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February 12, 2020
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly called
additionally pursue airborne C-UAS options, although the
drones, have proliferated rapidly and are available to nation
status of such efforts is unclear.
states and to nonstate actors and individuals. These systems
could provide U.S. adversaries with a low-cost means of
Figure 1. Man-Portable Counter-UAS Technology
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions against—or attacking—U.S. forces. Furthermore,
many smaller UASs cannot be detected by traditional air
defense systems due to their size, construction material, and
flight altitude. As a result, in FY2020, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plans to spend at least $373 million on
counter-UAS (C-UAS) research and development and at
least $200 million on C-UAS procurement. As DOD
continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems,
congressional oversight of their use may increase, and
Congress may have to make decisions about future
authorizations, appropriations, and other legislative actions.
C-UAS Technology
C-UAS can employ a number of methods to detect the
Source: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/01/15/new-
presence of hostile or unauthorized UAS. The first is using
pentagon-team-wil -develop-ways-fight-enemy-drones.html.
electro-optical, infrared, or acoustic sensors to detect a
target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively.
Navy
A second method is to use radar systems. However, these
methods are not always capable of detecting small UAS due
In 2014, the Navy fielded the first—and, to date, only—
operational directed-energy weapon, the Laser Weapon
to the limited signatures and size of such UAS. A third
method is identifying the wireless signals used to control
System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). LaWS is
the UAS, commonly using radio frequency sensors. These
a 30-kilowatt laser prototype capable of performing a C-
UAS mission. The Navy also plans to deploy ODIN, an
methods can be—and often are—combined to provide a
more effective, layered detection capability.
optical dazzler that interferes with UAS sensors, and
HELIOS, a 60-kilowatt laser, aboard the USS Preble
(DDG-88) in 2021. Both systems are intended to protect
Once detected, the UAS may be engaged or disabled.
Electronic warfare “jamming” can interfere with a UAS’s
U.S. assets from UAS attacks. In addition, in a March 28,
communications link to its operator. Jamming devices can
2019, memorandum, the Department of the Navy
announced that it would be partnering with the Defense
be as light as 5 to 10 pounds and therefore man-portable
Digital Service to “rapidly develop new
(see Figure 1), or as heavy as several hundred pounds and
[cyber-enabled] C-
UAS products to address the evolving UAS threats.”
in fixed locations or mounted on vehicles. UAS can also be
neutralized or destroyed using guns, nets, directed energy,
Marine Corps
traditional air defense systems, or even trained animals such
as eagles. DOD is developing and procuring a number of
The Marine Corps funds a number of C-UAS systems
through its Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) program
different C-UAS technologies to try to ensure a robust
defensive capability.
office. For example, in 2019, the Corps completed overseas
tests of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
Air Force
(MADIS), which employs jamming and guns. The system
The Air Force is testing high-powered microwaves and
can be mounted on MRZR all-terrain vehicles, Joint Light
lasers—both forms of directed energy—for C-UAS
Tactical Vehicles, and other platforms (see Figure 2). In
July 2019, Marines aboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4) used
missions. For example, in October 2019, the Air Force
received delivery of a vehicle-mounted C-UAS prototype—
MADIS to neutralize an Iranian UAS that was deemed to be
within “threatening range”
the High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)—that
of the ship. As part of GBAD,
the Marine Corps is also procuring the Compact Laser
will undergo a year-long overseas field test. HELWS is
intended to identify and neutralize hostile or unauthorized
Weapons System (CLaWS), the first DOD-approved
UAS in seconds and, when connected to a generator, to
ground-based laser. This system—which reportedly comes
provide “a nearly infinite number of shots.”
in variants of 2-, 5-, and 10-kilowatts—is also in use by the
As stated in its
2016 Small UAS Flight Plan, the Air Force may
Army. Although the Marine Corps has experimented with
man-portable C-UAS technologies, now-Commandant of
the Marine Corps David Berger testified to Congress in
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Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
2019 that they “have not panned out” due to weight and
In December 2019, DOD began to streamline the
power requirements.
Department’s various C-UAS programs, naming the Army
as the executive agent tasked with overseeing all DOD C-
Figure 2. Marine Air Defense Integrated System
UAS development efforts. The new Army-led office,
working in consultation with the combatant commands and
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, plans to test and evaluate
fielded systems and identify three to five C-UAS systems
for procurement.
Potential Questions for Congress
Is DOD funding of C-UAS systems appropriately
balanced between research and development and
procurement programs?
To what extent, if at all, has the designation of a DOD
executive agent for C-UAS reduced redundancies and
increased efficiencies in C-UAS procurement?
Source: https://www.marcorsyscom.marines.mil/PEOs/-PEO-LS/PM-
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with other
GBAD/.
departments and organizations, such as the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and
Army
the Department of Energy, on C-UAS development and
In July 2016, the Army published a C-UAS strategy to
procurement?
guide the development of its C-UAS capabilities (to date
Are any changes to airspace management, operational
the only service to do so publicly). This was followed in
concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required in
April 2017 by Army Techniques Publication, Counter-
order to optimize the use of C-UAS systems and/or de-
Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, which outlined
“planning considerations for defending against low, slow,
conflict with other U.S. military operations?
small [LSS] unmanned air threats during operations,” as
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with the
well as “how to plan for, and incorporate, C-UAS soldier
Federal Aviation Administration and international civil
tasks into unit training events.” C-UAS is also part of the
aviation authorities to identify and mitigate C-UAS
U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command’s
operational risks to civil aircraft?
six-layer air and missile defense concept, composed of (1)
Ballistic, Low-Altitude Drone Engagement (BLADE), (2)
Related CRS Products
Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser (MMHEL), (3) Next-
Generation Fires Radar, (4) Maneuver Air Defense
CRS Report R42136, U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems, by
Technology (MADT), (5) High-Energy Laser Tactical
Jeremiah Gertler
Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL-TVD), and (6) Low-Cost
CRS Report R45919, Ground Electronic Warfare: Background
Extended Range Air Defense (LOWER AD). Although
and Issues for Congress, by John R. Hoehn
these systems are still in development, the Army has fielded
CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies,
some man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and airborne C-UAS
by Kelley M. Sayler
systems. In addition, like the Navy, it has partnered with the
Defense Digital Service to develop computer-enabled C-
CRS Report R45098, U.S. Army Weapons-Related Directed
UAS products.
Energy (DE) Programs: Background and Potential Issues for
Congress, by Andrew Feickert
DOD-Wide Developments
CRS Report R44175, Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched
DOD is researching and developing a number of C-UAS
Guided Projectile: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
technologies. For example, the Joint Improvised-Threat
O'Rourke
Defeat Organization (JIDO), formerly the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization, hosted a UAS Hard-
Other Resources
Kill Challenge in 2017 designed to examine kinetic options
U.S. Army, Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, ATP
for disabling UAS. Similarly, the Joint Staff and other DOD
3-01.81, April 2017.
agencies have participated in C-UAS efforts such as Black
Dart, an exercise intended to “[assess and validate] existing
Arthur Hol and Michel, Counter Drone Systems, Bard Col ege:
and emerging air and missile defense capabilities and
Center for the Study of the Drone, Washington, DC,
concepts specific to the C-UAS mission set” and
December 2019.
“[advocate] for soldiers’ desired C-UAS capabilities.” In
addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) funds technology development programs for C-
UAS such as CounterSwarmAI, which is to “develop
John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and
systems for anticipating and defeating autonomous systems
Programs
of the future,” and the Multi-Azimuth Defense Fast
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
Intercept Round Engagement System for ship-based point
Global Security
defense.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
IF11426
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