Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy
January 8, 2021
and Issues in the 116th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan,
The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean
Coordinator
based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and
Specialist in Latin
security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment
American Affairs
for many countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with

11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; proximity
June S. Beittel
and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration. Curbing the flow of
Analyst in Latin American
illicit drugs has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region for more than four
Affairs
decades and currently involves close security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the

Caribbean. U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the region has been long-standing,
with current focus on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Overall, although the region has made
Peter J. Meyer
significant advances over the past four decades in terms of both political and economic
Specialist in Latin
development, notable challenges remain and some countries have experienced major setbacks,
American and Canadian
most prominently Venezuela. The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has had
Affairs

widespread economic, social, and political effects in the region. By the end of 2020, the region
reported over 507,000 deaths (almost 28% of deaths worldwide).
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean generally
American Affairs
moved toward a more confrontational approach from one of engagement and partnership during

past Administrations. Since FY2018, the Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for the
Maureen Taft-Morales
region would have cut assistance levels significantly. To deter increased unauthorized migration
Specialist in Latin
from Central America, the Administration used a variety of immigration policy tools as well as
American Affairs
aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on remittances. Among trade issues,

President Trump strongly criticized and repeatedly threatened to withdraw from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); this led to negotiation of the new United States-
M. Angeles Villarreal
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The Trump Administration also imposed broad economic
Specialist in International
sanctions on Venezuela and shifted U.S. policy toward Cuba away from engagement and toward
Trade and Finance

sanctions, especially on travel and remittances.

Congressional Action in the 116th Congress. Congress traditionally has played an active role in
policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. The 116th Congress did not
approve the Trump Administration’s downsized foreign aid budget requests for the region for FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and
FY2020 (P.L. 116-94),and instead provided aid amounts roughly similar to those provided in recent years. For FY2021, in
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), approved in December 2020, Congress again provided foreign aid
funding for key initiatives and countries in the region at amounts higher than requested. The FY2021 measure also included
the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (the House approved an earlier version, H.R. 2615, in July
2019) and the United States-Mexico Economic Partnership Act.
In other completed legislative action, Congress approved the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and
Development Act of 2019 (Division J of P.L. 116-94) in December 2019, which, among its provisions, codified several types
of sanctions imposed and authorized humanitarian assistance. In January 2020, Congress completed action on implementing
legislation (P.L. 116-113) for the USMCA, but before final agreement, the trade agreement was amended to address several
congressional concerns. In September 2020, Congress approved legislation (P.L. 116-164) providing a 10-year extension,
through September 2030, of tariff preferences in the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, currently benefitting eight
Caribbean countries. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-92), approved in December 2019,
included provisions on Venezuela and Guatemala and reporting requirements on Brazil, Honduras, Central America, and
Mexico. The FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283), enacted over a presidential veto in January 2021, included provisions or
reporting requirements on Guatemala, drug interdiction in the region, the Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and
Venezuela. In addition, Congress approved the Organization of American States Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L.
116-343) at the end of December 2020 to strengthen the participation of elected national legislators in the activities of the
Organization of American States (OAS) and reaffirm U.S. support for OAS human rights and anti-corruption initiatives.
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The House and Senate also approved several resolutions on a range of issues; S.Res. 35 and S.Res. 447 on the political
situation in Bolivia; H.Res. 441 and S.Res. 277, commemorating the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual
Association in Buenos Aires; H.Res. 754 and S.Res. 525 expressing support for democracy and human rights in Nicaragua;
and S.Res. 454, calling for the release of a Cuban democracy activist. Congressional committees held over 25 oversight
hearings on the region in the 116th Congress (see Appendix).
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Contents
Political and Economic Situation amid COVID-19 ............................................................... 1
Political Conditions ................................................................................................... 6
Economic Conditions ................................................................................................. 9
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean ......................................................... 12
Trump Administration Policy..................................................................................... 13
Congress and Policy Toward the Region...................................................................... 15
Regional U.S. Policy Issues ............................................................................................ 18
U.S. Foreign Aid ..................................................................................................... 18
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs ......................................................................... 20
Trade Policy ........................................................................................................... 23
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................... 26
Selected Country and Subregional Issues .......................................................................... 29
The Caribbean......................................................................................................... 29
Caribbean Regional Issues ................................................................................... 29
Cuba ................................................................................................................ 32
Haiti ................................................................................................................. 34
Mexico and Central America ..................................................................................... 37
Mexico ............................................................................................................. 37
Central America’s Northern Triangle ..................................................................... 39
Nicaragua.......................................................................................................... 41
South America ........................................................................................................ 43
Argentina .......................................................................................................... 43
Bolivia.............................................................................................................. 45
Brazil ............................................................................................................... 46
Colombia .......................................................................................................... 47
Venezuela.......................................................................................................... 50
Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 51

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean............................................................... 3
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries ........................................... 30
Figure 3. Map of Central America.................................................................................... 39

Tables
Table 1. COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) .................... 2
Table 2. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts .............................................. 4
Table 3. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2018-2021 .................................. 10
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2021 ..................... 19
Table 5. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012-
2019......................................................................................................................... 24

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Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 116th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean....................................................................................................... 53

Appendixes
Appendix. Hearings in the 116th Congress ......................................................................... 53

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 55


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Political and Economic Situation amid COVID-19
With 33 countries—ranging from the Caribbean nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s
smal est states, to the South American giant of Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country—the Latin
American and Caribbean region has made significant advances over the past four decades in
terms of both political and economic development. (See Figure 1 and Table 2 for a map and
basic facts on the region’s countries.) Notable political and economic chal enges remain,
however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks, most prominently Venezuela,
which has descended into dictatorship and economic collapse.
In 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic had widespread public health,
economic, social, and political effects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. As discussed
below, before the pandemic, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast a modest recovery
of 1.6% economic growth in 2020; as of October 2020, it was projecting an economic decline of
8.1%, the worst on record, with almost every country in the region in deep recession.1 Mil ions of
people are expected to fal into poverty, and many countries in the region may struggle with
protracted economic recoveries, given that they rely on global investment, trade, and tourism that
has been significantly affected by the pandemic (see “Economic Conditions,” below.) Political y,
observers have expressed concerns about leaders taking advantage of the emergency health
situation to limit civil liberties for political gain (see “Political Conditions,” below).
As of December 31, 2020, the region had some 15.6 mil ion confirmed cases (almost 19% of
cases worldwide) and over 507,000 deaths (almost 28% of deaths worldwide). Brazil, Mexico,
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru had the highest numbers of deaths in the region, and Brazil had
the highest death toll worldwide after the United States. The rankings change in terms of per
capita deaths—Peru had the highest recorded deaths per capita in the region, followed by Mexico,
Argentina, Panama, and Brazil (see Table 1).2 In December 2020, Brazil, Mexico, and Panama
were experiencing a second surge in cases, and cases also were rising sharply in Panama and
several South American countries; some observers are concerned about a potential post-Christmas
surge throughout the region in early 2021 as countries let their guards down over the holidays.3 A
University of Washington COVID-19 projection model, updated December 23, 2020, estimates
that deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean could reach more than 657,000 by April 1, 2021.4
Experts and observers have expressed concern that some countries, such as Mexico, Nicaragua,
and Venezuela, are significantly undercounting their death tolls. Many observers have expressed
special concern for Venezuela, where the health care system was collapsing prior to the pandemic.
(See CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19.)
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) has played a major role in supporting countries
in preventing, detecting, and responding to the pandemic. When the pandemic first began to surge
in the region in May 2020, PAHO Director Dr. Carissa Etienne expressed concern about the poor

1 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020 and October 2020.
2 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” January 1, 2021,
3:00 AM, updated daily, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
3 Juan Montes and Samantha Pearson, “New COVID-19 Surge Sweeps Across Latin America,” Wall Street Journal,
December 19, 2020; “Panama Orders Men and Women to Shop on Different Days to Curb Coronavirus,” Reuters
News, December 19, 2020; and “A Pandemic Christmas Season in Latin America,” Latin America Risk Report,
December 14, 2020.
4 4 University of Washington, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, COVID-19 Projections, updated December
23, 2020, at https://covid19.healthdata.org/global/latin-america-and-caribbean?view=total-deaths&tab=trend.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk, including those living in cities, towns, and remote
communities in the Amazon Basin (including indigenous communities); people of African
descent; migrants in temporary settlements; and prisoners in crowded jails. In July 2020, PAHO
issued an alert urging countries to intensify efforts to prevent further spread of the virus among
indigenous communities in the Americas.5
PAHO also is helping countries prepare for a successful rollout of vaccines and facilitating access
to vaccines under the COVAX (COVID-19 Global Vaccine Access) Facility developed by the
World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and GAVI, the
Vaccine Al iance.6 Low- and lower-middle-income countries in the region wil be eligible for
assistance in obtaining vaccines through the GAVI COVAX Advance Market Commitment.
Analysts caution, however, that some countries in the region could face significant hurdles in
procuring vaccines in a timely manner, with vaccines potential y not widely available until 2022.7
Table 1. COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)
(countries with more than 2,000 deaths, as of December 31, 2020)
Cases
Deaths per
Country
(millions)
Deaths
100,000
Brazil
7.676
194,949
93.07
Mexico
1.426
125,807
99.70
Argentina
1.626
43,245
97.19
Colombia
1.643
43,213
87.04
Peru
1.015
37,680
117.79
Chile
.609
16,608
88.67
Ecuador
.213
14.034
82.15
Bolivia
.160
9,165
80.73
Guatemala
.138
4,813
27.90
Panama
.247
4.022
96.29
Honduras
.122
3,130
32.65
Dominican Republic
.171
2,414
22.72
Paraguay
.108
2,262
32.52
Costa Rica
.169
2,185
43.70
Total LAC
15.580
507,760

United States
19.968
345,737
105.68
Source: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,”
January 1, 2021, 3:00 AM, updated daily, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.

5 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of
COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 19, 2020. “ PAHO Calls on Countries to Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further
Spread of COVID-19 Among Indigenous Peoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020.
6 PAHO, “ PAHO to Support Countries in Facing the Challenges and Cost of a Future COVID-19 Vaccine,” press
release, November 18, 2020.
7“Americas Politics: Latam Faces Drawn-out Vaccine Rollout,” EIU ViewsWire, December 18, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics.
Notes: Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American
countries are in green. Although Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located in
South America, al three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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Table 2. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts
GDP
GDP Per
(2019
Capita
Population
est.,
(2019
Area
(2019
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
Leader (elected/next election)
Caribbean
Antigua &
171
97
1.7
17,195
Gaston Browne (March 2018/by
Barbuda
March 2023)
Bahamas
5,359
381
13.6
35,664
Hubert Minnis (May 2017/by May
2022)
Barbados
166
287
5.2
18,139
Mia Mottley (May 2018/ by May
2023)
Belizea
8,867
408
1.8
4,498
Juan Antonio “Johnny” Briceño
(Nov. 11, 2020/by 2025)
Cuba
42,803
11,333
100.0

Miguel Díaz-Canel (April 2018/

(2018)
2023)b
Dominica
290
71
0.6
8,305
Roosevelt Skerrit (Dec. 2019/by
Dec. 2024)
Dominican
18,792
10,358
89.0
8,596
Luis Abinader (July 2020/ 2024)
Republic
Grenada
133
109
1.2
11,193
Keith Mitchel (March 2018/by
March 2023)
Guyanaa
83,000
785
5.2
6,594
Irfaan Ali (March 2, 2020/2025)c
Haiti
10,714
11,263
8.7
773
Jovenel Moïse (Nov. 2016/ TBD)
Jamaica
4,244
2,726
15.9
5,826
Andrew Holness (Sept. 3, 2020/ by
February 2025)
St. Kitts &
101
57
1.1
18,854
Timothy Harris (June 2020/by June
Nevis
2025)
St. Lucia
238
180
2.1
11,803
Al en Chastanet (June 2016/by June
2021)
St. Vincent &
150
110
0.8
7,464
Ralph Gonsalves (Nov. 5, 2020/by
the
2025)
Grenadines
Surinamea
63,251
597
3.7
6,191
Chandrikapersad “Chan” Santokhi
(May 2020/May 2025)
Trinidad &
1,980
1,395
24.1
17,276
Keith Rowley (August 2020/by
Tobago
2025)
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
758,449
127,576
1,258.2
9,862
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (July
2018/July 2024)
Costa Rica
19,730
5,075
62.1
12,244
Carlos Alvarado (Feb. & April
2018/Feb. 2022)
El Salvador
8,124
6,454
27.0
4,187
Nayib Bukele (Feb. 2019/Feb. 2024)
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GDP
GDP Per
(2019
Capita
Population
est.,
(2019
Area
(2019
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
Leader (elected/next election)
Guatemala
42,042
17,613
76.7
4,354
Alejandro Giammattei (June &
August 2019/2023)
Honduras
43,278
9,770
24.9
2,551
Juan Orlando Hernández (Nov.
2017/Nov. 2021)
Nicaragua
50,336
6,528
12.5
1,920
Daniel Ortega (Nov. 2015/Nov.
2021)
Panama
29,120
4,219
66.8
15,834
Laurentino Cortizo (May 2019/May
2024)
South America
Argentina
1,073,518
44,939
444.4
9,890
Alberto Fernández (Oct. 2019/Oct.
2023)
Bolivia
424,164
11,550
41.2
3,566
Luis Arce (Oct. 18, 2020/2025)d
Brazil
3,287,957
210,147
1,839.0
8,751
Jair Bolsonaro (Oct. 2018/Oct.
2022)
Chile
291,932
19,107
282.3
14,772
Sebastián Piñera (Nov. 2017/Nov.
2021)
Colombia
439,736
50,374
323.6
6,423
Iván Duque (May & June 2018/May
2022)
Ecuador
109,484
17,268
107.4
6,222
Lenín Moreno (Feb. & April
2017/Feb. 7, 2021)
Paraguay
157,048
7,153
37.4
5,233
Mario Abdo Benítez (April
2018/April 2023)
Peru
496,225
33,162
230.7
6,958
Francisco Sagasti (April & June
2016/April 11, 2021)e
Uruguay
68,037
3,519
56.7
16,111
Luis Lacal e Pou (Oct. & Nov.
2019/Oct. 2024)
Venezuela
352,144
27,817
63.7
2,299
Nicolás Maduro (May 2018/May
2024)f
Sources: Area statistics are from the Central Intel igence Agency’s World Factbook, with square kilometers
converted into square miles. Population and economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. Since the IMF database does not include economic statistics on
Cuba, population and gross domestic product (GDP) statistics for Cuba are from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators databank.
a. Geographical y, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern
coast of South America, but al three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and are
therefore listed under the Caribbean region.
b. Cuba does not have direct elections for its head of government. Instead, Cuba’s legislature selects the
president of the republic for a five-year term.
c. The government of President David Granger in Guyana lost a no-confidence vote in the country’s
legislature in December 2018. New elections were held on March 2, 2020, but al egations of fraud, a
recount, and numerous legal chal enges delayed the declaration of official results until August 2, 2020. See
CRS In Focus IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sul ivan.
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d. Bolivian President Evo Morales resigned on November 10, 2019, after weeks of protests and violence
al eging fraud in the October 20, 2019, presidential election. Opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez became
interim president on November 12, 2019. New presidential elections were delayed but ultimately held
October 18, 2020. See CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
e. Martin Vizcarra took office in March 2018 upon the resignation of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who faced
impeachment. Vizcarra was impeached on November 9, 2020, succeeded by Manuel Merino until he
resigned after six days. Amid pro-democracy demonstrations, Congress selected Francisco Sagasti to serve
out the remainder of the presidential term ending in July 2021.
f.
Venezuela’s May 2018 elections were characterized by widespread fraud. The United States and over 50
other countries recognize Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of
Venezuela.
Political Conditions
In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes governed 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries,
both on the left and the right. Today, three countries in the region—Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela—are ruled by authoritarian governments.8 Most governments in the region today are
elected democracies. Although free and fair elections have become the norm, recent elections in
several countries have been controversial and contested. In 2019, Argentina, Dominica, El
Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay held successful free and fair elections. Guatemala held two
presidential election rounds in June and August 2019 that international observers judged to be
successful, but the elections suffered because several popular candidates were disqualified from
the race on dubious grounds.
In Bolivia, severe irregularities in the conduct of the country’s October 2019 presidential
elections ignited protests and violence that led to the resignation of incumbent President Evo
Morales, who was seeking a fourth term. New elections under Interim President Jeanine Áñez
were scheduled for May 3, 2020, but were postponed twice because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
International criticism of Bolivia’s interim government grew because of al eged human rights
violations and the curtailment of civil liberties. Ultimately, elections were held October 18, 2020,
and Luis Arce, Morales’s former finance minister won with 55% of the vote. (See “Bolivia”
section below and CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections.)
In 2020, eight Caribbean countries held elections.
Guyana held elections on March 2, 2020, that were marred by al egations of
fraud. After a recount and multiple legal chal enges by supporters of the
government of President David Granger, final results were not issued until
August 2, 2020, with opposition candidate Mohamed Irfaan Ali of the People’s
Progressive Party/Civic sworn in as president. (See CRS In Focus IF11381,
Guyana: An Overview.)
 In Suriname, legislative elections took place on May 25, 2020, with the
opposition Progressive Reform Party (VHP) winning the most seats in the
country’s 51-member National Assembly. Under Suriname’s system of
government, the president is elected indirectly by a two-thirds majority vote of
the legislature. On July 13, the National Assembly elected VHP leader

8 See T he Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2019, January 2020 (hereinafter cited as EIU,
Dem ocracy Index, 2019), which classifies all three governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020, March 2020, which classifies all three governments as not free based on
their poor records on political rights and civil liberties. For additional background, see CRS Report R46016,
Dem ocracy in Latin Am erica and the Caribbean: A Com pilation of Selected Indices, by Carla Y. Davis-Castro.
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Chandrikapersad “Chan” Santokhi as president, succeeding longtime ruler Desi
Bouterse and beginning a new political era for Suriname. Since 2010, Bouterse
had been elected president three times; prior to that, he overthrew elected
governments in 1980 and 1990. He was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands
in 1999 for drug trafficking, and in November 2019 he was convicted in
Suriname for the 1982 kil ing of 15 political opponents.
 In the Dominican Republic, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in elections being
moved from May 17 to July 5, 2020. Opposition candidate Luis Abinader of the
Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) defeated the candidate of the ruling
Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), which has held the presidency and legislature
since 2004. The PRM also won a Senate majority and a plurality in the Chamber
of Deputies. (See CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic.)
 Between June and November 2020, incumbent leaders and ruling parties won
parliamentary elections held in St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago,
Jamaica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. St. Kitts and Nevis held
elections on June 5, in which Prime Minister Timothy Harris led a three-party
coalition known as Team Unity to its second electoral victory since 2015.
Trinidad and Tobago held elections on August 10, and Prime Minister Keith
Rowley of the ruling People’s National Movement was returned to power for his
second term since 2015. Jamaica held elections on September 3, with the ruling
Jamaica Labour Party, led by Prime Minister Andrew Holness, winning in a
landslide for a second term against the opposition People’s National Party. St.
Vincent and the Grenadines held elections on November 5 in which Prime
Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves of the Unity Labour Party won a fifth straight
term.
Belize held parliamentary elections on November 11 in which the opposition
center-left People’s United Party led by Johnny Briceño won in a landslide
against the long-ruling center-right United Democratic Party, whose candidate
was former Deputy Prime Minister Patrick Faber. Outgoing Prime Minister Dean
Barrow had led the government since 2008 but chose not to run for reelection.
Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many
countries in the region stil face considerable chal enges. In a number of countries, weaknesses
remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability and transparency,
advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. There are numerous examples of
elected presidents who have left office early amid severe social turmoil and economic crises, the
presidents’ own autocratic actions contributing to their ouster, or high-profile corruption. In
addition to Morales’s resignation in 2019, corruption scandals either caused or contributed to
several presidents’ resignations or removals—Guatemala in 2015, Brazil in 2016, and Peru in
2018.
Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several
countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises, raising
concerns among some observers.9 For example, in February 2020 in El Salvador, President Nayib
Bukele used the military in an effort to intimidate the country’s legislature into approving an anti-

9 See “Latin America’s 21st-Century Militaries,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 12-72.
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crime bil ; the action elicited strong criticism in El Salvador and abroad, with concerns centered
on the politicization of the military and the separation of powers.10
The quality of democracy has eroded in several countries over the past several years. The
Economist Intel igence Unit’s (EIU’s) 2019 democracy index shows a steady regional decline in
democratic practices in Latin America since 2017. Several years ago only Cuba was viewed as an
authoritarian regime, but Venezuela joined its ranks in 2017 as President Nicolás Maduro’s
government violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua escalated authoritarian
practices in 2018 under long-time President Daniel Ortega, as the government violently repressed
protests. The continued regional downward trend in 2019 stemmed from Bolivia’s post-election
crisis and to a lesser extent by setbacks in the following other countries: Guatemala, where the
government ousted the anti-corruption body known as the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala; Haiti, which experienced widespread anti-government protests against
corruption and deteriorating economic conditions; and Guyana, with the delay of elections
following a no-confidence vote by the legislature in December 2018.11
Public satisfaction with how democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of
democracy in the region. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey,
the percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries
averaged 39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level of satisfaction since the poll
began in 2004.12 Given these trends, the eruption of social protests in many countries around the
region in 2019 was unsurprising, but in each country a unique set of circumstances sparked the
protests. In addition to the protests in Bolivia and Haiti cited above, protests broke out in Ecuador
over fuel price increases, in Chile over pent-up frustration over social inequities, and in Colombia
over opposition to a range of government policies and proposals, from tax reform to education to
peace accord implementation.
Although each country is unique, several broad political and economic factors appear to be
driving the decline in satisfaction with democracy in the region. Political factors include an
increase in authoritarian practices, weak democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems,
corruption, high levels of crime and violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence
state institutions. Economic factors include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates
over the past several years; high levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries;
increased poverty; and the inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and
advancement opportunities, along with increased pressure on the region’s previously expanding
middle class.13 The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these factors, which could lead to
further deterioration in political conditions and stoke social unrest in the region.

10 See Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Armed Forces, Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different – and Worrying,”
Am ericas Quarterly, February 13, 2020; and Christine Wade, “ Bukele’s Politicization of the Military Revives Old
Fears in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, February 12, 2020.
11 EIU, Democracy Index 2019.
12 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt
University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019.
13 See, for example, the following studies and articles discussing social unrest in Latin America: EIU, Where Next and
What Next for Latin Am erica?
, December 2019; Michael Mantera and Maria de Lourdes Despradel, Latin Am erica and
the Caribbean in the New Decade, How Did We Get There?
, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January
2020; Michael Shifter, “T he Rebellion Against the Elites in Latin America,” New York Times, January 21, 2020; and
Eric Farnsworth, “In a Season of Discontent, Are Latin American Democracies at Risk?,” World Politics Review,
December 6, 2019.
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Human rights groups and other observers have expressed concerns about leaders taking advantage
of the pandemic to advance their own agenda and restrict freedom of expression. In El Salvador,
critics accuse President Bukele of exploiting the health crisis to pursue his aggressive anti-gang
policies. In Bolivia, the interim government twice postponed presidential elections, prompting
widespread protests, until elections were held successfully in October 2020. In Venezuela, the
government and security forces have used a state of emergency imposed to curb the spread of the
virus as an excuse to crack down on dissent. In December 2020, Human Rights Watch issued a
report documenting how the Cuban government has used regulations designed to prevent the
spread of COVID-19 to harass and imprison government opponents.14
In August 2020, the Inter-American Dialogue published a report with the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression at the Organization of American States (OAS) expressing concern about
the criminalization of free speech in the region related to governments’ responses to the
pandemic, restrictions on pandemic-related reporting, and stigmatization of media organizations
by some leaders for reporting on the pandemic. The report also documented restrictions on access
to public information related to COVID-19 in a number of countries in the region.15
Economic Conditions
Even before the onset of COVID-19 and its economic effects, Latin America and the Caribbean
experienced several years of slow economic growth. Beginning around 2015, the global decline
in commodity prices significantly affected the region, as did China’s economic slowdown and its
reduced appetite for imports from the region. According to the IMF, the region experienced an
economic contraction of 0.6% in 2016, dragged down by recessions in Argentina and Brazil and
by Venezuela’s severe economic deterioration as oil prices fel . From 2017 to 2019, the region
registered only marginal growth rates, including an estimated growth rate of 0.03% in 2019.
Regional growth in 2019 was suppressed by the collapse of much of the Venezuelan economy,
which contracted 35%, and by continued recession in Argentina, which suffered an economic
contraction of 2.1%.16
The reduction in economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic led to significant
economic decline for the region, with negative ramifications for its economic development
outlook. Compounding the problem was an historic drop in the price of oil (caused by
disagreements among producers over production cuts) beginning in late February 2020; the fiscal
accounts of countries dependent on proceeds from oil sales (Venezuela and Ecuador in particular,
and to a lesser extent Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) deteriorated rapidly.17
In early 2020, the IMF projected regional growth would reach 1.6% during the year, led by
recovery in Brazil and spurred by growth forecasts of 3% or higher for Chile, Colombia, and
Peru; however, with the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF altered its 2020 forecast and is now
predicting the worst economic downturn on record for the region. In October 2020, the IMF
estimated a regional contraction of 8.1% in 2020, with almost al countries experiencing deep

14 Human Rights Watch, “Cuba: COVID-19 Rules Used to Intensify Repression,” December 7, 2020.
15 Catharine Christe, Edison Lanza, and Michael Camilleri, COVID-19 and Freedom of Expression in the Americas,
Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020.
16 Economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, October
2020.
17 Mauricio Cárdenas, “T he Impact of Coronavirus and the Oil Price War on Latin America,” State of the Planet, Earth
Institute, Columbia University, March 18, 2020. Also see CRS Report R46270, Global Econom ic Effects of COVID-19,
coordinated by James K. Jackson.
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recessions and the region’s six largest economies forecast to contract between 5.8% and 13.9%
(see Table 3). Caribbean nations that depend on tourism face deep economic recessions, several
with projected gross domestic product declines wel over 10% in 2020, according to the IMF.18
The IMF is forecasting a regional recovery of 3.6% in 2021, reflecting the normalization of
economic activity from very low levels in response to COVID-19. This rebound, however,
depends largely on the course of the pandemic, governments’ responses, and the availability and
distribution of vaccines in the region. The rebound forecast for the region lags behind the world
economic growth forecast of 5.2% in 2021 and behind expected economic recoveries in several
other regions (such as Europe and Asia).19
Table 3. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2018-2021
(annual percentage change)
Regional Average
and Six Largest

2019
2020
2021
Economies
2018
estimate
projection
projection
Latin America and the
1.1
0.0
-8.1
3.6
Caribbean
Brazil
1.3
1.1
-5.8
2.8
Mexico
2.2
-0.3
-9.0
3.5
Argentina
-2.6
-2.1
-11.8
4.9
Colombia
2.5
3.3
-8.2
4.0
Chile
4.0
1.1
-6.0
4.5
Peru
4.0
2.2
-13.9
7.3
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, October 2020.
The decline in economic growth in 2020 is expected to increase income inequality and poverty in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America already was the most unequal region in the
world in terms of income inequality, according to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Despite an easing of income inequality in the region from
2002 to 2014, reductions in income inequality had slowed since 2015. ECLAC projects that
inequality wil rise in al countries in the region in 2020, with the worst results in some of the
region’s largest economies—Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.20
The level of poverty in the region, after having decreased significantly from 2002 through 2014,
has increased over the past five years. In 2014, 27.8% of the region’s population lived in poverty;
that figure increased to 30.3% by 2019, with an estimated 186 mil ion people living in poverty,
according to ECLAC. According to a July 2020 U.N. report, as a result of the pandemic, poverty
is expected to increase to 37.2% in 2020, with an increase of 45 mil ion people moving into
poverty, resulting in a total of 230 mil ion people in the region in poverty.21

18 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020; and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020.
19 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020.
20 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America
2019
, December 2019, and The Social Challenge in Tim es of COVID-19, May 12, 2020.
21 U.N. ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2019, December 2019; and United Nations, Policy Brief: The
Im pact of COVID-19 on Latin Am erica and the Caribbean
, July 9, 2020.
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A chal enge for the region’s economic recovery is the high rate of informality in the labor market
of many Latin American countries (reportedly about half of workers in Latin America work in the
informal economy). As the World Bank notes, many workers are self-employed and many are
paid under the table, living paycheck to paycheck; such characteristics make it more difficult for
governments to design programs that reach and provide adequate assistance to these w orkers.22
In April 2020, the World Bank predicted remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean would
decline by 19.3% in 2020.23 However, by June and July 2020, remittances began to rebound in
many countries in the region, including in Central America and Mexico, which had a record
increase for the year.24
Although a number of countries in the region have implemented stimulus programs to help
protect their economies and vulnerable populations, most countries have needed external
financing to respond to the pandemic and associated economic downturn. In response, the
international financial institutions increased lending to countries throughout the region.
 The IMF reported, as of December 21, 2020, that it had approved $63.8 bil ion in
lending to 21 countries in the region contending with the pandemic’s economic
impact, including $23.9 bil ion for Chile, $16.9 bil ion for Colombia, $11 bil ion
for Peru, and $7.1 bil ion for Ecuador.25
 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reported that as of December 21,
2020, its response to the pandemic in the region totaled nearly $8.1 bil ion,
focused on financing for immediate public-health needs, safety nets for
vulnerable populations, economic productivity and employment, and fiscal
measures to help mitigate economic impacts.26 On December 16, 2020, the IDB
announced it would mobilize an additional $1 bil ion to help countries acquire
and distribute COVID-19 vaccines, working closely with PAHO and other
institutions.27
 The World Bank reported, as of December 17, 2020, it delivered $7.4 bil ion in
COVID-19 related loans and grants to 21 countries in the region, with support
focused on minimizing the loss of life, strengthening health systems and disease
surveil ance, mitigating the pandemic’s economic impact, and addressing supply-
chain issues and delivery. Over the next 15 months, countries in the region also

22 World Bank, “Latin American and the Caribbean, Overview,” updated April 28, 2020. Also see Matías Busso et al.,
“Covid-19: T he Challenge of Ensuring Assistance to Informal and Vulnerable Worker,” Inter-American Development
Bank, Ideas Matter, May 6, 2020.
23 World Bank, “World Bank Predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History,” press release, April 22,
2020; Gabriella Cova, “Remittances Show Promise in the Face of the Ongo ing Global COVID-19 Pandemic,” Atlantic
Council, December 7, 2020; and “Forecast Record Remittances in Mexico of 40 T housand Mdd for US Support,” CE
Noticias Financieras, December 30, 2020.
24 Kevin Sieff, “Migrant Remittances Increase Abroad, Defying Econ omists’ Predictions,” Washington Post, August 9,
2020; and “In Brief: Remittances Surge in El Salvador, Guatemala,” LatinNews Daily, August 27, 2020.
25 T he other 17 countries receiving IMF support are the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, See IMF, “Emergency Funding and Debt Relief, Western Hemisphere,”
updated December 21, 2020, at https://www.imf.org/en/T opics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-T racker#WHD.
26 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “IDB Group Approves Record $21.6 Billion in Lendin g in 2020,” news
release, December 21, 2020. Also see IDB, “IDB-Financed Projects in Response to COVID-19,” accessed December
30, 2020, available at https://www.iadb.org/en/coronavirus/briefings-and-dashboards.
27 IDB, “IDB Mobilizes $1 Billion for COVID-19 Vaccine Financing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” press
release, December 16, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

may benefit from a portion of the $160 bil ion in worldwide assistance the bank
is providing.28
 The Development Bank of Latin America announced in July 2020 that it
provided $4.9 bil ion in financing to address the effects of the pandemic in 54
operations across the region.29
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact
of COVID-19
; CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact of COVID-19,
by Mark P. Sullivan et al.; CRS Report R46270, Global Economic Effects of COVID-19,
coordinated by James K. Jackson; and CRS Report R46342, COVID-19: Role of the International
Financial Institutions, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political,
security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages
between the United States and the region, with the United States being a major trading partner
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade
agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. The
Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and il egal; geographic
proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration trends.
Curbing the flow of il icit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component
of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for more than four decades. The
flow of il icit drugs, including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine
from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health and safety; and the trafficking of such drugs has
contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States. Since 2000, Colombia has
received U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In
addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought to forge close partnerships with other
countries to combat drug trafficking and related violence and advance citizen security. These
efforts include the Mérida Initiative begun in 2007 to support Mexico, the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) begun in 2008, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
(CBSI) begun in 2009.
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy has been support for strengthened democratic
governance and the rule of law. As described in the previous section, although many countries in
the region have made enormous strides in terms of democratic political development, several face
considerable chal enges. U.S. policy efforts have long supported democracy promotion efforts,
including support for strengthening civil society and promoting the rule of law and human rights.

28 T he countries are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, T rinidad and T obago, and Uruguay. See World Bank, “World Bank’s Response to Covid-19 (Coronavirus)
in Latin America & Caribbean,” fact sheet, updated December 17, 2020, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
factsheet/2020/04/02/world-bank-response-to-covid-19-coronavirus-latin-america-and-caribbean.
29 Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), “Latin America Works T ogether with CAF for Economic and Social
Recovery,” news release, July 7, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Trump Administration Policy
In its policy toward Latin America and the
Latin America and the Caribbean:
Caribbean, the Trump Administration retained
Views of U.S. Leadership
many of the same priorities and programs of
Negative views of U.S. leadership in the region have
past Administrations, but it also diverged
predominated since the Trump Administration took
considerably. The Administration general y
office in 2017, influenced by disparaging political
adopted a more confrontational approach,
rhetoric and certain actions on immigration and trade,
among other issues. Such views could affect the
especial y regarding efforts to curb irregular
wil ingness of countries to cooperate with the United
immigration from the region. In 2018, the
States on regional and global chal enges. A Gal up public
State Department set forth a framework for
opinion pol of worldwide views on U.S. leadership in
U.S. policy toward the region focused on three
2017 showed that in Western Hemisphere countries,
pil ars for engagement: (1) economic growth
58% disapproved of U.S. leadership and 24% approved.
The highest rates of disapproval included Chile (74%),
and prosperity, (2) security, and (3) democratic
Mexico (72%), and Uruguay (70%). This result was a
governance.30 The framework reflected
significant change from 2016, when the Gal up pol
continuity with long-standing U.S. policy
showed that 27% disapproved of U.S. leadership and
priorities for the region but at times appears to
49% approved.
have been at odds with the Administration’s
Subsequent Gal up pol s in 2018 and 2019 showed
actions, as wel as its sometimes antagonistic
some improvement in views of U.S. leadership in the
region, with 31% approving in 2018 and 34% in 2019.
statements on immigration, trade, and foreign
Despite the improvement, continued negative views
aid. Meanwhile, according to Gal up and Pew
prevailed in most countries in the region, with 53% in
Research Center polls, negative views of U.S.
2018 and 51% in 2019 disapproving of U.S. leadership.
leadership in the region increased markedly
Among the countries with the highest percentage
during the Trump Administration (see text box
negative views of U.S. leadership in 2019 were Mexico
(75%), Chile (67%), and Uruguay (55%); those with the
Latin America and the Caribbean: Views
highest percentage of positive views were the
of U.S. Leadership”).
Dominican Republic (56%) and El Salvador (44%). A
January 2020 Pew Research report likewise showed
In August 2020, the White House set forth a
low confidence rates for President Trump in Argentina
strategic framework for the Western
(22%), Brazil (28%), and Mexico (8%)
Hemisphere, which states that the principal
Sources: Gal up, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The
goal of U.S. engagement with the region “is to
U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; “Trump Ratings
support a prosperous, safe, and democratic
Remain Low Around Globe, While Views of U.S. Stay
region with which the United States can
Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 8,
2020.
partner to advance shared interests.” The
framework set forth five lines of effort to
realize this goal: (1) securing the homeland, which includes preventing il egal and uncontrolled
human migration, smuggling, and trafficking; (2) advancing economic growth and an expansion
of free market in the Americas; (3) reaffirming the region’s commitment to democracy and the
rule of law, which includes efforts to restore human rights and democracy in Nicaragua and
Venezuela and enable a transition to democracy in Cuba; (4) countering economic aggression and
malign political influence in the region from such external actors as China; and (5) expanding and
strengthening cooperation with like-minded partners in the region in such areas as resilience to

30 U.S. Department of State, then-Secretary of State Rex W. T illerson, “U.S. Engagement in the Western Hemisphere,”
February 1, 2018, at https://www.state.gov/u-s-engagement -in-the-western-hemisphere/. These three pillars dovetail
with key topics for the Western Hemisphere currently laid out on the State Department’s website: fostering inclusive
economic growth, protecting U.S. citizens at home and abroad, and defending freedom. See https://www.state.gov/
bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-western-hemisphere-affairs/.
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threats and hazards, countermeasures against actors that undermine political and economic
stability, and efforts to assist countries in achieving self-reliance and self-security.31
Foreign Aid. The Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for FY2018 and FY2019 would
have cut assistance to the region by more than a third, and the FY2020 budget request would have
cut funding to the region by about 30% compared to that appropriated in FY2019. Congress did
not implement those budget requests and instead provided significantly more for assistance to the
region in appropriations measures. Nevertheless, in 2019, the Trump Administration withheld an
estimated $396 mil ion that Congress had appropriated for Central America in FY2018 and
reprogrammed the funds elsewhere. For FY2021, the Administration requested 18% less than
al ocated in FY2020 and would have cut funding for most countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean, but Congress instead provided more than requested for key initiatives and countries in
the region. As of August 2020, U.S. agencies had al ocated more than $141 mil ion of new and
previously announced assistance to help the region respond to chal enges posed by the COVID-
19 pandemic. (See “U.S. Foreign Aid” section.)
Trade. In 2017, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) FTA that had been negotiated by 12 Asia-Pacific countries in 2015. The TPP
would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Latin American countries that were parties to
the agreement—Chile, Mexico, and Peru. President Trump strongly criticized the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada, repeatedly warned that the United
States might withdraw from the agreement, and initiated renegotiations in 2017. The three
countries agreed in September 2018 to a new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA), which entered into force on July 1, 2020; the agreement retained many NAFTA
provisions but also included some modernizing updates and changes, including provisions on
digital trade and the dairy and auto industries. (See “Trade Policy” section.)
Mexico, Central America, and Migration Issues. Relations with Mexico were tested by
inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric, immigration actions, and changes in U.S. border and
asylum polices that have shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to
Mexico. In September 2017, the Administration announced that it would end the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program; begun in 2012 by the Obama Administration, the
program provides relief from deportation for several hundred thousand immigrants who arrived in
the United States as children. Ultimately, federal court chal enges led to a Supreme Court ruling
that vacated the Administration’s action on DACA. In December 2018, Mexico’s president
agreed to al ow the United States to return certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico (pursuant to
Migrant Protection Protocols, or MPP) while awaiting U.S. immigration court decisions. In May
2019, President Trump threatened to impose new tariffs on motor vehicles from Mexico if the
government did not increase actions to deter U.S.-bound migrants from Central America; Mexico
ultimately agreed in June 2019 to increase its enforcement actions and to al ow more U.S.-bound
asylum seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. Despite tensions, U.S.-
Mexico bilateral relations remained friendly, with continued strong energy and economic ties,
including the USMCA, and close security cooperation related to drug interdiction. (See “Mexico”
and “Migration Issues” sections.)
Other Administration actions on immigration caused concern in the region. In 2017 and 2018, the
Administration announced plans to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for

31 T he White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August
2020; and Nora Gámez T orres, “T rump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,”
Miam i Herald, August 16, 2020.
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Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court chal enges put the terminations on
hold. (See “Migration Issues” section.)
Unauthorized migration from Central America’s Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—has increased in recent years, fueled by difficult socioeconomic and
security conditions and poor governance. To deter such migration, the Trump Administration
implemented a “zero tolerance” policy toward il egal border crossings in 2018 and applied
restrictions on access to asylum at the U.S. border. The Administration also used aid cuts of
previously appropriated assistance and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on remittances
to compel Central American countries and Mexico to curb unauthorized migration to the United
States. In 2019, the Administration negotiated “safe third country” agreements with each of the
Northern Triangle countries to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants from third
countries to the Northern Triangle countries. (See “Central America’s Northern Triangle”
section.)
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. In November 2018, then-National Security Adviser John
Bolton made a speech in Miami, FL, on the Administration’s policies in Latin America that
warned about “the destructive forces of oppression, socialism, and totalitarianism” in the region.
Reminiscent of Cold War political rhetoric, Bolton referred to Cuba, Nic aragua, and Venezuela as
the “troika of tyranny” in the hemisphere that has “final y met its match.” He referred to the three
countries as “the cause of immense human suffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability,
and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in the Western Hemisphere.”32
As the situation in Venezuela deteriorated under the Maduro government, the Trump
Administration imposed targeted and broader financial sanctions, including sanctions against the
state oil company, the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In
September 2019, the United States joined 11 other Western Hemisphere countries to invoke the
Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also
provided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who have fled to other
countries, especial y Colombia, as wel as for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. (See “Venezuela”
section and CRS Insight IN11116, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the
Crisis in Venezuela.)
With regard to Cuba, the Trump Administration did not continue the policy of engagement
advanced during the Obama Administration and instead imposed a series of economic sanctions
on Cuba for its poor human rights record and support for the Maduro government. Economic
sanctions included a wide array of restrictions, especial y on travel and remittances, efforts to
disrupt oil flows from Venezuela, and other trade and financial sanctions. In 2017, the State
Department cut the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Havana by about two-thirds in response to
unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff. (See “Cuba” section.)
After political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018, the Trump Administration employed
targeted sanctions against several senior officials and other individuals and entities for human
rights abuses or corruption. (See “Nicaragua” section.)
Congress and Policy Toward the Region
Congress traditional y has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to

32 T he White House, “Remarks by National Security Adviser John R. Bolton on the Administration’s Policies in Latin
America,” November 2, 2018.
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the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap,
particularly in areas of immigration and trade.
The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign aid appropriations in February 2019
when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). Amounts appropriated
for key U.S. initiatives and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded the
Administration’s request by almost $600 mil ion. Congress completed action on FY2020 foreign
aid appropriations in December 2019, when it enacted the Further Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), with amounts for key countries and regional programs exceeding the
Administration’s request by $525 mil ion.
For FY2021, Congress completed action on appropriations in December 2020 in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260); although the measure and its explanatory statement do
not specify appropriations levels for every country in the region, the amounts designated for
several programs (e.g. Central America, Colombia, and the Inter-American Foundation) are
higher than the Administration’s request (see “U.S. Foreign Aid” section).
The FY2021 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 116-260) included two other legislative acts
concerning U.S. policy toward Latin America.
 The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (Division FF,
Title III, Subtitle F) requires the State Department to develop a five-year strategy
to advance economic prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic
governance, and improve civilian security conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras. It also requires the imposition of targeted sanctions against those
undermining democracy or involved in significant acts of corruption in those
countries. The House had approved an earlier version of the act, H.R. 2615, in
July 2019.
 The United States-Mexico Economic Partnership Act (Division FF, Title XIX)
requires the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to prioritize and expand
educational and professional exchange programs with Mexico. Original y
introduced as H.R. 133, the House and Senate had approved their versions of the
act, respectively, in January 2019 and January 2020.
On trade, Congress completed action in January 2020 on implementing legislation for the
USMCA (P.L. 116-113). The agreement retains many of NAFTA’s provisions and includes new
provisions on the auto and dairy industries and some modernizing features. Before the legislation
received final congressional approval in January 2020, the trade agreement was amended to
address concerns of Congress regarding provisions related to labor (including enforcement), the
environment, dispute settlement procedures, and intel ectual property rights (IPR).33 The FY2021
omnibus measure (P.L. 116-260, Division O, Title VI) included technical corrections to the
USMCA. Congress also enacted legislation (P.L. 116-164) providing a 10-year extension, through
September 2030), of certain tariff preferences in the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
currently benefitting eight Caribbean countries.
On Venezuela, Congress supported the Administration’s efforts to sanction the Maduro
government for its antidemocratic actions and to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan
migrants throughout the region. In December 2019, Congress enacted the Venezuela Emergency
Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019, or the VERDAD Act of 2019, in
Division J of P.L. 116-94. The measure incorporated provisions from S. 1025, as reported by the

33 Kimberly Ann Elliot, “T rump and Pelosi Both Claim Victory on the USMCA. Who Really Won?” World Politics
Review
, January 7, 2020.
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Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2019, and provisions from three bil s on Venezuela
passed by the House in March 2019: H.R. 854, to authorize humanitarian assistance to the
Venezuelan people; H.R. 920, to restrict the export of defense articles and crime control
materials; and H.R. 1477, to require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence
in Venezuela. In other legislative action, the House approved H.R. 549 in July 2019, which would
have provided TPS to Venezuelans in the United States.
Congress included several provisions and reporting requirements related to Latin America in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020 NDAA; P.L. 116-92), signed
into law in December 2019. The act included provisions on Venezuela (Section 890, a prohibition
against Department of Defense [DOD] contracting) and Guatemala (Section 1267, requiring a
certification for the transfer of vehicles to the Guatemalan government). The act also included
various reporting requirements, including on the sufficiency of DOD and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) resources in the Western Hemisphere (Section 1265), Brazil
(Section 1266), Honduras (1268), and trafficking activities in Central America and Mexico
(Section 5522).
At the end of the 116th Congress, the House and Senate voted to override President Trump’s veto
of the FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283, on January 1, 2021. The measure and its accompanying
conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) include several provisions and reporting requirements on
Latin America and the Caribbean. The act included provisions on Cuba (Section 1100, extending
benefits to federal employees injured while stationed in Cuba), Guatemala (Section 1299K,
extending the certification requirement for the transfer of vehicles), and a reporting requirement
on Coast Guard drug interdiction in the Caribbean Basin (Section 8245). The conference report
included various statements and/or reporting requirements regarding U.S. engagement with the
Caribbean, security relations with Brazil, concerns of al egations of unlawful surveil ance or
intel igence gathering by the Colombian military, the situation in Venezuela, and U.S. cooperation
with Mexico’s security forces.
At the end of the year, Congress also completed action on the Organization of American States
Legislative Engagement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-343) to strengthen the participation of elected
national legislators in the activities of the OAS and reaffirm U.S. support for OAS human rights
and anti-corruption initiatives.
Other bil s and resolutions that passed either chamber include the following:
Bolivia. The Senate approved S.Res. 35 in April 2019, expressing support for
democratic principles in Bolivia and throughout Latin America. In January 2020,
the Senate approved S.Res. 447, expressing concerns about election irregularities
and violence in Bolivia and supporting the convening of new elections.
Argentina. Both houses approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July 2019, and
S.Res. 277 in October 2019) commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 1994
bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.
Nicaragua. Both houses approved similar resolutions, H.Res. 754, approved by
the House in March 2020, and S.Res. 525, approved by the Senate in June 2020,
regarding continued U.S. support for the people of Nicaragua in their peaceful
efforts to promote democracy and human rights and the use of tools under U.S.
law to increase political and financial pressure on the Ortega government.
Cuba. In June 2020, the Senate approved S.Res. 454, cal ing for the release of
democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer and al members of the Patriotic Union of
Cuba who have been arbitrarily imprisoned.
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Caribbean. In November 2020, the House approved H.R. 7703, the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act, which would have authorized $74.8
mil ion for the CBSI for each year from FY2021 through FY2015, including
monitoring and reporting requirements for the CBSI, and would have required
the State Department to prioritize efforts to increase disaster response and
resilience by carrying out such programs in beneficiary countries.
Haiti. In November 2020, the House approved H.R. 5586, the Haiti
Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act,
which would have directed the State Department, in coordination with USAID, to
prioritize and assess post-disaster recovery and efforts to address corruption, rule
and law, and media freedoms in Haiti.
Congressional committees held over 25 oversight hearings on the region, including on Venezuela,
Central America (including the impact of U.S. aid cuts), relations with Colombia, human rights in
Cuba, China’s engagement in Latin America, environmental concerns in the Brazilian Amazon,
repression in Nicaragua, Haiti, security cooperation with Mexico, the U.S. response to COVID-19
in the region, and the report and recommendations of the congressional y mandated Western
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission (see Appendix).
Regional U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as wel as countering il icit narcotics, since
the 1990s. The Trump Administration sought to shift the focus of U.S. assistance efforts in some
parts of the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration.
The Trump Administration also sought to reduce U.S. assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean, proposing significant cuts in each of its annual budget requests. Although Congress
slightly increased aid to the region between FY2017 and FY2020, the Administration used
various authorities to suspend and reprogram some of that assistance. In 2019, for example, the
Administration withheld an estimated $396 mil ion that Congress had appropriated for Central
America in FY2018 and reprogrammed the funds to address other foreign policy priorities inside
and outside the Western Hemisphere. (See “Central America’s Northern Triangle,” below.)
For FY2021, the Trump Administration requested $1.4 bil ion for Latin America and the
Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID.
That amount would have been $314 mil ion, or 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 bil ion of U.S.
assistance al ocated to the region in FY2020 (see Table 4). The proposal would have cut funding
for every type of assistance and most Latin American and Caribbean countries. For a fourth
consecutive year, the Trump Administration also proposed eliminating the Inter-American
Foundation (IAF)—a smal , independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots
development in the region—and consolidating its programs into USAID.
Congressional Action: After a partial government shutdown and a short-term continuing
resolution, the 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign aid appropriations in
February 2019. Of the funds appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-
6), nearly $1.7 bil ion of foreign assistance was al ocated to Latin America and the Caribbean.
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That amount was slightly more than was al ocated to the region in FY2018 and nearly $600
mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested for the region.
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2021
(bil ions of U.S. dol ars)
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020 (est.)
2021 (req.)
1.69
1.67
1.67a
1.69
1.72
1.40
Sources: U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2013-FY2021; and
U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimated data, June 15, 2020.
Notes: These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary
contributions to the Organization of American States.
a. Final FY2018 al ocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 mil ion
of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, real ocating some of
those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
Congress passed two continuing resolutions, which funded foreign aid programs in Latin America
and the Caribbean at the FY2019 level until December 2019, when President Trump signed into
law the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94). More than $1.7 bil ion
appropriated in the act was al ocated to Latin America and the Caribbean, which is $525 mil ion
more than the Trump Administration requested for the region.
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2021 until
several months into the fiscal year. The House passed an FY2021 foreign aid appropriations
measure (Division A of H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-444) in July 2020, but the Senate Appropriations
Committee did not release its draft bil and report until November 2020. Congress passed a series
of continuing resolutions that funded foreign aid programs in Latin America and the Caribbean at
the FY2020 level until December 27, 2020, when President Trump signed into law the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). Although the act and accompanying
explanatory statement do not specify appropriations levels for every Latin American and
Caribbean country, the amounts they designate for several key U.S. initiatives differ significantly
from the Administration’s request. The act provides
 $505.9 mil ion to address the underlying factors driving irregular migration from
Central America ($129 mil ion more than the Administration requested but $27.2
mil ion less than al ocated to the region in FY2020);
 $461.4 mil ion to support the peace process and security and development efforts
in Colombia ($48.5 mil ion more than requested and $9.7 mil ion more than
al ocated to the country in FY2020);
 $158.9 mil ion to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico ($95.2
mil ion more than requested and $1 mil ion more than al ocated to the country in
FY2020);
 $33 mil ion to support a democratic transition in Venezuela ($172 mil ion less
than requested and $2 mil ion less than al ocated to the country in FY2020); and
 $38 mil ion for the IAF ($34.1 mil ion more than requested and $0.5 mil ion
more than Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2020).
The act also includes $4 bil ion of global health assistance for GAVI, the Vaccine Al iance, to
procure and deliver coronavirus vaccines. Those funds build on nearly $1.8 bil ion of FY2020
emergency foreign aid provided through two supplemental appropriations measures (P.L. 116-123
and P.L. 116-136) to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 global y. As of August 2020
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(latest information made available), U.S. agencies had al ocated more than $141 mil ion in new
and previously announced assistance to help Latin American and Caribbean countries address the
health, economic, and humanitarian chal enges posed by the pandemic.34
For additional information, see CRS Report R46514, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America
and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations
, by Peter J. Meyer and Rachel L. Martin; CRS
Report R46367, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2021
Budget and Appropriations
, by Cory R. Gil , Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern;
CRS In Focus IF11496, COVID-19 and Foreign Assistance: Issues for Congress, by Nick M.
Brown, Marian L. Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern; and CRS In Focus IF11606, COVID-19
and Foreign Assistance: Congressional Oversight Framework and Current Activities
, by Nick M.
Brown and Emily M. Morgenstern.
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and transit zone for several il icit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opiates (plant-based and synthetic). Heroin abuse and
synthetic opioid-related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising
questions about how to address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that
methamphetamine and cocaine overdoses in the United States are on an upward trajectory.
Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market have prompted
rising drug production in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. While opium poppy cultivation
and heroin production rose in Mexico through 2017 but have since declined, the production of
fentanyl (a synthetic opioid) has surged and methamphetamine production is at “an industrial
level.”35 Over 90% of heroin seized and sampled in the United States comes from Mexico and
increasingly has included fentanyl. Since the Chinese government implemented strict controls on
al forms of fentanyl in mid-2019, including fentanyl analogues, Mexico has become a more
important source of fentanyl-related substances.36 Coca cultivation and cocaine production in
Colombia, which supplies roughly 89% of cocaine in the United States, reached record levels in
2017, leveled off in 2018, and slightly increased in 2019.37 Cultivation and production in Peru
and Bolivia have also surged, particularly from 2018 to 2019.38
Whereas Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region work
closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict il icit flows, the
Venezuelan government does not. Public corruption in Venezuela also has made it easier for drug
trafficking organizations to smuggle il icit drugs. In March 2020, the Department of Justice
indicted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as

34 U.S. Department of State, “Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” fact
sheet, August 21, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/update-the-united-states-continues-to-lead-the-global-response-to-
covid-19-6/.
35 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) Volum e 1: Drug and Chem ical Control, March 2020 (hereinafter cited as State
Department, INCSR 2020 Volume 1).
36 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Fentanyl Flow to the United States, January 2020.
37 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to
Reduce Cocaine Supply,” March 5, 2020.
38 ONDCP, “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in Peru,” July 31, 2020; “ONDCP Releases
Data on Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in Bolivia,” November 13, 2020.
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Venezuela’s legitimate president) and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials.
As charged, Maduro al egedly participated in a drug trafficking organization that c onspired with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to traffic il icit drugs to the United States.
Bolivia-U.S. antidrug cooperation was limited under Evo Morales (2006-2019), and remains
uncertain under the administration of newly elected President Luis Arce.39
Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to
degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in
high levels of violence. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin American
governments, particularly in Mexico and Central America—a region through which roughly 93%
of cocaine from South America transited in 2018—continue to suffer from weak criminal justice
systems and law enforcement agencies.40 Public corruption, including high-level cooperation with
criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict drugs, investigate and prosecute
traffickers, and recover il icit proceeds. At the same time, there is a widespread perception—
particularly among Latin American observers—that U.S. demand for il icit drugs is largely to
blame for the region’s crime and violence problems. The COVID-19 pandemic has lowered
violence in most countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remains elevated in Mexico.
Criminal gangs with origins in southern California, principal y the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
the “18th Street” gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in
Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and
urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world.
Although some gangs engage in local drug distribution, gangs general y do not have a role in
transnational drug trafficking. Gangs have been involved in a range of other criminal activities,
including extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and have used violence to
enforce COVID-19 related quarantines. Gang-related violence has fueled unauthorized migration
to the United States.
U.S. Policy. For more than 40 years, U.S. policy toward the region has focused on countering
drug trafficking and reducing drug production in Latin America and the Caribbean. The largest
support program, Plan Colombia, provided more than $10 bil ion to help Colombia combat both
drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade from FY2000 to FY2016.41 After
Colombia signed a historic peace accord with the country’s largest leftist guerril a group, the
FARC, the United States provided assistance to help implement the agreement. U.S. officials
remain concerned, however, about elevated cocaine production in Colombia.
U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included a series of
partnerships with other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative, which has led to improved
bilateral security cooperation with Mexico; the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI); and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). During the Obama Administration,
those initiatives combined U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law assistance with economic development
and violence prevention programs.
The Trump Administration’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean focused heavily on
U.S. security objectives. Al of the aforementioned assistance programs have continued, but
placed greater emphasis on combating drug trafficking, gangs, and other criminal groups than

39 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke.
40 U.S. Government, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM), based on 2018 data from the
Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB).
41 See CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel.
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during the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration also sought to reduce funding for
each of the U.S. security assistance programs and reprogrammed significant portions of assistance
to Central America due to concerns that those governments did not adequately curb unauthorized
migration. President Trump welcomed Mexico’s assistance on migration enforcement, but noted
in an FY2021 presidential determination issued in September 2020 that Mexico is in “serious risk
of being found to have failed demonstrably to uphold its international drug commitments.”42 Such
a determination could trigger foreign assistance cuts. In 2020, the Administration deployed a
large military-led antidrug effort in the Caribbean aimed at deterring drug trafficking emanating
from Venezuela.
President Trump also prioritized combating gangs, namely the MS-13, which the Department of
Justice (DOJ) has named a top priority. U.S. agencies, in cooperation with vetted units in Central
America funded through CARSI, have brought criminal charges against thousands of MS-13
members in the United States. Aid reductions for Central America exempted U.S. assistance that
supports vetted units working with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOJ.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress held hearings on opioids, which included
consideration of heroin and fentanyl production in Mexico; corruption in the Americas; the
Mérida Initiative, U.S. assistance to Central America (including CARSI); and the findings of the
congressional y-mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission. The commission’s
report, released in December 2020, recommended that the State Department take the lead in
regional drug policy and replace the annual drug certification process with compacts negotiated
with countries to identify bilateral antidrug policies.43
Compared to FY2018, Congress provided increased resources in FY2019 for Colombia and
Mexico, slightly less funding for CARSI, and stable funding for the CBSI in P.L. 116-6. For
FY2020, Congress again increased funding for Colombia, Mexico and CBSI, while slightly
reducing CARSI funds (P.L. 116-94).
For FY2021, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, (P.L. 116-260) provides significantly
more funding for Colombia and Mexico, CARSI, and CBSI than the Administration’s FY2021
request. In comparison to the FY2020 enacted funding levels, the act provides increased funding
for the CBSI equal to the amount authorized by the House-passed Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative Authorization Act (H.R. 7703). The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260
provides level funding for the Mérida Initiative in Mexico and increased funds for related
programs in Colombia, but reduced funds for CARSI.
The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) required an intel igence assessment of how drug trafficking
influenced migration-related crimes in Mexico and the Northern Triangle (Section 5522) and
created a Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking to report on, among other
things, opioids coming from Mexico (Section 7221). A provision in the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-
283, Section 8245) requires a study and report on Coast Guard interdiction of il icit drugs from
Central America and South America.
For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11535, Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel
Operations amid COVID-19
, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10578,
Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus

42 President T rump, Presidential Determination on Major Drug T ransit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for
Fiscal Year 2021, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, September 16, 2020.
43 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Engel Release Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Report,” press
release, December 1, 2020, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2020/12/engel-releases-western-hemisphere-drug-policy-
commission-report (includes link to the commission’s report).
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IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security
Cooperation
, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, Mexico:
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations
, by June S. Beittel; CRS Report R44812,
U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer;
CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel; and CRS In
Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan.
Trade Policy
The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the fastest-growing regional trading partners
for the United States. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading
partners in the region remain strong, despite chal enges, such as slow economic growth and high
levels of violence in some countries. The United States accounts for roughly 31% of the Latin
American and Caribbean region’s merchandise imports and 44% of its merchandise exports. Most
of this trade is with Mexico, which accounted for 65% of U.S. imports from the region and 61%
of U.S. exports to the region in 2019. In 2019, total U.S. merchandise exports to Latin America
and the Caribbean were valued at $418.9 bil ion, down from $429.7 bil ion in 2018. U.S.
merchandise imports were valued at $467.0 bil ion in 2019 (see Table 5).
The United States strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the past
26 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994,
which was replaced by the USMCA when it entered into force on July 1, 2020, the United States
currently has six FTAs in force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and
Peru. NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region,
establishing new rules and disciplines that influenced subsequent trade agreements on issues
important to the United States, such as IPR protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute
settlement, investment, labor, and the environment.
In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries
in the region through several trade preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of select Caribbean
products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to uncertain economic
and political conditions in the region. Several preference programs for Haiti, which expire in
2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two
other preference programs include the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), which
has been extended through September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP), which expired on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends preferences on
apparel products to eligible Caribbean countries similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA,
replaced by USMCA. The GSP, first authorized in the 1970s, has provided duty-free tariff
treatment to certain products imported from 120 designated developing countries throughout the
world, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American and Caribbean countries.
In the 15 to 20 years after NAFTA, some of the largest economies in South America, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the
United States. That opposition, has shifted as some countries, including Brazil and Ecuador, have
taken steps to enhance the trade relationship with the United States through partial bilateral trade
agreements on trade facilitation, regulatory cooperation, and anti-corruption. Numerous other
bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere, however, do not
include the United States. For example, the Pacific Al iance, a trade arrangement composed of
Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, is reportedly moving forward on a possible trade
arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. On June 28,
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2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political
agreement in principle for an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement. On April 28, 2020,
Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA and remove
most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners.
Congress may examine how the United States could enhance trade relations with these countries,
whether it be through bilateral FTAs or a broader regional FTA, such as the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) that was pursued in the mid-1990s but never concluded44, or through partial
trade agreements that are limited in scope such as the recently concluded arrangements with
Brazil and Ecuador.
Table 5. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2012-2019
(in bil ions of U.S. dol ars)
Partner
Country
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
U.S. Exports









Mexico
215.9
226.0
241.0
236.5
230.2
243.5
265.4
256.4

Brazil
43.8
44.1
42.4
31.6
30.2
37.3
39.6
43.1

Chile
18.8
17.5
16.5
15.5
12.9
13.6
15.4
15.8

Colombia
16.4
18.4
20.1
16.3
13.1
13.4
15.2
14.8

Total LAC
399.1
410.4
424.9
389.0
366.1
393.9
429.7
418.9

World
1,545.8
1,578.5
1,621.9
1,503.3
1,451.5
1,546.5
1,666.0
1645.2
U.S. Imports









Mexico
277.6
280.6
295.7
296.4
293.5
312.8
346.1
358.1

Brazil
32.1
27.5
30.0
27.5
26.0
29.5
31.1
30.9

Colombia
24.6
21.6
18.3
14.1
13.8
13.6
13.8
14.1

Chile
9.4
10.4
9.5
8.8
8.8
10.6
11.4
10.4

Total LAC
449.4
439.0
446.0
412.3
401.2
428.7
468.3
467.0

World
2,276.3
2,268.0
2,356.4
2,248.8
2,186.8
2,339.9
2,540.8
2,498.4
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) Interactive, “DataWeb: Tariff and Trade.”
Notes: This table provides statistics on the top four countries fol owed by the total of U.S. trade with al
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
President Trump made NAFTA renegotiation and modernization a priority of his Administration’s
trade policy. The United States, Canada, and Mexico subsequently entered into NAFTA
renegotiations and concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September 30,
2018. Mexico was the first country to ratify the agreement in June 2019 and the amended

44 In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a
Free T rade Area of the Americas (FT AA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States
and Brazil, the FT AA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. It moved the
FT AA away from the comprehensive, single undertaking principle, toward a two -tier framework comprising a set of
“common rights and obligations” for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral arrangements with country
benefits related to commitments. T he FT AA talks stalled in 2004. At the fourth Summit of the Americas held in
November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to restart negotiations . Further
action has not occurred.
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agreement on December 12, 2019. On January 16, 2020, Congress approved the agreement and n
on March 13, 2020, Canada was the last country to ratify it. USMCA continues NAFTA’s market
opening provisions but also modernizes the agreement with new provisions on digital trade, state-
owned-enterprises, currency manipulation, anti-corruption, and enforcement of worker rights and
the environment. USMCA’s tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor vehicle industry,
removal of government procurement provisions for Canada, and lessening of investor state
dispute settlement provisions are significant, because they scale back U.S. trade policy goals of
previous Administrations.
In 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain
steel and aluminum products, including products from Latin America, using presidential powers
granted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The proclamations outlined the
President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports, with some
flexibility on the application of tariffs by country. In May 2018, President Trump proclaimed
Argentina and Brazil permanently exempt from the steel tariffs in exchange for quota agreements.
The United States imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico on May 31, 2018,
and Mexico subsequently imposed retaliatory tariffs on 71 U.S. products, covering an estimated
$3.7 bil ion worth of trade. By May 2019, President Trump had exempted Mexico from steel and
aluminum tariffs, and Mexico agreed to terminate its retaliatory tariffs. After Brazil’s tariff-rate
quota (TRQ) on ethanol imports from the United States expired in August 2020, President Trump
tightened the cap on al owable steel imports from Brazil, stating that the decision was made under
Section 232 and acknowledging that the tightened quota may affect production activities in the
United States. The United States and Brazil agreed to hold consultations to resolve these issues,
the latest of which was planned for December 2020.
President Trump’s January 2017 withdrawal from the proposed TPP, an FTA that included
Mexico, Peru, and Chile as signatories, signified another change to U.S. trade policy. In March
2018, al remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11), which essential y brought a modified TPP into effect.
The TPP-11 has entered into force among seven countries—Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Chile and Peru expect to ratify the agreement eventual y.
Colombia has expressed plans to request entry into the agreement after it enters into force among
al partners. Some observers contend that U.S. withdrawal from the proposed TPP could damage
U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, whereas others see the withdrawal as
a way to prevent lower-cost imports and potential job losses.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight capacities, faced
numerous trade policy issues related to NAFTA’s renegotiation and the USMCA. The House
approved USMCA implementing legislation, H.R. 5430, on December 19, 2019, by a vote of 385-
41, and the Senate approved it on January 16, 2020, by a vote of 89-10; it was signed into law
(P.L. 116-113) on January 29, 2020. Lawmakers took an interest as to whether the Administration
followed U.S. trade negotiating objectives and procedures as required by Trade Promotion
Authority (Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, or TPA; P.L.
114-26). Some Members also considered issues surrounding the labor and environment
provisions’ enforceability, access to medicine, and economic effects. Other Members showed
interest in how the USMCA may affect U.S. industries, especial y the auto industry, as wel as the
overal effects on the U.S. and Mexican economies, North American supply chains, and trade
relations with the Latin American and Caribbean region. Other congressional concerns in regard
to USMCA were resolved by including language for technical corrections to USMCA in the
FY2021 appropriations package that President Trump signed December 27, 2020 (P.L. 116-260,
Division O, Title VI). Policymakers continue to monitor Mexico’s implementation of labor
USMCA commitments.
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The effects of COVID-19 on the U.S.-Mexico supply chain may be of interest for U.S.
policymakers, especial y for products manufactured in Mexico for U.S. essential sectors,
including the highly integrated motor vehicle industry. Automotive manufacturing plants in
Mexico were closed for approximately two months due to the pandemic and started reopening in
June, staggering hours and following government-established safety protocols. The industry
currently is experiencing a market decrease of 32% compared with 2019. Some officials,
including the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, noted that the United States and Mexico
need to improve coordination in determining which sectors are essential and that the two
countries need to work together to restart or continue production safely in essential sectors.
Policymakers may wish to address how the United States and Mexico are cooperating on the
possibility of future shutdowns.
Among other trade issues, numerous Members of Congress are monitoring bilateral trade
consultations with Brazil in regard to Brazil’s restrictions on imports of ethanol from the United
States, which prompted the Trump Administration’s tightening of the U.S. quota on semi-finished
steel from Brazil. Policymakers also may consider how U.S. trade policy is perceived by the
region and whether it may affect multilateral trade issues and cooperation on matters regarding
security and migration. Another issue relates to U.S. market share. If Mexico, Chile, Colombia,
Peru, and Mercosur countries continue trade and investment liberalization efforts with other
countries without the United States, doing so may open the door to more intra-trade and
investment among certain Latin American and Caribbean countries, or possibly China and other
Asian countries, which may affect U.S. exports.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade
Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R44981, The United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS
In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report RL32934,
U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Vil arreal; and
CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated
by Rachel F. Fefer.
Migration Issues
Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United
States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and U.S.
relations with their governments. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of individuals who
have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the DACA
initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum seekers.45 As a result, several
U.S. immigration policy changes have affected countries in the region.
The Trump Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and
Honduras (those terminations are facing legal chal enges);46 rescinded DACA through a process

45 T emporary Protected Status (T PS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by armed conflict, natural
disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the
United States. T PS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in
2010. T he Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative that the Obama Administration
implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present
individuals who arrived in the United States as children.
46 As legal challenges to the termination of T PS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of T PS
documents for current beneficiaries through October 4, 2021.
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that the Supreme Court ruled in June 2020 did not follow proper procedures and had to be
vacated;47 and restricted access to asylum. In January 2019, the Administration launched the
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), a program that requires many migrants and asylum seekers
processed at the Mexico-U.S. border to be returned to Mexico to await their immigration
proceedings; the program is currently facing legal chal enges but remains in place.48 The
Administration also signed what it termed “asylum cooperative agreements” (ACAs), also
referred to as “safe third country” agreements, with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to
al ow the United States to transfer certain migrants who arrive at a U.S. border to seek asylum to
apply for asylum in one of those countries. DHS began to implement the agreement with
Guatemala in November 2019, but implementation was suspended as a result of the COVID-19
pandemic in March 2020. In December 2020, DHS announced the finalization of the agreements
needed to implement the El Salvador and Honduras ACAs.49 To date, no migrants have been
transferred to either country.
The factors that have driven U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and
some have changed. They include poverty and unemployment, political and economic instability,
crime and violence, natural disasters and climate change, as wel as relatively close proximity to
the United States, familial ties in the United States, and relatively attractive U.S. economic
conditions. As an example, Venezuela, a historical y stable country with limited emigration to the
United States, recently has become the top country of origin among those who seek U.S. asylum
affirmatively due to Venezuela’s ongoing crisis.50
Migrant apprehensions at the southwest border had been steadily declining, reaching a 50-year
low in 2017, but they began to rise in mid-2017. By FY2019, DHS apprehended 977,509
migrants, roughly 456,400 more than in FY2018.51 Unaccompanied children and families from
the Northern Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, made up a majority of those
apprehensions. In FY2020, apprehensions declined by more than half, particularly after the
COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020.52 Mexican adults comprised the majority of those
apprehended. In response to the pandemic, nonessential travel and asylum processing were
suspended at the U.S.-Mexico border through January 21, 2021, with any persons without valid
travel documents returned to Mexico as quickly as possible.53 Under these so-cal ed Title 42 CDC
travel restrictions, more than 316,500 migrants from Mexico and the Northern Triangle were
expel ed to Mexico through November 2020.54 Mexico has had to contend with those individuals
as wel as the tens of thousands of individuals from those and other countries asked to “remain in
Mexico” under MPP during a pandemic.

47 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020).
48 DHS, “Migrant Protection Protocols,” at https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols.
49 DHS, “El Salvador Begins Implementation of Asylum Cooperative Agreement,” press release, December 15, 2020,
and “Asylum Cooperative Agreement with Honduras Finalized,” press release, December 18, 2020.
50 In FY2018, Venezuela ranked first among countries of origin for those seeking affirmative asylum in the United
States. Guatemala and El Salvador ranked second and third. See DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow
Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2018
, October 2019.
51 DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “ Southwest Border Migration FY2019.”
52 CBP, “Southwest Border Migration FY2020.
53 See CRS Insight IN11308, COVID-19: Restrictions on Travelers at U.S. Land Borders, by Audrey Singer.
54 CBP, “ Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: T itle 8 Enforcement Actions and T itle 42 Expulsions,” at
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement -statistics/title-8-and-title-42-statistics, accessed December, 15,
2020.
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The Trump Administration’s rhetoric and policies have tested U.S. relations with Mexico and the
Northern Triangle countries. Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador agreed to shelter
migrants affected by the MPP program and then, to avoid U.S. tariffs, al owed the MPP to be
expanded in Mexico and increased Mexico’s immigration enforcement efforts, particularly on its
southern border. Amidst U.S. foreign aid cuts and tariff threats (in the case of Guatemala), the
Northern Triangle countries signed “safe third country” agreements despite serious concerns
about conditions in the three countries. Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, which
received some 91% of the 267,258 individuals removed from the United States in FY2019, have
expressed concerns that removals could overwhelm their capacity to receive and reintegrate
migrants. Central American countries also are concerned about the potential for increased
removals of those with criminal records to exacerbate their security problems. More recently, in
response to the United States deporting and expel ing migrants infected with COVID-19, the
Guatemalan government has suspended repatriation flights on multiple occasions and cal ed for
the United States to screen returning migrants for the disease adequately.55
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress provided foreign assistance to help address some of
the factors fueling migration from Central America and to support Mexico’s migration
management efforts in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). In July 2019, the House
passed H.R. 2615, the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act, which would
require a report on how U.S. agencies are addressing the main drivers of unauthorized migration
from Central America. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) incorporated
H.R. 2615 as Division FF, Title III, Subtitle F. The explanatory statement accompanying the act
includes language from H.Rept. 116-444 requiring the Secretary of State to submit copies of
ACAs signed with Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras and how it was determined that those
ACAs met U.S. legal requirements. The explanatory statement also prohibits the provision of any
U.S. assistance for Mexico and Central America to justify or support the ACAs.
For more information, see CRS Report R46419, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 116th
Congress
, coordinated by Andorra Bruno; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10402, Safe Third Country
Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries: Background and Legal Issues, by Ben Harrington;
CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J.
Meyer and Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control
Efforts
, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R45266, The Trump Administration’s “Zero
Tolerance” Immigration Enforcement Policy
, by Wil iam A. Kandel; CRS Report R45995,
Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals, DACA, and Related Legislation, by Andorra Bruno; CRS
Legal Sidebar LSB10497, Supreme Court: DACA Rescission Violated the APA, by Ben
Harrington; CRS Report R43599, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, by Wil iam A.
Kandel; CRS Report R44849, H-2A and H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy and Related
Issues
, by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and
Current Issues
, by Jil H. Wilson; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10207, Asylum and Related Protections
for Aliens Who Fear Gang and Domestic Violence, by Hil el R. Smith; CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB10559, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Powers and Limitations: A Brief Primer, by
Hil el R. Smith; and CRS Report R46012, Immigration: Recent Apprehension Trends at the U.S.
Southwest Border, by Audrey Singer and Wil iam A. Kandel.

55 Cindy Carcamo and Molly O’T oole, “Migrants Deported by U.S. Make up More T han 15% of Guatemala’s
Coronavirus Cases,” Los Angeles Tim es, May 4, 2020.
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Selected Country and Subregional Issues
The Caribbean
Caribbean Regional Issues
The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories,
including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent
countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago
in the south; Belize, which is geographical y located in Central America; and Guyana and
Suriname, located on the north-central coast of South America (see Figure 2).
Pursuant to the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-291), the
State Department submitted a multiyear strategy for the Caribbean in 2017. The strategy
established a framework to strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas or pil ars: (1)
security, with the objectives of countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and
advancing citizen security; (2) diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized
engagement to forge greater cooperation at the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth and private sector-
led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S. exports of natural
gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing on increased
exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a focus on
long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
In July 2019, the State Department issued a report to Congress on the implementation of its
multiyear strategy. The report maintained that limited budgets and human resources have
constrained opportunities for deepening relations, but funding for the strategy’s security pil ar has
supported meaningful engagement and produced tangible results for regional and U.S. security
interests.56
Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean nations are vulnerable to use as transit
countries for il icit drugs from South America destined for the U.S. and European markets. Many
Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of violent crime, including murder, often
associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the United States launched the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to
reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program
dovetails with the first pil ar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S.
engagement. From FY2010 through FY2020, Congress appropriated almost $677 mil ion for the
CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries. The program has targeted assistance in five
areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law enforcement capacity building, (3)
border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice sector reform, and (5) crime prevention
and at-risk youth.
Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and, over the past decade, have participated in
Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, which supplies Venezuelan oil under preferential financing
terms. The United States launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI) in 2014, with

56 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report to Congress on Progress of Public Law (P.L.) 114 -291: Efforts to Implement
the Strategy for U.S. Engagem ent with the Caribbean Region
, July 2019.
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the goals of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the Caribbean.57 The CESI
includes a variety of initiatives to boost energy security and sustainable economic growth by
attracting investment in a range of energy technologies through a focus on improved governance,
increased access to finance, and enhanced coordination among energy donors, governments, and
stakeholders.58
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries

Source: CRS Graphics.
Notes: With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the
Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by
English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are
members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration,
harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states.
Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme weather events such as tropical storms and
hurricanes, which can significantly affect their economies and infrastructure. Recent scientific
studies suggest that climate change may be increasing the intensity of such events.59 In September
2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread damage to the northwestern Bahamian islands of
Grand Bahama and Abaco, with 70 confirmed deaths and many missing.60 The United States

57 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/.
58 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/.
59 See, for example, Kieran T Bhatia et al., “Recent Increases in T ropical Cyclone Intensification Rates,” Nature
Com m unications
, vol. 10, no. 635 (2019).
60 T he Government of the Bahamas, Cabinet & Disaster Management (NEMA), “Hurricane Dorian, NEMA Update,”
November 29, 2019.
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responded with nearly $34 mil ion in humanitarian assistance, including almost $25 mil ion
provided through USAID. Prior to the hurricane, the State Department had launched a U.S.-
Caribbean Resilience Partnership in April 2019, with the goal of increasing regional disaster
response capacity and promoting resilience to natural disasters. In December 2019, USAID
announced it was providing $10 mil ion to improve local resilience to disasters in the Caribbean.
The COVID-19 pandemic is having a significant economic impact on many Caribbean countries
that depend on tourism. In 2020, al Caribbean economies (with the exception of Guyana) are
expected to experience deep recessions. Caribbean nations that depend on tourism are projected
to have economic declines wel over 10%, according to the IMF.61 As of the end of 2020, the
Dominican Republic reported 2,414 COVID-19 deaths, the highest for any country in the
Caribbean region, while the countries in the region with the highest mortality rates of deaths per
100,000 were Belize (64.74) and the Bahamas (44.08).62
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress continued to appropriate funds for Caribbean regional
programs. Over the past two fiscal years, Congress has funded the CBSI at levels significantly
higher than requested by the Trump Administration. For FY2019, Congress appropriated $58
mil ion for the CBSI ($36.2 mil ion was requested), in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019
(P.L. 116-6). For FY2020, the Trump Administration requested $40.2 mil ion for the CBSI, about
a 30% drop from FY2019 appropriations. Ultimately, Congress appropriated not less than $60
mil ion for the CBSI for FY2020 in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-
94).
For FY2021, the Administration requested $32 mil ion for the CBSI, a cut of almost 47% from
that appropriated for FY2020, but in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260),
Congress provided not less than $74.8 mil ion. In other legislative action on the CBSI, the House
approved H.R. 7703, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act, on November 18,
2020, although the Senate did not take action on the measure. The bil would have authorized
$74.8 mil ion for the CBSI for each year from FY2021 through FY2015, including monitoring
and reporting requirements for the CBSI, and would have required the State Department to
prioritize efforts to increase disaster response and resilience by carrying out such programs in
beneficiary countries.
In other FY2021 assistance designated for the Caribbean, P.L. 116-260 provided $10 mil ion in
development assistance for the Caribbean region “to enhance island disaster recovery and
resilience and to assist the Caribbean region in adapting to, and mitigating the effec ts of, climate
change, to include supporting the Caribbean Islands’ consortium of higher education institutions
to inform and advance pre-disaster assessment and recovery.”63 The explanatory statement also
provided $2 mil ion in development assistance for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean.
Congress has also continued to provide funding for the CESI, appropriating $2 mil ion in FY2019
(P.L. 116-6) and $3 mil ion in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, the explanatory statement to
P.L. 116-260 provides $3 mil ion for the CESI.

61 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020.
62 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021,
updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
63 For FY2020, the report to the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill,
H.Rept. 116-178 to H.R. 2839, directed that bilateral economic assistance be made available to strengthen resilience to
emergencies and disasters in the Caribbean. (Division G of the explanatory statement to P.L. 116-94 provided that
federal departments and agencies were directed to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions
contained in H.Rept. 116-78 accompanying H.R. 2839 and S.Rept. 116-126 accompanying S. 2583, unless specifically
directed to the contrary.)
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More broadly, the conference report to the FY2021 NDAA (H.Rept. 116-617 to P.L. 116-283)
states that enhancing partnerships between the United States and Caribbean nations is in the U.S.
strategic interest, and that the United States should pursue opportunities to strengthen engagement
in the Caribbean consistent with the objections of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the
State Department’s Caribbean 2020 strategy. Such efforts, according to the conference report,
should include a commitment to strengthening security relationships and interoperability, and
advancing trade and investment, academic exchanges, and other cooperative efforts between the
United States and the Caribbean region.
As noted above in the section on “Trade Policy,” the 116th Congress also approved legislation
(P.L. 116-164, signed into law in October 2020) extending for 10 year, through September 2030,
trade preferences in the Caribbean Basin Trade Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act that
currently benefit eight Caribbean countries.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by
Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS Insight IN11171, Bahamas: Response to Hurricane Dorian, by Rhoda Margesson
and Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke and
Rachel L. Martin; CRS In Focus IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In
Focus IF10912, Jamaica, by Mark P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF10914, Trinidad and Tobago,
by Mark P. Sullivan.
Cuba
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human
rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959
Cuban revolution. Current Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro in April
2018, but Castro wil continue to head Cuba’s Communist Party until the next party congress,
scheduled for April 2021. In 2019, a new constitution took effect; it introduced some political and
economic reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the economy and the Communist
Party’s predominant political role. A November 2020 government crackdown on the San Isidro
Movement, a civil society group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression, spurred a protest
by several hundred Cubans and focused international attention on Cuba’s poor human rights
record.
The Cuban economy is being hard-hit by the economic effects of the response to the COVID-19
pandemic, reduced support from Venezuela, and increased U.S. economic sanctions. The Cuban
government reports that the economy contracted 11% in 2020; the global contraction in economic
growth, trade, foreign investment, and tourism likely wil slow post-COVID-19 economic
recovery. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy
changes, but the slow pace of these reforms has not fostered sustainable growth and development.
Amid the pandemic, the government has implemented more reforms and on December 10, 2020,
announced its dual-currency system would be eliminated on January 1, 2021, a major reform that
has long been debated. Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have
been effective. At the end of 2020, the country reported 146 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.29
deaths per 100,000 people, according to Johns Hopkins University, among the lowest rates in the
hemisphere.64

64 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses, January 1, 2021,
updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.

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Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions
aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy
toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation strengthening—and at times easing—U.S.
economic sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from
sanctions and toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic
relations; the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; and an
increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented through
regulatory changes.
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017 that introduced new sanctions and
rolled back some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations. In September
2017, the State Department reduced the staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response
to unexplained health injuries of members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana. The
reduction affected embassy operations, especial y visa processing. In November 2017, the
Administration restricted financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military,
intel igence, and security services; the “Cuba restricted list” has been updated several times, most
recently in September 2020. By 2019, the Administration had largely abandoned engagement and
increased sanctions to pressure the Cuban government on human rights and for its support of the
Venezuelan government of Nicolás Maduro.
In 2019 and 2020, the sanctions included a wide array of restrictions, especial y on travel and
remittances. Restrictions on travel included eliminating people-to-people educational travel,
limiting air travel between the United States and Cuba, prohibiting cruise ship travel, and
prohibiting U.S. travelers from staying at over 400 hotels and private residences for rent.
Restrictions on remittances limited family remittances, eliminated the category of donative
remittances, and implemented new regulations that resulted in Western Union (the major
company used for transmitting remittances to Cuba) ceasing its operations in Cuba. Other trade
and financial sanctions restricted Cuba’s access to leased commercial aircraft, reimposed a
license requirement for third-country companies exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10%
U.S. origin, and eliminated the use of U-turn transactions that al owed banking institutions to
process certain funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States. Sanctions
also targeted Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba. The Administration al owed lawsuits to go forward
(pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114) against those al eged to be trafficking
in confiscated property in Cuba, and imposed visa restrictions on several high-ranking Cuban
officials, including Raul Castro, for human rights violations. The Administration also initiated a
campaign highlighting al egations of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical mission,
and in May 2020, added Cuba to its annual list of countries certified as not cooperating fully with
U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress continued to fund Cuba democracy assistance and
U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 mil ion for democracy programs and
$29.1 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and $20 mil ion for democracy programs
and $20.973 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division G). For FY2021, the
Administration requested $10 mil ion for democracy programs and $12.973 mil ion for
broadcasting. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) and its explanatory
statement, Congress provided $20 mil ion for Cuba democracy programs, $12.973 mil ion for
Cuba broadcasting, and al owed for the transfer of up to $7 mil ion from the U.S. Agency for
Global Media’s Buying Power Maintenance Account to help manage the cost of Office of Cuba
Broadcasting reform begun in 2019.
In other completed action, P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for State Department
employees and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba. The FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283
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(Section 1110), extends such benefits to personnel of other federal agencies. The Senate also
approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, cal ing for the unconditional release of democracy activist
José Daniel Ferrer.
In September 2019, the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and
Trade (House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee) held a hearing on the human rights situation in
Cuba (see Appendix).
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan;
and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P.
Sullivan.
Haiti
During the administration of President Jovenel Moïse, who was inaugurated in February 2017,
Haiti has been experiencing political and social unrest, high inflation, and resurgent gang
violence. The Haitian judiciary is investigating Moïse’s possible involvement in money
laundering, irregular loans, and embezzlement; the president denies these al egations. He has
dismissed some officials looking into corruption.65 Because Haiti failed to hold legislative
elections scheduled for October 2019, there is currently no functioning legislature. Moïse has
been ruling by decree since January 2020. There is some debate whether his five-year term ends
on February 7 of 2021 or 2022; Moïse asserts the latter. There may be heightened tensions that
day.
In mid-2018, Moïse decided to end oil subsidies, which, coupled with deteriorating economic
conditions, sparked massive protests. Government instability heightened after May 2019, when
the Superior Court of Auditors delivered a report to the Haitian Senate al eging Moïse had
embezzled mil ions of dollars. Nevertheless, a legislative motion to impeach the president did not
pass. Mass demonstrations have cal ed for an end to corruption, the provision of government
services, and Moïse’s resignation. Moïse has said that he wil not resign.
Because the legislature also did not pass an elections law, the terms of the entire lower Chamber
of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of al local
government posts, without newly elected officials to take their place. Since January 2020, the
U.N., the OAS, and others have encouraged a dialogue among the government, opposition, civil
society, and private sector to establish a functioning government, develop a plan for reform,
create a constitutional revision process, and set an electoral calendar.66 Early talks stal ed without
producing a national unity government.
President Moïse appointed a new cabinet and prime minister, Joseph Jouthe, and replaced elected
mayors with his own nominees, al by decree. Although creating some stability, the appointments
also served to solidify his political control. Moïse has little public support. Armed gangs have
proliferated in recent years and targeted low-income neighborhoods where citizens held anti-
government protests. Moïse fired a justice minister after he criticized the government’s response
to the rise in gangs and violent crime as inadequate. Haitian politicians historical y have used

65 Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “Hearing Before Regional
Human Rights Body Leads to Request for Site Visit t o Haiti,” October 4, 2019, p. 2; and EIU, Haiti Country Report, 3rd
Quarter 2020.
66 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, S/2020/123, “United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti,”
February 13, 2020, p. 3.
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gangs for political benefits, and some observers raise concerns that pro-government gangs wil
weaken opposition to Moïse. Former police officer Jimmy Cherizier, who goes by “Barbecue,” is
leading a coalition of gangs that has committed massacres, kidnappings, and extortion; although
he and Moïse deny any agreement, Cherizier has attacked government critics.67
U.N. and U.S. officials have been pressing for Haiti to hold legislative and municipal elections as
soon as possible. Instead, Moïse announced in October 2020 that his government would hold a
referendum on a new constitution, and elections after that. Some observers are concerned Moïse
wil use decrees to advance constitutional reforms he advocates, including changes to strengthen
Haiti’s presidency and possibly a provision to al ow presidential reelection, setting himself up for
a second consecutive term, which Haiti’s current constitution prohibits. The Trump
Administration cal ed on Haiti to hold elections by January 2021, and said constitutional reforms
should follow elections.68 Some observers argue that by continuing to support Moïse, the United
Nations, the United States, and other international partners are facilitating Moïse’s apparent effort
to rule by decree as long as possible.69
Haiti has received high levels of U.S. assistance for many years given its proximity to the United
States and its status as the poorest country in the hemisphere. In recent years, it was the second-
largest recipient of U.S. aid in the region, after Colombia. Since a peak in 2010, the year a
massive earthquake hit the country, aid to Haiti has been declining steadily. Since 2014, a
prolonged drought and a hurricane have severely affected Haiti’s food supply. U.N. peacekeepers
inadvertently introduced cholera in Haiti in 2010. After nine years, Haiti has contained the
epidemic, having zero laboratory-confirmed cases of cholera since January 2019.70
The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti since 2004, recently shifting from peacekeeping
missions to a political office, authorizing its Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) in 2019, and
extending it for another year to October 15, 2021. The office’s mandate is to protect and promote
human rights and to advise the government of Haiti on strengthening political stability and good
governance through support for an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue.
With the support of U.N. peacekeeping forces and U.S. and other international assistance, the
Haitian National Police (HNP) force became increasingly professional and took on responsibility
for domestic security. New police stations have given more Haitians access to security services,
but with 14,000-15,000 officers, the HNP’s size remains below international standards for the
country’s population. It is also underfunded. Recently, however, members of the HNP have
protested their low pay and unsafe working conditions, and their protests have repeatedly turned
violent. According to the U.N., the HNP has committed human rights abuses, including 19
extrajudicial kil ings in September and October 2019.71

67Ingrid Arnesen and Anthony Faiola, “In Haiti, Coronavirus and a Man Named Barbecue T est the Rule of Law,”
Washington Post, August 14, 2020.
68 Jacqueline Charles, “ T rump Administration Steps up Pressure for Moïse to Stage Haiti’s Overdue Elections,” Miami
Herald
, November 2, 2020.
69 Jacques Létang, “Annex II: Statement by the President of the Haitian Bars Federation, Jacques Létang,” United
Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 23 June 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the
Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of th e Security Council,” S/2020/568, June 23,
2020, pp. 5-6; and EIU, Haiti Country Report, 3rd Quarter 2020.
70 T he World Bank, “Haiti: Overview,” May 1, 2020.
71 Marta Hurtado, “Press briefing note on Haiti unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
November 1, 2019.
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The COVID-19 pandemic adds an additional chal enge to governance. The government has
limited resources to treat the disease and prevent its spread. Health experts and some Members of
Congress cal ed for the United States to suspend U.S. deportations of Haitians because they pose
a high risk of introducing COVID-19 in Haiti.72 Such deportations continued throughout 2020.
Experts expected the disease to spread rapidly and result in a high death rate, given conditions in
Haiti. Yet the low number of cases baffles scientists. As of December 31, 2020, Haiti reported
10,015 confirmed cases and 236 deaths.73 While there may be under-reporting, hospitalizations
did not reach critical levels, and officials did not need to implement other emergency plans.74
Nonetheless, health experts worry that a higher surge could stil happen. Haiti has implemented
some measures to limit the spread of the corona virus, but observance and enforcement are lax.
Despite a surge in cases in early June, Moïse reopened borders in July, hoping to increase
economic activity. The government also is not wel equipped to deal with the pandemic ’s
economic impact; Haiti’s economy is expected to contract by at least 4% in 2020.75
As of August 2020, the State Department reported that the United States was providing $13.2
mil ion in previously announced health and humanitarian assistance for Haiti to support efforts to
respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, including aid to support risk communication, improve water
and sanitation, prevent infections in health facilities, manage COVID-19 cases, and strengthen
laboratories.76
Congressional Action: Congress provided an estimated $172.5 mil ion for Haiti through the
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94). The act required that aid to Haiti be
provided only through the regular notification procedures. Under the act, economic assistance for
Haiti could not be made available for assistance to the Haitian central government unless the
Secretary of State certified and reported to the Committees on Appropriations that the
government was taking effective steps to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption, increase
government revenues, and resolve commercial disputes. The act provided budget authority for
$51 mil ion in development assistance; it also provided $10 mil ion in International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement funds for prison assistance, prioritizing improvements to meet
basic sanitation, medical, nutritional, and safety needs at Haiti’s National Penitentiary. The
measure also prohibited the provision of appropriated funds for assistance to Haiti’s armed forces.
The Administration’s FY2021 request for Haiti totaled $128.2 mil ion, almost a 26% cut
compared with estimated assistance being provided in FY2020. The Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) extends the certification requirement contained in P.L. 116-94, provides
budget authority for $51 mil ion in development assistance, and not less than $5 mil ion to
address the basic sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of prisoners, and for alternatives to the
National Penitentiary. The act makes the Haitian government eligible to purchase defense articles
and services for the Coast Guard, and prohibits funding under the act for assistance to Haiti’s
armed forces. The act requires that most aid to Haiti, including development assistance, be
provided only through the regular notification procedures. The explanatory statement to the act

72 Jacqueline Charles and Monique O. Madan, “Haiti Coronavirus Panel Demands that ICE Halt Deportations until
Pandemic Is Controlled,” Miami Herald, May 10, 2020.
73 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021,
updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality; and Kevin Sieff, “ Haiti, Spared A Major Coronavirus
Outbreak So Far, Now a ‘T inderbox’ Set to ‘Explode,’” Washington Post, May 15, 2020.
74 Jacqueline Charles, “ Despite Lax rules, COVID Claims Few Lives in Haiti. Scientists Want to Know Why,” Miami
Herald
, December 16, 2020.
75International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020.
76 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “ Update: T he United States Is Continuing T o Lead the
Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020.
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(pursuant to H.Rept. 116-444) directs the Secretary of State to report to the appropriate
committees, within 45 days, on U.S. steps taken to address cholera and further the recovery of
cholera victims and their families in Haiti.
Congress also approved legislation (P.L. 116-164, signed into law in October 2020) extending
certain trade preferences to Haiti and seven other Caribbean nations for another 10 years, through
September 2030 (see “Trade Policy” section, above.)
In other action, the House approved H.R. 5586, the Haiti, Development, Accountability, and
Institutional Transparency Act, in November 2000, which would have required the State
Department, in coordination with USAID, take actions to measure the progress of recovery and
efforts to address corruption, rule and law, and media freedoms in Haiti.
The House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held a hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti in
December 2019; the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing on human rights in
Haiti in March 2020 (see Appendix).
For background, see CRS Report R45034, Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions, by
Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
Congress has demonstrated renewed interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading
partner with which the United States has a close but complicated relationship. In recent decades,
U.S.-Mexican relations have improved, as the countries have become close trade partners and
worked to address migration, crime and other issues of shared concern. Nevertheless, the history
of U.S. military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico and the asymmetry in the relationship
continue to provoke periodic tension. The October 2020 arrest of former defense minister
Salvador Cienfuegos in the United States on drug trafficking charges deeply angered the Mexican
government. Despite his subsequent release, Mexico’s Congress enacted reforms to limit U.S. law
enforcement operations in Mexico.
The United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), approved by Congress in
January 2020, entered into force on July 1, 2020, and its implementation is likely to receive
congressional attention. Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized-crime-related
violence in Mexico on U.S. security interests and U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico and has
increased oversight of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Congress has appropriated foreign
assistance for Mexico and overseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound unauthorized
migration, il egal drug flows, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement
(MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018.
He is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majorities in both legislative
chambers. In addition to combating corruption, he pledged to build infrastructure in southern
Mexico, revive the poor-performing state oil company, address citizen security through social
programs, and adopt a non-interventionist foreign policy.
President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained relatively high (64% in December
2020), even as his government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence, the
COVID-19 pandemic, and a deep recession. In 2019, most Mexicans approved of the López
Obrador government’s new social programs and minimum wage increases, but some opposed
large cuts to government expenditures. After high-profile massacres and record homicide levels,
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the López Obrador government has come under pressure to improve its security strategy.
Mexico’s economy recorded zero growth in 2019, and the IMF estimates that it may contract
9.0% in 2020. Nevertheless, President López Obrador has been slow to implement economic
policies and public health measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, which had caused
almost 126,000 reported deaths as of the end of 2020.77
U.S.-Mexico relations under the López Obrador government have remained general y cordial.
Tensions have emerged over several issues, however, including trade disputes and tariffs,
immigration and border security issues, U.S. citizens kil ed in Mexico and most recently, U.S.
investigations of Mexican officials. Security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative has
continued, including efforts to address the production and trafficking of opioids and
methamphetamine, but the Administration has pushed Mexico to improve its antidrug efforts. The
López Obrador’s administration has accommodated the Trump Administration’s border and
asylum policy changes that have shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering asylum
to Mexico. After enacting labor reforms and raising wages, the López Obrador administration
achieved a key foreign policy goal: U.S. congressional approval of implementing legislation for
the USMCA. On July 8, 2020, President López Obrador traveled to Washington, DC, to meet
with President Trump to mark the agreement’s entry into force and signed a joint declaration on
bilateral relations.78
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress closely followed the Trump Administration’s efforts
to renegotiate NAFTA and recommended modifications to the proposed USMCA (on labor, the
environment, and dispute settlement, among other topics) that led to the three countries signing an
amendment to the agreement on December 10, 2019. The House approved the implementing
legislation for the proposed USMCA in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in January
16, 2020 (P.L. 116-113). The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) required a classified assessment of
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and alien smuggling in Mexico.
Congress provided $162.5 mil ion in foreign assistance to Mexico in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and an
estimated $157.9 mil ion in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, the Administration requested
$63.8 mil ion for Mexico, a decline of almost 60% compared with that provided in FY2020. The
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, (P.L. 116-260) provides $158.9 mil ion for Mexico
subject to the same withholding requirements as in S.Rept. 116-126 on Foreign Military
Financing, but also requires the State Department to certify that Mexico has adopted “credible
counternarcotics and law enforcement strategies…[that are] consistent with the right of due
process and protection of human rights.” The act also incorporated the United States-Mexico
Economic Partnership Act in Division FF, Title XIX (original y approved by the House and
Senate, respectively, in January 2019 and January 2020 as an earlier version of H.R. 133)
directing the Secretary of State to enhance economic cooperation and educational and
professional exchanges with Mexico and requiring the State Department to develop a strategy to
achieve those aims. Division O, Title VI of the act also includes technical corrections to the
USMCA. The explanatory statement accompanying the act includes reporting requirements from
H.Rept. 116-444 that require a comprehensive strategy on the Mérida Initiative, as wel as reports
on (1) steps Mexico is taking to meet human rights standards, (2) how Mexico is addressing
highway crimes, and (3) the chal enges facing U.S. citizen minors in Mexico. The conference

77 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021,
updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
78 T he White House, “ Remarks by President T rump and President López Obrador of the United Mexican States in
Signing of a Joint Declaration,” July 8, 2020.
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report, H.Rept. 116-617, to the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires a comprehensive report
on past and future U.S. support for Mexican security forces.
For additional information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues,
and Implications
, by M. Angeles Vil arreal; CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada
(USMCA) Trade Agreement
, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS In Focus
IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2021, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS
Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S.
Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke;
and CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-
Mexico Security Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Central America’s Northern Triangle
The Northern Triangle region of Central America (see Figure 3) has received considerable
attention from U.S. policymakers over the past decade, as it has become a major transit corridor
for il icit drugs and has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the
United States. In FY2019, for example, U.S. authorities apprehended nearly 608,000
unauthorized migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras at the southwest border; 81%
of those apprehended were families or unaccompanied minors, many of whom were seeking
asylum.79 These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted chal enges in
the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels
of poverty. The COVID-19 pandemic and two Category 4 hurricanes exacerbated conditions in
the region in 2020, contributing to higher levels of unemployment and food insecurity while
creating opportunities for governments to curtail civil liberties and engage in corruption.
Figure 3. Map of Central America

Source: CRS Graphics.
Notes: Belize, although located in Central America, is considered a Caribbean country and belongs to the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
Since 2014, the United States has sought to improve security, strengthen governance, and
promote prosperity in the region through the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America.

79 CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2019,” October 29, 2019.
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Launched by the Obama Administration with support from Congress, the whole-of-government
strategy initial y doubled annual foreign assistance for the region. From FY2016-FY2021,
Congress appropriated more than $3.6 bil ion to implement the strategy, al ocating most of the
funds to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Annual appropriations measures have required a
portion of the aid to be withheld, however, until the Northern Triangle governments take steps to
improve border security, combat corruption, protect human rights, and address other
congressional concerns.
The Trump Administration maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
while repeatedly seeking to scale back the initiative. It proposed funding cuts ranging from 16%
to 33% in each of its annual budget requests, most of which were not adopted by Congress. The
Administration effectively halted the initiative in March 2019, however, when it suspended most
aid for the Northern Triangle due to the continued northward flow of migrants and asylum seekers
from the region. The aid suspension forced U.S. agencies to close some projects prematurely and
cancel some planned activities. Although Administration officials acknowledged that U.S. foreign
aid programs had been “producing the results [they] were intended to produce” with regard to
security, governance, and economic development in the region, they argued that, “the only metric
that matters is the question of what the migration situation looks like on the southern border” of
the United States.80
Over the course of 2019, the Trump Administration reprogrammed approximately $396 mil ion of
aid appropriated for the Northern Triangle to other foreign policy priorities while negotiating a
series of migration agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Under a “Safe Third
Country Agreement” (also known as an “Asylum Cooperative Agreement”), the United States
sent nearly 1,000 Hondurans and Salvadorans to Guatemala between November 2019 and March
2020, requiring them to apply for protection there rather than in the United States.81 Guatemala
suspended that agreement in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; similar agreements
with Honduras and El Salvador that had yet to be implemented also were suspended.82 Although
U.S. deportations to al three countries continued, Guatemala suspended repatriation flights on
multiple occasions due to nearly 200 deportees reportedly testing positive for COVID-19 after
arriving in Guatemala.83
The Trump Administration announced it would begin restoring aid to the region in October
2019—following the conclusion of the migration agreements—and obligated the last of the
suspended assistance in mid-2020. For FY2021, the Administration requested almost $377
mil ion for Central America, based on the assumption that countries in the region would continue
to take action to stem unauthorized migration to the United States. The request did not include
any foreign aid specifical y for El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, but the Administration
asserted that those countries could receive a portion of the assistance requested for regional
programs.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress demonstrated continued support for the U.S. Strategy
for Engagement in Central America but reduced annual funding for the initiative. Congress

80 Remarks of Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
and Kirsten D. Madison, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
“Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America, ” CQ
Congressional Transcripts
, September 25, 2019.
81 Instituto Guatemalteco de Migración, “T raslados Acuerdo de Cooperación de Asilo –ACA,” data provided to CRS in
April 2020.
82 T he T rump Administration concluded implementation accords with El Salvador and Honduras in December 2020,
but did not carry out any transfers under those Asylum Cooperative Agreements prior to the end of the year.
83 “Guatemala Says 8 Minors of 60 Deported Were COVID-19 Positive,” Associated Press, August 25, 2020.
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appropriated $525.1 mil ion for the Central America strategy in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), an
estimated $533.2 mil ion for the strategy in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94), and $505.9 mil ion for the
strategy in FY2021 (P.L. 116-260). Although those funding levels significantly exceeded the
Trump Administration’s budget requests, they were wel below the $750 mil ion Congress
appropriated for the Central America strategy in FY2016.
Congress also sought to improve the effectiveness of the Central America strategy. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee each held oversight hearings to assess U.S. policy and foreign assistance in Central
America (see Appendix). The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act
(Division FF, Title F of P.L. 116-260) requires the State Department, in coordination with other
agencies, to develop a five-year strategy to support inclusive economic growth, combat
corruption, strengthen democratic institutions, and improve security conditions in the Northern
Triangle. The act identifies priorities for U.S. policy as wel as objectives to incorporate into
annual benchmarks for measuring progress. Congress also continued to condition aid to the
Northern Triangle governments in annual appropriations measures, requiring those governments
to take steps toward addressing certain chal enges prior to receiving some U.S. support.
Corruption and human rights abuses in the region remained top congressional concerns. P.L. 116-
94 and P.L. 116-260 al ocated funding for the offices of attorneys general and other entities and
activities to combat corruption and impunity in Central America in FY2020 and FY2021. Both
measures also included funding to combat sexual and gender-based violence in the region, and to
support the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala and
Honduras and El Salvador’s National Commission for the Search of Persons Disappeared in the
Context of the Armed Conflict. The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act
requires the President to identify and impose visa restrictions on individuals who have
undermined democratic institutions or engaged in significant corruption in the region. The
explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 directs the State Department to produce a
similar list of corrupt officials. The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92, Section 1268) directed DOD to
enter into an agreement with an independent institution to conduct an analysis of the human rights
situation in Honduras. The act, in Section 1267, also required DOD to certify, prior to the transfer
of any vehicles to the Guatemalan government, that the government has made a credible
commitment to use such equipment only as intended. The FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283, Section
1299K) extends the certification requirement for assistance to Guatemala for another year.
For additional information, see CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America: Policy Issues for Congress
, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador:
Background and U.S. Relations
, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala:
Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS
Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer; and CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB10402, Safe Third Country Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries:
Background and Legal Issues, by Ben Harrington.
Nicaragua
President Daniel Ortega, who turned 75 in November 2020, has been suppressing popular unrest
in Nicaragua in a manner reminiscent of Anastasio Somoza, the dictator he helped overthrow in
1979 as a leader of the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Ortega served as
president from 1985 to 1990, during which time the United States backed right-wing insurgents
known as contras in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government. In the early 1990s,
Nicaragua began to establish democratic governance. Democratic space has narrowed as the
FSLN and Ortega have consolidated control over the country’s institutions, including while
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Ortega served as an opposition leader in the legislature from 1990 until 2006. Ortega reclaimed
the presidency in 2007 and has served as president for the past 13 years, becoming increasingly
authoritarian. Until recently, for many Nicaraguans, Ortega’s populist social welfare programs
that improved their standard of living outweighed his authoritarian tendencies and self-
enrichment. Similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua
outweighed Ortega’s antidemocratic actions.
Ortega’s long-term strategy to retain control of the government began to unravel in 2018 when
his proposal to reduce social security benefits triggered protests led by a wide range of
Nicaraguans. The government’s repressive response led to an estimated 325-600 extrajudicial
kil ings, torture, political imprisonment, suppression of the press, and thousands of citizens going
into exile.84 The government says it was defending itself from coup attempts. Such suppression
has continued. The crisis undermined economic growth in the hemisphere’s second poorest
country, and international economic sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and hurricane damage
made it worse. Nicaragua’s economy contracted by 3.9% in 2019; in October 2020, the IMF
estimated it would contract by 5.5% in 2020, and by 0.5% in 2021, with unemployment nearly
doubling from 6% to 11% from 2019 to 2021.85
The international community has sought to hold the Ortega government accountable for human
rights abuses and facilitate the reestablishment of democracy in Nicaragua. An Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights team concluded in July 2018 that the Nicaraguan security forces’
actions could be considered crimes against humanity. In November 2019, the OAS High Level
Commission on Nicaragua concluded that the government’s actions “make the democratic
functioning of the country impossible,” in violation of Nicaragua’s obligations under Article 1 of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Many OAS members reportedly are urging that
Nicaragua be suspended from the organization.86 In October 2020, the OAS stated that the Ortega
government has repeatedly violated the rule of law, altered constitutional order, and violated
human rights.87 The same month, the OAS passed a resolution urging the government to commit
to concrete electoral reforms, especial y making the electoral council independent and transparent
before convoking general elections or no later than May 2021.88
The Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335) effectively blocks
access to new multilateral lending to Nicaragua. The Trump Administration has imposed targeted
sanctions against multiple high-level officials, including Vice President and First Lady Rosario
Muril o, and three of the president’s sons. In 2020, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions
against the Nicaraguan National Police for its role in serious human rights abuses.
Dialogue between the government and the opposition collapsed in 2019 and has not resumed.
Two wings of protest groups united into the National Coalition, hoping to present a unified
candidate in November 2021 general elections. Sandinista-controlled state institutions are likely
to impede such efforts, however. The legislature passed a law requiring individuals or groups who
receive funding from foreign entities to register as foreign agents, and forbidding them from

84 Organization of American States, Report of the High-Level Commission on Nicaragua of the Organization of
Am erican States
, November 19, 2019.
85 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020.
86 EIU, Nicaragua Country Report, August 2020.
87 OAS, “Statement from the General Secretariat on the Situation in Nicaragua,” press release E-102/20, October 15,
2020.
88 OAS, “ Resolution Restoring Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights in Nicaragua T hrough Free and
Fair Elections,” press release S-019/20, October 22, 2020.
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running for public office. As his popularity declined, Ortega was pushing for passage of a bil in
December 2020 that opposition groups say is designed to keep them from running for office in
the upcoming elections. The bil would make people who cal for sanctions against Nicaragua or
take certain other actions ineligible for public office.89
Although Nicaragua announced its first case of COVID-19 on March 18, 2020, as of December
16, the Sandinista government had not established any type of quarantine or taken international y
recommended preventive measures against the COVID-19 virus, instead denouncing quarantine
and distancing orders as destructive, and encouraging large gatherings. 90 Meanwhile, civil and
regional health organizations have cal ed for voluntary quarantines and stricter health measures.
Experts and other observers are concerned that the government is concealing the disease’s spread.
The government reported just over 6,000 cases and 165 deaths as of the end of 2020,91 but an
independent, citizen-run registry reported 10,733 cases and 2,780 deaths as of October 14, 2020,
and a news analysis reported in October that the government was hiding over 6,000 corona virus-
related deaths.92 Some observers say the government is burying patients suspected of dying of
COVID-19 within hours and concealing the cause of death from families.93
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress expressed concern about the erosion of democracy
and human rights abuses in Nicaragua. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L.
116-94) appropriated $10 mil ion for foreign assistance programs to promote democracy and the
rule of law in Nicaragua. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) and its
explanatory statement provides $10 mil ion for democracy and civil society programs in
Nicaragua, and provides that various types of funding for Nicaragua may not be obligated or
spent except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on
Appropriations.
In March 2020, the House approved H.Res. 754, a resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that the United States should continue to support the people of Nicaragua in their
peaceful efforts to promote democracy and human rights and to use the tools under U.S. law to
increase political and financial pressure on the Ortega government. In June 2020, the Senate
agreed to a similar resolution, S.Res. 525. In June 2019, the House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee held a hearing on the Nicaraguan government’s repression of dissent (see
Appendix).
South America
Argentina
Current President Alberto Fernández of the center-left Peronist Frente de Todos (FdT, Front for
Al ) ticket won the October 2019 presidential election and was inaugurated to a four-year term in

89 “Daniel Ortega pushes for a law that will prevent the opposition from participating in the 2021 elections,” CE
Noticias Financieras, December 20, 2020.
90 Elizabeth Gonzalez, Katie Hopkins, Luisa Horwitz, et al., “ T he Coronavirus in Latin America,” AS/COA, December
16, 2020.
91 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses, January 1, 2021,
updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
92 Elizabeth Gonzalez, Katie Hopkins, Luisa Horwitz, et al., “ T he Coronavirus in Latin America,” AS/COA, December
16, 2020.
93 Alfredo Zuniga, “Quick burials in Nicaragua hint at a coronavirus crisis that officials say doesn’t exist,” Associated
Press, May 12, 2020.
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December 2019. He defeated incumbent President Mauricio Macri of the center-right Juntos por
el Cambio
(JC, Together for Change) coalition by a solid margin of 48.1% to 40.4% but by
significantly less than the 15 to 20 percentage points predicted by polls. The election also
returned to government former leftist Peronist President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-
2015), who ran on the FdT ticket as vice president.
Argentina’s economic decline in 2018 and 2019, with high inflation and increasing poverty, was
the major factor in Macri’s electoral defeat. Macri had ushered in economic policy changes in
2016-2017 that lifted currency controls, reduced or eliminated agricultural export taxes, and
reduced electricity, water, and heating subsidies. In 2018, as the economy faced pressure from a
severe drought and large budget deficits, the IMF supported the government with a $57 bil ion
program. Macri’s economic reforms and IMF support were not enough to stem Argentina’s
economic decline, and the government reimposed currency controls and took other measures to
stabilize the economy.
Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Fernández faced an economy in
crisis, with a recession expected to extend into 2020, high poverty, and a high level of
unsustainable public debt requiring restructuring. He pledged to restructure Argentina’s debt by
the end of March 2020, and opened talks with bondholders and other creditors, including the IMF.
Fernández also rolled out several measures, including a food program and price controls on basic
goods, aimed at helping low-income Argentines cope with inflation and increased poverty. By
August 2020, the government announced it had reached an agreement with private bondholders
for a $66 bil ion restructuring agreement, and in November 2020 began negotiations with the IMF
for a new lending arrangement; the government currently owes $44 bil ion to the IMF under a
previous lending arrangement during the Macri government.94 With the economic shutdown
because of the pandemic, the IMF initial y forecast in April 2020 an economic contraction of
5.7% in 2020, but in October, revised its forecast to an economic contraction of 11.8%.95
Initial y the Fernández government’s swift action in March 2020 imposing strict quarantine
measures to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant effect in keeping death rates
low initial y, but by July, the number of cases and deaths began to increase significantly. As of the
end of 2020, Argentina recorded over 1.6 mil ion cases, over 43,000 deaths, and a mortality rate
over 97 per 100,000 inhabitants, one of the highest in the hemisphere.96
U.S. relations with Argentina were strong under the Macri government, marked by increasing
engagement on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. After Argentina’s 2019
presidential race, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States looked forward to
working with the Fernández administration to promote regional security, prosperity, and the rule
of law. One point of contention in relations could be Argentina’s stance on Venezuela. Under
Macri, Argentina was strongly critical of the antidemocratic actions of the Maduro government.
The country joined with other regional countries in 2017 to form the Lima Group seeking a
democratic resolution, and in 2019, recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan
Guaidó, as the country’s interim president. In contrast, the Fernández government does not
recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, although it has not refrained from
condemning human rights abuses under the Maduro government.

94 “Argentina: Gov’t and Bondholders Reach Agreement,” LatinNews Daily, August 4, 2020; and “Negotiations with
the IMF Get Under Way,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 23, 2020.
95 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020, and “Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An
Intensifying Pandemic,” IMF Blog, June 26, 2020.
96 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021,
updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
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Congressional Action: Argentina has not traditional y received much U.S. foreign aid because of
its relatively high per capita income level, but for each of FY2018-FY2020, Congress
appropriated $2.5 mil ion in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance to
support Argentina’s counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and law enforcement capabilities.
Congress has expressed concern over the years about progress in bringing to justice those
responsible for the July 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in
Buenos Aires that kil ed 85 people. Both Iran and Hezbollah (the radical Lebanon-based Islamic
group) al egedly are linked to the attack, as wel as to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires that kil ed 29 people. As the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing approached in
July 2019, the House approved H.Res. 441, reiterating condemnation of the attack and expressing
strong support for accountability; the Senate followed suit in October 2019 when it approved
S.Res. 277.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10932, Argentina: An Overview, by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10991, Argentina’s Economic Crisis and Default, by Rebecca M.
Nelson; and CRS Insight IN11184, Argentina’s 2019 Elections, by Mark P. Sullivan and Angel
Carrasquil o Benoit.
Bolivia
Bolivia experienced relative stability and prosperity from 2006 to 2019, but as governance
standards weakened, relations with the United States deteriorated under populist President Evo
Morales. Morales was the country’s first indigenous president and leader of the Movement
Toward Socialism (MAS) party. In November 2019, Morales resigned and went into exile amid
nationwide protests against a disputed October first-round election in which he had claimed
victory. Luis Arce, Morales’s former finance minister, took office a year later, after winning 55%
of the vote in October 2020 elections in which the MAS also maintained a legislative majority.
President Arce faces many chal enges, including how to address the COVID-19 pandemic and
how to manage relations with the United States.
President Arce is an economist who worked in Bolivia’s central bank prior to serving as minister
of finance. He has pledged to govern in a conciliatory fashion, but clashes between his
government and eastern, opposition-led provinces could stil occur. The findings of an Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights investigation into two massacres in 2019 is likely to
ignite tensions if former interim government officials are cited for abuses. Intra-party disputes
between hardline and moderate MAS factions also could occur, particularly if Morales, recently
back from exile, seeks to exert undue influence over the government. With the IMF forecasting an
economic decline of 7.9% in 2020, the Arce government has vowed to raise taxes on the wealthy,
govern austerely, and renegotiate Bolivia’s debts.
U.S.-Bolivian relations are likely to remain chal enging, given tension in relations under Morales
and the Trump Administration’s strong support for the conservative interim government. U.S.
officials have vowed to work with President Arce on shared interests, but differences over drug
policy and geopolitics could prove difficult to overcome. With limited bilateral trade and
investment ties, the possibility of a resumption in U.S. foreign assistance could encourage
cooperation on some issues. In January 2020, President Trump waived restrictions on U.S.
assistance to Bolivia.97 USAID provided $5 mil ion supporting the 2020 elections, 200 ventilators
and related technical assistance to address COVID-19, and another $926,000 in health and

97 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “ Presidential Determination on Waiving a Restriction on United States
Assistance to Bolivia,” presidential memorandum, January 6, 2020.
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sanitation support. As of August 2020, the State Department said it had provided at least $900,000
to help Bolivia respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Congressional Action: Members of the 116th Congress expressed concerns about the situation in
Bolivia in resolutions and letters to the Administration. The Senate approved S.Res. 35 in April
2019, expressing support for democratic principles in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.
S.Res. 447, agreed to in the Senate in January 2020, expressed support for the prompt convening
of new elections. The explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriation Act,
2021 (P.L. 116-260) states that no assistance was requested and none was provided in the
agreement for lethal assistance for Bolivia. Some Members of Congress have congratulated Arce
on his victory and expressed hope for improved bilateral relations; others have concerns about the
return of a socialist government in Bolivia.
For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando
Seelke; and CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
Brazil
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous
country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
potential to become a world power and periodical y has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic
performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased
international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has struggled with a
series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep
recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises
contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma
Rousseff (2011-2016). They also discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for
right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in October 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has implemented some economic and
regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed
hardline security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-
based coalition to advance his agenda, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized
by taking social y conservative stands on cultural issues and verbal y attacking perceived
enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government.
This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential al ies within the
conservative-leaning congress and hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious chal enges, such as
the COVID-19 pandemic and accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has
placed additional stress on the country’s already strained democratic institutions.
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved aw ay from Brazil’s traditional
commitment to autonomy and toward closer alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro
coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional chal enges, such as the crisis in
Venezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations.
On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro general y has adopted a
pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil’s major export markets. The
Trump Administration welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-
Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation
on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major non-NATO al y
for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2321k) and the
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Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). The United States and Brazil also forged
agreements on several trade and investment matters, including a Protocol on Trade Rules and
Transparency, concluded in October 2020, intended to foster cooperation on trade facilitation and
customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress continued long-standing U.S. support for
environmental conservation efforts in Brazil. In September 2019, the House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee held an oversight hearing on preserving the Amazon rainforest that focused on the
surge of fires and deforestation in the region (see Appendix). Congress ultimately appropriated
$15 mil ion for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 mil ion to
address fires in the region, in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94).
That amount was $4 mil ion more than Congress appropriated for environmental programs in the
Brazilian Amazon in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). Congress increased
funding for environmental conservation efforts in the Brazilian Amazon to $17 mil ion in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260).
Congress also expressed concerns about human rights in Brazil. A provision of the FY2020
NDAA (P.L. 116-92, Section 1266) directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding the human rights climate in Brazil
and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. The House-passed FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283)
included a provision that would have prohibited the use of any federal funds to provide assistance
to Brazilian security forces to relocate indigenous or Quilombola communities involuntarily. That
provision was not included in the final legislation enacted over a presidential veto in January
2021, but the conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) encouraged the Secretary of Defense to further
strengthen U.S.-Brazil security relations while ensuring any security assistance provided to Brazil
is consistent with human rights and international law, as required by existing U.S. laws and
policies.
For additional information, see CRS Report R46236, Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles
Vil arreal; and CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by
Pervaze A. Sheikh et al.
Colombia
Colombia is a key U.S. al y in Latin America. Because of the country’s prominence in il egal
drug production, the United States and Colombia have forged a close relationship over the past
two decades. “Plan Colombia,” a program focused initial y on counternarcotics and later
counterterrorism, laid the foundation for an enduring security partnership. President Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC)—the country’s largest leftist guerril a organization at the time—his
government’s primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia’s
Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-
monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 13,200 FARC disarmed, demobilized,
and began the process of reintegration.
Iván Duque, a former senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, won the 2018
presidential election and was inaugurated to a four-year term in August 2018. Duque campaigned
as a critic of the peace accord and quickly suspended peace talks with the National Liberation
Army (ELN), Colombia’s current largest leftist guerril a group. President Duque’s approval
ratings slipped early in his presidency, and his government faced weeks of protests and strikes in
late 2019 focused on several administration policies, including what many Colombians viewed as
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a lackadaisical approach to peace accord implementation. According to polling in spring of 2020,
President Duque’s approval ratings rose from 23% in February to 52% in April—the highest of
his tenure. Although the rise likely was linked to Duque’s management of the COVID-19
pandemic, Colombian respondents rated corruption as their top concern, followed by
unemployment and the coronavirus.98
The Duque administration took early measures to contain the virus, including a national
lockdown beginning in March 2020, which was fitfully lifted between May and August 2020.
However, cases and deaths began to rise after that, and by the end of December 2020, Colombia
reported over 43,000 COVID-19 deaths.99 As of August 2020, the U.S. State Department reported
some $23.6 mil ion in pandemic-related response assistance, including humanitarian assistance to
reach Colombia’s most vulnerable populations.100
Along with the global pandemic, Colombia continues to face major chal enges. These include a
spike in coca cultivation and cocaine production; vulnerability to a mass migration of
Venezuelans; violence against human rights defenders and social activists, including recent
massacres of youth and those leading peace programs; and chal enges enacting the ambitious
peace accord commitments while controlling crime and violence by armed groups.101
In August 2019, a FARC splinter faction announced its return to arms. Neighboring Venezuela
appears to be sheltering and perhaps collaborating with FARC dissidents and ELN guerril a
forces. Some 3,000-4,000 former FARC fighters are estimated to have returned to armed struggle.
The majority of demobilized FARC members remain committed to the peace process, but face
numerous risks, with more than 200 former fighters and demobilized FARC kil ed since 2016.
In late 2020, some 1.7 mil ion Venezuelans were residing in Colombia, having fled their country.
The pandemic, however, has sharply strained the Duque government’s approach to receiving the
exodus of such migrants, with some opting to return to Venezuela as a result. In a controversial
announcement in December, President Duque said Venezuelan migrants would be excluded from
receiving the coronavirus vaccine unless they had either dual nationality or formal migratory
status. Health experts and humanitarian groups criticized the announcement.102
Colombia has set records in cocaine production in recent years. In 2019, according to U.S.
estimates, the country’s cocaine production reached 951 metric tons of pure cocaine. In 2019,
President Duque and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reaffirmed a March 2018 commitment to
work together to lower coca crop levels and cocaine production by 50% by 2023.103 President
Duque campaigned on resuming forced aerial eradication (or spraying of coca crops) with the
herbicide glyphosate, and in late August 2020, he cal ed for a resumption of spraying while

98 “Coronavirus Response Boosts Approval for Colombia’s Duque,” Reuters News, April 30, 2020.
99 Data from the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses,
January 1, 2021, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
100 U.S. State Department, “Update: T he United States is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” Fact Sheet,
August 21, 2020. T he support included 200 ventilators provided by the United States in June 2020.
101 Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said in a statement on December 15, 2020, that
Colombia’s government was not taking sufficient action to prevent “persistent violence across Colombia,” and
safeguard the fundamental rights of its population.
102 Joe Parkin Daniels, “Alarm at Colombia Plan to Exclude Migrants from Coronavirus Vaccine,” The Guardian,
December 23, 2020.
103 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to
Reduce Cocaine Supply,” Fact Sheet, March 5, 2020.
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escalating other means of forced eradication, such as forced manual eradication.104 Critics
contend only voluntary eradication coupled with alternative development wil reduce coca
cultivation sustainably.
For the past two years, Colombia has led a 26-country anti-drug operation cal ed the Orion
Campaign that included participation from Mexico, Central and South American nations, some
European nations, and the United States. In its most recent Phase VI, the multi-nation effort had
the participation of 29 countries and captured more than 90 metric tons of cocaine and destroyed
169 il icit drug laboratories.105
The United States remains Colombia’s top trading partner. In April 2020, Colombia became the
third Latin American country-member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development. Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the IMF forecast that Colombia’s economy
would exceed 3% growth in 2020; in its most recent estimate from October 2020, the IMF is
forecasting an economic contraction of 8.2%.106 In August 2020, the Trump Administration
announced a new United States-Colombia Growth Initiative, Colombia Crece, to harness
assistance from a variety of U.S. agencies to bring investment to Colombia’s rural areas and fight
crime through sustainable development and growth. According to the U.S. National Security
Adviser Robert O’Brien, on an official visit to Colombia in August, investment levels wil reach
$5 bil ion.107
Congressional Action: U.S. government assistance to Colombia over the past 20 years has
totaled nearly $12 bil ion, with funds appropriated by Congress mainly to the U.S. Departments
of State and Defense and to USAID.108 Many Members of Congress have expressed support for
Colombia’s continued leadership role to assist in a democratic transition in Venezuela and to
respond to the worsening humanitarian crisis. The State Department al ocated more than $400
mil ion by late 2019 to support countries receiving Venezuelan migrants, with over half for
Colombia, as the most severely affected country (also see “Venezuela” section).
For FY2020, Congress provided $448 mil ion in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2020 (P.L. 116-94), for State Department- and USAID-funded programs in Colombia. For
FY2021, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), Congress provided $461.4
mil ion in assistance for Colombia. This was the highest level of bilateral foreign assistance
appropriated for Colombia in a decade. A provision in the FY2021 NDAA conference report,
H.Rept. 116-617 to P.L. 116-283, requires the Defense Department to report within 120 days after
the NDAA’s passage any credible al egations since 2016 of misused intel igence assistance by
Colombian intel igence services, steps taken by DOD in response, and what the Colombian
government has done to punish those who misused the equipment to surveil civilians, such as
journalists, and steps to avoid future misuse.
For additional information, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,
by June S. Beittel; and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement:
Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Edward Y. Gracia.

104 Jake Kincaid, “Coca Eradication in Colombia Hits Post -peace-deal High During Coronavirus Pandemic,” Miami
Herald
, August 19, 2020.
105President Iván Duque, “ Declaración del Presidente Iván Duque en la Presentación de Resultados de la Campaña
Orión,” at https://www.yout ube.com/watch?v=Hjh7t4RFFaU&feature=emb_logo&app=desktop.
106 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020.
107 White House, “Statement by National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien,” press release, August 17, 2020;
“Colombia y Estados Unidos Lanzan Iniciativa ‘Colombia Crece,’” El Tiempo (Colombia), August 17, 2020.
108“Update: T he United States Is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020.
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Venezuela
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo
Chávez (president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that most Venezuelans
and much of the international community consider il egitimate. Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó,
president of Venezuela’s democratical y elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has
sought to dislodge Maduro from power so that a transition government can serve until
international y observed elections can be held. The United States and 57 other countries have
recognized Guaidó as interim president. Guaidó’s future remains uncertain, however, as a PSUV-
dominated National Assembly is to be seated in January 2021 after the party won December 6,
2020 legislative elections boycotted by the opposition, plagued by irregularities, and rejected by
the United States, the EU, and most Latin American countries.
Despite years of intense international pressure and his mishandling of Venezuela’s economic and
humanitarian crisis, Maduro remains entrenched in power. The Maduro government has used
repression to quash dissent; rewarded al ies, particularly in the security forces, with income
earned from il egal gold mining, drug trafficking, and other il icit activities; and relied on support
from Russia, China, Iran, and others to subvert U.S. sanctions. The COVID-19 pandemic, low oil
prices, and gasoline shortages do not appear to have weakened Maduro’s grip on power.
Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages
of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that has further deteriorated in 2020 because
of gasoline shortages, COVID-19, and strengthened U.S. sanctions. Maduro has blamed U.S.
sanctions for the economic crisis, but many observers cite economic mismanagement and
corruption as the main factors. U.N. agencies estimate that 5.4 mil ion Venezuelans have fled the
country as of December 2020, primarily to neighboring countries.
U.S. Policy. Since recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019, the United States has
coordinated its efforts with Interim President Guaidó. U.S. strategy has emphasized diplomatic
efforts to bolster support for Guaidó; targeted sanctions and visa revocations to increase pressure
on Maduro officials; broader sanctions on the state oil company, other state-controlled companies
and institutions, and the government; and humanitarian aid ($1 bil ion to countries sheltering
Venezuelans and for aid inside Venezuela from FY2017-FY2020). U.S. agencies have separately
provided $43.7 mil ion in COVID-related aid efforts in Venezuela.109 In October 2019, the
USAID signed an agreement with the Guaidó government enabling the provision of development
assistance, health assistance, and increased democracy assistance. In 2020, the Administration has
sanctioned companies that have transported Venezuelan oil and a Chinese technology company
that has aided the Maduro government and seized Venezuela-bound ships carrying Iranian
petroleum products in violation of sanctions. U.S. officials have vowed to keep “maximum
pressure” on Maduro and his foreign backers.
Congressional Action: Congress has supported the Administration’s efforts to support a
restoration of democracy in Venezuela without U.S. military intervention in the country and to
provide humanitarian support to Venezuelans, although some Members have expressed concerns
about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94,
which appropriated $30 mil ion in FY2020 assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela and
incorporated the Senate-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive bil to
address the crisis in Venezuela. The VERDAD Act incorporated House-passed measures
authorizing FY2020 humanitarian aid to Venezuela (H.R. 854), restricting the export of defense

109 USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis- Complex Emergency,” FY2021 Fact Sheet #1, December 16, 2020.
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articles to Venezuela (H.R. 920), and requiring a U.S. strategy to counter Russian influence in
Venezuela (H.R. 1477). In the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92, Section 890), enacted in December
2019, Congress prohibited federal contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro
government. In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, designating Venezuela as a beneficiary
country for temporary protected status; however, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549 by unanimous
consent failed.
For FY2021, the Administration requested $200 mil ion in democracy aid aimed to support a
democratic transition in Venezuela and $5 mil ion in global health assistance. The Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021, (P.L. 116-260) provides not less than $33 mil ion in Economic Support
Fund (ESF) for democracy programs in Venezuela and an unspecified amount of humanitarian
support for countries sheltering Venezuelan refugees. H.Rept. 116-617 accompanying the FY2021
NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires a briefing for certain House and Senate Committees on the
contents of the report required by P.L. 116-94, as wel an update on the political, economic,
health, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and the implications for United States national
security and regional security. House and Senate committees held several hearings on the
situation in Venezuela and U.S. policy (see Appendix).
For additional information, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations,
coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and
U.S. Policy
, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Insight IN11306, U.S. Indictment of Top Venezuelan
Officials
, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela:
Overview of U.S. Sanctions
, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela:
International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis
, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report
R46213, Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela, by Phil ip
Brown; CRS Report R46213, Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Iran, Russia,
Venezuela
, by Phil ip Brown; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian
Crisis and COVID-19, by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Outlook
Even before the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Latin American and Caribbean region
was facing significant political and economic chal enges—most prominently, Venezuela’s
ongoing political impasse and economic and humanitarian crisis. The pandemic multiplied the
region’s chal enges and negatively affected its future economic prospects. Instead of registering
low economic growth rates, as original y forecast, the region is experiencing a deep recession,
with mil ions of people expected to become impoverished. While some economic growth is
expected to resume in 2021, there are concerns that the region’s recovery wil be slow, lagging
behind the global economic recovery, and could jeopardize the economic and social progress that
the region made over the past two decades. At the end of 2020, the pandemic continued to surge
in the region, and there were few indications that the region would be able to rollout vaccines
rapidly or otherwise alter its trajectory.
Amid this difficult environment, the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden and the
117th Congress wil face numerous chal enges in U.S. policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean. During the campaign, Biden indicated that he would take a very different approach in
his policy toward the region. He vowed “to rebuild strong hemispheric ties based on respect for
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” when the United States hosts the next Summit of
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the Americas in 2021 (expected late in the year).110 He promised to “do away with the Trump
Administration’s draconian immigration policies and galvanize international action to address the
poverty and insecurity driving migrants” from Central America’s Northern Triangle, including the
development of a four-year, $4 bil ion regional strategy for the region.111 On Cuba, Biden
maintained that he would reverse Trump Administration policies, which he maintains “have
inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human
rights.”112 One of the most vexing chal enges for the new Administration wil be the political
crisis in Venezuela and the associated regional humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan migrants. As a
candidate, Biden said that “the overriding goal in Venezuela must be to press for a democratic
outcome through free and fair elections, and to help the Venezuela people rebuild their country.”
These potential policy shifts and other efforts to address chal enges discussed in this report may
be subjects of debate, legislation, and oversight in the 117th Congress.


110 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “T he Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet
the Challenges of the 21st Century,” at https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/.
111 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “T he Biden Plan to Build Security and Prosperity with the
People of Central America,” at https://joebiden.com/centralamerica/.
112 “Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, March 2, 2020 (updated October 29,
2020), at https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/.
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Appendix. Hearings in the 116th Congress
Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 116th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
Senate Armed Services Committee
February 7, 2019
United States Africa Command and United
States Southern Command
House Foreign Affairs Committee
February 13, 2019
Venezuela at a Crossroads
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 26, 2019
Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in
Subcommittee on the Western
Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
March 7, 2019
U.S.-Venezuela Relations and the Path to a
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Democratic Transition
Transitional Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women’s Issues
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 13, 2019
Hearing on H.R. 1004, Prohibiting
Subcommittee on the Western
Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Act
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 13, 2019
New Government, Ongoing Agenda: Human
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
Rights, Corruption, and Accountability in El
Salvador
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 26, 2019
Understanding Odebrecht: Lessons for
Subcommittee on the Western
Combatting Corruption in the Americas
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 10, 2019
The Importance of U.S. Assistance to Central
America
House Armed Services Committee
May 1, 2019
National Security Chal enges and U.S. Military
Activity in North and South America
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
May 9, 2019
Dol ar Diplomacy or Debt Trap? Examining
Subcommittee on the Western
China’s Role in the Western Hemisphere
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 11, 2019
Crushing Dissent: The Ongoing Crisis in
Subcommittee on the Western
Nicaragua
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Armed Services Committee,
July 9, 2019
Implementation of the National Defense
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Strategy in the United States Southern
Capabilities
Command Area of Responsibility
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 11, 2019
Human Rights in Cuba: Beyond the Veneer of
Subcommittee on the Western
Reform
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
September 10, 2019
Preserving the Amazon: A Shared Moral
Subcommittee on the Western
Imperative
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
September 18, 2019
U.S.-Colombia Relations: New Opportunities
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
to Reinforce and Strengthen Our Bilateral
Transitional Crime, Civilian Security,
Relationship
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women’s Issues
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Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
September 25, 2019
U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America:
Ensuring Effective Policies to Address the
Crisis at the Border
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
October 23, 2019
The Trump Administration’s FY2020 Budget
Subcommittee on the Western
and U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Caribbean
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
December 10, 2019
Haiti on the Brink: Assessing U.S. Policy
Subcommittee on the Western
Toward a Country in Crisis
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
December 11, 2019
Human Rights and Corruption in Honduras
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
January 15, 2020
Strengthening Security and the Rule of Law in
Subcommittee on the Western
Mexico
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Armed Services Committee
January 30, 2020
United States Africa Command and United
States Southern Command
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 13, 2020
Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico
Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 4, 2020
Human Rights in Haiti: Ideas for Next Steps
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
House Armed Services Committee
March 11, 2020
National Security Chal enges and U.S. Military
Activity in North and South America
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 01, 2020
The Trump Administration’s Response to
Subcommittee on the Western
COVID-19 in Latin America and the
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Caribbean.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
August 04, 2020
Venezuela in Maduro’s Grasp: Assessing the
Deteriorating Security and Humanitarian
Situation
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
October 1, 2020
Enforced Disappearance in Latin America:
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
Taking Stock
House Foreign Affairs Committee,
November 20, 2020
The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
Americas
House Foreign Affairs Committee
December 3, 2020
The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy
Commission: Charting a New Path Forward
Source: CRS, prepared by Nese F. DeBruyne, Senior Research Librarian.
Notes: See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings; Senate Foreign Relations Committee at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings.

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Author Information

Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs


June S. Beittel
Maureen Taft-Morales
Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs


Peter J. Meyer
M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance



Acknowledgments
Nese F. DeBruyne, former CRS Senior Research Librarian (now retired), prepared the appendix of hearings
in this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
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