Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
link to page 1 link to page 2 
Updated April 17, 2023
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly called
airborne C-UAS options, although the status of such efforts
drones, have proliferated rapidly and are available to nation
is unclear.
states and to nonstate actors and individuals. These systems
could provide U.S. adversaries with a low-cost means of
Figure 1. Man-Portable Counter-UAS Technology
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions against—or attacking—U.S. forces. Furthermore,
many smaller UASs cannot be detected by traditional air
defense systems due to their size, construction material, and
flight altitude. As a result, in FY2023, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plans to spend at least $668 million on
counter-UAS (C-UAS) research and development and at
least $78 million on C-UAS procurement. As DOD
continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems,
congressional oversight of their use may increase, and
Congress may have to make decisions about future
authorizations, appropriations, and other legislative actions.
C-UAS Technology
C-UAS can employ a number of methods to detect the
Source: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/01/15/new-
presence of hostile or unauthorized UAS. The first is using
pentagon-team-wil -develop-ways-fight-enemy-drones.html.
electro-optical, infrared, or acoustic sensors to detect a
target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively.
Navy
A second method is to use radar systems. However, these
methods are not always capable of detecting small UAS due
In 2014, the Navy fielded the first operational directed-
energy weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), aboard
to the limited signatures and size of such UAS. A third
method is identifying the wireless signals used to control
the USS Ponce (LPD-15). LaWS is a 30 kW laser prototype
the UAS, commonly using radio frequency sensors. These
capable of performing a C-UAS mission. The Navy has also
deployed ODIN, an optical dazzler that interferes with UAS
methods can be—and often are—combined to provide a
more effective, layered detection capability.
sensors, and HELIOS, a 60 kW laser, aboard Arleigh Burke
Flight IIA destroyers. Both systems are intended to protect
U.S. assets from UAS attacks.
Once detected, the UAS may be engaged or disabled.
Electronic warfare “jamming” can interfere with a UAS’s
Marine Corps
communications link to its operator. Jamming devices can
The Marine Corps funds a number of C-UAS systems
be as light as 5 to 10 pounds and therefore man-portable
(see Figure 1), or as heavy as several hundred pounds and
through its Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) program
in fixed locations or mounted on vehicles. UAS can also be
office. For example, in 2019, the Corps completed overseas
tests of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
neutralized or destroyed using guns, nets, directed energy,
traditional air defense systems, or even trained animals such
(MADIS), which employs jamming and guns. The system
as eagles. DOD is developing and procuring a number of
can be mounted on MRZR all-terrain vehicles, Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles, and other platforms (see Figure 2). In
different C-UAS technologies to try to ensure a robust
defensive capability.
July 2019, Marines aboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4) used
MADIS to neutralize an Iranian UAS that was deemed to be
Air Force
within “threatening range” of the ship. As part of GBAD,
The Air Force is developing high-powered microwaves and
the Marine Corps is also procuring the Compact Laser
lasers—both forms of directed energy—for C-UAS
Weapons System (CLaWS), the first DOD-approved
ground-based laser. This system—which reportedly comes
missions. For example, the Air Force has deployed a 15
kilowatt (kW) vehicle-mounted C-UAS system—the High-
in variants of 2, 5, and 10 kWs—is also in use by the Army.
Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)—in OCONUS
Although the Marine Corps has experimented with man-
portable C-UAS technologies, now-Commandant of the
(Outside the Continental United States) locations. HELWS
is intended to identify and neutralize hostile or unauthorized
Marine Corps David Berger testified to Congress in 2019
that they “have not panned out” due to weight and power
UAS in seconds and, when connected to a generator, to
provide “a
requirements.
nearly infinite number of shots,” according to
HELWS developer Raytheon. As stated in its 2016 Small
UAS Flight Plan, the Air Force has additionally considered
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Figure 2. Marine Air Defense Integrated System
assessments of fielded C-sUAS systems and makes
recommendations for further investments.
JCO has produced a Joint Capability Development
Document outlining operational requirements for future
systems and, in January 2021, released a DOD C-sUAS
strategy. JCO has also produced several training modules
and reference guides and is in the process of establishing a
Joint C-sUAS academy at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The
academy is to synchronize training on counter-drone tactics
across the military services.
Finally, Section 1074 of the FY2021 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-283) requires a series
of reports to Congress, including a report on and
Source: https://www.marcorsyscom.marines.mil/PEOs/-PEO-LS/PM-
independent assessment of the JCO’s C-sUAS activities and
GBAD/.
a report on the threat posed by UAS. Section 162 of the
Army
FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of
Defense to conduct an assessment of the threats posed by
In July 2016, the Army published a C-UAS strategy to
UAS swarms and of DOD counter-swarm capabilities. It
guide the development of its C-UAS capabilities (to date
additionally directs the Secretary to “develop and
the only service to do so publicly). This was followed in
implement a strategy to field capabilities to counter threats
April 2017 by Army Techniques Publication 3-01.81,
posed by unmanned aerial system swarms.”
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, which
outlined “planning considerations for defending against
Potential Questions for Congress
low, slow, small [LSS] unmanned air threats during
operations,” as well as “how to plan for, and incorporate, C
Is DOD funding of C-UAS systems appropriately
-
UAS soldier tasks into unit training events.” C
balanced between research and development and
-UAS is also
procurement programs?
part of the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development
Command’s six
-layer air and missile defense concept,
To what extent, if at all, has the designation of a DOD
composed of (1) Ballistic, Low-Altitude Drone Engagement
executive agent for C-UAS reduced redundancies and
(BLADE), (2) Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser
increased efficiencies in C-UAS procurement?
(MMHEL), (3) Next-Generation Fires Radar, (4) Maneuver
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with other
Air Defense Technology (MADT), (5) High-Energy Laser
departments and organizations, such as the Department
Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL-TVD), and (6) Low-
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and
Cost Extended Range Air Defense (LOWER AD).
the Department of Energy, on C-UAS development and
Although these systems are still in development, the Army
procurement?
has fielded some man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and
Are any changes to airspace management, operational
airborne C-UAS systems.
concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required in
DOD-Wide Developments
order to optimize the use of C-UAS systems and/or de-
conflict with other U.S. military operations?
DOD is researching and developing a number of C-UAS
technologies. For example, the Joint Staff and other DOD
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with the
agencies have participated in C-UAS efforts such as Black
Federal Aviation Administration and international civil
Dart, an exercise intended to “[assess and validate] existing
aviation authorities to identify and mitigate C-UAS
and emerging air and missile defense capabilities and
operational risks to civil aircraft?
concepts specific to the C-UAS mission set” and
“[advocate] for soldiers’ desired C-UAS capabilities.” In
Related CRS Products
addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) funds technology development programs such as
CRS In Focus IF11550, Protecting Against Rogue Drones, by Bart
Waveform Agile Radio-frequency Directed Energy
Elias.
(WARDEN), which “aims to extend the range and lethality
of high-power microwave systems” for C-UAS and other
Other Resources
missions.
U.S. Department of Defense, Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Strategy, January 2021.
In December 2019, DOD streamlined the Department’s
various counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) programs, naming
Arthur Hol and Michel, Counter-Drone Systems, Center for the
the Army as the executive agent tasked with overseeing all
Study of the Drone at Bard Col ege, December 2019.
DOD C-sUAS development efforts. On January 6, 2020,
This report was originally co-authored by John Hoehn.
the Secretary of Defense approved the implementation plan
of the new office, known as the Joint C-sUAS Office
(JCO). Working in consultation with the combatant
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
commands and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Global Security
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, JCO completes
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
IF11426
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11426 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED
Updated April 17, 2023
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly called
airborne C-UAS options, although the status of such efforts
drones, have proliferated rapidly and are available to nation
is unclear.
states and to nonstate actors and individuals. These systems
could provide U.S. adversaries with a low-cost means of
Figure 1. Man-Portable Counter-UAS Technology
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions against—or attacking—U.S. forces. Furthermore,
many smaller UASs cannot be detected by traditional air
defense systems due to their size, construction material, and
flight altitude. As a result, in FY2023, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plans to spend at least $668 million on
counter-UAS (C-UAS) research and development and at
least $78 million on C-UAS procurement. As DOD
continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems,
congressional oversight of their use may increase, and
Congress may have to make decisions about future
authorizations, appropriations, and other legislative actions.
C-UAS Technology
C-UAS can employ a number of methods to detect the
Source: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/01/15/new-
presence of hostile or unauthorized UAS. The first is using
pentagon-team-wil -develop-ways-fight-enemy-drones.html.
electro-optical, infrared, or acoustic sensors to detect a
target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively.
Navy
A second method is to use radar systems. However, these
methods are not always capable of detecting small UAS due
In 2014, the Navy fielded the first operational directed-
energy weapon, the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), aboard
to the limited signatures and size of such UAS. A third
method is identifying the wireless signals used to control
the USS Ponce (LPD-15). LaWS is a 30 kW laser prototype
the UAS, commonly using radio frequency sensors. These
capable of performing a C-UAS mission. The Navy has also
deployed ODIN, an optical dazzler that interferes with UAS
methods can be—and often are—combined to provide a
more effective, layered detection capability.
sensors, and HELIOS, a 60 kW laser, aboard Arleigh Burke
Flight IIA destroyers. Both systems are intended to protect
U.S. assets from UAS attacks.
Once detected, the UAS may be engaged or disabled.
Electronic warfare “jamming” can interfere with a UAS’s
Marine Corps
communications link to its operator. Jamming devices can
The Marine Corps funds a number of C-UAS systems
be as light as 5 to 10 pounds and therefore man-portable
(see Figure 1), or as heavy as several hundred pounds and
through its Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) program
in fixed locations or mounted on vehicles. UAS can also be
office. For example, in 2019, the Corps completed overseas
tests of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
neutralized or destroyed using guns, nets, directed energy,
traditional air defense systems, or even trained animals such
(MADIS), which employs jamming and guns. The system
as eagles. DOD is developing and procuring a number of
can be mounted on MRZR all-terrain vehicles, Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles, and other platforms (see Figure 2). In
different C-UAS technologies to try to ensure a robust
defensive capability.
July 2019, Marines aboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4) used
MADIS to neutralize an Iranian UAS that was deemed to be
Air Force
within “threatening range” of the ship. As part of GBAD,
The Air Force is developing high-powered microwaves and
the Marine Corps is also procuring the Compact Laser
lasers—both forms of directed energy—for C-UAS
Weapons System (CLaWS), the first DOD-approved
ground-based laser. This system—which reportedly comes
missions. For example, the Air Force has deployed a 15
kilowatt (kW) vehicle-mounted C-UAS system—the High-
in variants of 2, 5, and 10 kWs—is also in use by the Army.
Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)—in OCONUS
Although the Marine Corps has experimented with man-
portable C-UAS technologies, now-Commandant of the
(Outside the Continental United States) locations. HELWS
is intended to identify and neutralize hostile or unauthorized
Marine Corps David Berger testified to Congress in 2019
that they “have not panned out” due to weight and power
UAS in seconds and, when connected to a generator, to
provide “a
requirements.
nearly infinite number of shots,” according to
HELWS developer Raytheon. As stated in its 2016 Small
UAS Flight Plan, the Air Force has additionally considered
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Figure 2. Marine Air Defense Integrated System
assessments of fielded C-sUAS systems and makes
recommendations for further investments.
JCO has produced a Joint Capability Development
Document outlining operational requirements for future
systems and, in January 2021, released a DOD C-sUAS
strategy. JCO has also produced several training modules
and reference guides and is in the process of establishing a
Joint C-sUAS academy at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The
academy is to synchronize training on counter-drone tactics
across the military services.
Finally, Section 1074 of the FY2021 National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA; P.L. 116-283) requires a series
of reports to Congress, including a report on and
Source: https://www.marcorsyscom.marines.mil/PEOs/-PEO-LS/PM-
independent assessment of the JCO’s C-sUAS activities and
GBAD/.
a report on the threat posed by UAS. Section 162 of the
Army
FY2023 NDAA (P.L. 117-263) directs the Secretary of
Defense to conduct an assessment of the threats posed by
In July 2016, the Army published a C-UAS strategy to
UAS swarms and of DOD counter-swarm capabilities. It
guide the development of its C-UAS capabilities (to date
additionally directs the Secretary to “develop and
the only service to do so publicly). This was followed in
implement a strategy to field capabilities to counter threats
April 2017 by Army Techniques Publication 3-01.81,
posed by unmanned aerial system swarms.”
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, which
outlined “planning considerations for defending against
Potential Questions for Congress
low, slow, small [LSS] unmanned air threats during
operations,” as well as “how to plan for, and incorporate, C
Is DOD funding of C-UAS systems appropriately
-
UAS soldier tasks into unit training events.” C
balanced between research and development and
-UAS is also
procurement programs?
part of the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development
Command’s six
-layer air and missile defense concept,
To what extent, if at all, has the designation of a DOD
composed of (1) Ballistic, Low-Altitude Drone Engagement
executive agent for C-UAS reduced redundancies and
(BLADE), (2) Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser
increased efficiencies in C-UAS procurement?
(MMHEL), (3) Next-Generation Fires Radar, (4) Maneuver
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with other
Air Defense Technology (MADT), (5) High-Energy Laser
departments and organizations, such as the Department
Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL-TVD), and (6) Low-
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and
Cost Extended Range Air Defense (LOWER AD).
the Department of Energy, on C-UAS development and
Although these systems are still in development, the Army
procurement?
has fielded some man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and
Are any changes to airspace management, operational
airborne C-UAS systems.
concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required in
DOD-Wide Developments
order to optimize the use of C-UAS systems and/or de-
conflict with other U.S. military operations?
DOD is researching and developing a number of C-UAS
technologies. For example, the Joint Staff and other DOD
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with the
agencies have participated in C-UAS efforts such as Black
Federal Aviation Administration and international civil
Dart, an exercise intended to “[assess and validate] existing
aviation authorities to identify and mitigate C-UAS
and emerging air and missile defense capabilities and
operational risks to civil aircraft?
concepts specific to the C-UAS mission set” and
“[advocate] for soldiers’ desired C-UAS capabilities.” In
Related CRS Products
addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) funds technology development programs such as
CRS In Focus IF11550, Protecting Against Rogue Drones, by Bart
Waveform Agile Radio-frequency Directed Energy
Elias.
(WARDEN), which “aims to extend the range and lethality
of high-power microwave systems” for C-UAS and other
Other Resources
missions.
U.S. Department of Defense, Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems Strategy, January 2021.
In December 2019, DOD streamlined the Department’s
various counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) programs, naming
Arthur Hol and Michel, Counter-Drone Systems, Center for the
the Army as the executive agent tasked with overseeing all
Study of the Drone at Bard Col ege, December 2019.
DOD C-sUAS development efforts. On January 6, 2020,
This report was originally co-authored by John Hoehn.
the Secretary of Defense approved the implementation plan
of the new office, known as the Joint C-sUAS Office
(JCO). Working in consultation with the combatant
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
commands and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Global Security
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, JCO completes
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
IF11426
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11426 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED