Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

January 9, 2020 – April 8, 2021 R46175

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy
April 8, 2021
Kosovo, a country in the Western Balkans with a predominantly Albanian-speaking population,
declared independence from Serbia in 2008, less than a decade after a brief but lethal war. It has
Sarah E. Garding
since been recognized by about 100 countries. The United States and most European Union (EU)
Analyst in European Affairs
member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia, China, and various other countries (including

five EU member states) do not.

Key issues for Kosovo include the following:
 New Leadership. Following several years of political turmoil, early parliamentary elections in February
2021 delivered a landslide victory to the left-leaning Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje). Party leader
and longtime opposition figure Albin Kurti became prime minister on March 22, 2021, just one year after
his first short-lived government collapsed. Kosovo’s parliament elected Vetëvendosje-backed candidate
Vjosa Osmani as president on April 4, 2021.
 Dialogue with Serbia. The unresolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is one of the main threats to
regional stability in the Western Balkans. Since 2011, the EU has facilitated a dialogue aimed at
normalizing their relations. In July 2020, Kosovo and Serbia returned to EU-led talks after a 20-month
suspension. Shortly thereafter, the two parties agreed to new measures on economic cooperation at talks
hosted by the White House. Prime Minister Albin Kurti has indicated that the dialogue with Serbia will be a
low priority under his government. Nevertheless, he is likely to face considerable U.S. and EU pressure to
participate in EU-led talks and work toward a comprehensive final agreement with Serbia.
 Corruption and Rule-of-Law Challenges. Corruption and weak rule of law are long-standing challenges
in Kosovo. The consecutive victories of Vetëvendosje in snap elections in October 2019 and February 2021
were fueled in part by widespread voter anger over the status quo; Vetëvendosje has long railed against
corruption and was outside of national government prior to 2020. The Kurti government’s agenda of
combating corruption and state capture aligns with long-standing U.S. and EU priorities for Kosovo.
 Relations with the United States. Kosovo regards the United States as a key ally and security guarantor.
Kosovo receives the largest share of U.S. foreign assistance to the Balkans, and the two countries cooperate
on numerous security issues. The United States is the largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR), which has helped to maintain security in Kosovo since 1999. Although successive U.S.
Administrations have strongly supported the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the former
Trump Administration played a more direct role in facilitating negotiations between the two parties. At the
same time, some expressed concern over the Trump Administration’s reportedly strong pressure on Kosovo
and weak coordination with the EU. The Biden Administration has pledged support for the EU-led
dialogue, called for greater transatlantic cooperation on the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, and urged Kosovo and
Serbia to work toward a final, comprehensive settlement.
Congress was actively involved in debates over the U.S. response to a 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo and subsequently
supported Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Today, many Members of Congress continue to support Kosovo through
country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding levels averaging around $50 million
per year since 2015.

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Overview
The Republic of Kosovo is a landlocked country in the
Kosovo at a Glance
Western Balkans (see Figure 1). Ethnic Albanians
Capital: Pristina
comprise about 90% of Kosovo’s population, and Serbs
Population: 1.82 mil ion (2019 est.)
and other minority groups comprise about 10%. Kosovo
Ethnic Groups: Albanian (92.9%),
declared independence from Serbia in 2008, nearly a
Bosniak (1.6%), Serb (1.5%)
decade after the end of a brief but lethal conflict between Languages: Albanian (94.5%), Bosnian
Serbian forces and a Kosovo Albanian insurgency led by
(1.7%), Serbian (1.6%), Turkish (1.1%)
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Since 2008,
Religions: Muslim (95.6%), Catholic
Kosovo has been recognized by more than 100
(2.2%), Orthodox Christian (1.5%)
countries. The United States and most European Union
Leadership: Prime Minister Albin Kurti;
(EU) member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia,
President Vjosa Osmani; Assembly Speaker
China, and various other countries (including some EU
Glauk Konjufca
member states) do not. The United States has strongly
Sources: CIA World Factbook; International
Monetary Fund; 2011 Kosovo Census.
supported Kosovo’s state-building and development
Note: Figures for ethnic Serbs, Serbian
efforts, as wel as an EU-led dialogue aimed at
language, and Orthodox Christians is likely
normalizing Kosovo and Serbia’s relations. Kosovo
closer to 5%-10%. Kosovo Serbs largely
boycotted the 2011 census.
general y regards the United States as a security
guarantor and key al y.
Congress has maintained interest in Kosovo for many decades—from concerns over Serbia’s
treatment of ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslavia to the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998-
1999 after Yugoslavia disintegrated. Many Members were active in debates over the U.S.- and
NATO-led military intervention in the conflict. After Serbian forces withdrew in 1999, many
Members backed Kosovo’s independence. Today, many in Congress continue to support Kosovo
through country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding
levels averaging around $50 mil ion in recent years.
Looking ahead, Members may consider and assess U.S. policy regarding the Kosovo-Serbia
dialogue, transitional justice processes, efforts to strengthen the rule of law, and regional security.
Domestic Issues
Kosovo’s political scene has been volatile over the past few years, with three government
transitions and two snap parliamentary elections since late 2019. During the same period, some of
the country’s most prominent political figures were indicted on war crimes charges and resigned
from their positions. More broadly, mounting public anger over corruption and economic
conditions has fueled a major shift in Kosovo’s politics. Early parliamentary elections in February
2021 delivered a major victory to the Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje), a left-leaning
movement-turned-party that campaigned on these issues.
Key issues in Kosovo’s domestic affairs include managing relations with the country’s ethnic
Serb minority, particularly in northern Kosovo, and improving economic and living conditions,
including through mitigating the public health and economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
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Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

Politics
Kosovo is a parliamentary democracy with a prime minister, who serves as head of government,
and an indirectly elected president, who serves as head of state. The unicameral National
Assembly has 120 seats, of which 10 are reserved for Serbs and 10 are reserved for other
minorities. Longtime Vetëvendosje leader Albin Kurti became prime minister for the second time
on March 22, 2021, just one year after his first short-lived government collapsed. The National
Assembly elected Vetëvendosje-backed candidate Vjosa Osmani as president on April 4, 2021.
Figure 1. Republic of Kosovo

Source: Congressional Research Service.
Prior to 2020, Kosovo’s political system was largely dominated by several parties that governed
in varying coalition configurations. The center-right Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),
Kosovo’s oldest party, has roots in nonviolent resistance to Serbian rule during the 1990s. The
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), LDK’s main rival, grew out of the armed KLA resistance.
PDK and several other parties led by KLA veterans sometimes are referred to as the war wing.
Although many in Kosovo credit these established parties with resisting Serbian rule and helping
to bring about independence, critics assert the parties also became entrenched in state institutions
and bear considerable responsibility for Kosovo’s corruption chal enges.1
More recently, political power has shifted from these parties to reform-oriented political parties.
Vetëvendosje entered into national government for the first time in February 2020 after narrowly
winning parliamentary elections in October 2019. Albin Kurti became prime minister; however,
the party’s coalition partner, LDK, triggered a no-confidence motion less than two months later.
Analysts attributed the government collapse to political infighting and divisions over how to
respond to U.S. pressure to unconditional y lift tariffs against Serbia and return to negotiations
(the prior government’s imposition of tariffs in 2018 effectively froze the talks).2

1 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Kosovo
Political Econom y and Analysis, Final Report, December 2017.
2 Albin Kurti opposed unconditionally lifting tariffs, whereas the Democratic League of Kosovo’s (LDK’s) leader
expressed concern that not doing so could damage relations with the United States. Fatos Bytyci, “ Kosovo Coalition
Partner to File No-Confidence Vote in Government,” Reuters, March 18, 2020; Shaun Walker, “ Kosovan Acting PM
Accuses T rump Envoy of Meddling,” Guardian, April 20, 2020.
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LDK’s Avdullah Hoti formed a new coalition government in June 2020, and Vetëvendosje
returned to opposition. The Hoti government lifted tariffs against Serbia, returned to the EU-led
dialogue, and participated in talks with Serbia’s leader at the White House in September 2020
(see “U.S.-Kosovo Relations,” below). In December 2020, however, the Constitutional Court
invalidated the Hoti government and ordered early parliamentary elections.3
2021 Snap Parliamentary Election and Outlook
Kosovo held parliamentary elections (the country’s fifth since independence) on February 14,
2021 (see Table 1). Polls conducted during 2020 indicated a spike in support for Vetëvendosje
after it was sidelined from government and high approval ratings for then-Parliamentary Speaker
and Acting President Vjosa Osmani, who spoke out against LDK’s no-confidence motion and
subsequently left LDK. Vetëvendosje partnered with Osmani for the election, proposing Kurti for
prime minister and Osmani for president. Kurti described the election as a referendum on “justice
and jobs, against state capture and corruption.”4
As anticipated by polls, the joint Vetëvendosje-Osmani ticket won decisively, with nearly 50% of
votes—the largest vote share in Kosovo’s modern election history and nearly double
Vetëvendosje’s 2019 share. Analysts regard the results as a sharp voter rebuke of the status quo
and of established parties. PDK placed second, with 17% of the vote, and LDK placed third, with
13%. As in recent elections, Serbian List (Srpska Lista) won al 10 seats reserved for Serbs.
The election results appear to accelerate a shift in power from the KLA veterans who led the
country for most of the past two decades to a younger generation. In addition, women won nearly
40% of seats to the new parliament—a record figure in Kosovo. Exit polls indicate that youth and
female voters in particular helped to deliver the victory to Vetëvendosje/Osmani.5 Although
buoyed by its strong results, Vetëvendosje faces high voter expectations for swift change—
potential y beyond what the party can realistical y be expected to deliver.6
In a departure from Kosovo’s often unstable coalition governments and periodic intra-executive
tensions, Vetëvendosje and its al ies now hold the key positions in national politics, and the party
governs without other major parties.7 With the support of 67 out of 120 MPs, the National
Assembly voted in the Kurti government on March 22, 2021. The National Assembly elected
Vetëvendosje-backed candidate Vjosa Osmani as president on April 4, 2021; she is the second
woman to serve as president.
Prime Minister Kurti has outlined an agenda focused on domestic issues, particularly generating
jobs and combating corruption. Kurti asserts that the dialogue with Serbia is a relatively low
priority, although his government likely wil face strong U.S. and EU pressure to participate in
negotiations and to refrain from revisiting existing agreements reached through the dialogue. The
public health and economic impacts of COVID-19 also loom large. As of April 8, 2021, Kosovo

3 T he Constitutional Court ruled that parliament’s June 2020 confirmation of the Avdullah Hoti government, which
passed by just one vote, was illegitimate because a member of parliament who voted for it had been convicted of a
criminal offense within the preceding three years and thus was ineligible to have a parliamentary mandate under
Kosovo election law.
4 Quoted in Al Jazeera, “Kosovo’s Left -Wing Opposition Party Sees Landslide Win,” February 15, 2021.
5 Kosovo has a 30% gender quota for candidate lists and allocation of seats in parliament. Andrew Higgins, “In a Land
Dominated by Ex-Rebels, Kosovo Women Find Power at the Ballot Box,” New York Tim es, March 6, 2021.
6 Una Hajdari, “Ousted Ex-PM Wins Historic Victory in Kosovo Election,” Politico.eu, February 15, 2021 ; Engjellushe
Morina, “Kosovo Snap Elections: A Chance for Action,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2021 .
7 As is required under Kosovo’s constitution, several cabinet ministers are from minority communities.
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has had 95,015 confirmed cases and 1,956 reported deaths from COVID-19. Vaccine rollout in
Kosovo has lagged. On March 28, 2021, the country received its first instal ment of 24,000
vaccine doses through the COVAX facility. Prime Minister Kurti has raised alarm over the public
health situation in Kosovo, including vaccine shortages, and urged “support and solidarity,
especial y from the United States and the EU.”8 As discussed below, the pandemic has erased
some of Kosovo’s recent economic gains in reducing unemployment and poverty rates.
Table 1. Early Parliamentary Election Results, October 2019 and February 2021
Party
2019 Vote (%)
2021 Vote (%)
2021 Seats
Self-Determination (Vetevëndosje)
26.3
49.95
58
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)
21.2
16.9
19
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)
24.6
12.7
15
Serbian List (SL)
6.4
5.1
10
Al iance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)
11.5
7
8
Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA)
5.0
2.7
0
Other
5.0
5.7
10
Total
100%
100%
120
Source: Republic of Kosovo Electoral Commission.
Vetëvendosje: From Protest Movement to Governing Party
Left-leaning Vetëvendosje grew out of a 2000s-era protest movement that channeled popular frustration with
corruption. The movement-turned-party also railed against aspects of the postwar administration of Kosovo,
accusing international missions of failing to establish the rule of law despite their vast powers. Vetëvendosje
steadily built support across election cycles but remained in opposition at the national level until 2020.
While in opposition, Vetëvendosje’s platform and tactics sometimes caused friction with Kosovo’s al ies. U.S. and
European officials reportedly were wary of its position on certain issues, including its more hard-line stance on
negotiations with Serbia and statements of support for eventual unification with Kosovo’s neighbor and close al y,
Albania. (Unification does not appear likely to become a serious proposal or a priority under current conditions,
not least due to U.S. and EU objections.9) U.S. and European officials criticized Vetëvendosje’s (and some other
parties’) use of obstructionist tactics—including release of tear gas—to block legislative proceedings and try to
subvert agreements with Montenegro and Serbia that were viewed as important to regional reconciliation.
Yet Vetëvendosje appears to have moderated its tactics and improved relations with Kosovo’s al ies as it moved
closer to government. After its early 2021 parliamentary victory, U.S. and European officials were quick to
congratulate the party and express support for continued cooperation. Like most Kosovo parties, Vetëvendosje
has underscored the importance of Kosovo’s relationship with the United States. The party’s focus on fighting
corruption and organized crime appears to align with U.S. and EU priorities for Kosovo.
Sources: Aidan Hehir, “Wil There Be a Political Earthquake Fol owing Kosovo Elections?,” Balkans in
Europe Policy Advisory Group, February 13, 2021; Eraldin Fazliu and Jack Butcher, “Tear Gas, Eggs, and
Protests,” Kosovo 2.0, October 22, 2015; Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo.

8 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center; EuroNews, “Kosovo Receives First COVID-19 Vaccines
T hrough COVAX Programme,” March 29, 2021. T he COVAX system is a platform developed by global health
organizations to deliver COVID-19 vaccines in an equitable manner.
9 Some observers contend that politicians sometimes use pan-Albanian statements to mobilize domestic political
support or strategically exert pressure on international allies opposed to any such measure. Kosovo’s constitution states
that Kosovo “shall seek no union” with any other state (Article 1). See discussions in Blerta Begisholli, “Kosovo and
Albania Agree to Run Joint Foreign Policy,” BalkanInsight, July 3, 2019; Agon Maliqi, “What a New Poll Reveals
About Albania-Kosovo Relations,” Sbunker.net, November 27, 2019.
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Democracy and the Rule of Law
Analysts have been largely positive in their assessments of Kosovo’s democratic development
since 2008. Kosovo’s political scene is fragmented yet dynamic, and the country’s elections are
general y free, fair, and competitive. Kosovo’s active media and civil society sectors are open to a
variety of viewpoints, although they are somewhat reliant upon international donor support.10
Kosovo’s postwar state-building was undertaken with significant international input, and the
country’s institutions and legislation largely reflect contemporary best-practice guidelines.
Nevertheless, corruption, organized crime, and weak rule of law are enduring chal enges. Weak
implementation of legislation and political interference in the criminal justice system have
enabled widespread malfeasance, according to anti-corruption watchdogs. Only a smal share of
high-level corruption investigations and prosecutions result in final convictions.11 Many in
Kosovo attribute endemic corruption to the parties that circulated in government for most of the
past two decades. Some critics also charge that U.N. and EU missions in Kosovo, which had far-
reaching powers in the country’s judiciary until 2018, failed to improve the situation.12
Kosovo Serbs and Northern Kosovo
An estimated 120,000 Serbs live in Kosovo, primarily in semi-isolated rural areas and in urban
North Mitrovica.13 Integrating this population into Kosovo’s institutions has been an enduring
state-building chal enge and a source of friction between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo accorded
various forms of representation and protection to Kosovo Serbs and other minority groups in its
2008 constitution and related legislation.14 These provisions established a municipal level of
governance with specific areas of responsibility (most Serbs live in municipalities where they
form a majority). In addition, the constitution requires Serb representation in parliament, the
executive, and other institutions. Consent from minority members of parliament is mandatory on
some votes, and Serbian is an official language. Nevertheless, some observers question the
effectiveness of these measures in integrating Serbs.15 Autonomy measures for Kosovo Serbs are
a contentious issue in the ongoing EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (see “EU-Led
Dialogue to Normalize Relations,” below).
More than half of Kosovo Serbs live in several municipalities in central and southeastern Kosovo,
where they comprise a majority. These municipalities are largely integrated into Kosovo’s
institutions, although wartime legacies of distrust and fear persist. The situation in northern
Kosovo has been a more serious chal enge. About 40% of Kosovo Serbs live in four Serb-
majority municipalities along the border with Serbia (see map in Figure 1). Pristina has been

10 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo; Engjellushe Morina, “Kosovo Snap Election: A Chance for
Action,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2021.
11 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kosovo; European Commission,
Kosovo Progress Report 2020.
12 Aida Cama, “EU Ends Kosovo Rule-of-Law Mission amid Criticism over Results,” DeutscheWelle, June 14, 2018.
13 On population estimates, see T im Judah, “Kosovo’s Demographic Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar.” BalkanInsight,
November 7, 2019; Florian Bieber, “T he Serbs of Kosovo,” in Sabrina Ramet et al., eds., Civic and Uncivic Values in
Kosovo (Central European University Press, 2015), pp. 175-197. Hereinafter, Bieber, “ Serbs of Kosovo.”
14 Florian Bieber, “Power Sharing and Democracy in Southeast Europe,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, (Special Issue
2013); Ilire Agimi, “Governance Challenges to Interethnic Relations in Kosovo,” in Mehmeti and Radeljić, eds.,
Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016),
pp. 85-105. Hereinafter, Agimi, “ Governance Challenges.”
15 See discussion in Agimi, “Governance Challenges.”
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unable to exert full authority in this region, whereas Serbia has retained strong influence there
despite the withdrawal of Serbian forces in 1999.
After the war, Kosovo Serbs in the north continued to rely on Serbian-supported parallel
structures for security, health care, education, jobs, welfare, and other services. Some of these
structures have been dismantled, but Serbia continues to wield influence through others. Many
Kosovo Serbs depend on Serbia for employment and public services.16 This fragmented authority
has enabled northern Kosovo to become a regional hub for smuggling and other il icit activities
undertaken by organized crime groups.17
Serbian List party (Srpska Lista, SL), which is backed by the Serbian government, has
overwhelmingly won Serb votes in Kosovo’s recent elections and has been in some of Kosovo’s
governing coalitions. There have been reports of harassment and intimidation against rival
Kosovo Serb politicians and an overal shrinking space for opposition to SL. The 2018 murder of
prominent opposition figure Oliver Ivanović raised questions about the power structures and
vested interests that prevail in northern Kosovo.18 In the February 2021 parliamentary elections,
SL won al 10 seats reserved for Serbs. Kosovo officials assert that SL sought to influence
elections for some of the 10 other non-Serb minority seats and expand its clout in parliament.19
Economy
The 1998-1999 war with Serbia caused extensive damage to Kosovo’s infrastructure and
economy. Two decades later, economic recovery continues. Employment is a particularly
chal enging policy issue; Kosovo’s average 40% labor force participation rate is the lowest in the
Western Balkans. The pre-COVID 19 unemployment rate stood at about 26% in 2019, with
disproportionately higher levels among working-age females and youth.20
Kosovo has a smal , open economy. Gross domestic product (GDP) steadily grew during the
2010s, with growth rates of 3.8% in 2018 and 4.2% in 2019. Services, agriculture, mining, and
construction are key sectors.21 Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kosovo in 2019 was €272
mil ion (about $329 mil ion), the lowest figure in the Western Balkans. By contrast, remittances
received from citizens abroad totaled €852 mil ion (about $1 bil ion) in 2019, equivalent to more

16 Bieber, “Serbs of Kosovo”; OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Parallel Structures in Kosovo, October 2003; International
Crisis Group (ICG), Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, January 25, 2021 (hereinafter, ICG, Relaunching the
Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue); U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices for 2019: Kosovo;
Eraldin Fazliu and Jack Robinson, “ Srpska Lista Facing Little Opposition in Upcoming Elections,” PrishtinaInsight,
January 20, 2021.
17 See, for example, Global Initiative Against T ransnational Organized Crime, Hotspots of Organized Crime in the
Western Balkans, May 2019; Marko Prelec, “ North Kosovo Meltdown,” ICG, September 6, 2011; European
Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2020.
18 Ibid. European External Action Service, “Well-Administered and T ransparent Elections Affected by an Uneven
Playing Field, and Marred by Intimidation and Lack of Competition in the Kosovo Serb Areas,” October 8, 2019;
“Ivanovic Named Radoicic as North Kosovo Dark Ruler,” BalkanInsight, February 27, 2018.
19 “Vjosa Osmani: Vucic Interfered Directly in Kosovo’s Elections,” PrishtinaInsight, February 26, 2021.
20 World Bank, Fighting COVID-19; World Bank, Western Balkans Regular Economic Report: Rising Uncertainties:
Fall 2019. Labor force participation rate reflects the share of working-age persons employed or actively seeking work.
21 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, October 2020 (hereafter, WEO Outlook
Database, October 2020); U.S. Department of Commerce, Kosovo Country Com m ercial Guide, 2020; Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Unleashing the Transform ation Potential for Growth in the Western
Balkans, 2019.
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than 15% of GDP. Kosovo’s large diaspora also makes significant contributions to the country’s
economy through tourism, entrepreneurship, and investment.22
The International Monetary Fund estimates Kosovo’s GDP contracted by 7.5% in 2020 due to
COVID-19.23 The pandemic also erased Kosovo’s recent gains in employment and poverty
reduction. The World Bank assesses that the government’s policy responses helped mitigate some
of these adverse trends, however.24
Kosovo’s key trade partners are the EU and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans.
Kosovo has largely liberalized trade with both blocs through its Stabilization and Association
Agreement with the EU (a cooperation framework that includes steps to liberalize trade) and as a
signatory to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU
Balkan countries.25 Kosovo’s top exports are metals; plastic and rubber products; mineral
products; and prepared foods, beverages, and tobacco.26 In 2019, goods exports totaled about
€384 mil ion ($465.3 mil ion), of which the largest shares went to CEFTA countries and the EU.
In lobbying for greater FDI, Kosovo officials tout the country’s young workforce (the median age
in Kosovo is 29; in the EU, the median age is 44), natural resources, low corporate tax rate, use of
the euro as its currency, and preferential access to the EU market. However, various impediments
to investment remain, including corruption, weak rule of law, uncertainty over Kosovo’s
unresolved dispute with Serbia, and energy-supply disruptions. Economic conditions and
perceived limits to upward socioeconomic mobility contribute to high rates of emigration.27
Relations with Serbia28
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 with U.S. diplomatic support. Serbia does not
recognize Kosovo and relies on Russia in particular for diplomatic backing. Many analysts
believe the lack of normalized relations between Kosovo and Serbia impedes both countries’
prosperity and progress toward EU membership and imperils Western Balkan stability. Relations
between the two countries remain fraught. According to the nongovernmental organization
International Crisis Group, there is a “low but persistent risk of returning to deadly conflict” in
Kosovo, with northern Kosovo in particular a “potential flashpoint for violence.”29 Since 2011,
the EU has overseen a dialogue aimed at normalizing Kosovo and Serbia’s relations. Despite
some recent progress, a comprehensive final settlement appears unlikely in the near term.

22 Lyra Hadri, “Increasing Diaspora Investments in Kosovo,” PrishtinaInsight, November 5, 2018. T he main source
countries for remittances in 2019 were Germany (41%), Switzerland (20%), and the United States (7%). See Central
Bank of Kosovo, Annual Report 2019. GDP share data from World Bank, Personal Rem ittances, Received (% of
GDP)-Kosovo. Many remittances flow outside of reported channels, making it difficult to estimate actual levels.
23 WEO Outlook Database, October 2020; World Bank, Western Balkans Regular Economic Report: An Uncertain
Recovery: Fall 2020 (hereinafter, World Bank, An Uncertain Recovery).
24 World Bank, An Uncertain Recovery.
25 CEFT A countries include Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
26 European Commission, “European Union, T rade in Goods with Kosovo,” February 1, 2020; Central Bank of
Kosovo, Annual Report 2019. 2019 figures for exports to the EU include the United Kingdom.
27 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Investment Climate Statements: Kosovo; T im Judah, “Kosovo’s Demographic
Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar,” BalkanInsight, November 7, 2019.
28 For simplification, this report uses Serbia to refer to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003) and the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006); Serbia was the dominant entity in both states.
29 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.
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War and Independence
Following centuries of Ottoman rule, Kosovo became part of Serbia in the early 20th century.
After World War II, it became a province of Serbia, one of Yugoslavia’s six republics. While
some Serbian perspectives view Kosovo’s incorporation as the return of historical territory that is
prominent in Serbian national identity narratives, Kosovo Albanians largely view it as an
annexation that resulted in the marginalization of the Albanian-majority population.30
During the 1980s, Kosovo Albanians grew increasingly mobilized against Serbian rule. In 1989,
Serbia—then led by autocrat Slobodan Milošević, who leveraged Serbian nationalism to
consolidate power—imposed direct rule in Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, amid Yugoslavia’s
violent breakup and Milošević’s continued grip on power in Serbia, human rights groups
condemned Serbian repression of Albanians in Kosovo, including suppressing Albanian language
and culture, mass arrests, and purges of Albanians from the public sector and education
institutions.31 In the late 1990s, the Albanian-led Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched an
insurgency against Serbian rule. Serbia responded with heavy force in 1998 and 1999.
Following a NATO air campaign against Serbian targets in early 1999, Serbia agreed to cease
hostilities and withdraw its forces from Kosovo. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244
authorized the U.N. Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) to provide transitional civil
administration and the NATO-led KFOR mission to provide security (both missions stil operate
on a smal er scale). Milošević lost power in 2000 amid mass protests in Serbia.
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 followed protracted and ultimately unsuccessful efforts on the
part of the international community to broker a settlement with Serbia. Serbia chal enged
Kosovo’s actions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); however, the ICJ’s 2010
advisory opinion found that Kosovo had not contravened international law.
EU-Led Dialogue to Normalize Relations
Following the ICJ ruling, the two parties agreed in 2011 to participate in an EU-led dialogue
aimed at eventual normalization of relations.32 Kosovo and Serbia’s goal of EU membership has
helped to incentivize their participation in the dialogue; the EU maintains that neither country can
join until they normalize relations. Kosovo’s participation in the dialogue also is motivated by its
desire to clear a path to U.N. and NATO membership.
The EU-led talks initial y focused on technical measures to enable the cross-border movement of
goods and people and otherwise improve the quality of life. The EU hoped that beginning with
practical measures would build trust between the parties and lay the groundwork for more
sensitive issues. In 2012, the dialogue was elevated to a political level, bringing together leaders
from the two countries. In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo reached the First Agreement of Principles
Governing the Normalization of Relations (the Brussels Agreement), which included measures to
dismantle Serbian-backed paral el structures in northern Kosovo and create an Association of
Serb Municipalities (ASM) linking Kosovo’s 10 Serb-majority municipalities. Further talks in
2015 led to additional agreements on the ASM, telecommunications, and other issues. To date, the
dialogue has produced 33 agreements. Implementation has progressed in some areas, such as

30 See Leandrit I. Mehmeti and Branislav Radeljić, “Introduction” in Mehmeti and Radeljić, eds., Kosovo and Serbia:
Contested Options and Shared Consequences (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), pp. 3 -13.
31 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), HRW World Report 1990-Yugoslavia, January 1, 1991.
32 For background, see ICG, Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion, 2010.
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Kosovo Serb electoral participation and integrating law enforcement and the judiciary in the north
into statewide institutions. Other agreements, such as the ASM, have not been implemented.33
Although the dialogue format does not predetermine a specific outcome, the EU has urged a
comprehensive, legal y binding agreement between the parties. Two particularly thorny issues in
any such agreement are (1) what the outcome of normalization would entail (whether Serbia
would fully recognize Kosovo or accept Kosovo’s institutions and U.N. membership without
formal recognition) and (2) how to address northern Kosovo in a final settlement. On the latter
issue, U.S. and EU officials have mostly rejected local (primarily Serbian) leaders’ occasional
hints at partition as a potential solution, fearing it would set a dangerous precedent in the Western
Balkans.34 Alternatively, some consider expanded autonomy for Kosovo Serbs, such as the ASM,
to be a compromise that would preserve Kosovo’s territorial integrity. The ASM agreement’s
implementation has faced legal hurdles in Kosovo, however, and some Kosovo officials fear that
enhanced autonomy could give Serbia greater leverage in Kosovo.35 As a third scenario, some
have posited that an offer of accelerated EU membership and/or financial assistance could bring
about normalization of relations.36
Since late 2015, there has been little progress in reaching new agreements or implementing
existing measures. Further, a shift in focus absorbed some of the dialogue’s energies. In 2018,
then-President Thaçi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić raised the prospect of partition as a
settlement. To the surprise of some, Trump Administration officials broke with long-standing U.S.
opposition to redrawing borders by signaling wil ingness to consider such a proposal if Kosovo
and Serbia were to reach a mutual y satisfactory agreement.37 Shortly thereafter, the dialogue
came to a halt when Kosovo imposed tariffs on Serbian goods in retaliation for Serbia’s campaign
to undermine Kosovo’s international legitimacy. Under U.S. and EU pressure, Kosovo lifted the
measures in June 2020, and EU-led talks resumed in July. EU Special Representative Miroslav
Lajčák has facilitated recent talks on missing persons, property issues, financial claims, and
implementation of the ASM; the latter in particular remains a fraught issue.38
Dialogue Outlook
The EU-led dialogue has been operating for more than a decade. Many analysts view a final,
comprehensive agreement as unlikely in the near term yet caution that the status quo cannot hold
indefinitely. Politicians in Kosovo and Serbia appear to have done relatively little to prepare the
public to accept compromise. The International Crisis Group describes a seeming impasse:
“[Serbia] has one big concession to make—recognition—which is also [Kosovo’s] main goal ...
Yet Kosovo has not explained what it is prepared to offer in exchange and Serbia’s aims are
nebulous; [Serbian President] Vučić typical y says his country must get ‘something’ in return ...

33 Donika Emini and Isidora Stakic, Belgrade and Pristina: Lost in Normalisation?, EU Institute for Security Studies,
April 2018; BIRN, Big Deal: Lost in Stagnation, April 2015; Marta Szpala, Serbia-Kosovo Negotiations: Playing for
Tim e Under Pressure from the West, Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), August 21, 2018 .
34 Analysts believe such a scenario might entail transferring Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo to Serbia,
possibly in exchange for Albanian-majority areas of Serbia’s Preševo Valley.
35 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue; Balkans Policy Research Group, Scenarios for the ‘Grand Finale’
Between Kosovo and Serbia, 2018; ICG, Kosovo and Serbia After the ICJ Opinion, 2010.
36 Given signs of “enlargement fatigue” in some EU member states, as well as EU concern over Serbia’s compliance
with core EU membership requirements, it is unclear whether the EU would be in a position to extend such an offer.
37 RFE/RL, “Bolton Says U.S. Won’t Oppose Kosovo-Serbia Land Swap Deal,” August 24, 2018.
38 European Western Balkans, “T he Fifth Round of Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue at the Expert Level Was Held T oday in
Brussels,” October 29, 2020.
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but offers no details.” With the November 2020 resignation of then-President Thaçi, who largely
had led Kosovo’s participation in the dialogue since 2011, Kosovo may lack “a prominent
proponent for a negotiated settlement.”39 Many in Kosovo, including key politicians, contend the
country should not have to concede anything to Serbia.40
Political divisions in Kosovo have made it difficult for the country to bring a unified position to
negotiations. Kosovo’s spring 2021 leadership changes could bring greater internal cohesion and
coordination but also could bring a more hard-line approach to relations with Serbia. While in
opposition, Vetëvendosje criticized the dialogue, protested against some of its agreements, and
cal ed for wartime reparations from Serbia. Ahead of spring 2021 elections, Vetëvendosje leader
(now Prime Minister) Kurti stated that the dialogue would be a relatively low priority and
proposed revisiting some of the agreements that have already been reached.41 President Osmani
has voiced support for the dialogue but cal s for “remorse and an apology from Serbia and ...
justice for those who have suffered from [Serbian] crimes.”42 Both leaders are likely to face
considerable EU and U.S. pressure to participate in the dialogue and work toward a
comprehensive final settlement.
Separately, some observers caution that growing uncertainty over the Western Balkan countries’
EU membership prospects could alter the incentive structure weaving together the dialogue and
the accession process, making normalization more chal enging.
Transitional Justice
Transitional justice relating to the 1998-1999 war is a sensitive, emotional y charged issue in
Kosovo and Serbia and a source of friction in efforts to normalize relations. Serbian police,
soldiers, and paramilitary forces were accused of systematic, intentional human rights violations
during the conflict. About 13,000 people were kil ed, and nearly half of the population was
forcibly driven out of Kosovo. An estimated 20,000 people were victims of conflict-related sexual
violence. The vast majority of al victims were ethnic Albanians. On a smal er scale, some KLA
fighters—particularly at the local level—carried out retributive acts of violence against Serb
civilians, other minority civilians, and Albanian civilians whom they viewed as collaborators.43
Before closing in 2017, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
tried several high-profile cases relating to the Kosovo conflict, including those of deposed
Serbian leader Milošević, who died before his trial finished, and former Kosovo Prime Minister
Ramush Haradinaj, who was twice acquitted of charges relating to his role as a KLA commander.
Courts in Kosovo and Serbia now handle most war crimes cases. Weak law enforcement and
judicial cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia is an impediment in the many cases in which
evidence, witnesses, victims, and al eged perpetrators are no longer in Kosovo.44 Critics assert

39 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.
40 Marko Subotic, “Kurti’s Comments Spark Pessimism in Belgrade over Kosovo -Serbia T alks,” EuroNews, February
18, 2021.
41 Valon Fana, “Kurti Urges for Discussion on Reparations in Kosovo -Serbia Dialogue,” PrishtinaInsight, October 28,
2019; Marko Savkovic, “ How Does Kurti See the Dialogue?,” European Western Balkans, February 11, 2021.
42 Quoted in Reuters, “Kosovo Parliament Elects Vjosa Osmani as New National President,” April 4, 2021.
43 For further information, see HRW, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 2001 (hereinafter, HRW, Under Orders);
Amnesty International, “Wounds That Burn Our Souls”: Com pensation for Kosovo’s Wartim e Rape Survivors, But Still
No Justice, 2017; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: The
Hum an Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission , 1999.
44 On current challenges in transitional justice, see Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020; Humanitarian Law
Centre (Belgrade), Regional Judicial Cooperation in the Prosecution of War Crim es: Analysis and Im provem ent
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that low political wil in Serbia in particular hampers transitional justice. Officials from
successive post-Milošević Serbian governments have been criticized for downplaying or failing
to acknowledge Serbia’s role in the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in the 1990s and for
fostering a climate that is hostile to transitional justice and societal reconciliation with the past.45
Transitional justice processes concerning the KLA are controversial in Kosovo. Under U.S. and
EU pressure, in 2015 the National Assembly adopted a constitutional amendment and legislation
to create the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. These institutions
are part of Kosovo’s judicial system but are primarily staffed by international jurists and located
in The Hague, Netherlands, to al ay concerns over witness intimidation and political pressure.
They are to investigate the findings of a 2011 Council of Europe report concerning al egations of
war crimes committed by some KLA units. The Specialist Chambers is controversial in Kosovo,
because it is to try only al eged KLA crimes. In 2017, lawmakers from the then-governing
coalition moved to abrogate the Specialist Chambers but backed down after the United States and
al ies warned that doing so would have “severe negative consequences.”46
Over the past two years, the Special Chambers has begun issuing summons for questioning to
former KLA combatants and filing indictments against prominent former officials who were KLA
commanders.47 The highest-profile case is that of former President and Prime Minister Hashim
Thaçi, a towering figure in Kosovo’s push for independence and its politics for more than two
decades. Along with three high-profile codefendants, Thaçi’s charges include six counts of crimes
against humanity and four counts of war crimes.48 While many in Kosovo criticized the actions of
the Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, EU and U.S. officials reiterated
support for the courts and lauded Kosovo officials’ cooperation with the bodies.49
Relations with the EU and NATO
The EU and NATO have played key roles in Kosovo; these relationships continue to evolve
alongside Kosovo’s state-building processes.
European Union
The EU has played a significant role in Kosovo’s postwar development. As discussed above, the
EU has facilitated a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia since 2011. The EU provides the largest
amount of foreign assistance to Kosovo; it al ocated €602 mil ion (about $717 mil ion) in
assistance from 2014 to 2020.50 Many member states also provide bilateral aid to Kosovo through
their national foreign assistance programs.

Recom m endations, December 2018.
45 On Serbia, see Milica Stojanovic, “Serbia: A Year of Denying War Crimes,” BalkanInsight, December 26, 2019;
HRW, Under Orders; Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), Report on War Crim es Trials in Serbia, 2019; and
relevant sections in European Commission, Serbia Progress Report 2020.
46 U.S. Embassy in Kosovo, “Quint Member States Statement,” January 4, 2018.
47 Serbeze Haxhiaj, “Kosovo: War Commanders Questioned as Prosecutors Step Up Probes,” BalkanInsight, December
27, 2019; Dean Pineles, “ American Dilemma: What if Kosovo’s T haci Is Indicted?” BalkanInsight, January 24, 2019.
48 Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Hashim T haçi et al. (Case number KSC-BC-2020-06).
49 U.S. Embassy Pristina, “Statement from the Heads of Mission,” September 18, 2020; European External Action
Service, “Kosovo: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Latest Developments,” November 5, 2020.
50 European Commission, “Kosovo—Financial Assistance Under IPA II.”
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A European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) was launched in 2008 to assume some of the
policing, justice, and customs functions that UNMIK had carried out since 1999. The mission’s
broad mandate has decreased over time as domestic institutions assume more responsibilities.
Assessments of EULEX’s results under its initial mandate are mixed.51 Today, EULEX’s primary
role is to monitor and advise on rule-of-law issues, with some executive functions. EULEX’s
Formed Police Unit continues to play a role in internal security as second responder in a three-
level system (the domestic Kosovo Police is first responder). 52
Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU membership and signed a Stabilization and Association
Agreement with the EU in 2014.53 Public opinion polls indicate that Kosovo has one of the most
pro-EU populations in the Western Balkans. The next steps in Kosovo’s EU membership bid are
obtaining candidate status and launching accession negotiations, which would commence the
lengthy process of harmonizing domestic legislation with that of the EU. Kosovo’s EU
membership bid is complicated by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize it.54
Kosovo’s more immediate goal in its relationship with the EU is to obtain for its citizens visa-free
entry into the EU’s Schengen area of free movement, which al ows individuals to travel without
passport checks between most European countries. Kosovo is the only Western Balkan country
that does not have this status, despite EU officials’ assessment that it fulfil ed key requirements in
2018.55 Some observers contend that the EU’s continued denial of visa liberalization to Kosovo
has undercut the bloc’s credibility and influence in the country.
NATO
The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was launched in 1999 as a peace-support operation with a
mandate under UNSC Resolution 1244. KFOR’s initial objectives were to prevent renewed
violence and establish public safety and security. Early on, NATO deployed additional troops to
aid KFOR on several occasions amid interethnic violence and destabilizing incidents. In response
to an improving security situation, in 2009, NATO defense ministers resolved to shift KFOR’s
posture toward a deterrent presence. Some of KFOR’s functions have been transferred to the
Kosovo Police. KFOR’s current role is to maintain safety and security, support free movement of
citizens, and facilitate Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Many analysts assert that KFOR
continues to play an important role in both internal and regional security.56
The United States is the largest contributor to KFOR, providing about 660 of the 3,500 troops
deployed as of February 2021.57 KFOR is headquartered in in Pristina (Camp Film City) and has
two regional commands: one based in southeastern Kosovo (Camp Bondsteel) and the other in the

51 Some have criticized EULEX’s limited track record in cases concerning war crimes, high -level corruption, and
organized crime during the decade when EULEX had broad powers in Kosovo’s judiciary . See Naim Rashiti, Ten
Years After EULEX: Key Principles for Future EU Flagship Initiatives on the Rule of Law, Centre for European Policy
(Brussels), May 2019; T oby Vogel, “Auditors Say EU Mission in Kosovo Ineffective,” Politico.eu, October 30, 2012.
52 EULEX, “About EULEX;” UNMIK, “Rule of Law in Kosovo and the Mandate of UNMIK.”
53 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2020. T he Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into
force in 2016.
54 T he five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, a nd Spain.
55 Kosovo fulfilled a key requirement, the ratification of a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro, in 2018.
European Commission, “Visa Liberalisation: Commission Confirms Kosovo Fulfils All Required Benchmarks,” July
18, 2018; Die Morina, “ Kosovo’s EU Visa Liberalisation Hopes Dwindle in 2019,” BalkanInsight, January 16, 2019.
56 “Is KFOR Still Guaranteeing Stability and Security in Kosovo?” European Western Balkans, December 17, 2018.
57 Ibid; NAT O, “KFOR: Key Facts and Figures,” February 2021.
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west (Camp Vil agio Italia). Any changes to the size of the mission would require approval from
the North Atlantic Council and would be “dictated by continued positive conditions on the
ground.”58
KFOR has played a key role in developing the lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and
bringing it to full operational capacity. KSF’s current role is largely nonmilitary in nature and is
focused instead on emergency response. A recurring issue is how KSF may transform into a
regular army. In December 2018, Kosovo lawmakers amended legislation to gradual y transform
KSF by increasing its size and expanding its competencies to include territorial defense.59 Serbian
officials strongly objected, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg cal ed the measure “ill
timed” amid rising Kosovo-Serbia tensions. The United States expressed support for the Kosovo
government’s decision but urged officials to ensure a gradual, inclusive transformation.60
U.S.-Kosovo Relations
The United States enjoys broad popularity in Kosovo due to its support during the Milošević era,
leadership of NATO’s 1999 intervention in the Kosovo war, backing of Kosovo’s independence
in 2008, and subsequent diplomatic support for Kosovo. Kosovo regards the United States as a
security guarantor and critical al y, and many believe the United States has significant influence
in Kosovo’s domestic policymaking and politics.
Support for Normalization of Kosovo-Serbia Relations
Successive U.S. Administrations have supported EU-led efforts to normalize Kosovo and Serbia’s
relations, while general y avoiding a formal U.S. role in the dialogue format (in part due to
expectations that Russia could seek a similar role).61 Many analysts contend that U.S. and EU
policy regarding the dispute is more effective when coordinated.62 Because of the close U.S.-
Kosovo relationship, some observers view the United States as uniquely positioned to help
Kosovo’s political class overcome divisions on the dialogue.63
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. officials played a more direct role in Kosovo-Serbia
negotiations, asserting that normalization of the two countries’ relations was a strategic priority.64
U.S. policy initial y focused on bringing Kosovo and Serbia back to negotiations (the process had
halted in late 2018) and subsequently focused on directly facilitating talks.65 In early 2020, U.S.
officials announced two new Kosovo-Serbia agreements on transportation links. In September
2020, shortly after the EU-led dialogue resumed, then-Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President
Vučić met at the White House to sign separate agreements largely aimed at normalizing economic

58 NAT O, “T he Evolution of NAT O’s Role in Kosovo,” November 19, 2019.
59 “Kosovo Votes to T urn Security Force into Army,” BalkanInsight, December 14, 2018.
60 RFE/RL, “NAT O Chief Warns Kosovo over ‘Ill-T imed’ Army Plans,” December 5, 2018; “Statement from U.S.
Embassy Pristina,” December 14, 2018.
61 Filip Rudic, “Serbia Seeks Russian Role in Kosovo T alks,” BalkanInsight, December 20, 2017.
62 Florian Bieber, Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory
Group, August 2019; Majda Ruge, Trum p’s Kosovo Show: No Big Deal, European Council on Foreign Relations,
September 10, 2020 (hereafter, Ruge, Trum p’s Kosovo Show).
63 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.
64 U.S. Embassy in Pristina, “Special Representative for the Western Balkans Matthew Palmer,” November 1, 2019.
See also “T rump Gave Grenell Full Mandate to Clinch a Quick Deal on Kosovo,” Bloomberg, October 9, 2019.
65 Julija Simic, “U.S. Envoy T ells Serbia, Kosovo to Make Concessions, Cooperate,” Euractiv, January 24, 2020.
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link to page 18 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

relations. Among other measures, the two parties pledged to work on cross-border infrastructure
projects with support from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Through a
side agreement, the United States also facilitated Kosovo and Israel’s mutual diplomatic
recognition (formalized on February 1, 2021), and Kosovo agreed to locate its embassy in
Jerusalem. The aforementioned initiatives were brokered outside of the EU-led dialogue
framework, and U.S. officials reportedly did not fully consult with EU officials in advance.66
The Trump Administration hailed the new measures as a breakthrough in Kosovo and Serbia’s
relations. Many observers welcomed greater U.S. involvement in normalization talks, and some
assessed that it helped spur the EU to redouble its efforts in the dialogue.67 For Kosovo, Israel’s
diplomatic recognition was a particularly welcome development. Kosovo politicians and parties
had mixed reactions to other aspects of the U.S.-brokered agreements, however. Some observers
questioned their legal standing and the prospects for implementing various measures, including
several that overlapped with existing EU-brokered agreements and EU-backed projects. Others
asserted that weaker transatlantic coordination under the Trump Administration had effectively
created a two-track dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and sown confusion in Belgrade and
Pristina.68 Some Members of Congress expressed concern over reportedly strong U.S. pressure on
Kosovo’s government to return to negotiations in early 2020, including temporary suspension of
assistance through Kosovo’s Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program.69
Biden Administration officials have affirmed support for the EU-led dialogue and have cal ed for
greater cooperation with the EU on the dispute as part of broader efforts to revitalize transatlantic
alignment on global chal enges.70 One early development is the Administration’s seeming
emphasis on Serbian recognition of Kosovo (“mutual recognition”) as part of a final settlement—
an outcome that Kosovo insists upon but Serbia has not committed to.71
Foreign Assistance
The United States remains a significant source of foreign assistance to Kosovo, although U.S.
assistance levels have declined since independence (see Figure 2). U.S. assistance aims to

66 Jack Robinson, “Lajcak: DC Agreements Pushed Kosovo Further Away from European Future,” PrishtinaInsight,
January 12, 2021; Patrick Kingsley and Kenneth P. Vogel, “ Pushing for Serbia-Kosovo Peace Deal, U.S. Roils Allies,”
New York Tim es, June 20, 2020.
67 Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade & Prishtina Dialogue about Dialogue, October 2020; European
Western Balkans, “Miroslav Lajcak Appointed as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and
Regional Issues,” April 3, 2020.
68 Ruge, Trump’s Kosovo Show; Jeta Xharra and Perparim Isufi, “Kosovo ‘Should Rethink Serbia Agreements’ with
Biden in Power,” BalkanInsight, January 5, 2021; PrishtinaInsight January 12, 2021, op. cit.
69 Prime Minister Albin Kurti alleged that U.S. officials aided efforts to unseat his government in the March 2020 no -
confidence session when he resisted U.S. pressure to immediately lift tariffs and return to talks. RFE/RL, “ Kosovo’s
Kurti Accuses U.S. Envoy of ‘Direct Involvement’ in Collapse of His Government,” April 20, 2020; U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations, “Engel & Menendez Express Concern about T rump Administrat ion
Approach to Serbia and Kosovo,” April 13, 2020.
70 Keida Kostreci, “By Weighing in on Long-Running Serbia-Kosovo Dispute, Biden Signals Interest in Europe,”
Voice of America, February 24, 2021; Nike Ching, “U.S. to Scrutinize Beijing Commitments Under EU -China
Investment Deal,” Voice of America, February 24, 2021.
71 In correspondence with Kosovo and Serbia’s leaders, President Biden urged the parties to reach “a comprehensive
agreement ... focused on m utual recognition.” Quoted in RFE/RL, “ Biden Says Kosovo Holds ‘Special Place’ for His
Family,” February 17, 2021 (emphasis added). Secretary of State Antony Blinken is also quoted as urging a
comprehensive agreement based on “mutual recognition.” Quoted in Zeljko T rkanjec, “U.S. Goal is to See Serbia -
Kosovo Agreement Centered on Mutual Recognition,” Euractiv, April 1, 2021.
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support the implementation of agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and to improve
transparent and responsive governance, among other goals.72 Additional assistance is provided
through a $49 mil ion MCC Threshold Program that launched in 2017, with focus on governance
and energy efficiency and reliability. Threshold programs are intended to help countries become
eligible to participate in a larger Compact Program. In December 2018, the MCC board
determined Kosovo was eligible to participate in a compact; this assessment was renewed in 2019
and 2020. As discussed above, MCC assistance was suspended temporarily in 2020.
Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Kosovo Since 2008

Source: U.S. State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; State Department, FY2020 Estimate Data.
Notes: Includes assistance through Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Assistance
extended through the Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation is not included. FY2020 data are partial y reported.
Assistance figures have not been adjusted for inflation.
Cooperation on Transnational Threats and Security Issues
The United States and Kosovo cooperate to combat transnational threats and bolster security. Like
elsewhere in the Western Balkans, Kosovo is a transit country and in some cases a source country
for trafficking in humans, contraband smuggling (including il icit drugs), and other criminal
activities. Observers consider Kosovo to have a relatively strong legal framework to counter these
threats. At the same time, U.S. and EU officials have urged Kosovo to better implement its
domestic laws by more strenuously investigating, prosecuting, and convicting cases.73
Combating terrorism and violent extremism is a core area of U.S.-Kosovo security cooperation.
Kosovo is a secular state with a moderate Islamic tradition, but an estimated 400 Kosovo citizens
traveled to Syria and Iraq in the 2010s to support the Islamic State amid the terrorist group’s
growing recruitment efforts. As this policy chal enge emerged, the United States assisted Kosovo

72 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Kosovo, October 31, 2019.
73 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Kosovo (Tier 2).
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with tightening its legal framework to combat recruitment, foreign fighter travel, and terrorism
financing, as wel as strengthening its countering violent extremism strategy.74
The United States provides support to Kosovo law enforcement and judicial institutions to
combat terrorism and extremism. The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, for
example, has provided training or capacity-building support for the Kosovo Police
Counterterrorism Directorate and for the Border Police. Kosovo and the United States agreed to
an extradition treaty in March 2016. In April 2019, the United States provided diplomatic and
logistical support for the repatriation of about 110 Kosovo citizens from Syria—primarily women
and children—who had supported the Islamic State or were born to parents who had. Some
repatriated persons were indicted on terrorism-related charges.75
Kosovo has a sister-state relationship with Iowa that grew out of a 2011 State Partnership
Program (SPP) between the Iowa National Guard and the KSF. That relationship has been hailed
as a “textbook example” of the scope and aims of the SPP. In January 2021, Kosovo’s parliament
approved a U.S.-Kosovo agreement to deploy KSF units in global peacekeeping missions under
the command of the Iowa National Guard.76
Congressional Engagement
Congressional interest in Kosovo predates Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Through resolutions,
hearings, and congressional delegations, many Members of Congress highlighted the status of
ethnic Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia, engaged in heated debates over military intervention
during the Clinton Administration, urged the George W. Bush Administration to back Kosovo’s
independence, and supported continued financial assistance.
Congressional interest and support continues. In the 116th Congress, several hearings addressed
Kosovo in part or in whole, including an April 2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on
Kosovo’s wartime victims and hearings on Western Balkan issues held by the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation. Congressional interest in Kosovo is also tied to interest in
developments in Kosovo’s neighboring countries and broader regional concerns.
Given Kosovo’s geography, history, and current chal enges, the country also factors into wider
U.S. foreign policy issues in which Congress remains engaged. Such issues include transitional
justice, the rule of law, combating human trafficking and organized crime, U.S. foreign assistance
and overseas military deployments, security in Europe, and EU and NATO enlargement.

Author Information

Sarah E. Garding

Analyst in European Affairs

74 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism: Kosovo for 2014-2019.
75 “Kosovo Is T rying to Reintegrate ISIL Returnees. Will It Work?” Al Jazeera, June 9, 2019.
76 “Iowa, Kosovo a Model National Guard State Partnership Program,” National Guard, November 25, 2015;
Associated Press, “Kosovo Approves Sending Army T roops on Peacekeeping Missions,” January 5, 2021.
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