerns.addressing a series of other congressional concerns.5453 The legislation also tied 20% of FMF and ~~The legislation also tied 20% of FMF and~~

~~51 Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command, “Statement Before the 117th Congress,~~
~~Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 16, 2021.~~
~~52 10 U.S.C. §381.~~
~~53 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,~~ ~~Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget, Justification~~
~~for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding, May 2021, p. 66.~~
~~54 P.L. 116-260, §7045(a).~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

19

~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

INCLE aid for Colombia and 25% of FMF aid for Mexico to certain human rights and INCLE aid for Colombia and 25% of FMF aid for Mexico to certain human rights and
counternarcotics conditions.counternarcotics conditions.5554 Neither the FY2021 Department of Defense Appropriations Act Neither the FY2021 Department of Defense Appropriations Act
(P.L. 116-260, Div. C) nor the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (NDAA; P.L. 116-(P.L. 116-260, Div. C) nor the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (NDAA; P.L. 116-
283) imposed any similar restrictions on DOD security cooperation programs in those countries, 283) imposed any similar restrictions on DOD security cooperation programs in those countries,
with the exception of an NDAA provision requiring DOD to issue a certification prior to with the exception of an NDAA provision requiring DOD to issue a certification prior to
transferring any vehicles to Guatemala.transferring any vehicles to Guatemala.5655
Such divergences may weaken the impact of legislative restrictions and may reduce recipient Such divergences may weaken the impact of legislative restrictions and may reduce recipient
nations’ incentives to comply with legislative conditions. For example, Congress prohibited FMF nations’ incentives to comply with legislative conditions. For example, Congress prohibited FMF
for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and placed conditions on other security assistance for for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and placed conditions on other security assistance for
those countries following a series of human rights violations and anti-democratic actions those countries following a series of human rights violations and anti-democratic actions
~~committed by security forces in each country.57 Although the State Department has yet to certify~~
~~that the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras have met the conditions necessary~~
~~to release assistance, DOD has continued to implement security cooperation programs in those~~
~~countries.58 At the same time, by attaching different legislative conditions to State Department-~~
~~and DOD-managed security assistance, Congress may be able to highlight its concerns while~~
~~allowing continued U.S. engagement with partner security forces in the region.~~

55 51 10 U.S.C. §381. 52 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget, Justification for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding, May 2021, p. 66. 53 P.L. 116-260, §7045(a). 54 P.L. 116-260, §7045(b)(2); and the Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House P.L. 116-260, §7045(b)(2); and the Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House
Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, Appropriations Act, 2021, Congressional Record, vol. 166, part No. 218 - Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794. , vol. 166, part No. 218 - Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794.
5655 P.L. 116-283, §1299K. In addition to the restrictions imposed in a given fiscal year, all State Department- and DOD- P.L. 116-283, §1299K. In addition to the restrictions imposed in a given fiscal year, all State Department- and DOD-
managed security assistance is subject to the permanent “Leahy Laws,” which prohibit U.S. security assistance to managed security assistance is subject to the permanent “Leahy Laws,” which prohibit U.S. security assistance to
foreign security forces when there is credible information that a recipient unit has committed a “gross violation of foreign security forces when there is credible information that a recipient unit has committed a “gross violation of
human rights.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10575, human rights.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting
(“Leahy Laws”), by Liana W. Rosen. , by Liana W. Rosen.
57 Congressional Research Service 20 link to page 15 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations committed by security forces in each country.56 Although the State Department has yet to certify that the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras have met the conditions necessary to release that assistance, DOD has continued to implement security cooperation programs in those countries.57 At the same time, by attaching different legislative conditions to State Department- and DOD-managed security assistance, Congress may be able to highlight its concerns while allowing continued U.S. engagement with partner security forces in the region. The 117th Congress has taken some steps to obtain increased information regarding DOD security cooperation programs and to harmonize State Department-managed and DOD-managed security assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries. The explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 DOD Appropriations Act (P.L. 117-103, Div. C) directs DOD to submit a spend plan that details the amounts allocated to international security cooperation programs in the previous two fiscal years and planned for FY2022 “by combatant command, country, and authority.” 58 The explanatory statement also directs DOD to submit a similar document with requested amounts concurrent with the FY2023 budget submission. A separate directive requires DOD, in coordination with the State Department, to submit integrated security cooperation strategies for Colombia and Mexico.59 The FY2022 NDAA (P.L. 117-81) does not subject DOD security cooperation programs in the region to the withholding requirements included in FY2022 SFOPS legislation for State Department-managed programs (see “Legislative Developments”). Nevertheless, it advances some similar objectives by requiring a series of reports on U.S. security cooperation with Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the extent to which such programs promote the rule of law and human rights.60 56 For examples, see U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Honduras Election Protests Met with For examples, see U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Honduras Election Protests Met with
Excessive and Lethal Force – UN Report,” press release, March 12, 2018; Associated Press, “U.S. Suspends Some Excessive and Lethal Force – UN Report,” press release, March 12, 2018; Associated Press, “U.S. Suspends Some
Military Aid to Guatemala over Vehicle Use,” March 14, 2019; and Nelson Renteria, “Backed by Soldiers, El Military Aid to Guatemala over Vehicle Use,” March 14, 2019; and Nelson Renteria, “Backed by Soldiers, El
Salvador’s President Briefly Occupies Congress,” Reuters, February 9, 2020. Salvador’s President Briefly Occupies Congress,” Reuters, February 9, 2020.
5857 Testimony of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in U.S. Congress, House Committee Testimony of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in U.S. Congress, House Committee
on Armed Services, on Armed Services, National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America, 117th Cong., , 117th Cong.,
1st sess., April 14, 2021. 1st sess., April 14, 2021.
58 Explanatory Statement Submitted by Ms. DeLauro, Chair of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 2471, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, Congressional Record, vol. 168, no. 42—Book III (March 9, 2022), p. H1944. 59 Ibid. 60 P.L. 117-81, §§1336 and 1337. Congressional Research Service 21~~Congressional Research Service~~

20

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Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean by Account and by Country or
Regional Program: FY2020-FY2022 Request
Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2020
(millions of current U.S. dollars) (millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina Argentina
— —
— —
— —
— —
2.5 2.5
— —
0.6 0.6
— —
3.1 3.1
Bahamas Bahamas
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Belize Belize
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
1.0 1.0
1.2 1.2
Brazil Brazil
15.0 15.0
— —
— —
4.3 4.3
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
20.1 20.1
Chile Chile
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.6 0.6
— —
0.6 0.6
Colombia Colombia
61.0 61.0
146.3 146.3
3.0 3.0
1.5 1.5
180.0 180.0
21.0 21.0
1.8 1.8
45.5 45.5
460.2 460.2
Costa Rica Costa Rica
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
7.5 7.5
8.2 8.2
Cuba Cuba
— —
20.0 20.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
20.0 20.0
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
7.0 7.0
— —
— —
21.2 21.2
— —
— —
0.4 0.4
— —
28.6 28.6
Ecuador Ecuador
12.2 12.2
— —
— —
— —
7.0 7.0
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
19.5 19.5
El Salvador El Salvador
70.0 70.0
— —
— —
6.2 6.2
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
1.9 1.9
78.9 78.9
Guatemala Guatemala
65.7 65.7
— —
13.0 13.0
16.5 16.5
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
95.9 95.9
Guyana Guyana
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.1 0.1
— —
0.1 0.1
Haiti Haiti
51.0 51.0
— —
24.5 24.5
78.8 78.8
18.0 18.0
— —
0.1 0.1
— —
172.4 172.4
Honduras Honduras
65.0 65.0
— —
— —
7.6 7.6
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
73.4 73.4
Jamaica Jamaica
1.0 1.0
— —
— —
6.7 6.7
— —
— —
0.5 0.5
— —
8.2 8.2
Mexico Mexico
— —
50.0 50.0
— —
— —
100.0 100.0
1.2 1.2
1.8 1.8
5.0 5.0
157.9 157.9
Nicaragua Nicaragua
10.0 10.0
— —
— —
1.3 1.3
— —
— —
— —
— —
11.3 11.3
Panama Panama
— —
— —
— —
7.1 7.1
— —
0.5 0.5
0.5 0.5
2.0 2.0
10.1 10.1
Paraguay Paraguay
4.0 4.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
4.2 4.2
Peru Peru
34.8 34.8
— —
— —
1.2 1.2
40.0 40.0
— —
0.6 0.6
1.8 1.8
78.3 78.3
Suriname Suriname
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Trinidad and Trinidad and
— —
— —
— —
1.8 1.8
— —
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
2.1 2.1
Tobago Tobago
Uruguay Uruguay
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.4 0.4
— —
0.4 0.4
Venezuela Venezuela
— —
30.0 30.0
5.0 5.0
3.5 3.5
— —
— —
— —
— —
38.5 38.5
Barbados and Barbados and
5.0 5.0
— —
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
— —
0.6 0.6
— —
5.9 5.9
Eastern Caribbean Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean USAID Caribbean
7.0 7.0
3.0 3.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
10.0 10.0
Developmen Developmenta
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
USAID Central USAID Central
5.0 5.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
5.0 5.0
Ameri Americaa
USAID South USAID South
15.0 15.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
15.0 15.0
Ameri Americaa
USAID Latin USAID Latin
29.2 29.2
— —
7.8 7.8
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
37.0 37.0
America and America and
CaribbCaribbeana
State Western State Western
— —
128.3 128.3
— —
— —
207.7 207.7
4.6 4.6
— —
15.0 15.0
355.6 355.6
Hemispher Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[——] [100.0]
[——]
[——]
[170.0]
[——]
[——]
[——]
[270.0]
[CBSI]a
[——]
[27.3]
[——]
[——]
[25.2]
[——]
[——]
[7.5]
[60.0]
Total Total
457.8 457.8
377. 377.6b
53.3 53.3
157.7 157.7
555.2 555.2
27.3 27.3
13.1 13.1
79.7 1,721. 79.7 1,721.7b
Source: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June, June 25, 2021. 2021.
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; pandemic. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs;
INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military
Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI =
Central America Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Central America Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through
the State Western Hemisphere Regional program. the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2020 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States. FY2020 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2021 ~~Estimate~~
(millions of current U.S. dollars) (millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina Argentina
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.1 0.1
— —
0.6 0.6
— —
0.7 0.7
Bahamas Bahamas
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Belize Belize
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.3 0.3
1.0 1.0
1.3 1.3
Brazil Brazil
17.0 17.0
— —
— —
—1.8
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
— —
~~17.7~~19.5
Chile Chile
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.5 0.5
— —
0.5 0.5
Colombia Colombia
70.0 70.0
141.0 141.0
2.0 2.0
—1.7
189.0 189.0
21.0 21.0
1.9 1.9
38.5 38.5
~~463.3~~465.1
Costa Rica Costa Rica
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
7.5 7.5
8.2 8.2
Cuba Cuba
— —
20.0 20.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
20.0 20.0
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
~~6.9~~5.6
— —
— —
23.3 23.3
— —
— —
0.5 0.5
— —
~~30.7~~29.4
Ecuador Ecuador
11.5 11.5
— —
— —
— —
7.0 7.0
— —
0.3 0.3
—5.0
23.8 23.8
El Salvador El Salvador
70.0 70.0
— —
— —
—8.1
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
— —
~~70.7~~78.8
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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Guatemala Guatemala
65.7 65.7
— —
13.0 13.0
—18.6
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
~~79.4~~98.0
Guyana Guyana
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Haiti Haiti
5152.0 .0
— —
24.5 24.5
99.8 99.8
13.0 13.0
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
~~188~~189.6 .6
Honduras Honduras
65.0 65.0
— —
— —
—8.3
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
~~65.8~~74.0
Jamaica Jamaica
12.0 .0
— —
— —
—15.5
— —
— —
0.6 0.6
— —
~~1.6~~18.1
Mexico Mexico
— —
50.0 50.0
— —
— —
100.0 100.0
1.2 1.2
1.8 1.8
6.0 6.0
158.9 158.9
Nicaragua Nicaragua
10.0 10.0
— —
— —
—1.6
— —
— —
— —
— —
~~10.0~~11.6
Panama Panama
— —
— —
— —
—8.6
— —
0.5 0.5
0.7 0.7
2.0 2.0
~~3.2~~11.8
Paraguay Paraguay
4.0 4.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.4 0.4
— —
4.4 4.4
Peru Peru
43.0 43.0
— —
— —
—1.9
39.0 39.0
1.0 1.0
0.6 0.6
— —
~~83.6~~85.5
Suriname Suriname
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago
— —
— —
— —
—2.6
— —
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
~~0.3~~2.9
Uruguay Uruguay
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.4 0.4
— —
0.4 0.4
Venezuela Venezuela
— —
33.0 33.0
5.0 5.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
38.0 38.0
Barbados and Barbados and
27.0 .0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
— —
27.7 .7
Eastern Caribbean Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean USAID Caribbean
1013.3 .3
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
1013.3 .3
Developmen Developmenta
USAID Central USAID Central
5.0 5.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
5.0 5.0
Ameri Americaa
USAID South USAID South
15.0 15.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
15.0 15.0
Ameri Americaa
USAID Latin USAID Latin
~~43.2~~34.5
— —
11.0 11.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
~~54.2~~45.5
America and America and
CaribbCaribbeana
State Western State Western
— —
134.5 134.5
— —
~~72.7~~3.2
204.9 204.9
7.4 7.4
— —
16.9 16.9
~~436.4~~366.9
Hemispher Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[——] [101.0]
[——]
[——]
[155.0]
[——]
[——]
[——] [256.0]
[CBSI]a
[——]
[2732.3]
[——]
[——]
[35.0]
[——]
[——]
[7.5]
[6974.8]
Total Total
490.6 490.6
378. 378.5b
55.5 55.5
195. 195.90
553.0 553.0
31.0 31.0
13.8 13.8
76.9 1, 76.9 1,~~795.2~~
~~Source~~794.3 Sources: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, ~~FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021~~Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Fiscal Year 2023, March 28, 2022. CARSI and CBSI totals are estimates drawn from “Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House Committee on Appropriations, Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021,” Congressional Record, vol. 166, no. 218—Book IV (December 21, 2020), pp. H8793-H8794. .
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. DA = Development through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. DA = Development
Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs;
IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America Regional Security International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America Regional Security
Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
Congressional Research Service 24 link to page 30 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through
the State Western Hemisphere Regional program. the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
~~Congressional Research Service~~

23

~~link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2021 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States. FY2021 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
Table A-3. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars) (millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET ~~FMF~~ FMF Total
Argentina Argentina
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
— —
0.7 0.7
Bahamas Bahamas
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Belize Belize
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
0.3 0.3
Brazil Brazil
17.0 17.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
17.8 17.8
Chile Chile
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.5 0.5
— —
0.5 0.5
Colombia Colombia
70.0 70.0 141.0 141.0
5.0 5.0
— —
175.0 175.0
21.0 21.0
1.9 1.9
40.0 40.0
453.9 453.9
Costa Rica Costa Rica
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
— —
0.7 0.7
Cuba Cuba
— —
20.0 20.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
20.0 20.0
Dominican Republic Dominican Republic
8.0 8.0
— —
— —
20.0 20.0
— —
— —
0.5 0.5
— —
28.5 28.5
Ecuador Ecuador
13.0 13.0
— —
— —
— —
10.5 10.5
— —
0.3 0.3
5.0 5.0
28.8 28.8
El Salvador El Salvador
95.0 95.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
95.8 95.8
Guatemala Guatemala
113.7 113.7
— —
13.0 13.0
— —
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
127.5 127.5
Guyana Guyana
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Haiti Haiti
51.0 51.0
— —
24.5 24.5
100.0 100.0
12.1 12.1
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
187.9 187.9
Honduras Honduras
95.0 95.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.8 0.8
— —
95.8 95.8
Jamaica Jamaica
1.0 1.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.6 0.6
— —
1.6 1.6
Mexico Mexico
— —
50.0 50.0
— —
— —
64.0 64.0
1.0 1.0
1.6 1.6
— —
116.6 116.6
Nicaragua Nicaragua
15.0 15.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
15.0 15.0
Panama Panama
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.5 0.5
0.7 0.7
— —
1.2 1.2
Paraguay Paraguay
4.0 4.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.4 0.4
— —
4.4 4.4
Peru Peru
39.0 39.0
— —
— —
— —
46.2 46.2
1.0 1.0
0.7 0.7
— —
86.9 86.9
Suriname Suriname
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.2 0.2
— —
0.2 0.2
Trinidad and Trinidad and ~~Tobago~~
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.3 0.3
— —
0.3 0.3
Tobago Uruguay Uruguay
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.4 0.4
— —
0.4 0.4
Venezuela Venezuela
— —
50.0 50.0
5.0 5.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
55.0 55.0
Barbados and Barbados and ~~Eastern~~
5.0 5.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
0.7 0.7
— —
5.7 5.7
Eastern Caribbean Caribbean
USAID Caribbean USAID Caribbean
10.0 10.0
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
— —
10.0 10.0
Developmen Developmenta
~~USAID Central~~
~~73.1~~
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
~~73.1~~
~~Americaa~~
~~USAID South~~
~~20.2~~
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
~~20.2~~
~~Americaa~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~

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~~link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29~~ ~~U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations~~

~~USAID Latin America and~~
~~29.2~~
~~35.0 11.0~~
—
—
—
—
—
~~75.2~~
~~Caribbeana~~
~~State Central Americaa~~
—
~~131.0~~
—
~~43.6~~
~~219.7~~
~~2.0~~
—
~~27.5~~
~~423.8~~
~~State Western Hemispherea~~
—
~~28.3~~
—
~~26.4~~
~~43.0~~
~~5.5~~
—
~~22.5~~
~~125.7~~
[CARSI]a
~~[—] [123.0] [—]~~
~~[—] [219.7] [—] [—]~~
[—] [342.7]
[CBSI]a
~~[—]~~
[27.0] [—]
~~[—]~~
~~[29.0] [—] [—] [10.0]~~
~~[66.0]~~
~~Total~~
~~659.1~~
~~455.3 58.5 190.0~~
~~570.4 31.0~~ Congressional Research Service 25 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 link to page 30 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations GHP- GHP- DA ESF USAID State INCLE NADR IMET FMF Total USAID Central 73.1 — — — — — — — 73.1 Americaa USAID South 20.2 — — — — — — — 20.2 Americaa USAID Latin 29.2 35.0 11.0 — — — — — 75.2 America and Caribbeana State Central — 131.0 — 43.6 219.7 2.0 — 27.5 423.8 Americaa State Western — 28.3 — 26.4 43.0 5.5 — 22.5 125.7 Hemispherea [CARSI]a [—] [123.0] [—] [—] [219.7] [—] [—] [—] [342.7] [CBSI]a [—] [27.0] [—] [—] [29.0] [—] [—] [10.0] [66.0] Total 659.1 455.3 58.5 190.0 570.4 31.0 14.1 14.1
95.0 2,073.4 95.0 2,073.4
Source: U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June, June 25, 2021. 2021.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE
= International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing;
USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America
Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S. borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. ~~Under the~~The FY2022 request FY2022 request~~, CARSI~~
~~would be funded~~ proposed funding CARSI through the State Central America regional program and through the State Central America regional program and ~~CBSI would be funded~~funding CBSI through through
the State Western Hemisphere regional program. the State Western Hemisphere regional program.

Author Information

Peter J. Meyer Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs

Congressional Research Service 26 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

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