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Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly called
additionally pursue airborne C-UAS options, although the
drones, have proliferated rapidly and are available to nation
status of such efforts is unclear.
states and to nonstate actors and individuals. These systems
could provide U.S. adversaries with a low-cost means of
Figure 1. Man-Portable Counter-UAS Technology
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions against—or attacking—U.S. forces. Furthermore,
many smaller UASs cannot be detected by traditional air
defense systems due to their size, construction material, and
flight altitude. As a result, in FY2023, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plans to spend at least $668 million on
counter-UAS (C-UAS) research and development and at
least $78 million on C-UAS procurement. As DOD
continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems,
congressional oversight of their use may increase, and
Congress may have to make decisions about future
authorizations, appropriations, and other legislative actions.
C-UAS Technology
C-UAS can employ a number of methods to detect the
Source: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/01/15/new-
presence of hostile or unauthorized UAS. The first is using
pentagon-team-wil -develop-ways-fight-enemy-drones.html.
electro-optical, infrared, or acoustic sensors to detect a
target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively.
Navy
A second method is to use radar systems. However, these
methods are not always capable of detecting small UAS due
In 2014, the Navy fielded the first—and, to date, only—
operational directed-energy weapon, the Laser Weapon
to the limited signatures and size of such UAS. A third
method is identifying the wireless signals used to control
System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). LaWS is
the UAS, commonly using radio frequency sensors. These
a 30-kilowatt laser prototype capable of performing a C-
UAS mission. The Navy also plans to deploy ODIN, an
methods can be—and often are—combined to provide a
more effective, layered detection capability.
optical dazzler that interferes with UAS sensors, and
HELIOS, a 60-kilowatt laser, aboard the USS Preble
(DDG-88) in 2021. Both systems are intended to protect
Once detected, the UAS may be engaged or disabled.
Electronic warfare “jamming” can interfere with a UAS’s
U.S. assets from UAS attacks. In addition, in a March 28,
communications link to its operator. Jamming devices can
2019, memorandum, the Department of the Navy
announced that it would be partnering with the Defense
be as light as 5 to 10 pounds and therefore man-portable
Digital Service to “rapidly develop new
(see Figure 1), or as heavy as several hundred pounds and
[cyber-enabled] C-
UAS products to address the evolving UAS threats.”
in fixed locations or mounted on vehicles. UAS can also be
neutralized or destroyed using guns, nets, directed energy,
Marine Corps
traditional air defense systems, or even trained animals such
as eagles. DOD is developing and procuring a number of
The Marine Corps funds a number of C-UAS systems
through its Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) program
different C-UAS technologies to try to ensure a robust
defensive capability.
office. For example, in 2019, the Corps completed overseas
tests of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
Air Force
(MADIS), which employs jamming and guns. The system
The Air Force is testing high-powered microwaves and
can be mounted on MRZR all-terrain vehicles, Joint Light
lasers—both forms of directed energy—for C-UAS
Tactical Vehicles, and other platforms (see Figure 2). In
July 2019, Marines aboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4) used
missions. For example, in October 2019, the Air Force
received delivery of a vehicle-mounted C-UAS prototype—
MADIS to neutralize an Iranian UAS that was deemed to be
within “threatening range”
the High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)—that
of the ship. As part of GBAD,
the Marine Corps is also procuring the Compact Laser
will undergo a year-long overseas field test. HELWS is
intended to identify and neutralize hostile or unauthorized
Weapons System (CLaWS), the first DOD-approved
UAS in seconds and, when connected to a generator, to
ground-based laser. This system—which reportedly comes
provide “a nearly infinite number of shots.”
in variants of 2-, 5-, and 10-kilowatts—is also in use by the
As stated in its
2016 Small UAS Flight Plan, the Air Force may
Army. Although the Marine Corps has experimented with
man-portable C-UAS technologies, now-Commandant of
the Marine Corps David Berger testified to Congress in
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
2019 that they “have not panned out” due to weight and
DOD C-sUAS development efforts. On January 6, 2020,
power requirements.
the Secretary of Defense approved the implementation plan
of the new office, known as the Joint C-sUAS Office
Figure 2. Marine Air Defense Integrated System
(JCO). Working in consultation with the combatant
commands and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, JCO assessed
over 40 fielded C-sUAS systems. To date, it has selected 10
C-sUAS defensive systems and one standardized command
and control system for further development.
JCO has produced a Joint Capability Development
Document outlining operational requirements for future
systems and, in January 2021, released a DOD C-sUAS
strategy. JCO is to additionally produce a DOD Directive
on C-sUAS and a threat assessment of C-sUAS capabilities.
DOD also plans to establish a Joint C-sUAS academy at
Fort Sill, Oklahoma by FY2024. The academy is to
synchronize training on counter-drone tactics across the
Source: https://www.marcorsyscom.marines.mil/PEOs/-PEO-LS/PM-
military services.
GBAD/.
Army
Finally, Section 1074 of the FY2021 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) requires a series of
In July 2016, the Army published a C-UAS strategy to
reports to Congress, including a report on and independent
guide the development of its C-UAS capabilities (to date
assessment of the JCO’s C-sUAS activities and a report on
the only service to do so publicly). This was followed in
the threat posed by UAS.
April 2017 by Army Techniques Publication 3-01.81,
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, which
Potential Questions for Congress
outlined “planning considerations for defending against
Is DOD funding of C-UAS systems appropriately
low, slow, small [LSS] unmanned air threats during
operations,” as well as “how to plan for, and incorporate, C
balanced between research and development and
-
procurement programs?
UAS soldier tasks into unit training events.” C-UAS is also
part of the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development
To what extent, if at all, has the designation of a DOD
Command’s six-layer air and missile defense concept,
executive agent for C-UAS reduced redundancies and
composed of (1) Ballistic, Low-Altitude Drone Engagement
increased efficiencies in C-UAS procurement?
(BLADE), (2) Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with other
(MMHEL), (3) Next-Generation Fires Radar, (4) Maneuver
departments and organizations, such as the Department
Air Defense Technology (MADT), (5) High-Energy Laser
of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, and
Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL-TVD), and (6) Low-
the Department of Energy, on C-UAS development and
Cost Extended Range Air Defense (LOWER AD).
procurement?
Although these systems are still in development, the Army
Are any changes to airspace management, operational
has fielded some man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and
concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required in
airborne C-UAS systems. In addition, like the Navy, it has
order to optimize the use of C-UAS systems and/or de-
partnered with the Defense Digital Service to develop
conflict with other U.S. military operations?
computer-enabled C-UAS products.
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with the
DOD-Wide Developments
Federal Aviation Administration and international civil
DOD is researching and developing a number of C-UAS
aviation authorities to identify and mitigate C-UAS
technologies. For example, the Joint Staff and other DOD
operational risks to civil aircraft?
agencies have participated in C-UAS efforts such as Black
Dart, an exercise intended to “[assess and validate] existing
Related CRS Products
and emerging air and missile defense capabilities and
concepts specific to the C-UAS mission set” and
CRS In Focus IF11550, Protecting Against Rogue Drones, by Bart
“[advocate] for soldiers’ desired C-UAS capabilities.” In
Elias.
addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) funds technology development programs for C-
Other Resources
UAS such as CounterSwarmAI, which is to “develop
U.S. Department of Defense, Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft
systems for anticipating and defeating autonomous systems
Systems Strategy, January 2021.
of the future,” and the Multi-Azimuth Defense Fast
Intercept Round Engagement System for ship-based point
Arthur Hol and Michel, Counter-Drone Systems, Center for the
defense.
Study of the Drone at Bard Col ege, December 2019.
In December 2019, DOD streamlined the Department’s
various counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) programs, naming
the Army as the executive agent tasked with overseeing all
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
Global Security
John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and
IF11426
Programs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11426 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED