Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

Changes from March 11, 2021 to April 8, 2021

This page shows textual changes in the document between the two versions indicated in the dates above. Textual matter removed in the later version is indicated with ~~red strikethrough~~ and textual matter added in the later version is indicated with blue.

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy
~~March 11~~April 8, 2021 , 2021
Kosovo, a country in the Western Balkans with a predominantly Albanian-speaking population, Kosovo, a country in the Western Balkans with a predominantly Albanian-speaking population,
declared independence from Serbia in 2008, less than a decade after a brief but lethal war. It has declared independence from Serbia in 2008, less than a decade after a brief but lethal war. It has
Sarah E. Garding
since been recognized by about 100 countries. The United States and most European Union (EU) since been recognized by about 100 countries. The United States and most European Union (EU)
Analyst in European Affairs Analyst in European Affairs
member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia, China, and various other countries (including member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia, China, and various other countries (including

five EU member states) do not. five EU member states) do not.

Key issues for Kosovo include the following: Key issues for Kosovo include the following:
  New Leadership. ~~Albin Kurti is poised to become prime minister for the second time after his~~Following several years of political turmoil, early parliamentary elections in February 2021 delivered a landslide victory to the left-leaning ~~left-leaning~~
~~Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje) won a landslide victory in early parliamentary elections in~~
~~February 2021. The poll was Kosovo’s second snap parliamentary election in less than two years.~~

~~Once of the new parliament’s initial responsibilities is to elect the country’s next president. Acting~~
~~President Vjosa Osmani, whose candidacy is backed by Vetëvendosje, is heavily favored to win.~~
~~Parliament’s failure to elect a president could trigger early parliamentary elections, however.~~
Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje). Party leader and longtime opposition figure Albin Kurti became prime minister on March 22, 2021, just one year after his first short-lived government collapsed. Kosovo’s parliament elected Vetëvendosje-backed candidate Vjosa Osmani as president on April 4, 2021.   Dialogue with Serbia. The unresolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is one of the main threats to The unresolved dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is one of the main threats to
regional stability in the Western Balkans. Since 2011, the EU has facilitated a dialogue aimed at regional stability in the Western Balkans. Since 2011, the EU has facilitated a dialogue aimed at
normalizing their relations. In July 2020, Kosovo and Serbia returned to EU-led talks after a 20-month normalizing their relations. In July 2020, Kosovo and Serbia returned to EU-led talks after a 20-month
suspension. Shortly thereafter, the two parties agreed to new measures on economic cooperation at talks suspension. Shortly thereafter, the two parties agreed to new measures on economic cooperation at talks
hosted by the White House. Prime Ministerhosted by the White House. Prime Minister~~-designate~~ Albin Kurti has Albin Kurti has ~~a more hard-line stance on~~indicated that the the
dialogue with Serbia dialogue with Serbia ~~and indicated it~~ will be a low priority under his will be a low priority under his ~~presumptive government, which is~~
~~expected to form in March 2021~~government. Nevertheless, he is likely to face considerable U.S. and EU pressure to . Nevertheless, he is likely to face considerable U.S. and EU pressure to
participate in EU-led talks and work toward a comprehensive final agreement with Serbia. participate in EU-led talks and work toward a comprehensive final agreement with Serbia.
  Corruption and Rule-of-Law Challenges. Corruption and weak rule of law are long-standing challenges Corruption and weak rule of law are long-standing challenges
in Kosovo. The consecutive victories of Vetëvendosje in snap elections in October 2019 and February 2021 in Kosovo. The consecutive victories of Vetëvendosje in snap elections in October 2019 and February 2021
were fueled in part by widespread voter anger over the status quo; Vetëvendosje has long railed against were fueled in part by widespread voter anger over the status quo; Vetëvendosje has long railed against
corruption and was outside of national government prior to 2020. corruption and was outside of national government prior to 2020. ~~Prime Minister-designate Kurti~~The Kurti government’s agenda ’s agenda
of combating corruption and state capture aligns with long-standing U.S. and EU priorities for Kosovo. of combating corruption and state capture aligns with long-standing U.S. and EU priorities for Kosovo.
  Relations with the United States. Kosovo regards the United States as a key ally and security guarantor. Kosovo regards the United States as a key ally and security guarantor.
Kosovo receives the largest share of U.S. foreign assistance to the Balkans, and the two countries cooperate Kosovo receives the largest share of U.S. foreign assistance to the Balkans, and the two countries cooperate
on numerous security issues. The United States is the largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led Kosovo on numerous security issues. The United States is the largest contributor of troops to the NATO-led Kosovo
Force (KFOR), which has helped to maintain security in Kosovo since 1999. Although successive U.S. Force (KFOR), which has helped to maintain security in Kosovo since 1999. Although successive U.S.
Administrations have strongly supported the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the former Administrations have strongly supported the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, the former
Trump Administration played a more direct role in facilitating negotiations between the two parties. At the Trump Administration played a more direct role in facilitating negotiations between the two parties. At the
same time, some expressed concern over the Trump Administration’s reportedly strong pressure on Kosovo same time, some expressed concern over the Trump Administration’s reportedly strong pressure on Kosovo
and weak coordination with the EU. The Biden Administration has pledged support for the EU-led and weak coordination with the EU. The Biden Administration has pledged support for the EU-led
dialogue, called for greater transatlantic cooperation on the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, and urged Kosovo and dialogue, called for greater transatlantic cooperation on the Kosovo-Serbia dispute, and urged Kosovo and
Serbia to work toward a final, comprehensive settlement. Serbia to work toward a final, comprehensive settlement.
Congress was actively involved in debates over the U.S. response to a 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo and subsequently Congress was actively involved in debates over the U.S. response to a 1998-1999 conflict in Kosovo and subsequently
supported Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Today, many Members of Congress continue to support Kosovo through supported Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Today, many Members of Congress continue to support Kosovo through
country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding levels averaging around $50 million country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding levels averaging around $50 million
per year since 2015. per year since 2015.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service

link to page 5 link to page 5 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

Overview
The Republic of Kosovo is a landlocked country in the The Republic of Kosovo is a landlocked country in the
Kosovo at a Glance
Western Balkans (se Western Balkans (see Figure 1). Ethnic Albanians . Ethnic Albanians
Capital: Pristina Pristina
comprise about 90% of Kosovo’s population, and Serbs comprise about 90% of Kosovo’s population, and Serbs
Population: 1.82 mil ion (2019 est.) 1.82 mil ion (2019 est.)
and other minority groups comprise about 10%. Kosovo and other minority groups comprise about 10%. Kosovo
Ethnic Groups: Albanian (92.9%), Albanian (92.9%),
declared independence from Serbia in 2008, nearly a declared independence from Serbia in 2008, nearly a
Bosniak (1.6%), Serb (1.5%) Bosniak (1.6%), Serb (1.5%)
decade after the end of a brief but lethal conflict between decade after the end of a brief but lethal conflict between Languages: Albanian (94.5%), Bosnian Albanian (94.5%), Bosnian
Serbian forces and a Kosovo Albanian insurgency led by Serbian forces and a Kosovo Albanian insurgency led by
(1.7%), Serbian (1.6%), Turkish (1.1%) (1.7%), Serbian (1.6%), Turkish (1.1%)
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Since 2008, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Since 2008,
Religions: Muslim (95.6%), Catholic Muslim (95.6%), Catholic
Kosovo has been recognized by more than 100 Kosovo has been recognized by more than 100
(2.2%), Orthodox Christian (1.5%) (2.2%), Orthodox Christian (1.5%)
countries. The United States and most European Union countries. The United States and most European Union
Leadership: ~~Acting~~ Prime Minister Prime Minister
Albin Kurti; (EU) member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia, (EU) member states recognize Kosovo. Serbia, Russia,
~~Avdul ah Hoti (since 2020); Prime Minister-~~
President Vjosa Osmani; Assembly Speaker China, and various other countries (including some EU China, and various other countries (including some EU
~~designate Albin Kurti (since 2021); Acting~~
~~President Vjosa Osmani (since 2020)~~
Glauk Konjufca member states) do not. The United States has strongly member states) do not. The United States has strongly

Sources: CIA : CIA World Factbook; International ; International
~~supported Kosovo’s state-building and development~~
~~Monetary Fund; 2011 Kosovo Census.~~
~~efforts, as wel as an EU-led dialogue aimed at~~Monetary Fund; 2011 Kosovo Census. supported Kosovo’s state-building and development
Note: Figures for ethnic Serbs, Serbian Figures for ethnic Serbs, Serbian
~~normalizing Kosovo and Serbia’s relations. Kosovo~~efforts, as wel as an EU-led dialogue aimed at
language, and Orthodox Christians is likely language, and Orthodox Christians is likely
~~general y regards the United States as a security~~normalizing Kosovo and Serbia’s relations. Kosovo
closer to 5%-10%. Kosovo Serbs largely closer to 5%-10%. Kosovo Serbs largely
boycotted the 2011 census. boycotted the 2011 census.
general y regards the United States as a security guarantor and key al y. guarantor and key al y.
Congress has maintained interest in Kosovo for many decades—from concerns over Serbia’s Congress has maintained interest in Kosovo for many decades—from concerns over Serbia’s
treatment of ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslavia to the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998-treatment of ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslavia to the armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998-
1999 after Yugoslavia disintegrated. Many Members were active in debates over the U.S.- and 1999 after Yugoslavia disintegrated. Many Members were active in debates over the U.S.- and
NATO-led military intervention in the conflict. After Serbian forces withdrew in 1999, many NATO-led military intervention in the conflict. After Serbian forces withdrew in 1999, many
Members backed Kosovo’s independence. Today, many in Congress continue to support Kosovo Members backed Kosovo’s independence. Today, many in Congress continue to support Kosovo
through country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding through country- or region-specific hearings, congressional visits, and foreign assistance funding
levels averaging around $50 mil ion in recent years. levels averaging around $50 mil ion in recent years.
Looking ahead, Members may consider and assess U.S. policy regarding the Kosovo-Serbia Looking ahead, Members may consider and assess U.S. policy regarding the Kosovo-Serbia
dialogue, transitional justice processes, efforts to strengthen the rule of law, and regional security. dialogue, transitional justice processes, efforts to strengthen the rule of law, and regional security.
Domestic Issues
Kosovo’s political scene has been volatile over the past few years, with three government Kosovo’s political scene has been volatile over the past few years, with three government
transitions and two snap parliamentary elections since late 2019. During the same period, some of transitions and two snap parliamentary elections since late 2019. During the same period, some of
the country’s most prominent political figures were indicted on war crimes charges and resigned the country’s most prominent political figures were indicted on war crimes charges and resigned
from their positions. More broadly, mounting public anger over corruption and economic from their positions. More broadly, mounting public anger over corruption and economic
conditions has fueled a major shift in Kosovo’s politics. Early parliamentary elections in February conditions has fueled a major shift in Kosovo’s politics. Early parliamentary elections in February
2021 delivered a major victory to the Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje), a left-leaning 2021 delivered a major victory to the Self-Determination Party (Vetëvendosje), a left-leaning
movement-turned-party that campaigned on these issues. movement-turned-party that campaigned on these issues.
~~In addition to this political turbulence, other key~~Key issues in Kosovo’s domestic affairs include issues in Kosovo’s domestic affairs include
managing relations with the country’s ethnic Serb minority, particularly in northern Kosovo, and managing relations with the country’s ethnic Serb minority, particularly in northern Kosovo, and
~~improving the~~improving economic and living conditions, including through mitigating the public health and economic and living conditions, including through mitigating the public health and
economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease economic impacts of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
1 1

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

Politics
Kosovo is a parliamentary democracy with a prime minister, who serves as head of government, Kosovo is a parliamentary democracy with a prime minister, who serves as head of government,
and an indirectly elected president, who serves as head of state. The unicameral National and an indirectly elected president, who serves as head of state. The unicameral National
Assembly has 120 seats, of which 10 are reserved for Serbs and 10 are reserved for other Assembly has 120 seats, of which 10 are reserved for Serbs and 10 are reserved for other
minorities. minorities. ~~Avdullah Hoti is acting prime minister. Prime Minister-designate Albin Kurti (the~~
~~longtime leader of Vetëvendosje) is poised to form the next government~~Longtime Vetëvendosje leader Albin Kurti became prime minister for the second time on March 22, 2021, just one year after his , just one year after his
first short-lived government collapsed. first short-lived government collapsed. ~~Parliamentary Speaker Vjosa Osmani became acting~~
~~president in November 2020, when then-President Hashim Thaçi resigned (see “Transitional~~
~~Justice,” below)~~The National Assembly elected Vetëvendosje-backed candidate Vjosa Osmani as president on April 4, 2021. .
Figure 1. Republic of Kosovo

Source: Congressional Research Service.Congressional Research Service.
Prior to 2020, Kosovo’s political system was largely dominated by several parties that governed Prior to 2020, Kosovo’s political system was largely dominated by several parties that governed
in varying coalition configurations. The center-right Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), in varying coalition configurations. The center-right Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),
Kosovo’s oldest party, has roots in nonviolent resistance to Serbian rule during the 1990s. The Kosovo’s oldest party, has roots in nonviolent resistance to Serbian rule during the 1990s. The
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), LDK’s main rival, grew out of the armed KLA resistance. Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), LDK’s main rival, grew out of the armed KLA resistance.
PDK and several other parties led by KLA veterans sometimes are referred to as the PDK and several other parties led by KLA veterans sometimes are referred to as the war wing. .
Although many in Kosovo credit these established parties with resisting Serbian rule and helping Although many in Kosovo credit these established parties with resisting Serbian rule and helping
to bring about independence, critics assert the parties also became entrenched in state institutions to bring about independence, critics assert the parties also became entrenched in state institutions
and bear considerable responsibility for Kosovo’s corruption chal enges.1 and bear considerable responsibility for Kosovo’s corruption chal enges.1
More recently, political power has shifted from these parties to More recently, political power has shifted from these parties to ~~Vetëvendosje. The party entered~~
reform-oriented political parties. Vetëvendosje entered into national government for the first time into national government for the first time in February 2020 after narrowly winning parliamentary elections in after narrowly winning parliamentary elections in
October 2019. Albin Kurti became prime minister; however, October 2019. Albin Kurti became prime minister; however, the party’s coalition partner, LDK, the party’s coalition partner, LDK,
triggered a no-confidence motion less than two months later. Analysts attributed the government triggered a no-confidence motion less than two months later. Analysts attributed the government
collapse to political infighting and divisions over how to respond to U.S. pressure to collapse to political infighting and divisions over how to respond to U.S. pressure to
unconditional y lift tariffs against Serbia and return to negotiations unconditional y lift tariffs against Serbia and return to negotiations (the prior government’s (the prior government’s
imposition of tariffs in 2018 effectively froze the talks).2 imposition of tariffs in 2018 effectively froze the talks).2

1 Freedom House, 1 Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), ; U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Kosovo
Political Econom y and Analysis, Final Report, December 2017. December 2017.
2 Albin Kurti opposed unconditionally lifting tariffs, whereas the Democratic League of Kosovo’s (LDK’s) leader 2 Albin Kurti opposed unconditionally lifting tariffs, whereas the Democratic League of Kosovo’s (LDK’s) leader
expressed concern that not doing so could damage relations with the United States.expressed concern that not doing so could damage relations with the United States. Fatos Bytyci, “ Kosovo Coalition Fatos Bytyci, “ Kosovo Coalition
Partner to File No-Confidence Vote in Government,” Reuters, March 18, 2020; Shaun Walker, “ Kosovan Acting PM Accuses T rump Envoy of Meddling,” Guardian, April 20, 2020. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
2 2

link to page 7 link to page 7 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

LDK’s Avdullah Hoti formed a new coalition government in June 2020, and Vetëvendosje LDK’s Avdullah Hoti formed a new coalition government in June 2020, and Vetëvendosje
returned to opposition. The Hoti government lifted tariffs against Serbia, returned to the EU-led returned to opposition. The Hoti government lifted tariffs against Serbia, returned to the EU-led
dialogue, and participated in talks with Serbia’s leader at the White House in September 2020 dialogue, and participated in talks with Serbia’s leader at the White House in September 2020
(see “U.S.-Kosovo Relations,” below). In December 2020, however, the Constitutional Court (see “U.S.-Kosovo Relations,” below). In December 2020, however, the Constitutional Court
invalidated the Hoti government and ordered early parliamentary elections.3 invalidated the Hoti government and ordered early parliamentary elections.3
2021 Snap Parliamentary Election and Outlook
Kosovo held parliamentary elections (the country’s fifth since independence) on February 14, Kosovo held parliamentary elections (the country’s fifth since independence) on February 14,
2021 (se 2021 (see Table 1). Polls conducted during 2020 indicated a spike in support for Vetëvendosje . Polls conducted during 2020 indicated a spike in support for Vetëvendosje
after it was sidelined from government and high approval ratings for after it was sidelined from government and high approval ratings for ~~Parliamentary~~
~~Speaker/~~then-Parliamentary Speaker and Acting President Vjosa Osmani, who spoke out against LDK’s no-confidence motion Acting President Vjosa Osmani, who spoke out against LDK’s no-confidence motion
and subsequently left LDK. Vetëvendosje partnered with Osmani for the election, proposing Kurti and subsequently left LDK. Vetëvendosje partnered with Osmani for the election, proposing Kurti
for prime minister and Osmani for president.for prime minister and Osmani for president.4 Kurti described the election as a referendum on Kurti described the election as a referendum on
“justice “justice and jobs, against state capture and corruption.”and jobs, against state capture and corruption.”54
As anticipated by polls, the joint Vetëvendosje-Osmani ticket won decisively, with nearly 50% of As anticipated by polls, the joint Vetëvendosje-Osmani ticket won decisively, with nearly 50% of
votes—the largest vote share in Kosovo’s modern election history and nearly double votes—the largest vote share in Kosovo’s modern election history and nearly double
Vetëvendosje’s 2019 share. Analysts regard the results as a sharp voter rebuke of the status quo Vetëvendosje’s 2019 share. Analysts regard the results as a sharp voter rebuke of the status quo
and of established parties. PDK placed second, with 17% of the vote, and LDK placed third, with and of established parties. PDK placed second, with 17% of the vote, and LDK placed third, with
13%. As in recent elections, Serbian List (Srpska Lista) won al 10 seats reserved for Serbs. 13%. As in recent elections, Serbian List (Srpska Lista) won al 10 seats reserved for Serbs.
The election results appear to accelerate a shift in power from the KLA veterans who led the The election results appear to accelerate a shift in power from the KLA veterans who led the
country for most of the past two decades to a younger generation. In addition, women won nearly country for most of the past two decades to a younger generation. In addition, women won nearly
40% of seats to the new parliament—a record figure in Kosovo. Exit polls indicate that youth and 40% of seats to the new parliament—a record figure in Kosovo. Exit polls indicate that youth and
female voters in particular helped to deliver the victory to Vetëvendosje/Osmani.female voters in particular helped to deliver the victory to Vetëvendosje/Osmani.65 Although Although
buoyed by its strong results, Vetëvendosje faces high voter expectations for swift change—buoyed by its strong results, Vetëvendosje faces high voter expectations for swift change—
potential y beyond what the party can realistical y be expected to deliver. potential y beyond what the party can realistical y be expected to deliver.7
~~As one of its earliest actions, the new National Assembly is to elect the next president. Acting~~
~~President Vjosa Osmani, who is backed by Vetëvendosje, is heavily favored to win. Parliament’s~~
~~failure to elect a president would trigger another snap parliamentary election, however.~~
~~Prime Minister-designate~~6 In a departure from Kosovo’s often unstable coalition governments and periodic intra-executive tensions, Vetëvendosje and its al ies now hold the key positions in national politics, and the party governs without other major parties.7 With the support of 67 out of 120 MPs, the National Assembly voted in the Kurti government on March 22, 2021. The National Assembly elected Vetëvendosje-backed candidate Vjosa Osmani as president on April 4, 2021; she is the second woman to serve as president. Prime Minister Kurti has outlined an agenda focused on domestic issues, particularly Kurti has outlined an agenda focused on domestic issues, particularly
generating jobs and combating corruption. Kurti asserts that the dialogue with Serbia is a generating jobs and combating corruption. Kurti asserts that the dialogue with Serbia is a
relatively low priority, although his relatively low priority, although his ~~presumptive~~ government likely government likely ~~will~~ wil face strong U.S. and EU pressure to participate in negotiations and to refrain from revisiting existing agreements reached through the dialogue. The public health and economic impacts of COVID-19 also loom large. As of April 8, 2021, Kosovo ~~face strong U.S. and EU~~

~~Partner to File No-Confidence Vote in Government,” Reuters, March 18, 2020; Shaun Walker, “ Kosovan Acting PM~~
~~Accuses T rump Envoy of Meddling,” Guardian, April 20, 2020.~~
3 T he Constitutional Court ruled that parliament’s June 2020 confirmation of the Avdullah Hoti government, which 3 T he Constitutional Court ruled that parliament’s June 2020 confirmation of the Avdullah Hoti government, which
passed by just one vote, was illegitimate because a member of parliament who voted for it had been convicted of a passed by just one vote, was illegitimate because a member of parliament who voted for it had been convicted of a
criminal offense within the preceding three years and thus was ineligible tocriminal offense within the preceding three years and thus was ineligible to have a parliamentary mandate under have a parliamentary mandate under
Kosovo election law. Kosovo election law.
4 4 ~~In January 2021, Kosovo’s Central Election Commission effectively barred Kurti and several other candidates from~~
~~sitting in parliament because they had been convicted of criminal offenses within the past three years. Analysts assess~~
~~that this restriction does not appear to prevent Kurti from being prime minister. See Perparim Isufi and Emirjeta~~
~~Vllahiu, “Kosovo Court to Decide on Ex-PM’s Right to Run for Parliament,” BalkanInsight, January 29, 2021.~~
5 Quoted in Al Jazeera, “Kosovo’s Left -Wing Opposition Party Sees Landslide Win,” February 15, 2021. Quoted in Al Jazeera, “Kosovo’s Left -Wing Opposition Party Sees Landslide Win,” February 15, 2021.
65 Kosovo has a 30% gender quota for candidate lists and allocation of seats in parliament. Andrew Higgins, “In a Land Kosovo has a 30% gender quota for candidate lists and allocation of seats in parliament. Andrew Higgins, “In a Land
Dominated by Ex-Rebels, Kosovo Women Find Power at the Ballot Box,” Dominated by Ex-Rebels, Kosovo Women Find Power at the Ballot Box,” New York Tim es, March 6, 2021. March 6, 2021.
76 Una Hajdari, “Ousted Ex-PM Wins Historic Victory in Kosovo Election,” Politico.eu, February 15, 2021 ; Engjellushe Una Hajdari, “Ousted Ex-PM Wins Historic Victory in Kosovo Election,” Politico.eu, February 15, 2021 ; Engjellushe
Morina, “Kosovo Snap Elections: A Chance for Action,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2021 . Morina, “Kosovo Snap Elections: A Chance for Action,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2021 .
7 As is required under Kosovo’s constitution, several cabinet ministers are from minority communities. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
3 3

~~link to page 9~~ Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy has had 95,015 confirmed cases and 1,956 reported deaths from COVID-19. Vaccine rollout in Kosovo has lagged. On March 28, 2021, the country received its first instal ment of 24,000 vaccine doses through the COVAX facility. Prime Minister Kurti has raised alarm over the public health situation in Kosovo, including vaccine shortages, and urged “support and solidarity, especial y from the United States and the EU.”8~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~pressure to participate in negotiations and to refrain from revisiting existing agreements reached~~
~~through the dialogue.8 The public health and economic impacts of COVID-19 also loom large. As~~
~~of March 10, 2021, Kosovo has had 73,735 confirmed cases and 1,655 reported deaths from~~
~~COVID-19. Vaccine rollout in Kosovo has lagged; officials expect to receive the first instal ment~~
~~of doses through the COVAX facility in March 2021.9~~ As discussed below, the pandemic has As discussed below, the pandemic has
erased erased some of Kosovo’s recent economic gains in reducing unemployment and poverty ratessome of Kosovo’s recent economic gains in reducing unemployment and poverty rates
~~(see “Economy,” below)~~. .
Table 1. Early Parliamentary Election Results, October 2019 and February 2021
Party
2019 Vote (%)
2021 Vote (%)
2021 Seats
Self-Determination (Vetevëndosje) Self-Determination (Vetevëndosje)
26.3 26.3
49.95 49.95
58 58
Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)
21.2 21.2
16.9 16.9
19 19
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)
24.6 24.6
12.7 12.7
15 15
Serbian List (SL) Serbian List (SL)
6.4 6.4
5.1 5.1
10 10
Al iance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Al iance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)
11.5 11.5
7 7
8 8
Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA) Social Democratic Initiative (NISMA)
5.0 5.0
2.7 2.7
0 0
Other Other
5.0 5.0
5.7 5.7
10 10
Total
100% 100%
100% 100%
120 120
Source: Republic of Kosovo Electoral Commission. Republic of Kosovo Electoral Commission.
Vetëvendosje: From Protest Movement to Governing Party
Left-leaning Vetëvendosje grew out of a 2000s-era protest movement that channeled popular frustration with Left-leaning Vetëvendosje grew out of a 2000s-era protest movement that channeled popular frustration with
corruption. The movement-turned-party also railed against aspects of the postwar administration of Kosovo, corruption. The movement-turned-party also railed against aspects of the postwar administration of Kosovo,
accusing international missions of failing to establish the rule of law despite their vast powers. Vetëvendosje accusing international missions of failing to establish the rule of law despite their vast powers. Vetëvendosje
steadily built support across election cycles but remained in opposition at the national level until 2020. steadily built support across election cycles but remained in opposition at the national level until 2020.
While in opposition, Vetëvendosje’s platform and tactics sometimes caused friction with Kosovo’s al ies. U.S. and While in opposition, Vetëvendosje’s platform and tactics sometimes caused friction with Kosovo’s al ies. U.S. and
European officials reportedly were wary of its position on certain issues, including its more hard-line stance on European officials reportedly were wary of its position on certain issues, including its more hard-line stance on
negotiations with Serbia and statements of support for eventual unification with Kosovo’s neighbor and close al y, negotiations with Serbia and statements of support for eventual unification with Kosovo’s neighbor and close al y,
Albania. (Unification does not appear likely to become a serious proposal or a priority under current conditions, Albania. (Unification does not appear likely to become a serious proposal or a priority under current conditions,
not least due to U.S. and EU objections.not least due to U.S. and EU objections.109) U.S. and European officials criticized Vetëvendosje’s (and some other ) U.S. and European officials criticized Vetëvendosje’s (and some other
parties’) use of obstructionist tactics—including release of tear gas—to block legislative proceedings and try to parties’) use of obstructionist tactics—including release of tear gas—to block legislative proceedings and try to
subvert agreements with Montenegro and Serbia that were viewed as important to regional subvert agreements with Montenegro and Serbia that were viewed as important to regional ~~recon ciliation~~reconciliation. .
Yet Vetëvendosje appears to have moderated its tactics and improved relations with Kosovo’s al ies as it moved Yet Vetëvendosje appears to have moderated its tactics and improved relations with Kosovo’s al ies as it moved
closer to government. After its closer to government. After its ~~recent~~early 2021 parliamentary victory, parliamentary victory, U.S.U.S. and European officials were quick to and European officials were quick to
congratulate the party and express support for continued cooperation. Like most Kosovo parties, Vetëvendosje congratulate the party and express support for continued cooperation. Like most Kosovo parties, Vetëvendosje

~~8 Llazar Semini, “Kosovo’s Leftist Opposition Party Gains Landslide Win,” Associated Press, February 15, 2021.~~
~~9 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center; Government of Kosovo, “Prime Minister Hoti: Measures~~
~~Against COVID-19 to be Fully Respected,” March 5, 2021. T he COVAX system is a platform developed by global~~
~~health organizations to deliver COVID-19 vaccines in an equitable manner.~~
~~10 Some observers contend~~ has underscored the importance of Kosovo’s relationship with the United States. The party’s focus on fighting corruption and organized crime appears to align with U.S. and EU priorities for Kosovo. Sources: Aidan Hehir, “Wil There Be a Political Earthquake Fol owing Kosovo Elections?,” Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, February 13, 2021; Eraldin Fazliu and Jack Butcher, “Tear Gas, Eggs, and Protests,” Kosovo 2.0, October 22, 2015; Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo. 8 Johns Hopkins University, Coronavirus Resource Center; EuroNews, “Kosovo Receives First COVID-19 Vaccines T hrough COVAX Programme,” March 29, 2021. T he COVAX system is a platform developed by global health organizations to deliver COVID-19 vaccines in an equitable manner. 9 Some observers contend that politicians sometimes use pan-Albanian statements to mobilize domestic political support or politicians sometimes use pan-Albanian statements to mobilize domestic political support or
strategically exert pressure on international allies opposed to any such measure. Kosovo’s constitution states that strategically exert pressure on international allies opposed to any such measure. Kosovo’s constitution states that
Kosovo “shall seek no union” with any other state (Article 1). See discussions in Blerta Begisholli, “Kosovo and Kosovo “shall seek no union” with any other state (Article 1). See discussions in Blerta Begisholli, “Kosovo and
Albania Agree to Run Joint Foreign Policy,” Albania Agree to Run Joint Foreign Policy,” BalkanInsight, July 3, 2019; July 3, 2019; ~~Fatos Bytyci and Matt Robinson, “Albania~~
~~and Kosovo to United, Inside EU or Not,” Reuters, April 7, 2015;~~ Agon Maliqi, “What a New Poll RevealsAgon Maliqi, “What a New Poll Reveals ~~About~~
About Albania-Kosovo Relations,” Sbunker.net, November 27, 2019. Albania-Kosovo Relations,” Sbunker.net, November 27, 2019.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
4 4

~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~has underscored the importance of Kosovo’s relationship with the United States. The party’s focus on fighting~~
~~corruption and organized crime aligns with U.S. and EU priorities for Kosovo.~~
Sources: Marta Szpala, Kosovo: A Protest Movement Comes to Power, Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw),
~~February 5, 2020; Aidan Hehir, “Wil There Be a Political Earthquake Fol owing Kosovo Elections? ,” Balkans~~
~~in Europe Policy Advisory Group, February 13, 2021; Eraldin Fazliu and Jack Butcher, “Tear Gas, Eggs, and~~
Protests,” Kosovo 2.0, October 22, 2015; Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo. link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 5 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy
Democracy and the Rule of Law
Analysts have been largely positive in their assessments of Kosovo’s democratic development Analysts have been largely positive in their assessments of Kosovo’s democratic development
since 2008. Kosovo’s political scene is fragmented yet dynamic, and the country’s elections are since 2008. Kosovo’s political scene is fragmented yet dynamic, and the country’s elections are
general y free, fair, and competitive. Kosovo’s active media and civil society sectors are open to a general y free, fair, and competitive. Kosovo’s active media and civil society sectors are open to a
variety of viewpoints, although they are somewhat reliant upon international donor support.variety of viewpoints, although they are somewhat reliant upon international donor support.1110
Kosovo’s postwar state-building was undertaken with significant international input, and the Kosovo’s postwar state-building was undertaken with significant international input, and the
country’s institutions and legislation largely reflect contemporary best-practice guidelines. country’s institutions and legislation largely reflect contemporary best-practice guidelines.
Nevertheless, corruption, organized crime, and weak rule of law are enduring chal enges. Weak Nevertheless, corruption, organized crime, and weak rule of law are enduring chal enges. Weak
implementation of legislation and political interference in the criminal justice system have implementation of legislation and political interference in the criminal justice system have
enabled widespread malfeasance, according to anti-corruption watchdogs. Only a smal share of enabled widespread malfeasance, according to anti-corruption watchdogs. Only a smal share of
high-level corruption investigations and prosecutions result in final convictions.high-level corruption investigations and prosecutions result in final convictions.1211 Many in Many in
Kosovo attribute endemic corruption to the parties that circulated in government for most of the Kosovo attribute endemic corruption to the parties that circulated in government for most of the
past two decades. Some critics also charge that U.N. and EU missions in Kosovo, which had far-past two decades. Some critics also charge that U.N. and EU missions in Kosovo, which had far-
reaching powers in the country’s judiciary until 2018, failed to improve the situation. reaching powers in the country’s judiciary until 2018, failed to improve the situation.1312
Kosovo Serbs and Northern Kosovo
An estimated 120,000 Serbs live in Kosovo, primarily in semi-isolated rural areas and in urban An estimated 120,000 Serbs live in Kosovo, primarily in semi-isolated rural areas and in urban
North Mitrovica.North Mitrovica.1413 Integrating this population into Kosovo’s institutions has been an enduring Integrating this population into Kosovo’s institutions has been an enduring
state-building chal enge and a source of friction between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo accorded state-building chal enge and a source of friction between Kosovo and Serbia. Kosovo accorded
various forms of representation and protection to Kosovo Serbs and other minority groups in its various forms of representation and protection to Kosovo Serbs and other minority groups in its
2008 constitution and related legislation.2008 constitution and related legislation.1514 These provisions established a municipal level of These provisions established a municipal level of
governance with specific areas of responsibility (most Serbs live in municipalities where they governance with specific areas of responsibility (most Serbs live in municipalities where they
form a majority). In addition, the constitution requires Serb representation in parliament, the form a majority). In addition, the constitution requires Serb representation in parliament, the
executive, and other institutions. Consent from minority members of parliament is mandatory on executive, and other institutions. Consent from minority members of parliament is mandatory on
some votes, and Serbian is an official language. Nevertheless, some observers question the some votes, and Serbian is an official language. Nevertheless, some observers question the
effectiveness of these measures in integrating Serbs.effectiveness of these measures in integrating Serbs.1615 Autonomy measures for Kosovo Serbs are a contentious issue in the ongoing EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (see “EU-Led Dialogue to Normalize Relations,” below). More than half of Kosovo Serbs live in several municipalities in central and southeastern Kosovo, where they comprise a majority. These municipalities are largely integrated into Kosovo’s institutions, although wartime legacies of distrust and fear persist. The situation in northern Kosovo has been a more serious chal enge. About 40% of Kosovo Serbs live in four Serb-majority municipalities along the border with Serbia (see map in Figure 1). Pristina has been ~~Autonomy measures for Kosovo Serbs are~~

1110 Freedom House, Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2020: Kosovo; Engjellushe Morina, “Kosovo Snap Election: A Chance for ; Engjellushe Morina, “Kosovo Snap Election: A Chance for
Action,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2021. Action,” European Council on Foreign Relations, February 17, 2021.
1211 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, ~~2019~~2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Kosovo; European Commission, European Commission,
Kosovo Progress Report 2020.
1312 Aida Cama, “EU Ends Kosovo Rule-of-Law Mission amid Criticism over Results,” DeutscheWelle, June 14, 2018. Aida Cama, “EU Ends Kosovo Rule-of-Law Mission amid Criticism over Results,” DeutscheWelle, June 14, 2018.
1413 On population estimates, see T im Judah, “Kosovo’s Demographic Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar.” On population estimates, see T im Judah, “Kosovo’s Demographic Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar.” BalkanInsight,
November 7, 2019; Florian Bieber, “T he Serbs of Kosovo,” in Sabrina Ramet et al., eds., November 7, 2019; Florian Bieber, “T he Serbs of Kosovo,” in Sabrina Ramet et al., eds., Civic and Uncivic Values in
Kosovo (Central European University Press, 2015), pp. 175-197. Hereinafter, Bieber, “ Serbs of Kosovo.” (Central European University Press, 2015), pp. 175-197. Hereinafter, Bieber, “ Serbs of Kosovo.”
1514 Florian Bieber, “Power Sharing and Democracy in Southeast Europe,” Florian Bieber, “Power Sharing and Democracy in Southeast Europe,” Taiwan Journal of Democracy, (Special Issue (Special Issue
2013); Ilire Agimi, “Governance Challenges to Interethnic Relations in Kosovo,” in Mehmeti and Radeljić, eds., 2013); Ilire Agimi, “Governance Challenges to Interethnic Relations in Kosovo,” in Mehmeti and Radeljić, eds.,
Kosovo and Serbia: Contested Options and Shared Consequences (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016),
pp. 85-105.pp. 85-105. Hereinafter, Agimi, “ Governance Challenges.” Hereinafter, Agimi, “ Governance Challenges.”
1615 See discussion in Agimi, “Governance Challenges.” See discussion in Agimi, “Governance Challenges.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
5 5

~~link to page 11 link to page 11 link to page 5~~ ~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~a contentious issue in the ongoing EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia (see “EU-Led~~
~~Dialogue to Normalize Relations,” below).~~
~~More than half of Kosovo Serbs live in several municipalities in central and southeastern Kosovo,~~
~~where they comprise a majority. These municipalities are largely integrated into Kosovo’s~~
~~institutions, although wartime legacies of distrust and fear persist. The situation in northern~~
~~Kosovo has been a more serious chal enge. About 40% of Kosovo Serbs live in four Serb-~~
~~majority municipalities along the border with Serbia (see map in Figure 1). Pristina has been~~
Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy unable to exert full authority in this region, whereas Serbia has retained strong influence there unable to exert full authority in this region, whereas Serbia has retained strong influence there
despite the withdrawal of Serbian forces in 1999. despite the withdrawal of Serbian forces in 1999.
After the war, Kosovo Serbs in the north continued to rely on Serbian-supported After the war, Kosovo Serbs in the north continued to rely on Serbian-supported parallel
structures for security, health care, education, jobs, welfare, and other services. Some of these for security, health care, education, jobs, welfare, and other services. Some of these
structures have been dismantled, but Serbia continues to wield influence through others. Many structures have been dismantled, but Serbia continues to wield influence through others. Many
Kosovo Serbs depend on Serbia for employment and public services.Kosovo Serbs depend on Serbia for employment and public services.1716 This fragmented authority This fragmented authority
has enabled northern Kosovo to become a regional hub for smuggling and other il icit activities has enabled northern Kosovo to become a regional hub for smuggling and other il icit activities
undertaken by organized crime groups. undertaken by organized crime groups.1817
Serbian List party ( Serbian List party (Srpska Lista, SL), which is backed by the Serbian government, has SL), which is backed by the Serbian government, has
overwhelmingly won Serb votes in Kosovo’s recent elections and has been in some of Kosovo’s overwhelmingly won Serb votes in Kosovo’s recent elections and has been in some of Kosovo’s
governing coalitions. There have been reports of harassment and intimidation against rival governing coalitions. There have been reports of harassment and intimidation against rival
Kosovo Serb politicians and an overal shrinking space for opposition to SL. The 2018 murder of Kosovo Serb politicians and an overal shrinking space for opposition to SL. The 2018 murder of
prominent opposition figure Oliver Ivanović raised questions about the power structures and prominent opposition figure Oliver Ivanović raised questions about the power structures and
vested interests that prevail in northern Kosovo.vested interests that prevail in northern Kosovo.1918 In the February 2021 parliamentary elections, In the February 2021 parliamentary elections,
SL won al 10 seats reserved for Serbs. Kosovo officials assert that SL sought to SL won al 10 seats reserved for Serbs. Kosovo officials assert that SL sought to ~~fix~~ influence elections for elections for
some of the 10 some of the 10 ~~remaining~~other non-Serb minority seats and expand its non-Serb minority seats and expand its ~~influence~~clout in parliament. in parliament.2019
Economy
The 1998-1999 war with Serbia caused extensive damage to Kosovo’s infrastructure and The 1998-1999 war with Serbia caused extensive damage to Kosovo’s infrastructure and
economy. Two decades later, economic recovery continues. Employment is a particularly economy. Two decades later, economic recovery continues. Employment is a particularly
chal enging policy issue; Kosovo’s average 40% labor force participation rate is the lowest in the chal enging policy issue; Kosovo’s average 40% labor force participation rate is the lowest in the
Western Balkans. The pre-COVID 19 unemployment rate stood at about 26% in 2019, with Western Balkans. The pre-COVID 19 unemployment rate stood at about 26% in 2019, with
disproportionately higher levels among working-age females and youth. disproportionately higher levels among working-age females and youth.2120
Kosovo has a smal , open economy. Gross domestic product (GDP) steadily grew during the Kosovo has a smal , open economy. Gross domestic product (GDP) steadily grew during the
2010s, with growth rates of 3.8% in 2018 and 4.2% in 2019. Services, agriculture, mining, and 2010s, with growth rates of 3.8% in 2018 and 4.2% in 2019. Services, agriculture, mining, and
construction are key sectors.21 Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kosovo in 2019 was €272 mil ion (about $329 mil ion), the lowest figure in the Western Balkans. By contrast, remittances received from citizens abroad totaled €852 mil ion (about $1 bil ion) in 2019, equivalent to more
1716 Bieber, “Serbs of Kosovo”; OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Bieber, “Serbs of Kosovo”; OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Parallel Structures in Kosovo, October 2003; International October 2003; International
Crisis Group (ICG), Crisis Group (ICG), Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue, January 25, 2021 (hereinafter, ICG, January 25, 2021 (hereinafter, ICG, Relaunching the
Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue); U.S. Department of State, ); U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Hum an Rights Practices for 2019: Kosovo;
Eraldin Fazliu and Jack Robinson, “Eraldin Fazliu and Jack Robinson, “ Srpska Lista Facing Little Opposition in Upcoming Elections,” Srpska Lista Facing Little Opposition in Upcoming Elections,” PrishtinaInsight,
January 20, 2021. January 20, 2021.
1817 See, for example, Global Initiative Against T ransnational Organized Crime, See, for example, Global Initiative Against T ransnational Organized Crime, Hotspots of Organized Crime in the
Western Balkans, May 2019; Marko Prelec, “ North Kosovo Meltdown,” ICG, September 6, 2011; European May 2019; Marko Prelec, “ North Kosovo Meltdown,” ICG, September 6, 2011; European
Commission, Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2020.
19 18 Ibid. European External Action Service, “Well-Administered and T ransparent Elections Affected by an Uneven Ibid. European External Action Service, “Well-Administered and T ransparent Elections Affected by an Uneven
Playing Field, and Marred by Intimidation and Lack of Competition in the Kosovo Serb Areas,” October 8, 2019; Playing Field, and Marred by Intimidation and Lack of Competition in the Kosovo Serb Areas,” October 8, 2019;
“Ivanovic Named Radoicic as North Kosovo Dark Ruler,” “Ivanovic Named Radoicic as North Kosovo Dark Ruler,” BalkanInsight, February 27, 2018. February 27, 2018.
2019 “Vjosa Osmani: Vucic Interfered Directly in Kosovo’s Elections,” “Vjosa Osmani: Vucic Interfered Directly in Kosovo’s Elections,” PrishtinaInsight, February 26, 2021. February 26, 2021.
2120 World Bank, World Bank, Fighting COVID-19; World Bank, ; World Bank, Western Balkans Regular Economic Report: Rising Uncertainties:
Fall 2019. Labor force participation rate reflects the share of working-age persons employed or actively seeking work. . Labor force participation rate reflects the share of working-age persons employed or actively seeking work.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
6

~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~construction are key sectors.22 Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kosovo in 2019 was €272~~
~~mil ion (about $329 mil ion), the lowest figure in the Western Balkans. By contrast, remittances~~
~~received from citizens abroad totaled €852 mil ion (about $1 bil ion) in 2019, equivalent to more~~
21 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, October 2020 (hereafter, WEO Outlook Database, October 2020); U.S. Department of Commerce, Kosovo Country Com m ercial Guide, 2020; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Unleashing the Transform ation Potential for Growth in the Western Balkans, 2019. Congressional Research Service 6 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy than 15% of GDP. Kosovo’s large diaspora also makes significant contributions to the country’s than 15% of GDP. Kosovo’s large diaspora also makes significant contributions to the country’s
economy through tourism, entrepreneurship, and investment. economy through tourism, entrepreneurship, and investment.2322
The International Monetary Fund estimates Kosovo’s GDP contracted by 7.5% in 2020 due to The International Monetary Fund estimates Kosovo’s GDP contracted by 7.5% in 2020 due to
COVID-19.COVID-19.2423 The pandemic also erased Kosovo’s recent gains in employment and poverty The pandemic also erased Kosovo’s recent gains in employment and poverty
reduction. The World Bank assesses that the government’s policy responses helped mitigate some reduction. The World Bank assesses that the government’s policy responses helped mitigate some
of these adverse trends, however. of these adverse trends, however.2524
Kosovo’s key trade partners are the EU and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans. Kosovo’s key trade partners are the EU and neighboring countries in the Western Balkans.
Kosovo has largely liberalized trade with both blocs through its Stabilization and Association Kosovo has largely liberalized trade with both blocs through its Stabilization and Association
Agreement with the EU (a cooperation framework that includes steps to liberalize trade) and as a Agreement with the EU (a cooperation framework that includes steps to liberalize trade) and as a
signatory to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU signatory to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) alongside other non-EU
Balkan countries.Balkan countries.2625 Kosovo’s top exports are metals; plastic and rubber products; mineral Kosovo’s top exports are metals; plastic and rubber products; mineral
products; and prepared foods, beverages, and tobacco.products; and prepared foods, beverages, and tobacco.2726 In 2019, goods exports totaled about In 2019, goods exports totaled about
€384 mil ion ($465.3 mil ion), of which the largest shares went to CEFTA countries and the EU. €384 mil ion ($465.3 mil ion), of which the largest shares went to CEFTA countries and the EU.
In lobbying for greater FDI, Kosovo officials tout the country’s young workforce (the median age In lobbying for greater FDI, Kosovo officials tout the country’s young workforce (the median age
in Kosovo is 29; in the EU, the median age is 44), natural resources, low corporate tax rate, use of in Kosovo is 29; in the EU, the median age is 44), natural resources, low corporate tax rate, use of
the euro as its currency, and preferential access to the EU market. However, various impediments the euro as its currency, and preferential access to the EU market. However, various impediments
to investment remain, including corruption, weak rule of law, uncertainty over Kosovo’s to investment remain, including corruption, weak rule of law, uncertainty over Kosovo’s
unresolved dispute with Serbia, and energy-supply disruptions. Economic conditions and unresolved dispute with Serbia, and energy-supply disruptions. Economic conditions and
perceived limits to upward socioeconomic mobility contribute to high rates of emigration. perceived limits to upward socioeconomic mobility contribute to high rates of emigration.2827
Relations with ~~Serbia29~~Serbia28
Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 with U.S. diplomatic support. Serbia does not Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008 with U.S. diplomatic support. Serbia does not
recognize Kosovo and relies on Russia in particular for diplomatic backing. Many analysts recognize Kosovo and relies on Russia in particular for diplomatic backing. Many analysts
believe the lack of normalized relations between Kosovo and Serbia impedes both countries’ believe the lack of normalized relations between Kosovo and Serbia impedes both countries’
prosperity and progress toward EU membership and imperils Western Balkan stability. Relations prosperity and progress toward EU membership and imperils Western Balkan stability. Relations

~~22 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, October 2020 (hereafter, WEO Outlook~~
~~Database, October 2020); U.S. Department of Commerce, Kosovo Country Com m ercial Guide, 2020; Organisation for~~
~~Economic Co-operation and Development,~~ ~~Unleashing the Transform ation Potential for Growth in the Western~~
~~Balkans,~~ ~~2019.~~
23between the two countries remain fraught. According to the nongovernmental organization International Crisis Group, there is a “low but persistent risk of returning to deadly conflict” in Kosovo, with northern Kosovo in particular a “potential flashpoint for violence.”29 Since 2011, the EU has overseen a dialogue aimed at normalizing Kosovo and Serbia’s relations. Despite some recent progress, a comprehensive final settlement appears unlikely in the near term. 22 Lyra Hadri, “Increasing Diaspora Investments in Kosovo,” Lyra Hadri, “Increasing Diaspora Investments in Kosovo,” PrishtinaInsight, November 5, 2018. T he main source November 5, 2018. T he main source
countries for remittances in 2019 were Germany (41%), Switzerland (20%), and the United States (7%). See Central countries for remittances in 2019 were Germany (41%), Switzerland (20%), and the United States (7%). See Central
Bank of Kosovo, Bank of Kosovo, Annual Report 2019. GDP share data from World Bank, GDP share data from World Bank, Personal Rem ittances, Received (% of
GDP)-Kosovo. Many remittances flow outside of reported channels, making it difficult to estimate actual levels. Kosovo. Many remittances flow outside of reported channels, making it difficult to estimate actual levels.
24 23 WEO Outlook Database, October 2020; World Bank, WEO Outlook Database, October 2020; World Bank, Western Balkans Regular Economic Report: An Uncertain
Recovery: Fall 2020 (hereinafter, World Bank, (hereinafter, World Bank, An Uncertain Recovery). ).
2524 World Bank, World Bank, An Uncertain Recovery. .
2625 CEFT A countries include Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. CEFT A countries include Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.
2726 European Commission, “European Union, T rade in Goods with Kosovo,” February 1, 2020; Central Bank of European Commission, “European Union, T rade in Goods with Kosovo,” February 1, 2020; Central Bank of
Kosovo, Kosovo, Annual Report 2019. 2019 figures for exports to the EU include the United Kingdom. 2019 figures for exports to the EU include the United Kingdom.
2827 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2020 Investment Climate Statements: Kosovo; T im Judah, “Kosovo’s Demographic ; T im Judah, “Kosovo’s Demographic
Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar,” Destiny Looks Eerily Familiar,” BalkanInsight, November 7, 2019. November 7, 2019.
2928 For simplification, this report uses For simplification, this report uses Serbia to refer to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003) and the State to refer to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2003) and the State
Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006); Serbia was the dominant entity in both states. Union of Serbia and Montenegro (2003-2006); Serbia was the dominant entity in both states.
29 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
7 7

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

~~between the two countries remain fraught. According to the nongovernmental organization~~
~~International Crisis Group, there is a “low but persistent risk of returning to deadly conflict” in~~
~~Kosovo, with northern Kosovo in particular a “potential flashpoint for violence.”30 Since 2011,~~
~~the EU has overseen a dialogue aimed at normalizing Kosovo and Serbia’s relations. Despite~~
~~some recent progress, a comprehensive final settlement appears unlikely in the near term.~~
War and Independence
Following centuries of Ottoman rule, Kosovo became part of Serbia in the early 20th century. Following centuries of Ottoman rule, Kosovo became part of Serbia in the early 20th century.
After World War II, it became a province of Serbia, one of Yugoslavia’s six republics. While After World War II, it became a province of Serbia, one of Yugoslavia’s six republics. While
some Serbian perspectives view Kosovo’s incorporation as the return of historical territory that is some Serbian perspectives view Kosovo’s incorporation as the return of historical territory that is
prominent in Serbian national identity narratives, Kosovo Albanians largely view it as an prominent in Serbian national identity narratives, Kosovo Albanians largely view it as an
annexation that resulted in the marginalization of the Albanian-majority population. annexation that resulted in the marginalization of the Albanian-majority population.3130
During the 1980s, Kosovo Albanians grew increasingly mobilized against Serbian rule. In 1989, During the 1980s, Kosovo Albanians grew increasingly mobilized against Serbian rule. In 1989,
Serbia—then led by autocrat Slobodan Milošević, who leveraged Serbian nationalism to Serbia—then led by autocrat Slobodan Milošević, who leveraged Serbian nationalism to
consolidate power—imposed direct rule in Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, amid Yugoslavia’s consolidate power—imposed direct rule in Kosovo. Throughout the 1990s, amid Yugoslavia’s
violent breakup and Milošević’s continued grip on power in Serbia, human rights groups violent breakup and Milošević’s continued grip on power in Serbia, human rights groups
condemned Serbian repression of Albanians in Kosovo, including suppressing Albanian language condemned Serbian repression of Albanians in Kosovo, including suppressing Albanian language
and culture, mass arrests, and purges of Albanians from the public sector and education and culture, mass arrests, and purges of Albanians from the public sector and education
institutions.institutions.3231 In the late 1990s, the Albanian-led Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched an In the late 1990s, the Albanian-led Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched an
insurgency against Serbian rule. Serbia responded with heavy force in 1998 and 1999. insurgency against Serbian rule. Serbia responded with heavy force in 1998 and 1999.
Following a NATO air campaign against Serbian targets in early 1999, Serbia agreed to cease Following a NATO air campaign against Serbian targets in early 1999, Serbia agreed to cease
hostilities and withdraw its forces from Kosovo. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244 hostilities and withdraw its forces from Kosovo. U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1244
authorized the U.N. Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) to provide transitional civil authorized the U.N. Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK) to provide transitional civil
administration and the NATO-led KFOR mission to provide security (both missions stil operate administration and the NATO-led KFOR mission to provide security (both missions stil operate
on a smal er scale). Milošević lost power in 2000 amid mass protests in Serbia. on a smal er scale). Milošević lost power in 2000 amid mass protests in Serbia.
Kosovo’s independence in 2008 followed protracted and ultimately unsuccessful efforts on the Kosovo’s independence in 2008 followed protracted and ultimately unsuccessful efforts on the
part of the international community to broker a settlement with Serbia. Serbia chal enged part of the international community to broker a settlement with Serbia. Serbia chal enged
Kosovo’s actions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); however, the ICJ’s 2010 Kosovo’s actions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ); however, the ICJ’s 2010
advisory opinion found that Kosovo had not contravened international law. advisory opinion found that Kosovo had not contravened international law.
EU-Led Dialogue to Normalize Relations
Following the ICJ ruling, the two parties agreed in 2011 to participate in an EU-led dialogue Following the ICJ ruling, the two parties agreed in 2011 to participate in an EU-led dialogue
aimed at eventual normalization of relations.aimed at eventual normalization of relations.3332 Kosovo and Serbia’s goal of EU membership has Kosovo and Serbia’s goal of EU membership has
helped to incentivize their participation in the dialogue; the EU maintains that neither country can helped to incentivize their participation in the dialogue; the EU maintains that neither country can
join until they normalize relations. Kosovo’s participation in the dialogue also is motivated by its join until they normalize relations. Kosovo’s participation in the dialogue also is motivated by its
desire to clear a path to U.N. and NATO membership. desire to clear a path to U.N. and NATO membership.
The EU-led talks initial y focused on technical measures to enable the cross-border movement of The EU-led talks initial y focused on technical measures to enable the cross-border movement of
goods and people and otherwise improve the quality of life. The EU hoped that beginning with goods and people and otherwise improve the quality of life. The EU hoped that beginning with
practical measures would build trust between the parties and lay the groundwork for more practical measures would build trust between the parties and lay the groundwork for more
sensitive issues. In 2012, the dialogue was elevated to a political level, bringing together leaders sensitive issues. In 2012, the dialogue was elevated to a political level, bringing together leaders

30 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.
31from the two countries. In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo reached the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations (the Brussels Agreement), which included measures to dismantle Serbian-backed paral el structures in northern Kosovo and create an Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM) linking Kosovo’s 10 Serb-majority municipalities. Further talks in 2015 led to additional agreements on the ASM, telecommunications, and other issues. To date, the dialogue has produced 33 agreements. Implementation has progressed in some areas, such as 30 See Leandrit I. Mehmeti and Branislav Radeljić, “Introduction” in Mehmeti and Radeljić, eds., See Leandrit I. Mehmeti and Branislav Radeljić, “Introduction” in Mehmeti and Radeljić, eds., Kosovo and Serbia:
Contested Options and Shared Consequences (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), pp. 3 -13. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016), pp. 3 -13.
3231 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), HRW World Report 1990-Yugoslavia, January 1, 1991. January 1, 1991.
3332 For background, see ICG, For background, see ICG, Kosovo and Serbia after the ICJ Opinion, 2010. 2010.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
8 8

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

~~from the two countries. In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo reached the First Agreement of Principles~~
~~Governing the Normalization of Relations (the Brussels Agreement), which included measures to~~
~~dismantle Serbian-backed paral el structures in northern Kosovo and create an Association of~~
~~Serb Municipalities (ASM) linking Kosovo’s 10 Serb-majority municipalities. Further talks in~~
~~2015 led to additional agreements on the ASM, telecommunications, and other issues. To date, the~~
~~dialogue has produced 33 agreements. Implementation has progressed in some areas, such as~~
Kosovo Serb electoral participation and integrating law enforcement and the judiciary in the north Kosovo Serb electoral participation and integrating law enforcement and the judiciary in the north
into statewide institutions. Other agreements, such as the ASM, have not been implemented. into statewide institutions. Other agreements, such as the ASM, have not been implemented.3433
Although the dialogue format does not predetermine a specific outcome, the EU has urged a Although the dialogue format does not predetermine a specific outcome, the EU has urged a
comprehensive, legal y binding agreement between the parties. Two particularly thorny issues in comprehensive, legal y binding agreement between the parties. Two particularly thorny issues in
any such agreement are (1) what the outcome of any such agreement are (1) what the outcome of normalization would entail (whether Serbia would entail (whether Serbia
would fully recognize Kosovo or accept Kosovo’s institutions and U.N. membership without would fully recognize Kosovo or accept Kosovo’s institutions and U.N. membership without
formal recognition) and (2) how to address northern Kosovo in a final settlement. On the latter formal recognition) and (2) how to address northern Kosovo in a final settlement. On the latter
issue, U.S. and EU officials have mostly rejected local (primarily Serbian) leaders’ occasional issue, U.S. and EU officials have mostly rejected local (primarily Serbian) leaders’ occasional
hints at partition as a potential solution, fearing it would set a dangerous precedent in the Western hints at partition as a potential solution, fearing it would set a dangerous precedent in the Western
Balkans.Balkans.3534 Alternatively, some consider expanded autonomy for Kosovo Serbs, such as the ASM, Alternatively, some consider expanded autonomy for Kosovo Serbs, such as the ASM,
to be a compromise that would preserve Kosovo’s territorial integrity. The ASM agreement’s to be a compromise that would preserve Kosovo’s territorial integrity. The ASM agreement’s
implementation has faced legal hurdles in Kosovo, however, and some Kosovo officials fear that implementation has faced legal hurdles in Kosovo, however, and some Kosovo officials fear that
enhanced autonomy could give Serbia greater leverage in Kosovo.enhanced autonomy could give Serbia greater leverage in Kosovo.3635 As a third scenario, some As a third scenario, some
have posited that an offer of accelerated EU membership and/or financial assistance could bring have posited that an offer of accelerated EU membership and/or financial assistance could bring
about normalization of relations. about normalization of relations.3736
Since late 2015, there has been little progress in reaching new agreements or implementing Since late 2015, there has been little progress in reaching new agreements or implementing
existing measures. Further, a shift in focus absorbed some of the dialogue’s energies. In 2018, existing measures. Further, a shift in focus absorbed some of the dialogue’s energies. In 2018,
then-President Thaçi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić raised the prospect of partition as a then-President Thaçi and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić raised the prospect of partition as a
settlement. To the surprise of some, Trump Administration officials broke with long-standing U.S. settlement. To the surprise of some, Trump Administration officials broke with long-standing U.S.
opposition to redrawing borders by signaling wil ingness to consider such a proposal if Kosovo opposition to redrawing borders by signaling wil ingness to consider such a proposal if Kosovo
and Serbia were to reach a mutual y satisfactory agreement.and Serbia were to reach a mutual y satisfactory agreement.3837 Shortly thereafter, the dialogue Shortly thereafter, the dialogue
came to a halt when Kosovo imposed tariffs on Serbian goods in retaliation for Serbia’s campaign came to a halt when Kosovo imposed tariffs on Serbian goods in retaliation for Serbia’s campaign
to undermine Kosovo’s international legitimacy. Under U.S. and EU pressure, Kosovo lifted the to undermine Kosovo’s international legitimacy. Under U.S. and EU pressure, Kosovo lifted the
measures in June 2020, and EU-led talks resumed in July. EU Special Representative Miroslav measures in June 2020, and EU-led talks resumed in July. EU Special Representative Miroslav
Lajčák has facilitated recent talks on missing persons, property issues, financial claims, and Lajčák has facilitated recent talks on missing persons, property issues, financial claims, and
implementation of the ASM; the latter in particular remains a fraught issue. implementation of the ASM; the latter in particular remains a fraught issue.39

3438 Dialogue Outlook The EU-led dialogue has been operating for more than a decade. Many analysts view a final, comprehensive agreement as unlikely in the near term yet caution that the status quo cannot hold indefinitely. Politicians in Kosovo and Serbia appear to have done relatively little to prepare the public to accept compromise. The International Crisis Group describes a seeming impasse: “[Serbia] has one big concession to make—recognition—which is also [Kosovo’s] main goal ... Yet Kosovo has not explained what it is prepared to offer in exchange and Serbia’s aims are nebulous; [Serbian President] Vučić typical y says his country must get ‘something’ in return ... 33 Donika Emini and Isidora Stakic, Donika Emini and Isidora Stakic, Belgrade and Pristina: Lost in Normalisation?, EU Institute for Security Studies, EU Institute for Security Studies,
April 2018; BIRN, April 2018; BIRN, Big Deal: Lost in Stagnation, April 2015; Marta Szpala, April 2015; Marta Szpala, Serbia-Kosovo Negotiations: Playing for
Tim e Under Pressure from the West, Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), August 21, 2018 . Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), August 21, 2018 .
3534 Analysts believe such a scenario might entail transferring Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo to Serbia, Analysts believe such a scenario might entail transferring Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo to Serbia,
possibly in exchange for Albanian-majority areas of Serbia’s Preševo Valley. possibly in exchange for Albanian-majority areas of Serbia’s Preševo Valley.
3635 ICG, ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue; Balkans Policy Research Group,Balkans Policy Research Group, Scenarios for the ‘Grand Finale’
Between Kosovo and Serbia, 2018; ICG, , 2018; ICG, Kosovo and Serbia After the ICJ Opinion, 2010., 2010.
3736 Given signs of “enlargement fatigue” in some EU member Given signs of “enlargement fatigue” in some EU member ~~stat es~~states, as well as EU concern over Serbia’s compliance , as well as EU concern over Serbia’s compliance
with core EU membership requirements, it is unclear whether the EU would be in a position to extend such an offer. with core EU membership requirements, it is unclear whether the EU would be in a position to extend such an offer.
3837 RFE/RL, “Bolton Says U.S. Won’t Oppose Kosovo-Serbia Land Swap Deal,” RFE/RL, “Bolton Says U.S. Won’t Oppose Kosovo-Serbia Land Swap Deal,” August 24, 2018. August 24, 2018.
3938 European Western Balkans, “T he Fifth Round of Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue at the Expert Level Was Held T oday in European Western Balkans, “T he Fifth Round of Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue at the Expert Level Was Held T oday in
Brussels,” October 29, 2020. Brussels,” October 29, 2020.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
9 9

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

~~Dialogue Outlook~~
~~The EU-led dialogue has been operating for more than a decade. Many analysts view a final,~~
~~comprehensive agreement as unlikely in the near term yet caution that the status quo cannot hold~~
~~indefinitely. Politicians in Kosovo and Serbia appear to have done relatively little to prepare the~~
~~public to accept compromise. The International Crisis Group describes a seeming impasse:~~
~~“[Serbia] has one big concession to make—recognition—which is also [Kosovo’s] main goal ...~~
~~Yet Kosovo has not explained what it is prepared to offer in exchange and Serbia’s aims are~~
~~nebulous; [Serbian President] Vučić typical y says his country must get ‘something’ in return ...~~
~~but offers no details.”~~but offers no details.” With the November 2020 resignation of then-President Thaçi, who largely had led Kosovo’s participation in the dialogue since 2011, Kosovo may lack “a prominent proponent for a negotiated settlement.”39 Many in Kosovo, including key politicians, contend the Many in Kosovo, including key politicians, contend the country should not country should not
have to concede anything to Serbia.40 have to concede anything to Serbia.40
Political divisions in Kosovo have made it difficult for the country to bring a unified position to Political divisions in Kosovo have made it difficult for the country to bring a unified position to
negotiations. negotiations. ~~With the November 2020 resignation of then-President Thaçi, who largely had led~~
~~Kosovo’s participation in the dialogue since 2011, Kosovo may lack “a prominent proponent for a~~
~~negotiated settlement.”41 Some observers assert that the presumptive Vetëvendosje-led~~
~~government, which is expected to form in March 2021, could impact the dynamics of the~~
~~dialogue. In the past, Vetëvendosje has~~ Kosovo’s spring 2021 leadership changes could bring greater internal cohesion and coordination but also could bring a more hard-line approach to relations with Serbia. While in opposition, Vetëvendosje criticized the dialogue, protested against some of its criticized the dialogue, protested against some of its
agreements, and agreements, and cal ed for wartime reparations from Serbia. Ahead of cal ed for wartime reparations from Serbia. Ahead of spring 2021 elections, Vetëvendosje elections, Vetëvendosje
leader (now Prime Ministerleader (now Prime Minister~~-designate) Kurti indicated~~) Kurti stated that the dialogue would be a relatively the dialogue would be a relatively low low
priority and proposed revisiting some of the agreements that have already been reached.priority and proposed revisiting some of the agreements that have already been reached.4241 President Osmani has voiced support for the dialogue but cal s for “remorse and an apology from Serbia and ... justice for those who have suffered from [Serbian] crimes.”42 Both leaders are likely to face considerable EU and U.S. pressure to participate in the dialogue and work toward a comprehensive final settlement.
Separately, some observers caution that growing uncertainty over the Western Balkan countries’ Separately, some observers caution that growing uncertainty over the Western Balkan countries’
EU membership prospects could alter the incentive structure weaving together the dialogue and EU membership prospects could alter the incentive structure weaving together the dialogue and
the accession process, making normalization more chal enging. the accession process, making normalization more chal enging.
Transitional Justice
Transitional justice relating to the 1998-1999 war is a sensitive, emotional y charged issue in Transitional justice relating to the 1998-1999 war is a sensitive, emotional y charged issue in
Kosovo and Serbia and a source of friction in efforts to normalize relations. Serbian police, Kosovo and Serbia and a source of friction in efforts to normalize relations. Serbian police,
soldiers, and paramilitary forces were accused of systematic, intentional human rights violations soldiers, and paramilitary forces were accused of systematic, intentional human rights violations
during the conflict. About 13,000 people were kil ed, and nearly half of the population was during the conflict. About 13,000 people were kil ed, and nearly half of the population was
forcibly driven out of Kosovo. An estimated 20,000 people were victims of conflict-related sexual forcibly driven out of Kosovo. An estimated 20,000 people were victims of conflict-related sexual
violence. The vast majority of al victims were ethnic Albanians. On a smal er scale, some KLA violence. The vast majority of al victims were ethnic Albanians. On a smal er scale, some KLA
fighters—particularly at the local level—carried out retributive acts of violence against Serb fighters—particularly at the local level—carried out retributive acts of violence against Serb
civilians, other minority civilians, and Albanian civilians whom they viewed as collaborators.43 civilians, other minority civilians, and Albanian civilians whom they viewed as collaborators.43
Before closing in 2017, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Before closing in 2017, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
tried several high-profile cases relating to the Kosovo conflict, including those of deposed tried several high-profile cases relating to the Kosovo conflict, including those of deposed
Serbian leader Milošević, who died before his trial finished, and former Kosovo Prime Minister Serbian leader Milošević, who died before his trial finished, and former Kosovo Prime Minister
Ramush Haradinaj, who was twice acquitted of charges relating to his role as a KLA commander. Ramush Haradinaj, who was twice acquitted of charges relating to his role as a KLA commander.

Courts in Kosovo and Serbia now handle most war crimes cases. Weak law enforcement and judicial cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia is an impediment in the many cases in which evidence, witnesses, victims, and al eged perpetrators are no longer in Kosovo.44 Critics assert 39 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue. 40 Marko Subotic, “Kurti’s Comments Spark Pessimism in Belgrade over Kosovo -Serbia T alks,” EuroNews, February 40 Marko Subotic, “Kurti’s Comments Spark Pessimism in Belgrade over Kosovo -Serbia T alks,” EuroNews, February
18, 2021. 18, 2021.
41 41 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.
42 Valon Fana, “Kurti Urges for Discussion on Reparations in Kosovo -Serbia Dialogue,” Valon Fana, “Kurti Urges for Discussion on Reparations in Kosovo -Serbia Dialogue,” PrishtinaInsight, October 28, October 28,
2019; Marko Savkovic, “2019; Marko Savkovic, “ How Does Kurti See the Dialogue?,” How Does Kurti See the Dialogue?,” European Western Balkans, February 11, 2021. February 11, 2021.
42 Quoted in Reuters, “Kosovo Parliament Elects Vjosa Osmani as New National President,” April 4, 2021. 43 For further information, see HRW, 43 For further information, see HRW, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 2001 (hereinafter, HRW, 2001 (hereinafter, HRW, Under Orders); ;
Amnesty International, Amnesty International, “Wounds That Burn Our Souls”: Com pensation for Kosovo’s Wartim e Rape Survivors, But Still
No Justice, 2017; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), , 2017; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told: The
Hum an Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission , 1999. , 1999.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
10

~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~Courts in Kosovo and Serbia now handle most war crimes cases. Weak law enforcement and~~
~~judicial cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia is an impediment in the many cases in which~~
~~evidence, witnesses, victims, and al eged perpetrators are no longer in Kosovo.44 Critics assert~~
44 On current challenges in transitional justice, see Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020; Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), Regional Judicial Cooperation in the Prosecution of War Crim es: Analysis and Im provem ent Congressional Research Service 10 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy that low political wil in Serbia in particular hampers transitional justice. Officials from that low political wil in Serbia in particular hampers transitional justice. Officials from
successive post-Milošević Serbian governments have been criticized for downplaying or failing successive post-Milošević Serbian governments have been criticized for downplaying or failing
to acknowledge Serbia’s role in the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in the 1990s and for to acknowledge Serbia’s role in the wars in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo in the 1990s and for
fostering a climate that is hostile to transitional justice and societal reconciliation with the past.45 fostering a climate that is hostile to transitional justice and societal reconciliation with the past.45
Transitional justice processes concerning the KLA are controversial in Kosovo. Under U.S. and Transitional justice processes concerning the KLA are controversial in Kosovo. Under U.S. and
EU pressure, in 2015 the National Assembly adopted a constitutional amendment and legislation EU pressure, in 2015 the National Assembly adopted a constitutional amendment and legislation
to createto create the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. These institutions the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office. These institutions
are part of Kosovo’s judicial system but are primarily staffed by international jurists and located are part of Kosovo’s judicial system but are primarily staffed by international jurists and located
in The Hague, Netherlands, to al ay concerns over witness intimidation and political pressure. in The Hague, Netherlands, to al ay concerns over witness intimidation and political pressure.
They are to investigate the findings of a 2011 Council of Europe report concerning al egations of They are to investigate the findings of a 2011 Council of Europe report concerning al egations of
war crimes committed by some KLA units. The Specialist Chambers is controversial in Kosovo, war crimes committed by some KLA units. The Specialist Chambers is controversial in Kosovo,
because it is to try only al eged KLA crimes. In 2017, lawmakers from the then-governing because it is to try only al eged KLA crimes. In 2017, lawmakers from the then-governing
coalition moved to abrogate the Specialist Chambers but backed down after the United States and coalition moved to abrogate the Specialist Chambers but backed down after the United States and
al ies warned that doing so would have “severe negative consequences.”46 al ies warned that doing so would have “severe negative consequences.”46
Over the past two years, the Special Chambers has begun issuing summons for questioning to Over the past two years, the Special Chambers has begun issuing summons for questioning to
former KLA combatants and filing indictments against prominent former officials who were KLA former KLA combatants and filing indictments against prominent former officials who were KLA
commanders.47 The highest-profile case is that of former President and Prime Minister Hashim commanders.47 The highest-profile case is that of former President and Prime Minister Hashim
Thaçi, a towering figure in Kosovo’s push for independence and its politics for more than two Thaçi, a towering figure in Kosovo’s push for independence and its politics for more than two
decades. Along with three high-profile codefendants, Thaçi’s charges include six counts of crimes decades. Along with three high-profile codefendants, Thaçi’s charges include six counts of crimes
against humanity and four counts of war crimes.48 While many in Kosovo criticized the actions of against humanity and four counts of war crimes.48 While many in Kosovo criticized the actions of
the Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, EU and U.S. officials reiterated the Specialist Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, EU and U.S. officials reiterated
support for the courts and lauded Kosovo officials’ cooperation with the bodies.49 support for the courts and lauded Kosovo officials’ cooperation with the bodies.49
Relations with the EU and NATO
The EU and NATO have played key roles in Kosovo; these relationships continue to evolve The EU and NATO have played key roles in Kosovo; these relationships continue to evolve
alongside Kosovo’s state-building processes. alongside Kosovo’s state-building processes.
European Union
The EU has played a significant role in Kosovo’s postwar development. As discussed above, the The EU has played a significant role in Kosovo’s postwar development. As discussed above, the
EU has facilitated a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia since 2011. The EU provides the largest EU has facilitated a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia since 2011. The EU provides the largest

~~44 On current challenges in transitional justice, see Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020; Humanitarian Law~~
~~Centre (Belgrade),~~ ~~Regional Judicial Cooperation in the Prosecution of War Crim es: Analysis and Im provem ent~~
~~Recom m endations, December 2018.~~
amount of foreign assistance to Kosovo; it al ocated €602 mil ion (about $717 mil ion) in assistance from 2014 to 2020.50 Many member states also provide bilateral aid to Kosovo through their national foreign assistance programs. Recom m endations, December 2018. 45 On Serbia, see Milica Stojanovic, “Serbia: A Year of Denying War Crimes,” 45 On Serbia, see Milica Stojanovic, “Serbia: A Year of Denying War Crimes,” BalkanInsight, December 26, 2019; December 26, 2019;
HRW, HRW, Under Orders;; Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), Humanitarian Law Centre (Belgrade), Report on War Crim es Trials in Serbia, 2019; and 2019; and
relevant sections in European Commission, relevant sections in European Commission, Serbia Progress Report 2020.
46 U.S. Embassy in Kosovo, “Quint Member States Statement,” 46 U.S. Embassy in Kosovo, “Quint Member States Statement,” ~~Jan uary~~January 4, 2018. 4, 2018.
47 Serbeze Haxhiaj, “Kosovo: War Commanders Questioned as Prosecutors Step Up Probes,” 47 Serbeze Haxhiaj, “Kosovo: War Commanders Questioned as Prosecutors Step Up Probes,” BalkanInsight, December December
27, 2019; Dean Pineles, “ American Dilemma: What if Kosovo’s T haci Is Indicted?” 27, 2019; Dean Pineles, “ American Dilemma: What if Kosovo’s T haci Is Indicted?” BalkanInsight, January 24, 2019. January 24, 2019.
48 Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Hashim T haçi et al.48 Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Hashim T haçi et al. (Case number KSC-BC-2020-06). (Case number KSC-BC-2020-06).
49 U.S. Embassy Pristina, “Statement from the Heads of Mission,” September 18, 2020; European External Action 49 U.S. Embassy Pristina, “Statement from the Heads of Mission,” September 18, 2020; European External Action
Service, “Kosovo: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Latest Service, “Kosovo: Statement by the Spokesperson on the Latest ~~Develo pments~~Developments,” November 5, 2020.,” November 5, 2020. 50 European Commission, “Kosovo—Financial Assistance Under IPA II.”
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
11 11

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

~~amount of foreign assistance to Kosovo; it al ocated €602 mil ion (about $717 mil ion) in~~
~~assistance from 2014 to 2020.50 Many member states also provide bilateral aid to Kosovo through~~
~~their national foreign assistance programs.~~
A European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) was launched in 2008 to assume some of the A European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) was launched in 2008 to assume some of the
policing, justice, and customs functions that UNMIK had carried out since 1999. The mission’s policing, justice, and customs functions that UNMIK had carried out since 1999. The mission’s
broad mandate has decreased over time as domestic institutions assume more responsibilities. broad mandate has decreased over time as domestic institutions assume more responsibilities.
Assessments of EULEX’s results under its initial mandate are mixed.51 Today, EULEX’s primary Assessments of EULEX’s results under its initial mandate are mixed.51 Today, EULEX’s primary
role is to monitor and advise on rule-of-law issues, with some executive functions. EULEX’s role is to monitor and advise on rule-of-law issues, with some executive functions. EULEX’s
Formed Police Unit continues to play a role in internal security as second responder in a three-Formed Police Unit continues to play a role in internal security as second responder in a three-
level system (the domestic Kosovo Police is first responder). 52 level system (the domestic Kosovo Police is first responder). 52
Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU membership and signed a Stabilization and Association Kosovo is a potential candidate for EU membership and signed a Stabilization and Association
Agreement with the EU in 2014.53 Public opinion polls indicate that Kosovo has one of the most Agreement with the EU in 2014.53 Public opinion polls indicate that Kosovo has one of the most
pro-EU populations in the Western Balkans. The next steps in Kosovo’s EU membership bid are pro-EU populations in the Western Balkans. The next steps in Kosovo’s EU membership bid are
obtaining candidate status and launching accession negotiations, which would commence the obtaining candidate status and launching accession negotiations, which would commence the
lengthy process of harmonizing domestic legislation with that of the EU. Kosovo’s EU lengthy process of harmonizing domestic legislation with that of the EU. Kosovo’s EU
membership bid is complicated by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize it.54 membership bid is complicated by the fact that five EU member states do not recognize it.54
Kosovo’s more immediate goal in its relationship with the EU is to obtain for its citizens visa-free Kosovo’s more immediate goal in its relationship with the EU is to obtain for its citizens visa-free
entry into the EU’s Schengen area of free movement, which al ows individuals to travel without entry into the EU’s Schengen area of free movement, which al ows individuals to travel without
passport checks between most European countries. Kosovo is the only Western Balkan country passport checks between most European countries. Kosovo is the only Western Balkan country
that does not have this status, despite EU officials’ assessment that it fulfil ed key requirements in that does not have this status, despite EU officials’ assessment that it fulfil ed key requirements in
2018.55 Some observers contend that the EU’s continued denial of visa liberalization to Kosovo 2018.55 Some observers contend that the EU’s continued denial of visa liberalization to Kosovo
has undercut the bloc’s credibility and influence in the country. has undercut the bloc’s credibility and influence in the country.
NATO
The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was launched in 1999 as a peace-support operation with a The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was launched in 1999 as a peace-support operation with a
mandate under UNSC Resolution 1244. KFOR’s initial objectives were to prevent renewed mandate under UNSC Resolution 1244. KFOR’s initial objectives were to prevent renewed
violence and establish public safety and security. Early on, NATO deployed additional troops to violence and establish public safety and security. Early on, NATO deployed additional troops to
aid KFOR on several occasions amid interethnic violence and destabilizing incidents. In response aid KFOR on several occasions amid interethnic violence and destabilizing incidents. In response
to an improving security situation, in 2009, NATO defense ministers resolved to shift KFOR’s to an improving security situation, in 2009, NATO defense ministers resolved to shift KFOR’s
posture toward a deterrent presence. Some of KFOR’s functions have been transferred to the posture toward a deterrent presence. Some of KFOR’s functions have been transferred to the
Kosovo Police. KFOR’s current role is to maintain safety and security, support free movement of Kosovo Police. KFOR’s current role is to maintain safety and security, support free movement of
citizens, and facilitate Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Many analysts assert that KFOR citizens, and facilitate Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Many analysts assert that KFOR
continues to play an important role in both internal and regional security.56 continues to play an important role in both internal and regional security.56

~~50 European Commission, “Kosovo—Financial Assistance Under IPA II.”~~
The United States is the largest contributor to KFOR, providing about 660 of the 3,500 troops deployed as of February 2021.57 KFOR is headquartered in in Pristina (Camp Film City) and has two regional commands: one based in southeastern Kosovo (Camp Bondsteel) and the other in the 51 Some have criticized EULEX’s limited track record in cases concerning war crimes, high -level corruption, and 51 Some have criticized EULEX’s limited track record in cases concerning war crimes, high -level corruption, and
organized crime during the decade when EULEX had broad powers in Kosovo’s judiciaryorganized crime during the decade when EULEX had broad powers in Kosovo’s judiciary . See Naim Rashiti, . See Naim Rashiti, Ten
Years After EULEX: Key Principles for Future EU Flagship Initiatives on the Rule of Law, Centre for European Policy Centre for European Policy
(Brussels), May 2019; T oby Vogel, “Auditors Say EU Mission in Kosovo Ineffective,” Politico.eu, October 30, 2012.(Brussels), May 2019; T oby Vogel, “Auditors Say EU Mission in Kosovo Ineffective,” Politico.eu, October 30, 2012.
52 EULEX, “About EULEX;” UNMIK, “Rule of Law in Kosovo and the Mandate of UNMIK.”52 EULEX, “About EULEX;” UNMIK, “Rule of Law in Kosovo and the Mandate of UNMIK.”
53 European Commission, 53 European Commission, Kosovo Progress Report 2020. T he Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into T he Stabilization and Association Agreement entered into
force in 2016. force in 2016.
54 T he five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, 54 T he five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, ~~and~~a nd Spain. Spain.
55 Kosovo fulfilled a key requirement, the ratification of a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro, in 2018. 55 Kosovo fulfilled a key requirement, the ratification of a border demarcation agreement with Montenegro, in 2018.
European Commission, “Visa Liberalisation: Commission Confirms Kosovo Fulfils All Required Benchmarks,” July European Commission, “Visa Liberalisation: Commission Confirms Kosovo Fulfils All Required Benchmarks,” July
18, 2018; Die Morina, “18, 2018; Die Morina, “ Kosovo’s EU Visa Liberalisation Hopes Dwindle in 2019,” Kosovo’s EU Visa Liberalisation Hopes Dwindle in 2019,” BalkanInsight, January 16, 2019. January 16, 2019.
56 “Is KFOR Still Guaranteeing Stability and Security in Kosovo?” 56 “Is KFOR Still Guaranteeing Stability and Security in Kosovo?” European Western Balkans, December 17, 2018. December 17, 2018.
57 Ibid; NAT O, “KFOR: Key Facts and Figures,” February 2021. Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
12 12

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

~~The United States is the largest contributor to KFOR, providing about 660 of the 3,500 troops~~
~~deployed as of February 2021.57 KFOR is headquartered in in Pristina (Camp Film City) and has~~
~~two regional commands: one based in southeastern Kosovo (Camp Bondsteel) and the other in the~~
west (Camp Vil agio Italia). Any changes to the size of the mission would require approval from west (Camp Vil agio Italia). Any changes to the size of the mission would require approval from
the North Atlantic Council and would be “dictated by continued positive conditions on the the North Atlantic Council and would be “dictated by continued positive conditions on the
ground.”58 ground.”58
KFOR has played a key role in developing the lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and KFOR has played a key role in developing the lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and
bringing it to full operational capacity. KSF’s current role is largely nonmilitary in nature and is bringing it to full operational capacity. KSF’s current role is largely nonmilitary in nature and is
focused instead on emergency response. A recurring issue is how KSF may transform into a focused instead on emergency response. A recurring issue is how KSF may transform into a
regular army. In December 2018, Kosovo lawmakers amended legislation to gradual y transform regular army. In December 2018, Kosovo lawmakers amended legislation to gradual y transform
KSF by increasing its size and expanding its competencies to include territorial defense.59 Serbian KSF by increasing its size and expanding its competencies to include territorial defense.59 Serbian
officials strongly objected, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg cal ed the measure “ill officials strongly objected, and NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg cal ed the measure “ill
timed” amid rising Kosovo-Serbia tensions. The United States expressed support for the Kosovo timed” amid rising Kosovo-Serbia tensions. The United States expressed support for the Kosovo
government’s decision but urged officials to ensure a gradual, inclusive transformation.60 government’s decision but urged officials to ensure a gradual, inclusive transformation.60
U.S.-Kosovo Relations
The United States enjoys broad popularity in Kosovo due to its support during the Milošević era, The United States enjoys broad popularity in Kosovo due to its support during the Milošević era,
leadership of NATO’s 1999 intervention in the Kosovo war, backing of Kosovo’s independence leadership of NATO’s 1999 intervention in the Kosovo war, backing of Kosovo’s independence
in 2008, and subsequent diplomatic support for Kosovo. Kosovo regards the United States as a in 2008, and subsequent diplomatic support for Kosovo. Kosovo regards the United States as a
security guarantor and critical al y, and many believe the United States has significant influence security guarantor and critical al y, and many believe the United States has significant influence
in Kosovo’s domestic policymaking and politics. in Kosovo’s domestic policymaking and politics.
Support for Normalization of Kosovo-Serbia Relations
Successive U.S. Administrations have supported EU-led efforts to normalize Kosovo and Serbia’s Successive U.S. Administrations have supported EU-led efforts to normalize Kosovo and Serbia’s
relations, while general y avoiding a formal U.S. role in the dialogue format (in part due to relations, while general y avoiding a formal U.S. role in the dialogue format (in part due to
expectations that Russia could seek a similar role).61 Many analysts contend that U.S. and EU expectations that Russia could seek a similar role).61 Many analysts contend that U.S. and EU
policy regarding the dispute is more effective when coordinated.62 Because of the close U.S.-policy regarding the dispute is more effective when coordinated.62 Because of the close U.S.-
Kosovo relationship, some observers view the United States as uniquely positioned to help Kosovo relationship, some observers view the United States as uniquely positioned to help
Kosovo’s political class overcome divisions on the dialogue.63 Kosovo’s political class overcome divisions on the dialogue.63
Under the Trump Administration, U.S. officials played a more direct role in Kosovo-Serbia Under the Trump Administration, U.S. officials played a more direct role in Kosovo-Serbia
negotiations, asserting that normalization of the two countries’ relations was a strategic priority.64 negotiations, asserting that normalization of the two countries’ relations was a strategic priority.64
U.S. policy initial y focused on bringing Kosovo and Serbia back to negotiations (the process had U.S. policy initial y focused on bringing Kosovo and Serbia back to negotiations (the process had

~~57 Ibid; NAT O, “KFOR: Key Facts and Figures,” February 2021.~~
halted in late 2018) and subsequently focused on directly facilitating talks.65 In early 2020, U.S. officials announced two new Kosovo-Serbia agreements on transportation links. In September 2020, shortly after the EU-led dialogue resumed, then-Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vučić met at the White House to sign separate agreements largely aimed at normalizing economic 58 NAT O, “T he Evolution of NAT O’s Role in Kosovo,” November 19, 2019. 58 NAT O, “T he Evolution of NAT O’s Role in Kosovo,” November 19, 2019.
59 “Kosovo Votes to T urn Security Force into Army,” 59 “Kosovo Votes to T urn Security Force into Army,” BalkanInsight, December 14, 2018. December 14, 2018.
60 RFE/RL, “NAT O Chief Warns Kosovo over ‘Ill-T imed’ Army Plans,” December 5, 2018; “Statement from U.S. 60 RFE/RL, “NAT O Chief Warns Kosovo over ‘Ill-T imed’ Army Plans,” December 5, 2018; “Statement from U.S.
Embassy Pristina,” December 14, 2018. Embassy Pristina,” December 14, 2018.
61 Filip Rudic, “Serbia Seeks Russian Role in Kosovo T alks,” 61 Filip Rudic, “Serbia Seeks Russian Role in Kosovo T alks,” BalkanInsight, December 20, 2017. December 20, 2017.
62 Florian Bieber, 62 Florian Bieber, Leadership Adrift: American Policy in the Western Balkans, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory
Group, August 2019; Majda Ruge, Group, August 2019; Majda Ruge, Trum p’s Kosovo Show: No Big Deal, European Council on Foreign Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations,
September 10, 2020 (hereafter, Ruge, September 10, 2020 (hereafter, Ruge, Trum p’s Kosovo Show). ).
63 ICG, 63 ICG, Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue.
64 U.S. Embassy in Pristina, “Special Representative for the Western Balkans Matthew Palmer,” November 1, 2019. 64 U.S. Embassy in Pristina, “Special Representative for the Western Balkans Matthew Palmer,” November 1, 2019.
See also “T rump Gave Grenell Full Mandate to Clinch a Quick Deal on Kosovo,” See also “T rump Gave Grenell Full Mandate to Clinch a Quick Deal on Kosovo,” Bloomberg, October 9, 2019. October 9, 2019.
~~Congressional Research Service~~
13

~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~halted in late 2018) and subsequently focused on directly facilitating talks.65 In early 2020, U.S.~~
~~officials announced two new Kosovo-Serbia agreements on transportation links. In September~~
~~2020, shortly after the EU-led dialogue resumed, then-Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President~~
~~Vučić met at the White House to sign separate agreements largely focused on normalizing~~
~~economic~~ 65 Julija Simic, “U.S. Envoy T ells Serbia, Kosovo to Make Concessions, Cooperate,” Euractiv, January 24, 2020. Congressional Research Service 13 link to page 18 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy relations. Among other measures, the two parties pledged to work on cross-border relations. Among other measures, the two parties pledged to work on cross-border
infrastructure projects with support from the U.S. International Development Finance infrastructure projects with support from the U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation. Through a side agreement, the United States also facilitated Kosovo and Israel’s Corporation. Through a side agreement, the United States also facilitated Kosovo and Israel’s
mutual diplomatic recognition (formalized on February 1, 2021), and Kosovo agreed to locate its mutual diplomatic recognition (formalized on February 1, 2021), and Kosovo agreed to locate its
embassy in Jerusalem. The aforementioned initiatives were brokered outside of the EU-led embassy in Jerusalem. The aforementioned initiatives were brokered outside of the EU-led
~~dialogue~~ dialogue framework, and U.S. officials reportedly did not fully consult with EU officials in framework, and U.S. officials reportedly did not fully consult with EU officials in
advance.66 advance.66
The Trump Administration hailed the new measures as a breakthrough in Kosovo and Serbia’s The Trump Administration hailed the new measures as a breakthrough in Kosovo and Serbia’s
relations. Many observers welcomed greater U.S. involvement in normalization talks, and some relations. Many observers welcomed greater U.S. involvement in normalization talks, and some
assessed that it helped spur the EU to redouble its efforts in the dialogue.67 For Kosovo, Israel’s assessed that it helped spur the EU to redouble its efforts in the dialogue.67 For Kosovo, Israel’s
diplomatic recognition was a particularly welcome development. Kosovo politicians and parties diplomatic recognition was a particularly welcome development. Kosovo politicians and parties
had mixed reactions to other aspects of the U.S.-brokered agreements, however. Some observers had mixed reactions to other aspects of the U.S.-brokered agreements, however. Some observers
questioned their legal standing and the prospects for implementing various measures, including questioned their legal standing and the prospects for implementing various measures, including
several that overlapped with existing EU-brokered agreements and EU-backed projects. Others several that overlapped with existing EU-brokered agreements and EU-backed projects. Others
asserted that weaker transatlantic coordination under the Trump Administration had effectively asserted that weaker transatlantic coordination under the Trump Administration had effectively
created a two-track dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and sown confusion in Belgrade and created a two-track dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and sown confusion in Belgrade and
Pristina.68 Some Members of Congress expressed concern over reportedly strong U.S. pressure on Pristina.68 Some Members of Congress expressed concern over reportedly strong U.S. pressure on
Kosovo’s government to return to negotiations in early 2020, including temporary suspension of Kosovo’s government to return to negotiations in early 2020, including temporary suspension of
assistance through Kosovo’s Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program.69 assistance through Kosovo’s Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program.69
Biden Administration officials have affirmed support for the EU-led dialogue and have cal ed for Biden Administration officials have affirmed support for the EU-led dialogue and have cal ed for
greater cooperation with the EU on the dispute as part of broader efforts to revitalize transatlantic greater cooperation with the EU on the dispute as part of broader efforts to revitalize transatlantic
alignment on global chal enges.70 One early development is the Administration’s seeming alignment on global chal enges.70 One early development is the Administration’s seeming
emphasis on Serbian recognition of Kosovo emphasis on Serbian recognition of Kosovo (“mutual recognition”) as part of a final settlement—as part of a final settlement— an outcome that an outcome that
Kosovo insists upon but Serbia has not committed to.71 Kosovo insists upon but Serbia has not committed to.71

~~65 Julija Simic, “U.S. Envoy T ells Serbia, Kosovo to Make Concessions, Cooperate,” Euractiv, January 24, 2020.~~
Foreign Assistance The United States remains a significant source of foreign assistance to Kosovo, although U.S. assistance levels have declined since independence (see Figure 2). U.S. assistance aims to 66 Jack Robinson, “Lajcak: DC Agreements Pushed Kosovo Further Away from European Future,” 66 Jack Robinson, “Lajcak: DC Agreements Pushed Kosovo Further Away from European Future,” PrishtinaInsight,
January 12, 2021; Patrick Kingsley and Kenneth P. Vogel, “ Pushing for Serbia-Kosovo Peace Deal, U.S. Roils Allies,” January 12, 2021; Patrick Kingsley and Kenneth P. Vogel, “ Pushing for Serbia-Kosovo Peace Deal, U.S. Roils Allies,”
New York Tim es, June 20, 2020. June 20, 2020.
67 Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 67 Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade & Prishtina Dialogue about Dialogue, October 2020; European October 2020; European
Western Balkans, “Western Balkans, “ Miroslav Lajcak Appointed as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and Miroslav Lajcak Appointed as EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and
Regional Issues,” April 3, 2020. Regional Issues,” April 3, 2020.
68 Ruge, 68 Ruge, Trump’s Kosovo Show; Jeta Xharra and Perparim Isufi, “Kosovo ‘Should Rethink Serbia Agreements’ with ; Jeta Xharra and Perparim Isufi, “Kosovo ‘Should Rethink Serbia Agreements’ with
Biden in Power,” Biden in Power,” BalkanInsight, January 5, 2021; January 5, 2021; PrishtinaInsight January 12, 2021, op. cit. January 12, 2021, op. cit.
69 69 ~~T hen-Prime Minister (and current P rime Minister-designate)~~Prime Minister Albin Kurti alleged that U.S. officials aided efforts to Albin Kurti alleged that U.S. officials aided efforts to
unseat his government in the March 2020 no -confidence session whenunseat his government in the March 2020 no -confidence session when he resisted U.S. pressure to immediately lift he resisted U.S. pressure to immediately lift
tariffs and return to talks. RFE/RL, “ Kosovo’s Kurti Accusestariffs and return to talks. RFE/RL, “ Kosovo’s Kurti Accuses U.S. Envoy of ‘Direct Involvement’ in Collapse of His U.S. Envoy of ‘Direct Involvement’ in Collapse of His
Government,” April 20, 2020; U.S. HouseGovernment,” April 20, 2020; U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations, “Engel & Menendez of Representatives Committee on Foreign Relations, “Engel & Menendez
Express Concern about T rump Express Concern about T rump ~~Administration~~ Administrat ion Approach to Serbia and Kosovo,” April 13, 2020.Approach to Serbia and Kosovo,” April 13, 2020.
70 Keida Kostreci, “By Weighing in on Long-Running Serbia-Kosovo Dispute, Biden Signals Interest in Europe,” 70 Keida Kostreci, “By Weighing in on Long-Running Serbia-Kosovo Dispute, Biden Signals Interest in Europe,”
Voice of America, February 24, 2021; Nike Ching, “U.S. to Scrutinize Beijing Commitments Under EU -China Voice of America, February 24, 2021; Nike Ching, “U.S. to Scrutinize Beijing Commitments Under EU -China
Investment Deal,” Voice of America, February 24, 2021. Investment Deal,” Voice of America, February 24, 2021.
71 In correspondence with Kosovo and Serbia’s leaders, President Biden urged the parties to reach “a comprehensive 71 In correspondence with Kosovo and Serbia’s leaders, President Biden urged the parties to reach “a comprehensive
agreement ... focused on agreement ... focused on m utual recognition.” Quoted in RFE/RL, “ Biden Says Kosovo Holds ‘Special Place’ for His .” Quoted in RFE/RL, “ Biden Says Kosovo Holds ‘Special Place’ for His
Family,” February 17, 2021 (emphasis added). Family,” February 17, 2021 (emphasis added). ~~Euractiv, “Vucic to Biden: Kosovo Recognition Not Mentioned in Any~~
~~Agreement,” February 8, 2021.~~
~~Congressional Research Service~~
14

~~link to page 18~~

Secretary of State Antony Blinken is also quoted as urging a comprehensive agreement based on “mutual recognition.” Quoted in Zeljko T rkanjec, “U.S. Goal is to See Serbia -Kosovo Agreement Centered on Mutual Recognition,” Euractiv, April 1, 2021. Congressional Research Service 14 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy ~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

~~Foreign Assistance~~
~~The United States is a significant source of foreign assistance to Kosovo (see Figure 2). U.S.~~
~~assistance aims to~~ support the implementation of agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue support the implementation of agreements from the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue
and to improve transparent and responsive governance, among other goals.72 Additional and to improve transparent and responsive governance, among other goals.72 Additional
assistance is provided through a $49 mil ion MCC Threshold Program that launched in 2017, assistance is provided through a $49 mil ion MCC Threshold Program that launched in 2017,
with focus on governance and energy efficiency and reliability.with focus on governance and energy efficiency and reliability. Threshold programs are intended Threshold programs are intended
to help countries become to help countries become ~~eligible~~ eligible to participate in a larger Compact Program. In December 2018, to participate in a larger Compact Program. In December 2018,
the MCC board determined Kosovo was eligiblethe MCC board determined Kosovo was eligible to participate in a compact; this assessment was to participate in a compact; this assessment was
renewed in 2019 renewed in 2019 and 2020. As discussed above, MCC assistance was suspended temporarily in and 2020. As discussed above, MCC assistance was suspended temporarily in
2020. 2020.
Figure 2. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Kosovo Since 2008

Source: U.S. State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; State Department, FY2020 Estimate Data. U.S. State Department Congressional Budget Justifications; State Department, FY2020 Estimate Data.
Notes: Includes assistance through Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Assistance Includes assistance through Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs. Assistance
extended through the Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation is not included. FY2020 data are partial y reported. extended through the Mil ennium Chal enge Corporation is not included. FY2020 data are partial y reported.
Assistance figures have not been adjusted for inflation. Assistance figures have not been adjusted for inflation.
Cooperation on Transnational Threats and Security Issues
The United States and Kosovo cooperate to combat transnational threats and bolster security. Like The United States and Kosovo cooperate to combat transnational threats and bolster security. Like
elsewhere in the Western Balkans, Kosovo is a transit country and in some cases a source country elsewhere in the Western Balkans, Kosovo is a transit country and in some cases a source country
for trafficking in humans, contraband smuggling (including il icit drugs), and other criminal for trafficking in humans, contraband smuggling (including il icit drugs), and other criminal
activities. Observers consider Kosovo to have a relatively strong legal framework to counter these activities. Observers consider Kosovo to have a relatively strong legal framework to counter these
threats. At the same time, U.S. and EU officials have urged Kosovo to better implement its threats. At the same time, U.S. and EU officials have urged Kosovo to better implement its
domestic laws by more strenuously investigating, prosecuting, and convicting cases.73 domestic laws by more strenuously investigating, prosecuting, and convicting cases.73

~~72 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Kosovo, October 31, 2019.~~
73 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Kosovo (Tier 2).
~~Congressional Research Service~~
15

~~Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy~~

Combating terrorism and violent extremism is a core area of U.S.-Kosovo security cooperation. Combating terrorism and violent extremism is a core area of U.S.-Kosovo security cooperation.
Kosovo is a secular state with a moderate Islamic tradition, but an estimated 400 Kosovo citizens Kosovo is a secular state with a moderate Islamic tradition, but an estimated 400 Kosovo citizens
traveled to Syria and Iraq in the 2010s to support the Islamic State amid the terrorist group’s traveled to Syria and Iraq in the 2010s to support the Islamic State amid the terrorist group’s
growing recruitment efforts. As this policy chal enge emerged, the United States assisted Kosovo growing recruitment efforts. As this policy chal enge emerged, the United States assisted Kosovo
72 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Kosovo, October 31, 2019. 73 U.S. Department of State, 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Kosovo (Tier 2). Congressional Research Service 15 Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy with tightening its legal framework to combat recruitment, foreign fighter travel, and terrorism with tightening its legal framework to combat recruitment, foreign fighter travel, and terrorism
financing, as wel as strengthening its countering violent extremism strategy.74 financing, as wel as strengthening its countering violent extremism strategy.74
The United States provides support to Kosovo law enforcement and judicial institutions to The United States provides support to Kosovo law enforcement and judicial institutions to
combat terrorism and extremism. The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, for combat terrorism and extremism. The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, for
example, has provided training or capacity-building support for the Kosovo Police example, has provided training or capacity-building support for the Kosovo Police
Counterterrorism Directorate and for the Border Police. Kosovo and the United States agreed to Counterterrorism Directorate and for the Border Police. Kosovo and the United States agreed to
an extradition treaty in March 2016. In April 2019, the United States provided diplomatic and an extradition treaty in March 2016. In April 2019, the United States provided diplomatic and
logistical support for the repatriation of about 110 Kosovo citizens from Syria—primarily women logistical support for the repatriation of about 110 Kosovo citizens from Syria—primarily women
and children—who had supported the Islamic State or were born to parents who had. Some and children—who had supported the Islamic State or were born to parents who had. Some
repatriated persons were indicted on terrorism-related charges.75 repatriated persons were indicted on terrorism-related charges.75
Kosovo has a sister-state relationship with Iowa that grew out of a 2011 State Partnership Kosovo has a sister-state relationship with Iowa that grew out of a 2011 State Partnership
Program (SPP) between the Iowa National Guard and the KSF. That relationship has been hailed Program (SPP) between the Iowa National Guard and the KSF. That relationship has been hailed
as a “textbook example” of the scope and aims of the SPP. In January 2021, Kosovo’s parliament as a “textbook example” of the scope and aims of the SPP. In January 2021, Kosovo’s parliament
approved a U.S.-Kosovo agreement to deploy KSF units in global peacekeeping missions under approved a U.S.-Kosovo agreement to deploy KSF units in global peacekeeping missions under
the command of the Iowa National Guard.76 the command of the Iowa National Guard.76
Congressional Engagement
Congressional interest in Kosovo predates Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Through resolutions, Congressional interest in Kosovo predates Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Through resolutions,
hearings, and congressional delegations, many Members of Congress highlighted the status of hearings, and congressional delegations, many Members of Congress highlighted the status of
ethnic Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia, engaged in heated debates over military intervention ethnic Albanian minorities in Yugoslavia, engaged in heated debates over military intervention
during the Clinton Administration, urged the George W. Bush Administration to back Kosovo’s during the Clinton Administration, urged the George W. Bush Administration to back Kosovo’s
independence, and supported continued financial assistance. independence, and supported continued financial assistance.
Congressional interest and support continues. In the 116th Congress, several hearings addressed Congressional interest and support continues. In the 116th Congress, several hearings addressed
Kosovo in part or in whole, including an April 2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on Kosovo in part or in whole, including an April 2019 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on
Kosovo’s wartime victims and hearings on Western Balkan issues held by the Senate Armed Kosovo’s wartime victims and hearings on Western Balkan issues held by the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe and Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation. Regional Security Cooperation.
Congressional interest in Kosovo is also tied to interest in developments in Kosovo’s neighboring countries and broader regional concerns. Given Kosovo’s geography, history, and current chal enges, the country also factors into wider Given Kosovo’s geography, history, and current chal enges, the country also factors into wider
U.S. foreign policy issues in which Congress remains engaged. Such issues include transitional U.S. foreign policy issues in which Congress remains engaged. Such issues include transitional
justice, the rule of law, combating human trafficking and organized crime, U.S. foreign assistance justice, the rule of law, combating human trafficking and organized crime, U.S. foreign assistance
and overseas military deployments, security in Europe, and EU and NATO enlargement. and overseas military deployments, security in Europe, and EU and NATO enlargement.
Author Information Sarah E. Garding Analyst in European Affairs
74 See U.S. Department of State, 74 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism: Kosovo for 2014-2019. for 2014-2019.
75 “Kosovo Is T rying to Reintegrate ISIL Returnees. Will It Work?” 75 “Kosovo Is T rying to Reintegrate ISIL Returnees. Will It Work?” Al Jazeera, June 9, 2019. June 9, 2019.
76 “Iowa, Kosovo a Model National Guard State Partnership Program,” National Guard, November 25, 2015; 76 “Iowa, Kosovo a Model National Guard State Partnership Program,” National Guard, November 25, 2015;
Associated Press, “Kosovo Approves Sending Army T roops on Peacekeeping Missions,” January 5, 2021.Associated Press, “Kosovo Approves Sending Army T roops on Peacekeeping Missions,” January 5, 2021.
Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
16 16

Kosovo: Background and U.S. Policy

~~Author Information~~

~~Sarah E. Garding~~

~~Analyst in European Affairs~~

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should n ot be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

Congressional Research Service Congressional Research Service
R46175 R46175 · VERSION 67 · UPDATED
17 17