U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
February 7, 2022
the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations
Peter J. Meyer
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
Specialist in Latin
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
American and Canadian
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Affairs
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as well as countering illicit narcotics, since

the 1990s. In recent years, top U.S. funding priorities for foreign assistance in the region have
included addressing the underlying drivers of migration from Central America, combatting drug

production and supporting peace accord implementation in Colombia, and strengthening security
and the rule of law in Mexico. U.S. agencies also have dedicated significant resources to combatting HIV/AIDS and fostering
long-term stability in Haiti, addressing security concerns in the Caribbean, and responding to the political and humanitarian
crises in Venezuela and their effects on the broader region.
Congress may assess how the region’s assistance needs have changed due to the effects of the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) pandemic. At the end of 2021, Latin American and Caribbean countries, which are home to about 8.4% of the
world’s population, accounted for 28.7% of COVID-19 deaths globally. The region’s economy as a whole contracted by
6.9% in 2020, increasing Latin America’s poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates to levels not seen for 10 and
20 years, respectively. Economic recovery may be protracted, as many countries are facing high levels of debt and some may
not achieve widespread vaccination until 2023. Political and security conditions also have deteriorated in portions of the
region during the pandemic, as governments have rolled back political rights and civil liberties and criminal organizations
have extended their territorial control and influence.
FY2022 Budget Request
The Biden Administration has requested nearly $2.1 billion of foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean for
FY2022, which (in current dollars) would be the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If
enacted, total State Department- and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-managed funding for the region
would increase by $278.2 million (15.5%) compared with FY2021 estimated levels. The Administration’s FY2022 budget
request also would provide $38.0 million to the Inter-American Foundation—a small, independent U.S. foreign assistance
agency that promotes grassroots development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The Administration states that it intends to use the assistance requested for FY2022 to address the socioeconomic effects of
the pandemic while continuing to respond to a variety of other challenges in the region. Much of the funding would support
implementation of the Administration’s four-year, $4.0 billion plan to foster systemic reform and address the root causes of
irregular migration from Central America. The FY2022 request includes $860.6 million for Central America—a $298.0
million (53.0%) increase compared with the FY2021 estimate. With regard to other regional priorities, the Administration’s
FY2022 request would provide $453.9 million for Colombia, $187.9 million for Haiti, $116.6 million for Mexico, $66.0
million for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and $55.0 million for Venezuela.
Legislative Developments
Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2022 appropriations. The House passed the Department of State, Foreign
Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R. 4373/H.Rept. 117-84) in July 2021, and the Senate
Appropriations Committee introduced a foreign aid appropriations bill (S. 3075) in October 2021. Neither bill would specify
comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country. Nevertheless, the House-passed
measure would designate funding levels for Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and the CBSI that match or exceed the
Administration’s request. The bill introduced in the Senate would provide slightly more assistance than the Administration
requested for Colombia and the CBSI but $206.7 million less than the Administration requested for Central America. Two
continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43 and P.L. 117-70) have funded foreign aid programs in the region at the FY2021 level
since October 1, 2021. P.L. 117-70 extends appropriations through February 18, 2022.
Congress may consider various policy issues as it continues the appropriations process. Such issues include how to help Latin
American and Caribbean countries respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign
assistance for managing migration; and the challenges Department of Defense security cooperation programs present for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
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Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 25

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Introduction
Foreign assistance (also referred to as foreign aid in this report) is one of the tools the United
States employs to advance U.S. interests and policy goals in Latin America and the Caribbean.1
The focus and funding levels of aid programs change along with broader U.S. objectives.2
Current aid programs reflect the diverse needs of the countries in the region, as well as the broad
range of these countries’ ties to the United States (see Figure 1 for a map of Latin America and
the Caribbean). Some countries receive U.S. assistance across many sectors to address political,
socioeconomic, and security challenges. Others have made major strides in consolidating
democratic governance and improving living conditions; these countries no longer receive
traditional U.S. development assistance but typically receive some U.S. support to address shared
security challenges, such as transnational crime.
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Map Resources, edited by the Congressional Research Service (CRS).

1 For more information on foreign assistance, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Assistance: An Introduction to U.S.
Programs and Policy, by Emily M. Morgenstern and Nick M. Brown.
2 For more information on U.S. policy in the region, see CRS Report R46781, Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S.
Policy and Key Issues in the 117th Congress, coordinated by Mark P. Sullivan.
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Congress authorizes and appropriates foreign assistance funds for Latin America and the
Caribbean and conducts oversight of aid programs and the executive branch agencies that
administer them. The 117th Congress is currently assessing the Biden Administration’s FY2022
foreign assistance request for the region as well as a variety of related bills. These bills include
measures to authorize certain U.S. assistance activities in the Caribbean (H.R. 4133) and Central
America (H.R. 1177/S. 348 and H.R. 4017/S. 2003), and to evaluate the past decade of U.S.
recovery and development efforts in Haiti (H.R. 2471, passed by the House in June 2021 and by
the Senate, with an amendment, in January 2022).
This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. It
examines trends in aid to the region; the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request for aid
administered by the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
and the Inter-American Foundation (IAF); and congressional action on FY2022 Department of
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. It also analyzes several
issues that Congress may consider as it deliberates on FY2022 appropriations and other
legislation. These issues include how to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic in the region, the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration, and the
challenges Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation programs present for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
Report Notes
To more accurately compare the Biden Administration’s FY2022 foreign assistance request with previous years’
appropriations, most aid figures in this report refer only to bilateral assistance that is managed by the State
Department or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and is requested for individual countries
or regional programs. Such assistance accounted for 62.8% of the total aid obligated by all U.S. agencies in Latin
America and the Caribbean in FY2019.
Many countries in the region are receiving additional assistance through of a series of supplemental appropriations
bil s Congress enacted to help countries worldwide respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those supplemental
resources are discussed in the “COVID-19 Response” section of this report but otherwise are excluded from this
analysis due to data inconsistencies.
Several other sources of U.S. assistance to the region exist. Some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
receive U.S. assistance to address humanitarian needs through USAID- and State Department-managed foreign
assistance accounts, such as Food for Peace Act Title II, International Disaster Assistance, and Migration and
Refugee Assistance. Likewise, some countries receive assistance from other U.S. agencies, such as the Department
of Defense, Mil ennium Challenge Corporation, and Peace Corps. Moreover, multilateral organizations that the
United States supports financially, such as the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Development
Bank, and the Pan American Health Organization, provide additional aid to the region. Except where indicated,
those accounts, agencies, and organizations are excluded from this analysis.
Source: USAID and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
Trends in U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean
The United States has long been a major contributor of foreign assistance to countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Between FY1946 and FY2019, the United States provided $93.8
billion ($194.5 billion in constant 2019 dollars) of assistance to the region.3 U.S. assistance to the
region spiked in the early 1960s, following the introduction of President John F. Kennedy’s

3 These totals include aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies to the 33 independent Latin American and
Caribbean countries (identified in Figure 1) and regional programs. U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and U.S. Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
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Alliance for Progress, an anti-poverty initiative that sought to counter Soviet and Cuban influence
in the aftermath of Fidel Castro’s 1959 seizure of power in Cuba. After a period of decline, U.S.
assistance to the region increased again following the 1979 assumption of power by the leftist
Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Throughout the 1980s, the United States provided considerable support
to Central American governments battling leftist insurgencies to prevent potential Soviet allies
from establishing political or military footholds in the region. U.S. aid flows declined in the mid-
1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Central American civil
conflicts (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY1946-FY2019
(obligations in billions of constant 2019 dollars)

Source: CRS presentation of data from U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S.
Department of State, ForeignAssistance.gov, at https://foreignassistance.gov/.
Notes: Includes aid obligations from all U.S. government agencies. Comprehensive data for FY2020 and FY2021
are not yet available.
U.S. foreign assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean began to increase again in the late
1990s and remained on a generally upward trajectory through FY2010. The higher levels of
assistance were partially the result of increased spending on humanitarian and development
assistance. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, the United States provided extensive
humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to several countries in Central America. The
establishment of the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in 2003 and the Millennium
Challenge Corporation in 2004 also provided many countries in the region with new sources of
U.S. assistance.4 In addition, the United States provided significant assistance to Haiti in the
aftermath of a massive earthquake in 2010.

4 For more information on the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief and the Millennium Challenge Corporation,
see CRS In Focus IF10797, PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities, by Tiaji Salaam-Blyther;
and CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation: Overview and Issues, by Nick M. Brown.
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Increased funding for counternarcotics and security programs also contributed to the rise in U.S.
assistance. Beginning with President Bill Clinton and the 106th Congress in FY2000, successive
Administrations and Congresses provided significant amounts of foreign aid to Colombia and its
Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking and end Colombia’s long-running internal armed
conflict. Spending received another boost in FY2008, when President George W. Bush joined
with his Mexican counterpart to announce the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. counterdrug
and anti-crime assistance for Mexico and Central America. In FY2010, Congress and the Obama
Administration split the Central American portion of the Mérida Initiative into a separate Central
America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and created a similar program for the countries of
the Caribbean known as the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI).
Although U.S. assistance levels for Latin America and the Caribbean have remained elevated
over the past two decades compared with the 1990s, the U.S. government has increasingly
concentrated those resources in fewer countries and sectors due to significant development
progress in much of the region. Between 2002 and 2019, the percentage of people living in
poverty in Latin America decreased from 45.3% to 30.5%, due to stronger economic growth and
the implementation of more effective social policies.5 Health and education indicators also
improved significantly during that period. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, began to provide assistance to others in the region based on
their own development experiences.
Trends have reversed in the last decade, however, as countries in the region has struggled to
address a series of challenges. Socioeconomic conditions began to stagnate in many Latin
American and Caribbean countries around 2015 due to a decline in global commodity prices and
deteriorated sharply in 2020 as the COVID-19 pandemic eroded more than a decade of
development gains (see “COVID-19 Response”). Political conditions also have deteriorated as
Venezuela and Nicaragua have entrenched authoritarian rule and widespread corruption and
violence have eroded the quality of democracy elsewhere. These challenges have generated
instability, including large-scale migration flows throughout the hemisphere.
Biden Administration’s FY2022 Foreign Assistance
Budget Request6
The Biden Administration has requested nearly $2.1 billion of State Department- and USAID-
managed foreign assistance for Latin America and the Caribbean in FY2022, which (in current
dollars) would be the largest annual budget allocation for the region in more than a decade. If
enacted, funding for the region would increase by $278.2 million, or 15.5%, compared with
FY2021 estimated levels (see Table 1). The Administration’s proposed increase for the region
exceeds the 11.4% increase requested for SFOPS globally in FY2022.7

5 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America
2021, January 2022, p. 63.
6 Unless otherwise noted, data and information in this section are drawn from U.S. Department of State, Congressional
Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021, at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/06/FY-2022-C-J-Appendix-2-FINAL-6-25-2021.pdf; and U.S. Department of State, FY2021
estimate data, June 15, 2021.
7 This calculation is based on enacted FY2021 levels, excluding emergency funding. For more information on the
global foreign operations request, see CRS Report R46935, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs: FY2022 Budget and Appropriations, by Cory R. Gill, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern.
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Major Foreign Assistance Categories and Accounts8
The Administration’s proposed FY2022 foreign aid budget for Latin America and the Caribbean
requests $659.1 million (31.8% of the total) through the Development Assistance (DA) account,
which seeks to foster broad-based economic growth and social welfare in low- and middle-
income countries. USAID typically uses DA funding for long-term projects in areas such as
agriculture, democracy and governance, economic reform, education, and environmental
protection. The FY2022 request would continue to support long-term development efforts while
seeking to address the negative effects the pandemic has had on many of those sectors. Compared
with the FY2021 estimate, DA funding for the region would increase by $168.6 million (34.4%),
with the majority of the additional funding allocated to Central America to address root causes of
migration.
Another $455.3 million (22.0%) of the Administration’s request for the region would be provided
through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account, the primary purpose of which is to promote
special U.S. political, economic, or security interests. In practice, ESF programs generally aim to
promote political and economic stability and are often indistinguishable from programs funded
through the DA account. If enacted, ESF assistance for the region would increase by $76.8
million (20.2%) compared with the FY2021 estimate. The additional resources would support
rule of law and crime and violence prevention programs in Central America, economic
development efforts in southern Mexico, and democracy and human rights activities in
Venezuela.
The FY2022 request for Latin America and the Caribbean would provide $248.5 million (12.0%
of the total) through the Global Health Programs (GHP) account. This amount includes $190.0
million requested for the State Department, primarily to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS, and $58.5
million requested for USAID to combat malaria and COVID-19 and support maternal and child
health, nutrition, and family planning programs.9 Under the FY2022 GHP request for the region,
funding for the State Department-managed subaccount would decline by $5.9 million (3.0%), and
funding for the USAID-managed subaccount would increase by $3.0 million (5.5%) compared
with the FY2021 estimate.
The remaining $710.5 million (34.3%) of the Administration’s FY2022 request for Latin America
and the Caribbean would support security assistance programs, including the following:
 $570.4 million requested through the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account for counternarcotics, civilian law enforcement
efforts, and projects intended to strengthen judicial institutions. INCLE funding
for the region would increase by $17.4 million (3.1%) compared with the
FY2021 estimate, with decreased aid to Colombia and Mexico offset by
increased aid to Central America.
 $31.0 million requested through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs (NADR) account to help countries in the region carry out
humanitarian demining programs, strengthen conventional weapons stockpile
management, develop strategic trade controls and border security measures, and

8 For more information on the various foreign assistance accounts and the programs they fund, see CRS Report
R40482, Department of State, Foreign Operations Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts, by Nick M.
Brown and Cory R. Gill.
9 The region is receiving additional assistance to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic
through previously enacted supplemental appropriations. See “COVID-19 Response.”
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enhance their counterterrorism capacities. NADR funding for the region would
remain flat compared with the FY2021 estimate.
 $14.1 million requested through the International Military Education and
Training (IMET) account to train Latin American and Caribbean military
personnel. IMET funding would increase by $285,000 (2.1%) compared with the
FY2021 estimate.
 $95.0 million requested through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account
to provide U.S. military equipment and services to partners in the region. FMF
funding for the region would increase by $18.1 million (23.5%) compared with
the FY2021 estimate, with the additional resources allocated to Colombia and
regional programs in Central America and the Caribbean.
Table 1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Account: FY2017-FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
Foreign Assistance
FY2017 FY2018a FY2019 FY2020b
FY2021
FY2022
% Change:
Account
(est.)b
(req.)
FY21-FY22
Development Assistance
484.4
386.2
385.3
457.8
490.6
659.1
+34.4%
Economic Support Fund
352.0c
419.1c
402.3c
377.6c
378.5c
455.3
+20.3%
Global Health Programs
64.4
63.4
53.3
53.3
55.5
58.5
+5.5%
(USAID)
Global Health Programs
117.7
136.7
170.5
157.7
195.9
190.0
-3.0%
(State)
International Narcotics
533.2
542.2
564.3
555.2
553.0
570.4
+3.1%
Control and Law
Enforcement
Nonproliferation, Anti-
25.4
23.5
25.8
27.3
31.0
31.0
—
terrorism, Demining,
and Related programs
International Military
13.4
11.2
9.9
13.1
13.8
14.1
+2.0%
Education and Training
Foreign Military
82.7
86.0
82.8
79.7
76.9
95.0
+23.5%
Financing
Total
1,673.2
1,668.4a
1,694.1
1,721.7b
1,795.2b
2,073.4
+15.5%
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2019-FY2022, at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and U.S. Department of State,
FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021.
Notes: USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State = U.S. Department of State.
a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed approximately $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in
Latin America and the Caribbean region and the remainder to priorities outside the region.
b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency
appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19.
c. Congress appropriated an additional $9.0 mil ion of Economic Support Funds for the region each year from
FY2017 to FY2019 and an additional $5.0 mil ion for the region in FY2020 and FY2021. Those funds are not
included in this table because they were appropriated as multilateral assistance for the Organization of
American States.
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Major Country and Regional Programs
The Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request would slightly reduce State Department- and
USAID-managed assistance for some countries and regional programs in Latin America and the
Caribbean while significantly increasing assistance for others (see Table 2).
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Since FY2010, the CBSI has funded maritime and aerial
security cooperation, law enforcement support, border and port security, justice sector reform, and
crime prevention programs in the Caribbean.10 The FY2022 request includes $66.0 million for the
CBSI, which would be a $3.8 million (5.4%) cut compared with the FY2021 estimate.
Central America. Addressing the underlying drivers of irregular migration from Central America
to the United States has been a top U.S. policy priority in the region since an unexpected surge of
unaccompanied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (the “Northern Triangle”)
arrived at the U.S. border in 2014. However, specific policy approaches have shifted from one
Administration to another.11 The Biden Administration has developed a new U.S. Strategy for
Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America, and has requested $860.6 million
for FY2022 to promote good governance, economic prosperity, and improved security in the
subregion.12 Of that total, $833.1 million falls within the regional request for Latin America and
the Caribbean, and the remainder would be drawn from global accounts.13 The Administration’s
budget requests about 39% of the Central America funding as bilateral assistance for the seven
nations of the isthmus (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Panama), with the vast majority allocated to the Northern Triangle countries. It requests the other
61% as regional assistance through USAID’s Central America Regional program and a new State
Department Central America Regional program. If fully funded, aid to Central America would
increase by $298.0 million (53.0%) compared with the FY2021 estimate.
Colombia. Colombia has been among the top recipients of U.S. assistance worldwide since the
launch of Plan Colombia, a counternarcotics program, in FY2000. The focus of U.S. assistance
efforts has evolved over time, responding to changes in Colombia’s long-running internal
conflict.14 The FY2022 request includes $453.9 million for Colombia, primarily to support the
Colombian government’s counternarcotics strategy and the continued implementation of its peace
accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The request also includes
some funding for environmental conservation efforts and for maternal and child health programs
for Venezuelan migrants and their host communities. The Administration’s request is $9.5 million
(2.0%) lower than the FY2021 estimate due to a proposed reduction in INCLE funding.

10 For more information on the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan.
11 For more information on U.S. policy toward Central America, see CRS Insight IN11603, Central America’s
Northern Triangle: Challenges for U.S. Policymakers in 2021; and CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American
Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy.
12 White House, “U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America,” July 2021, at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
13 The remainder includes $25.5 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, provided to
the State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs for Program Development and
Support, and $2 million of International Organizations and Programs funding for the U.N. Refugee Agency.
14 For more information on U.S. policy toward Colombia, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S.
Relations, by June S. Beittel.
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Haiti. For many years, the United States has provided Haiti significant aid to support the
country’s recovery from recurrent natural disasters and foster long-term stability.15 U.S.
assistance spiked after a massive earthquake struck Haiti in 2010 but has declined since then. The
Administration’s FY2022 request would provide $187.9 million to help Haiti address health
challenges (particularly HIV/AIDS), strengthen government and police capacity, increase
agricultural production and other economic development, and support natural resource
management. The Administration’s request, if funded, would represent a $0.7 million (0.4%)
decline in U.S. assistance to Haiti compared with the FY2021 estimate.
Mexico. Mexico traditionally was not a major U.S. aid recipient due to its middle-income status,
but it began receiving larger amounts of counternarcotics and anti-crime assistance through the
Mérida Initiative in FY2008.16 The Administration’s FY2022 request includes $116.6 million for
Mexico, primarily to strengthen the rule of law; secure borders and ports; and combat
transnational organized crime, including opium poppy cultivation and heroin and fentanyl
production. The request also includes some funding to help Mexico reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and improve environmental conservation. The Administration’s request for Mexico is
$42.3 million (26.6%) lower than the FY2021 estimate due to proposed INCLE and FMF cuts.
However, the Administration has requested an additional $35 million through the USAID Latin
America and Caribbean Regional program to support development in Southern Mexico and to
implement joint U.S.-Mexican aid projects in Central America.
Venezuela. The United States has provided democracy assistance to Venezuelan civil society for
nearly two decades and has increased such assistance over the past four years in response to the
authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro. The United States also has provided humanitarian support
for those who have fled the country’s humanitarian crisis (see the text box “Venezuela Regional
Crisis Response”).17 The Administration has requested $55.0 million in FY2022 to support
democratic actors, human rights advocates, and other civil society organizations; increase food
security; and support access to health care in Venezuela. The request would increase U.S. aid to
Venezuela by $17.0 million (44.7%) compared with the FY2021 estimate.
Venezuela Regional Crisis Response
An estimated 6.1 mil ion Venezuelan migrants and refugees have fled the country’s political and humanitarian crisis,
approximately 5 mil ion of whom are residing throughout 17 other Latin American and Caribbean countries. From
FY2017 to FY2021, U.S. agencies provided nearly $1.7 bil ion of humanitarian assistance to help countries in the
region respond to Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows, support host communities, and assist those who remain
in Venezuela. These assistance funds, which U.S. agencies have allocated over the course of each fiscal year from
global humanitarian accounts, are not included in the country or regional totals found in Table 1, Table 2, or the
Appendix of this report.
For more information on the humanitarian response and allocations for particular countries, see USAID,
“Venezuela Regional Crisis – Complex Emergency, Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year 2022,” January 11, 2022, at
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-01-
11_USG_Venezuela_Regional_Crisis_Response_Fact_Sheet_1.pdf.

15 For more information on U.S. policy toward Haiti, see CRS Insight IN11699, Haiti: Concerns After the Presidential
Assassination, by Maureen Taft-Morales.
16 For more information on U.S. policy toward Mexico, see CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida
Initiative, FY2008-FY2022, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
17 For more information on U.S. policy toward Venezuela, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S.
Relations, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke.
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Table 2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean by Country or Regional Program: FY2017-FY2022
Request
(thousands of current U.S. dollars)
FY2017
FY2018a
FY2019
FY2020b
FY2021
FY2022
%
(est.)b
(req.)
Change:
FY21-

FY22
Argentina
624
2,918
3,089
3,061
700
650
-7.1%
Bahamas
173
138
196
197
200
200
—
Belize
1,241
1,143
235
1,179
1,250
250
-80.0%
Brazil
11,690
11,423a
11,619
20,060
17,650
17,800
+0.9%
Chile
689
357
487
553
455
450
-1.1%
Colombia
384,248
384,312a
421,180
460,183
463,345
453,850
-2.0%
Costa Rica
5,718
5,725
8,180
8,225
8,225
725
-91.2%
Cuba
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
—
Dominican
13,736
20,174
36,777
28,569
30,745
28,500
-7.3%
Republic
Ecuador
1,789
1,789
12,000
19,450
23,750
28,800
+21.3%
El Salvador
72,759
57,656a
39,533
78,865
70,700
95,800
+35.5%
Guatemala
125,493
108,453a
80,351
95,887
79,410
127,450
+60.5%
Guyana
277
239
176
140
200
200
—
Haiti
164,552
181,319
193,752
172,361
188,577
187,855
-0.4%
Honduras
95,260
79,678a
56,906
73,365
65,750
95,800
+45.7%
Jamaica
10,597
1,335
1,598
8,206
1,600
1,600
—
Mexico
138,566
151,263
162,410
157,910
158,910
116,575
-26.6%
Nicaragua
9,679
10,000a
11,610
11,323
10,000
15,000
+50.0%
Panama
3,271
3,086
1,162
10,131
3,200
1,225
-61.7%
Paraguay
6,150
4,297
4,397
4,227
4,400
4,400
—
Peru
64,473
74,814a
75,396
78,342
83,635
86,870
+3.9%
Suriname
269
167
195
178
200
200
—
Trinidad and
343
341
326
2,058
300
300
—
Tobago
Uruguay
498
401
385
377
400
350
-12.5%
Venezuela
7,000
15,000a
22,500
38,452
38,000
55,000
+44.7%
Barbados and
26,629
24,027a
3,456
5,854
2,700
5,700
+111.1%
Eastern
Caribbean
USAID
3,000
4,000
4,000
10,000
10,300
10,000
-2.9%
Caribbean
Development
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FY2017
FY2018a
FY2019
FY2020b
FY2021
FY2022
%
(est.)b
(req.)
Change:
FY21-

FY22
USAID
38,316
19,931a
4,600
5,000
5,000
73,085
+1,361.7%
Central
America
Regional
USAID South
14,000
18,065a
18,000
15,000
15,000
20,200
+34.7%
America
Regional
USAID Latin
26,700
51,600a
68,300
36,978
54,200
75,178
+38.7%
America and
Caribbean
Regional
State Central
—
—
—
—
—
423,765c
—c
America
Regionalc
State
425,471
414,795
431,313
355,610
436,390
125,660c
-71.2%c
Western
Hemisphere
Regionalc
[CARSI]
[329,225]
[319,225]a
[290,000]
[270,000]
[256,040]
[342,665]
[+33.8%]
[CBSI]
[57,700]
[57,700]
[58,000]
[60,000]
[69,800]
[66,000]
[-5.4%]
Total
1,673,211 1,668,446a 1,694,129 1,721,741b 1,795,192b 2,073,438
+15.5%
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2021, at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/; and U.S. Department of State,
FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021.
Notes: CARSI = Central America Regional Security Initiative; CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. USAID
and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives, including CARSI and CBSI, as well as
activities that cross borders or take place in non-presence countries. These regional programs provide the vast
majority of U.S. assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries.
a. FY2018 totals represent allocations as of the end of that fiscal year. The Trump Administration
subsequently reprogrammed $396.2 mil ion of FY2018 aid Congress had appropriated for El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras, reallocating at least $264.3 mil ion to other countries and programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean region. This included $116.0 mil ion reprogrammed to Colombia, $87.1 mil ion
to Venezuela, $17.0 mil ion to Peru, $12.2 mil ion to USAID South America Regional, $10.0 mil ion to
Nicaragua, $10.0 mil ion to Barbados and Eastern Caribbean, $8.0 mil ion to Brazil, $3 mil ion to regional
anti-trafficking in persons programs, and $1 mil ion to USAID Latin America and Caribbean Regional. The
remainder was allocated to priorities outside the region
b. FY2020 and FY2021 totals do not include assistance made available through supplemental emergency
appropriations (P.L. 116-123, P.L. 116-136, or P.L. 117-2) to respond to COVID-19.
c. The Biden Administration’s FY2022 request would establish a new State Department-managed Central
America Regional program, which would fund CARSI and other regional activities in Central America.
CARSI was funded through the State Department’s Western Hemisphere regional program in prior years.
Inter-American Foundation
In addition to State Department and USAID-managed assistance for the region, the Biden
Administration’s FY2022 budget request would provide $38.0 million to the IAF (see Table 3).
The IAF is an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency established through the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969 (22 U.S.C. §290f). Congress created the agency after conducting a
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comprehensive review of previous assistance efforts and determining that programs at the
government-to-government level had not promoted significant social and civic change in the
region despite fostering economic growth.18 The IAF provides grants and other targeted
assistance directly to the organized poor to foster economic and social development and to
encourage civic engagement in their communities. The IAF is active in 26 countries in the region,
including several countries where USAID no longer has field missions. The FY2022 request
would support the agency’s ongoing efforts to address the root causes of Central American
migration, build resilience to natural disasters and extreme weather, and advance the social and
economic inclusion of historically marginalized populations, among other initiatives.
Table 3. Inter-American Foundation (IAF) Appropriations: FY2017-FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
% Change
(req.)
FY21-FY22
22.5
22.5
22.5
37.5
38.0
38.0
—
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2018-FY2022, at
https://www.state.gov/plans-performance-budget/international-affairs-budgets/.
Note: The IAF received an additional $6.0 mil ion in FY2017, $10.0 mil ion in FY2018, and $10.0 mil ion in
FY2019 via congressionally directed interagency transfers from USAID for programs in Central America.
Legislative Developments
Congress has not yet concluded action on FY2022 SFOPS appropriations. The House passed the
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2022 (H.R.
4373/H.Rept. 117-84), in July 2021, and the Senate’s SFOPS bill (S. 3075) was introduced in
October 2021. Congress has not taken further action on either bill. Instead, it has enacted two
continuing resolutions (P.L. 117-43 and P.L. 117-70) that have funded foreign aid programs in the
region at the FY2021 level since October 1, 2021. The current continuing resolution extends
appropriations through February 18, 2022.
Neither H.R. 4373 nor S. 3075 specifies comprehensive appropriations levels for every Latin
American and Caribbean country. Nevertheless, the measures do include funding directives
and/or restrictions for some U.S. initiatives in the region (see Table 4).
Table 4. U.S. Foreign Assistance for Selected Countries and Initiatives: FY2022
Appropriations Legislation
(millions of current U.S. dollars)

FY2021 (est.)
FY2022 (req.)
H.R. 4373 and
S. 3075 and draft
H.Rept. 117-84
explanatory
statement
Caribbean Basin
69.8
66.0
80.0
74.5
Security Initiative
Central America
562.6
860.6
860.6
653.9

18 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, report on H.R. 14580 to
Promote the Foreign Policy, Security, and General Welfare of the United States by Assisting Peoples of the World to
Achieve Development Within a Framework of Democratic, Economic, Social, and Political Institutions, and for Other
Purposes, 91st Cong., 1st sess., November 6, 1969, H.Rept. 91-611 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), p. 57.
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FY2021 (est.)
FY2022 (req.)
H.R. 4373 and
S. 3075 and draft
H.Rept. 117-84
explanatory
statement
Colombia
463.3
453.9
461.4
463.9
Haiti
188.6
187.9
NA
NA
Inter-American
38.0
38.0
44.5
44.5
Foundation
Mexico
158.9
116.6
158.9
NA
Venezuela
38.0
55.0
50.0
50.0
Sources: U.S. Department of State, FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021; U.S. Department of State,
Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022, June 25, 2021; H.R. 4373; H.Rept.
117-84; S. 3075; and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement, available at
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SFOPSREPT_FINAL.PDF.
Note: NA indicates that comprehensive appropriation totals are not available.
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Both measures would provide more funding for the CBSI
than the Administration requested. H.R. 4373 would provide “not less than” $80.0 million for the
CBSI, and the Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement would recommend
$74.5 million for the initiative.
Central America. The House and Senate bills diverge on aid to Central America. H.R. 4373
would fully fund the Administration’s request, providing “up to” $860.6 million for the
subregion. S. 3075 would provide “not less than” $653.9 million for Central America, or 24.0%
less than the Administration requested. As in prior years, both bills would require the State
Department to withhold some assistance to support the central governments of El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras until those governments meet a series of conditions related to
corruption, human rights, migration, and other congressional concerns. Both bills also would
prohibit FMF for those three countries.
Colombia. Both bills would provide slightly more funding for Colombia than the Administration
requested. H.R. 4373 would provide $461.4 million for Colombia, and S. 3075 would provide
$463.9 million. As in prior years, both bills would require the State Department to withhold some
security assistance until the Colombian government meets certain human rights conditions. S.
3075 also would tie a portion of the security assistance funding to Colombia’s counternarcotics
policies.
Haiti. Neither measure would specify a comprehensive appropriation level for Haiti. H.Rept.
117-84 would allocate $56.0 million of DA to Haiti, including $8.5 million for reforestation; H.R.
4373 would require the State Department to withhold those funds and any ESF for Haiti until the
Haitian government takes steps to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption, increase
government revenues, and resolve commercial disputes with U.S. entities. The Senate
Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory statement would allocate $57.0 million of DA to
Haiti, including $8.5 million for reforestation, and would recommend “not less than” $5.0 million
to address inhumane penitentiary conditions. S. 3075 would require the State Department to
withhold aid to the Haitian government until a new president and parliament take office following
free and fair elections or a broadly representative transitional government is in place.
Inter-American Foundation. Both bills would provide $44.5 million for the IAF, which would
exceed the Administration’s request and prior year appropriations. H.Rept. 117-84 would direct
the IAF to use the additional resources to assist Venezuelan migrants, build disaster resiliency in
the Caribbean, strengthen civil society and livelihoods in Haiti, support conflict recovery and
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historically marginalized groups in Colombia, and implement a pilot exchange program between
indigenous IAF grantees and Native American tribes.
Mexico. The House and Senate measures differ on aid to Mexico. H.Rept. 117-84 would provide
$158.9 million for Mexico, which is the same as the FY2021 estimate but $42.3 million more
than the Administration requested. The Senate Appropriations Committee’s draft explanatory
statement would not designate a comprehensive funding level for Mexico but would recommend
$80.0 million of INCLE aid. Both reports would direct the State Department and USAID to
conduct a comprehensive review of the Mérida Initiative.
Venezuela. Both bills would provide $50.0 million of ESF for democracy programs in Venezuela.
Both bills also would direct U.S. agencies to continue providing support to other Latin American
and Caribbean countries hosting Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
Policy Issues for Congress
Congress may examine various policy issues as it considers the President’s FY2022 budget
request and other legislation related to foreign operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.
These issues may include how to help countries in the region respond to, and recover from, the
COVID-19 pandemic; the effectiveness of foreign assistance for managing migration; and the
challenges DOD security cooperation programs present for congressional efforts to guide security
assistance policy in the region.
COVID-19 Response19
The COVID-19 pandemic has significantly affected socioeconomic conditions in Latin America
and the Caribbean. At the end of 2021, the region had registered nearly 1.6 million COVID-19
deaths, or 28.7% of such deaths worldwide while accounting for about 8.4% of the world’s
population.20 The pandemic and related containment efforts also contributed to a regional
economic contraction of 6.9% in 2020.21 Although some countries were able to mitigate the
impact of the economic downturn with emergency social assistance programs, Latin America’s
poverty (33.0%) and extreme poverty (13.1%) rates increased to levels not seen for 10 and 20
years, respectively.22 Severe food insecurity also increased, with an estimated 53.8 million-66.1
million people (8.2%-10.1% of the region’s population) undernourished in 2020.23 The sharp
deterioration in living conditions has contributed to large-scale migration flows throughout Latin
America and the Caribbean.
To date, Congress has provided some $17 billion in supplemental and emergency international
affairs funding to help countries worldwide respond to, and recover from, the COVID-19
pandemic. This total includes funds enacted through the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 116-123); the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic

19 For more information on COVID-19 in the region, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean:
Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan and Peter J. Meyer.
20 Johns Hopkins University & Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” accessed January 1,
2022, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
21 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update: Rising Caseloads, A Disrupted Recovery, and
Higher Inflation, January 2022, p. 5. (Hereinafter: IMF, January 2022).
22 ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2021, January 2022, p. 63.
23 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations et al., Latin America and the Caribbean: Regional
Overview of Food Security and Nutrition, 2021, p. 2.
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Security Act (P.L. 116-136); the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260, Division
K, Title IX); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2). As of November 2021,
according to the State Department, the United States had provided more than $614 million of
supplemental assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, with the vast majority implemented
by USAID (see Table 5).24 These funds are in addition to the base appropriations described
earlier in this report (see Table 1 and Table 2), some of which U.S. agencies have used to support
pandemic response and recovery. Among other activities, U.S. supplemental assistance has
funded efforts to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene; strengthen health systems; and address
economic and social impacts of the pandemic, such as food insecurity and gender-based violence.
Table 5. USAID-Managed Supplemental Assistance for the COVID-19 Response in
Latin America and the Caribbean: Total as of November 2021
(obligations in millions of current U.S. dollars)
Country or Region
U.S. Assistance
Bahamas
0.8
Belize
0.3
Bolivia
10.6
Brazil
47.2
Colombia
89.5
Costa Rica
1.8
Dominican Republic
10.3
Ecuador
37.1
El Salvador
21.8
Guatemala
68.2
Haiti
35.7
Honduras
48.8
Jamaica
7.7
Nicaragua
2.8
Panama
4.8
Paraguay
11.5
Peru
56.7
St. Kitts and Nevis
0.5
Uruguay
1.0
Venezuela
40.0
Caribbean Regional
4.8
Central America Regional
3.2
South America Regional
0.8

24 Testimony of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian A. Nichols, in U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, Migration and International
Economic Policy, The Biden Administration’s Policy Priorities for Latin America and the Caribbean, 117th Cong., 1st
sess., November 16, 2021.
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Country or Region
U.S. Assistance
Latin America and Caribbean Regional
1.4
Total
507.1
Source: USAID, “COVID-19 – Latin America and the Caribbean Response,” Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year 2022,
November 30, 2021, at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Regional_Fact_Sheet_3_-_LAC.pdf.
Notes: USAID figures represent obligations of supplemental assistance as of November 30, 2021. They do not
include any of the funds contributed to Gavi or base or reprogrammed foreign assistance funds used to respond
to COVID-19. The State Department has not released a country-by-country breakdown of its COVID-19
response.
The United States is also supporting vaccination efforts in the region. P.L. 116-260 included $4.0
billion as a contribution to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, which supports the COVID-19 Vaccines
Global Access (COVAX) Facility, a mechanism developed by global health organizations to
facilitate equitable distribution of COVID-19 vaccines. Within Latin America and the Caribbean,
22 countries have signed agreements to purchase vaccines through the facility, and 10 countries—
Bolivia, Dominica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines—are eligible for donor-funded vaccines through the COVID-19
Vaccines Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC).25 In December 2021, the State
Department announced it would contribute $75 million appropriated in P.L. 117-2 to the Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO)—the specialized international health agency of the
Americas—to assist countries with vaccination implementation and monitoring.26 The Biden
Administration also has pledged to donate 1.2 billion vaccine doses globally, both bilaterally and
through the COVAX facility and COVAX AMC.27 As of February 3, 2022, the United States had
delivered more than 57 million doses to 29 Latin American and Caribbean countries.28
Nevertheless, the region continues to face significant challenges. Although South America is
among the most vaccinated regions in the world, 17 Latin American and Caribbean countries had
vaccination rates below the global average of about 53% as of February 3, 2022.29 The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that real gross domestic product (GDP) in Latin
America and the Caribbean grew by 6.8% in 2021, buoyed by global commodity price increases,
but GDP per capita will remain below pre-pandemic levels until 2023.30 Recovery may be

25 Gavi, “COVAX,” May 12, 2021.
26 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “Announcement of ARPA – International Organizations and
Programs (IO&P) Funds,” Fact Sheet, December 21, 2021.
27 White House, “President Biden Announces New Actions to Protect Americans Against the Delta and Omicron
Variants as We Battle COVID-19 This Winter,” press release, December 2, 2021.
28 Testimony of USAID Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean Marcela X.
Escobari, in U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Overview of U.S. Priorities in the Western
Hemisphere: Opportunities, Challenges and the Path Ahead, 117th Cong., 2nd sess., February 3, 2022. The U.S.
Department of State provides additional information on vaccine donations at https://www.state.gov/covid-19-recovery/
vaccine-deliveries/#map_western. This website does not note U.S. vaccine donations to the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and
Trinidad and Tobago.
29 The countries with vaccination rates lower than the global average were Haiti (0.7%), Jamaica (21.1%), St. Vincent
and the Grenadines (24.8%), Saint Lucia (27.9%), Guatemala (32.0%), Grenada (32.8%), Bahamas (38.9%), Guyana
(40.0), Suriname (40.1%), Dominica (40.5%), Paraguay (43.9%), Honduras (45.0%), Bolivia (45.8%), Venezuela
(47.9%), Trinidad and Tobago (49.6%), Barbados (51.2%), and Belize (52.1%). Johns Hopkins University & Medicine,
Coronavirus Resource Center, “Understanding Vaccination Progress,” accessed January 29, 2022, at
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/vaccines/international; and Kejal Vyas, “Latin America Is Now a World Leader in
Vaccinations,” Wall Street Journal, December 25, 2021.
30 IMF, January 2022, p. 5; and IMF, Western Hemisphere Regional Economic Outlook: A Long and Winding Road to
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particularly protracted for tourism-dependent economies in the Caribbean and countries without
widespread vaccine coverage. High public debt levels have led many governments in the region
to begin scaling back income support programs, while their populations continue to contend with
persistently weak labor markets. Such shifts toward austerity have sparked protests in several
countries and could contribute to further instability should socioeconomic conditions deteriorate.
As the appropriations process continues, Congress may consider providing additional pandemic
response and recovery assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean. Given the region’s difficult
situation, its close ties to the United States, and the geopolitical challenge posed by China’s
provision of vaccines to countries throughout the hemisphere, some analysts and Members of
Congress argue the United States should prioritize Latin America and the Caribbean when
allocating vaccine donations and assistance.31 By contrast, some public health advocates have
warned the United States that allocating vaccines based on geopolitical considerations could
prevent vaccines from reaching the areas where they are the most needed; they argue that donors
should channel vaccines through a single mechanism, such as COVAX.32 Neither of the FY2022
SFOPS measures (H.R. 4373 or S. 3075) would specify priority regions for U.S. vaccine
donations, but another bill introduced in the House (H.R. 3236) would direct the President to
prioritize Western Hemisphere countries.
Separate from bilateral foreign assistance channels, Congress also could consider measures to
influence the pandemic responses of international financial institutions. For example, a provision
of H.R. 4373 would direct the U.S. executive directors at each international financial institution to
use the voice and vote of the United States to support the suspension of all debt-service payments
and the relaxation of fiscal targets to ensure governments around the world have sufficient fiscal
space to respond to the pandemic. It also would call for the U.S. executive director at the IMF to
advocate for the issuance of Special Drawing Rights to enable governments to access additional
resources to finance their pandemic responses.33 Other bills (S. 1260, passed by the Senate in
June 2021, and S. 616), would authorize a 10th general capital increase for the Inter-American
Development Bank to help Latin American and Caribbean countries achieve sustainable debt
structures and recover from the pandemic.
Migration Management
For nearly a decade, U.S. policymakers concerned about irregular migration from Central
America to the United States have sought to deter migrant flows with foreign assistance. As noted
above, the Biden Administration’s FY2022 budget request includes $860.6 million “as a first step
toward the President’s four-year commitment of $4 billion to address the root causes of irregular
migration from Central America.”34 Similarly, the SFOPS measures passed by the House (H.R.
4373) and introduced in the Senate (S. 3075) would once again direct the Administration to use
foreign assistance appropriated for Central America to address “factors that contribute to irregular

Recovery, October 2021.
31 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational
Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women’s Issues, Vaccine Diplomacy in Latin
America and the Caribbean: The Importance of Engagement, 117th Cong., 1st sess., November 18, 2021.
32 Erin Banco, “‘It’s a Sore Spot for a Lot of People’: Why Officials Are Raising Questions About Biden’s Vaccine
Donations,” Politico Pro, December 8, 2021.
33 H.R. 4373, §7073. For additional information on Special Drawing Rights, see CRS In Focus IF11835, International
Monetary Fund: Special Drawing Rights Allocation, by Martin A. Weiss and Rebecca M. Nelson.
34 U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year 2022,
June 25, 2021, p. 25.
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migration.”35 Many analysts are skeptical of such efforts, given the limited data available
regarding how previously appropriated aid affected migration trends.36
Academic research provides some evidence that foreign assistance can reduce migration, though
the impact is typically modest and the results vary depending on the type of assistance. For
example, a 2018 study found a 10% increase in assistance to help a country improve governance
and social services would lower that country’s emigration rate by 1.6%.37 Other studies have
found that governance and rural development aid are associated with slight decreases in
emigration rates, whereas other types of assistance are not.38 Alternatively, large and sudden drops
in foreign aid disbursements are associated with increased emigration from aid recipients.39 Fewer
scholars have examined the impact of foreign assistance on asylum trends, but a 2020 study found
a 10% increase in bilateral assistance to a low-income country was followed by a 0.6% reduction
in asylum applications the following year and a 3% decrease in such applications in the long
run.40
Some research shows that economic development assistance is less effective than governance and
social services aid in deterring migration.41 Although observers often assume emigration is a
decision of last resort, studies have found that higher-income individuals are more likely to be
actively preparing to migrate than lower-income individuals in the same country. This appears to
be the result of comparatively poorer individuals facing financial barriers to emigration and many
higher-income individuals viewing emigration as a financial investment.42 Studies across
countries have found that emigration rates tend to increase along with economic growth until
countries reach a certain level of economic development—typically a per capita income of
roughly $10,000 (in purchasing power parity-adjusted 2011 U.S. dollars, 2011 PPP). This is
partially attributable to demographic changes, as economic development may initially spur a large
increase in the youth population, which later dissipates as fertility rates decline.43
These findings suggest foreign assistance alone is unlikely to resolve the challenge posed by
irregular migration from Central America. As of 2018, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador
had per capita GDPs (2011 PPP) of $5,042; $7,402; and $8,598, respectively.44 Whereas El

35 H.R. 4373, §7045(a)(1) and S. 3075, §7045(a)(1).
36 See, for example, Greg Weeks, “USAID in Central America: Less Is Better,” Global Americans, January 10, 2022.
37 Mauro Lanati and Rainer Thiele, “Foreign Assistance and Migration Choices: Disentangling the Channels,”
Economics Letters, vol. 172 (November 2018), pp. 148-151. (Hereinafter: Lanati and Thiele, 2018).
38 Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Targeted Foreign Aid and International Migration: Is Development-Promotion
an Effective Immigration Policy?,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 4 (December 2018), pp. 809-820; and
Jonas Gamso and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Rural Development Aid Reduce International Migration?,” World
Development, vol. 110 (October 2018), pp. 268-282.
39 Jonas Gamso, Jikuo Lu, and Farhod Yuldashev, “Does Foreign Aid Volatility Increase International Migration?,”
Review of International Organizations, vol. 16 (2021), pp. 581-598.
40 Marina Murat, “Foreign Aid, Bilateral Asylum Immigration and Development,” Journal of Population Economics,
vol. 33, no. 1 (2020), pp. 79-114.
41 Lanati and Thiele, 2018.
42 Michael A. Clemens and Mariapia Mendola, Migration from Developing Countries: Selection, Income Elasticity, and
Simpson’s Paradox, Center for Global Development, Working Paper 539, August 2020; and Michael A. Clemens,
“Emigration Rises Along with Economic Development. Aid Agencies Should Face This, But Not Fear It,” Center for
Global Development Blog, August 18, 2020.
43 Michael A. Clemens, The Emigration Life Cycle: How Development Shapes Emigration from Poor Countries, Center
for Global Development, Working Paper 540, August 2020.
44 2018 is the most recent year for which data are available. Jotta Bolt and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Maddison Project
Database, version 2020,” accessed on January 28, 2021.
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Salvador’s youth cohort has begun to shrink, those of Honduras and Guatemala will continue to
grow for the next 5-10 years.45 As a result, emigration rates in the region are likely to continue
increasing in the near term, assuming they follow the typical development pattern. The Biden
Administration’s proposed 53% increase in assistance for Central America in FY2022 could
partially alleviate the situation, particularly if the aid is targeted toward the types of governance,
social services, and rural development programs that have been shown to be the most effective.
Some analysts argue that U.S. assistance programs in Central America should focus on mitigating
the impact of short-term shocks, which can spark sudden migration surges that strain U.S.
resources at the Southwest border.46 For example, Congress could direct foreign assistance funds
toward preparing for and responding to natural disasters; alleviating food insecurity; and
preventing outbreaks of violence in the region. Others argue U.S. assistance efforts in Central
America should remain focused on long-term development objectives and caution against
evaluating programs based on short-term migration trends that are largely outside U.S. agencies’
control.47
Congress also could seek to reduce the challenges posed by irregular migration with measures
aimed at channeling asylum-seekers and other migrants into legal pathways. As part of its
Collaborative Migration Management Strategy, the Biden Administration has reestablished and
expanded the Central American Minors (CAM) refugee and parole program, which reunites
eligible children from the region with their parents in the United States.48 The Administration also
made available 6,000 supplemental H2B temporary nonagricultural visas for nationals of El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in FY2021, and it has reserved 6,500 such visas for nationals
of those countries and Haiti in the first half of FY2022.49 Among other provisions, the U.S.
Citizenship Act (H.R. 1177/S. 348) would establish refugee-processing centers in Central
America and would codify and expand refugee and humanitarian parole programs for individuals
from the region. Some Members of Congress view such measures as counterproductive; these
Members have introduced bills, such as H.R. 4199, which would prohibit funding for the CAM
program.
Congressional Guidance of Security Assistance
Historically, Congress has authorized most security assistance programs under Title 22 of the U.S.
Code (Foreign Relations) and has appropriated funding for such programs through State
Department-managed foreign assistance accounts in annual SFOPS appropriations legislation.
That approach has changed to a certain extent in recent decades, as Congress has provided
numerous security assistance authorities to DOD under Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed
Services) and has appropriated funding for such activities (often referred to as “security
cooperation”) through annual DOD appropriations.50 For example, 10 U.S.C. §333 authorizes

45 Michael A. Clemens, “The Real Root Causes of Americas Border Crisis,” Foreign Affairs, June 7, 2021.
46 Ibid.
47 Sarah Rose et al., Addressing the ‘Root Causes’ of Irregular Migration from Central America: An Evidence Agenda
for USAID, Center for Global Development, Policy Paper 243, December 2021.
48 White House, “Collaborative Migration Management Strategy,” July 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Collaborative-Migration-Management-Strategy.pdf.
49 Ibid; and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “For First Time, DHS to Supplement H-2B Cap with Additional
Visas in First Half of Fiscal Year,” press release, December 20, 2021.
50 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11677, Defense Primer: DOD “Title 10” Security Cooperation, by
Christina L. Arabia.
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DOD, with the State Department’s concurrence, to train and equip foreign security forces for
operations to counter terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illicit drugs, and transnational
organized crime and to maritime and border security, among other purposes.
As a result, many Latin American and Caribbean countries receive training, equipment, and other
support from DOD in addition to the security assistance provided through the SFOPS budget
examined earlier in this report. The U.S. Southern Command asserts that these security
cooperation programs allow the United States to remain engaged with partner militaries and help
these militaries identify and respond to shared threats, such as transnational crime and the malign
influence of external state actors.51 However, such programs may present challenges for
congressional efforts to guide security assistance policy in the region.
Whereas the State Department requests and justifies most of its planned security assistance
expenditures in Latin America and the Caribbean on a country-by-country basis in annual budget
proposals, DOD does not. As part of a broad series of reforms enacted in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2017 (P.L. 114-328), Congress required DOD to submit consolidated
budget requests for its planned security cooperation programs, including the specific country or
region where activities are to be conducted “to the extent practicable.”52 To date, DOD’s budget
requests have included planned expenditures by combatant command areas of responsibility but
no further detail on planned activities or recipient countries. For FY2022, for example, DOD
requested $50.3 million for U.S. Northern Command, which covers Mexico and the Bahamas,
and $164.8 million for U.S. Southern Command, which covers the rest of the Latin American and
Caribbean region. That total is roughly twice as much funding as the Administration requested for
FMF and IMET assistance for the region, but it is unclear how DOD would expend those
resources. DOD asserts that it intends to provide country budgetary information in the future but
doing so “is not currently feasible.”53
This lack of detail regarding planned DOD expenditures may limit Congress’s ability to establish
security assistance priorities in Latin America and the Caribbean during the appropriations
process. Whereas Congress typically designates specific funding levels for the region’s top
security assistance recipients and initiatives in annual SFOPS bills and explanatory statements,
DOD notifies Congress of its planned allocations in tranches over the course of each fiscal year.
Consequently, DOD assistance may significantly increase the total amount of security assistance
provided to some countries and may shift the relative proportion of U.S. assistance dedicated to
militaries versus civilian security forces in the region. At the same time, the lack of congressional
funding directives may provide DOD with the flexibility to respond to security threats and needs
in the region as they arise.
There also are differences in the conditions imposed on State Department-managed and DOD-
managed security assistance for Latin American and Caribbean countries. For example, FY2021
SFOPS legislation (P.L. 116-260, Div. K) prohibited FMF assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras and conditioned 50% of other State Department-managed security assistance for
those countries on their governments combating corruption, protecting human rights, and
addressing a series of other congressional concerns.54 The legislation also tied 20% of FMF and

51 Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, United States Southern Command, “Statement Before the 117th Congress,
Senate Armed Services Committee,” March 16, 2021.
52 10 U.S.C. §381.
53 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Fiscal Year 2022 President’s Budget, Justification
for Security Cooperation Program and Activity Funding, May 2021, p. 66.
54 P.L. 116-260, §7045(a).
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INCLE aid for Colombia and 25% of FMF aid for Mexico to certain human rights and
counternarcotics conditions.55 Neither the FY2021 Department of Defense Appropriations Act
(P.L. 116-260, Div. C) nor the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (NDAA; P.L. 116-
283) imposed any similar restrictions on DOD security cooperation programs in those countries,
with the exception of an NDAA provision requiring DOD to issue a certification prior to
transferring any vehicles to Guatemala.56
Such divergences may weaken the impact of legislative restrictions and may reduce recipient
nations’ incentives to comply with legislative conditions. For example, Congress prohibited FMF
for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and placed conditions on other security assistance for
those countries following a series of human rights violations and anti-democratic actions
committed by security forces in each country.57 Although the State Department has yet to certify
that the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras have met the conditions necessary
to release assistance, DOD has continued to implement security cooperation programs in those
countries.58 At the same time, by attaching different legislative conditions to State Department-
and DOD-managed security assistance, Congress may be able to highlight its concerns while
allowing continued U.S. engagement with partner security forces in the region.

55 P.L. 116-260, §7045(b)(2); and the Explanatory Statement Submitted by Mrs. Lowey, Chairwoman of the House
Committee on Appropriations Regarding the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 133, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, Congressional Record, vol. 166, part No. 218 - Book IV (December 21, 2020), p. H8794.
56 P.L. 116-283, §1299K. In addition to the restrictions imposed in a given fiscal year, all State Department- and DOD-
managed security assistance is subject to the permanent “Leahy Laws,” which prohibit U.S. security assistance to
foreign security forces when there is credible information that a recipient unit has committed a “gross violation of
human rights.” For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10575, Human Rights Issues: Security Forces Vetting
(“Leahy Laws”), by Liana W. Rosen.
57 For examples, see U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Honduras Election Protests Met with
Excessive and Lethal Force – UN Report,” press release, March 12, 2018; Associated Press, “U.S. Suspends Some
Military Aid to Guatemala over Vehicle Use,” March 14, 2019; and Nelson Renteria, “Backed by Soldiers, El
Salvador’s President Briefly Occupies Congress,” Reuters, February 9, 2020.
58 Testimony of Admiral Craig S. Faller, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, in U.S. Congress, House Committee
on Armed Services, National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America, 117th Cong.,
1st sess., April 14, 2021.
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Appendix. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean by Account and by Country or
Regional Program: FY2020-FY2022 Request
Table A-1. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2020
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina
—
—
—
—
2.5
—
0.6
—
3.1
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
1.0
1.2
Brazil
15.0
—
—
4.3
—
—
0.8
—
20.1
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
—
0.6
Colombia
61.0
146.3
3.0
1.5
180.0
21.0
1.8
45.5
460.2
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
7.5
8.2
Cuba
—
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
Dominican Republic
7.0
—
—
21.2
—
—
0.4
—
28.6
Ecuador
12.2
—
—
—
7.0
—
0.3
—
19.5
El Salvador
70.0
—
—
6.2
—
—
0.8
1.9
78.9
Guatemala
65.7
—
13.0
16.5
—
—
0.8
—
95.9
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.1
—
0.1
Haiti
51.0
—
24.5
78.8
18.0
—
0.1
—
172.4
Honduras
65.0
—
—
7.6
—
—
0.8
—
73.4
Jamaica
1.0
—
—
6.7
—
—
0.5
—
8.2
Mexico
—
50.0
—
—
100.0
1.2
1.8
5.0
157.9
Nicaragua
10.0
—
—
1.3
—
—
—
—
11.3
Panama
—
—
—
7.1
—
0.5
0.5
2.0
10.1
Paraguay
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
4.2
Peru
34.8
—
—
1.2
40.0
—
0.6
1.8
78.3
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Trinidad and
—
—
—
1.8
—
—
0.3
—
2.1
Tobago
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
0.4
Venezuela
—
30.0
5.0
3.5
—
—
—
—
38.5
Barbados and
5.0
—
—
0.3
—
—
0.6
—
5.9
Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
7.0
3.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
Developmenta
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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
USAID Central
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
5.0
Americaa
USAID South
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
Americaa
USAID Latin
29.2
—
7.8
—
—
—
—
—
37.0
America and
Caribbeana
State Western
—
128.3
—
—
207.7
4.6
—
15.0
355.6
Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[—] [100.0]
[—]
[—]
[170.0]
[—]
[—]
[—]
[270.0]
[CBSI]a
[—]
[27.3]
[—]
[—]
[25.2]
[—]
[—]
[7.5]
[60.0]
Total
457.8
377.6b
53.3
157.7
555.2
27.3
13.1
79.7 1,721.7b
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June 2021.
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)
pandemic. DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs;
INCLE = International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism,
Demining, and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military
Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI =
Central America Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as wel as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through
the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2020 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
Table A-2. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Estimate
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Argentina
—
—
—
—
0.1
—
0.6
—
0.7
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
1.0
1.3
Brazil
17.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
17.7
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
—
0.5
Colombia
70.0
141.0
2.0
—
189.0
21.0
1.9
38.5
463.3
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
7.5
8.2
Cuba
—
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
Dominican Republic
6.9
—
—
23.3
—
—
0.5
—
30.7
Ecuador
11.5
—
—
—
7.0
—
0.3
—
23.8
El Salvador
70.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
70.7
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GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF
Total
Guatemala
65.7
—
13.0
—
—
—
0.8
—
79.4
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Haiti
51.0
—
24.5
99.8
13.0
—
0.3
—
188.6
Honduras
65.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
65.8
Jamaica
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
—
1.6
Mexico
—
50.0
—
—
100.0
1.2
1.8
6.0
158.9
Nicaragua
10.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.7
2.0
3.2
Paraguay
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
4.4
Peru
43.0
—
—
—
39.0
1.0
0.6
—
83.6
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Trinidad and Tobago
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
—
0.3
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
0.4
Venezuela
—
33.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
38.0
Barbados and
2.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
2.7
Eastern Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
10.3
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.3
Developmenta
USAID Central
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
5.0
Americaa
USAID South
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
Americaa
USAID Latin
43.2
—
11.0
—
—
—
—
—
54.2
America and
Caribbeana
State Western
—
134.5
—
72.7
204.9
7.4
—
16.9
436.4
Hemispherea
[CARSI]a
[—] [101.0]
[—]
[—]
[155.0]
[—]
[—]
[—] [256.0]
[CBSI]a
[—]
[27.3]
[—]
[—]
[35.0]
[—]
[—]
[7.5]
[69.8]
Total
490.6
378.5b
55.5
195.9
553.0
31.0
13.8
76.9 1,795.2
Source: U.S. Department of State, FY2021 estimate data, June 15, 2021.
Notes: These totals do not include any of the assistance made available for Latin America and the Caribbean
through supplemental emergency appropriations to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. DA = Development
Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE = International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs;
IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing; USAID = U.S. Agency for
International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America Regional Security
Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. CARSI and CBSI are funded through
the State Western Hemisphere Regional program.
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b. This amount does not include an additional $5.0 mil ion of ESF for the region that Congress appropriated in
FY2021 as multilateral assistance through the Organization of American States.
Table A-3. State Department- and USAID-Managed Foreign Assistance to Latin
America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Request
(millions of current U.S. dollars)
GHP-
GHP-

DA
ESF
USAID
State
INCLE NADR IMET FMF Total
Argentina
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
0.7
Bahamas
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Belize
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
—
0.3
Brazil
17.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
17.8
Chile
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
—
0.5
Colombia
70.0 141.0
5.0
—
175.0
21.0
1.9
40.0
453.9
Costa Rica
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
0.7
Cuba
—
20.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.0
Dominican Republic
8.0
—
—
20.0
—
—
0.5
—
28.5
Ecuador
13.0
—
—
—
10.5
—
0.3
5.0
28.8
El Salvador
95.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
95.8
Guatemala
113.7
—
13.0
—
—
—
0.8
—
127.5
Guyana
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Haiti
51.0
—
24.5
100.0
12.1
—
0.3
—
187.9
Honduras
95.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
—
95.8
Jamaica
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
—
1.6
Mexico
—
50.0
—
—
64.0
1.0
1.6
—
116.6
Nicaragua
15.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
15.0
Panama
—
—
—
—
—
0.5
0.7
—
1.2
Paraguay
4.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
4.4
Peru
39.0
—
—
—
46.2
1.0
0.7
—
86.9
Suriname
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
0.2
Trinidad and Tobago
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.3
—
0.3
Uruguay
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.4
—
0.4
Venezuela
—
50.0
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
55.0
Barbados and Eastern
5.0
—
—
—
—
—
0.7
—
5.7
Caribbean
USAID Caribbean
10.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
10.0
Developmenta
USAID Central
73.1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
73.1
Americaa
USAID South
20.2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20.2
Americaa
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link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 link to page 29 U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2022 Appropriations

USAID Latin America and
29.2
35.0 11.0
—
—
—
—
—
75.2
Caribbeana
State Central Americaa
—
131.0
—
43.6
219.7
2.0
—
27.5
423.8
State Western Hemispherea
—
28.3
—
26.4
43.0
5.5
—
22.5
125.7
[CARSI]a
[—] [123.0] [—]
[—] [219.7] [—] [—]
[—] [342.7]
[CBSI]a
[—]
[27.0] [—]
[—]
[29.0] [—] [—] [10.0]
[66.0]
Total
659.1
455.3 58.5 190.0
570.4 31.0 14.1
95.0 2,073.4
Source: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations, Appendix 2, Fiscal Year
2022, June 2021.
Notes: DA = Development Assistance; ESF = Economic Support Fund; GHP = Global Health Programs; INCLE
= International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF = Foreign Military Financing;
USAID = U.S. Agency for International Development; State=U.S. Department of State; CARSI = Central America
Regional Security Initiative; and CBSI = Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
a. USAID and State Department regional programs fund region-wide initiatives as well as activities that cross
borders or take place in nonpresence countries. These regional programs provide the majority of U.S.
assistance received by some Latin American and Caribbean countries. Under the FY2022 request, CARSI
would be funded through the State Central America regional program and CBSI would be funded through
the State Western Hemisphere regional program.

Author Information

Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs

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