
 
Updated December 21, 2022
Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention 
Retention  
disability separation and retirement (Title 10, U.S. Code, 
The term retention refers to the rate at which military 
Chapter 61) and punitive discharge for criminal activity 
personnel voluntarily choose to stay in the military after 
(Title 10, U.S. Code, Chapter 45). 
their obligated term of service has ended (as determined by 
their enlistment contract). Imbalances in the retention rate 
Retention Goals and Results 
can cause problems within the military personnel system. A 
Table 1 lists active component enlisted retention goals and 
common retention concern is that too few people will stay 
results for FY2020-FY2022. The data are broken out by 
in, thereby creating a shortage of experienced leaders, 
armed service and retention zones, which are established by 
decreasing military efficiency, and lowering job 
each armed service to reflect important phases in the 
satisfaction. This was a particular concern from 2004 to 
military career lifecycle. For example, a soldier coming to 
2009, as the stress of major combat deployments to Iraq and 
the end of his or her first enlistment after serving for four 
Afghanistan raised concerns about the willingness of 
years in the Army would be in the Army’s Initial Term 
military personnel to continue serving. The opposite 
retention zone; a similarly situated sailor would fall into the 
concern may also occur at times, particularly during force 
Navy’s Zone A retention zone. The armed services’ main 
drawdowns: that too many people will stay in, thereby 
retention zones listed in Table 1 are defined as follows: 
decreasing promotion opportunities and possibly requiring 
involuntarily separations to prevent the organization from 
Army Retention Zones 
becoming “top heavy” with middle- and upper-level leaders 
  Initial Term: serving in first enlistment, regardless of 
or to comply with end-strength limitations. Each of these 
length  
imbalances can also have a negative impact on recruiting by 
making the military a less-attractive career option.  
  Mid-career: second or subsequent enlistment with less 
Congressional Role 
than 10 years of service 
The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers 
over the Armed Forces, including the power “
  Career: second or subsequent enlistment with 10 or 
To raise and 
support Armies” and “
more years of service 
To provide and maintain a Navy.” In 
the exercise of this authority, Congress has historically 
Navy Retention Zones 
shown great interest in maintaining military retention rates 
sufficient to sustain a fully manned and capable military 
  Zone A: up to six years of service 
workforce. Through its oversight powers, Congress 
monitors the performance of the Executive Branch in 
  Zone B: 6 years of service to under 10 years of service 
managing the size and quality of the military workforce. 
  Zone C: 10 years of service to under 14 years of service 
Congress influences retention rates in a variety of ways, 
including authorizing and funding 
Marine Corps Retention Zones 
  First term: serving in first enlistment 
  overall compensation levels, particularly in light of their 
competitiveness with private-sector compensation; 
  Subsequent: second or subsequent enlistment, with less 
than 18 years of service 
  quality-of-life initiatives that enhance servicemember 
and family member satisfaction with a military career; 
Air Force Retention Zones 
  retention programs that provide for dedicated career 
  Zone A: 17 months to under 6 years of service 
counselors; and 
  Zone B: 6 years of service to under 10 years of service 
  retention incentives, such as reenlistment bonuses. 
  Zone C: 10 years of service to under 14 years of service 
More broadly, congressionally established personnel end-
strength levels can influence each armed service’s retention 
Congressional interest in retention typically increases when 
goals. For example, if Congress were to substantially 
an armed service fails to meet its goal for one or more 
increase the end-strength for an armed service, that service 
retention zones by about 10% or more, and particularly if 
would generally require a greater number of new recruits, 
the shortfall continues over several years. Additionally, 
higher rates of retention among current servicemembers, or 
even if an armed service is meeting its goals by retention 
some combination of the two. Congress also establishes 
zones, Congress may nonetheless focus on retention 
criteria that affect eligibility for continued service, such as 
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Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention 
shortfalls within specific occupational specialties (for 
which necessitated higher retention goals? Was it due to 
example, health care professions or special operations). 
more attractive compensation packages in the private 
sector? Was it due to decreased job satisfaction? The 
The perceived cause of any such shortfalls is often of 
perceived cause can affect interpretations of the shortfalls’ 
interest to Congress as well. For example, was the shortfall 
significance and the options for remedying them.
related to congressionally directed end-strength increases, 
Table 1. Retention Goals and Results 
Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2020-FY2022 
Armed 
FY2020 
FY2021 
FY2022 
Service/ 
Retention 
Percent 
Percent 
Percent 
Category 
Goal 
Achieved 
of Goal 
Goal 
Achieved 
of Goal 
Goal 
Achieved 
of Goal 
Army 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initial 
21,990 
22,924 
104% 
25,006 
25,618 
102% 
26,321 
27,111 
103% 
Mid-Career 
18,240 
19,174 
105% 
19,776 
20,388 
103% 
19,506 
20,296 
104% 
Career 
9,990 
10,924 
109% 
11,494 
12,106 
105% 
10,107 
10,897 
108% 
Navy* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zone A 
19,250 
17,969 
93% 
17,594 
18,099 
103% 
17,523 
18,886 
108% 
Zone B 
11,570 
9,315 
81% 
8,184 
7,701 
94% 
7,751 
8,271 
107% 
Zone C 
6,318 
5,701 
90% 
5,304 
5,200 
98% 
5,247 
5,724 
109% 
Marine 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corps* 
First 
5,412 
5,491 
101% 
5,877 
5,567 
95% 
5,820 
5,918 
102% 
Subsequent 
6,005 
6,004 
100% 
5,835 
5,853 
100% 
5,417 
5,794 
107% 
Air Force* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zone A 
16,590 
20,717 
125% 
18,068 
23,013 
127% 
19,109 
22,627 
118% 
Zone B 
9,003 
10,463 
116% 
9,941 
11,478 
115% 
10,852 
11,426 
105% 
Zone C 
7,218 
8,484 
118% 
7,406 
8,539 
115% 
7,900 
9,010 
114% 
Source: Department of Defense.   
Note: *The Navy and Air Force also have a Zone D and Zone E, which are not displayed above. Navy Zone D is 14 to 20 years of service, and 
Zone E is more than 20 years of service. Air Force Zone D is 14 years to under 18 years of service and Zone E is 18 years to under 20 years 
of service. Starting in FY2020, the Marine Corps added an “Other” retention category which is not displayed above. It includes those who 
reenlist with more than 18 years of service, certain Marines who reenlist under a special program for high quality personnel, and short-term 
extensions of existing enlistment contracts into the next fiscal year. DOD is not yet reporting retention results for the newly established Space 
Force.  
Relevant Statutes 
Other Resources 
Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 31  
DOD Instruction 1332.45, Retention Determinations for 
Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 115  
Non-Deployable Service Members 
DOD Instruction 1308.3, DOD Physical Fitness and Body Fat 
 
Programs Procedures 
 
DOD Instruction 1304.29, Administration of Enlistment 
 
Bonuses, Accession Bonuses for New Officers in Critical 
 
Skil s, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skil s 
 
Retention Bonuses for Active Members 
 
 
 
 
 
Lawrence Kapp, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy   
 
 
IF11274
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Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention 
 
 
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