Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy
September 3, 2020January 7, 2021
and Issues in the 116th Congress
Mark P. Sullivan,
The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean The United States maintains strong linkages with neighboring Latin America and the Caribbean
Coordinator
based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and based on geographic proximity and diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and source of foreign investment
American Affairs American Affairs
for many countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with for many countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with

11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, b oth legal and illegal; proximity 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, b oth legal and illegal; proximity
June S. Beittel
and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration. Curbing the flow of and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration. Curbing the flow of
Analyst in Latin American Analyst in Latin American
illicit drugs has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region for more than four illicit drugs has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region for more than four
Affairs Affairs
decades and currently involves close security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the decades and currently involves close security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the

Caribbean. U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the region has been long-standing, Caribbean. U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the region has been long-standing,
with current focus on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Overall, although the region has made with current focus on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Overall, although the region has made
Peter J. Meyer
significant advances over the past four decades in terms of both political and economic significant advances over the past four decades in terms of both political and economic
Specialist in Latin Specialist in Latin
development, notable challenges remain and some countries have experienced major setbacks, development, notable challenges remain and some countries have experienced major setbacks,
American Affairs American Affairs
most prominently Venezuela. most prominently Venezuela. Most significantly in 2020, theThe Coronavirus Disease 2019 Coronavirus Disease 2019

(COVID-19) pandemic (COVID-19) pandemic is having has had widespread economic, social, and political effects in the regionwidespread economic, social, and political effects in the region
Clare Ribando Seelke
and is currently surging in infections and deaths in some countries. As of September 2, 2020, the
Specialist in Latin
region had almost 280. By the end of 2020, the region Clare Ribando Seelke reported over 507,000 deaths (almost ,000 deaths (almost 3128% of deaths worldwide). % of deaths worldwide).
Specialist in Latin American Affairs American Affairs

Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean Under the Trump Administration, U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have
Maureen Taft-Morales
generally generally moved toward a more confrontational approach from one of engagement and moved toward a more confrontational approach from one of engagement and
Specialist in Latin
partnership during partnership during Maureen Taft-Morales past Administrations. Since FY2018, the Administration’s proposed foreign past Administrations. Since FY2018, the Administration’s proposed foreign
American Affairs
aid budgets for the aid budgets for the Specialist in Latin region would have cut assistance levels significantly. To deter increased region would have cut assistance levels significantly. To deter increased

unauthorized migration unauthorized migration American Affairs from Central America, the Administration from Central America, the Administration has used a variety of used a variety of
immigration policy tools as well as immigration policy tools as well as aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on aid cuts and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on
M. Angeles Villarreal
remittances. Among trade issues, President Trump strongly criticized and repeatedly threatened remittances. Among trade issues, President Trump strongly criticized and repeatedly threatened
Specialist in International
to withdraw from the North to withdraw from the North M. Angeles Villarreal American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); this led to negotiation of American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); this led to negotiation of
Trade and Finance

the new United States-the new United States- Specialist in International Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The Trump Administration also Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). The Trump Administration also
has imposed imposed strongbroad economic Trade and Finance economic sanctions on Venezuela and sanctions on Venezuela and has shifted U.S. policy toward Cuba shifted U.S. policy toward Cuba

away from engagement away from engagement and toward sanctions, especially on travel and remittances. toward increased sanctions.
Congressional Action in the 116th Congress. Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin
America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. The 116th Congress America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. The 116th Congress has not approveddid not approve the Trump the Trump
Administration’s downsized foreign aid budget requests for the region for FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and FY2020 (P.L. 116-94),Administration’s downsized foreign aid budget requests for the region for FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and FY2020 (P.L. 116-94),and
instead instead providingprovided aid amounts roughly similar to those provided in recent years. For FY2021, aid amounts roughly similar to those provided in recent years. For FY2021, the House-passed foreign aid
appropriations bill, Division A of H.R. 7608, approved in July 2020, would fund key countries and programsin the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), approved in December 2020, Congress again provided foreign aid funding for key initiatives and countries in the region at amounts at amounts
higher than requested. higher than requested. The FY2021 measure also included the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (the House approved an earlier version, H.R. 2615, in July 2019) and the United States-Mexico Economic Partnership Act. In other completed legislative action, Congress approved the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of Congress approved the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of
2019 in December 2019 (included in 2019 (Division J of P.L. 116-94)Division J of P.L. 116-94), in December 2019, which, among its provisions, which, among its provisions, codifiescodified several types of several types of
sanctions imposed and sanctions imposed and authorizesauthorized humanitarian assistance. In January 2020, Congress completed action on implementing humanitarian assistance. In January 2020, Congress completed action on implementing
legislation legislation (P.L. 116-113)(P.L. 116-113) for the USMCA, but before final for the USMCA, but before final agreement, the trade agreement was amended to address several agreement, the trade agreement was amended to address several
congressional concerns. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (FY20202 NDAA; P.L. 116-92), congressional concerns. In September 2020, Congress approved legislation (P.L. 116-164) providing a 10-year extension, through September 2030, of tariff preferences in the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act, currently benefitting eight Caribbean countries. The FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-92), approved in approved in
December 2019, December 2019, includes included provisions on Venezuelaprovisions on Venezuela and Guatemala and reporting requirements on Brazil, Honduras, Central and Guatemala and reporting requirements on Brazil, Honduras, Central
America, and America, and Mexico. The FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) enacted over a presidential veto in January 2021, included provisions or reporting requirements on Guatemala, drug interdiction in the region, the Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Congressional Research Service link to page 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress The House and Senate also approved several resolutions on a range of issuesMexico. The House-passed FY2021 NDAA, H.R. 6395, approved in July 2020, has provisions on the
Caribbean, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Guatemala, and Central America.
Either or both houses approved several bills and resolutions on a range of issues: H.R. 133, which would promote economic
cooperation and exchanges with Mexico; H.R. 2615, which would authorize aid to Central America to address the root causes
of migration; S.Res. 35 and S.Res. 447 on the political situation in Bolivia; H.Res. 441 and S.Res. 277, commemorating the ; S.Res. 35 and S.Res. 447 on the political situation in Bolivia; H.Res. 441 and S.Res. 277, commemorating the
1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires; H.Res. 754 and S.Res. 525 expressing support 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires; H.Res. 754 and S.Res. 525 expressing support
for democracy and human rights in Nicaragua; and S.Res. 454, calling for the release of for democracy and human rights in Nicaragua; and S.Res. 454, calling for the release of a Cuban democracy activistCuban democracy activist Jose
Daniel Ferrer. Congressional committees . Congressional committees have held over held over 2025 oversight hearings on the region in the 116th Congress ( oversight hearings on the region in the 116th Congress (seesee
Appendix)..
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Contents
Political and Economic Situation amid COVID-19 ............................................................... 1
Political Conditions ................................................................................................... 6
Economic Conditions ................................................................................................. 9
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean ......................................................... 12
Trump Administration Policy..................................................................................... 13
Congress and Policy Toward the Region...................................................................... 1615
Regional U.S. Policy Issues ............................................................................................ 1918
U.S. Foreign Aid ..................................................................................................... 1918
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs ......................................................................... 2120
Trade Policy ........................................................................................................... 23
Migration Issues ...................................................................................................... 2726
Selected Country and Subregional Issues .......................................................................... 29
The Caribbean......................................................................................................... 29
Caribbean Regional Issues ................................................................................... 29
Cuba ................................................................................................................ 3332
Haiti ................................................................................................................. 34
Mexico and Central America ..................................................................................... 37
Mexico ............................................................................................................. 37
Central America’s Northern Triangle ..................................................................... 39
Nicaragua.......................................................................................................... 4241
South America ........................................................................................................ 4443
Argentina .......................................................................................................... 4443
Bolivia.............................................................................................................. 45
Brazil ............................................................................................................... 46
Colombia .......................................................................................................... 4847
Venezuela.......................................................................................................... 50
Outlook ....................................................................................................................... 51

Figures
Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean............................................................... 3
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries ........................................... 3130
Figure 3. Map of Central America.................................................................................... 4039

Tables
Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths and Mortality RatesCases and Deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) .................... 2
Table 2. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts .............................................. 4
Table 3. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2018-2021 .................................. 10
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2021 ..................... 19
Table 5. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2012-
2019......................................................................................................................... 2524

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Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 116th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean....................................................................................................... 53

Appendixes
Appendix. Hearings in the 116th Congress ......................................................................... 53

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 5455


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Political and Economic Situation amid COVID-19
With 33 countries—ranging from the Caribbean nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s With 33 countries—ranging from the Caribbean nation of St. Kitts and Nevis, one of the world’s
smal est states, to the South American giant of Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country—the Latin smal est states, to the South American giant of Brazil, the world’s fifth-largest country—the Latin
American and Caribbean region has made significant advances over the past four decades in American and Caribbean region has made significant advances over the past four decades in
terms of both political and economic development. (Seterms of both political and economic development. (See Figure 1 a and Table 2 for a map and for a map and
basic facts on the region’s countries.) Notable political and economic chal enges remain, basic facts on the region’s countries.) Notable political and economic chal enges remain,
however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks, most prominently Venezuela, however, and some countries have experienced major setbacks, most prominently Venezuela,
which has descended into dictatorship and economic collapse. which has descended into dictatorship and economic collapse.
In 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic In 2020, the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, which has surged in many Latin
American and Caribbean countries, is having had widespread public health, widespread public health, economic, social, and economic, social, and
political effects throughoutpolitical effects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean the region. As discussed below, before the pandemic, the International . As discussed below, before the pandemic, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) forecast a modest recovery of 1.6% economic growthMonetary Fund (IMF) forecast a modest recovery of 1.6% economic growth for the region in in
2020; by late June 2020, the IMF2020; as of October 2020, it was projecting an economic decline of was projecting an economic decline of 9.48.1%, the worst on %, the worst on
record, with almost every country in the region in deep recession.1 Mil ions of people record, with almost every country in the region in deep recession.1 Mil ions of people wil fal
are expected to fal into poverty, and many countries in the region may struggle with into poverty, and many countries in the region may struggle with protracted economic recoveries, protracted economic recoveries,
given that they rely on global investment, trade, and tourism that has been significantly affected given that they rely on global investment, trade, and tourism that has been significantly affected
by COVID-19by the pandemic (see (see ““Economic Conditions,,” below.) Political y, observers have expressed ” below.) Political y, observers have expressed
concerns about leaders taking advantage of the emergency health concerns about leaders taking advantage of the emergency health situation to limit civil liberties situation to limit civil liberties
for political gain. The pandemic could exacerbate public dissatisfaction with how democracy is
working and stoke social unrest similar to that experienced by many countries in the region in
2019for political gain (see (see “Political Conditions,” below). ” below).
As of As of September 2December 31, 2020, the region had , 2020, the region had almost 6.1some 15.6 mil ion confirmed cases (almost mil ion confirmed cases (almost 2919% of cases % of cases
worldwide) and worldwide) and almost 280over 507,000 deaths (almost ,000 deaths (almost 3328% of deaths worldwide)% of deaths worldwide), with the virus
continuing to spread at high levels in several countries. Brazil, Mexico, Peru. Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and , Colombia, and
Chile havePeru had the highest numbers of deaths in the region, and Brazil the highest numbers of deaths in the region, and Brazil has had the highest death toll the highest death toll
worldwide after the United States. The rankings change in terms of per worldwide after the United States. The rankings change in terms of per capita deaths—Peru capita deaths—Peru has
had the highest recorded deaths per capita in the region, followed by the highest recorded deaths per capita in the region, followed by Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and
Panama (see Table 1.) A June 2020 University of Washington model for COVID-19Mexico, Argentina, Panama, and Brazil (see Table 1).2 In December 2020, Brazil, Mexico, and Panama were experiencing a second surge in cases, and cases also were rising sharply in Panama and several South American countries; some observers are concerned about a potential post-Christmas surge throughout the region in early 2021 as countries let their guards down over the holidays.3 A University of Washington COVID-19 projection model, updated December 23, 2020, estimates that deaths in Latin in Latin
America and the Caribbean America and the Caribbean forecast that deaths could reach 438,000 by October 1, 2020.2could reach more than 657,000 by April 1, 2021.4
Experts and observers Experts and observers are concerned that severalhave expressed concern that some countries, such as Mexico, countries, such as Mexico, Venezuela, Haiti, and
NicaraguaNicaragua, and Venezuela, are significantly undercounting their death tolls. Many observers have expressed , are significantly undercounting their death tolls. Many observers have expressed
special concern for Venezuela, where the health care system was collapsing prior to the pandemic. special concern for Venezuela, where the health care system was collapsing prior to the pandemic.
Experts have criticized the leaders of Brazil, Mexico, and Nicaragua for playing down the virus
threat and not taking adequate actions to stem its spread.
On May 19, 2020, the Director of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Dr. Carissa
Etienne, maintained that “the virus is surging across our region” and expressed concern about the
poor and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk from the virus. Dr. Etienne expressed particular
concern for cities, towns, and remote communities in the Amazon Basin, including indigenous
communities, as wel as people of African descent in Latin America, migrants in temporary
settlements, and prisoners in crowded jails with poor sanitation.3 On June 16, 2020, the PAHO (See CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-19). The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) has played a major role in supporting countries in preventing, detecting, and responding to the pandemic. When the pandemic first began to surge in the region in May 2020, PAHO Director Dr. Carissa Etienne expressed concern about the poor

1 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1 International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020 and , January 2020 and JuneOctober 2020. 2020.
2 2 University of Washington, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, “Correction: New IHME COVID -19 Model
Forecasts Latin American, Caribbean Nations Will See Nearly 440,000 Deaths by October 1, 2020.”
3 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of
COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 19, 2020. Also see PAHO, “ PAHO Director Asks Countries to Address
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Director cal ed on countries to work together to contain the spread of COVID-19 cases among
migrant and vulnerable populations in border areas.4 PAHO issued guidance in June 2020 on
measures to reduce COVID-19 transmission among indigenous populations, Afro-descendants,
and other ethnic groups. In July 2020, it Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,” January 1, 2021, 3:00 AM, updated daily, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. 3 Juan Montes and Samantha Pearson, “New COVID-19 Surge Sweeps Across Latin America,” Wall Street Journal, December 19, 2020; “Panama Orders Men and Women to Shop on Different Days to Curb Coronavirus,” Reuters News, December 19, 2020; and “A Pandemic Christmas Season in Latin America,” Latin America Risk Report, December 14, 2020. 4 4 University of Washington, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, COVID-19 Projections, updated December 23, 2020, at https://covid19.healthdata.org/global/latin-america-and-caribbean?view=total-deaths&tab=trend. Congressional Research Service 1 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress and other vulnerable groups at greatest risk, including those living in cities, towns, and remote communities in the Amazon Basin (including indigenous communities); people of African descent; migrants in temporary settlements; and prisoners in crowded jails. In July 2020, PAHO issued an alert urging countries to intensify efforts to issued an alert urging countries to intensify efforts to
prevent further spread of the virus among prevent further spread of the virus among indigenous communities in the Americas.5 PAHO also is helping countries prepare for a successful rollout of vaccines and facilitating access to vaccines under the COVAX (COVID-19 Global Vaccine Access) Facility developed by the World Health Organization, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, and GAVI, the Vaccine Al iance.6 Low- and lower-middle-income countries in the region wil be eligible for assistance in obtaining vaccines through the GAVI COVAX Advance Market Commitment. Analysts caution, however, that some countries in the region could face significant hurdles in procuring vaccines in a timely manner, with vaccines potential y not widely available until 2022.7 Table 1. COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (countries with more than 2,000 deaths, as of December 31, 2020) Cases Deaths per Country (millions) Deaths 100,000 Brazil 7.676 194,949 93.07 Mexico 1.426 125,807 99.70 Argentina 1.626 43,245 97.19 Colombia 1.643 43,213 87.04 Peru 1.015 37,680 117.79 Chile .609 16,608 88.67 Ecuador .213 14.034 82.15 Bolivia .160 9,165 80.73 Guatemala .138 4,813 27.90 Panama .247 4.022 96.29 Honduras .122 3,130 32.65 Dominican Republic .171 2,414 22.72 Paraguay .108 2,262 32.52 Costa Rica .169 2,185 43.70 Total LAC 15.580 507,760 —indigenous communities in the Americas.5 PAHO is
playing a major role in supporting the response to COVID-19 in the Americas, including support
for surveil ance, laboratory capacity, health care services, infection prevention control, clinical
management, and risk communication; it also has developed, published, and disseminated
technical documents to help guide countries’ efforts to manage the pandemic.6
Table 1. COVID-19 Deaths and Mortality Rates in Latin America and the Caribbean
(countries with more than 1,000 deaths as of September 2, 2020)
Country
Confirmed
Deaths
Deaths per
Regional
Cases
100,000
Rank (deaths
People
per 100,000)
Brazil
3,950,931
122,596
58.53
3
Mexico
606,036
65,241
51.70
4
Peru
652,037
28,944
90.48
1
Colombia
624,026
20,050
40.38
7
Chile
413,145
11,321
60.45
2
Argentina
428,239
8,919
20.05
9
Ecuador
114,309
6,571
38.46
8
Bolivia
117,267
5,101
44.93
6
Guatemala
74,893
2,778
16.11
12
Panama
93,552
2,018
48.31
5
Honduras
61,769
1,888
19.69
10
Dominican Republic
94,979
1,738
16.35
11
Latin America &
Caribbean Total
7,397,169
279,788
—
—
United States United States 19.968 345,737 105.68
6,073,840
184,664
56.44
—
Source: Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center,Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, “Mortality Analyses,Mortality Analyses, September
2, 2020” January 1, 2021, 3:00 AM, updated daily, updated daily, at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.

Health, Social, and Economic Emergencies T ogether, as COVID-19 Expands in the Americas,” press release, May 12,
2020.
4 PAHO, “ PAHO Director Calls to Contain Spread of COVID-19 in Vulnerable Populations in Border Areas,” June 16,
2020.
5 PAHO, “PAHO Issues Guidance to Reduce COVID-19 T ransmission Among Indigenous, Afro-descendant Groups,”
press release, June 8, 2020. “PAHO Calls on Countries to5 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), “PAHO Director Calls to Protect Vulnerable Groups from Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic,” press release, May 19, 2020. “ PAHO Calls on Countries t o Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further Intensify Efforts to Prevent Further Spread Spread of COVIDof COVID -19-19
Among IndigenousAmong Indigenous Peoples in the Americas,” press release, JulyPeoples in the Americas,” press release, July 20, 2020. 20, 2020.
6 PAHO, “ PAHO to Support Countries in Facing the Challenges and Cost of a Future COVID-19 Vaccine,” press release, November 18, 2020. 7“Americas Politics: Latam Faces Drawn-out Vaccine Rollout,” EIU ViewsWire, December 18, 2020. 6 PAHO, COVID-19 Situation in the Region of the Americas, Situation Reports, available at https://www.paho.org/en/
topics/coronavirus-infections/coronavirus-disease-covid-19-pandemic.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Figure 1. Map of Latin America and the Caribbean

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Graphics.
Notes: Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American Caribbean countries are in purple, Central American countries are in gold, and South American
countries are in green. Although Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located in countries are in green. Although Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located in
South America, al three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). South America, al three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
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Table 2. Latin American and Caribbean Countries: Basic Facts
GDP
GDP Per
(2019
Capita
Population
est.,
(2019
Area
(2019
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
Leader (elected/next election)
Caribbean
Antigua &
171 171
9397
1.7 1.7
18,10917,195
Gaston Browne Gaston Browne
Barbuda
(March 2018/by (March 2018/by Barbuda March 2023) March 2023)
Bahamas
5,359 5,359
381 381
12.7
33,26113.6 35,664
Hubert Minnis (May 2017/by May Hubert Minnis (May 2017/by May
2022) 2022)
Barbados
166 166
287 287
5.2 5.2
18, 18,069139
Mia Mottley (May 2018/ by May Mia Mottley (May 2018/ by May
2023) 2023)
Belizea
8,867 8,867
406
2.0
4,925
Dean Barrow (Nov. 2015/by Feb.
2021)b408 1.8 4,498 Juan Antonio “Johnny” Briceño (Nov. 11, 2020/by 2025)
Cuba
42,803 42,803
11, 11,332333
100.0 100.0
— —
Miguel Díaz-Canel (April 2018/ Miguel Díaz-Canel (April 2018/

(2018) (2018)
2023) 2023)cb
Dominica
290 290
71 71
0.6 0.6
8, 8,381305
Roosevelt Skerrit (Dec. 2019/by Roosevelt Skerrit (Dec. 2019/by
Dec. 2024) Dec. 2024)
Dominican
18,792 18,792
10, 10,369358
89. 89.50
8, 8,629596
Luis Abinader (July 2020/ 2024) Luis Abinader (July 2020/ 2024)
Republic
Grenada
133 133
109 109
1.2 1.2
11, 11,381193
Keith Mitchel (March 2018/by Keith Mitchel (March 2018/by
March 2023) March 2023)
Guyanaa
83,000 83,000
785 785
4.1
5,2525.2 6,594
Irfaan Ali (March 2, 2020/ Irfaan Ali (March 2, 2020/2025)d2025)c
Haiti
10,714 10,714
11, 11,248263
8. 8.8
7847 773
Jovenel Moïse (Nov. 2016/ Jovenel Moïse (Nov. 2016/Oct.
2021 TBD) )
Jamaica
4,244 4,244
2, 2,875726
15. 15.79
5, 5,461826
Andrew Holness ( Andrew Holness (Feb. 2016/Sept. 3, Sept. 3,
20202020/ by February 2025) )
St. Kitts &
101 101
57 57
1. 1.01
18, 18,246854
Timothy Harris (June 2020/by Timothy Harris (June 2020/by 2025)June
Nevis 2025)
St. Lucia
238 238
180 180
2. 2.01
11, 11,076803
Al en Chastanet (June 2016/by June Al en Chastanet (June 2016/by June
2021) 2021)
St. Vincent &
150 150
110 110
0. 0.98
7, 7,751464
Ralph Gonsalves ( Ralph Gonsalves (Dec. 2015Nov. 5, 2020/by /by
the
March 2021)e2025)
Grenadines
Surinamea
63,251 63,251
598597
3. 3.87
6, 6,311191
Chandrikapersad “Chan” Santokhi Chandrikapersad “Chan” Santokhi
(May 2020/May 2025) (May 2020/May 2025)
Trinidad &
1,980 1,980
1, 1,381
22.6
16,366395 24.1 17,276
Keith Rowley (August 2020/by Keith Rowley (August 2020/by
Tobago
2025) 2025)
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
758,449 758,449
125,929
1,274.2
10,118127,576 1,258.2 9,862
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (July Andrés Manuel López Obrador (July
2018/July 2024) 2018/July 2024)
Costa Rica
19,730 19,730
5, 5,079
61.0
12,015075 62.1 12,244
Carlos Alvarado (Feb. & April Carlos Alvarado (Feb. & April
2018/Feb. 2022) 2018/Feb. 2022)
El Salvador
8,124 8,124
6, 6,704
26.9
4,008454 27.0 4,187
Nayib Bukele (Feb. 2019/Feb. 2024) Nayib Bukele (Feb. 2019/Feb. 2024)
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GDP
GDP Per
(2019
Capita
Population
est.,
(2019
Area
(2019
U.S. $
est.,
(square
estimated,
billions,
U.S. $,
Country
miles)
thousands)
current)
current)
Leader (elected/next election)
Guatemala
42,042 42,042
17,613 17,613
81.376.7
4, 4,617354
Alejandro Giammattei (June & Alejandro Giammattei (June &
August 2019/2023) August 2019/2023)
Honduras
43,278 43,278
9, 9,594770
24. 24.49
2, 2,548551
Juan Orlando Hernández (Nov. Juan Orlando Hernández (Nov.
2017/Nov. 2021) 2017/Nov. 2021)
Nicaragua
50,336 50,336
6,528 6,528
12.5 12.5
1, 1,919920
Daniel Ortega (Nov. 2015/Nov. Daniel Ortega (Nov. 2015/Nov.
2021) 2021)
Panama
29,120 29,120
4,219 4,219
68.5
16,24566.8 15,834
Laurentino Cortizo (May 2019/May Laurentino Cortizo (May 2019/May
2024) 2024)
South America
Argentina
1,073,518 1,073,518
45,052
445.5
9,88844,939 444.4 9,890
Alberto Fernández (Oct. 2019/Oct. Alberto Fernández (Oct. 2019/Oct.
2023) 2023)
Bolivia
424,164 424,164
11,550 11,550
42.441.2
3, 3,671
Jeanine Áñez (Oct. 2019/Oct. 18,
2020)f566 Luis Arce (Oct. 18, 2020/2025)d
Brazil
3,287,957 3,287,957
209,962
1,847.0
8,797210,147 1,839.0 8,751
Jair Bolsonaro (Oct. 2018/Oct. Jair Bolsonaro (Oct. 2018/Oct.
2022) 2022)
Chile
291,932 291,932
19,107 19,107
294.2
15,399282.3 14,772
Sebastián Piñera (Nov. 2017/Nov. Sebastián Piñera (Nov. 2017/Nov.
2021) 2021)
Colombia
439,736 439,736
50, 50,382
327.9
6,508374 323.6 6,423
Iván Duque (May & June 2018/May Iván Duque (May & June 2018/May
2022) 2022)
Ecuador
109,484 109,484
17,268 17,268
107. 107.94
6, 6,249222
Lenín Moreno (Feb. & April Lenín Moreno (Feb. & April
2017/Feb. 2017/Feb. 7, 2021) 2021)
Paraguay
157,048 157,048
7,153 7,153
40.737.4
5, 5,692233
Mario Abdo Benítez (April Mario Abdo Benítez (April
2018/April 2023) 2018/April 2023)
Peru
496,225 496,225
32,496
229.0
7,047
Martín Vizcarra (April 33,162 230.7 6,958 Francisco Sagasti (April & June & June
2016/April 2016/April 11, 2021)2021)ge
Uruguay
68,037 68,037
3,519 3,519
59.9
17,02956.7 16,111
Luis Lacal e Pou (Oct. & Nov. Luis Lacal e Pou (Oct. & Nov.
2019/Oct. 2024) 2019/Oct. 2024)
Venezuela
352,144 352,144
27, 27,530
70.1
2,548817 63.7 2,299
Nicolás Maduro (May 2018/May Nicolás Maduro (May 2018/May
2024)2024)h
f Sources: Area statistics are from the Central Intel igenceArea statistics are from the Central Intel igence Agency’s Agency’s World Factbook, with square kilometers , with square kilometers
converted into square miles. Population and economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), converted into square miles. Population and economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Economic Outlook Database, October , October 20192020. Since the IMF database does not include economic. Since the IMF database does not include economic statistics on statistics on
Cuba, population and gross domestic product (GDP) statistics for Cuba are from the World Bank’s World Cuba, population and gross domestic product (GDP) statistics for Cuba are from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators databank. Development Indicators databank.
a. Geographical y, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern a. Geographical y, Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname are located on the northern
coast of South America, but al three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and are coast of South America, but al three are members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and are
therefore listed under the Caribbean region. therefore listed under the Caribbean region.
b. b. In Belize, elections are expected in November 2020 but are not constitutional y due until February 2021.
c. Cuba does not have direct elections for its head of government. Instead, Cuba’s legislature selects the Cuba does not have direct elections for its head of government. Instead, Cuba’s legislature selects the
president of the republic for a five-year term. president of the republic for a five-year term.
dc. The government of President David Granger in Guyana lost a no-confidence vote in the country’s . The government of President David Granger in Guyana lost a no-confidence vote in the country’s
legislature in December 2018. New elections were held on March 2, 2020, but al egations of fraud, a legislature in December 2018. New elections were held on March 2, 2020, but al egations of fraud, a
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recount, and numerous legal chal enges delayed the declaration of official results until August 2, 2020. See recount, and numerous legal chal enges delayed the declaration of official results until August 2, 2020. See
CRS In Focus IF11381, CRS In Focus IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sul ivan.
e. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, elections are not constitutional y due until March 2021, but the
government has said elections wil be held by the end of 2020.
f.
, by Mark P. Sul ivan. Congressional Research Service 5 link to page 50 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress d. Bolivian President Evo Morales resigned on November 10, 2019, after weeks of protests and violence Bolivian President Evo Morales resigned on November 10, 2019, after weeks of protests and violence
al eging fraud in the October 20, 2019, presidential election. Opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez became al eging fraud in the October 20, 2019, presidential election. Opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez became
interim president on November 12, 2019. New presidential elections were interim president on November 12, 2019. New presidential elections were scheduled for May 3, 2020, but
were postponed twice because of the COVID-19 pandemic and now are scheduled for delayed but ultimately held October 18, 2020. October 18, 2020.
See CRS Insight IN11198, See CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia: Elections Postponed to October, by Clare Ribando Seelke
g’s October 2020 General Elections, by Clare Ribando Seelke. e. Martin Vizcarra took office in March 2018 upon the resignation of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who faced . Martin Vizcarra took office in March 2018 upon the resignation of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, who faced
impeachment. impeachment.
h. Vizcarra was impeached on November 9, 2020, succeeded by Manuel Merino until he resigned after six days. Amid pro-democracy demonstrations, Congress selected Francisco Sagasti to serve out the remainder of the presidential term ending in July 2021. f. Venezuela’s May 2018 elections were characterized by widespread fraud. The United States and over 50 Venezuela’s May 2018 elections were characterized by widespread fraud. The United States and over 50
other countries recognize Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of other countries recognize Juan Guaidó, president of Venezuela’s National Assembly, as interim president of
Venezuela. Venezuela.
Political Conditions
In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes governed 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries, In the early 1980s, authoritarian regimes governed 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries,
both on the left and the right. Today, three countries in the region—Cuba, Nicaragua, and both on the left and the right. Today, three countries in the region—Cuba, Nicaragua, and
Venezuela—are ruled by authoritarian governments.Venezuela—are ruled by authoritarian governments.78 Most governments in the region today are Most governments in the region today are
elected democracies. Although free and fair elections have become the norm, recent elections in elected democracies. Although free and fair elections have become the norm, recent elections in
several countries have been controversial and contested. In 2019, Argentina, Dominica, El several countries have been controversial and contested. In 2019, Argentina, Dominica, El
Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay held successful free and fair elections. Guatemala held two Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay held successful free and fair elections. Guatemala held two
presidential election rounds in June and August 2019 that international observers judged to be presidential election rounds in June and August 2019 that international observers judged to be
successful, but the elections suffered because several popular candidates were disqualified from successful, but the elections suffered because several popular candidates were disqualified from
the race on dubious grounds. the race on dubious grounds.
In Bolivia, severe irregularities in the conduct of the country’s October 2019 presidential In Bolivia, severe irregularities in the conduct of the country’s October 2019 presidential
elections ignited protests and violence that led to the resignation of incumbent President Evo elections ignited protests and violence that led to the resignation of incumbent President Evo
Morales, who was seeking a fourth term. New elections under Interim President Jeanine Áñez Morales, who was seeking a fourth term. New elections under Interim President Jeanine Áñez
were scheduled for May 3, 2020, but were postponed were scheduled for May 3, 2020, but were postponed twice because of the COVID-19 pandemic. International criticism of Bolivia’s interim government grew because of al eged human rights violations and the curtailment of civil liberties. Ultimately, elections were held October 18, 2020, and Luis Arce, Morales’s former finance minister won with 55% of the vote. (See because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Initial y the elections were postponed until September 6, but they were postponed again to
October 18, 2020. International criticism of Bolivia’s interim government has been growing
because of al eged human rights violations and the curtailment of civil liberties. (See “Bolivia”
section below and CRS Insight IN11198, section below and CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia: Elections Postponed to October.)
To date, five’s October 2020 General Elections.) In 2020, eight Caribbean countries Caribbean countries have held elections in 2020, Jamaica has elections scheduled for
early September, and two countries potential y could hold elections by the end of the yearheld elections. .
  Guyana held elections on March 2, 2020, that were marred by al egations of held elections on March 2, 2020, that were marred by al egations of
fraud. After a recount and multiple legal chal enges by supporters of the fraud. After a recount and multiple legal chal enges by supporters of the
government of President David Granger, final results were not issued until government of President David Granger, final results were not issued until
August 2, 2020, with opposition candidate Mohamed Irfaan Ali of the People’s August 2, 2020, with opposition candidate Mohamed Irfaan Ali of the People’s
Progressive Party/Civic sworn in as president. (See CRS In Focus IF11381, Progressive Party/Civic sworn in as president. (See CRS In Focus IF11381,
Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan.) .)
 In  In Suriname, legislative elections took place on May 25, 2020, with the legislative elections took place on May 25, 2020, with the
opposition Progressive Reform Party (VHP) winning the most seats in the opposition Progressive Reform Party (VHP) winning the most seats in the
country’s 51-member National Assembly. Under Suriname’s system of government, the president is elected indirectly by a two-thirds majority vote of the legislature. On July 13, the National Assembly elected VHP leader
78 See T he Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), See T he Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2019, January 2020 (hereinafter cited as EIU, , January 2020 (hereinafter cited as EIU,
Dem ocracy Index, 2019), which classifies all three governments as ), which classifies all three governments as authoritarian based on some 60 indicators; and based on some 60 indicators; and
Freedom House, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2020, March 2020, which classifies all three governments as , March 2020, which classifies all three governments as not free based on based on
their poor records on political rights and civil liberties. For additional background, see CRS Report R46016, their poor records on political rights and civil liberties. For additional background, see CRS Report R46016,
Dem ocracy in Latin Am erica and the Caribbean: A Com pilation of Selected Indices, by Carla Y. Davis-Castro. , by Carla Y. Davis-Castro.
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country’s 51-member National Assembly. Under Suriname’s system of
government, the president is elected indirectly by a two-thirds majority vote of
the legislature. On July 13, the National Assembly elected VHP leader
Chandrikapersad “Chan” Santokhi as president, succeeding longtime ruler Desi Chandrikapersad “Chan” Santokhi as president, succeeding longtime ruler Desi
Bouterse and beginning a new political era for Suriname. Since 2010, Bouterse Bouterse and beginning a new political era for Suriname. Since 2010, Bouterse
had been elected president three times; prior to that, he overthrew elected had been elected president three times; prior to that, he overthrew elected
governments in 1980 and 1990. He was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands governments in 1980 and 1990. He was convicted in absentia in the Netherlands
in 1999 for drug trafficking, and in November 2019 he was convicted in in 1999 for drug trafficking, and in November 2019 he was convicted in
Suriname for the 1982 kil ing of 15 political opponents. Suriname for the 1982 kil ing of 15 political opponents.
 In the  In the Dominican Republic, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in elections being , the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in elections being
moved from May 17 to July 5, 2020. Opposition candidate Luis Abinader of the moved from May 17 to July 5, 2020. Opposition candidate Luis Abinader of the
Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) defeated the candidate of the ruling Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) defeated the candidate of the ruling
Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), which has held the presidency and legislature Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), which has held the presidency and legislature
since 2004. The PRM also won a Senate majority and a plurality in the Chamber since 2004. The PRM also won a Senate majority and a plurality in the Chamber
of Deputies. (See CRS In Focus IF10407, of Deputies. (See CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando
Seelke and Rachel L. Martin.)
 In .)  Between June and November 2020, incumbent leaders and ruling parties won parliamentary elections held in parliamentary elections held in St. Kitts and Nevis and, Trinidad and
Tobago, Jamaica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines Tobago, ruling parties were returned to office. St. Kitts and Nevis held elections . St. Kitts and Nevis held elections
on June 5, on June 5, 2020, in which Prime Minister Timothy Harris led a three-party in which Prime Minister Timothy Harris led a three-party
coalition known as Team Unity to its second electoral victory since 2015. coalition known as Team Unity to its second electoral victory since 2015.
Trinidad and Tobago held elections on August 10, and Prime Minister Keith Trinidad and Tobago held elections on August 10, and Prime Minister Keith
Rowley of the ruling People’s National Movement was returned to power for his Rowley of the ruling People’s National Movement was returned to power for his
second term since 2015. second term since 2015.
 In Jamaica, parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 3, 2020, with
the ruling Jamaica held elections on September 3, with the ruling Jamaica Labour Party, led byJamaica Labour Party, led by current Prime Minister Andrew Holness, Prime Minister Andrew Holness,
vying winning in a landslide for a second term against the opposition People’s National Partyfor a second term against the opposition People’s National Party led by
former Finance Minister Dr. Peter Phil ips.
 Elsewhere in the region, although parliamentary elections in Belize are expected
during the first week of November 2020, they have not yet been cal ed and are
not official y due until February 2021. In St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
elections are not due until March 2021, but the government previously said
elections would be held before the end of 2020.8. St. Vincent and the Grenadines held elections on November 5 in which Prime Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves of the Unity Labour Party won a fifth straight term.  Belize held parliamentary elections on November 11 in which the opposition center-left People’s United Party led by Johnny Briceño won in a landslide against the long-ruling center-right United Democratic Party, whose candidate was former Deputy Prime Minister Patrick Faber. Outgoing Prime Minister Dean Barrow had led the government since 2008 but chose not to run for reelection.
Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many Despite significant improvements in political rights and civil liberties since the 1980s, many
countries in the region stil face considerable chal enges. In a number of countries, weaknesses countries in the region stil face considerable chal enges. In a number of countries, weaknesses
remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability and transparency, remain in the state’s ability to deliver public services, ensure accountability and transparency,
advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. There are numerous examples of advance the rule of law, and ensure citizen safety and security. There are numerous examples of
elected presidents who have left office early amid severe social turmoil and economic crises, the elected presidents who have left office early amid severe social turmoil and economic crises, the
presidents’ own autocratic actions contributing to their ouster, or high-profile corruption. In presidents’ own autocratic actions contributing to their ouster, or high-profile corruption. In
addition to Morales’s resignation in 2019, corruption scandals either caused or contributed to addition to Morales’s resignation in 2019, corruption scandals either caused or contributed to
several presidents’ resignations or removals—Guatemala in 2015, Brazil in 2016, and Peru in several presidents’ resignations or removals—Guatemala in 2015, Brazil in 2016, and Peru in
2018. 2018.
Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several Although the threat of direct military rule has dissipated, civilian governments in several
countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises, raising countries have turned to their militaries or retired officers for support or during crises, raising

8 “Elections Set for the First Week in November, Breakingbelizenews.com, July 29, 2020, and EIU, Organisation of
Eastern Caribbean States, Country Report, 2nd Quarter 2020.
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concerns among some observers.9 For example, in February 2020 in El Salvador, President Nayib
Bukele used the military in an effort to intimidate the country’s legislature into approving an anti-
concerns among some observers.9 For example, in February 2020 in El Salvador, President Nayib Bukele used the military in an effort to intimidate the country’s legislature into approving an anti- 9 See “Latin America’s 21st-Century Militaries,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 12-72. Congressional Research Service 7 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress crime bil ; the action elicited strong criticism in El Salvador and abroad, with concerns centered crime bil ; the action elicited strong criticism in El Salvador and abroad, with concerns centered
on the politicization of the military and the separation of powers.10 on the politicization of the military and the separation of powers.10
The quality of democracy has eroded in several countries over the past several years. The The quality of democracy has eroded in several countries over the past several years. The
Economist Intel igence Unit’s (EIU’s) 2019 democracy index shows a steady regional decline in Economist Intel igence Unit’s (EIU’s) 2019 democracy index shows a steady regional decline in
democratic practices in Latin America since 2017. Several years ago only Cuba was viewed as an democratic practices in Latin America since 2017. Several years ago only Cuba was viewed as an
authoritarian regime, but Venezuela joined its ranks in 2017 as President Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian regime, but Venezuela joined its ranks in 2017 as President Nicolás Maduro’s
government violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua government violently repressed the political opposition. Nicaragua turned toescalated authoritarian authoritarian
practices in 2018 under long-time President Daniel Ortega, as the government violently repressed practices in 2018 under long-time President Daniel Ortega, as the government violently repressed
protests. The continued regional downward trend in 2019 stemmed from Bolivia’s post-election protests. The continued regional downward trend in 2019 stemmed from Bolivia’s post-election
crisis and to a lesser extent by setbacks in the following other countries: Guatemala, where the crisis and to a lesser extent by setbacks in the following other countries: Guatemala, where the
government ousted the anti-corruption body known as the International Commission against government ousted the anti-corruption body known as the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala; Haiti, which experienced widespread anti-government protests against Impunity in Guatemala; Haiti, which experienced widespread anti-government protests against
corruption and deteriorating economic conditions; and Guyana, with the delay of elections corruption and deteriorating economic conditions; and Guyana, with the delay of elections
following a no-confidence vote by the legislature in December 2018.11 following a no-confidence vote by the legislature in December 2018.11
Public satisfaction with how democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of Public satisfaction with how democracy is operating has declined along with the quality of
democracy in the region. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey, democracy in the region. According to the 2018/2019 AmericasBarometer public opinion survey,
the percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries the percentage of individuals satisfied with how democracy was working in their countries
averaged 39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level of satisfaction since the poll averaged 39.6% among 18 countries in the region, the lowest level of satisfaction since the poll
began in 2004.12 Given these trends, the eruption of social protests in many countries around the began in 2004.12 Given these trends, the eruption of social protests in many countries around the
region in 2019 region in 2019 iswas unsurprising, but in each country a unique set of circumstances unsurprising, but in each country a unique set of circumstances has sparked the sparked the
protests. In addition to the protests in Bolivia and Haiti cited above, protests broke out in Ecuador protests. In addition to the protests in Bolivia and Haiti cited above, protests broke out in Ecuador
over fuel price increases, in Chile over pent-up frustration over social inequities, and in Colombia over fuel price increases, in Chile over pent-up frustration over social inequities, and in Colombia
over opposition to a range of government policies and proposals, from tax reform to education to over opposition to a range of government policies and proposals, from tax reform to education to
peace accord implementation. peace accord implementation.
Although each country is unique, several broad political and economic factors appear to be Although each country is unique, several broad political and economic factors appear to be
driving the decline in satisfaction with democracy in the region. Political factors include an driving the decline in satisfaction with democracy in the region. Political factors include an
increase in authoritarian practices, weak democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems, increase in authoritarian practices, weak democratic institutions and politicized judicial systems,
corruption, high levels of crime and violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence corruption, high levels of crime and violence, and organized crime that can infiltrate or influence
state institutions. Economic factors include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates state institutions. Economic factors include declining or stagnant regional economic growth rates
over the past several years; high levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries; over the past several years; high levels of income inequality in many Latin American countries;
increased poverty; and the inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and increased poverty; and the inadequacy of public services, social safety net programs, and
advancement opportunities, along with increased pressure on the region’s previously expanding advancement opportunities, along with increased pressure on the region’s previously expanding
middle class.13 The COVID-19 pandemic middle class.13 The COVID-19 pandemic could exacerbate some of these factors and contributehas exacerbated these factors, which could lead to to
further deterioration in political conditions further deterioration in political conditions and stoke social unrest in the region. in the region.

9 See “Latin America’s 21st-Century Militaries,” Americas Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1 (2020), pp. 12-72.
10 See Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Armed Forces, Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different – and Worrying,” 10 See Brian Winter, “Latin America’s Armed Forces, Q&A: Why El Salvador’s Crisis Is Different – and Worrying,”
Am ericas Quarterly, February 13, 2020; and Christine Wade, “ Bukele’s Politicization of the Military Revives Old , February 13, 2020; and Christine Wade, “ Bukele’s Politicization of the Military Revives Old
Fears in El Salvador,” Fears in El Salvador,” World Politics Review, February 12, 2020. , February 12, 2020.
11 EIU, 11 EIU, Democracy Index 2019. .
12 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, 12 Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Noam Lupu, LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer Takes the Pulse of Democracy, Vanderbilt , Vanderbilt
University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019. University, Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2019.
13 See, for example, the following studies and articles discussing social unrest in Latin America: EIU, 13 See, for example, the following studies and articles discussing social unrest in Latin America: EIU, Where Next and
What Next for Latin Am erica?, December 2019; Michael Mantera and Maria de Lourdes Despradel, , December 2019; Michael Mantera and Maria de Lourdes Despradel, Latin Am erica and
the Caribbean in the New Decade, How Did We Get There? , Center for Strategic and International Studies, January , Center for Strategic and International Studies, January
2020; Michael Shifter, “T he Rebellion Against the Elites in Latin America,” 2020; Michael Shifter, “T he Rebellion Against the Elites in Latin America,” New York Times, January 21, 2020; and , January 21, 2020; and
Eric Farnsworth, “In a Season of Discontent, Are Latin American Democracies at Risk?,” World Politics Review, December 6, 2019. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
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Human rights groups and other observers have expressed concerns about leaders taking advantage Human rights groups and other observers have expressed concerns about leaders taking advantage
of the pandemic to advance their own agendaof the pandemic to advance their own agenda. In Bolivia, the government of Interim President
Áñez issued a decree in April 2020 criminalizing the spread of misinformation affecting public
health; lawyers and human rights groups criticized the government for using a health emergency
to punish anyone who publishes information that the government deems incorrect.14 Critics
included the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.15 In El Salvador,
President Bukele has been accused of exploiting the health crisis to pursue his aggressive anti-
gang policies. Photos released by the government in late April 2020 of a crackdown on jailed
gang members prompted strong criticism by human rights organization of inhumane conditions
imposed on prisoners and actions that could exacerbate the spread of COVID-19.16 In Venezuela,
according to Human Rights Watch, the security forces and Venezuelan government authorities
have used a state of emergency imposed to curb the spread of COVID-19 as an excuse to crack
down on dissent and increase control over the population.17 and restrict freedom of expression. In El Salvador, critics accuse President Bukele of exploiting the health crisis to pursue his aggressive anti-gang policies. In Bolivia, the interim government twice postponed presidential elections, prompting widespread protests, until elections were held successfully in October 2020. In Venezuela, the government and security forces have used a state of emergency imposed to curb the spread of the virus as an excuse to crack down on dissent. In December 2020, Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting how the Cuban government has used regulations designed to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to harass and imprison government opponents.14
In August 2020, the Inter-American Dialogue published a report with the Special Rapporteur for In August 2020, the Inter-American Dialogue published a report with the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression at the Organization of American States (OAS) expressing concern about Freedom of Expression at the Organization of American States (OAS) expressing concern about
the criminalization of free speech in the region related to governments’ responses to the the criminalization of free speech in the region related to governments’ responses to the
pandemic, restrictions on pandemic-related reporting, and stigmatization of media organizations pandemic, restrictions on pandemic-related reporting, and stigmatization of media organizations
by some leaders for reporting on the pandemic. The report also documented restrictions on access by some leaders for reporting on the pandemic. The report also documented restrictions on access
to public information related to COVID-19 in a number of countries in the region. to public information related to COVID-19 in a number of countries in the region.1815
Economic Conditions
Even before the onset of COVID-19 and its economic effects, Latin America and the Caribbean Even before the onset of COVID-19 and its economic effects, Latin America and the Caribbean
experienced several years of slow economic growth. Beginning around 2015, the global decline experienced several years of slow economic growth. Beginning around 2015, the global decline
in commodity prices significantly affected the region, as did China’s economic slowdown and its in commodity prices significantly affected the region, as did China’s economic slowdown and its
reduced appetite for imports from the region. According to the IMF, the region experienced an reduced appetite for imports from the region. According to the IMF, the region experienced an
economic contraction of 0.6% in 2016, dragged down by recessions in Argentina and Brazil and economic contraction of 0.6% in 2016, dragged down by recessions in Argentina and Brazil and
by Venezuela’s severe economic deterioration as oil prices fel . From 2017 to 2019, the region by Venezuela’s severe economic deterioration as oil prices fel . From 2017 to 2019, the region
registered only marginal growth rates, including an estimated growth rate of 0.registered only marginal growth rates, including an estimated growth rate of 0.103% in 2019. % in 2019.
Regional growth in 2019 was suppressed by the collapse of much of the Venezuelan economy, Regional growth in 2019 was suppressed by the collapse of much of the Venezuelan economy,
which contracted 35%, and by continued recession in Argentina, which suffered an economic which contracted 35%, and by continued recession in Argentina, which suffered an economic
contraction of 2. contraction of 2.2%.191%.16
The reduction in economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic The reduction in economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic has led to significant led to significant
economic decline for the regioneconomic decline for the region and wil have, with negative ramifications for negative ramifications for the region’s economic
prospectsits economic development outlook. Compounding the problem was an historic drop in the price of oil (caused by disagreements among producers over production cuts) beginning in late February 2020; the fiscal accounts of countries dependent on proceeds from oil sales (Venezuela and Ecuador in particular, and to a lesser extent Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) deteriorated rapidly.17 In early 2020, the IMF projected regional growth would reach 1.6% during the year, led by recovery in Brazil and spurred by growth forecasts of 3% or higher for Chile, Colombia, and Peru; however, with the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF altered its 2020 forecast and is now predicting the worst economic downturn on record for the region. In October 2020, the IMF estimated a regional contraction of 8.1% in 2020, with almost al countries experiencing deep 14 Human Rights Watch, “Cuba: COVID-19 Rules Used to Intensify Repression,” December 7, 2020. 15. Compounding the problem was an historic drop in the price of oil (caused by

Eric Farnsworth, “In a Season of Discontent, Are Latin American Democracies at Risk?,” World Politics Review,
December 6, 2019.
14 Gideon Long, “Bolivia Leader Faces Claims of Using Outbreak to T ighten Grip,” Financial Times, May 5, 2020.
15 “Bolivia: Pandemic Policies Under Fire,” LatinNews Weekly Report, May 14, 2020; and “Bolivia: Misinformation
Decree Sparks Free Speech Concerns,” LatinNews Daily, May 13, 2020.
16 May Beth Sheridan, “Photos Show El Salvador’s Crackdown on Imprisoned Gang Members,” Washington Post,
April 28, 2020; Human Rights Watch, “El Salvador” Inhumane Prison Lockdown T reatment,” April 29, 2020.
17 “Venezuela: A Police State Lashes Out Amid COVID-19,” Human Rights Watch, August 28, 2020.
18 Catharine Christe, Edison Lanza, and Michael Camilleri, Catharine Christe, Edison Lanza, and Michael Camilleri, COVID-19 and Freedom of Expression in the Americas, ,
Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020. Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020.
1916 Economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Economic statistics are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database, , April
2020.
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link to page 14 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

disagreements among producers over production cuts) beginning in late February 2020; the fiscal
accounts of countries dependent on proceeds from oil sales (Venezuela and Ecuador in particular,
and to a lesser extent Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico) have deteriorated rapidly.20
In early 2020, the IMF projected regional growth would reach 1.6% during the year, led by
recovery in Brazil and spurred by growth forecasts of 3% or higher for Chile, Colombia, and
Peru. With the COVID-19 pandemic, the IMF has altered its forecast twice and now is predicting
the worst economic downturn on record for the region. In April 2020, the IMF predicted a
regional contraction of 5.2% in 2020, with almost al countries experiencing deep recessions. By
late June 2020, as the economic fal out from the pandemic intensified worldwide, the IMF revised
its forecast downward again, estimating a 9.4% economic contraction for the region in 2020, with
October 2020. 17 Mauricio Cárdenas, “T he Impact of Coronavirus and the Oil Price War on Latin America,” State of the Planet, Earth Institute, Columbia University, March 18, 2020. Also see CRS Report R46270, Global Econom ic Effects of COVID-19, coordinated by James K. Jackson. Congressional Research Service 9 link to page 15 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress recessions and the region’s six largest economies forecast to contract between the region’s six largest economies forecast to contract between 7.55.8% and 13.9% (s% and 13.9% (see Table 3)). Caribbean nations that depend on tourism face deep economic recessions, several with projected gross domestic product declines wel over 10% in 2020, according to the IMF.18 The IMF is forecasting a regional recovery of 3.6.
Tourism-dependent Caribbean economies, including the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and
Eastern Caribbean countries, are being especial y hard hit economical y, with these economies
forecast to contract 10.3%.21
The IMF is currently forecasting a regional recovery of 3.7% in 2021, reflecting the % in 2021, reflecting the
normalization of economic activity from very low levels in response to COVID-19. This rebound, normalization of economic activity from very low levels in response to COVID-19. This rebound,
however, depends largely on the course of the pandemichowever, depends largely on the course of the pandemic and could be affected by a second
outbreak, both within the region and abroad.
, governments’ responses, and the availability and distribution of vaccines in the region. The rebound forecast for the region lags behind the world economic growth forecast of 5.2% in 2021 and behind expected economic recoveries in several other regions (such as Europe and Asia).19 Table 3. Latin America and Caribbean: Real GDP Growth, 2018-2021
(annual percentage change) (annual percentage change)
Regional Average
and Six Largest
2019
2020
2021
Economies
2018
estimate
projection
projection
Latin America and the Latin America and the
1.1 1.1
0. 0.10
- -9.48.1
3. 3.76
Caribbean Caribbean
Brazil Brazil
1.3 1.3
1.1 1.1
- -9.1
3.65.8 2.8
Mexico Mexico
2.2 2.2
-0.3 -0.3
- -10.59.0
3. 3.35
Argentina Argentina
-2. -2.56
-2. -2.21
- -9.9
311.8 4.9 .9
Colombia Colombia
2.5 2.5
3.3 3.3
- -7.88.2
4.0 4.0
Chile Chile
3.94.0
1.1 1.1
- -7.5
5.06.0 4.5
Peru Peru
4.0 4.0
2.2 2.2
-13.9 -13.9
6.57.3
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, , June 2020, and “Outlook for Latin
America and the Caribbean: An Intensifying Pandemic,” IMF Blog, June 26,October 2020. 2020.
The decline in economic growth in 2020 is expected to increase income inequality and poverty in The decline in economic growth in 2020 is expected to increase income inequality and poverty in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America already was the most unequal region in the Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin America already was the most unequal region in the
world in terms of income inequality, according to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin world in terms of income inequality, according to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Despite an easing of income inequality in the region from America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Despite an easing of income inequality in the region from

20 Mauricio Cárdenas, “T he Impact of Coronavirus and the Oil Price War on Latin America,” State of the Planet, Earth
Institute, Columbia University, March 18, 2020. Also see CRS Report R46270, Global Econom ic Effects of COVID-19,
coordinated by James K. Jackson.
21 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020 and June 2020; IMF, World Economic Outlook Database,
October 2019 and April 2020; and IMF, “Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An Intensifying Pandemic,”
IMF Blog, June 26, 2020.
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2002 to 2014, reductions in income inequality 2002 to 2014, reductions in income inequality had slowed since 2015. had slowed since 2015. In 2020, ECLAC projects ECLAC projects
that that inequality wil rise in al countries in the regioninequality wil rise in al countries in the region in 2020, with the worst results in some of the , with the worst results in some of the
region’s largest economies—Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. region’s largest economies—Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina.2220
The level of poverty in the region, after having decreased significantly from 2002 through 2014, The level of poverty in the region, after having decreased significantly from 2002 through 2014,
has increased over the past five years. In 2014, 27.8% of the region’s population lived in poverty; has increased over the past five years. In 2014, 27.8% of the region’s population lived in poverty;
that figure increased to 30.3% by 2019, with an estimated 186 mil ion people living in poverty, that figure increased to 30.3% by 2019, with an estimated 186 mil ion people living in poverty,
according to ECLAC. According to a July 2020 U.N. report, as a result of the pandemic, poverty according to ECLAC. According to a July 2020 U.N. report, as a result of the pandemic, poverty
is expected to increase to 37.2% in 2020, with an increase of 45 mil ion people moving into is expected to increase to 37.2% in 2020, with an increase of 45 mil ion people moving into
poverty, resulting in a total of 230 mil ion people in the region in poverty. poverty, resulting in a total of 230 mil ion people in the region in poverty.2321 18 IMF, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2020; and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. 19 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. 20 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America 2019, December 2019, and The Social Challenge in Tim es of COVID-19, May 12, 2020. 21 U.N. ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2019, December 2019; and United Nations, Policy Brief: The Im pact of COVID-19 on Latin Am erica and the Caribbean , July 9, 2020. Congressional Research Service 10 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress
A chal enge for the region’s economic recovery is the high rate of informality in the labor market A chal enge for the region’s economic recovery is the high rate of informality in the labor market
of many Latin American countries (reportedly about half of workers in Latin America work in the of many Latin American countries (reportedly about half of workers in Latin America work in the
informal economy). As the World Bank notes, many workers are self-employed and many are informal economy). As the World Bank notes, many workers are self-employed and many are
paid under the table, living paycheck to paycheck; such characteristics make it more difficult for paid under the table, living paycheck to paycheck; such characteristics make it more difficult for
governments to design programs that reach and provide adequate assistance to these workers. governments to design programs that reach and provide adequate assistance to these workers.24
There were concerns that incoming remittances from abroad (the lion’s share from the United
States) would drop significantly because of the pandemic. For several countries—El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Nicaragua—remittances play a significant role in their
economies. 22 In AprilIn April 2020, the World Bank predicted 2020, the World Bank predicted that remittances to Latin America and the remittances to Latin America and the
Caribbean would Caribbean would decline by 19.3% in 2020.23 However, by June and July 2020, remittances began to rebound in many countries in the region, including in Central America and Mexico, w hich had a record increase for the year.24decline by 19.3% in 2020.25 An Inter-American Dialogue report estimated that,
as of April 2020, remittances from the United States to the region had declined 16% compared to
2019.26 Nevertheless, there are indications that remittances to the region have rebounded, with
Mexico showing an overal increase in remittances for the first six months of 2020, and
remittances to Central American countries recovering in June and July 2020.27
Although a number of countries in the region have implemented stimulus programs to help Although a number of countries in the region have implemented stimulus programs to help
protect their economies and vulnerable populations, protect their economies and vulnerable populations, manymost countries have needed external countries have needed external
financing to respond to the financing to respond to the severepandemic and associated economic downturn. In response, the economic downturn. In response, the international financial international financial
institutions institutions are providing assistanceincreased lending to countries throughout the to countries throughout the Latin America and Caribbean
region to support the region’s response to COVID-19region. .
 The  The World Bank, as of August 27, 2020, reported it is providing almost $4 bil ion
across the Latin American and Caribbean region; to date, it has identified specific
projects in 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries. The assistance focuses on
minimizing the loss of life, strengthening health systems and disease
surveil ance, mitigating the pandemic’s economic impact, and addressing supply-

22 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Social Panorama of Latin America
2019, December 2019, and The Social Challenge in Tim es of COVID-19, May 12, 2020.
23 U.N. ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America 2019, December 2019; and United Nations, Policy Brief: The
Im pact of COVID-19 on Latin Am erica and the Caribbean , July 9, 2020.
24IMF reported, as of December 21, 2020, that it had approved $63.8 bil ion in lending to 21 countries in the region contending with the pandemic’s economic impact, including $23.9 bil ion for Chile, $16.9 bil ion for Colombia, $11 bil ion for Peru, and $7.1 bil ion for Ecuador.25  The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) reported that as of December 21, 2020, its response to the pandemic in the region totaled nearly $8.1 bil ion, focused on financing for immediate public-health needs, safety nets for vulnerable populations, economic productivity and employment, and fiscal measures to help mitigate economic impacts.26 On December 16, 2020, the IDB announced it would mobilize an additional $1 bil ion to help countries acquire and distribute COVID-19 vaccines, working closely with PAHO and other institutions.27  The World Bank reported, as of December 17, 2020, it delivered $7.4 bil ion in COVID-19 related loans and grants to 21 countries in the region, with support focused on minimizing the loss of life, strengthening health systems and disease surveil ance, mitigating the pandemic’s economic impact, and addressing supply-chain issues and delivery. Over the next 15 months, countries in the region also 22 World Bank, “Latin American and the Caribbean, Overview,” updated April 28, 2020. Also see Matías Busso et al, World Bank, “Latin American and the Caribbean, Overview,” updated April 28, 2020. Also see Matías Busso et al,
“Covid-19: T he Challenge of Ensuring Assistance to Informal and Vulnerable Worker,” Inter-American Development “Covid-19: T he Challenge of Ensuring Assistance to Informal and Vulnerable Worker,” Inter-American Development
Bank, Ideas Matter, May 6, 2020. Bank, Ideas Matter, May 6, 2020.
2523 World Bank, “World Bank Predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History,” press release, April 22, World Bank, “World Bank Predicts Sharpest Decline of Remittances in Recent History,” press release, April 22,
20202020.
26 Mariellen Malloy Jewers and Manuel Orozco, Migrants, Remittances, and COVID-19, Remittance Behavior and
Econom ic and Health Vulnerabilities, Inter-American Dialogue, August 2020.
27; Gabriella Cova, “Remittances Show Promise in the Face of the Ongoing Global COVID-19 Pandemic,” Atlantic Council, December 7, 2020; and “Forecast Record Remittances in Mexico of 40 T housand Mdd for US Support,” CE Noticias Financieras, December 30, 2020. 24 Kevin Sieff, “Migrant Remittances Increase Abroad, Defying Kevin Sieff, “Migrant Remittances Increase Abroad, Defying EconomistsEcono mists’ Predictions,” ’ Predictions,” Washington Post, August 9, t, August 9,
2020; and “In Brief: Remittances Surge in El Salvador, Guatemala,” 2020; and “In Brief: Remittances Surge in El Salvador, Guatemala,” LatinNews Daily, August 27, 2020. , August 27, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

chain issues and delivery. Over the next 15 months, countries in the region also
may benefit from a portion of the $160 bil ion in worldwide assistance the bank
is providing.28
 The IMF, as of September 2, 2020, had approved $50.9 bil ion in lending to 20
countries in the region contending with the pandemic’s economic impact,
including $23.9 bil ion for Chile, $11 bil ion for Peru, and $10.8 bil ion for
Colombia.29
 The Inter-American Development Bank announced in March 2020 that it was
providing support to countries in four priority areas: (1) the immediate public
health response, (2) safety nets for vulnerable populations, (3) economic
productivity and employment, and (4) fiscal policies for the amelioration of
economic impacts. The bank is making available up to $12 bil ion, including $3.2
bil ion in additional funding for 2020 and the remainder in reprogrammed
existing health projects to address the crisis.30
 The Development Bank of Latin America, as of July 2020, is providing $4.9
25 T he other 17 countries receiving IMF support are the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, See IMF, “Emergency Funding and Debt Relief, Western Hemisphere,” updated December 21, 2020, at https://www.imf.org/en/T opics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-T racker#WHD. 26 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “IDB Group Approves Record $21.6 Billion in Lending in 2020,” news release, December 21, 2020. Also see IDB, “IDB-Financed Projects in Response to COVID-19,” accessed December 30, 2020, available at https://www.iadb.org/en/coronavirus/briefings-and-dashboards. 27 IDB, “IDB Mobilizes $1 Billion for COVID-19 Vaccine Financing in Latin America and the Caribbean,” press release, December 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 11 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress may benefit from a portion of the $160 bil ion in worldwide assistance the bank is providing.28  The Development Bank of Latin America announced in July 2020 that it provided $4.9 bil ion in financing to address the effects of the pandemic in 54 operations across bil ion in financing to address the effects of the pandemic in 54 operations across
the region.the region.3129
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean: Impact
of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan et al.; CRS Report R46270, , by Mark P. Sullivan et al.; CRS Report R46270, Global Economic Effects of
COVID-19, coordinated by James K. Jackson; and CRS Report R46342, , coordinated by James K. Jackson; and CRS Report R46342, COVID-19: Role of the
International Financial Institutions, by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss. , by Rebecca M. Nelson and Martin A. Weiss.
U.S. Policy Toward Latin America and the
Caribbean
U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political, U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean are diverse and include economic, political,
security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages security, and humanitarian concerns. Geographic proximity has ensured strong economic linkages
between the United States and the region, with the United States being a major trading partner between the United States and the region, with the United States being a major trading partner
and source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade and source of foreign investment for many Latin American and Caribbean countries. Free-trade
agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. The agreements (FTAs) have augmented U.S. economic relations with 11 countries in the region. The
Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and il egal; geographic Western Hemisphere is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and il egal; geographic
proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration trends. proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration trends.
Curbing the flow of il icit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component Curbing the flow of il icit drugs from Latin America and the Caribbean has been a key component
of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for more than four decades. The

28 T he countries are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vin cent and the Grenadines, Suriname,
T rinidad and T obago, and Uruguay. See World Bank, “World Bank’s Response to Covid-19 (Coronavirus) in Latin
America & Caribbean,” fact sheet, updated August 27, 2020, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/04/
02/world-bank-response-to-covid-19-coronavirus-latin-america-and-caribbean.
29 T he other 17 countries receiving IMF support are the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, St.
Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, See IMF, “Emergency Fundin g and Debt Relief, Western Hemisphere,”
updated September 2, 2020, at https://www.imf.org/en/T opics/imf-and-covid19/COVID-Lending-T racker#WHD.
30 Inter-American Development Bank, “IDB Group Announces Priority Support Areas for Countries Affected by
COVID-19,” news release, March 26, 2020.
31 Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), “Latin America Works T ogether with CAF for Economic and Social
Recovery,” news release, July 7, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

of U.S. relations with the region and a major interest of Congress for more than four decades. The flow of il icit drugs, including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine flow of il icit drugs, including heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl from Mexico and cocaine
from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health and safety; and the trafficking of such drugs has from Colombia, poses risks to U.S. public health and safety; and the trafficking of such drugs has
contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States. Since 2000, Colombia has contributed to violent crime and gang activities in the United States. Since 2000, Colombia has
received U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombiareceived U.S. counternarcotics support through Plan Colombia and its successor programs. In and its successor programs. In
addition, for over a decade, the United States addition, for over a decade, the United States has sought to forge close partnerships with other sought to forge close partnerships with other
countries to combat drug trafficking and related violence and advance citizen security. These countries to combat drug trafficking and related violence and advance citizen security. These
efforts include the Mérida Initiative begun in 2007 to support Mexico, the Central America efforts include the Mérida Initiative begun in 2007 to support Mexico, the Central America
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) begun in 2008, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) begun in 2008, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
(CBSI) begun in 2009. (CBSI) begun in 2009.
Another long-standing component of U.S. policy has been support for strengthened democratic Another long-standing component of U.S. policy has been support for strengthened democratic
governance and the rule of law. As described in the previous section, although many countries in governance and the rule of law. As described in the previous section, although many countries in
the region have made enormous strides in terms of democratic political development, several face the region have made enormous strides in terms of democratic political development, several face
considerable chal enges. U.S. policy efforts have long supported democracy promotion efforts, considerable chal enges. U.S. policy efforts have long supported democracy promotion efforts,
including support for strengthening civil society and promoting the rule of law and human rights. including support for strengthening civil society and promoting the rule of law and human rights.
28 T he countries are Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, T rinidad and T obago, and Uruguay. See World Bank, “World Bank’s Response to Covid-19 (Coronavirus) in Latin America & Caribbean,” fact sheet, updated December 17, 2020, at https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2020/04/02/world-bank-response-to-covid-19-coronavirus-latin-america-and-caribbean. 29 Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), “Latin America Works T ogether with CAF for Economic and Social Recovery,” news release, July 7, 2020. Congressional Research Service 12 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Trump Administration Policy Trump Administration Policy
In its policy toward Latin America and the In its policy toward Latin America and the Latin America and the Caribbean: Caribbean, the Trump Administration Caribbean, the Trump Administration has retained
retained Views of U.S. Leadership many of the same priorities and programs of many of the same priorities and programs of Negative views of U.S. leadership in the region have past Administrations, but it past Administrations, but it has also diverged
also diverged predominated since the Trump Administration took considerably. The Administration considerably. The Administration has general y adopted a more confrontational approach,
especial y regarding efforts to curb irregular immigration from the region. In 2018, the State
Department set forth a framework for U.S. policy toward the region focused on three general y office in 2017, influenced by disparaging political adopted a more confrontational approach, rhetoric and certain actions on immigration and trade, among other issues. Such views could affect the especial y regarding efforts to curb irregular wil ingness of countries to cooperate with the United immigration from the region. In 2018, the States on regional and global chal enges. A Gal up public State Department set forth a framework for opinion pol of worldwide views on U.S. leadership in U.S. policy toward the region focused on three 2017 showed that in Western Hemisphere countries, pil ars for pil ars for
engagement: (1) economic growth engagement: (1) economic growth and prosperity, (2) security, and (3) democratic governance.32
The framework reflects continuity with long-standing U.S. policy 58% disapproved of U.S. leadership and 24% approved. The highest rates of disapproval included Chile (74%), and prosperity, (2) security, and (3) democratic Mexico (72%), and Uruguay (70%). This result was a governance.30 The framework reflected significant change from 2016, when the Gal up pol continuity with long-standing U.S. policy showed that 27% disapproved of U.S. leadership and priorities for the region but at priorities for the region but at
times appears to be at odds with the Administration’s actions, which sometimes have been
accompanied by antagonistic statements on immigration, trade, and foreign times appears to 49% approved. have been at odds with the Administration’s Subsequent Gal up pol s in 2018 and 2019 showed actions, as wel as its sometimes antagonistic some improvement in views of U.S. leadership in the region, with 31% approving in 2018 and 34% in 2019. statements on immigration, trade, and foreign Despite the improvement, continued negative views aid. Meanwhile, aid. Meanwhile,
according to Gal up and Pew according to Gal up and Pew Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. prevailed in most countries in the region, with 53% in Research Center polls, negative views of U.S. 2018 and 51% in 2019 disapproving of U.S. leadership. leadership in the leadership in the
region region have increased markedly during the Trump Administration (see text box “Latin America
and the Caribbean: Views of U.S. Leadership”).
In August 2020, the White House set forth a strategic framework for the Western Hemisphere,
which states that the principal goal of U.S. engagement with the region “is to support a
prosperous, safe, and democratic region with which the United States can increased markedly Among the countries with the highest percentage during the Trump Administration (see text box negative views of U.S. leadership in 2019 were Mexico (75%), Chile (67%), and Uruguay (55%); those with the “Latin America and the Caribbean: Views highest percentage of positive views were the of U.S. Leadership”). Dominican Republic (56%) and El Salvador (44%). A January 2020 Pew Research report likewise showed In August 2020, the White House set forth a low confidence rates for President Trump in Argentina strategic framework for the Western (22%), Brazil (28%), and Mexico (8%) Hemisphere, which states that the principal Sources: Gal up, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The goal of U.S. engagement with the region “is to U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; “Trump Ratings support a prosperous, safe, and democratic Remain Low Around Glove, While Views of U.S. Stay region with which the United States can Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 8, 2020. partner to advance partner to advance
shared interests.” The framework set forth five lines of effort to realize this goal: (1) securing the shared interests.” The framework set forth five lines of effort to realize this goal: (1) securing the
homeland, which includes preventing il egalhomeland, which includes preventing il egal and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and and uncontrolled human migration, smuggling, and
trafficking; (2) advancing economic growth and an expansion trafficking; (2) advancing economic growth and an expansion of free market in the Americas; (3) of free market in the Americas; (3)
reaffirming the region’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law, which includes efforts to reaffirming the region’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law, which includes efforts to
restore human rights and democracy in Nicaragua and restore human rights and democracy in Nicaragua and Venezuela Venezuela and enable a transition to and enable a transition to
democracy in Cuba; (4) countering economic aggression and malign political influence in the democracy in Cuba; (4) countering economic aggression and malign political influence in the
region from such external actors as China; and (5) expanding and strengthening cooperation with region from such external actors as China; and (5) expanding and strengthening cooperation with
like-minded partners in the region in such areas as resilience to like-minded partners in the region in such areas as resilience to threats and hazards,
countermeasures against actors that undermine political and economic stability, and efforts to
assist countries in achieving self-reliance and self-security.33

3230 U.S. Department of U.S. Department of StateStat e, then-Secretary of State Rex W. T illerson, “U.S. Engagement in the Western Hemisphere,” , then-Secretary of State Rex W. T illerson, “U.S. Engagement in the Western Hemisphere,”
February 1, 2018, at https://www.state.gov/u-s-engagement -in-the-western-hemisphere/. These three pillars dovetail February 1, 2018, at https://www.state.gov/u-s-engagement -in-the-western-hemisphere/. These three pillars dovetail
with key topics for the Western Hemisphere currently laid out on the State Department’s website: fostering inclusive with key topics for the Western Hemisphere currently laid out on the State Department’s website: fostering inclusive
economic growth, protecting U.S. citizens at home and abroad,economic growth, protecting U.S. citizens at home and abroad, and defending freedom. See https://www.state.gov/and defending freedom. See https://www.state.gov/
bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-western-hemisphere-affairs/. bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-political-affairs/bureau-of-western-hemisphere-affairs/.
33 White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,”
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Foreign Aid. The Administration’s proposed
Latin America and the Caribbean:
threats and hazards, countermeasures against actors that undermine political and economic stability, and efforts to assist countries in achieving self-reliance and self-security.31 Foreign Aid. The Administration’s proposed foreign aid budgets for FY2018 and FY2019 foreign aid budgets for FY2018 and FY2019
Views of U.S. Leadership
would would have cut assistance to the region by have cut assistance to the region by
more than a third, and the FY2020 budget more than a third, and the FY2020 budget
Negative views of U.S. leadership in the region have
predominated since the Trump Administration took
request would have request would have cut funding to the region by about 30% compared to that appropriated cut funding to the region
office in 2017, influenced by disparaging political
by about 30% compared to that appropriated
rhetoric and certain actions on immigration and trade.
in FY2019. Congress did in FY2019. Congress did not implement those budget requests and instead provided significantly more for assistance to the region in appropriations measures. Nevertheless, in 2019, the Trump Administration withheld an estimated $396not implement those
Such views could affect the wil ingness of countries to
budget requests and instead provided
cooperate with the United States on regional and
significantly more for assistance to the region
global chal enges. A Gal up public opinion pol of
worldwide views on U.S. leadership in 2017 showed
in appropriations measures. Nevertheless, in
that in Western Hemisphere countries, 58%
2019, the Trump Administration withheld an
disapproved of U.S. leadership and 24% approved. The
estimated $405 mil ion that Congress had
highest rates of disapproval included Chile (74%),
appropriated for Central America in FY2018
Mexico (72%), and Uruguay (70%). This result was a
significant change from 2016, when the Gal up pol
and reprogrammed the funds elsewhere. For
showed that 27% disapproved of U.S. leadership and
FY2021, the Administration has requested
49% approved.
$1.4 bil ion in assistance for the region, 18%
Subsequent Gal up pol s in 2018 and 2019 showed
less than al ocated in FY2020. As of August
some improvement in views of U.S. leadership in the
21, mil ion that Congress had appropriated for Central America in FY2018 and reprogrammed the funds elsewhere. For FY2021, the Administration requested 18% less than al ocated in FY2020 and would have cut funding for most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, but Congress instead provided more than requested for key initiatives and countries in the region. As of August 2020, U.S. agencies had al ocated more than $141 mil ion of new and previously announced assistance to help the region respond to chal enges posed by the COVID- 19 pandemic. (See “U.S. Foreign Aid” section.) Trade. In 2017, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) FTA that had been negotiated by 12 Asia-Pacific countries in 2020, U.S. agencies had al ocated more
region, with 31% approving in 2018 and 34% in 2019.
than $141 mil ion of new and previously
Despite the improvement, continued negative views
prevailed in most countries in the region, with 53% in
announced assistance to help the region
2018 and 51% in 2019 disapproving of U.S. leadership.
respond to chal enges posed by the COVID-19
Among the countries with the highest percentage
pandemic. (See “U.S. Foreign Aid” section.)
negative views of U.S. leadership in 2019 were Mexico
(75%), Chile (67%), and Uruguay (55%); those with the
Trade. In 2017, President Trump ordered U.S.
highest percentage of positive views were the
withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific
Dominican Republic (56%) and El Salvador (44%). A
Partnership (TPP) FTA that had been
January 2020 Pew Research report likewise showed
negotiated by 12 Asia-Pacific countries in
low confidence rates for President Trump in Argentina
(22%), Brazil (28%), and Mexico (8%)
2015. The TPP 2015. The TPP would have increased U.S. would have increased U.S.
economic linkages with Latin American economic linkages with Latin American
Sources: Gal up, Rating World Leaders, 2018-2020, The
U.S. vs. Germany, China, and Russia; “Trump Ratings
countries that were parties to countries that were parties to the agreement—Chile, Mexico, and Peru. President Trump the agreement—
Remain Low Around Glove, While Views of U.S. Stay
Chile, Mexico, and Peru. President Trump
Mostly Favorable,” Pew Research Center, January 8,
strongly criticized the North American strongly criticized the North American Free Free
2020.
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and
Canada, repeatedly warned that the United States might withdraw from the agreement, and Canada, repeatedly warned that the United States might withdraw from the agreement, and
initiated renegotiations in 2017. The three countries agreed in September 2018 to a new United initiated renegotiations in 2017. The three countries agreed in September 2018 to a new United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force on July 1, 2020; the States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which entered into force on July 1, 2020; the
agreement retained many NAFTA agreement retained many NAFTA provisions but also included some modernizing updates and provisions but also included some modernizing updates and
changes, including provisions on changes, including provisions on digital digital trade and the dairy and auto industries. (See trade and the dairy and auto industries. (See “Trade
Policy” section.) section.)
Mexico, Central America, and Migration Issues. Relations with Mexico Relations with Mexico have beenwere tested by tested by
inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric, immigration actions, and changes in U.S. border and inflammatory anti-immigrant rhetoric, immigration actions, and changes in U.S. border and
asylum polices that have shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to asylum polices that have shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to
Mexico. In September 2017, the Administration announced that it would end the Deferred Action Mexico. In September 2017, the Administration announced that it would end the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program; begun in 2012 by the Obama Administration, the for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program; begun in 2012 by the Obama Administration, the
program provides relief from deportation for several hundred thousand immigrants who arrived in program provides relief from deportation for several hundred thousand immigrants who arrived in
the United States as children. Ultimately, federal court chal enges led to a Supreme Court ruling the United States as children. Ultimately, federal court chal enges led to a Supreme Court ruling
in June 2020 that vacated the Administration’s action on DACA. In December 2018, Mexico’s that vacated the Administration’s action on DACA. In December 2018, Mexico’s
president agreed to al ow the United States to return certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico president agreed to al ow the United States to return certain non-Mexican migrants to Mexico
(pursuant to Migrant Protection Protocols, or MPP) while awaiting U.S. immigration court (pursuant to Migrant Protection Protocols, or MPP) while awaiting U.S. immigration court
decisions. In May 2019, President Trump threatened to impose new tariffs on motor vehicles from decisions. In May 2019, President Trump threatened to impose new tariffs on motor vehicles from
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Mexico if the Mexico if the government did not increase actions to deter U.S.-bound migrants from Central government did not increase actions to deter U.S.-bound migrants from Central
America; Mexico ultimately agreed in June 2019 to increase its enforcement actions and to al ow America; Mexico ultimately agreed in June 2019 to increase its enforcement actions and to al ow
more U.S.-bound asylum seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. Despite more U.S.-bound asylum seekers to await their U.S. immigration proceedings in Mexico. Despite
tensions, U.S.-Mexico bilateraltensions, U.S.-Mexico bilateral relations relations remainremained friendly, with continued strong energy and friendly, with continued strong energy and
economic ties, including the USMCA,economic ties, including the USMCA, and close security cooperation related to drug interdiction. and close security cooperation related to drug interdiction.
(See (See “Mexico” and and “Migration Issues” sections.) ” sections.)
Other Administration actions on immigration Other Administration actions on immigration have caused concern in the region. In 2017 and caused concern in the region. In 2017 and
2018, the Administration announced plans to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) 2018, the Administration announced plans to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
designations for designations for 31 T he White House, National Security Council, “Overview of Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework,” August 2020; and Nora Gámez T orres, “T rump Adviser to Unveil U.S. Strategy for the Americas in South Florida Event,” Miam i Herald, August 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 14 link to page 31 link to page 44 link to page 55 link to page 37 link to page 46 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court chal enges Nicaragua, Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras, but federal court chal enges have
put the terminations on put the terminations on hold. (See hold. (See “Migration Issues” ” section.) section.)
Unauthorized migration from Central America’s Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador, Unauthorized migration from Central America’s Northern Triangle countries—El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras—has increased in recent years, fueled by difficult socioeconomic and Guatemala, and Honduras—has increased in recent years, fueled by difficult socioeconomic and
security conditions and poor governance. To deter such migration, the Trump Administration security conditions and poor governance. To deter such migration, the Trump Administration
implemented a “zero tolerance” policy toward il egal border crossings in 2018 and applied implemented a “zero tolerance” policy toward il egal border crossings in 2018 and applied
restrictions on access to asylum at the U.S. border. The Administration also restrictions on access to asylum at the U.S. border. The Administration also has used aid cuts of used aid cuts of
previously appropriated assistance previously appropriated assistance for and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on and threats of increased U.S. tariffs and taxes on
remittances remittances to compel Central American countries and Mexico to curb unauthorized migration to to compel Central American countries and Mexico to curb unauthorized migration to
the United States. In 2019, the Administration negotiated “safe third country” agreements with the United States. In 2019, the Administration negotiated “safe third country” agreements with
each of the Northern Triangle countries to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants each of the Northern Triangle countries to permit the United States to transfer asylum applicants
from third countries to the Northern Triangle countries. (Seefrom third countries to the Northern Triangle countries. (See “Central America’s Northern
Triangle” section.) section.)
Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. In November 2018, then-National Security Adviser John In November 2018, then-National Security Adviser John
Bolton made a speech in Miami, FL, on the Administration’s policies in Latin America that Bolton made a speech in Miami, FL, on the Administration’s policies in Latin America that
warned about “the destructive forces of oppression, socialism, and totalitarianism” in the region. warned about “the destructive forces of oppression, socialism, and totalitarianism” in the region.
Reminiscent of Cold War political rhetoric, Bolton referred to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as Reminiscent of Cold War political rhetoric, Bolton referred to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela as
the “troika of tyranny” in the hemisphere that has “final y met its match.” He referred to the three the “troika of tyranny” in the hemisphere that has “final y met its match.” He referred to the three
countries as “the cause of immense human suffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability, countries as “the cause of immense human suffering, the impetus of enormous regional instability,
and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in the Western Hemisphere.” and the genesis of a sordid cradle of communism in the Western Hemisphere.”3432
As the situation in Venezuela As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated under the Maduro government, the Trump deteriorated under the Maduro government, the Trump
AdministrationAdministration has imposed targeted and broader financial sanctions, including sanctions against imposed targeted and broader financial sanctions, including sanctions against
the state oil company, the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration the state oil company, the country’s main source of income. In January 2019, the Administration
recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as interim president. In
September 2019, the United States joined 11 other Western Hemisphere countries to invoke the September 2019, the United States joined 11 other Western Hemisphere countries to invoke the
Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also Rio Treaty to facilitate a regional response to the Venezuelan crisis. The Administration also is
providingprovided humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who have fled to other humanitarian and development assistance for Venezuelans who have fled to other
countries, especial y Colombia, as wel as for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. (See countries, especial y Colombia, as wel as for Venezuelans inside Venezuela. (See “Venezuela”
sectionsection and CRS Insight IN11116, The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the Crisis in Venezuela.) .)
With regard to Cuba, the Trump Administration With regard to Cuba, the Trump Administration has not continueddid not continue the policy of engagement the policy of engagement
advanced during the Obama Administration and advanced during the Obama Administration and hasinstead imposed a series of economic sanctions imposed a series of economic sanctions on on
Cuba for its poor human rights record and support for the Maduro government. Economic Cuba for its poor human rights record and support for the Maduro government. Economic
sanctions sanctions have included restrictionsincluded a wide array of restrictions, especial y on travel and remittances, efforts to disrupt oil flows from on travel and remittances, efforts to disrupt oil flows from
Venezuela, and authorization (pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114) of the
right to file lawsuits against those trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba. In 2017, the State

34 T he White House, “Remarks by National Security Adviser John R. Bolton on the Administration’s Policies in Latin
America,” November 2, 2018.
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Venezuela, and other trade and financial sanctions. In 2017, the State Department cut the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Havana by about two-thirds in response to Department cut the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Havana by about two-thirds in response to
unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff. (See unexplained injuries of U.S. diplomatic staff. (See “Cuba” section.) section.)
SinceAfter political political unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018, the Trump Administration unrest began to grow in Nicaragua in 2018, the Trump Administration has
employed employed targeted sanctions against several targeted sanctions against several individuals close to President Ortega due to their
al eged ties tosenior officials and other individuals and entities for human human rights abuses or rights abuses or significant corruption. (Seecorruption. (See “Nicaragua” section.) ” section.)
Congress and Policy Toward the Region
Congress traditional y has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Congress traditional y has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the
Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Given the region’s geographic proximity to
32 T he White House, “Remarks by National Security Adviser John R. Bolton on the Administration’s Policies in Latin America,” November 2, 2018. Congressional Research Service 15 link to page 23 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap, the United States, U.S. foreign policy toward the region and domestic policy often overlap,
particularly in areas of immigration and trade. particularly in areas of immigration and trade.
The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign aid appropriations in February 2019 The 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign aid appropriations in February 2019
when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). Amounts appropriated when it enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). Amounts appropriated
for key U.S. initiatives and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded the for key U.S. initiatives and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean exceeded the
Administration’s request by almost $600 mil ion. Congress completed action on FY2020 foreign Administration’s request by almost $600 mil ion. Congress completed action on FY2020 foreign
aid appropriations in December 2019aid appropriations in December 2019, when it enacted the Further Consolidated Appropriations when it enacted the Further Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), with amounts for key countries and regional programs Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), with amounts for key countries and regional programs once again
significantly exceeding the exceeding the Administration’s request by $525 mil ion. For FY2021, Congress completed action on appropriations in December 2020 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260); although the measure and its explanatory statement do not specify appropriationsAdministration’s request. The House approved the FY2021 foreign
aid appropriations bil , Division A of H.R. 7608, in July 2020; the bil and accompanying report,
H.Rept. 116-444, do not specify aid levels for every country in the region, levels for every country in the region, but the amounts the amounts designated for for
several several key aid programs (programs (e.g. Central America, Colombia, Central America, Colombia, Mexico, and the Inter-American and the Inter-American
Foundation) are Foundation) are significantly more than requested higher than the Administration’s request (see (see “U.S. Foreign Aid” section). section).
In January 2020, Congress completed action on implementing legislation for the USMCA (P.L.
116-113).35The FY2021 omnibus appropriations measure (P.L. 116-260) included two other legislative acts concerning U.S. policy toward Latin America.  The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act (Division FF, Title III, Subtitle F) requires the State Department to develop a five-year strategy to advance economic prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen democratic governance, and improve civilian security conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. It also requires the imposition of targeted sanctions against those undermining democracy or involved in significant acts of corruption in those countries. The House had approved an earlier version of the act, H.R. 2615, in July 2019.  The United States-Mexico Economic Partnership Act (Division FF, Title XIX) requires the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to prioritize and expand educational and professional exchange programs with Mexico. Original y introduced as H.R. 133, the House and Senate had approved their versions of the act, respectively, in January 2019 and January 2020. On trade, Congress completed action in January 2020 on implementing legislation for the USMCA (P.L. 116-113). The agreement retains many of NAFTA’s provisions and includes new provisions on The agreement retains many of NAFTA’s provisions and includes new provisions on
the auto and dairy industries and some modernizing features. Before the legislation received final the auto and dairy industries and some modernizing features. Before the legislation received final
congressional approval in January 2020, the trade agreement was amended to congressional approval in January 2020, the trade agreement was amended to address concerns of address concerns of
Congress regarding provisions related to labor (including enforcement), the environment, dispute Congress regarding provisions related to labor (including enforcement), the environment, dispute
settlement procedures, and intel ectual property rights (IPR).settlement procedures, and intel ectual property rights (IPR).36
On Venezuela, Congress has 33 The FY2021 omnibus measure (P.L. 116-260, Division O, Title VI) included technical corrections to the USMCA. Congress also enacted legislation (P.L. 116-164) providing a 10-year extension, through September 2030), of certain tariff preferences in the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act currently benefitting eight Caribbean countries. On Venezuela, Congress supported the Administration’s efforts to sanction the Maduro supported the Administration’s efforts to sanction the Maduro
government for its antidemocratic actions and to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan government for its antidemocratic actions and to provide humanitarian assistance to Venezuelan
migrants throughout the region. In December 2019, Congress enacted the Venezuela Emergency migrants throughout the region. In December 2019, Congress enacted the Venezuela Emergency
Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019, or the VERDAD Act of 2019, in Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act of 2019, or the VERDAD Act of 2019, in
Division J of P.L. 116-94. The measure Division J of P.L. 116-94. The measure incorporatesincorporated provisions from S. 1025, as reported by the 33 Kimberly Ann Elliot, “T rump and Pelosi Both Claim Victory on the USMCA. Who Really Won?” World Politics Review, January 7, 2020. Congressional Research Service 16 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress provisions from S. 1025, as reported by the
Senate Foreign RelationsSenate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2019, and provisions from three bil s on Venezuela Committee in June 2019, and provisions from three bil s on Venezuela
passed by the House in March 2019: H.R. 854, to authorize humanitarian assistance to the passed by the House in March 2019: H.R. 854, to authorize humanitarian assistance to the
Venezuelan people; H.R. 920, to restrict the export of defense articles and crime control Venezuelan people; H.R. 920, to restrict the export of defense articles and crime control
materials; and H.R. 1477, to require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence materials; and H.R. 1477, to require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence
in Venezuela. In other legislative action, the House approved H.R. 549 in July 2019, which would in Venezuela. In other legislative action, the House approved H.R. 549 in July 2019, which would
providehave provided TPS to Venezuelans in the United States. Congress included several provisions and reporting requirements TPS to Venezuelans in the United States.

35 T he USMCA does not go into force until after Canada ratifies the agreement (Mexico did so in December 2019); and
at least 30 days prior to USMCA’s entry into force, the President must notify Congress that he has determined that the
other parties have taken the necessary legal and regulatory measures to comply with their commitments under the
agreement. See CRS Report R44981, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreem ent (USMCA), by M. Angeles
Villarreal and Ian F. Fergusson.
36 Kimberly Ann Elliot, “T rump and Pelosi Both Claim Victory on the USMCA. Who Really Won?” World Politics
Review, January 7, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

Congress included several provisions related to Latin America in the National Defense related to Latin America in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020 NDAA; P.L. 116-92), signed Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY2020 NDAA; P.L. 116-92), signed into law in into law in
December 2019. Among the provisions are the following:
 Venezuela. Section 890 prohibits the Department of Defense (DOD) from
entering into a contract for the procurement of goods or services with any person
that has business operations with the Maduro regime in Venezuela.
 Western Hemisphere Resources. Section 1265 provides that the Secretary of
Defense shal seek to enter into a contract with an independent nongovernmental
institute that has recognized credentials and expertise in national security and
military affairs to conduct an accounting and an assessment of the sufficiency of
resources available to the U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. Northern Command,
the Department of State, and the December 2019. The act included provisions on Venezuela (Section 890, a prohibition against Department of Defense [DOD] contracting) and Guatemala (Section 1267, requiring a certification for the transfer of vehicles to the Guatemalan government). The act also included various reporting requirements, including on the sufficiency of DOD and U.S. Agency for International Development U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) to carry out their respective missions in the Western Hemisphere.
Among other matters, the assessment is required to include “a list of investments,
programs, or partnerships in the Western Hemisphere by China, Iran, Russia, or
other adversarial groups or countries that threaten the national security of the
United States.” A report on the assessment is due to Congress within one year, in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
 Brazil. Section 1266 requires the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding the human rights
climate in Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation.
 Guatemala. Section 1267 requires the Secretary of Defense to certify, prior to
the transfer of any vehicles to the Guatemalan government, that the government
has made a credible commitment to use such equipment only as intended.
 Honduras. Section 1268 requires the Secretary of Defense to enter into an
agreement with an independent institution to conduct an analysis of the human
rights situation in Honduras.
 Central America and Mexico. Section 5522 requires the Director of National
Intel igence, in collaboration with other agencies, to submit within 90 days a
comprehensive assessment of drug trafficking, human trafficking, and human
smuggling activities in Central America and Mexico; the report may be in
classified form, but if so, it shal contain an unclassified summary.
For the FY2021 NDAA, the House-passed version of the bil , H.R. 6395, approved in July 2020,
includes numerous provisions on Latin America and the Caribbean. These include the following:
 Section 1283, which would express the sense of Congress supporting the
enhancement of engagement with the Caribbean;
 Section 1290, which would prohibit the use of any federal funds to provide
assistance to Brazilian security forces to involuntarily relocate indigenous or
Quilombola communities;
 Section 1298, which would require a report on possible misuse of U.S. security
sector funds for il egal surveil ance by Colombia’s armed services;
 Section 1299A, which would require a report on the multifaceted crisis in
Venezuela and its implications for U.S. national security and regional security
and stability, including an assessment of the influence of external actors in
Venezuela, such as China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia;
 Section 1299I, which would require a report on Mexican security forces;
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 Section 1299K, which would extend the certification requirement from the
FY2020 NDAA related to the transfer of any equipment by the Department of
Defense to Guatemala;
 Section 1299P, which would incorporate many provisions of a bil approved by
the House in July 2019 (H.R. 2615) requiring the Secretary of State to develop
strategies to support efforts to advance prosperity, combat corruption, strengthen
democratic institutions, and improve security conditions in the Northern Triangle
countries of Central America, including the use of targeted sanctions to fight
corruption in these countries;
Other bil s and resolutions that have passed either or both houses include the following:
 Mexico. In January 2019, the House approved H.R. 133, which would promote
U.S.-Mexican economic partnership and cooperation, including a strategy to
prioritize and expand educational and professional exchange programs with
Mexico. The Senate approved the bil , amended, in January 2020, which included
a new provision that would promote positive cross-border relations as a priority
for advancing U.S. foreign policy and programs.
 Central America. The House approved H.R. 2615, the United States-Northern
Triangle Engagement Act, in July 2019, which would authorize foreign
assistance to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to address the root causes of
migration. The bil would also require the State Department to devise strategies
to foster economic development, combat corruption, strengthen democracy and
the rule of law, and improve security conditions in the region.
 Bolivia. The Senate approved S.Res. 35 in April 2019, expressing support for
democratic principles in Bolivia and throughout Latin America. In January 2020,
the Senate approved S.Res. 447, expressing concerns about election irregularities
and violence in Bolivia and supporting the convening of new elections.
 Argentina. Both houses approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July 2019, and
S.Res. 277 in October 2019) commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 1994
bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.
 Nicaragua. Both Houses approved similar resolutions, H.Res. 754, approved by
the House in March 2020, and S.Res. 525, approved by the Senate in June 2020,
regarding continued U.S. support for the people of Nicaragua in their peaceful
efforts to promote democracy and human rights and the use of tools under U.S.
law to increase political and financial pressure on the Ortega government.
 Cuba. In June 2020, the Senate approved S.Res. 454, cal ing for the release of
democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer and al members of the Patriotic Union of
Cuba who have been arbitrarily imprisoned.
Congressional committees have held over 20 oversight hearings on the region, including on
Venezuela, (USAID) resources in the Western Hemisphere (Section 1265), Brazil (Section 1266), Honduras (1268), and trafficking activities in Central America and Mexico (Section 5522). At the end of the 116th Congress, the House and Senate voted to override President Trump’s veto of the FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283, on January 1, 2021. The measure and its accompanying conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) include several provisions and reporting requirements on Latin America and the Caribbean. The act included provisions on Cuba (Section 1100, extending benefits to federal employees injured while stationed in Cuba), Guatemala (Section 1299K, extending the certification requirement for the transfer of vehicles), and a reporting requirement on Coast Guard drug interdiction in the Caribbean Basin (Section 8245). The conference report included various statements and/or reporting requirements regarding U.S. engagement with the Caribbean, security relations with Brazil, concerns of al egations of unlawful surveil ance or intel igence gathering by the Colombian military, the situation in Venezuela, and U.S. cooperation with Mexico’s security forces. Other bil s and resolutions that passed either chamber include the following:  Bolivia. The Senate approved S.Res. 35 in April 2019, expressing support for democratic principles in Bolivia and throughout Latin America. In January 2020, the Senate approved S.Res. 447, expressing concerns about election irregularities and violence in Bolivia and supporting the convening of new elections.  Argentina. Both houses approved resolutions (H.Res. 441 in July 2019, and S.Res. 277 in October 2019) commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.  Nicaragua. Both Houses approved similar resolutions, H.Res. 754, approved by the House in March 2020, and S.Res. 525, approved by the Senate in June 2020, regarding continued U.S. support for the people of Nicaragua in their peaceful efforts to promote democracy and human rights and the use of tools under U.S. law to increase political and financial pressure on the Ortega government.  Cuba. In June 2020, the Senate approved S.Res. 454, cal ing for the release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer and al members of the Patriotic Union of Cuba who have been arbitrarily imprisoned.  Caribbean. In November 2020, the House approved H.R. 7703, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act, which would have authorized $74.8 mil ion for the CBSI for each year from FY2021 through FY2015, including monitoring and reporting requirements for the CBSI, and would have required Congressional Research Service 17 link to page 58 link to page 44 link to page 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress the State Department to prioritize efforts to increase disaster response and resilience by carrying out such programs in beneficiary countries.  Haiti. In November 2020, the House approved H.R. 5586, the Haiti Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Initiative Act, which would have directed the State Department, in coordination with USAID, to prioritize and assess post-disaster recovery and efforts to address corruption, rule and law, and media freedoms in Haiti.  OAS. In December 2020, the Senate approved S. 1310, the Organization of American States Legislative Engagement Act of 2020, which had the goals of strengthening the participation of elected national legislators in the activities of the OAS and reaffirming U.S. support for OAS human rights and anti-corruption initiatives. Congressional committees held over 25 oversight hearings on the region, including on Venezuela, Central America (including the impact of U.S. aid cuts), relations with Colombia, Central America (including the impact of U.S. aid cuts), relations with Colombia,
human rights in Cuba, China’s engagement in Latin America, environmental concerns in the human rights in Cuba, China’s engagement in Latin America, environmental concerns in the
Brazilian Amazon, repression in Nicaragua, Haiti,Brazilian Amazon, repression in Nicaragua, Haiti, security cooperation with Mexico, security cooperation with Mexico, and the U.S. the U.S.
response to response to COVIdCOVID-19 -19 in the region (see Appendix).
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in the region, and the report and recommendations of the congressional y mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission (see Appendix).
Regional U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. Foreign Aid
The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to The United States provides foreign assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries to
support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different support development and other U.S. objectives. U.S. policymakers have emphasized different
strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the strategic interests in the region at different times, from combating Soviet influence during the
Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as wel as countering il icit narcotics, since Cold War to promoting democracy and open markets, as wel as countering il icit narcotics, since
the 1990s. The Trump Administration the 1990s. The Trump Administration has sought to shift the focus of U.S. assistance efforts in sought to shift the focus of U.S. assistance efforts in
some some parts of the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration. parts of the region to address U.S. domestic concerns, such as irregular migration.
The Trump Administration also The Trump Administration also has sought to reduce U.S. assistance to Latin America and the sought to reduce U.S. assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean, proposing significant cuts in each of its annual budget requests. Although Congress Caribbean, proposing significant cuts in each of its annual budget requests. Although Congress
has slightly increased aid to the region slightly increased aid to the region over the past four yearsbetween FY2017 and FY2020, the Administration , the Administration has used used
various authorities to suspend and reprogram some of that assistance. In 2019, for example, the various authorities to suspend and reprogram some of that assistance. In 2019, for example, the
Administration withheld an estimated $Administration withheld an estimated $405396 mil ion that Congress had appropriated for Central mil ion that Congress had appropriated for Central
America in FY2018 and reprogrammed the funds to address other foreign policy priorities inside America in FY2018 and reprogrammed the funds to address other foreign policy priorities inside
and outside the Western Hemisphere. (See and outside the Western Hemisphere. (See “Central America’s Northern Triangle,” below.) ” below.)
For FY2021, the Trump Administration For FY2021, the Trump Administration has requested $1.4 bil ion for Latin America and the requested $1.4 bil ion for Latin America and the
Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID. Caribbean through foreign assistance accounts managed by the State Department and USAID.
That amount would That amount would behave been $314 mil ion, or 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 bil ion $314 mil ion, or 18%, less than the estimated $1.7 bil ion of U.S. of U.S.
assistance al ocated to the region in FY2020 (seassistance al ocated to the region in FY2020 (see Table 4). The proposal would . The proposal would have cut funding cut funding for for
every type of assistance and most Latin American and Caribbean countries. For a fourth every type of assistance and most Latin American and Caribbean countries. For a fourth
consecutive year, the Trump Administration also consecutive year, the Trump Administration also has proposed eliminating the Inter-American proposed eliminating the Inter-American
Foundation (IAF)—a smal , independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots Foundation (IAF)—a smal , independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that promotes grassroots
development in the region—and consolidating its programs into USAID. development in the region—and consolidating its programs into USAID.
Congressional Action: After a partial government shutdown and a short-term continuing After a partial government shutdown and a short-term continuing
resolutionresolution (P.L. 116-5), the 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign aid , the 116th Congress completed action on FY2019 foreign aid
appropriations in February 2019. Of the funds appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations appropriations in February 2019. Of the funds appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), nearly $1.7 bil ion Act, 2019 (P.L. 116- Congressional Research Service 18 link to page 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress 6), nearly $1.7 bil ion of foreign assistance was al ocated to Latin America of foreign assistance was al ocated to Latin America
and the Caribbean. That amount was slightly more than was al ocated to the region in FY2018 and the Caribbean. That amount was slightly more than was al ocated to the region in FY2018
and nearly $600 and nearly $600 mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested for the region. mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested for the region.
Table 4. U.S. Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2016-FY2021
(bil ions of U.S. dol ars) (bil ions of U.S. dol ars)
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020 (est.)
2021 (req.)
1.69 1.69
1.67 1.67
1.6 1.67a
1.69 1.69
1.72 1.72
1.40 1.40
Sources: U.S. Department of StateU.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations, FY2013-FY2021; and FY2013-FY2021; and
U.S. Department of State, FY2020 U.S. Department of State, FY2020 estimateestimated data, June 15, 2020. data, June 15, 2020.
Notes: These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary These figures exclude Food for Peace Act (P.L. 480) food aid and assistance appropriated as voluntary
contributions to the Organization of American States. contributions to the Organization of American States.
a. Final FY2018 al ocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $a. Final FY2018 al ocations are unclear, because the Administration reprogrammed approximately $405396 mil ion mil ion
of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, real ocating some of of FY2018 aid that Congress appropriated for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, real ocating some of
those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region. those funds to countries outside of the Latin American and Caribbean region.
Although the House passed an FY2020 foreign aid appropriations bil in June 2019 (H.R. 2740,
H.Rept. 116-78), and the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its bil in September 2019
(S. 2583, S.Rept. 116-126), neither measure was enacted before the start of FY2020. Instead,
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Congress passed two continuing resolutions (P.L. 116-59 and P.L. 116-69)Congress passed two continuing resolutions, which funded foreign , which funded foreign
aid programs in Latin America aid programs in Latin America and the Caribbean at the FY2019 level until December 2019, and the Caribbean at the FY2019 level until December 2019,
when President Trump signed into law the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. when President Trump signed into law the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L.
116-94). More than $1.7 bil ion appropriated in the act was al ocated to Latin America and the 116-94). More than $1.7 bil ion appropriated in the act was al ocated to Latin America and the
Caribbean, which is $525 mil ionCaribbean, which is $525 mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested for the region. more than the Trump Administration requested for the region.
Similar to prior years, Congress did not conclude action on appropriations for FY2021 until several months into the fiscal year. The House passed an FY2021 foreign aid appropriations measure (Division A of H.R. 7608The House passed an FY2021 foreign aid appropriations measure (Division A of H.R. 7608) on
July 24, 2020. The bil and the accompanying report (H.Rept. 116-444), H.Rept. 116-444) in July 2020, but the Senate Appropriations Committee did not release its draft bil and report until November 2020. Congress passed a series of continuing resolutions that funded foreign aid programs in Latin America and the Caribbean at the FY2020 level until December 27, 2020, when President Trump signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). Although the act and accompanying explanatory statement do not specify do not specify
appropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean countryappropriations levels for every Latin American and Caribbean country. Nevertheless, the amounts , the amounts
designatedthey designate for several key U.S. initiatives for several key U.S. initiatives differ significantly differ significantly from the Administration’s request. from the Administration’s request.
The bil would provide
 $519The act provides  $505.9 mil ion to address the underlying factors driving irregular migration from .9 mil ion to address the underlying factors driving irregular migration from
Central America ($ Central America ($143129 mil ion more than the Administration requested mil ion more than the Administration requested and $13.3but $27.2
mil ion less than al ocated to the region in FY2020); mil ion less than al ocated to the region in FY2020);
 $  $457.3461.4 mil ion to support the peace process and security and development efforts mil ion to support the peace process and security and development efforts
in Colombia ($ in Colombia ($44.448.5 mil ion more than requested and $ mil ion more than requested and $5.69.7 mil ion more than mil ion more than
al ocated al ocated to the country in FY2020); in FY2020);
 $  $159158.9 mil ion to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico ($.9 mil ion to support security and rule-of-law efforts in Mexico ($9695.2 .2
mil ion more than requested and $ mil ion more than requested and $21 mil ion more than al ocated mil ion more than al ocated to the country in in FY2020); FY2020);
 $  $3033 mil ion to support a democratic transition mil ion to support a democratic transition and reestablish health systems in
Venezuela ($175in Venezuela ($172 mil ion less mil ion less than requested and $than requested and $52 mil ion mil ion less than al ocated than al ocated to the country in in
FY2020); and FY2020); and
 $  $41.538 mil ion for the IAF ($ mil ion for the IAF ($37.634.1 mil ion more than requested and $ mil ion more than requested and $40.5 mil ion mil ion
more than Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2020). more than Congress appropriated for the agency in FY2020).
The The bil act also includes $also includes $9.1 bil ion of emergency foreign aid to respond to the COVID-19
pandemic global y—$10 mil ion of which would be provided to the IAF. Those funds would
4 bil ion of global health assistance for GAVI, the Vaccine Al iance, to procure and deliver coronavirus vaccines. Those funds build on nearly $1.8 bil ion of FY2020 build on nearly $1.8 bil ion of FY2020 emergency foreign aid provided through two supplemental emergency foreign aid provided through two supplemental
appropriations appropriations bil smeasures (P.L. 116-123 (P.L. 116-123 and P.L. 116-136). As of August 21, 2020 Congressional Research Service 19 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress and P.L. 116-136) to prevent, prepare for, and respond to COVID-19 global y. As of August 2020 (latest information made available), U.S. agencies had , U.S. agencies had
al ocated more than $141 mil ion in new and previously announced assistance to help Latin al ocated more than $141 mil ion in new and previously announced assistance to help Latin
American and Caribbean countries American and Caribbean countries respond toaddress the the health, economic, and humanitarian chal enges health, economic, and humanitarian chal enges
posed by the pandemic.posed by the pandemic.37
The Senate Appropriations Committee has yet to mark up a foreign assistance appropriations bil
for FY2021.
In addition to appropriations measures, resolutions have been introduced in both houses (H.Res.
649 and S.Res. 297) to commend the IAF on its 50th anniversary, recognize its contributions to
development and to advancing U.S. national interests, and pledge continued support for the
agency’s work.
For additional information, see CRS 34 For additional information, see CRS Report R46514, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: FY2021 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer and Rachel L. Martin; CRS Report R46367, Report R46367, Department of State, Foreign Operations,
and Related Programs: FY2021 Budget and Appropriations, by Cory R. Gil , Marian L. Lawson, , by Cory R. Gil , Marian L. Lawson,
and Emily M. Morgenstern; CRS Report R45547, U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and
the Caribbean: FY2019 Appropriations, by Peter J. Meyer and Edward Y. Gracia; and Emily M. Morgenstern; CRS In Focus CRS In Focus
IF11496, IF11496, COVID-19 and Foreign Assistance: Issues for Congress, by Nick M. Brown, Marian L. , by Nick M. Brown, Marian L.
Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern; CRS In Focus IF11581, Latin America and the Caribbean:

37 U.S. Department of State, “Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” fact
sheet, August 21, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/update-the-united-states-continues-to-lead-the-global-response-to-
covid-19-6/.
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Impact of COVID-19, by Mark P. Sullivan et al.; Lawson, and Emily M. Morgenstern; and CRS In Focus IF11606, and CRS In Focus IF11606, COVID-19 and
Foreign Assistance: Congressional Oversight Framework and Current Activities, by Nick M. , by Nick M.
Brown and Emily M. Morgenstern. Brown and Emily M. Morgenstern.
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Gangs
Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the Latin America and the Caribbean feature prominently in U.S. counternarcotics policy due to the
region’s role as a source and transit zone for several il icit drugs destined for U.S. markets—region’s role as a source and transit zone for several il icit drugs destined for U.S. markets—
cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opiates (plant-based and synthetic). Heroin abuse and cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and opiates (plant-based and synthetic). Heroin abuse and
synthetic opioid-related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising synthetic opioid-related deaths in the United States have reached epidemic levels, raising
questions about how to address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that questions about how to address foreign sources of opioids. Policymakers also are concerned that
methamphetamine and cocaine overdoses in the United States are on an upward trajectory. methamphetamine and cocaine overdoses in the United States are on an upward trajectory.
Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market have prompted Drug demand in the United States and changes in the international drug market have prompted
rising drug production in Mexicorising drug production in Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. While opium poppy cultivation and heroin production rose in Mexico through 2017 but have since declined, the production of and Colombia. Mexico has experienced an uptick in opium
poppy cultivation, as wel as the production of heroin, fentanyl (a synthetic opioid)fentanyl (a synthetic opioid), and
methamphetamine.38 has surged and methamphetamine production is at “an industrial level.”35 Over 90% of heroin seized and sampled in the United States comes from Over 90% of heroin seized and sampled in the United States comes from
Mexico and increasingly has included fentanyl. Mexico and increasingly has included fentanyl. In May 2019,Since the Chinese government the Chinese government
implemented strict controls on al forms of fentanylimplemented strict controls on al forms of fentanyl in mid-2019, including fentanyl analogues, including fentanyl analogues—a
development that led to the emergence of Mexico as an , Mexico has become a more important source of fentanyl-related important source of fentanyl-related
substances.substances.3936 Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, which supplies roughly 89% Coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia, which supplies roughly 89%
of cocaine in the United States, reached record levels in 2017, leveledof cocaine in the United States, reached record levels in 2017, leveled off in 2018, and slightly off in 2018, and slightly
increased in 2019.40increased in 2019.37 Cultivation and production in Peru and Bolivia have also surged, particularly from 2018 to 2019.38
Whereas Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region work Whereas Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and most other source and transit countries in the region work
closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict il icit flows, the closely with the United States to combat drug production and interdict il icit flows, the
Venezuelan government does not. Public corruption in Venezuela also has made it easier for drug Venezuelan government does not. Public corruption in Venezuela also has made it easier for drug
trafficking organizations to smuggle il icit drugs. In March 2020, the Department of Justice
trafficking organizations to smuggle il icit drugs. In March 2020, the Department of Justice 34 U.S. Department of State, “Update: T he United States Continues to Lead the Global Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020, at https://www.state.gov/update-the-united-states-continues-to-lead-the-global-response-to-covid-19-6/. 35 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) Volum e 1: Drug and Chem ical Control, March 2020 (hereinafter cited as State Department, INCSR 2020 Volume 1). 36 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Fentanyl Flow to the United States, January 2020. 37 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to Reduce Cocaine Supply,” March 5, 2020. 38 ONDCP, “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Production in Peru,” July 31, 2020; “ONDCP Releases Data on Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in Bolivia,” November 13, 2020. Congressional Research Service 20 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress indicted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as indicted Venezuela’s leader, Nicolás Maduro (whom the United States does not recognize as
Venezuela’s legitimate president) and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials. Venezuela’s legitimate president) and other current and former high-ranking Venezuelan officials.
As charged, Maduro al egedly participated in As charged, Maduro al egedly participated in the Cartel of the Sunsa drug trafficking organization drug trafficking organization
in conspiracythat conspired with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to produce and traffic
traffic il icit drugs to the United States. il icit drugs to the United States.
Bolivia-U.S. antidrug cooperation was limited under Evo Morales (2006-2019), and remains uncertain under the administration of newly elected President Luis Arce.39 Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to Contemporary drug trafficking and transnational crime syndicates have contributed to
degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in degradations in citizen security and economic development in some countries, often resulting in
high levels of violence high levels of violence and homicide. Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin . Despite efforts to combat the drug trade, many Latin
American governments, particularly in Mexico and Central America—a region through which American governments, particularly in Mexico and Central America—a region through which
roughly 93% of cocaine from South America transited in 2018—continue to suffer from weak roughly 93% of cocaine from South America transited in 2018—continue to suffer from weak
criminal justice systems and criminal justice systems and overwhelmed law enforcement agencies.law enforcement agencies.41 Government40 Public corruption, corruption,
including high-levelincluding high-level cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict cooperation with criminal organizations, further frustrates efforts to interdict
drugs, investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover il icit proceeds. At the same time, there is drugs, investigate and prosecute traffickers, and recover il icit proceeds. At the same time, there is
a widespread perception—a widespread perception— particularly among Latin American observers—that U.S. demand for il icit particularly among Latin American observers—that U.S. demand for

38 U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) Volum e 1: Drug and Chem ical Contro l, March 2020 (hereinafter cited as State
Department, INCSR 2020 Volume 1).
39 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Fentanyl Flow to the United States, January 2020.
40 T he White House, “ONDCP Reports Cocaine Production in Colombia is Leveling Off,” June 26 , 2019; “United
States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to Reduce Cocaine Supply,” March 5, 2020.
41 U.S. Government, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM), based on 2018 data from the
Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB).
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il icit drugs is largely to blame for the region’s drugs is largely to blame for the region’s ongoing crime and violence problems. crime and violence problems. Although
theThe COVID-19 pandemic has lowered COVID-19 pandemic has lowered violence in violence in manymost countries, but drug trafficking-related violence remains elevated in countries, organized crime-related
violence has escalated in a few countries, particularly Mexico. Mexico.
Criminal gangs with origins in southern California, principal y the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Criminal gangs with origins in southern California, principal y the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
the “18th Street” gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in the “18th Street” gang, continue to undermine citizen security and subvert government authority in
Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and Central America. Gang-related violence has been particularly acute in El Salvador, Honduras, and
urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world. urban areas in Guatemala, contributing to some of the highest homicide rates in the world.
Although some gangs engage in local drug distribution, gangs general y do not have a role in Although some gangs engage in local drug distribution, gangs general y do not have a role in
transnational drug trafficking. Gangs have been involved in a range of other criminal activities, transnational drug trafficking. Gangs have been involved in a range of other criminal activities,
including extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and including extortion, money laundering, and weapons smuggling, and ganghave used violence to enforce COVID-19 related quarantines. Gang-related violence has -related violence has
fueled unauthorized migration fueled unauthorized migration to the United States. to the United States.
U.S. Policy. For more than 40 years, U.S. policy toward the region has focused on countering For more than 40 years, U.S. policy toward the region has focused on countering
drug trafficking and reducing drug production in Latin America and the Caribbean. The largest drug trafficking and reducing drug production in Latin America and the Caribbean. The largest
support program, Plan Colombia, provided more than $10 bil ion to help Colombia combat both support program, Plan Colombia, provided more than $10 bil ion to help Colombia combat both
drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade from FY2000 to FY2016.drug trafficking and rebel groups financed by the drug trade from FY2000 to FY2016.4241 After After
Colombia signed a historic peace accord with the country’s largest leftist guerril a group, the Colombia signed a historic peace accord with the country’s largest leftist guerril a group, the
FARC, the United States provided assistance to help implement the agreement. U.S. officials FARC, the United States provided assistance to help implement the agreement. U.S. officials
concerned about rising cocaine production have praised Colombian President Ivan Duque’s
wil ingness to restart aerial fumigation of coca crops and significantly scale up manual
eradication remain concerned, however, about elevated cocaine production in Colombia. .
U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included a series of U.S. support to combat drug trafficking and reduce crime also has included a series of
partnerships with other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative, which has led to improved partnerships with other countries in the region: the Mérida Initiative, which has led to improved
bilateral security cooperation with Mexico; the Central America Regional Security Initiative bilateral security cooperation with Mexico; the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI); and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). During the Obama Administration, (CARSI); and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). During the Obama Administration,
those initiatives combined U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law assistance with economic development those initiatives combined U.S. antidrug and rule-of-law assistance with economic development
and violence prevention programs. and violence prevention programs.
The Trump Administration’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean The Trump Administration’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean has focused heavily focused heavily
on on U.S. security objectives. Al of the aforementioned assistance programs have continued, but U.S. security objectives. Al of the aforementioned assistance programs have continued, but
they place 39 For more, see CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke. 40 U.S. Government, Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM), based on 2018 data from the Consolidated Counterdrug Database (CCDB). 41 See CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel. Congressional Research Service 21 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress placed greater emphasis on combating drug trafficking, gangs, and other criminal groups than greater emphasis on combating drug trafficking, gangs, and other criminal groups than
during the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration also during the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration also has sought to reduce funding sought to reduce funding
for each of the U.S. security assistance programs and for each of the U.S. security assistance programs and has reprogrammed, withheld, or not yet
obligatedreprogrammed significant portions of assistance to Central America due to concerns that those significant portions of assistance to Central America due to concerns that those
governments governments havedid not adequately not adequately curbedcurb unauthorized migration. President Trump unauthorized migration. President Trump has welcomed welcomed
Mexico’s assistance on migration enforcement, but noted in an Mexico’s assistance on migration enforcement, but noted in an FY2020FY2021 presidential presidential
determination issued in determination issued in August 2019 that “without further progress over [this year], he could
determine that Mexico has ‘September 2020 that Mexico is in “serious risk of being found to have failed demonstrablyfailed demonstrably’ to to meetuphold its international drug its international drug control
commitments.”commitments.”4342 Such a determination could trigger Such a determination could trigger U.S. foreign assistance cuts to Mexico. On
April 1, 2020, the Trump Administration announced the deployment of the largestforeign assistance cuts. In 2020, the Administration deployed a large military-led military-led
antidrug effort in the Caribbean antidrug effort in the Caribbean in several decades aimed at deterring drug trafficking emanating aimed at deterring drug trafficking emanating
from Venezuela. from Venezuela.44
President Trump also President Trump also has prioritized combating gangs, namely the MS-13, which the Department prioritized combating gangs, namely the MS-13, which the Department
of Justice (DOJ) has named a top priority. U.S. agencies, in cooperation with vetted units in of Justice (DOJ) has named a top priority. U.S. agencies, in cooperation with vetted units in

42 See CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel.
43 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “ Memorandum on the Presidential Determination on Major Drug T ransit
or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2020 ,” presidential memorandum, August 8, 2019.
44 T he White House, “ Remarks by President T rump, Vice President Pence, and Members of the Coronavirus T ask
Force in Press Briefing,” April 1, 2020.
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Central Central America funded through CARSI, have brought criminal charges against thousands of MS-America funded through CARSI, have brought criminal charges against thousands of MS-
13 members in the United States. 13 members in the United States. Aid reductions for Central America exempted U.S. assistance that U.S. assistance that supports vetted units working with the U.S. supports vetted units working with the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOJDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOJ have been exempt from recent aid reductions
for Central America.
. Congressional Action: The 116th Congress The 116th Congress has held hearings on opioids, which included held hearings on opioids, which included
consideration of heroin and fentanyl production in Mexico; corruption in the Americas; the consideration of heroin and fentanyl production in Mexico; corruption in the Americas; the
importance ofMérida Initiative, U.S. assistance to Central America (including CARSI); and U.S. assistance to Central America (including CARSI); and relations with
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Central America, including antidrug cooperation and
concerns. Compared to FY2018, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6)the findings of the congressional y-mandated Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission. The Commission’s report, released in December 2020, recommended that the State Department take the lead in regional drug policy and replace the annual drug certification process with compacts negotiated with countries to identify bilateral antidrug policies.43 Compared to FY2018, Congress provided provided
increased increased FY2019 resourcesresources in FY2019 for Colombia and Mexico, slightly less funding for CARSI, and for Colombia and Mexico, slightly less funding for CARSI, and
stable funding for the CBSIstable funding for the CBSI. P.L. 116-6 provided $1.5 mil ion to support the creation of a Western
Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission to assess U.S. policy and make recommendations on how it
might be improved. The Further in P.L. 116-6. For FY2020, Congress again increased funding for Colombia, Mexico and CBSI, while slightly reducing CARSI funds (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 20202021, (P.L. 116- (P.L. 116-94260) provides significantly more funding for Colombia and Mexico, CARSI, and CBSI than the Administration’s FY2021 request. In comparison to the FY2020 enacted funding levels, the act provides increased) provides
more security and rule of law funding for Colombia and Mexico than the estimated FY2019
appropriations level, less funding for CARSI, and slightly more funding funding for the CBSI equal to the amount authorized by the House-passed Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act (H.R. 7703). The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 provides level funding for the Mérida Initiative in Mexico and increased funds for related programs in Colombia, but reduced funds for CARSI. The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) required an intel igence assessment of how drug trafficking influenced migration-related crimes in Mexico and the Northern Triangle (Section 5522) and createdfor the CBSI. The
FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) requires the Director of National Intel igence, in collaboration with
other agencies, to submit within 90 days of enactment an assessment of drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and human smuggling activities and how those activities influence migration in
Mexico and the Northern Triangle. The FY2020 NDAA also establishes a Commission on
a Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking to report on, among other Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking to report on, among other things, opioids coming from Mexico (Section 7221). A provision in the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283, Section 8245) requires a study and report on Coast Guard interdiction of il icit drugs from Central America and South America. For additional information, see CRS Insight IN11535, Mexican Drug Trafficking and Cartel Operations amid COVID-19, by June S. Beittel and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10578, 42 President T rump, Presidential Determination on Major Drug T ransit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2021, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, September 16, 2020. 43 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Engel Release Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Report,” press release, December 1, 2020, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2020/12/engel-releases-western-hemisphere-drug-policy-commission-report (includes link to the Commission’s report). Congressional Research Service 22 link to page 29 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress things, the scale of opioids
coming from Mexico.
The House-passed version of the FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil , Division A of H.R. 7608
(H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would provide significantly more funding for
Colombia and Mexico, CARSI, and CBSI than the Administration’s FY2021 request. In
comparison to the FY2020 enacted funding levels, the House bil would provide an increase in
funding for CBSI and roughly level funding for Colombia, CARSI, and Mexico.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida
Initiative, 2007-2020, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10400, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican
Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security CooperationCooperation, by Liana W. Rosen , by Liana W. Rosen
and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, and Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking
OrganizationsOrganizations, by June S. Beittel; CRS Report R44812, , by June S. Beittel; CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R43813, , by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R43813, Colombia:
Background and U.S. Relations, by June S. Beittel; and CRS In , by June S. Beittel; and CRS In Focus IF10789, Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin
Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan. , by Mark P. Sullivan.
Trade Policy
The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the fastest-growing regional trading partners The Latin American and Caribbean region is among the fastest-growing regional trading partners
for the United States. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading for the United States. Economic relations between the United States and most of its trading
partners in the region remain strong, despite chal enges, such as slow economic growth and high partners in the region remain strong, despite chal enges, such as slow economic growth and high
levels of violence in some countries. The United States accounts for roughly 31% of the Latin levels of violence in some countries. The United States accounts for roughly 31% of the Latin
American and Caribbean region’s merchandise imports and 44% of its merchandise exports. Most American and Caribbean region’s merchandise imports and 44% of its merchandise exports. Most
of this trade is with Mexico, which accounted for 65% of U.S. imports from the region and 61% of this trade is with Mexico, which accounted for 65% of U.S. imports from the region and 61%
of U.S. exports to the region in 2019. In 2019, total U.S. merchandise exports to Latin America of U.S. exports to the region in 2019. In 2019, total U.S. merchandise exports to Latin America
and the Caribbean were valued at $418.9 bil ion, down from $429.7 bil ion in 2018. U.S. and the Caribbean were valued at $418.9 bil ion, down from $429.7 bil ion in 2018. U.S.
merchandise imports were valued at $467.0 bil ion in 2019 (se merchandise imports were valued at $467.0 bil ion in 2019 (see Table 5).
The United States strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the past The United States strengthened economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean over the past
26 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994, 26 years through the negotiation and implementation of FTAs. Starting with NAFTA in 1994,
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which was replaced by the USMCA when it entered into force on July 1, 2020, the United States which was replaced by the USMCA when it entered into force on July 1, 2020, the United States
currently has six FTAs in force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia, currently has six FTAs in force involving 11 Latin American countries: Mexico, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and
Peru. NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region, Peru. NAFTA was the first U.S. FTA with a country in the Latin American and Caribbean region,
establishing new rules and disciplines that influenced establishing new rules and disciplines that influenced futuresubsequent trade agreements on issues important trade agreements on issues important
to the United States, such as IPR protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute to the United States, such as IPR protection, services trade, agriculture, dispute settlement, settlement,
investment, labor, and the environment. investment, labor, and the environment.
In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries In addition to FTAs, the United States has extended unilateral trade preferences to some countries
in the region through several trade preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic in the region through several trade preference programs. The Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of select Caribbean Recovery Act (no expiration), for example, provides limited duty-free entry of select Caribbean
products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to uncertain economic products as a core element of the U.S. foreign economic policy response to uncertain economic
and political conditions in the region. Several preference programs for Haiti, which expire in and political conditions in the region. Several preference programs for Haiti, which expire in
2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two 2025, provide generous and flexible unilateral preferences to the country’s apparel sector. Two
other preference programs include the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), which other preference programs include the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), which
expires in September 2020has been extended through September 2030 (P.L. 116-164), and the Generalized System of , and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which Preferences (GSP), which expires in
Decemberexpired on December 31, 2020. The CBTPA extends preferences on apparel products to eligible Caribbean 2020. The CBTPA extends preferences on apparel products to eligible Caribbean
countries similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA, replaced by USMCA. The GSPcountries similar to those given to Mexico under NAFTA, replaced by USMCA. The GSP
provides, first authorized in the 1970s, has provided duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from 120 designated developing duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from 120 designated developing
countries throughout the countries throughout the world, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American world, including Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and other Latin American
and Caribbean countries. and Caribbean countries.
In the 15 to 20 years after NAFTA, some of the largest economies in South America, such as In the 15 to 20 years after NAFTA, some of the largest economies in South America, such as
Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, resisted the idea of forming comprehensive FTAs with the
United States. That opposition, at least in the case of Brazil, may be changing. In September
2019, President Trump noted preliminary talks with Brazil for a trade agreement, and Brazilian
officials recently stated that the country was ready for a trade deal similar to USMCAUnited States. That opposition, has shifted as some countries, including Brazil and Ecuador, have taken steps to enhance the trade relationship with the United States through partial bilateral trade agreements on trade facilitation, regulatory cooperation, and anti-corruption. Numerous . Numerous
other bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphereother bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements throughout the Western Hemisphere, however, do not do not
include the United States. For example, the Pacific Al iance, a trade arrangement composed of include the United States. For example, the Pacific Al iance, a trade arrangement composed of
Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, is reportedly moving forward on a possible trade Mexico, Peru, Colombia, and Chile, is reportedly moving forward on a possible trade
Congressional Research Service 23 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. On June 28, arrangement with Mercosur, composed of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. On June 28,
2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political 2019, after 20 years of negotiations, the European Union and Mercosur reached a political
agreement in principle for an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement. On April 28, 2020, agreement in principle for an ambitious and comprehensive trade agreement. On April 28, 2020,
Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA and remove Mexico and the European Union finalized negotiations to update their original FTA and remove
most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners. most of the remaining trade barriers between the two partners. U.S. policymakers, including in
Congress, could Congress may examine how the United States could enhance trade relations with these examine how the United States could enhance trade relations with these
countries through regional agreementscountries, whether it be through bilateral FTAs or a broader regional FTA, such as the Free Trade Area of or a broader regional FTA, such as the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) that was pursued in the mid-1990s but never concluded.45

45 In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a
Free T rade Area of the Americas (FT AA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States
and Brazil, the FT AA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. It moved the
FT AA away from the comprehensive, single undertaking principle, toward a two -tier framework comprising a set of
“common rights and obligations” for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral arrangements with country
benefits related to commitments. T he FT AA talks stalled in 2004. At the fourth Summit of the Americas held in
November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to resta rt negotiations. Further
action has not occurred.
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the Americas (FTAA) that was pursued in the mid-1990s but never concluded44, or through partial trade agreements that are limited in scope such as the recently concluded arrangements with Brazil and Ecuador.
Table 5. U.S. Trade with Key Trading Partners in Latin America and the Caribbean,
2012-2019
(in bil ions of U.S. dol ars) (in bil ions of U.S. dol ars)
Partner
Country
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
U.S. Exports U.S. Exports









Mexico Mexico
215.9 215.9
226.0 226.0
241.0 241.0
236.5 236.5
230.2 230.2
243.5 243.5
265.4 265.4
256.4 256.4

Brazil Brazil
43.8 43.8
44.1 44.1
42.4 42.4
31.6 31.6
30.2 30.2
37.3 37.3
39.6 39.6
43.1 43.1

Chile Chile
18.8 18.8
17.5 17.5
16.5 16.5
15.5 15.5
12.9 12.9
13.6 13.6
15.4 15.4
15.8 15.8

Colombia Colombia
16.4 16.4
18.4 18.4
20.1 20.1
16.3 16.3
13.1 13.1
13.4 13.4
15.2 15.2
14.8 14.8

Total LAC Total LAC
399.1 399.1
410.4 410.4
424.9 424.9
389.0 389.0
366.1 366.1
393.9 393.9
429.7 429.7
418.9 418.9

World World
1,545.8 1,545.8
1,578.5 1,578.5
1,621.9 1,621.9
1,503.3 1,503.3
1,451.5 1,451.5
1,546.5 1,546.5
1,666.0 1,666.0
1645.2 1645.2
U.S. Imports U.S. Imports









Mexico Mexico
277.6 277.6
280.6 280.6
295.7 295.7
296.4 296.4
293.5 293.5
312.8 312.8
346.1 346.1
358.1 358.1

Brazil Brazil
32.1 32.1
27.5 27.5
30.0 30.0
27.5 27.5
26.0 26.0
29.5 29.5
31.1 31.1
30.9 30.9

Colombia Colombia
24.6 24.6
21.6 21.6
18.3 18.3
14.1 14.1
13.8 13.8
13.6 13.6
13.8 13.8
14.1 14.1

Chile Chile
9.4 9.4
10.4 10.4
9.5 9.5
8.8 8.8
8.8 8.8
10.6 10.6
11.4 11.4
10.4 10.4

Total LAC Total LAC
449.4 449.4
439.0 439.0
446.0 446.0
412.3 412.3
401.2 401.2
428.7 428.7
468.3 468.3
467.0 467.0

World World
2,276.3 2,276.3
2,268.0 2,268.0
2,356.4 2,356.4
2,248.8 2,248.8
2,186.8 2,186.8
2,339.9 2,339.9
2,540.8 2,540.8
2,498.4 2,498.4
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) Interactive, “DataWeb: Tariff and Trade.” U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) Interactive, “DataWeb: Tariff and Trade.”
Notes: This table provides statistics on the top four countries fol owed by the total of U.S. trade with al This table provides statistics on the top four countries fol owed by the total of U.S. trade with al
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
President Trump made NAFTA renegotiation and modernization a priority of his Administration’s President Trump made NAFTA renegotiation and modernization a priority of his Administration’s
trade policy. The United States, Canada, and Mexico subsequently entered into NAFTA renegotiations and concluded talks with the announcement of the USMCA on September 30, 44 In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan to complete a Free T rade Area of the Americas (FT AA) by January 1, 2005. Faced with deadlocked negotiations, the United States and Brazil, the FT AA co-chairs, brokered a compromise at the November 2003 Miami trade ministerial. It moved the FT AA away from the comprehensive, single undertaking principle, toward a two -tier framework comprising a set of “common rights and obligations” for all countries, combined with voluntary plurilateral arrangements with country benefits related to commitments. T he FT AA talks stalled in 2004. At the fourth Summit of the Americas held in November 2005, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela blocked an effort to resta rt negotiations. Further action has not occurred. Congressional Research Service 24 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress trade policy. Early in his Administration, he viewed FTAs as detrimental to U.S. workers and
industries, stating that NAFTA was “the worst trade deal” and repeatedly warning that the United
States may withdraw from the agreement. The United States, Canada, and Mexico subsequently
renegotiated NAFTA and concluded negotiations for USMCA on September 30, 2018. Mexico 2018. Mexico
was the first country to ratify the agreement in June 2019 and the was the first country to ratify the agreement in June 2019 and the first country to approve the
amended USMCA amended agreement on December 12, 2019. On January 16, 2020, Congress approved the on December 12, 2019. On January 16, 2020, Congress approved the
agreement. Canada ratified the agreement on March 13, 2020agreement and n on March 13, 2020, Canada was the last country to ratify it. USMCA continues NAFTA’s . USMCA continues NAFTA’s
market opening provisions but also modernizes the agreement with new provisions on digital market opening provisions but also modernizes the agreement with new provisions on digital
trade, state-owned-enterprises, currency manipulation, anti-corruption, and enforcement of trade, state-owned-enterprises, currency manipulation, anti-corruption, and enforcement of
worker rights and the environment. USMCA’s tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor worker rights and the environment. USMCA’s tighter rules-of-origin requirements for the motor
vehicle industry, vehicle industry, removal of government procurement provisions for Canada, and lessening of removal of government procurement provisions for Canada, and lessening of
investor state dispute settlement provisions are significant, because they scale back U.S. trade investor state dispute settlement provisions are significant, because they scale back U.S. trade
policy goals of policy goals of previous Administrations. previous Administrations.
In 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain In 2018, President Trump issued two proclamations imposing tariffs on U.S. imports of certain
steel and aluminum productssteel and aluminum products, including products from Latin America, using presidential powers granted under Section 232 of the Trade using presidential powers granted under Section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. Expansion Act of 1962. In doing so, the Administration added new chal enges to U.S. trade
relations with the region. The proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of The proclamations outlined the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of
25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports, with some 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports, with some flexibility flexibility on the application of tariffs by on the application of tariffs by
country. In May 2018, President Trump proclaimed country. In May 2018, President Trump proclaimed Argentina and Brazil permanently exempt Argentina and Brazil permanently exempt
from the steel tariffs in exchange for quota agreementsfrom the steel tariffs in exchange for quota agreements, but he threatened to impose tariffs again
in December 2019. The United States imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from
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. The United States imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico on May 31, 2018, and Mexico subsequently imposed retaliatory tariffs on 71 U.S. Mexico on May 31, 2018, and Mexico subsequently imposed retaliatory tariffs on 71 U.S.
products, covering an estimated $3.7 bil ionproducts, covering an estimated $3.7 bil ion worth of trade. By May 2019, President Trump had worth of trade. By May 2019, President Trump had
exempted Mexico from steel and aluminum tariffs, and Mexico agreed to terminate its retaliatory exempted Mexico from steel and aluminum tariffs, and Mexico agreed to terminate its retaliatory
tariffs. tariffs. On August 30,After Brazil’s tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on ethanol imports from the United States expired in August 2020, President Trump tightened the cap on al owable steel imports from 2020, President Trump tightened the cap on al owable steel imports from
Brazil, stating that the decision was made under Section 232 and acknowledging that the Brazil, stating that the decision was made under Section 232 and acknowledging that the
tightened quota may affect production activities in the tightened quota may affect production activities in the United States. The United States and Brazil agreed to hold consultations to resolve these issues, the latest of which was planned for December 2020. United States.
President Trump’s January 2017 withdrawal from the proposed TPP, an FTA that included President Trump’s January 2017 withdrawal from the proposed TPP, an FTA that included
Mexico, Peru, and Chile as signatories, signified another change to U.S. trade policy. In March Mexico, Peru, and Chile as signatories, signified another change to U.S. trade policy. In March
2018, al remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-2018, al remaining TPP parties signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11), which essential y brought a modified TPP into effect. Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11), which essential y brought a modified TPP into effect.
The TPP-11 has entered into force among seven countries—Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico, The TPP-11 has entered into force among seven countries—Canada, Australia, Japan, Mexico,
New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Chile and Peru expect to ratify the agreement eventual y. New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. Chile and Peru expect to ratify the agreement eventual y.
Colombia has expressed plans to request entry into the agreement after it enters into force among Colombia has expressed plans to request entry into the agreement after it enters into force among
al partners. Some observers contend that U.S. withdrawal from the proposed TPP could damage al partners. Some observers contend that U.S. withdrawal from the proposed TPP could damage
U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, whereas others see the withdrawal as U.S. competitiveness and economic leadership in the region, whereas others see the withdrawal as
a way to prevent lower-cost imports and potential job losses. a way to prevent lower-cost imports and potential job losses.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight capacities, faced The 116th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight capacities, faced
numerous trade policy issues related to NAFTA’s renegotiation and the USMCA. The numerous trade policy issues related to NAFTA’s renegotiation and the USMCA. The U.S. House
of Representatives House approved USMCA implementing legislation,approved USMCA implementing legislation, H.R. 5430, on December 19, H.R. 5430, on December 19,
2019, by a vote of 385-41, and the Senate approved it on January 16, 2020, by a vote of 89-10; it 2019, by a vote of 385-41, and the Senate approved it on January 16, 2020, by a vote of 89-10; it
was signed into law (P.L. 116-113) on January 29, 2020. Lawmakers took an interest as to was signed into law (P.L. 116-113) on January 29, 2020. Lawmakers took an interest as to
whether the Administration followed U.S. trade negotiating objectives and procedures as required whether the Administration followed U.S. trade negotiating objectives and procedures as required
by Trade Promotion by Trade Promotion Authority (Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act Authority (Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act
of 2015, or TPA; P.L. 114-26). Some Members also considered issues surrounding the labor and of 2015, or TPA; P.L. 114-26). Some Members also considered issues surrounding the labor and
environment provisions’ enforceability, access to medicine, and economic effects. Other environment provisions’ enforceability, access to medicine, and economic effects. Other
Members showed interest in how the USMCA may affect U.S. industries, especial y the auto Members showed interest in how the USMCA may affect U.S. industries, especial y the auto
industry, as wel as the overal effects on the U.S. and Mexican economies, North American industry, as wel as the overal effects on the U.S. and Mexican economies, North American
supply chains, and trade relations with the Latin American and Caribbean region.supply chains, and trade relations with the Latin American and Caribbean region.
Other congressional concerns in regard to USMCA were resolved by including language for technical corrections to USMCA in the FY2021 appropriations package that President Trump signed December 27, 2020 (P.L. 116-260, Congressional Research Service 25 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Division O, Title VI). Policymakers continue to monitor Mexico’s implementation of labor USMCA commitments. The effects of COVID-19 on the U.S.-Mexico supply chain may be of interest for U.S. The effects of COVID-19 on the U.S.-Mexico supply chain may be of interest for U.S.
policymakers, especial y for products manufactured in Mexico for U.S. essential sectors, policymakers, especial y for products manufactured in Mexico for U.S. essential sectors,
including the highly integrated motor vehicle industry. Automotive manufacturing plants in including the highly integrated motor vehicle industry. Automotive manufacturing plants in
Mexico were closed for approximately two months due to the pandemic and started reopening in Mexico were closed for approximately two months due to the pandemic and started reopening in
June, staggering hours and following government-established safety protocols. The industry June, staggering hours and following government-established safety protocols. The industry
currently is experiencing a market decrease of 32% compared with 2019. Some officials, currently is experiencing a market decrease of 32% compared with 2019. Some officials,
including the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, noted that the United States and Mexico including the Mexican Ambassador to the United States, noted that the United States and Mexico
need to improve coordination in determining which sectors are essential and that the two need to improve coordination in determining which sectors are essential and that the two
countries need to work together to restart or continue production safely in essential sectors. countries need to work together to restart or continue production safely in essential sectors.
Depending on how the pandemic spreads in the fal and winter, policymakersPolicymakers may wish to may wish to
address how the United States and Mexico are cooperating on the address how the United States and Mexico are cooperating on the possibility of future shutdowns. possibility of future shutdowns.
Among other trade issues, Among other trade issues, legislation was introduced (H.R. 991 and S. 2473) that would extend
CBTPA benefits through September 2030. Regarding Brazil, numerous Members of Congress are numerous Members of Congress are
monitoring bilateral trade monitoring bilateral trade relations with increased concern aboutconsultations with Brazil in regard to Brazil’s restrictions on imports Brazil’s restrictions on imports
of ethanol from the United of ethanol from the United States. These concerns may haveStates, which prompted the Trump prompted the Trump
Administration’s tightening of the U.S. quota on semi-finished Administration’s tightening of the U.S. quota on semi-finished steel from Brazil. steel from Brazil. Regarding the
Section 232 investigations on aluminum and steel imports, the impact of tariffs and retaliatory
tariffs from Mexico on U.S. producers, domestic U.S. industries, and consumers raised numerous
issues for Congress. Policymakers also may consider how U.S. trade policy is perceived by the Policymakers also may consider how U.S. trade policy is perceived by the
region and whether it may affect multilateral trade issues and cooperation on matters regarding region and whether it may affect multilateral trade issues and cooperation on matters regarding
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security and migration. Another issue relates to U.S. market share. If Mexico, Chile, Colombia, security and migration. Another issue relates to U.S. market share. If Mexico, Chile, Colombia,
Peru, and Mercosur countries continue trade and investment liberalization efforts with other Peru, and Mercosur countries continue trade and investment liberalization efforts with other
countries without the United States, doing so may open the door to more intra-trade and countries without the United States, doing so may open the door to more intra-trade and
investment among certain Latin American and Caribbean countries, or possibly China and other investment among certain Latin American and Caribbean countries, or possibly China and other
Asian countries, which may affect U.S. exports. Asian countries, which may affect U.S. exports.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade
Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R44981, , by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report R44981, The United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS , by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS
In Focus IF10038, In Focus IF10038, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report RL32934, , by Ian F. Fergusson; CRS Report RL32934,
U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications, by M. Angeles Vil arreal; and , by M. Angeles Vil arreal; and
CRS Report R45249, CRS Report R45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, coordinated , coordinated
by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones. by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones.
Migration Issues
Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United Latin America’s status as a leading source of both legal and unauthorized migration to the United
States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and U.S. States means that U.S. immigration policies significantly affect countries in the region and U.S.
relations with their governments. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of individuals who relations with their governments. Latin Americans comprise the vast majority of individuals who
have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the DACA have received relief from removal (deportation) through the TPS program and the DACA
initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum seekers.initiative; they also comprise a large percentage of recent asylum seekers.4645 As a result, several As a result, several
U.S. immigration policy changes have affected countries in the region.U.S. immigration policy changes have affected countries in the region. These include the
following Trump Administration actions: ending 45 T emporary Protected Status (T PS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by arme d conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the United States. T PS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in 2010. T he Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative that the Obama Administration implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present individuals who arrived in the United States as children. Congressional Research Service 26 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress The Trump Administration terminated TPS designations for Haiti, El Salvador, TPS designations for Haiti, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, and Nicaragua, and Honduras; rescindingHonduras (those terminations are facing legal chal enges);46 rescinded DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in DACA through a process that the Supreme Court ruled in
June 2020 did not follow proper procedures and had to be vacated;47 and June 2020 did not follow proper procedures and had to be vacated;47 and restrictingrestricted access to asylum access to
asylum in the United States. In January 2019, the Administration launched the Migrant Protection . In January 2019, the Administration launched the Migrant Protection
Protocols (MPP), a program that requires many migrants and asylum seekers processed at the Protocols (MPP), a program that requires many migrants and asylum seekers processed at the
Mexico-U.S. border to be returned to Mexico to await their immigration Mexico-U.S. border to be returned to Mexico to await their immigration proceedings; the proceedings; the
program is currently facing legal chal enges but remains in place.48 The Administration also program is currently facing legal chal enges but remains in place.48 The Administration also
signed what it termed “asylum cooperative agreements”signed what it termed “asylum cooperative agreements”— (ACAs), also referred to as “safe third country” also referred to as “safe third country”
agreements—agreements, with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to al ow the United States to transfer with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras to al ow the United States to transfer
certain migrants who arrive at a U.S. border certain migrants who arrive at a U.S. border seekingto seek asylum to apply for asylum in one of those asylum to apply for asylum in one of those
countries. DHS began countries. DHS began implementingto implement the agreement with the agreement with Guatemala in November 2019, but Guatemala in November 2019, but the
agreements with Honduras and El Salvador have not yet been implementedimplementation was suspended as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. In December 2020, DHS announced the finalization of the agreements needed to implement the El Salvador and Honduras ACAs.49 To date, no migrants have been transferred to either country. .
The factors that have driven U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and The factors that have driven U.S.-bound migration from Latin America are multifaceted, and
some have changedsome have changed over time. They include poverty and unemployment, political and economic . They include poverty and unemployment, political and economic
instability, crime and violence, natural disasters and climate change, as wel as relatively close instability, crime and violence, natural disasters and climate change, as wel as relatively close
proximity to the United States, familial ties in the United States, and relatively attractive U.S. proximity to the United States, familial ties in the United States, and relatively attractive U.S.
economic economic conditions. As an example, Venezuela, a historical y stable country with limited conditions. As an example, Venezuela, a historical y stable country with limited

46 T emporary Protected Status (T PS) is a discretionary, humanitarian benefit granted to eligible nationals after the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) determines that a country has been affected by arme d conflict, natural
disaster, or other extraordinary conditions that limit the country’s ability to accept the return of its nationals from the
United States. T PS designations began for Nicaragua and Honduras in 1999, for El Salvador in 2001, and for Haiti in
2010. T he Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA) initiative is an initiative that the Obama Administration
implemented in 2012 to provide temporary relief from removal and work authorization to certain unlawfully present
individuals who arrived in the United States as children.
47 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020).
48 DHS, “Migrant Protection Protocols,” press release, January 24, 2019. For additional information, see
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/policy-guidance-implementation-migrant -protection-protocols.
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emigration to the United States, recently has become the top country of origin among those who
seek U.S. asylum affirmatively due to Venezuela’s ongoing crisis.49
Migrant apprehensions at the southwest border had been steadily declining, reaching a 50-year
low in 2017, but they began to rise in mid-2017. By FY2019, DHS apprehended 977,509
migrants, roughly 456,400 more than in FY2018.50 Unaccompanied children and families from
the Northern Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, made up a majority of those
apprehensions.51 During the first 10 months of FY2020, total apprehensions declined compared
with FY2019, particularly since mid-March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.52 In response
to the pandemic, nonessential travel and asylum processing have been suspended at the U.S.-
Mexico border through September 21, 2020, with any persons without valid travel documents
returned to Mexico as quickly as possible.53 Under these so-cal ed Title 42 CDC travel
restrictions, more than 90,000 migrants from Mexico and the Northern Triangle have been
expel ed to Mexico.54 Mexico has had to contend with those individuals emigration to the United States, recently has become the top country of origin among those who seek U.S. asylum affirmatively due to Venezuela’s ongoing crisis.50 Migrant apprehensions at the southwest border had been steadily declining, reaching a 50-year low in 2017, but they began to rise in mid-2017. By FY2019, DHS apprehended 977,509 migrants, roughly 456,400 more than in FY2018.51 Unaccompanied children and families from the Northern Triangle, many of whom were seeking asylum, made up a majority of those apprehensions. In FY2020, apprehensions declined by more than half, particularly after the COVID-19 pandemic began in March 2020.52 Mexican adults comprised the majority of those apprehended. In response to the pandemic, nonessential travel and asylum processing were suspended at the U.S.-Mexico border through January 21, 2021, with any persons without valid travel documents returned to Mexico as quickly as possible.53 Under these so-cal ed Title 42 CDC travel restrictions, more than 316,500 migrants from Mexico and the Northern Triangle were expel ed to Mexico through November 2020.54 Mexico has had to contend with those individuals 46 As legal challenges to the termination of T PS for these countries continue, DHS has extended the validity of T PS documents for current beneficiaries through October 4, 2021. 47 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,—S. Ct.—, 2020 WL 3271746, at *3 (2020). 48 DHS, “Migrant Protection Protocols,” at https://www.dhs.gov/migrant-protection-protocols. 49 DHS, “El Salvador Begins Implementation of Asylum Cooperative Agreement,” press release, December 15, 2020, and “Asylum Cooperative Agreement with Honduras Finalized,” press release, December 18, 2020. 50 In FY2018, Venezuela ranked first among countries of origin for those seeking affirmative asylum in the United States. Guatemala and El Salvador ranked second and third. See DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2018, October 2019. 51 DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “ Southwest Border Migrat ion FY2019.” 52 CBP, “Southwest Border Migration FY2020. 53 See CRS Insight IN11308, COVID-19: Restrictions on Travelers at U.S. Land Borders, by Audrey Singer. 54 CBP, “ Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: T itle 8 Enforcement Actions and T itle 42 Expulsions,” at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement -statistics/title-8-and-title-42-statistics, accessed December, 15, Congressional Research Service 27 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress as wel as the tens of as wel as the tens of
thousands of individuals from those and other countries asked to “remain in thousands of individuals from those and other countries asked to “remain in Mexico” under MPP Mexico” under MPP
during a pandemic. during a pandemic.
The Trump Administration’s rhetoric and policies have tested U.S. relations with Mexico and the The Trump Administration’s rhetoric and policies have tested U.S. relations with Mexico and the
Northern Triangle countries. Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador agreed to shelter Northern Triangle countries. Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador agreed to shelter
migrants affected by the MPP program and then, to avoid U.S. tariffs, al owed the MPP to be migrants affected by the MPP program and then, to avoid U.S. tariffs, al owed the MPP to be
expanded in Mexico and increased Mexico’s immigration enforcement efforts, particularly on its expanded in Mexico and increased Mexico’s immigration enforcement efforts, particularly on its
southern border. Amidst U.S. foreign aid cuts and tariff threats (in the case of Guatemala), the southern border. Amidst U.S. foreign aid cuts and tariff threats (in the case of Guatemala), the
Northern Triangle countries signed “safe third country” agreements despite serious concerns Northern Triangle countries signed “safe third country” agreements despite serious concerns
about conditions in the three countries. Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, which about conditions in the three countries. Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries, which
received some 91% of the 267,258 individuals removed from the United States in FY2019, have received some 91% of the 267,258 individuals removed from the United States in FY2019, have
expressed concerns that removals could overwhelm their capacity to receive and reintegrate expressed concerns that removals could overwhelm their capacity to receive and reintegrate
migrants. Central American countries also are concerned about the potential for increased migrants. Central American countries also are concerned about the potential for increased
removals of those with criminal records to exacerbate their security problems. More recently, in removals of those with criminal records to exacerbate their security problems. More recently, in
response to the United States deporting response to the United States deporting some migrants to Guatemala that turned out to beand expel ing migrants infected infected
with COVID-19, the with COVID-19, the Guatemalan government has suspended repatriation flights on multiple Guatemalan government has suspended repatriation flights on multiple
occasions and cal ed for occasions and cal ed for the United States to the United States to adequately screen returning migrants for the screen returning migrants for the
diseasedisease adequately.55 .55
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress The 116th Congress has provided foreign assistance to help address some provided foreign assistance to help address some
of the factors fueling migration from Central America and to support Mexico’s migration of the factors fueling migration from Central America and to support Mexico’s migration
management efforts in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). management efforts in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). The House-passed
version of the FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil , Division A of H.R. 7608, would continue
that funding. The report accompanying the bil , H.Rept. 116-444, would prohibit funds
appropriated from being used to help implement asylum cooperation agreements. In July 2019,

49 In FY2018, Venezuela ranked first among countries of origin for tho se seeking affirmative asylum in the United
States. Guatemala and El Salvador ranked second and third. See DHS, Office of Immigration Statistics, Annual Flow
Report: Refugees and Asylees: 2018, October 2019.
50 DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), “Southwest Border Migration FY2019” (hereinafter cited as CBP,
“Southwest Border Migration FY2019”).
51 CBP, “Southwest Border Migration FY2019.”
52 CBP, “Enforcement Statistics FY2020.
53 See CRS Insight IN11308, COVID-19: Restrictions on Travelers at U.S. Land Borders, by Audrey Singer.
54 CBP, “ Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: T itle 8 Enforcement Actions and T itle 42 Expulsions,” August 26,
2020.
55 Cindy Carcamo and Molly O’T oole, “Migrants Deported by U.S. Make up More T han 15% of Guatemala’s
Coronavirus Cases,” Los Angeles Tim es, May 4, 2020.
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link to page 35 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

the House In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 2615, the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act, passed H.R. 2615, the United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act,
which would require a report on which would require a report on how U.S. agencies are addressing the main drivers of the main drivers of unauthorized migration migration from Central America. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) incorporated H.R. 2615 as Division FF, Title III, Subtitle F. The explanatory statement accompanying the act includes language from H.Rept. 116-444 requiring the Secretary of State to submit copies of ACAs signed with Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras and how it was determined that those ACAs met U.S. legal requirements. The explanatory statement also prohibits the provision of any U.S. assistance for Mexico and Central America to justify or support the ACAsfrom Central America.
The 116th Congress has also acted on bil s that could affect significant numbers of individuals
from Latin America and the Caribbean living in the United States. For example in June 2019, the
House passed H.R. 6, the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019, which would establish a
process for certain unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States as children, such as
DACA recipients, and for certain TPS recipients to obtain lawful permanent resident (LPR)
status. In July 2019, the House passed H.R. 549, the Venezuela TPS Act of 2019, which would
provide TPS designation for Venezuela. In December 2019, the House passed H.R. 5038, the
Farm Workforce Modernization Act of 2019, which would create a new temporary immigration
status (certified agricultural worker (CAW) status) for certain unauthorized and other agricultural
workers and would establish a process for CAWs to become LPRs. .
For more information, see CRS Report R46419, For more information, see CRS Report R46419, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 116th
Congress, coordinated by Andorra Bruno; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10402, , coordinated by Andorra Bruno; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10402, Safe Third Country
Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries: Background and Legal Issues, by Ben Harrington; , by Ben Harrington;
CRS In Focus IF11151, CRS In Focus IF11151, Central American Migration: Root Causes and U.S. Policy, by Peter J. , by Peter J.
Meyer and Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS In Focus IF10215, Meyer and Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control
Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R45266, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R45266, The Trump Administration’s “Zero
Tolerance” Immigration Enforcement Policy, by Wil iam A. Kandel; CRS Report R45995, , by Wil iam A. Kandel; CRS Report R45995,
Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals, DACA, and Related Legislation, by Andorra Bruno; CRS , by Andorra Bruno; CRS
Legal Sidebar LSB10497, Legal Sidebar LSB10497, Supreme Court: DACA Rescission Violated the APA, by Ben , by Ben
Harrington; CRS Report Harrington; CRS Report R43599, Unaccompanied Alien Children: An Overview, by Wil iam A. Kandel; CRS Report R44849, R44849, H-2A and H-2B Temporary Worker Visas: Policy and Related
Issues, by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report RS20844, , by Andorra Bruno; CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Overview and
Current Issues, by Jil H. Wilson; CRS , by Jil H. Wilson; CRS In Focus IF11363, Processing Aliens at the U.S.-Mexico
Border: Recent Policy Changes, by Hil el R. Smith, Ben Harrington, and Audrey Singer; and
Legal Sidebar LSB10207, Asylum and Related Protections for Aliens Who Fear Gang and Domestic Violence, by Hil el R. Smith; CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10559, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Powers and Limitations: A Brief Primer, by Hil el R. Smith; and CRS Report R46012, CRS Report R46012, Immigration: Recent Apprehension Trends at the U.S. Southwest Border, by , by
Audrey Singer and Wil iam A. Kandel.
Audrey Singer and Wil iam A. Kandel. 2020. 55 Cindy Carcamo and Molly O’T oole, “Migrants Deported by U.S. Make up More T han 15% of Guatemala’s Coronavirus Cases,” Los Angeles Tim es, May 4, 2020. Congressional Research Service 28 link to page 35 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Selected Country and Subregional Issues
The Caribbean
Caribbean Regional Issues
The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories, The Caribbean is a diverse region of 16 independent countries and 18 overseas territories,
including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent including some of the hemisphere’s richest and poorest nations. Among the region’s independent
countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago countries are 13 island nations stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Trinidad and Tobago
in the south; Belize, which is geographical y located in Central America; and Guyana and in the south; Belize, which is geographical y located in Central America; and Guyana and
Suriname, located on the north-central coast of South America (se Suriname, located on the north-central coast of South America (see Figure 2). ).
Pursuant to the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-291), the Pursuant to the United States-Caribbean Strategic Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-291), the
State Department submitted a multiyear strategy for the Caribbean in 2017. The strategy State Department submitted a multiyear strategy for the Caribbean in 2017. The strategy
established a framework to strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas or pil ars: (1) established a framework to strengthen U.S.-Caribbean relations in six priority areas or pil ars: (1)
security, with the objectives of countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and security, with the objectives of countering transnational crime and terrorist organizations and
advancing citizen security; (2) diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized advancing citizen security; (2) diplomacy, with the goal of increasing institutionalized
engagement to forge greater cooperation at the Organization of American States (OAS) and the engagement to forge greater cooperation at the Organization of American States (OAS) and the
U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth and private sector-U.N.; (3) prosperity, including the promotion of sustainable economic growth and private sector-
led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S. exports of natural led investment and development; (4) energy, with the goals of increasing U.S. exports of natural
gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing on increased gas and the use of U.S. renewable energy technologies; (5) education, focusing on increased
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a focus on exchanges for students, teachers, and other professionals; and (6) health, including a focus on
long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. long-standing efforts to fight infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
In July 2019, the State Department issued a report to Congress on the implementation of its In July 2019, the State Department issued a report to Congress on the implementation of its
multiyear strategy. The report maintained that limited budgets and human resources have multiyear strategy. The report maintained that limited budgets and human resources have
constrained opportunities for deepening relations, but funding for the strategy’s security pil ar has constrained opportunities for deepening relations, but funding for the strategy’s security pil ar has
supported meaningful engagement and produced tangible results for regional and U.S. security supported meaningful engagement and produced tangible results for regional and U.S. security
interests.56 interests.56
Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean nations are vulnerable to use as transit Because of their geographic location, many Caribbean nations are vulnerable to use as transit
countries for il icit drugs from South America destined for the U.S. and European markets. Many countries for il icit drugs from South America destined for the U.S. and European markets. Many
Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of violent crime, including murder, often Caribbean countries also have suffered high rates of violent crime, including murder, often
associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the United States launched the Caribbean associated with drug trafficking activities. In response, the United States launched the Caribbean
Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) in 2009, a regional U.S. foreign assistance program seeking to
reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program reduce drug trafficking in the region and advance public safety and security. The program
dovetails with the first pil ar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S. dovetails with the first pil ar of the State Department’s Caribbean multiyear strategy for U.S.
engagement. From FY2010 through FY2020, Congress appropriated almost $677 mil ion for the engagement. From FY2010 through FY2020, Congress appropriated almost $677 mil ion for the
CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries. The program has targeted assistance in five CBSI. These funds benefitted 13 Caribbean countries. The program has targeted assistance in five
areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law enforcement capacity building, (3) areas: (1) maritime and aerial security cooperation, (2) law enforcement capacity building, (3)
border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice sector reform, and (5) crime prevention border/port security and firearms interdiction, (4) justice sector reform, and (5) crime prevention
and at-risk youth. and at-risk youth.
Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and, over the past decade, have participated in Many Caribbean nations depend on energy imports and, over the past decade, have participated in
Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, which supplies Venezuelan oil under preferential financing Venezuela’s PetroCaribe program, which supplies Venezuelan oil under preferential financing
terms. The United States launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI) in 2014, with terms. The United States launched the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI) in 2014, with
the goals of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the Caribbean.57 The CESI
includes a variety of initiatives to boost energy security and sustainable economic growth by
attracting investment in a range of energy technologies through a focus on improved governance,
increased access to finance, and enhanced coordination among energy donors, governments, and
stakeholders.58

56 U.S. Department of State, 56 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Report to Congress on Progress of Public Law (P.L.) 114 -291: Efforts to Implement
the Strategy for U.S. Engagem ent with the Caribbean Region , July 2019. , July 2019.
57 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/.
58 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security
Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/.
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Congressional Research Service 29 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress the goals of promoting a cleaner and more sustainable energy future in the Caribbean.57 The CESI includes a variety of initiatives to boost energy security and sustainable economic growth by attracting investment in a range of energy technologies through a focus on improved governance, increased access to finance, and enhanced coordination among energy donors, governments, and stakeholders.58
Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Region: Independent Countries

Source: CRS Graphics. CRS Graphics.
Notes: With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the With the exception of Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the remaining 14 independent countries of the
Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by Caribbean region are members of the Caribbean Community, or CARICOM, an organization established by
English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua English-speaking Caribbean nations in 1973 to spur regional integration. Six Eastern Caribbean nations—Antigua
and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines—are
members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration, members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, established in 1981 to promote economic integration,
harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states. harmonization of foreign policy, and other forms of cooperation among member states.
Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme weather events such as tropical storms and Many Caribbean countries are susceptible to extreme weather events such as tropical storms and
hurricanes, which can significantly affect their economies and infrastructure. Recent scientific hurricanes, which can significantly affect their economies and infrastructure. Recent scientific
studies suggest that climate change may be increasing the intensity of such events.59 In September studies suggest that climate change may be increasing the intensity of such events.59 In September
2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread damage to the northwestern Bahamian islands of 2019, Hurricane Dorian caused widespread damage to the northwestern Bahamian islands of
Grand Bahama and Abaco, with 70 confirmed deaths and many missing.60 The United States Grand Bahama and Abaco, with 70 confirmed deaths and many missing.60 The United States
responded with nearly $34 mil ion in humanitarian assistance, including almost $25 mil ion
provided through USAID. Prior to the hurricane, the State Department had launched a U.S.-
Caribbean Resilience Partnership in April 2019, with the goal of increasing regional disaster
response capacity and promoting resilience to natural disasters. In December 2019, USAID
announced it was providing $10 mil ion to improve local resilience to disasters in the Caribbean.
The COVID-19 pandemic is having a significant economic impact on many Caribbean countries
that depend on tourism. In 2020, al Caribbean economies (with the exception of Guyana) are
expected to experience deep recessions. In June 2020, the IMF forecast that tourism-dependent

57 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership,” at https://www.state.gov/u-s-caribbean-resilience-partnership/. 58 For background, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, “Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI),” at https://www.state.gov/caribbean-energy-security-initiative-cesi/. 59 See, for example, Kieran T Bhatia et al., “Recent Increases in T ropical Cyclone Intensification Rates,” 59 See, for example, Kieran T Bhatia et al., “Recent Increases in T ropical Cyclone Intensification Rates,” Nature
Com m unications, vol. 10, no. 635 (2019). , vol. 10, no. 635 (2019).
60 T he Government of the Bahamas, Cabinet & Disaster Management (NEMA), “Hurricane Dorian, NEMA Update,60 T he Government of the Bahamas, Cabinet & Disaster Management (NEMA), “Hurricane Dorian, NEMA Update, ” ”
November 29, 2019. November 29, 2019.
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Caribbean economies would contract an average of 10.3% in 2020.61 St. Lucia’s ambassador to
the United States, Anton Edmunds, maintains the pandemic could be “catastrophic to Caribbean
tourism and regional economies,” not only because of the cruise industry but more significantly
because of the effect on land-based tourism, which is the major economic driver for most
Caribbean countries.62 To date, the Dominican Republic is the Caribbean country most affected
by the spread of COVID-19, with 1,738 deaths as of September 2, 2020. Most other Caribbean
countries have had significantly fewer deaths.63
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress has responded with nearly $34 mil ion in humanitarian assistance, including almost $25 mil ion provided through USAID. Prior to the hurricane, the State Department had launched a U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership in April 2019, with the goal of increasing regional disaster response capacity and promoting resilience to natural disasters. In December 2019, USAID announced it was providing $10 mil ion to improve local resilience to disasters in the Caribbean. The COVID-19 pandemic is having a significant economic impact on many Caribbean countries that depend on tourism. In 2020, al Caribbean economies (with the exception of Guyana) are expected to experience deep recessions. Caribbean nations that depend on tourism are projected to have economic declines wel over 10%, according to the IMF.61 As of the end of 2020, the Dominican Republic reported 2,414 COVID-19 deaths, the highest for any country in the Caribbean region, while the countries in the region with the highest mortality rates of deaths per 100,000 were Belize (64.74) and the Bahamas (44.08).62 Congressional Action: The 116th Congress continued to appropriate funds for Caribbean continued to appropriate funds for Caribbean
regional programs. Over the past two fiscal years, Congress has funded the CBSI at levels regional programs. Over the past two fiscal years, Congress has funded the CBSI at levels
significantly higher than requested by the Trump Administration. For FY2019, Congress significantly higher than requested by the Trump Administration. For FY2019, Congress
appropriated $58 mil ion for the CBSI ($36.2 mil ion was requested), in the Consolidated appropriated $58 mil ion for the CBSI ($36.2 mil ion was requested), in the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2019 Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). For FY2020, the Trump Administration requested $40.2 (P.L. 116-6). For FY2020, the Trump Administration requested $40.2
mil ionmil ion for the CBSI, about a 30% drop from FY2019 appropriations. Ultimately, Congress for the CBSI, about a 30% drop from FY2019 appropriations. Ultimately, Congress
appropriated not less than $60 mil ion for the CBSI for FY2020 in the Further Consolidated appropriated not less than $60 mil ion for the CBSI for FY2020 in the Further Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116- 94). 94). For FY2021, the Administration For FY2021, the Administration is requestingrequested $32 $32
mil ionmil ion for the CBSI, a cut of almost 47% from that appropriated for FY2020for the CBSI, a cut of almost 47% from that appropriated for FY2020. The House-passed
version of the FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil , Division A of H.R. 7608 (H.Rept, but in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), Congress provided not less than $74.8 mil ion. In other legislative action on the CBSI, the House approved H.R. 7703, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act, on November 18, 2020, although the Senate did not take action on the measure. The bil would have authorized . 116-
444), approved July 24, 2020, would provide a minimum of $74.8 mil ion for the CBSI, including
$10 mil ion to strengthen resilience to emergencies and disasters.64
In other legislative action, on July 29, 2020, the House Foreign Affairs Committee ordered
reported, without amendment, H.R. 7703, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization
Act. The bil would authorize $74.8 mil ion for the CBSI for each year from FY2021 through $74.8 mil ion for the CBSI for each year from FY2021 through
FY2015, FY2015, includedincluding monitoring and reporting requirements for the CBSI, and would monitoring and reporting requirements for the CBSI, and would requirehave required the the
State Department to prioritize efforts to increase disaster response and resilience by carrying out State Department to prioritize efforts to increase disaster response and resilience by carrying out
such programs in such programs in beneficiary countries. beneficiary countries.
Congress has also continued to provide funding for the CESI, appropriating $2 mil ion in FY2019
(P.L. 116-6) and $3 mil ion in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, House-passed H.R. 7608
would provide $3 mil ion for the CESI.
More broadly, a provision in the House-passed version of the FY2021 NDAA, Section 1283 of
H.R. 6395, approved by the House by July 21, 2020, would express the sense of Congress
supporting the strengthening of engagement with the Caribbean.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by
Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10666, The Bahamas: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS
Insight IN11171, Bahamas: Response to Hurricane Dorian, by Rhoda Margesson and Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus

61 T he exception in the region, Guyana, is forecast to have a 53% because of its new oil wealth. See IMF, World
Econom ic Outlook Database, April 2020, and “ Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An Intensifying
Pandemic,” IMF Blog, June 26, 2020.
62 “Feature Q&A, Can the Caribbean T ourism Industry Withstand COVI-19?” Latin America Advisor, Inter-American
Dialogue, March 23, 2020.
63In other FY2021 assistance designated for the Caribbean, P.L. 116-260 provided $10 mil ion in development assistance for the Caribbean region “to enhance island disaster recovery and resilience and to assist the Caribbean region in adapting to, and mitigating the effec ts of, climate change, to include supporting the Caribbean Islands’ consortium of higher education institutions to inform and advance pre-disaster assessment and recovery.”63 The explanatory statement also provided $2 mil ion in development assistance for Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. Congress has also continued to provide funding for the CESI, appropriating $2 mil ion in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and $3 mil ion in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, the explanatory statement to P.L. 116-260 provides $3 mil ion for the CESI. 61 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. 62 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses, January 1, 2021, updated daily Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses, September 2,
2020, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
6463 For FY2020, the report to the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill, For FY2020, the report to the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations bill,
H.Rept. 116-178 to H.R. 2839, directed that bilateral economic assistance be made available to strengthen resilience to H.Rept. 116-178 to H.R. 2839, directed that bilateral economic assistance be made available to strengthen resilience to
emergencies and disasters in the Caribbean. (Division G of the explanatory statement to P.L. 116-94 provided that emergencies and disasters in the Caribbean. (Division G of the explanatory statement to P.L. 116-94 provided that
federal departments and agencies were directed to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions federal departments and agencies were directed to comply with the directives, reporting requirements, and instructions
contained in H.Rept. 116-78 accompanying H.R. 2839 and S.Rept. 116-126 accompanying S. 2583, unless specifically contained in H.Rept. 116-78 accompanying H.R. 2839 and S.Rept. 116-126 accompanying S. 2583, unless specifically
directed to the contrary.) directed to the contrary.)
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link to page 28 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress More broadly, the conference report to the FY2021 NDAA (H.Rept. 116-617 to P.L. 116-283) states that enhancing partnerships between the United States and Caribbean nations is in the U.S. strategic interest, and that the United States should pursue opportunities to strengthen engagement in the Caribbean consistent with the objections of the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the State Department’s Caribbean 2020 strategy. Such efforts, according to the conference report, should include a commitment to strengthening security relationships and interoperability, and advancing trade and investment, academic exchanges, and other cooperative efforts between the United States and the Caribbean region. As noted above in the section on “Trade Policy,” the 116th Congress also approved legislation (P.L. 116-164, signed into law in October 2020) extending for 10 year, through September 2030, trade preferences in the Caribbean Basin Trade Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act that currently benefit eight Caribbean countries. For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10789, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS Insight IN11171, Bahamas: Response to Hurricane Dorian, by Rhoda Margesson and Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10407, Dominican Republic, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Rachel L. Martin; CRS In Focus Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

IF11381, IF11381, Guyana: An Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10912, , by Mark P. Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10912, Jamaica, by Mark , by Mark
P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF10914, P. Sullivan; and CRS In Focus IF10914, Trinidad and Tobago, , by Mark P. Sullivan. by Mark P. Sullivan.
Cuba
Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human Political and economic developments in Cuba, a one-party authoritarian state with a poor human
rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959 rights record, frequently have been the subject of intense congressional concern since the 1959
Cuban revolution. Current Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro in April Cuban revolution. Current Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro in April
2018, but Castro 2018, but Castro continueswil continue to head Cuba’s Communist Party to head Cuba’s Communist Party. A until the next party congress, scheduled for April 2021. In 2019, a new constitution took effect new constitution took effect in
2019 that; it introduced some political and economic reforms but maintained the state introduced some political and economic reforms but maintained the state sector’s ’s
dominance over the economy and the Communist Party’s predominantdominance over the economy and the Communist Party’s predominant political role. A November 2020 government crackdown on the San Isidro Movement, a civil society group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression, spurred a protest by several hundred Cubans and focused international attention on Cuba’s poor human rights record role. Over the past decade,
Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but it has not taken
enough action to foster sustainable economic growth. .
The Cuban economy is being hard The Cuban economy is being hard hit by Venezuela’s economic crisis, which has reduced
Venezuela’s support for Cuba; increased U.S. economic sanctions; and the economic decline
associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. The Economist Intel igence Unit is forecasting an 8.3%
economic contraction in 2020.65
Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions
-hit by the economic effects of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, reduced support from Venezuela, and increased U.S. economic sanctions. The Cuban government reports that the economy contracted 11% in 2020; the global contraction in economic growth, trade, foreign investment, and tourism likely wil slow post-COVID-19 economic recovery. Over the past decade, Cuba has implemented gradual market-oriented economic policy changes, but the slow pace of these reforms has not fostered sustainable growth and development. Amid the pandemic, the government has implemented more reforms and on December 10, 2020, announced its dual-currency system would be eliminated on January 1, 2021, a major reform that has long been debated. Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have been effective. At the end of 2020, the country reported 146 deaths, with a mortality rate of 1.29 deaths per 100,000 people, according to Johns Hopkins University, among the lowest rates in the hemisphere.64 64 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. Congressional Research Service 32 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Since the early 1960s, the centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has been economic sanctions aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy aimed at isolating the Cuban government. Congress has played an active role in shaping policy
toward Cuba, including by enacting legislation strengtheningtoward Cuba, including by enacting legislation strengthening, —and at times easingand at times easing, —U.S. economic U.S. economic
sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions and sanctions. In 2014, the Obama Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions and
toward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic relationstoward a policy of engagement. This shift included the restoration of diplomatic relations (July
2015); the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism; the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism (May
2015); and an ; and an increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented increase in travel, commerce, and the flow of information to Cuba implemented
through through regulatory changes. regulatory changes.
President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017 President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba in 2017, rolling back some efforts to
normalize relations and introducing new sanctions. These included restrictions on transactions
with entities controlled by the Cuban military, intel igence, and security services. The State
Department issued a list of “restricted entities” in 2017, which has been updated several times and
now includes almost 230 Cuban entities that introduced new sanctions and rolled back some of the Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations. In September 2017, the State Department reduced the . In September 2017, the State Department reduced the
staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained health injuries of staff of the U.S. Embassy by about two-thirds in response to unexplained health injuries of
members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana. The reduction affected embassy members of the U.S. diplomatic community in Havana. The reduction affected embassy
operations, especial y visa processing. operations, especial y visa processing.
By 2019, the Trump In November 2017, the Administration restricted financial transactions with entities controlled by the Cuban military, intel igence, and security services; the “Cuba restricted list” has been updated several times, most recently in September 2020. By 2019, the Administration had largely abandoned engagement Administration had largely abandoned engagement by increasing economic
sanctions significantlyand increased sanctions to pressure the Cuban government to pressure the Cuban government for itson human rights human rights record andand for its support support
forof the Venezuelan the government of Nicolás Madurogovernment of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela. The Administration has tightened
restrictions on travel to Cuba, eliminating . In 2019 and 2020, the sanctions included a wide array of restrictions, especial y on travel and remittances. Restrictions on travel included eliminating people-to-people educational travel, people-to-people educational travel, prohibiting cruise
shiplimiting air travel travel frombetween the United States the United States, and limiting flights between the United States and Cuba to
Havana flights only. The Administration also has taken actions to al ow lawsuits against those
trafficking in property confiscated by the Cuban government (as provided for in the 1996
LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114), imposed sanctions targeting Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba, and
imposed a series of other trade and financial sanctions. In addition, the Administration has
increased efforts to cal attention to al eged coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical
missions. In May 2020, the State Department added Cuba to its annual list of countries certified
as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, the first such certification for Cuba since
2015.

65 EIU, Cuba Country Report, August 2020.
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Cuba’s public health response to the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have been effective. As of
September 2, 2020, the country registered 4,065 confirmed cases and 95 deaths, with a mortality
rate of 0.84 per 100,000 people, according to Johns Hopkins University. Cuba has provided
international assistance to respond to the pandemic by sending over 3,700 medical professionals
to almost 40 countries worldwide, including in Europe, Africa, and Latin America and the
Caribbean. The pandemic led to increased cal s, including by United Nations officials, for the
United States to ease sanctions to make it less difficult for Cuba to acquire needed equipment,
supplies, and medicines to confront the health crisis. U.S. officials responded by maintaining that
U.S. sanctions al ow for such exports providing humanitarian relief and assistance to the Cuban
people.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress has continued to fund democracy assistance for Cuba
and U.S. government- and Cuba, prohibiting cruise ship travel, and prohibiting U.S. travelers from staying at over 400 hotels and private residences for rent. Restrictions on remittances limited family remittances, eliminated the category of donative remittances, and implemented new regulations that resulted in Western Union (the major company used for transmitting remittances to Cuba) ceasing its operations in Cuba. Other trade and financial sanctions restricted Cuba’s access to leased commercial aircraft, reimposed a license requirement for third-country companies exporting goods to Cuba with more than 10% U.S. origin, and eliminated the use of U-turn transactions that al owed banking institutions to process certain funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States. Sanctions also targeted Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba. The Administration al owed lawsuits to go forward (pursuant to Title III of the LIBERTAD Act, P.L. 104-114) against those al eged to be trafficking in confiscated property in Cuba, and imposed visa restrictions on several high-ranking Cuban officials, including Raul Castro, for human rights violations. The Administration also initiated a campaign highlighting al egations of coercive labor practices in Cuba’s foreign medical mission, and in May 2020, added Cuba to its annual list of countries certified as not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Congressional Action: The 116th Congress continued to fund Cuba democracy assistance and U.S.-government sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 mil ion for democracy programs and sponsored broadcasting to Cuba: $20 mil ion for democracy programs and
$29.1 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and $20 mil ion for democracy programs $29.1 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and $20 mil ion for democracy programs
and $20.973 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division G). and $20.973 mil ion for broadcasting in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94, Division G). P.L. 116-94 (Division
J) included benefits for U.S. government employees and dependents injured while stationed in
Cuba. For FY2021, the For FY2021, the Administration requested $10 mil ion for democracy programs and Administration requested $10 mil ion for democracy programs and
$12.973 mil ion for $12.973 mil ion for broadcasting. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) and its explanatory statement, Congress provided $20 mil ion for Cuba democracy programs, $12.973 mil ion for Cuba broadcasting, and al owed for the transfer of up to $7 mil ion from the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s Buying Power Maintenance Account to help manage the cost of Office of Cuba Broadcasting reform begun in 2019. In other completed action, P.L. 116-94 (Division J) included benefits for State Department employees and dependents injured while stationed in Cuba. The FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283 Congressional Research Service 33 link to page 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress (Section 1110), extends such benefits to personnel of other federal agencies. The Senate also approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, cal ing for the unconditional release of democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer. broadcasting. The House-passed version of the FY2021 foreign aid
appropriations bil , Division A of H.R. 7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24, 2020, would
provide $20 mil ion for democracy programs and would fully fund the broadcasting request. In
other legislative action, the Senate approved S.Res. 454 in June 2020, cal ing for the release of
democracy activist José Daniel Ferrer and al members of the Patriotic Union of Cuba who have
been arbitrarily imprisoned.
Among other introduced bil s, several would ease or lift U.S. sanctions: H.R. 213 (basebal ); S.
428 (trade); H.R. 1898/S. 1447 (U.S. agricultural exports); H.R. 2404 (overal embargo); and
H.R. 3960/S. 2303 (travel). H.R. 4884 would direct the Administration to reinstate the Cuban
Family Reunification Program. S. 3977 would require the State Department to report on countries
contracting with Cuba for medical missions. Several introduced resolutions would address Cuba’s
medical missions (S.Res. 14/H.Res. 136); U.S. fugitives from justice in Cuba (H.Res. 92/S.Res.
232); religious/political freedom in Cuba (S.Res. 215); the release of José Daniel Ferrer (H.Res.
774); Las Damas de Blanco human rights organization, (S.Res. 531); and the 35th anniversary of
broadcasting to Cuba (H.Res. 971/S.Res. 637). In September 2019, the House Subcommittee on In September 2019, the House Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere, Civilianthe Western Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade (House Western Hemisphere Security, and Trade (House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee) held a hearing on the human rights situation in Subcommittee) held a hearing on the human rights situation in Cuba (seCuba (see Appendix).
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10045, For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P. , by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS Report R45657, Sullivan; CRS Report R45657, Cuba: U.S. Policy in the 116th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan; , by Mark P. Sullivan;
and CRS Report RL31139, and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by Mark P. , by Mark P.
Sullivan. Sullivan.
Haiti
During the administration of President Jovenel Moïse, who During the administration of President Jovenel Moïse, who began a five-year termwas inaugurated in February in February
2017, 2017, Haiti Haiti has been experiencing political and social unrest, high inflation, and resurgent gang has been experiencing political and social unrest, high inflation, and resurgent gang
violence. The Haitian judiciary is violence. The Haitian judiciary is conducting investigations intoinvestigating Moïse’s possible involvement in Moïse’s possible involvement in
money laundering, irregular loans, and embezzlement; the president denies these al egations. He money laundering, irregular loans, and embezzlement; the president denies these al egations. He
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has dismissed some officials looking into corruption.66 Because Haiti failed to hold legislative
elections, Moïse is now ruling by decreehas dismissed some officials looking into corruption.65 Because Haiti failed to hold legislative elections scheduled for October 2019, there is currently no functioning legislature. Moïse has been ruling by decree since January 2020. There is some debate whether his five-year term ends on February 7 of 2021 or 2022; Moïse asserts the latter. There may be heightened tensions that day. .
In mid-2018, Moïse decided to end oil subsidies, which, coupled with deteriorating economic In mid-2018, Moïse decided to end oil subsidies, which, coupled with deteriorating economic
conditions, sparked massive protests. Government instability heightened after May 2019, when conditions, sparked massive protests. Government instability heightened after May 2019, when
the Superior Court of Auditors delivered a report to the Haitian Senate al eging Moïse had the Superior Court of Auditors delivered a report to the Haitian Senate al eging Moïse had
embezzled mil ions of dollars. embezzled mil ions of dollars. Nevertheless, a legislative motion to impeach the president did not pass. Mass demonstrations have cal ed for an end to corruption, the Mass demonstrations have cal ed for an end to corruption, the
provision of government provision of government services, and Moïse’s resignation. Moïse has said that he wil not resign. Because the legislature also did not pass an elections lawservices, and Moïse’s resignation. Nevertheless, a legislative motion to
impeach the president did not pass. Moïse has said that he wil not resign.
Haiti’s elected officials exacerbated the ongoing instability by not forming a government. After
the first two prime ministers under Moïse resigned, the Haitian legislature did not confirm the
president’s subsequent two nominees for prime minister, who serves as head of government.
Because the legislature also did not pass an elections law, parliamentary elections scheduled for
October 2019 were postponed indefinitely. On January 13, 2020, the terms of the entire lower , the terms of the entire lower
Chamber Chamber of Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expiredof Deputies and two-thirds of the Senate expired in January 2020, as did the terms of al local , as did the terms of al local
government posts, without newly elected officials to take their place. government posts, without newly elected officials to take their place. Currently, there is no
functioning legislature.
Since January 2020, the U.N., the OAS, and others have Since January 2020, the U.N., the OAS, and others have supportedencouraged a dialogue among the a dialogue among the
government, opposition, civil society, and private sector to establish a functioning government, government, opposition, civil society, and private sector to establish a functioning government,
develop a plan for reform, create a constitutional revision process, and set an electoral calendar.develop a plan for reform, create a constitutional revision process, and set an electoral calendar.67
66 Early talks stal ed without Early talks stal ed without producing a national unity government.producing a national unity government. The Trump Administration
supports the efforts to break the political impasse but states that “while constitutional reforms are
necessary and welcome, they must not become a pretext to delay elections.”68
President Moïse appointed a new cabinet and prime minister, Joseph Jouthe, and replaced elected President Moïse appointed a new cabinet and prime minister, Joseph Jouthe, and replaced elected
mayors with his own nominees, al by decree. Although creating some stability, the appointments mayors with his own nominees, al by decree. Although creating some stability, the appointments
also served to solidify his political control. Moïse has little public support. Armed gangs have also served to solidify his political control. Moïse has little public support. Armed gangs have
proliferated in recent years and proliferated in recent years and have targeted low-income neighborhoods where citizens held targeted low-income neighborhoods where citizens held
anti-government protests. Moïse fired a justice minister after he criticized the government’s anti-government protests. Moïse fired a justice minister after he criticized the government’s
response to the rise in gangs and violent crime as inadequate. Haitian politicians historical y have response to the rise in gangs and violent crime as inadequate. Haitian politicians historical y have
used gangs for political benefits, and some observers raise concerns that pro-government gangs
could bolster Moïse’s position.
Some observers are concerned Moïse wil use decrees to advance constitutional reforms he
advocates, including changes to strengthen Haiti’s presidency and executive branch and possibly
a provision to al ow presidential reelection, setting himself up for a second consecutive term,
which Haiti’s current constitution prohibits. Moïse likely wil schedule legislative elections to
coincide with the presidential election, due to be held in 2021. Some observers argue that by
continuing to support Moïse, the United Nations, the United States, and other international
partners are facilitating Moïse’s apparent effort to rule by decree as long as possible.69

66 Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “Hearing Before Regional
Human Rights Body Leads to Request for Site Visit t o Haiti,” October 4, 2019, p. 2; and EIU, Haiti Country Report, 3rd
Quarter 2020.
67 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, S/2020/123, “Unit ed Nations Integrated Office in Haiti,”
February 13, 2020, p. 3.
68 U.S. Mission to the U.N., “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Haiti, Ambassador Cherith
Norman-Chalet,” February 20, 2020.
69 Jacques Létang, “Annex II: Statement by the President of the Haitian Bars Federation, Jacques Létang,” United
Nations Security Council, “Letter dated 23 June 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the
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used 65 Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, “Hearing Before Regional Human Rights Body Leads to Request for Site Visit t o Haiti,” October 4, 2019, p. 2; and EIU, Haiti Country Report, 3rd Quarter 2020. 66 U.N. Security Council, Report of the Secretary General, S/2020/123, “United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti,” February 13, 2020, p. 3. Congressional Research Service 34 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress gangs for political benefits, and some observers raise concerns that pro-government gangs wil weaken opposition to Moïse. Former police officer Jimmy Cherizier, who goes by “Barbecue,” is leading a coalition of gangs that has committed massacres, kidnappings, and extortion; although he and Moïse deny any agreement, Cherizier has attacked government critics.67 U.N. and U.S. officials have been pressing for Haiti to hold legislative and municipal elections as soon as possible. Instead, Moïse announced in October 2020 that his government would hold a referendum on a new constitution, and elections after that. Some observers are concerned Moïse wil use decrees to advance constitutional reforms he advocates, including changes to strengthen Haiti’s presidency and possibly a provision to al ow presidential reelection, setting himself up for a second consecutive term, which Haiti’s current constitution prohibits. The Trump Administration cal ed on Haiti to hold elections by January 2021, and said constitutional reforms should follow elections.68 Some observers argue that by continuing to support Moïse, the United Nations, the United States, and other international partners are facilitating Moïse’s apparent effort to rule by decree as long as possible.69
Haiti has received high levels of U.S. assistance for many years given its proximity to the United Haiti has received high levels of U.S. assistance for many years given its proximity to the United
States and its status as the poorest country in the hemisphere. In recent years, it was the second-States and its status as the poorest country in the hemisphere. In recent years, it was the second-
largest recipient of U.S. aid in the region, after Colombia. Since a peak in 2010, the year a largest recipient of U.S. aid in the region, after Colombia. Since a peak in 2010, the year a
massive earthquake hit the country, aid to Haiti has been declining steadily. Since 2014, a massive earthquake hit the country, aid to Haiti has been declining steadily. Since 2014, a
prolonged drought and a hurricane have severely affected Haiti’s food supply. U.N. peacekeepers prolonged drought and a hurricane have severely affected Haiti’s food supply. U.N. peacekeepers
inadvertently introduced cholera in Haiti in 2010. After nine years, Haiti has contained the inadvertently introduced cholera in Haiti in 2010. After nine years, Haiti has contained the
epidemic, having zero laboratory-confirmed cases of cholera since January 2019.70 epidemic, having zero laboratory-confirmed cases of cholera since January 2019.70
The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti since 2004, recently shifting from peacekeeping The U.N. has had a continuous presence in Haiti since 2004, recently shifting from peacekeeping
missions to a political office, missions to a political office, and authorizedauthorizing its Integrated Office in Haiti its Integrated Office in Haiti for an initial one-year
period scheduled to expire on October 16, 2020(BINUH) in 2019, and extending it for another year to October 15, 2021. The office’s mandate is to protect and promote . The office’s mandate is to protect and promote
human rights and to advise the government of Haiti on strengthening political stability and good human rights and to advise the government of Haiti on strengthening political stability and good
governance through support for an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue. governance through support for an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue.
With the support of U.N. With the support of U.N. peacekeeping forces and U.S. and other international assistance, the forces and U.S. and other international assistance, the Haitian Haitian National National
Police (HNP) force became increasingly professional and took on responsibility for domestic Police (HNP) force became increasingly professional and took on responsibility for domestic
security. New police stations have given more Haitians access to security services, but with security. New police stations have given more Haitians access to security services, but with
14,000-15,000 officers, the HNP’s size remains below international standards for the country’s 14,000-15,000 officers, the HNP’s size remains below international standards for the country’s
population. It is also underfunded. population. It is also underfunded. MembersRecently, however, members of the HNP have of the HNP have been protestingprotested their low pay and their low pay and
unsafe working conditionsunsafe working conditions;, and their protests have repeatedly turned their protests have repeatedly turned violent. According to the U.N., violent. According to the U.N.,
the HNP has committed human rights abuses, including the HNP has committed human rights abuses, including 19 extrajudicial kil ingsextrajudicial kil ings.71
in September and October 2019.71 67Ingrid Arnesen and Anthony Faiola, “In Haiti, Coronavirus and a Man Named Barbecue T est the Rule of L aw,” Washington Post, August 14, 2020. 68 Jacqueline Charles, “T rump Administration Steps up Pressure for Moïse to Stage Haiti’s Overdue Elections,” Miami Herald, November 2, 2020. 69 Jacques Létang, “Annex II: Statement by the President of the Haitian Bars Federation, Jacques Létang,” United Nations Security Council, “ Letter dated 23 June 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council,” S/2020/568, June 23, 2020, pp. 5-6; and EIU, Haiti Country Report, 3rd Quarter 2020. 70 T he World Bank, “Haiti: Overview,” May 1, 2020. 71 Marta Hurtado, “Press briefing note on Haiti unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, November 1, 2019. Congressional Research Service 35 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress The COVID-19 pandemic adds an additional chal enge to governance. The government has The COVID-19 pandemic adds an additional chal enge to governance. The government has
limited resources to treat the disease and prevent its spread. limited resources to treat the disease and prevent its spread. A panel of Haitian health experts
cal ed for MoïseHealth experts and some Members of Congress cal ed for the United States to suspend U.S. deportations of Haitians to suspend U.S. deportations of Haitians held in U.S. prisons to Haiti because because
they pose they pose a high risk of introducing COVID-19 in Haiti.72a high risk of introducing COVID-19 in Haiti.72 Conditions are such that the disease is
likely to spread rapidly and result in a high death rate, and it could provoke more social unrest. As
of September 2, 2020, Haiti reported 8,230 confirmed cases and 203 deaths.73 Such deportations continued throughout 2020. Experts expected the disease to spread rapidly and result in a high death rate, given conditions in Haiti. Yet the low number of cases baffles scientists. As of December 31, 2020, Haiti reported 10,015 confirmed cases and 236 deaths.73 While there may be under-reporting, hospitalizations did not reach critical levels, and officials did not need to implement other emergency plans.74 Nonetheless, health experts worry that a higher surge could stil happen. Haiti has implemented some measures to limit the spread of the corona virus, but observance and enforcement are lax. Despite a surge in cases in early June, Moïse reopened borders in July, hoping to increase economic activity. The government The government
also is not wel equipped to deal with the pandemicalso is not wel equipped to deal with the pandemic ’s ’s economic impact; Haiti’s economy is economic impact; Haiti’s economy is
expected to contract by at least 4% in 2020.74 Despite the recent surge in cases, Moïse reopened
borders in July, hoping to increase economic activity but raising concerns that imported
transmission of the virus also wil occur.
Congressional Action: The Trump Administration’s FY2020 aid request for Haiti totaled $145.5
mil ion, which would have been 25% reduction from FY2019; ultimately,expected to contract by at least 4% in 2020.75 As of August 2020, the State Department reported that the United States was providing $13.2 mil ion in previously announced health and humanitarian assistance for Haiti to support efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, including aid to support risk communication, improve water and sanitation, prevent infections in health facilities, manage COVID-19 cases, and strengthen laboratories.76 Congressional Action: Congress provided an estimated $172.5 an estimated $172.5
mil ion for FY2020 is being providedmil ion for Haiti through the through the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020
(P.L. 116-94). The act (P.L. 116-94). The act requiresrequired that aid to Haiti be provided only through the regular notification that aid to Haiti be provided only through the regular notification
procedures. Under the act, economic assistance for procedures. Under the act, economic assistance for Haiti mayHaiti could not be made available for assistance not be made available for assistance
to the Haitianto the Haitian central government unless the Secretary of State central government unless the Secretary of State certifies and reportscertified and reported to the to the
Committees on Appropriations that the government Committees on Appropriations that the government iswas taking effective steps to strengthen the rule taking effective steps to strengthen the rule
of law, combat corruption, increase of law, combat corruption, increase government revenues, and resolve commercial disputes. The government revenues, and resolve commercial disputes. The

Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council,” S/2020/568, June 23,
2020, pp. 5-6; and EIU, Haiti Country Report, 3rd Quarter 2020.
70 T he World Bank, “Haiti: Overview,” May 1, 2020.
71 Marta Hurtado, “Press briefing note on Haiti unrest,” Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
November 1, 2019.
72 Jacqueline Charles and Monique O. Madan, “Haiti coronavirus panel demands that ICE halt deportations until
pandemic is controlled,” Miami Herald, May 10, 2020.
73 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, September 2,
2020, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality; and Kevin Sieff, “ Haiti, Spared A Major Coronavirus
Outbreak So Far, Now a ‘T inderbox’ Set to ‘Explode,’” Washington Post, May 15, 2020.
74International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020.
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act provides budget authority for $51 million in development assistance; it also provides $10
mil ion in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for prison assistance,
prioritizing improvements to meet basic sanitation, medical, nutritional, and safety needs at
Haiti’s National Penitentiary. The measure also prohibits the provision of appropriated funds for
assistance to Haiti’s armed forces.
The Administration’s FY2021 request for Haiti totals $128.2 mil ion, almost a 26% cut compared
with estimated assistance being provided in FY2020. The House-passed version of the FY2021
foreign aid appropriations bil (Division A of H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-444), approved July 24,
2020, would, among its provisions on Haiti, extend the certification requirement contained in P.L.
116-94, provide budget authority for $51 mil ion in development assistance, make the Haitian
government eligible to purchase defense articles and services for the Coast Guard, and prohibit
funding under the act for assistance to Haiti’s armed forces.
As of August 2020, the State Department said the United States was providing $13.2 mil ion in
previously announced health and humanitarian assistance for Haiti to support efforts to respond to
the COVID-19 pandemic, including aid to support risk communication, improve water and
sanitation, prevent infections in health facilities, manage COVID-19 cases, and strengthen
laboratories.75
The CBTPA, which extends certain trade preferences to Haiti and several other Caribbean
nations, is due to expire September 30, 2020 (see “Trade Policy” section, above.) H.R. 991 and S.
2473 would extend the CBTPA through September 2030.
The House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held a hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti in
December 2019 (see Appendix).act provided budget authority for $51 mil ion in development assistance; it also provided $10 mil ion in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for prison assistance, prioritizing improvements to meet basic sanitation, medical, nutritional, and safety needs at Haiti’s National Penitentiary. The measure also prohibited the provision of appropriated funds for assistance to Haiti’s armed forces. The Administration’s FY2021 request for Haiti totaled $128.2 mil ion, almost a 26% cut compared with estimated assistance being provided in FY2020. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) extends the certification requirement contained in P.L. 116-94, provides budget authority for $51 mil ion in development assistance, and not less than $5 mil ion to address the basic sanitary, medical, and nutritional needs of prisoners, and for alternatives to the National Penitentiary. The act makes the Haitian government eligible to purchase defense articles and services for the Coast Guard, and prohibits funding under the act for assistance to Haiti’s armed forces. The act requires that most aid to Haiti, including development assistance, be provided only through the regular notification procedures. The explanatory statement to the act 72 Jacqueline Charles and Monique O. Madan, “Haiti Coronavirus Panel Demands that ICE Halt Deportations until Pandemic Is Controlled,” Miami Herald, May 10, 2020. 73 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses, January 1, 2021, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality; and Kevin Sieff, “ Haiti, Spared A Major Coronavirus Outbreak So Far, Now a ‘T inderbox’ Set to ‘Explode,’” Washington Post, May 15, 2020. 74 Jacqueline Charles, “ Despite Lax rules, COVID Claims Few Lives in Haiti. Scientists Want to Know Why,” Miami Herald, December 16, 2020. 75International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. 76 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “ Update: T he United States Is Continuing T o Lead the Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020. Congressional Research Service 36 link to page 28 link to page 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress (pursuant to H.Rept. 116-444) directs the Secretary of State to report to the appropriate committees, within 45 days, on U.S. steps taken to address cholera and further the recovery of cholera victims and their families in Haiti. Congress also approved legislation (P.L. 116-164, signed into law in October 2020) extending certain trade preferences to Haiti and seven other Caribbean nations for another 10 years, through September 2030 (see “Trade Policy” section, above.) In other action, the House approved H.R. 5586, the Haiti, Development, Accountability, and Institutional Transparency Act, in November 2000, which would have required the State Department, in coordination with USAID, take actions to measure the progress of recovery and efforts to address corruption, rule and law, and media freedoms in Haiti. The House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee held a hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti in December 2019; the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission held a hearing on human rights in Haiti in March 2020. (see Appendix).
For background, see CRS Report R45034, For background, see CRS Report R45034, Haiti’s Political and Economic Conditions, by , by
Maureen Taft-Morales. Maureen Taft-Morales.
Mexico and Central America
Mexico
Congress has demonstrated renewed interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading Congress has demonstrated renewed interest in Mexico, a neighboring country and top trading
partner with which the United States has a close but complicated relationship. In recent decades, partner with which the United States has a close but complicated relationship. In recent decades,
U.S.-Mexican relations have improved, as the countries have become close trade partners and U.S.-Mexican relations have improved, as the countries have become close trade partners and
worked to address worked to address migration, crime and other issues of shared concern. Nevertheless, the history of U.S. crime and other issues of shared concern. Nevertheless, the history of U.S.
military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico and the asymmetry in the relationship continue to military and diplomatic intervention in Mexico and the asymmetry in the relationship continue to
provoke periodic tension.provoke periodic tension.
The October 2020 arrest of former defense minister Salvador Cienfuegos in the United States on drug trafficking charges deeply angered the Mexican government. Despite his subsequent release, Mexico’s Congress enacted reforms to limit U.S. law enforcement operations in Mexico. The United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), approved by Congress in The United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement (USMCA), approved by Congress in
January 2020, entered into force on July 1, 2020, and its implementation is likely to receive January 2020, entered into force on July 1, 2020, and its implementation is likely to receive
congressional attention. Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized-crime-related congressional attention. Congress remains concerned about the effects of organized-crime-related
violence in Mexico on U.S. security interests and U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico and has violence in Mexico on U.S. security interests and U.S. citizens’ safety in Mexico and has
increased oversight of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Congress increased oversight of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. Congress may appropriatehas appropriated foreign foreign
assistance for Mexico and assistance for Mexico and overseeoverseen bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound unauthorized bilateral efforts to address U.S.-bound unauthorized migration, migration,
il egal drug flows, and the COVID-19 pandemic. il egal drug flows, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the populist leader of the National Regeneration Movement
(MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018. (MORENA) party, which he created in 2014, took office for a six-year term in December 2018.

75 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “ Update: T he United States Is Continuing T o Lead the
Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020.
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He is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majorities in both legislative He is the first Mexican president in over two decades to enjoy majorities in both legislative
chambers. In addition to combating corruption, he pledged to build infrastructure in southern chambers. In addition to combating corruption, he pledged to build infrastructure in southern
Mexico, revive the poor-performing state oil company, address citizen security through social Mexico, revive the poor-performing state oil company, address citizen security through social
programs, and adopt a non-interventionist foreign policy. programs, and adopt a non-interventionist foreign policy.
President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained relatively high ( President López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained relatively high (5864% in % in July December 2020), 2020),
even as his government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence, the COVID-19 even as his government has struggled to address organized crime-related violence, the COVID-19
pandemic, and a deep recession. In 2019, most Mexicans approved of the López Obrador pandemic, and a deep recession. In 2019, most Mexicans approved of the López Obrador
government’s new social programs and minimum wage increases, but some government’s new social programs and minimum wage increases, but some viewed theopposed large cuts to cuts to
government expendituresgovernment expenditures as shortsighted. After several . After high-profile massacres and record high-profile massacres and record
homicide levels, the López Obrador government camehomicide levels, Congressional Research Service 37 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress the López Obrador government has come under pressure to improve its security under pressure to improve its security
strategy. Mexico’s economy recorded zero growth in 2019, and the IMF estimates that it may strategy. Mexico’s economy recorded zero growth in 2019, and the IMF estimates that it may
contract contract 10.59.0% in 2020. Nevertheless, President López Obrador has been slow to implement % in 2020. Nevertheless, President López Obrador has been slow to implement
economic policies and public health measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, which had economic policies and public health measures to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, which had
caused almost 126,000 caused 65,241 reported deaths as of reported deaths as of September 2, 2020.76
Despite some predictions to the contrary, the end of 2020.77 U.S.-Mexico relations under the López Obrador U.S.-Mexico relations under the López Obrador
government have remained government have remained cordial thus far. Nevertheless, tensionsgeneral y cordial. Tensions have emerged over several have emerged over several
issues, issues, however, including trade disputes and tariffs, immigration and border security issues, including trade disputes and tariffs, immigration and border security issues, and U.S. U.S.
citizens kil edcitizens kil ed in Mexico in Mexico and most recently, U.S. investigations of Mexican officials. Security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative has continued, . Security cooperation under the Mérida Initiative has continued,
including efforts to address the production and trafficking of opioids and methamphetamine, but including efforts to address the production and trafficking of opioids and methamphetamine, but
the Administration has pushed Mexico to improve its antidrug efforts. The López Obrador’s the Administration has pushed Mexico to improve its antidrug efforts. The López Obrador’s
administration has accommodatedadministration has accommodated most of the Trump Administration’s border and asylum policy the Trump Administration’s border and asylum policy
changes that have shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to Mexico. changes that have shifted the burden of interdicting migrants and offering asylum to Mexico.
After enacting labor reforms and raising wages, the López Obrador administration After enacting labor reforms and raising wages, the López Obrador administration achieved a key achieved a key
foreign policy goal: U.S. congressional approval of implementing legislation for the USMCA. On foreign policy goal: U.S. congressional approval of implementing legislation for the USMCA. On
July 8, 2020, President López Obrador traveled to Washington, DC, to meet with President Trump July 8, 2020, President López Obrador traveled to Washington, DC, to meet with President Trump
to mark the agreement’s entry into force and to mark the agreement’s entry into force and to signsigned a joint declaration on a joint declaration on goals for bilateral
bilateral relations.relations.7778
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress closely followed the Trump Administration’s efforts The 116th Congress closely followed the Trump Administration’s efforts
to renegotiate NAFTA and recommended modifications to the proposed USMCA (on labor, the to renegotiate NAFTA and recommended modifications to the proposed USMCA (on labor, the
environment, and dispute settlement, among other topics) that led to the three countries signing an environment, and dispute settlement, among other topics) that led to the three countries signing an
amendment to the agreement on December 10, 2019. The House approved the implementing amendment to the agreement on December 10, 2019. The House approved the implementing
legislation for the proposed USMCA in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in January legislation for the proposed USMCA in December 2019, and the Senate followed suit in January
16, 2020 (P.L. 116-113). 16, 2020 (P.L. 116-113). Both houses have taken action on H.R. 133, the United States-Mexico
Economic Partnership Act (H.R. 133), which directs the Secretary of State to enhance economic
cooperation and educational and professional exchanges with Mexico; the House approved the
measure in January 2019, and the Senate approved an amended version in January 2020. The
The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) requiresrequired a classified assessment of a classified assessment of drug trafficking, human drug trafficking, human
trafficking, and alien smuggling in Mexico. trafficking, and alien smuggling in Mexico.
Regarding foreign aid, Congress provided $162.5 mil ion in foreign assistance to Mexico in Congress provided $162.5 mil ion in foreign assistance to Mexico in
FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and an estimated $157.9 FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) and an estimated $157.9 mil ion million in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, the in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94). For FY2021, the
Administration requested $63.8 mil ionAdministration requested $63.8 mil ion for Mexico, a decline of almost 60% compared with that for Mexico, a decline of almost 60% compared with that
provided in FY2020. The provided in FY2020. The House-passed version of the FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil ,
Division A of H.R. 7608, would provide $159.9 mil ion for Mexico. H.Rept. 116-444, the report

76 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, September 2,
2020, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
77 T he White House, “ Remarks by President T rump and President López Obrador of the United Mexican States in
Signing of a Joint Declaration,” July 8, 2020.
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accompanying the measure, wouldConsolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, (P.L. 116-260) provides $158.9 mil ion for Mexico subject to the same withholding requirements as in S.Rept. 116-126 on Foreign Military Financing, but also requires the State Department to certify that Mexico has adopted “credible counternarcotics and law enforcement strategies…[that are] consistent with the right of due process and protection of human rights.” The act also incorporated the United States-Mexico Economic Partnership Act in Division FF, Title XIX (original y approved by the House and Senate, respectively, in January 2019 and January 2020 as an earlier version of H.R. 133) directing the Secretary of State to enhance economic cooperation and educational and professional exchanges with Mexico and requiring the State Department to develop a strategy to achieve those aims. Division O, Title VI of the act also includes technical corrections to the USMCA. The explanatory statement accompanying the act includes reporting requirements from H.Rept. 116-444 that require a comprehensive strategy on the Mérida Initiative, as require a comprehensive strategy on the Mérida Initiative, as
wel as reports on (1) steps Mexico is taking to meet human rights standards, (2) how Mexico is wel as reports on (1) steps Mexico is taking to meet human rights standards, (2) how Mexico is
addressing addressing highway crimes, and (3) the chal enges facing U.S. citizen minors in Mexico. The conference 77 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. 78 T he White House, “ Remarks by President T rump and President López Obrador of the United Mexican States in Signing of a Joint Declaration,” July 8, 2020. Congressional Research Service 38 link to page 44 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress report, H.Rept. 116-617, to the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires a comprehensive report on past and future U.S. support for Mexican security forces. For additional information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by highway crimes, and (3) the chal enges facing U.S. citizen minors in Mexico.
Additional House-passed bil s with provisions on Mexico that have not yet received Senate
consideration include H.R. 951, the United States-Mexico Tourism Improvement Act of 2019,
approved by the House in April 2019, which would require the State Department to develop a
strategy to improve bilateral tourism. More recently, the FY2021 House-passed NDAA (H.R.
6395) would require a report on Mexican security forces. The House-passed FY2018-FY2020
Intel igence Authorization Act (H.R. 3494) would require intel igence assessments of drug
trafficking, human smuggling, and human smuggling in Mexico (and the Northern Triangle) and
a review of intel igence community collection efforts in that region.
In the wake of recent high-profile massacres in Mexico, congressional concerns about the
efficacy of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation and cal s for oversight have increased. Other
oversight issues may include bilateral public health, immigration, and economic responses to
COVID-19, as wel as the entry into force of the USMCA.
For additional information, see CRS Report R42917, Mexico: Background and U.S. Relations, by
Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RL32934, Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report RL32934, U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues,
and Implications, by M. Angeles Vil arreal; CRS In Focus IF10997, , by M. Angeles Vil arreal; CRS In Focus IF10997, U.S.-Mexico-Canada
(USMCA) Trade Agreement, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS In Focus , by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Ian F. Fergusson; CRS In Focus
IF10578, IF10578, Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, 2007-2020, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS
Report R41576, Report R41576, Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations, by June S. , by June S.
Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Beittel; CRS In Focus IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts, by Clare Ribando Seelke; , by Clare Ribando Seelke;
and CRS In Focus IF10400, and CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-
Mexico Security Cooperation, by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Liana W. Rosen and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Central America’s Northern Triangle
The Northern Triangle region of Central America (se The Northern Triangle region of Central America (see Figure 3) has received ) has received renewed considerable attention attention
from U.S. policymakers from U.S. policymakers in recent yearsover the past decade, as it has become a major transit corridor for il icit, as it has become a major transit corridor for il icit drugs drugs
and has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the United States. In and has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the United States. In
FY2019FY2019, for example, U.S. authorities apprehended nearly 608,000 unauthorized migrants from El Salvador, , U.S. authorities apprehended nearly 608,000 unauthorized migrants from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras at the southwest border; 81% of those apprehended were families or Guatemala, and Honduras at the southwest border; 81% of those apprehended were families or
unaccompanied minors, many of whom were seeking asylum.unaccompanied minors, many of whom were seeking asylum.7879 These narcotics and migrant These narcotics and migrant
flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted chal enges in flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted chal enges in the region, including widespread the region, including widespread
insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty. The COVID-19 insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty. The COVID-19
pandemic has exacerbated these chal enges, as the sharp economic downturn has led to increased
unemployment and food insecurity, and some governments have used the crisispandemic and two Category 4 hurricanes exacerbated conditions in the region in 2020, contributing to higher levels of unemployment and food insecurity while creating opportunities for governments to curtail civil to curtail civil
liberties and engage in corruption. liberties and engage in corruption.
The Obama Administration determined it was in the national security interests of the United
States to work with Central American countriesFigure 3. Map of Central America Source: CRS Graphics. Notes: Belize, although located in Central America, is considered a Caribbean country and belongs to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Since 2014, the United States has sought to improve security, strengthen governance, and to improve security, strengthen governance, and
promote prosperity in the region through the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. 79 CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2019,” October 29, 2019. Congressional Research Service 39 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Launched by the Obama Administration with support from Congress, the whole-of-government strategy initial y doubled annual foreign assistance for the region. From FY2016-FY2021, Congress appropriated more than $3.6 bil ion to implement the strategypromote prosperity in the region. Accordingly, the Obama Administration launched a whole-of-
government U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America and requested a significant
increase in foreign assistance for the region to support the strategy’s implementation. Since
FY2016, Congress has appropriated more than $3.1 bil ion of aid for Central America, al ocating
, al ocating most of the funds to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Annual appropriations measures most of the funds to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Annual appropriations measures
have required a have required a portion of the aid to be withheld, however, until the Northern Triangle governments take steps to improve border security, combat corruption, protect human rights, and address other congressional concerns. The Trump Administration maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America while repeatedly seeking to scale back the initiative. It proposed funding cuts ranging from 16% to 33% in each of its annual budget requests, most of which were not adopted by Congress. The Administration effectively halted the initiative in March 2019, however, when itportion of the aid to be withheld, however, until the Northern Triangle

78 CBP, “U.S. Border Patrol Southwest Border Apprehensions by Sector Fiscal Year 2 019,” October 29, 2019.
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governments take steps to improve border security, combat corruption, protect human rights, and
address other congressional concerns.
Figure 3. Map of Central America

Source: CRS Graphics.
Notes: Belize, although located in Central America, is considered a Caribbean country and belongs to the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).
The Trump Administration has maintained the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America
but suspended most aid for the Northern Triangle suspended most aid for the Northern Triangle in March 2019 due to the continued northward due to the continued northward
flow of migrants and asylum seekers from the region. The aid suspension forced U.S. agencies to flow of migrants and asylum seekers from the region. The aid suspension forced U.S. agencies to
close some projects prematurely and cancel some planned activities. Although Administration close some projects prematurely and cancel some planned activities. Although Administration
officials acknowledged that U.S. foreign officials acknowledged that U.S. foreign aid programs had been “producing the results [they] aid programs had been “producing the results [they]
were intended to produce” with regard to security, governance, and economic development in the were intended to produce” with regard to security, governance, and economic development in the
region, they argued that, “the only metric that matters is the question of what the migration region, they argued that, “the only metric that matters is the question of what the migration
situation looks like on the southern border” of situation looks like on the southern border” of the United States.the United States.7980
Over the course of 2019, the Trump Administration reprogrammed approximately $ Over the course of 2019, the Trump Administration reprogrammed approximately $405396 mil ion of mil ion of
aid appropriated for the Northern Triangle to other foreign policy priorities while negotiating a aid appropriated for the Northern Triangle to other foreign policy priorities while negotiating a
series of migration agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Under a series of migration agreements with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Under a safe third
country agreement“Safe Third Country Agreement” (also known as an (also known as an asylum cooperative agreement“Asylum Cooperative Agreement”), the United States ), the United States sent
sent nearly 1,000 Hondurans and Salvadorans to Guatemala between November 2019 and March nearly 1,000 Hondurans and Salvadorans to Guatemala between November 2019 and March
2020, requiring them to apply for protection there rather than in the United States.2020, requiring them to apply for protection there rather than in the United States.8081 Guatemala Guatemala
suspended that agreement in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; similar agreements suspended that agreement in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; similar agreements
with Honduras and El Salvador that had yet to be implemented also were suspended.with Honduras and El Salvador that had yet to be implemented also were suspended.82 Although Although
U.S. deportations to al three countries U.S. deportations to al three countries have continued, Guatemala continued, Guatemala has suspended repatriation suspended repatriation
flights on flights on multiple occasions due to nearly 200 deportees reportedly testing positive for COVID-multiple occasions due to nearly 200 deportees reportedly testing positive for COVID-
19 after 19 after arriving in Guatemala.arriving in Guatemala.81

7983 The Trump Administration announced it would begin restoring aid to the region in October 2019—following the conclusion of the migration agreements—and obligated the last of the suspended assistance in mid-2020. For FY2021, the Administration requested almost $377 mil ion for Central America, based on the assumption that countries in the region would continue to take action to stem unauthorized migration to the United States. The request did not include any foreign aid specifical y for El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, but the Administration asserted that those countries could receive a portion of the assistance requested for regional programs. Congressional Action: The 116th Congress demonstrated continued support for the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America but reduced annual funding for the initiative. Congress 80 Remarks of Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs Remarks of Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
and Kirsten D. Madison, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and Kirsten D. Madison, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
“Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America, ” “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds Hearing on U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America, ” CQ
Congressional Transcripts, September 25, 2019. , September 25, 2019.
8081 Instituto Guatemalteco de Migración, “T raslados Acuerdo de Cooperación de Asilo –ACA,” data provided to CRS in Instituto Guatemalteco de Migración, “T raslados Acuerdo de Cooperación de Asilo –ACA,” data provided to CRS in
April 2020. April 2020.
81 82 T he T rump Administration concluded implementation accords with El Salvador and Honduras in December 2020, but did not carry out any transfers under those Asylum Cooperative Agreements prior to the end of the year. 83 “Guatemala Says 8 Minors of 60 Deported Were COVID-19 Positive,” Associated Press, August 25, 2020. “Guatemala Says 8 Minors of 60 Deported Were COVID-19 Positive,” Associated Press, August 25, 2020.
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link to page link to page 5758 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress appropriated $525.1 mil ion for the Central America strategy in FY2019 (P.L. 116-6), an estimated $533.2 mil ion for the strategy in FY2020 (P.L. 116-94), and $505.9 mil ion for the strategy in FY2021 (P.L. 116-260). Although those funding levels significantly exceeded the Trump Administration’s budget requests, they were wel below the $750 mil ion Congress appropriated for the Central America strategy in FY2016. Congress Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

In October 2019, following the conclusion of the migration agreements, the Administration
announced it would begin restoring targeted aid to the region. As of mid-June 2020, the
Administration was in the process of obligating the last of the previously suspended assistance.
For FY2021, the Administration has requested almost $377 mil ion for Central America, based on
the assumption that countries in the region wil continue to take action to stem unauthorized
migration to the United States. The request does not include any foreign aid specifical y for El
Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, but the Administration asserts that those countries could
receive a portion of the assistance requested for CARSI and the USAID Latin America and
Caribbean Regional Program.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress has demonstrated continued support for the U.S.
Strategy for Engagement in Central America but has reduced annual funding for the initiative.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) provided $527.6 mil ion for the Central
America strategy, which is about $92 mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested. The
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94), provided $519.9 mil ion for the
initiative, which is about $75 mil ion more than the Trump Administration requested.82 For
FY2021, the House-passed foreign aid appropriations bil (H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-444) would
again provide $519.9 mil ion for Central America, which is $143 mil ion more than the
Administration requested. The bil would maintain conditions on U.S. assistance to the
governments of the Northern Triangle.
Congress has also sought to improve the effectiveness of the Central America strategy. The also sought to improve the effectiveness of the Central America strategy. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and House Western Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, and House Western
Hemisphere Subcommittee each held oversight hearings to assess U.S. policy and foreign Hemisphere Subcommittee each held oversight hearings to assess U.S. policy and foreign
assistance in Central assistance in Central America (seAmerica (see Appendix). The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced . The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced
Engagement Act (H.R. 2615), passed by the House in July 2019, would authorize assistance for
Central America and requireEngagement Act (Division FF, Title F of P.L. 116-260) requires the State Department, in coordination with other agencies, to the State Department, in coordination with other agencies, to
develop develop a five-year five-year strategiesstrategy to support inclusive economic growth, combat corruption, strengthen to support inclusive economic growth, combat corruption, strengthen
democratic institutions, and improve security conditions in the Northern democratic institutions, and improve security conditions in the Northern Triangle. The act identifies priorities for U.S. policy as wel as objectives to incorporate into annual benchmarks for measuring progress. Congress also continued to condition aid to the Northern Triangle governments in annual appropriations measures, requiring those governments to take steps toward addressing certain chal enges prior to receiving some U.S. support. CorruptionTriangle. Many of those
same provisions are included in the House-passed FY2021 NDAA (H.R. 6395). Other measures
introduced in the 116th Congress that would authorize certain types of assistance and guide U.S.
policy in the region include the Central America Reform and Enforcement Act (S. 1445), the
Northern Triangle and Border Stabilization Act (H.R. 3524), and the Central American Women
and Children Protection Act (H.R. 2836/S. 1781).
Congress has continued to express concerns about corruption and human rights abuses in the and human rights abuses in the
regionregion remained top congressional concerns. P.L. 116-. P.L. 116-94 and P.L. 116-260 al ocated funding for the94 provides $45 mil ion for offices of attorneys general and other entities and offices of attorneys general and other entities and
activities to combat corruption and impunity in Central America in FY2020activities to combat corruption and impunity in Central America in FY2020. That act also
includes $20 mil ion for combating sexual and gender-based violence in the region, as wel as a
total of $3 mil ion for and FY2021. Both measures also included funding to combat sexual and gender-based violence in the region, and to support the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala the offices of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Guatemala
and Honduras and El Salvador’s National Commission for the Search of Persons Disappeared in and Honduras and El Salvador’s National Commission for the Search of Persons Disappeared in
the the Context of the Armed Conflict. The United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act requires the President to identify and impose visa restrictions on individuals who have undermined democratic institutions or engaged in significant corruption in the region. The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 116-260 directs the State Department to produce a similar list of corrupt officials. The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92, Section 1268) directed DOD to Context of the Armed Conflict. H.R. 7608 would maintain the same funding levels for those
priorities in FY2021. H.Rept. 116-444 would direct the Secretary of State, in consultation with
the Secretary of the Treasury, to report the names of Northern Triangle officials known to have
engaged in corruption and the steps that have been taken to impose sanctions on those
individuals.
Several other legislative measures also include provisions intended to address corruption and
human rights abuses in the Northern Triangle. The FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92) requires DOD to

82 Final allocations have differed slightly from enacted levels, with funding for the strategy totaling approximately $525
million in FY2019 and an estimated $533 million in FY2020.
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enter into an agreement with an independent institution to conduct an analysis of the human rights enter into an agreement with an independent institution to conduct an analysis of the human rights
situation in Honduras. The actsituation in Honduras. The act, in Section 1267, also required also requires DOD to certify, prior to the transfer of any vehicles to DOD to certify, prior to the transfer of any vehicles to
the Guatemalan government, that the government has made a credible commitment to use such the Guatemalan government, that the government has made a credible commitment to use such
equipment only as intended. equipment only as intended. A provision in the House-passed FY2021 NDAA, H.R. 6395, would
extendThe FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283, Section 1299K) extends the certification the certification requirement for assistance for assistance forto Guatemala for another year Guatemala for another year. Other initiatives introduced
in the 116th Congress addressing corruption and human rights include the Guatemala Rule of Law
Accountability Act (H.R. 1630/S. 716) and the Berta Caceres Human Rights in Honduras Act
(H.R. 1945). .
For additional information, see CRS Report R44812, For additional information, see CRS Report R44812, U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
America: Policy Issues for Congress, by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R43616, , by Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R43616, El Salvador:
Background and U.S. Relations, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R42580, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report R42580, Guatemala:
Political and Socioeconomic Conditions and U.S. Relations, by Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS , by Maureen Taft-Morales; CRS
Report RL34027, Report RL34027, Honduras: Background and U.S. Relations, by Peter J. Meyer; and CRS Legal , by Peter J. Meyer; and CRS Legal
Sidebar LSB10402, Sidebar LSB10402, Safe Third Country Agreements with Northern Triangle Countries:
Background and Legal Issues, by Ben Harrington., by Ben Harrington.
Nicaragua
President Daniel Ortega, who President Daniel Ortega, who wil turnturned 75 in November 2020, has been suppressing popular 75 in November 2020, has been suppressing popular
unrest in Nicaragua in a manner reminiscent of Anastasio Somoza, the dictator he helped unrest in Nicaragua in a manner reminiscent of Anastasio Somoza, the dictator he helped
overthrow in 1979 as a leader of the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Ortega overthrow in 1979 as a leader of the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Ortega
served as president from 1985 to 1990, during which time the United States backed right-wing served as president from 1985 to 1990, during which time the United States backed right-wing
insurgents known as insurgents known as contras in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government. In the early in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government. In the early
1990s, 1990s, Nicaragua began to establish democratic governance. Democratic space has narrowed as Nicaragua began to establish democratic governance. Democratic space has narrowed as
the FSLN and Ortega have consolidated control over the country’s institutions, including while the FSLN and Ortega have consolidated control over the country’s institutions, including while
Congressional Research Service 41 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Ortega served as an opposition leader in the legislature from 1990 until 2006. Ortega reclaimed Ortega served as an opposition leader in the legislature from 1990 until 2006. Ortega reclaimed
the presidency in 2007 and has served as president for the past 13 years, becoming increasingly the presidency in 2007 and has served as president for the past 13 years, becoming increasingly
authoritarian. Until recently, for many Nicaraguans, Ortega’s populist social welfare programs authoritarian. Until recently, for many Nicaraguans, Ortega’s populist social welfare programs
that improved their standard of living outweighed his authoritarian tendencies and self-that improved their standard of living outweighed his authoritarian tendencies and self-
enrichment. Similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua enrichment. Similarly, for many in the international community, the relative stability in Nicaragua
outweighed Ortega’s antidemocratic actions. outweighed Ortega’s antidemocratic actions.
Ortega’s long-term strategy to retain control of the government began to unravel in 2018 when Ortega’s long-term strategy to retain control of the government began to unravel in 2018 when
his proposal to reduce social security benefits triggered protests led by a wide range of his proposal to reduce social security benefits triggered protests led by a wide range of
Nicaraguans. The government’s repressive response led to an estimated 325-600 extrajudicial Nicaraguans. The government’s repressive response led to an estimated 325-600 extrajudicial
kil ings, torture, political imprisonment, suppression of the press, and thousands of citizens going kil ings, torture, political imprisonment, suppression of the press, and thousands of citizens going
into exile.into exile.8384 The government says it was defending itself from coup attempts. Such suppression The government says it was defending itself from coup attempts. Such suppression
has continued. The crisis undermined economic growth in the hemisphere’s second poorest has continued. The crisis undermined economic growth in the hemisphere’s second poorest
country, and country, and the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to makeinternational economic sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and hurricane damage made it worse. Nicaragua’s economy it worse. Nicaragua’s economy
contracted by contracted by almost 43.9% in 2019; in % in 2019; in AprilOctober 2020, the IMF 2020, the IMF estimated it would contract by estimated it would contract by 65.5% in % in
2020, 2020, and by 0.5% in 2021, with unemployment nearly with unemployment nearly doubling from 6% to 11%doubling from 6% to 11%.84 from 2019 to 2021.85
The international community has sought to hold the Ortega government accountable for human The international community has sought to hold the Ortega government accountable for human
rights abuses and facilitate the reestablishment of democracy in Nicaragua. An Inter-American rights abuses and facilitate the reestablishment of democracy in Nicaragua. An Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights team concluded in July 2018 that the Nicaraguan security forces’ Commission on Human Rights team concluded in July 2018 that the Nicaraguan security forces’
actions could be considered crimes against humanity. In November 2019, the OAS High Level actions could be considered crimes against humanity. In November 2019, the OAS High Level

83 Organization of American States, Report of the High-Level Commission on Nicaragua of the Organization of
Am erican States, November 19, 2019.
84 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020.
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Commission on Nicaragua concluded that the government’s actions “make the democratic
functioning of the country impossible,” in violation of Nicaragua’s obligations under Article 1 of
the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Many OAS members reportedly are urging that
Nicaragua be suspended from the organization.85 Commission on Nicaragua concluded that the government’s actions “make the democratic functioning of the country impossible,” in violation of Nicaragua’s obligations under Article 1 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Many OAS members reportedly are urging that Nicaragua be suspended from the organization.86 In October 2020, the OAS stated that the Ortega government has repeatedly violated the rule of law, altered constitutional order, and violated human rights.87 The same month, the OAS passed a resolution urging the government to commit to concrete electoral reforms, especial y making the electoral council independent and transparent before convoking general elections or no later than May 2021.88 The Nicaragua Human Rights and The Nicaragua Human Rights and
Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335)Anticorruption Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-335), effectively blocks access to new multilateral lending effectively blocks access to new multilateral lending
to Nicaragua. The Trump Administration has imposed targeted to Nicaragua. The Trump Administration has imposed targeted sanctions against multiple high-sanctions against multiple high-
level officials, including Vice President and First Lady Rosario level officials, including Vice President and First Lady Rosario Muril o, and three of the president’s sons. In Muril o. In March 2020, the 2020, the
Trump Administration imposed sanctions Trump Administration imposed sanctions against the Nicaraguan National against the Nicaraguan National Polic ePolice for its role in for its role in
serious human rights abuses.serious human rights abuses. On July 17, 2020, the Treasury Department sanctioned Juan Carlos
Ortega Muril o, the third son of the president to be sanctioned.
Dialogue between the government and the opposition collapsed in 2019 and has not resumed. Dialogue between the government and the opposition collapsed in 2019 and has not resumed.
Two wings of protest groups united into the National Coalition, hoping to present a unified Two wings of protest groups united into the National Coalition, hoping to present a unified
candidate in candidate in November 2021 general elections. Sandinista-controlled state institutions are likely2021 general elections. Sandinista-controlled state institutions are likely to impede to impede
such efforts, however.
Although Nicaragua announced its first case of COVID-19 on March 18, 2020, as of May 12, the
Sandinista government had maintained the position it established in February, that “Nicaragua has
not and wil not establish any type of quarantine.” Although the Health Ministry reportedly told
hospital directors and health officials in late April to prepare for the pandemic, Nicaragua has not
taken other international y recommended preventive measures against the COVID-19 virus, and
has encouraged large gatherings. Experts and observers are concerned that the government is now
concealing the disease’s spread. While the government reports low numbers (4,668 cases and 141
deaths as of September 2, 2020), health specialists and non-governmental organizations estimate
the number of cases to be much higher, and somesuch efforts, however. The legislature passed a law requiring individuals or groups who receive funding from foreign entities to register as foreign agents, and forbidding them from 84 Organization of American States, Report of the High-Level Commission on Nicaragua of the Organization of Am erican States, November 19, 2019. 85 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. 86 EIU, Nicaragua Country Report, August 2020. 87 OAS, “Statement from the General Secretariat on the Situation in Nicaragua,” press release E-102/20, October 15, 2020. 88 OAS, “ Resolution Restoring Democratic Institutions and Respect for Human Rights in Nicaragua T hrough Free and Fair Elections,” press release S-019/20, October 22, 2020. Congressional Research Service 42 link to page 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress running for public office. As his popularity declined, Ortega was pushing for passage of a bil in December 2020 that opposition groups say is designed to keep them from running for office in the upcoming elections. The bil would make people who cal for sanctions against Nicaragua or take certain other actions ineligible for public office.89 Although Nicaragua announced its first case of COVID-19 on March 18, 2020, as of December 16, the Sandinista government had not established any type of quarantine or taken international y recommended preventive measures against the COVID-19 virus, instead denouncing quarantine and distancing orders as destructive, and encouraging large gatherings. 90 Meanwhile, civil and regional health organizations have cal ed for voluntary quarantines and stricter health measures. Experts and other observers are concerned that the government is concealing the disease’s spread. The government reported just over 6,000 cases and 165 deaths as of the end of 2020,91 but an independent, citizen-run registry reported 10,733 cases and 2,780 deaths as of October 14, 2020, and a news analysis reported in October that the government was hiding over 6,000 corona virus-related deaths.92 Some observers say the government is burying observers say the government is burying
patients suspected of dying of patients suspected of dying of COVID-19 within hours and concealing the cause of death from COVID-19 within hours and concealing the cause of death from
families.families.8693
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress The 116th Congress remains concernedexpressed concern about the erosion of democracy about the erosion of democracy
and human rights abuses in Nicaragua. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. and human rights abuses in Nicaragua. The Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L.
116-94) 116-94) appropriatesappropriated $10 mil ion $10 mil ion for foreign assistance programs to promote democracy and the for foreign assistance programs to promote democracy and the
rule of law in Nicaragua. rule of law in Nicaragua. For FY2021, the Administration has requestedThe Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) and its explanatory statement provides $10 mil ion for $10 mil ion for
democracy and civil society programs in democracy and civil society programs in Nicaragua; the House-passed foreign aid appropriations
measure (Division A of H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-444) would fully the Administration’s requestNicaragua, and provides that various types of funding for Nicaragua may not be obligated or spent except as provided through the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. .
In March 2020, the House approved H.Res. 754, a resolution expressing the sense of the House of In March 2020, the House approved H.Res. 754, a resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that the United States should continue to support the people of Nicaragua in their Representatives that the United States should continue to support the people of Nicaragua in their
peaceful efforts to promote democracy and human rights and to use the tools under U.S. law to peaceful efforts to promote democracy and human rights and to use the tools under U.S. law to
increase political and financial pressure on the Ortega government. In June 2020, the Senate increase political and financial pressure on the Ortega government. In June 2020, the Senate
agreed to a similar resolution, S.Res. 525. In June 2019, the House Western Hemisphere agreed to a similar resolution, S.Res. 525. In June 2019, the House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee held a hearing on the Nicaraguan government’s repression of dissent (see Subcommittee held a hearing on the Nicaraguan government’s repression of dissent (see
Appendix).

85 EIU, Nicaragua Country Report, August 2020.
86 Alfredo Zuniga, “Quick burials in Nicaragua hint at a coronavirus crisis that officials say doesn’t exist,” Associated
Press, May 12, 2020. Nicaragua’s COVID-19 cases are from: South America Argentina Current President Alberto Fernández of the center-left Peronist Frente de Todos (FdT, Front for Al ) ticket won the October 2019 presidential election and was inaugurated to a four-year term in 89 “Daniel Ortega pushes for a law that will prevent the opposition from participating in the 2021 elections,” CE Noticias Financieras, December 20, 2020. 90 Elizabeth Gonzalez, Katie Hopkins, Luisa Horwitz, et al, “T he Coronavirus in Latin America,” AS/COA, December 16, 2020. 91 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine,
Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, September 2, 2020, January 1, 2021, updated dailyupdated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/
data/mortality.
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South America
Argentina
Current President Alberto Fernández of the center-left Peronist Frente de Todos (FdT, Front for
Al ) ticket won the October 2019 presidential election and was inaugurated to a four-year term indata/mortality. 92Elizabeth Gonzalez, Katie Hopkins, Luisa Horwitz, et al, “T he Coronavirus in Latin America,” AS/COA, December 16, 2020. 93 Alfredo Zuniga, “Quick burials in Nicaragua hint at a coronavirus crisis that officials say doesn’t exist,” Associated Press, May 12, 2020. Congressional Research Service 43 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress
December 2019. He defeated incumbent President Mauricio Macri of the center-right December 2019. He defeated incumbent President Mauricio Macri of the center-right Juntos por
el Cambio (JC, Together for Change) coalition by a solid margin of 48.1% to 40.4% but by (JC, Together for Change) coalition by a solid margin of 48.1% to 40.4% but by
significantly less than the 15 to 20 percentage points predicted by polls. The election also significantly less than the 15 to 20 percentage points predicted by polls. The election also
returned to government former leftist Peronist President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-returned to government former leftist Peronist President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-
2015), who ran on the FdT ticket as vice president. 2015), who ran on the FdT ticket as vice president.
Argentina’s economic decline in 2018 and 2019, with high inflation and increasing poverty, was Argentina’s economic decline in 2018 and 2019, with high inflation and increasing poverty, was
the major factor in Macri’s electoral defeat. Macri had ushered in economic policy changes in the major factor in Macri’s electoral defeat. Macri had ushered in economic policy changes in
2016-2017 that lifted currency controls, reduced or eliminated agricultural export taxes, and 2016-2017 that lifted currency controls, reduced or eliminated agricultural export taxes, and
reduced electricity, water, and heating subsidies. In 2018, as the economy faced pressure from a reduced electricity, water, and heating subsidies. In 2018, as the economy faced pressure from a
severe drought and large budget deficits, the IMF supported the government with a $57 bil ion severe drought and large budget deficits, the IMF supported the government with a $57 bil ion
program. Macri’s economic reforms and IMF support were not enough to stem Argentina’s program. Macri’s economic reforms and IMF support were not enough to stem Argentina’s
economic decline, and the government reimposed currency controls and took other measures to economic decline, and the government reimposed currency controls and took other measures to
stabilize the economy. stabilize the economy.
Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Fernández faced an economy in Even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Fernández faced an economy in
crisis, with a recession expected to extend into 2020, high poverty, and a high level of crisis, with a recession expected to extend into 2020, high poverty, and a high level of
unsustainable public debt requiring restructuring. He pledged to restructure Argentina’s debt by unsustainable public debt requiring restructuring. He pledged to restructure Argentina’s debt by
the end of March 2020, and opened talks with bondholders and other creditors, including the IMF. the end of March 2020, and opened talks with bondholders and other creditors, including the IMF.
Fernández also rolled out several measures, including a food program and price controls on basic Fernández also rolled out several measures, including a food program and price controls on basic
goods, aimed at helping low-income Argentines cope with inflation and increased poverty. By goods, aimed at helping low-income Argentines cope with inflation and increased poverty. By
August 2020, the government announced it had reached an agreement with private bondholders August 2020, the government announced it had reached an agreement with private bondholders
for a $66 bil ion restructuring agreementfor a $66 bil ion restructuring agreement, and in November 2020 began and requested negotiations with the IMF negotiations with the IMF to replace its
previous $57 bil ion program.87
The Fernández government’s swift action for a new lending arrangement; the government currently owes $44 bil ion to the IMF under a previous lending arrangement during the Macri government.94 With the economic shutdown because of the pandemic, the IMF initial y forecast in April 2020 an economic contraction of 5.7% in 2020, but in October, revised its forecast to an economic contraction of 11.8%.95 Initial y the Fernández government’s swift action in March 2020 imposing strict quarantine measures to respond to the imposing strict quarantine measures to respond to the
COVID-19 pandemic COVID-19 pandemic in mid-March 2020 appears to have had a significant effect in keeping had a significant effect in keeping
death rates low initial ydeath rates low initial y. However,, but by July by July 2020, the number of , the number of confirmed cases and deaths began cases and deaths began
to increase significantly (almost 9,000 deaths as of September 2, 2020).88 With the economic
shutdown because of the pandemic, the IMF forecast in April 2020 an economic contraction of
5.7% in 2020; in June 2020, the IMF revised its forecast to an economic contraction of 9.9%.89to increase significantly. As of the end of 2020, Argentina recorded over 1.6 mil ion cases, over 43,000 deaths, and a mortality rate over 97 per 100,000 inhabitants, one of the highest in the hemisphere.96
U.S. relations with Argentina were strong under the Macri government, marked by increasing U.S. relations with Argentina were strong under the Macri government, marked by increasing
engagement on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. After Argentina’s 2019 engagement on a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues. After Argentina’s 2019
presidential race, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States looked forward to presidential race, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the United States looked forward to
working with the Fernández administration to promote regional security, prosperity, and the rule working with the Fernández administration to promote regional security, prosperity, and the rule
of law. One point of contention in relations could be Argentina’s stance on Venezuela. Under of law. One point of contention in relations could be Argentina’s stance on Venezuela. Under
Macri, Argentina was strongly critical of the antidemocratic actions of the Maduro Macri, Argentina was strongly critical of the antidemocratic actions of the Maduro regime. government. The The
country joined with other regional countries in 2017 to form the Lima Group seeking a country joined with other regional countries in 2017 to form the Lima Group seeking a

87 “Argentina: Gov’t and Bondholders Reach Agreement,” LatinNews Daily, August 4, 2020; and Patrick Gillespie and
Jorgelina Do Rosario, “Argentina Asks for New IMF Plan to Replace $57 Billion Deal,” Bloomberg, August 26, 2020.
88 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, September 2,
2020, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
89democratic resolution, and in 2019, recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, as the country’s interim president. In contrast, the Fernández government does not recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, although it has not refrained from condemning human rights abuses under the Maduro government. 94 “Argentina: Gov’t and Bondholders Reach Agreement,” LatinNews Daily, August 4, 2020; and “Negotiations with the IMF Get Under Way,” Economist Intelligence Unit, November 23, 2020. 95 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020, and “Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2020, and “Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An
Intensifying Pandemic,” Intensifying Pandemic,” IMF Blog, June 26, 2020. , June 26, 2020.
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democratic resolution, and in 2019, recognized the head of Venezuela’s National Assembly, Juan
Guaidó, as the country’s interim president. In contrast, the Fernández government does not
recognize Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president.
96 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mortality Analyses, January 1, 2021, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. Congressional Research Service 44 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Congressional Action: Argentina has not traditional y received much U.S. foreign aid because of Argentina has not traditional y received much U.S. foreign aid because of
its relatively high per capita income level, but for each of FY2018-FY2020, Congress its relatively high per capita income level, but for each of FY2018-FY2020, Congress has
appropriated $2.5 mil ion in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance to appropriated $2.5 mil ion in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance to
support Argentina’s counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and law enforcement capabilities. support Argentina’s counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and law enforcement capabilities.
Congress has expressed concern over the years about progress in bringing to justice those Congress has expressed concern over the years about progress in bringing to justice those
responsible for the July 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in responsible for the July 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in
Buenos Aires that kil ed 85 people. Both Iran and Hezbollah (the radical Lebanon-based Islamic Buenos Aires that kil ed 85 people. Both Iran and Hezbollah (the radical Lebanon-based Islamic
group) al egedly are linked to the attack, as wel as to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in group) al egedly are linked to the attack, as wel as to the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in
Buenos Aires that kil ed 29 people. As the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing approached in Buenos Aires that kil ed 29 people. As the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing approached in
July 2019, the House approved H.Res. 441, reiterating condemnation of the attack and expressing July 2019, the House approved H.Res. 441, reiterating condemnation of the attack and expressing
strong support for accountability; the Senate followed suit in October 2019 when it approved strong support for accountability; the Senate followed suit in October 2019 when it approved
S.Res. 277. S.Res. 277.
For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10932, For additional information, see CRS In Focus IF10932, Argentina: An Overview, by Mark P. , by Mark P.
Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10991, Sullivan; CRS In Focus IF10991, Argentina’s Economic Crisis and Default, by Rebecca M. , by Rebecca M.
Nelson; and CRS Insight IN11184, Nelson; and CRS Insight IN11184, Argentina’s 2019 Elections, by Mark P. Sullivan and Angel , by Mark P. Sullivan and Angel
Carrasquil o Benoit. Carrasquil o Benoit.
Bolivia
Bolivia experienced relative stability and prosperity from 2006 to 2019, but as governance Bolivia experienced relative stability and prosperity from 2006 to 2019, but as governance
standards weakened, relations with the United States deteriorated under populist President Evo standards weakened, relations with the United States deteriorated under populist President Evo
Morales. Morales was the country’s first indigenous president and leader of the Movement Morales. Morales was the country’s first indigenous president and leader of the Movement
Toward Socialism (MAS) party. Toward Socialism (MAS) party. OnIn November November 10, 2019, President 2019, Morales resigned and went into exile amid nationwide protests against a disputed October first-round election in which he had claimed victory. Luis Arce, Morales’s former finance minister, took office a year later, after winning 55% of the vote in October 2020 elections in which the MAS also maintained a legislative majority. President Arce faces many chal enges, including how to address the COVID-19 pandemic and how to manage relations with the United States. President Arce is an economist who worked in Bolivia’s central bank prior to serving as minister of finance. He has pledged to govern in a conciliatory fashion, but clashes between his government and eastern, opposition-led provinces could stil occur. The findings of an Inter- American Commission on Human Rights investigation into two massacres in 2019 is likely to ignite tensions if former interim government officials are cited for abuses. Intra-party disputes between hardline and moderate MAS factions also could occur, particularly if Morales, recently back from exile, seeks to exert undue influence over the government. With the IMF forecasting an economic decline of 7.9% in 2020, the Arce government has vowed to raise taxes on the wealthy, govern austerely, and renegotiate Bolivia’s debts. U.S.-Bolivian relations are likely to remain chal enging, given tension in relations under Morales and the Trump Administration’s strong support for the conservative interim government. U.S. officials have vowed to work with President Arce on shared interests, but differences over drug policy and geopolitics could prove difficult to overcome. With limited bilateral trade and investment ties, the possibility of a resumption in U.S. foreign assistance c ould encourage cooperation on some issues. In January 2020, President Trump waived restrictions on U.S. assistance to Bolivia.97 USAID provided $5 mil ion supporting the 2020 elections, 200 ventilators and related technical assistance to address COVID-19, and another $926,000 in health and 97 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “ Presidential Determination on Waiving a Restriction on United States Assistance to Bolivia,” presidential memorandum, January 6, 2020. Congressional Research Service 45 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress sanitation support. AsMorales resigned and sought
protection abroad (first in Mexico and then in Argentina) after weeks of protests al eging fraud in
the October 20, 2019, election in which he had sought a fourth term. After three individuals in
line to succeed Morales also resigned, opposition Senator Jeanine Áñez, formerly second vice
president of the senate, declared herself senate president and then interim president on November
12. Bolivia’s constitutional court recognized her succession. In late November, the MAS-led
Congress unanimously approved an electoral law to annul the October elections and select a new
electoral tribunal. On January 3, 2020, the reconstituted tribunal scheduled new presidential and
legislative elections for May 3, 2020, but then postponed them twice due to the COVID-19
pandemic and national quarantine. With protests mounting about the delays, electoral authorities
established October 18, 2020, as the first-round election date.
The situation in Bolivia remains volatile. On January 24, 2020, Interim President Áñez
announced her intention to run in the May presidential election, abandoning her earlier pledge to
preside over a caretaker government focused on convening credible elections. Even before she
announced her candidacy, observers had criticized Áñez for exceeding her mandate by using
excessive force against protesters, reversing several MAS foreign policy positions, and bringing
charges of sedition and terrorism against Morales and other former MAS officials.
The Trump Administration has sought to bolster ties with the Áñez government while expressing
support for “free, fair, transparent, and inclusive elections.”90 U.S. officials have praised the Áñez

90 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Bolivia, “Secretary Pompeo’s Meeting with Bolivian Foreign Minister
Longaric,” readout, January 20, 2020.
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government for expel ing Cuban officials and recognizing Venezuela’s Guaidó government. In
January 2020, President Trump waived restrictions on U.S. assistance to Bolivia.91 USAID has
provided $3 mil ion in support for the upcoming elections, and, as of August 2020, the State of August 2020, the State
Department said it Department said it was providinghad provided at least $900,000 $900,000 to help Bolivia respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. to help Bolivia respond to the COVID-19 pandemic.
U.S. officials have not commented on reports by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
and other institutions on human rights abuses committed by the Áñez government or criticized
that government’s corruption scandals.92
Congressional Action: Members of the 116th Congress Members of the 116th Congress have expressed concerns about the expressed concerns about the
situation in situation in Bolivia in resolutions and letters to the Administration. Bolivia in resolutions and letters to the Administration. The Senate approved S.Res. 35 in April 2019, expressing support for democratic principles in Bolivia and throughout Latin America. S.Res. 447, agreed to in the Senate in January 2020, expressed support for the prompt convening of new elections. The explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriation Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260) states that no assistance was requested and none was provided in the agreement for lethal assistance for Bolivia. Some Members of Congress have congratulated Arce on his victory and expressed hope for improved bilateral relations; others have concerns about the return of a socialist government in Bolivia. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando Seelke; and CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections, by Clare Ribando Seelke. S.Res. 35, approved in April
2019, expressed concern over Morales’s efforts to circumvent term limits in Bolivia and cal ed on
his government to al ow electoral bodies to administer the October 2019 elections in accordance
with international norms. Although some Members condemned the ouster of Morales as a “coup,”
most have focused on ensuring a democratic transition. In January 2020, the Senate agreed by
unanimous consent to S.Res. 447, expressing concerns about election irregularities and violence
in Bolivia, urging the Bolivian government to protect human rights and promptly convene new
elections, and encouraging the U.S. State Department and the OAS to help ensure the integrity of
the electoral process.
For more information, see CRS Insight IN11198, Bolivia: Elections Postponed to October, by
Clare Ribando Seelke and CRS In Focus IF11325, Bolivia: An Overview, by Clare Ribando
Seelke.
Brazil
Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous Occupying almost half of South America, Brazil is the fifth-largest and fifth-most-populous
country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the country in the world. Given its size and tremendous natural resources, Brazil has long had the
potential to become a world power and periodical y has been the focal point of U.S. policy in potential to become a world power and periodical y has been the focal point of U.S. policy in
Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic Latin America. Brazil’s rise to prominence has been hindered, however, by uneven economic
performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased performance and political instability. After a period of strong economic growth and increased
international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has struggled with a international influence during the first decade of the 21st century, Brazil has struggled with a
series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep series of domestic crises in recent years. Since 2014, the country has experienced a deep
recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises recession, record-high homicide rate, and massive corruption scandal. Those combined crises
contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma contributed to the controversial impeachment and removal from office of President Dilma
Rousseff (2011-2016). They also discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for Rousseff (2011-2016). They also discredited much of Brazil’s political class, paving the way for
right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in October 2018. right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro to win the presidency in October 2018.
Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has Since taking office in January 2019, President Bolsonaro has begun to implementimplemented some economic and economic and
regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed regulatory reforms favored by international investors and Brazilian businesses and has proposed
hardline security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-hardline security policies intended to reduce crime and violence. Rather than building a broad-
based coalition to advance his agenda, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized based coalition to advance his agenda, Bolsonaro has sought to keep his political base mobilized
by taking social y conservative stands on cultural issues and verbal y attacking perceived by taking social y conservative stands on cultural issues and verbal y attacking perceived
enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government. enemies, such as the press, nongovernmental organizations, and other branches of government.
This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential al ies within the This confrontational approach to governance has alienated potential al ies within the
conservative-leaning congress and hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious chal enges, such as conservative-leaning congress and hindered Brazil’s ability to address serious chal enges, such as
the COVID-19 pandemic and accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has

91 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “ Presidential Determination on Waiving a Restriction on United States
Assistance to Bolivia,” presidential memorandum, January 6, 2020.
92 U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Human Rights Situation in the Aftermath of the
October 20, 2019 General Elections in Bolivia, August 2020; “ Bolivian Health Minister Held For Suspected
Corruption,” Agence France Presse, May 20, 2020.
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placed additional stress on the country’s already strained democratic institutions. With COVID-19
continuing to spread throughout the country and the economy projected to contract 9.1% in 2020,
Brazilian public opinion toward Bolsonaro remains polarizedthe COVID-19 pandemic and accelerating deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. It also has placed additional stress on the country’s already strained democratic institutions. .
In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved In international affairs, the Bolsonaro Administration has moved awayaw ay from Brazil’s traditional from Brazil’s traditional
commitment to autonomy and toward commitment to autonomy and toward closer alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro alignment with the United States. Bolsonaro has
coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional chal enges, such as the crisis in coordinated closely with the Trump Administration on regional chal enges, such as the crisis in
VenezuelaVenezuela, and frequently supported the Trump Administration within multilateral organizations. . On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro general y has On other matters, such as commercial ties with China, Bolsonaro general y has taken
a adopted a pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil’s major export markets. The pragmatic approach intended to ensure continued access to Brazil’s major export markets. The
Trump Administration Trump Administration has welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-welcomed Bolsonaro’s rapprochement and sought to strengthen U.S.-
Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation Brazilian relations. In 2019, the Trump Administration took steps to bolster bilateral cooperation
on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major non-NATO al y on counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts and designated Brazil as a major non-NATO al y
for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2321k) and the for the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2321k) and the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). The United States and Brazil also have agreed
to lower some agricultural trade barriers and have begun negotiating additional accords on
customs administration, e-commerce rules, Congressional Research Service 46 link to page 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). The United States and Brazil also forged agreements on several trade and investment matters, including a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, concluded in October 2020, intended to foster cooperation on trade facilitation and customs administration, good regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures. regulatory practices, and anti-corruption measures.
Congressional Action: The 116th Congress The 116th Congress has continued long-standing U.S. support for continued long-standing U.S. support for
environmental conservation efforts in Brazil. In September 2019, the House Western Hemisphere environmental conservation efforts in Brazil. In September 2019, the House Western Hemisphere
Subcommittee held an oversight hearing on preserving the Amazon rainforest that focused on the Subcommittee held an oversight hearing on preserving the Amazon rainforest that focused on the
surge of fires and deforestation in the region (sesurge of fires and deforestation in the region (see Appendix). Congress ultimately appropriated . Congress ultimately appropriated
$15 mil ion for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 mil ion to $15 mil ion for foreign assistance programs in the Brazilian Amazon, including $5 mil ion to
address fires in the region, in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94). address fires in the region, in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94).
That amount That amount iswas $4 mil ion $4 mil ion more than Congress appropriated for environmental programs in the more than Congress appropriated for environmental programs in the
Brazilian Amazon in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). The House-passed
FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil (H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-444) would again provide $15
mil ion for conservation efforts in the Brazilian Amazon.
Members of Congress have introduced several other legislative proposals intended to protect the
Brazilian Amazon. A Senate resolution (S.Res. 337) would express concern about fires and il egal
deforestation in the Amazon, cal on the Brazilian government to strengthen environmental
enforcement, and support continued U.S. assistance to the Brazilian government and NGOs. The
Act for the Amazon Act (H.R. 4263) would take a more punitive approach. The act would ban the
importation of certain fossil fuels and agricultural products from Brazil, prohibit certain types of
military-to-military engagement and security assistance to Brazil, and forbid U.S. agencies from
entering into free trade negotiations with Brazil.
Congress also has expressed concerns about the state of democracy andBrazilian Amazon in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6). Congress increased funding for environmental conservation efforts in the Brazilian Amazon to $17 mil ion in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260). Congress also expressed concerns about human rights in Brazil. A human rights in Brazil. A
provision of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92provision of the FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92, Section 1266) directed) directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the with the Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding the human rights climate in Secretary of State, to submit a report to Congress regarding the human rights climate in
Brazil Brazil and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. and U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. A provision in theThe House-passed FY2021 NDAA House-passed FY2021 NDAA
(H.R. 6395) would prohibit(P.L. 116-283) included a provision that would have prohibited the use of any federal funds to provide assistance to Brazilian the use of any federal funds to provide assistance to Brazilian security security
forces to forces to involuntarily relocate indigenous or Quilombola communitiesrelocate indigenous or Quilombola communities. Some Members have
cal ed for more far-reaching changes to U.S.-Brazilian security cooperation. A resolution
introduced in September 2019 expressing profound concerns about threats to human rights, the
rule of law, democracy, and the environment in Brazil (H.Res. 594) would cal for the United
States to rescind Brazil’s designation as a major non-NATO al y and suspend assistance to
Brazilian security forces, among other actions involuntarily. That provision was not included in the final legislation enacted over a presidential veto in January 2021, but the conference report (H.Rept. 116-617) encouraged the Secretary of Defense to further strengthen U.S.-Brazil security relations while ensuring any security assistance provided to Brazil is consistent with human rights and international law, as required by existing U.S. laws and policies. .
For additional information, see CRS Report R46236, For additional information, see CRS Report R46236, Brazil: Background and U.S. Relations, by , by
Peter J. Meyer; Peter J. Meyer; CRS Report R46619, U.S.-Brazil Economic Relations, coordinated by M. Angeles Vil arreal; and CRS In Focus IF11306, and CRS In Focus IF11306, Fire and Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, by , by
Pervaze A. Sheikh et al. Pervaze A. Sheikh et al.
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Colombia
Colombia is a key U.S. al y in Latin America. Because of the country’s prominence in il egal Colombia is a key U.S. al y in Latin America. Because of the country’s prominence in il egal
drug production, the United States and Colombia have forged a close relationship over the past drug production, the United States and Colombia have forged a close relationship over the past
two decades. “Plan Colombia,” a program focused initial y on counternarcotics and later two decades. “Plan Colombia,” a program focused initial y on counternarcotics and later
counterterrorism, laid the foundation for an enduring security partnership. President Juan Manuel counterterrorism, laid the foundation for an enduring security partnership. President Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Santos (2010-2018) made concluding a peace accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC)—the country’s largest leftist guerril a organization at the time—his Colombia (FARC)—the country’s largest leftist guerril a organization at the time—his
government’s primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia’s government’s primary focus. Following four years of formal peace negotiations, Colombia’s
Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-Congress ratified the FARC-government peace accord in November 2016. During a U.N.-
monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 13,200 FARC disarmed, demobilized, monitored demobilization effort in 2017, approximately 13,200 FARC disarmed, demobilized,
and began the process of reintegration. and began the process of reintegration.
Iván Duque, a former senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, won the 2018 Iván Duque, a former senator from the conservative Democratic Center party, won the 2018
presidential election and was inaugurated to a four-year term in August 2018. Duque campaigned presidential election and was inaugurated to a four-year term in August 2018. Duque campaigned
as a critic of the peace accord and quickly suspended peace talks with the National Liberation as a critic of the peace accord and quickly suspended peace talks with the National Liberation
Army (ELN), Colombia’s current largest leftist guerril a group. President Duque’s approval Army (ELN), Colombia’s current largest leftist guerril a group. President Duque’s approval
ratings slipped early in his presidency, and his government faced weeks of protests and strikes in ratings slipped early in his presidency, and his government faced weeks of protests and strikes in
late 2019 focused on several administration policies, including what many Colombians viewed as late 2019 focused on several administration policies, including what many Colombians viewed as
Congressional Research Service 47 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress a lackadaisicala halting approach to peace accord implementation. approach to peace accord implementation.
According to polling in spring of 2020, President Duque’s approval ratings rose from 23% in According to polling in spring of 2020, President Duque’s approval ratings rose from 23% in
February to 52% in April—the highest of his tenure. Although the rise likely was linked to February to 52% in April—the highest of his tenure. Although the rise likely was linked to
Duque’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic, Colombian respondents rated corruption as Duque’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic, Colombian respondents rated corruption as
their top concern, their top concern, fol owedfollowed by by unemployment and the coronavirus.unemployment and the coronavirus.93 98 The Duque administration The Duque administration
took early measures to contain the virus, including a national lockdown beginning took early measures to contain the virus, including a national lockdown beginning in March March 24,
2020, which was fitfully lifted between May and August2020, which was fitfully lifted between May and August 2020. . However, However, by September 2,cases and deaths began to rise after that, and by the end of December 2020, 2020,
Colombia Colombia surpassed 20 reported over 43,000 COVID-19 deaths,000 COVID-19 deaths (40 deaths per 100,000).94.99 As of August As of August 21, 2020, 2020,
the U.S. State Department the U.S. State Department announced reported some $23.6 mil ion in pandemic-related response some $23.6 mil ion in pandemic-related response
assistance, including humanitarian assistance to assistance, including humanitarian assistance to reach Colombia’s most vulnerable populations.reach Colombia’s most vulnerable populations.95100
Along with the global pandemic, Colombia continues to face major chal enges. These include a Along with the global pandemic, Colombia continues to face major chal enges. These include a
spike in coca cultivation and cocaine production; vulnerability to a mass migration of spike in coca cultivation and cocaine production; vulnerability to a mass migration of
Venezuelans fleeing the authoritarian government of MaduroVenezuelans; violence against human rights ; violence against human rights
defenders and social activists, including recent massacres of youth and those leading peace defenders and social activists, including recent massacres of youth and those leading peace
programs; and chal enges enacting the ambitious programs; and chal enges enacting the ambitious peace accord commitments while controlling peace accord commitments while controlling
crime and violence by armed groups.crime and violence by armed groups.
101 In August 2019, a FARC splinter faction announced its return to arms. Neighboring Venezuela In August 2019, a FARC splinter faction announced its return to arms. Neighboring Venezuela
appears to be sheltering and perhaps collaborating with FARC dissidents and ELN guerril a appears to be sheltering and perhaps collaborating with FARC dissidents and ELN guerril a
forces. Some 3,000-4,000 former FARC fighters are estimated to have returned to armed struggle. forces. Some 3,000-4,000 former FARC fighters are estimated to have returned to armed struggle.
The majority of demobilized FARC members remain committed to the peace process, but face numerous risks, with more than 200 former fighters and demobilized FARC kil ed since 2016. In late 2020, some 1.7 mil ion Venezuelans were residing in Colombia, having fled their country. The pandemic, however, has sharply strained the Duque government’s approach to receiving the exodus of such migrants, with some opting to return to Venezuela as a result. In a controversial announcement in December, President Duque said Venezuelan migrants would be excluded from receiving the coronavirus vaccine unless they had either dual nationality or formal migratory status. Health experts and humanitarian groups criticized the announcement.102 Colombia has set records in cocaine production in recent years. In 2019, according to U.S. estimates, the country’s cocaine production reached 951 metric tons of pure cocaine. In 2019, President Duque and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reaffirmed a March 2018 commitment to work together to lower coca crop levels and cocaine production by 50% by 2023.103 President Duque campaigned on resuming forced aerial eradication (or spraying of coca crops) with the herbicide glyphosate, and in late August 2020, he cal ed for a resumption of spraying while 98 “Coronavirus Response Boosts Approval for Colombia’s Duque,” Reuters News, April 30, 2020. 99 Data from the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses, January 1, 2021, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality. 100 U.S. State Department, “Update: T he United States is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” Fact Sheet, August 21, 2020. T he support included 200 ventilators provided by the United States in June 2020. 101 Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, said in a statement on December 15, 2020, that Colombia’s government was not taking sufficient action to prevent “persistent violence across Colombia, ” and safeguard the fundamental rights of its population. 102 Joe Parkin Daniels, “Alarm at Colombia Plan to Exclude Migrants from Coronavirus Vaccine,” The Guardian, December 23, 2020. 103 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to Reduce Cocaine Supply,” Fact Sheet, March 5, 2020. Congressional Research Service 48 link to page 55 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress escalating other means of forced eradication, such as forced manual eradication.104 Critics contend only voluntary eradication coupled with alternative development wil reduce coca cultivation sustainably. For the past two years, Colombia has led a 26-country anti-drug operation cal ed the Orion Campaign that included participation from Mexico, Central and South American nations, some European nations, and the United States. In its most recent Phase VI, the multi-nation effort had the participation of 29 countries and captured more than 90 metric tons of cocaine and destroyed 169 il icit drug laboratories.105 The United States remains Colombia’s top trading partner. In April 2020, Colombia became the third Latin American country-member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the IMF forecast that Colombia’s economy would exceed 3% growth in 2020; in its most recent estimate from October 2020, the IMF is forecasting an economic contraction of 8.2%.106 In The majority of demobilized FARC members remain committed to the peace process, but face
numerous risks, with more than 200 former fighters and demobilized FARC kil ed since 2016.

93 “Coronavirus Response Boosts Approval for Colombia’s Duque,” Reuters News, April 30, 2020.
94 Data from the Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Center, Mor tality Analyses,
September 2, 2020, updated daily at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/mortality.
95 U.S. State Department, “Update: T he United States is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” Fact Sheet,
August 21, 2020. T he support included 200 ventilators provided by the United States in June 2020.
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In February 2020, 1.8 mil ion Venezuelans were residing in Colombia, having fled their homes.
The pandemic, however, has sharply strained the Duque government’s approach to receiving the
exodus of Venezuelan migrants and refugees, with some opting to return to Venezuela as a result.
Senator and former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), credited with bringing the conflict with
Colombia’s insurgencies under control, was ordered into house arrest by the Colombian Supreme
Court during its investigation of witness tampering charges early in August 2020. Later that
month, he was asked to testify in another Supreme Court probe about three massacres that
occurred during the 1990s when he served as a state governor of Antioquia. In a separate
development in August 2020, the Duque government requested the extradition of a Colombian
paramilitary leader who had served a 12-year prison sentence for drug trafficking in the United
States and was wanted in Colombia on charges of crimes against humanity; at the end of August,
press reports indicated the Trump Administration would, pending legal chal enges, move to
deport the paramilitary leader to Colombia.96
Colombia has set records in cocaine production in recent years. In 2019, according to U.S.
estimates, the country’s cocaine production reached 951 metric tons of pure cocaine. In 2019,
President Duque and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reaffirmed a March 2018 commitment to
work together to lower coca crop levels and cocaine production by 50% by 2023.97 President
Duque campaigned on resuming forced aerial eradication (or spraying of coca crops) with the
herbicide glyphosate, and in late August 2020, he cal ed for a resumption of spraying while
escalating other means of forced eradication, such as forced manual eradication.98 Critics contend
only voluntary eradication coupled with alternative development wil reduce coca cultivation
sustainably.
The United States remains Colombia’s top trading partner. In April 2020, Colombia became the
third Latin American country-member of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development. Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, the IMF forecast that Colombia’s economy
would exceed 3% growth in 2020; following the pandemic’s outbreak and a crash in oil prices, a
top Colombian export, the IMF revised its forecast in June 2020 to a contraction of 7.8%.99 In
August 2020, the Trump Administration announced a new United States-Colombia Growth August 2020, the Trump Administration announced a new United States-Colombia Growth
Initiative,Initiative, Colombia Crece, to harness assistance from a variety of U.S. agencies to bring , to harness assistance from a variety of U.S. agencies to bring
investment to Colombia’s rural areas and fight crime through sustainable development and investment to Colombia’s rural areas and fight crime through sustainable development and
growth. According to the U.S. National Security growth. According to the U.S. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien, on an official visit to Adviser Robert O’Brien, on an official visit to
Colombia in August, investment levels wil reach Colombia in August, investment levels wil reach $5 bil ion.$5 bil ion.100107
Congressional Action: U.S. government assistance to Colombia over the past 20 years has U.S. government assistance to Colombia over the past 20 years has
totaled nearly $12 bil ion, with funds appropriated by Congress mainly to the U.S. Departments totaled nearly $12 bil ion, with funds appropriated by Congress mainly to the U.S. Departments
of State and Defense and to USAID.of State and Defense and to USAID.101108 Many Members of Congress have expressed support for Many Members of Congress have expressed support for
Colombia’s continued leadership role to assist in a democratic transition in Venezuela and to Colombia’s continued leadership role to assist in a democratic transition in Venezuela and to

96 Christine Armario, “Colombia Court Calls on Uribe to T estify in Massacre Probe,” Associated Press, August 23,
2020; Joshua Goodman, “Colombia Calls on U.S. to Extradite Warlord over Fears He will Escape Justice,” The
Guardian, August 21, 2020; and Joshua Goodman, “ Sources: U.S. Stops Ex Colombia Warlord’s Deportation to Italy,”
Associated Press, August 31, 2020.
97 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), “ United States and Colombian Officials Set Bilateral Agenda to
Reduce Cocaine Supply,” Fact Sheet, March 5, 2020.
98 Jake Kincaid, “Coca Eradication in Colombia Hits Post -peace-deal High During Coronavirus Pandemic,” Miami
Herald, August 19, 2020.
99 IMF, “Outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean: An Intensifying Pandemic,” IMF Blog, June 26, 2020.
100 White House, “Statement by National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien,” press release, August 17, 2020;
“Colombia y Estados Unidos Lanzan Iniciativa ‘Colombia Crece,’” El Tiempo (Colombia), August 17, 2020.
101“Update: T he United States Is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

respond to the worsening humanitarian crisis. The State Department al ocated more than $400 respond to the worsening humanitarian crisis. The State Department al ocated more than $400
mil ion by late 2019 to support countries receiving Venezuelan migrants, with over half for mil ion by late 2019 to support countries receiving Venezuelan migrants, with over half for
Colombia, as the most severely affected country Colombia, as the most severely affected country. (For more, (also see “Venezuela see “Venezuela.”)” section).
For FY2020, Congress provided $448 mil ion in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, For FY2020, Congress provided $448 mil ion in the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2020 (P.L. 116-94), for State Department- and USAID-funded programs in Colombia. For 2020 (P.L. 116-94), for State Department- and USAID-funded programs in Colombia. For
FY2021, FY2021, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), Congress provided $461.4 mil ion in assistance for Colombia. This was the highest level of bilateral foreign assistance appropriated for Colombia in a decade. A provision in the FY2021 NDAA conference report, H.Rept. 116-617 to P.L. 116-283, requires the Defense Department to report within 120 days after the NDAA’s passage any credible al egations since 2016 of misused intel igence assistance by Colombian intel igence services, steps taken by DOD in response, and what the Colombian government has done to punish those who misused the equipment to surveil civilians, such as journalists, and steps to avoid future misusethe Administration requested $412.9 mil ion for Colombia (about a 9% decline
compared with the FY2020 aid estimate); the House-passed FY2021 foreign aid appropriations
bil , Division A of H.R. 7608 (H.Rept. 116-444), would provide not less than $457.3 mil ion. A
provision in the House-passed FY2021 NDAA (Section 1298 of H.R. 6395) would require a
report on possible misuse of U.S. security sector funds for il egal surveil ance by Colombia’s
armed services and recommendations to prevent such abuse. .
For additional information, see CRS Report R43813, For additional information, see CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
by June S. Beittel; and CRS Report RL34470, by June S. Beittel; and CRS Report RL34470, The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement:
Background and Issues, by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Edward Y. Gracia. , by M. Angeles Vil arreal and Edward Y. Gracia.
104 Jake Kincaid, “Coca Eradication in Colombia Hits Post -peace-deal High During Coronavirus Pandemic,” Miami Herald, August 19, 2020. 105President Iván Duque, “ Declaración del Presidente Iván Duque en la Presentación de Resultados de la Campaña Orión,” at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hjh7t4RFFaU&feature=emb_logo&app=desktop. 106 IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2020. 107 White House, “Statement by National Security Advisor Robert C. O’Brien,” press release, August 17, 2020; “Colombia y Estados Unidos Lanzan Iniciativa ‘Colombia Crece,’” El Tiempo (Colombia), August 17, 2020. 108“Update: T he United States Is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” fact sheet, August 21, 2020. Congressional Research Service 49 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Venezuela
Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United Venezuela remains in a deep crisis under the authoritarian rule of Nicolás Maduro of the United
Socialist Party of VenezuelaSocialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Chávez . Maduro, narrowly elected in 2013 after the death of Hugo Chávez
(president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that most Venezuelans and (president, 1999-2013), began a second term on January 10, 2019, that most Venezuelans and
much of the international community consider il egitimate. Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó, much of the international community consider il egitimate. Since January 2019, Juan Guaidó,
president of Venezuela’s democratical y elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has president of Venezuela’s democratical y elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, has
sought to dislodge Maduro from power so that a transition government can serve until sought to dislodge Maduro from power so that a transition government can serve until
international y observed elections can be held.international y observed elections can be held.
The United States and 57 other countries The United States and 57 other countries recognizehave recognized Guaidó as interim president. Guaidó’s future remains uncertain, however, as a PSUV-dominated National Assembly is to be seated in January 2021 after the party won December 6, 2020 legislative elections boycotted by the opposition, plagued by irregularities, and rejected by the United States, the EU, and most Latin American countries. Despite years of intense international pressure and his mishandling of Venezuela’s economic and humanitarian crisis, Maduro remains entrenched in power. The Maduro government Guaidó as interim president, but he has been
unable to wrest Maduro from power and has faced increased danger since returning from an
international tour in early 2020, during which he met with President Trump. Maduro has used has used
repression to quash dissent; rewarded al iesrepression to quash dissent; rewarded al ies, particularly in the security forces, with income earned from il egal gold mining, drug with income earned from il egal gold mining, drug
trafficking, and other il icit activities; and relied on support from Russia, China, Iran, and others trafficking, and other il icit activities; and relied on support from Russia, China, Iran, and others
to subvert U.S. sanctions. The COVID-19 pandemic, low oil to subvert U.S. sanctions. The COVID-19 pandemic, low oil prices, and gasoline shortages do not prices, and gasoline shortages do not
appear to have weakened Maduro’s grip on power. A botched raid against Maduro in early May
2020 by U.S. mercenaries and former Venezuelan soldiers weakened the Guaidó-led
opposition.102 Maduro is seeking to convene new National Assembly elections in December 2020;
many observers maintain that such a vote wil not meet international standards, and most
opposition parties plan to boycott the vote.
appear to have weakened Maduro’s grip on power. Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages Venezuela’s economy has collapsed. The country is plagued by hyperinflation, severe shortages
of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that has further deteriorated in 2020 of food and medicine, and a dire humanitarian crisis that has further deteriorated in 2020 as a
result because of gasoline shortages, of gasoline shortages, an outbreak of COVID-19, and strengthened U.S. sanctions. Maduro COVID-19, and strengthened U.S. sanctions. Maduro
has blamed U.S. has blamed U.S. sanctions for the economic crisis, but many observers cite economic sanctions for the economic crisis, but many observers cite economic
mismanagement and corruption as the main factors. U.N. agencies estimate that 5.mismanagement and corruption as the main factors. U.N. agencies estimate that 5.14 mil ion mil ion
Venezuelans have fled the Venezuelans have fled the country as of country as of AugustDecember 2020, primarily to neighboring countries. 2020, primarily to neighboring countries.
U.S. Policy. Since recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019, the United States has Since recognizing the Guaidó government in January 2019, the United States has
coordinated its efforts with Interim President Guaidó. U.S. strategy has emphasized diplomatic coordinated its efforts with Interim President Guaidó. U.S. strategy has emphasized diplomatic
efforts to bolster support for Guaidó; targeted sanctions and visa revocations to increase pressure efforts to bolster support for Guaidó; targeted sanctions and visa revocations to increase pressure
on Maduro officials; broader sanctions on the state oil company, other state-controlled companies on Maduro officials; broader sanctions on the state oil company, other state-controlled companies

102 Patrick J. McDonnell, Mery Mogollan, “Maduro Buoyed, Guaidó Reeling After Failed Amphibious Raid in
Venezuela,” Los Angeles Tim es, May 10, 2020.
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and institutions, and the government; and humanitarian aid ($and institutions, and the government; and humanitarian aid ($534 mil1 bil ion to countries sheltering ion to countries sheltering
Venezuelans and Venezuelans and $76 mil ion forfor aid inside Venezuela Venezuela from FY2017 through May 2020). As of August 21,
2020, the State Department had announced $13.7 mil ion in COVID-related humanitarian aid to
Venezuela.103 from FY2017-FY2020). U.S. agencies have separately provided $43.7 mil ion in COVID-related aid efforts in Venezuela.109 In October 2019, the USAID signed an agreement with the Guaidó government In October 2019, the USAID signed an agreement with the Guaidó government
enabling the provision of development assistance, health assistance, and increased democracy enabling the provision of development assistance, health assistance, and increased democracy
assistance. In 2020, the Administration has sanctioned companies that have transported assistance. In 2020, the Administration has sanctioned companies that have transported
Venezuelan oilVenezuelan oil and a Chinese technology company that has aided the Maduro government and seized Venezuela-bound ships carrying Iranian and seized Venezuela-bound ships carrying Iranian petroleum products in petroleum products in
violation of sanctions. U.S. officials have vowed to keep “maximum violation of sanctions. U.S. officials have vowed to keep “maximum pressure” on Maduro and his pressure” on Maduro and his
foreign backers until he agrees to al ow a transition government to convene free and fair
legislative and presidential electionsforeign backers. .
Congressional Action: Congress has supported the Administration’s efforts to support a Congress has supported the Administration’s efforts to support a
restoration of democracy in Venezuela without U.S. military intervention in the country and to restoration of democracy in Venezuela without U.S. military intervention in the country and to
provide humanitarian support to Venezuelans, although some Members have expressed concerns provide humanitarian support to Venezuelans, although some Members have expressed concerns
about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, about the humanitarian impact of sanctions. In December 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94,
which appropriated $30 mil ion in FY2020 assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela and which appropriated $30 mil ion in FY2020 assistance for democracy programs in Venezuela and
incorporated the Senate-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive bil to incorporated the Senate-reported version of the VERDAD Act (S. 1025), a comprehensive bil to
address the crisis in Venezuela. The VERDAD Act incorporated House-passed measures address the crisis in Venezuela. The VERDAD Act incorporated House-passed measures
authorizing FY2020 humanitarian aid to Venezuela (H.R. 854), restricting the export of defense authorizing FY2020 humanitarian aid to Venezuela (H.R. 854), restricting the export of defense
109 USAID, “Venezuela Regional Crisis- Complex Emergency,” FY2021 Fact Sheet #1, December 16, 2020. Congressional Research Service 50 link to page 58 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress articles to Venezuela (H.R. 920), and requiring a U.S. strategy to counter Russian influence in articles to Venezuela (H.R. 920), and requiring a U.S. strategy to counter Russian influence in
Venezuela (H.R. 1477). In Venezuela (H.R. 1477). In December 2019, Congress also enacted P.L. 116-92, whichthe FY2020 NDAA (P.L. 116-92, Section 890), enacted in December 2019, Congress prohibited prohibited
federal contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro government. In July 2019, the federal contracting with persons who do business with the Maduro government. In July 2019, the
House passed H.R. 549, designating Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected House passed H.R. 549, designating Venezuela as a beneficiary country for temporary protected
status; however, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549 by unanimous status; however, a Senate effort to pass H.R. 549 by unanimous consent failed. consent failed.
For FY2021, the Administration requested $200 mil ion in democracy aid aimed to support a For FY2021, the Administration requested $200 mil ion in democracy aid aimed to support a
democratic transition in Venezuela and $5 mil ion in global health assistancedemocratic transition in Venezuela and $5 mil ion in global health assistance; the House-passed
version of the FY2021 foreign aid appropriations bil (Division A of H.R. 7608, H.Rept. 116-444)
would provide $30 in democracy aid for Venezuela and would support the provision of additional
aid if a democratic transition occurs. The House-passed version of. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, (P.L. 116-260) provides not less than $33 mil ion in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for democracy programs in Venezuela and an unspecified amount of humanitarian support for countries sheltering Venezuelan refugees. H.Rept. 116-617 accompanying the FY2021 the FY2021 NDAA (P.L. 116-283) requires a briefing for certain House and Senate Committees on the contents of the report required by P.L. 116-94, as wel an update on the political, economic, health, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and the implications for United States national securityNDAA (H.R.
6395, H.Rept. 116-442) would require a report on the crises in Venezuela and their impacts on
U.S. and regional security. House and Senate committees and regional security. House and Senate committees have heldheld several hearings on the hearings on the situation in situation in
Venezuela and U.S. policy (seVenezuela and U.S. policy (see Appendix).
For additional information, see CRS Report R44841, For additional information, see CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, ,
coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10230, coordinated by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and
U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Insight IN11306, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Insight IN11306, U.S. Indictment of Top Venezuelan
Officials, by Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10715, , by Clare Ribando Seelke and Liana W. Rosen; CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela:
Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF11216, , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS In Focus IF11216, Venezuela:
International Efforts to Resolve the Political Crisis, by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report , by Clare Ribando Seelke; CRS Report
R46213, R46213, Oil Market Effects from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Iran, Russia, Venezuela, by Phil ip , by Phil ip
Brown; and CRS In Focus IF11029, Brown; and CRS In Focus IF11029, The Venezuela Regional Humanitarian Crisis and COVID-
19, by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke. , by Rhoda Margesson and Clare Ribando Seelke.
Outlook
Even before the arrival of Even before the arrival of the COVID-19COVID-19 pandemic, the Latin American and Caribbean region , the Latin American and Caribbean region was facing was facing
significant politicalsignificant political and economic chal enges—most prominently, Venezuela’s and economic chal enges—most prominently, Venezuela’s ongoing political impasse and economic and humanitarian crisis. The pandemic multiplied the region’s chal enges and negatively affected its future economic prospects. Instead of registering low economic growth rates, as original y forecast, the region is experiencing a deep recession, with mil ions of people expected to become impoverished. While some economic growth is expected to resume in 2021, there are concerns that the region’s recovery wil be slow, lagging behind the global economic recovery, and could jeopardize the economic and social progress that the region made over the past two decades. At the end of 2020, the pandemic continued to surge in the region, and there were few indications that the region would be able to rollout vaccines rapidly or otherwise alter its trajectory. Amid this difficult environment, the incoming administration of President-elect Joe Biden and the 117th Congress wil face numerous chal enges in U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. During the campaign, Biden indicated that he would take a very different approach in his policy toward the region. He vowed “to rebuild strong hemispheric ties based on respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law” when the United States hosts the next Summit of the Americas in 2021 (expected late in the year).110 He promised to “do away with the Trump 110 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “T he Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to Meet Congressional Research Service 51 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress Administration’s draconian immigration policies and galvanize international action to address the poverty and insecurity driving migrants” from Central America’s Northern Triangle, including the development of a four-year, $4 bil ion regional strategy for the region.111 On Cuba, Biden maintained that he would reverse Trump Administration policies, which he maintains “have inflicted harm on the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights.”112 One of the most vexing chal enges for the new Administration wil be the political crisis in Venezuela and the associated regional humanitarian crisis of Venezuelan migrants. As a candidate, Biden said that “the overriding goal in Venezuela must be to press for a democratic outcome through free and fair elections, and to help the Venezuela people rebuild their country.” These potential policy shifts and other efforts to address chal enges discussed in this report may be subjects of debate, legislation, and oversight in the 117th Congress. the Challenges of the 21st Century,” at https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/. 111 Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign website, “T he Biden Plan to Build Security and Prosperity with the People of Central America,” at https://joebiden.com/centralamerica/. 112 “Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, March 2, 2020 (updated October 29, 2020), at https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/. ongoing political

103 U.S. Department of State, “ Update: T he United States Is Continuing to Lead the Response to COVID-19,” August
21, 2020.
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Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress

impasse and economic and humanitarian crisis—which has resulted in over 5.1 mil ion
Venezuelan refugees and migrants. The pandemic has multiplied the region’s chal enges and
negatively affected its future economic prospects. Instead of registering low economic growth
levels, as original forecast, the region is forecast to experience a deep recession, with mil ions of
people moving into poverty. The pandemic continues to surge in several countries in the region.
Human rights groups and other observers have expressed concerns about leaders taking advantage
of the pandemic to advance their own agendas. Forthcoming presidential elections in Bolivia,
postponed twice in 2020 and now scheduled for October 18, 2020, could be an important test of
the country’s political system in the aftermath of President Morales’s October 2019. Social
protests racked many Latin American countries in late 2019, and such unrest could reemerge in
2020, given that many of the underlying conditions that prompted the protests stil exist or have
been exacerbated by the poor economic conditions brought about by the pandemic.
As the 116th Congress winds down, these chal enges and the appropriate U.S. policy responses
may remain oversight issues for Congress. Final congressional action awaits on FY2021 foreign
aid appropriations and the FY2021 NDAA; House-passed bil s for both measures include
numerous provisions on U.S. assistance and policy toward the region.

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Appendix. Hearings in the 116th Congress
Table A-1. Congressional Hearings in the 116th Congress on Latin America
and the Caribbean
Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title
Senate Armed Services Committee Senate Armed Services Committee
February 7, 2019 February 7, 2019
United States Africa Command and United United States Africa Command and United
States Southern Command States Southern Command
House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee
February 13, 2019 February 13, 2019
Venezuela at a Crossroads Venezuela at a Crossroads
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 26, 2019 February 26, 2019
Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in Made by Maduro: The Humanitarian Crisis in
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses Venezuela and U.S. Policy Responses
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
March 7, 2019 March 7, 2019
U.S.-Venezuela Relations and the Path to a U.S.-Venezuela Relations and the Path to a
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Democratic Transition Democratic Transition
Transitional Crime, Civilian Security, Transitional Crime, Civilian Security,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women’s Issues Women’s Issues
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
March 13, 2019 March 13, 2019
Hearing on H.R. 1004, Prohibiting Hearing on H.R. 1004, Prohibiting
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela Unauthorized Military Action in Venezuela
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Act Act
House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 13, 2019 New Government, Ongoing Agenda: Human Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Rights, Corruption, and Accountability in El Salvador House Foreign Affairs Committee, ,
March 26, 2019 March 26, 2019
Understanding Odebrecht: Lessons for Understanding Odebrecht: Lessons for
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Combatting Corruption in the Americas Combatting Corruption in the Americas
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee
April 10, 2019 April 10, 2019
The Importance of U.S. Assistance to Central The Importance of U.S. Assistance to Central
America America
House Armed Services Committee House Armed Services Committee
May 1, 2019 May 1, 2019
National Security Chal enges and U.S. Military National Security Chal enges and U.S. Military
Activity in North and South America Activity in North and South America
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
May 9, 2019 May 9, 2019
Dol ar Diplomacy or Debt Trap? Examining Dol ar Diplomacy or Debt Trap? Examining
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
China’s Role in the Western Hemisphere China’s Role in the Western Hemisphere
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
June 11, 2019 June 11, 2019
Crushing Dissent: The Ongoing Crisis in Crushing Dissent: The Ongoing Crisis in
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Nicaragua Nicaragua
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Armed Services Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee,
July 9, 2019 July 9, 2019
Implementation of the National Defense Implementation of the National Defense
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Strategy in the United States Strategy in the United States CommandSouthern
Capabilities Capabilities
Southern Command Area of Responsibility Command Area of Responsibility
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 11, 2019 July 11, 2019
Human Rights in Cuba: Beyond the Veneer of Human Rights in Cuba: Beyond the Veneer of
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Reform Reform
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
September 10, 2019 September 10, 2019
Preserving the Amazon: A Shared Moral Preserving the Amazon: A Shared Moral
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Imperative Imperative
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
September 18, 2019 September 18, 2019
U.S.-Colombia Relations: New Opportunities U.S.-Colombia Relations: New Opportunities
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
to Reinforce and Strengthen Our Bilateral to Reinforce and Strengthen Our Bilateral
Transitional Crime, Civilian Security, Transitional Crime, Civilian Security,
Relationship Relationship
Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women’s Issues Women’s Issues
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
September 25, 2019
U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America:
Ensuring Effective Policies to Address the
Crisis at the Border
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Committee and Subcommittee
Date
Title Senate Foreign Relations Committee September 25, 2019 U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America: Ensuring Effective Policies to Address the Crisis at the Border
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
October 23, 2019 October 23, 2019
The Trump Administration’s FY2020 Budget The Trump Administration’s FY2020 Budget
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
and U.S. Policy Toward Latin and U.S. Policy Toward Latin AmericanAmerica and and
the Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
the Caribbean Caribbean
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
December 10, 2019 December 10, 2019
Haiti on the Brink: Assessing U.S. Policy Haiti on the Brink: Assessing U.S. Policy
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Toward a Country in Crisis Toward a Country in Crisis
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House Foreign Affairs Committee House Foreign Affairs Committee, December 11, 2019 Human Rights and Corruption in Honduras Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission House Foreign Affairs Committee, ,
January 15, 2020 January 15, 2020
Strengthening Security and the Rule of Law in Strengthening Security and the Rule of Law in
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Mexico Mexico
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Senate Armed Services Committee Senate Armed Services Committee
January 30, 2020 January 30, 2020
United States Africa Command and United United States Africa Command and United
States Southern Command States Southern Command
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
February 13, 2020 February 13, 2020
Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico Assessing U.S. Security Assistance to Mexico
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
House House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 4, 2020 Human Rights in Haiti: Ideas for Next Steps Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission House Armed Services Committee Armed Services Committee
March 11, 2020 March 11, 2020
National Security Chal enges and U.S. Military National Security Chal enges and U.S. Military
Activity in North and South America Activity in North and South America
House Foreign Affairs Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee,
July 01, 2020 July 01, 2020
The Trump Administration’s Response to The Trump Administration’s Response to
Subcommittee on the Western Subcommittee on the Western
COVID-19 in Latin America and the COVID-19 in Latin America and the
Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade Hemisphere, Civilian Security, and Trade
Caribbean. Caribbean.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senate Foreign Relations Committee
August 04, 2020 August 04, 2020
Venezuela in Maduro’s Grasp: Assessing the Venezuela in Maduro’s Grasp: Assessing the
Deteriorating Security and Humanitarian Deteriorating Security and Humanitarian
Situation Situation
House Foreign Affairs Committee, October 1, 2020 Enforced Disappearance in Latin America: Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Taking Stock House Foreign Affairs Committee, November 20, 2020 The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Americas House Foreign Affairs Committee December 3, 2020 The Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission: Charting a New Path Forward Source: CRS, prepared by Nese F. DeBruyne, Senior Research Librarian. CRS, prepared by Nese F. DeBruyne, Senior Research Librarian.
Notes: See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/See also hearing information at House Foreign Affairs Committee at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/
hearings; Senate Foreign Relations Committee at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings. hearings; Senate Foreign Relations Committee at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings.


Congressional Research Service 54 Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy and Issues in the 116th Congress
Author Information

Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator Mark P. Sullivan, Coordinator
Clare Ribando Seelke Clare Ribando Seelke
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs


June S. Beittel June S. Beittel
Maureen Taft-Morales Maureen Taft-Morales
Analyst in Latin American Affairs Analyst in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs


Peter J. Meyer Peter J. Meyer
M. Angeles Villarreal M. Angeles Villarreal
Specialist in Latin American Affairs Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Specialist in International Trade and Finance Specialist in International Trade and Finance



Acknowledgments
Nese F. DeBruyne, former CRS Senior Research Librarian (now retired), prepared the appendix of hearings Nese F. DeBruyne, former CRS Senior Research Librarian (now retired), prepared the appendix of hearings
in this report. in this report.
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Disclaimer
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