Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention
Updated January 28, 2026 (IF11274)

Retention

The term retention refers to the rate at which military personnel voluntarily choose to stay in the military after their obligated term of service has ended as determined by their enlistment contract (typically less than six years for an initial contract). Imbalances in the retention rate can cause problems within the military personnel system. A common retention concern is that too few people will stay in, thereby creating a shortage of experienced leaders and operators, decreasing military efficiency, and lowering job satisfaction. The opposite concern may also occur at times, particularly during force drawdowns: that too many people will stay in, thereby decreasing promotion opportunities and possibly requiring involuntary separations to prevent the organization from becoming "top heavy" with middle- and upper-level leaders or to comply with end-strength limitations. These imbalances can also have a negative impact on recruiting by making the military a less-attractive career option.

Congressional Role

The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power "To raise and support Armies" and "To provide and maintain a Navy." In the exercise of this authority, Congress has historically shown great interest in maintaining military retention rates sufficient to sustain a fully manned and capable military workforce. Through its oversight powers, Congress monitors the performance of the executive branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce.

Congress influences retention rates in a variety of ways, including authorizing and funding

  • overall compensation levels, particularly in light of their competitiveness with private-sector compensation;
  • quality-of-life initiatives to enhance servicemember and family member satisfaction with a military career;
  • retention programs that provide for dedicated career counselors; and
  • retention incentives, such as reenlistment bonuses.

More broadly, congressionally established personnel end-strength levels can influence each armed service's retention goals. For example, if Congress were to substantially increase the end-strength for an armed service, that service would generally require a greater number of new recruits, higher rates of retention among current servicemembers, or some combination of the two. Congress also establishes criteria that affect eligibility for continued service, such as disability separation and retirement (Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 61) and punitive discharge for criminal activity (Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 45).

Retention Goals and Results

Table 1 lists active component enlisted retention goals and results for FY2023-FY2025. The data are broken out by armed service and retention zones, which are established by each armed service to reflect important phases in the military career lifecycle. The armed services define their primary retention zones as follows:

For Navy, Air Force, and Space Force:

  • Zone A (Initial Term): serving in first enlistment with less than six years of service.
  • Zone B (Midcareer): second or subsequent enlistment with less than 10 years of service.
  • Zone C (Career): second or subsequent enlistment with 10-14 years of service.

The Navy and Air Force also have a Zone D and Zone E, which are not shown in Table 1. Navy Zone D is 14 to 20 years of service, and Zone E is more than 20 years of service. Air Force Zone D is 14 years to under 18 years of service, and Zone E is 18 years to under 20 years of service.

The Army uses the same definitions for Zones A and B as the other three services above; however, for Zone C, the Army includes all enlisted personnel over 10 years of service.

The Marine Corps uses slightly different categories:

  • First term: serving in first enlistment with more than 17 months and less than six years of service.
  • Subsequent: second or subsequent enlistment, with less than 18 years of service.
  • Other: Those with more than 18 years of service.

Table 1.Retention Goals and Results

Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2023-FY2025

Armed Service/ Retention Category

FY2023

FY2024

FY2025

Goal

Achieved

Percent of Goal

Goal

Achieved

Percent of Goal

Goal

Achieved

Percent of Goal

Army

Zone A

24,351

24,729

102%

26,811

29,154

109%

22,442

26,556

118%

Zone B

18,771

19,149

102%

18,098

22,330

123%

18,162

21,169

117%

Zone C

11,985

12,363

103%

9,791

11,052

113%

11,286

13,415

119%

Navy

Zone A

18,210

21,371

117%

18,941

22,413

118%

20,472

20,290

99%

Zone B

8,107

7,890

97%

7,763

8,163

105%

7,924

7,889

100%

Zone C

5,506

5,914

107%

5,705

6,511

114%

5,951

5,918

99%

Marine Corps

First

6,225

7,070

114%

6,950

7,953

114%

7,674

8,228

107%

Subsequent

5,632

5,942

106%

5,962

5,799

97%

6,296

7,201

114%

Air Force

Zone A

18,185

23,102

127%

19,094

25,166

132%

16,874

24,136

143%

Zone B

12,117

12,170

100%

12,888

13,125

102%

13,206

14,001

106%

Zone C

7,874

9,189

117%

8,012

9,929

124%

7,648

9,199

120%

Space Force

Zone A

-

-

-

276

338

122%

264

369

140%

Zone B

-

-

-

204

257

126%

132

209

158%

Zone C

-

-

-

132

195

148%

77

151

196%

Source: Department of Defense data provided to CRS as of November 6, 2025.

Note: Space Force data were included with the Air Force for FY2023.

Issues for Congress

Congressional interest in retention typically increases when an armed service fails to meet its goal for one or more retention zones by about 10% or more, and particularly if the shortfall continues over several years. Additionally, even if an armed service is meeting its goals by retention zones, Congress may nonetheless focus on retention shortfalls within specific occupational specialties (e.g., health care professions or special operations) or for certain demographics.

The perceived cause of any such shortfalls is often of interest to Congress as well. For example, was the shortfall related to congressionally directed end-strength increases, which necessitated higher retention goals? Was it due to more attractive compensation packages in the private sector? Was it due to decreased job satisfaction? The perceived cause can affect interpretations of the shortfalls' significance and the options for remedying them.