https://crsreports.congress.gov
Updated November 15, 2024
The term retention refers to the rate at which military personnel voluntarily choose to stay in the military after their obligated term of service has ended as determined by their enlistment contract (typically less than six years for an initial contract). Imbalances in the retention rate can cause problems within the military personnel system. A common retention concern is that too few people will stay in, thereby creating a shortage of experienced leaders, decreasing military efficiency, and lowering job satisfaction. This was a particular concern from 2004 to 2009, as the stress of major combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan raised concerns about the willingness of military personnel to continue serving. The opposite concern may also occur at times, particularly during force drawdowns: that too many people will stay in, thereby decreasing promotion opportunities and possibly requiring involuntarily separations to prevent the organization from becoming “top heavy” with middle- and upper-level leaders or to comply with end-strength limitations. Each of these imbalances can also have a negative impact on recruiting by making the military a less-attractive career option.
The Constitution provides Congress with broad powers over the Armed Forces, including the power “To raise and support Armies” and “To provide and maintain a Navy.” In the exercise of this authority, Congress has historically shown great interest in maintaining military retention rates sufficient to sustain a fully manned and capable military workforce. Through its oversight powers, Congress monitors the performance of the Executive Branch in managing the size and quality of the military workforce.
Congress influences retention rates in a variety of ways, including authorizing and funding
• overall compensation levels, particularly in light of their
competitiveness with private-sector compensation;
• quality-of-life initiatives that enhance servicemember
and family member satisfaction with a military career;
• retention programs that provide for dedicated career
counselors; and
• retention incentives, such as reenlistment bonuses.
More broadly, congressionally established personnel end- strength levels can influence each armed service’s retention
goals. For example, if Congress were to substantially increase the end-strength for an armed service, that service would generally require a greater number of new recruits, higher rates of retention among current servicemembers, or some combination of the two. Congress also establishes criteria that affect eligibility for continued service, such as disability separation and retirement (Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 61) and punitive discharge for criminal activity (Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 45).
Table 1 lists active component enlisted retention goals and results for FY2022-FY2024. The data are broken out by armed service and retention zones, which are established by each armed service to reflect important phases in the military career lifecycle. The armed services define their primary retention zones as follows:
For Navy, Air Force, and Space Force:
• Zone A (Initial Term): serving in first enlistment with
less than 6 years of service.
• Zone B (Midcareer): second or subsequent enlistment
with less than 10 years of service.
• Zone C (Career): second or subsequent enlistment with
10-14 years of service.
The Navy and Air Force also have a Zone D and Zone E, which are not shown in Table 1. Navy Zone D is 14 to 20 years of service, and Zone E is more than 20 years of service. Air Force Zone D is 14 years to under 18 years of service, and Zone E is 18 years to under 20 years of service.
The Army uses the same definitions for Zones A and B as the other three services above; however, for Zone C, the Army includes all enlisted personnel over 10 years of service.
The Marine Corps uses slightly different categories:
• First term: serving in first enlistment with more than 17
months and less than 6 years of service.
• Subsequent: second or subsequent enlistment, with less
than 18 years of service.
• Other: Those with more than 18 years of service.
Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Table 1.Retention Goals and Results
Active Component Enlisted Personnel, FY2022-FY2024
Armed Service/
Retention
Category
FY2022 FY2023 FY2024
Goal Achieved
Percent
of Goal Goal Achieved
Percent
of Goal Goal Achieved
Percent
of Goal
Army
Zone A 26,321 27,111 103% 24,351 24,729 102% 26,811 29,154 109%
Zone B 19,506 20,296 104% 18,771 19,149 102% 18,098 22,330 123%
Zone C 10,107 10,897 108% 11,985 12,363 103% 9,791 11,052 113%
Navy
Zone A 17,523 18,886 108% 18,210 21,371 117% 18,941 22,413 118%
Zone B 7,751 8,271 107% 8,107 7,890 97% 7,763 8,163 105%
Zone C 5,247 5,724 109% 5,506 5,914 107% 5,705 6,511 114%
Marine Corps
First 5,820 5,918 102% 6,225 7,070 114% 6,950 7,953 114%
Subsequent 5,417 5,794 107% 5,632 5,942 106% 5,962 5,799 97%
Air Force
Zone A 19,109 22,627 118% 18,185 23,102 127% 19,094 25,166 132%
Zone B 10,852 11,426 105% 12,117 12,170 100% 12,888 13,125 102%
Zone C 7,900 9,010 114% 7,874 9,189 117% 8,012 9,929 124%
Space Force
Zone A - - - - - - 276 338 122%
Zone B - - - - - - 204 257 126%
Zone C - - - - - - 132 195 148%
Source: Department of Defense data provided to CRS as of October 29, 2024. Note: Space Force data were included with the Air Force for FY2022 and FY2023.
Congressional interest in retention typically increases when an armed service fails to meet its goal for one or more retention zones by about 10% or more, and particularly if the shortfall continues over several years. Additionally, even if an armed service is meeting its goals by retention zones, Congress may nonetheless focus on retention shortfalls within specific occupational specialties (for example, health care professions or special operations) or for certain demographics.
The perceived cause of any such shortfalls is often of interest to Congress as well. For example, was the shortfall related to congressionally directed end-strength increases, which necessitated higher retention goals? Was it due to more attractive compensation packages in the private sector? Was it due to decreased job satisfaction? The perceived cause can affect interpretations of the shortfalls’ significance and the options for remedying them.
Relevant Statutes
Title 10 U.S. Code, Chapter 31
Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 115
Other Resources
DOD Instruction 1332.45, Retention Determinations for Non-Deployable Service Members
DOD Instruction 1308.3, DOD Physical Fitness and Body Fat Programs Procedures
DOD Instruction 1304.29, Administration of Enlistment Bonuses, Accession Bonuses for New Officers in Critical Skills, Selective Reenlistment Bonuses, and Critical Skills Retention Bonuses for Active Members
Kristy N. Kamarck, Specialist in Military Personnel Carly A. Miller, Research Librarian
IF11274
Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11274 · VERSION 7 · UPDATED
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