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Updated June 7, 2021
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), commonly called
additionally pursue airborne C-UAS options, although the
drones, have proliferated rapidly and are available to nation
status of such efforts is unclear.
states and to nonstate actors and individuals. These systems
could provide U.S. adversaries with a low-cost means of
Figure 1. Man-Portable Counter-UAS Technology
conducting intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions against—or attacking—U.S. forces. Furthermore,
many smaller UASs cannot be detected by traditional air
defense systems due to their size, construction material, and
flight altitude. As a result, in FY2022, the Department of
Defense (DOD) plans to spend at least $636 million on
counter-UAS (C-UAS) research and development and at
least $75 million on C-UAS procurement; this represents a
$134 million overall increase from FY2021. As DOD
continues to develop, procure, and deploy these systems,
congressional oversight of their use may increase, and
Congress may have to make decisions about future
authorizations, appropriations, and other legislative actions.
C-UAS Technology
C-UAS can employ a number of methods to detect the
Source: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/01/15/new-
pentagon-team-wil -develop-ways-fight-enemy-drones.html.
presence of hostile or unauthorized UAS. The first is using
electro-optical, infrared, or acoustic sensors to detect a
Navy
target by its visual, heat, or sound signatures, respectively.
A second method is to use radar systems. However, these
In 2014, the Navy fielded the first—and, to date, only—
operational directed-energy weapon, the Laser Weapon
methods are not always capable of detecting small UAS due
System (LaWS), aboard the USS Ponce (LPD-15). LaWS is
to the limited signatures and size of such UAS. A third
a 30-kilowatt laser prototype capable of performing a C-
method is identifying the wireless signals used to control
the UAS, commonly using radio frequency sensors. These
UAS mission. The Navy also plans to deploy ODIN, an
optical dazzler that interferes with UAS sensors, and
methods can be—and often are—combined to provide a
HELIOS, a 60-kilowatt laser, aboard the USS Preble
more effective, layered detection capability.
(DDG-88) in 2021. Both systems are intended to protect
Once detected, the UAS may be engaged or disabled.
U.S. assets from UAS attacks. In addition, in a March 28,
2019, memorandum, the Department of the Navy
Electronic warfare “jamming” can interfere with a UAS’s
announced that it would be partnering with the Defense
communications link to its operator. Jamming devices can
Digital Service to “rapidly develop new [cyber-enabled] C-
be as light as 5 to 10 pounds and therefore man-portable
(see Figure 1), or as heavy as several hundred pounds and
UAS products to address the evolving UAS threats.”
in fixed locations or mounted on vehicles. UAS can also be
Marine Corps
neutralized or destroyed using guns, nets, directed energy,
The Marine Corps funds a number of C-UAS systems
traditional air defense systems, or even trained animals such
as eagles. DOD is developing and procuring a number of
through its Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) program
office. For example, in 2019, the Corps completed overseas
different C-UAS technologies to try to ensure a robust
tests of the Marine Air Defense Integrated System
defensive capability.
(MADIS), which employs jamming and guns. The system
Air Force
can be mounted on MRZR all-terrain vehicles, Joint Light
Tactical Vehicles, and other platforms (see Figure 2). In
The Air Force is testing high-powered microwaves and
July 2019, Marines aboard the USS Boxer (LHD-4) used
lasers—both forms of directed energy—for C-UAS
MADIS to neutralize an Iranian UAS that was deemed to be
missions. For example, in October 2019, the Air Force
within “threatening range”
received delivery of a vehicle-mounted C-UAS prototype—
of the ship. As part of GBAD,
the Marine Corps is also procuring the Compact Laser
the High-Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS)—that
Weapons System (CLaWS), the first DOD-approved
will undergo a year-long overseas field test. HELWS is
ground-based laser. This system—which reportedly comes
intended to identify and neutralize hostile or unauthorized
UAS in seconds and, when connected to a generator, to
in variants of 2-, 5-, and 10-kilowatts—is also in use by the
provide “a nearly infinite number of shots.”
Army. Although the Marine Corps has experimented with
As stated in its
man-portable C-UAS technologies, now-Commandant of
2016 Small UAS Flight Plan, the Air Force may
the Marine Corps David Berger testified to Congress in
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
2019 that they “have not panned out” due to weight and
the Secretary of Defense approved the implementation plan
power requirements.
of the new office, known as the Joint C-sUAS Office
(JCO). Working in consultation with the combatant
Figure 2. Marine Air Defense Integrated System
commands and the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, JCO assessed
over 40 fielded C-sUAS systems. To date, it has selected 10
C-sUAS defensive systems and one standardized command
and control system for further development.
JCO has produced a Capability Development Document
outlining operational requirements for future systems and,
in January 2021, released a DOD C-sUAS strategy. JCO is
to also produce a DOD Directive on C-sUAS and a threat
assessment of C-sUAS capabilities. DOD plans to establish
by FY2024 a Joint C-sUAS academy at Fort Sill, OK. The
academy is to synchronize training on counter-drone tactics
for all military services.
Source: https://www.marcorsyscom.marines.mil/PEOs/-PEO-LS/PM-
Finally, Section 1074 of the FY2021 National Defense
GBAD/.
Authorization Act (P.L. 116-283) requires a series of
Army
reports to Congress, including a report on and independent
assessment of the JCO’s C-sUAS activities and a report on
In July 2016, the Army published a C-UAS strategy to
the threat posed by UAS.
guide the development of its C-UAS capabilities (to date
the only service to do so publicly). This was followed in
Potential Questions for Congress
April 2017 by Army Techniques Publication 3-01.81,
Is DOD funding of C-UAS systems appropriately
Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques, which
balanced between research and development and
outlined “planning considerations for defending against
procurement programs?
low, slow, small [LSS] unmanned air threats during
operations,” as well as “how to plan for, and incorporate, C
-
To what extent, if at all, has the designation of a DOD
UAS soldier tasks into unit training events.” C-UAS is also
executive agent for C-UAS reduced redundancies and
part of the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development
increased efficiencies in C-UAS procurement?
Command’s six-layer air and missile defense concept,
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with other
composed of (1) Ballistic, Low-Altitude Drone Engagement
departments and organizations—including the
(BLADE), (2) Multi-Mission High-Energy Laser
Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, and
(MMHEL), (3) Next-Generation Fires Radar, (4) Maneuver
Energy—on C-UAS development and procurement?
Air Defense Technology (MADT), (5) High-Energy Laser
Are any changes to airspace management, operational
Tactical Vehicle Demonstrator (HEL-TVD), and (6) Low-
concepts, rules of engagement, or tactics required in
Cost Extended Range Air Defense (LOWER AD).
order to optimize the use of C-UAS systems and/or de-
Although these systems are still in development, the Army
conflict with other U.S. military operations?
has fielded some man-portable, vehicle-mounted, and
airborne C-UAS systems. In addition, like the Navy, it has
To what extent, if at all, is DOD coordinating with the
partnered with the Defense Digital Service to develop
Federal Aviation Administration and international civil
computer-enabled C-UAS products.
aviation authorities to identify and mitigate C-UAS
operational risks to civil aircraft?
DOD-Wide Developments
DOD is examining a number of C-UAS technologies. For
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example, the Joint Staff and other DOD agencies have
participated in C-UAS efforts such as Black Dart, an
CRS In Focus IF11550, Protecting Against Rogue Drones, by Bart
exercise intended to “[assess and validate] existing and
Elias.
emerging air and missile defense capabilities and concepts
specific to the C-UAS mission set” and “[advocate] for
Other Resources
soldiers’ desired C-UAS capabilities.” In addition, the
U.S. Department of Defense, Counter-Smal Unmanned Aircraft
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Systems Strategy, January 2021.
funds technology development programs for C-UAS such
as CounterSwarmAI, which is to “develop systems for
Arthur Hol and Michel, Counter-Drone Systems, Center for the
anticipating and defeating autonomous systems of the
Study of the Drone at Bard Col ege, December 2019.
future,” and the Multi-Azimuth Defense Fast Intercept
Round Engagement System for ship-based point defense.
In December 2019, DOD streamlined the Department’s
John R. Hoehn, Analyst in Military Capabilities and
various counter-small UAS (C-sUAS) programs, naming
Programs
the Army as the executive agent tasked with overseeing all
DOD C-sUAS development efforts. On January 6, 2020,
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Department of Defense Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems
IF11426
Kelley M. Sayler, Analyst in Advanced Technology and
Global Security
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11426 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED