Contents

• Introduction
• Recent Developments
• North Korea's January 2016 Nuclear Weapon Test
• Reactions to the Test
• North Korea Economic Conditions in Early 2016
• Kim Jong-Un's Leadership and International Isolation
• History of Nuclear Negotiations
• Six-Party Talks
• Obama Administration North Korea Policy
• "Strategic Patience" Approach
• North Korean Provocations and U.S. Response
• North Korean Demands and Motivation
• China's Role
• North Korea's Internal Situation
• Kim Jong-un's Rule
• Purges of Jang Song-taek and Other High-Level Officials
• Information Flows In and Out of North Korea
• North Korean Security Threats
• North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction
• Nuclear
• Chemical and Biological Weapons
• North Korea's Missile Programs
• Foreign Connections
• Regional Missile Defense Systems
• North Korea's Conventional Military Forces
• North Korea's Cyberattack Capabilities
U.S.-DPRK Relations in 2018
• Advances in North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs
• Trump Administration Policy
• 2017: "Maximum Pressure" and Hostile Rhetoric
• 2018: Shift to Diplomacy in Early 2018
• The June 2018 Trump-Kim Singapore Summit
• International and U.S. Sanctions
• U.N. Sanctions
• U.S. Sanctions
• North Korean Demands and Motivations
• History of Nuclear Negotiations
• Agreed Framework
• Missile Negotiations
• Six-Party Talks
• Obama Administration's "Strategic Patience" Policy and Leap Day Agreement
• China's Role
• North Korea's Internal Situation
• Kim Jong-un's Political Position
• North Korea Economic Conditions
• Increasing Access to Information Inside North Korea
• North Korean Security Threats
• North Korea's Military Capabilities
• North Korea's Conventional Military Forces
• Nuclear Weapons
• Ballistic Missiles
• Chemical and Biological Weapons
• Foreign Connections
• North Korea's Illicit Activities
• Narcotics Production and Distribution
• Arms Dealing
• Money Laundering
• North Korea's Human Rights Record
• Human Rights Diplomacy at the United Nations
• North Korean Refugees
• China's Policy on Repatriation of North Koreans
• The North Korean Human Rights Act
• Implementation
• North Korean Overseas Labor
• North Korea's Illicit Activities
• U.S. Engagement Activities with North Korea
• Official U.S. Assistance to North Korea
• POW-MIA Recovery Operations in North Korea
• Nongovernmental Organizations' Activities
• List of Other CRS Reports on North Korea
• Archived Reports for Background

Summary

North Korea has presentedposed one of the most vexing and persistent problems inpersistent U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the official name for North Korea), although since 2000 contact at a lower level has ebbed and flowed. Negotiations overchallenges of the post-Cold War period due to its pursuit of proscribed weapons technology and belligerence toward the United States and its allies. With North Korea's advances in 2016 and 2017 in its nuclear and missile capabilities under 34-year-old leader Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang has evolved from a threat to U.S. interests in East Asia to a potentially direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program have occupied the past three U.S. administrations, even as some analysts anticipated a collapse of the isolated authoritarian regime. North Korea has been the recipient of over $1 billion in U.S. aid (though none since 2009) and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions.

Negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program began in the early 1990s under the Clinton Administration. As U.S. policy toward Pyongyang evolved through the 2000s, the negotiations moved from a bilateral format to the multilateral Six-Party Talks (made up of China, Japan, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States). Although the talks reached some key agreements that laid out deals for aid and recognition to North Korea in exchange for denuclearization, major problems with implementation persisted. The talks have been suspended throughout the Obama Administration. As diplomacy remains stalled, North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile programs in the absence of any agreement it considers binding. Security analysts are concerned about this growing capability, as well as the potential for proliferation to other actors.

After North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's death in December 2011, his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, has consolidated authority as supreme leader. Kim has ruled brutally, carrying out large-scale purges of senior officials. He has declared a two-track policy (the byungjin line) that pursues economic development and nuclear weapons development. Market-oriented reforms announced in 2014 appear to be producing modest economic growth for some citizens, but the reforms are small in scale and reversible. North Korea continues to insist that it be recognized as a nuclear-armed state and in January 2016 conducted its fourth nuclear weapon test. North Korea is already under multiple international sanctions required by the United Nations Security Council in response to its repeated missile and nuclear tests.

In 2012, the U.S.-North Korean "Leap Day" agreement fell apart after Pyongyang launched a long-range ballistic missile in April, followed by a more successful launch and a third nuclear test in February 2013. During this period, North Korea's relations with China apparently cooled and have remained tense. Pyongyang has made fleeting, mostly unsuccessful attempts to reach out to other countries in the region. Simultaneously, international attention to North Korea's human rights violations intensified at the United Nations and in official U.S. statements.

North Korea's intransigence and the stalled negotiations present critical questions for the United States. Do the nuclear tests and successful long-range missile launch fundamentally change the strategic calculus? Has North Korea's capacity to hurt U.S. interests increased to the point that new diplomatic and perhaps military options should be considered more carefully? What could the Six Party Talks achieve if North Korea insists on recognition as a nuclear-armed state? Does the United States need a strategy that relies less on Beijing's willingness to punish Pyongyang? Do North Korea's nuclear advances mean that the Obama Administration's approach (known as "strategic patience") is too risky to continue? Should the United States pursue engagement initiatives that push for steps toward denuclearization?

Although the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea is the nuclear weapons program, there are a host of other contentious issues, including Pyongyang's missile programs, conventional military forces, illicit activities, and abysmal human rights record.

This report will be updated periodically.

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Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula

Sources: Production by CRS using data from ESRI, and the U.S. State Department's Office of the Geographer. Notes: four U.S. Administrations, and North Korea is the target of scores of U.S. and United Nations Security Council sanctions. Although the weapons programs have been the primary focus of U.S. policy toward North Korea, other U.S. concerns include North Korea's illicit activities, such as counterfeiting currency and narcotics trafficking, small-scale armed attacks against South Korea, and egregious human rights violations. In 2018, the Trump Administration and Kim regime appeared to open a new chapter in the relationship. After months of rising tension and hostile rhetoric from both capitals in 2017, including a significant expansion of U.S. and international sanctions against North Korea, Trump and Kim held a leaders' summit in Singapore in June 2018. The meeting produced an agreement on principles for establishing a positive relationship. The United States agreed to provide security guarantees to North Korea, which committed to "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The agreement made no mention of resolving significant differences between the two countries, including the DPRK's ballistic missile program. Trump also said he would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, labeling them "provocative," during the coming U.S.-DPRK nuclear negotiations. Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. The history of negotiating with the Pyongyang regime suggests a difficult road ahead, as officials try to implement the Singapore agreement, which contains few details on timing, verification mechanisms, or the definition of "denuclearization," challenges that the United States has struggled to implement in the previous four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea that were held since the end of the Cold War. During that period, the United States provided over $1 billion in humanitarian aid and energy assistance. It is unclear how much assistance, if any, the Trump Administration is planning to commit to facilitate the current denuclearization talks. The Singapore summit, which was partially brokered by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, has reshuffled regional diplomacy. In particular, the Chinese-North Korean relationship, which had cooled significantly in the past several years, appears to be restored, with Beijing offering its backing to Pyongyang and Kim able to deliver some benefits for Chinese interests as well. North Korea and South Korea also have restored more positive relations. Kim Jong-un appears to have consolidated authority as the supreme leader of North Korea. Kim has ruled brutally, carrying out large-scale purges of senior officials. In 2013, he announced a two-track policy (the byungjin line) of simultaneously pursuing economic development and nuclear weapons development. Five years later, after significant advances, including successful tests of long-range missiles that could potentially reach the United States, Kim declared victory on the nuclear front, and announced a new "strategic line" of pursuing economic development. Market-oriented reforms announced in 2014 appear to be producing modest economic growth for many citizens. The economic policy changes, however, remain relatively limited in scope. North Korea is one of the world's poorest countries, and more than a third of the population is believed to live under conditions of chronic food insecurity and undernutrition. This report will be updated periodically. Introduction North Korea's threatening behavior; development of proscribed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capabilities; and pursuit of a range of illicit activities, including proliferation, has posed one of the most vexing and perpetual problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. Since North Korea's creation in 1948, the United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name for North Korea). Successive U.S. Administrations since the early 1990s have sought to use a combination of negotiations, aid, and bilateral and international sanctions to end North Korea's weapons programs, but have not curbed the DPRK's increasing capabilities. U.S. interests in North Korea encompass grave security, political, and human rights concerns. Bilateral military alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK, the official name for South Korea) and Japan obligate the United States to defend these allies from any attack from the North. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops based in South Korea and Japan, as well as tens of thousands of U.S. civilians residing in those countries, are stationed within striking range of North Korean intermediate-range missiles. North Korea's rapid advances in its nuclear and long-range missile capabilities may put the U.S. homeland at risk of a DPRK strike. A conflict on the Korean peninsula or the collapse of the government in Pyongyang would have severe implications for the regional—if not global—economy. Negotiations and diplomacy surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program influence U.S. relations with all the major powers in the region, particularly with China and South Korea. At the center of this complicated intersection of geostrategic interests is the task of dealing with a totalitarian regime that is unfettered by many of the norms that govern international relations. A country of about 25 million people, North Korea was founded by Kim Jong-un's grandfather, Kim Il-sung, on an official philosophy of juche (self-reliance) that has led it to resist outside influences, which the regime generally has seen as a potential threat to its rule. The Kim family's near-totalitarian control has helped enable North Korea to resist outside influences, as well as to enter into and then break diplomatic and commercial agreements, to an extent surprising for a relatively small country surrounded by more materially powerful neighbors. Over the past 70 years, the Kims have created one of the world's largest militaries, which acts as a deterrent to outside military intervention and provides Pyongyang with a degree of leverage over foreign powers that has helped the regime extract diplomatic and economic concessions from its neighbors. This same militarization, however—combined with North Korea's often-provocative behavior, opaque policymaking system, and willingness to defy international conventions—also has severely stunted North Korea's economic growth by minimizing its interactions with the outside world. Despite Kim's apparently solid hold on power and indications that the DPRK economy is strengthening, North Korea's internal situation remains difficult, with most of the population deeply impoverished, and slowly increasing access to information from the outside world potentially could lead to greater public discontent with the regime if growth does not continue. Congress has both direct and indirect influence on the U.S. policy on North Korea. Through sanctions legislation, Congress has set the terms for U.S. restrictions on trade and engagement with the DPRK, as well as on the President's freedom to ease or lift sanctions against the DPRK. Congress has also passed and repeatedly reauthorized the North Korean Human Rights Act, which calls on the U.S. government to address the DPRK's poor human rights record as well as accept North Korean refugees. Under past nuclear agreements, Congress authorized millions of dollars in energy assistance, at times putting conditions on the provision of aid if it doubted North Korean compliance. In future arrangements, if the United States agrees to provide aid in exchange for DPRK steps on denuclearization, Congress will need to authorize and appropriate funds, as it presumably would if the Administration sought to normalize diplomatic relations as the June 2018 Singapore agreement implies. In its oversight capacity, Congress has held dozens of hearings with both government and private witnesses that question North Korea's capabilities, intentions, human rights record, sanctions evasion, and linkage with other governments, among other topics. U.S.-DPRK Relations in 2018 Advances in North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs North Korea's rapid advances in missile and nuclear weapons capabilities in 2016 and 2017 have shifted U.S. policymakers' assessment of the regime's threat to the United States. Although North Korea has presented security challenges to U.S. interests for decades, recent tests have demonstrated that North Korea is nearly if not already capable of striking the continental United States with a nuclear-armed ballistic missile. This acceleration in capability made North Korea a top-line U.S. foreign policy and national security problem, outpacing the Middle East and terrorism in the first 18 months of the Trump Administration. Pyongyang's threats have increased across several domains: nuclear weapons, long-range missile technology, submarine-based missiles, short-range artillery, and cyberattack capacity.1 North Korea conducted three nuclear tests between January 2016 and September 2017. The last test, its sixth, was its most powerful to date. Also in 2017, North Korea conducted multiple tests of missiles that some observers assert demonstrate a capability of reaching the continental United States.2 According to satellite imagery, Pyongyang appears to be developing its submarine-based ballistic missile program that could potentially help it evade U.S. missile defense programs. In December 2017, the Trump Administration publicly blamed North Korea for the cyberattack known as "WannaCry" that crippled computer networks worldwide earlier in the year, demonstrating North Korea's ability to use cyberattacks to disrupt critical operations. Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula Sources: Production by CRS using data from ESRI, and the U.S. State Department's Office of the Geographer. Notes: The "Cheonan Sinking" refers to the March 2010 sinking of a South Korean naval vessel that killed 46 sailors. Yeonpyeong Island was attacked in November 2010 by North Korean artillery, killing four South Koreans. * This map reflects geographic place name policies set forth by the United States Board on Geographic Names pursuant to P.L. 80-242. In applying these policies to the case of the sea separating the Korean Peninsula and the Japanese Archipelago, the Board has determined that the "Sea of Japan" is the appropriate standard name for use in U.S. government publications. The Republic of Korea refers to this body of water as the "East Sea."

Introduction

A country of about 25 million people, North Korea has presented one of the most vexing and persistent problems in U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War period. The United States has never had formal diplomatic relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, the official name for North Korea). Negotiations over North Korea's nuclear weapons program have occupied the past three administrations, even as some analysts anticipated a collapse of the diplomatically isolated regime in Pyongyang. North Korea has been both the recipient of hundreds of millions of dollars of U.S. aid (official aid ceased in 2009) and the target of dozens of U.S. sanctions. Once considered a relic of the Cold War, the divided Korean peninsula has become an arena of more subtle strategic and economic competition among the region's powers.

U.S. interests in North Korea encompass serious security, political, and human rights concerns. Bilateral military alliances with the Republic of Korea (ROK, the official name for South Korea) and Japan obligate the United States to defend these allies from any attack from the North. Tens of thousands of U.S. troops occupying the largest U.S. military bases in the Pacific are stationed within striking range of North Korean missiles. An outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula or the collapse of the government in Pyongyang would have severe implications for the regional—if not global—economy. Negotiations and diplomacy surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program influence U.S. relations with all the major powers in the region and have become a complicating factor for U.S.-China ties.

At the center of this complicated intersection of geostrategic interests is the task of dealing with an isolated, totalitarian regime. Unfettered by many of the norms that govern international diplomacy, the leadership in Pyongyang, now headed by its dynastic "Great Successor" Kim Jong-un, is unpredictable and opaque. Little is known about the young leader and the policymaking system in Pyongyang. U.S. policymakers face a daunting challenge in navigating a course toward a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue.

In the long run, the ideal outcome remains, presumably, reunification of the Korean peninsula under stable democratic rule.¹ At this point, however, the road to that result appears fraught with risks. If the Pyongyang regime falls due to internal or external forces, the potential for major strategic consequences (including competition for control of the North's nuclear arsenal) and a massive humanitarian crisis, not to mention long-term strategic, economic, and social repercussions, looms large. In the interim, policymakers face deep challenges in even defining achievable objectives, let alone reaching them.

Recent Developments

North Korea's January 2016 Nuclear Weapon Test

On January 6, North Korea announced that it had successfully tested an "experimental hydrogen bomb,"² its fourth nuclear weapon test since 2006. Analysts speculated that Pyongyang may have been motivated largely by a desire to elevate Kim Jong-un's status ahead of a rare full Congress of the Korean Workers Party (last held in 1980) scheduled for May 2016. Despite skepticism that Pyongyang successfully detonated a full-fledged thermonuclear device (see "North Korean Security Threats" section below), most analysts agree that U.S. and multilateral sanctions have not prevented North Korea from advancing its fledgling nuclear weapons capability.

Reactions to the Test

Governments around the world condemned the nuclear weapon test as a flagrant violation of several United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. The UNSC convened an emergency meeting and began work on a resolution that would impose additional sanctions and punitive measures on North Korea. U.S. officials announced that a U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber flew over South Korea four days after the test to conduct exercises with U.S. and South Korean aircraft.

China's reaction to the test—a strongly-worded criticism that stressed the need for North Korea to denuclearize—seemed to confirm Beijing's strained relations with Pyongyang. Under Kim Jong-un, now entering his fifth year in power, China's role as North Korea's benefactor and protector appears to have diminished. Yet China still provides critical assistance and trade to the isolated nation and does not appear to have adjusted its fundamental strategic calculus that opposes a collapse of the regime, fearing a flood of refugees and instability on its border. Following the test, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said that China could not continue "business as usual" and that its approach to North Korea had not been successful.³ Chinese officials retorted that U.S. policy bore much of the blame for North Korea's moves toward a nuclear capability. Some analysts pointed out that this testy exchange exposed a stark gap between Beijing and Washington's approach to North Korea, a development that may have pleased Pyongyang.

As China's ties with North Korea have chilled, South Korea and China have enhanced their strong trade and diplomatic relationship and South Korean President Park Geun-hye has pursued more influence over China's Korean peninsula policy. A day after the blast, Seoul announced that it had resumed anti-North Korea propaganda broadcasts across the border, a practice that has elicited strong complaints from Pyongyang in the past.

North Korea Economic Conditions in Early 2016

Since early 2015, reports about modest economic growth in North Korea have appeared in the media. A series of tentative economic reforms announced in 2014 appear, according to some sources, to have lifted the living standard for a portion of ordinary North Koreans.⁴ The reforms, which apply market principles in a limited manner to some sectors of North Korean business and agriculture, have created opportunities for economic growth in the impoverished country. In the cities, practices such as allowing managers to set salaries and hire or fire workers are permitted. In the countryside, agricultural reforms allow for farmers to keep a larger portion of their harvest, relaxing the system of fixed rations, and reduced the size of farming collectives to individual households to increase production incentives. Journalists report a bustle of commerce and trade across the border with China, including scores of labor compounds on the Chinese side that employ North Korean workers and large-scale construction taking place on the North Korean side.⁵ Economists caution that these reforms are modest in scale and are far from irreversible, but they may be enough to lift North Korea's moribund economy from its low base. Furthermore, the Kim Jong-un regime appears to have allowed the unofficial market economy (mostly small businesses, including street stalls) to continue to function.

The agricultural reforms may have contributed to unusually strong harvests in 2013 and 2014. However, even as the elite appears to be faring better, the food security situation for many North Koreans remains tenuous. One economist described the situation: "The new normal of North Korean food security seems to be increasing choice for the privileged elite, chronic insecurity for a non-trivial share of the non-elite."⁶

Kim Jong-Un's Leadership and International Isolation

In his four years as supreme leader, Kim Jong-un appears to have consolidated his leadership and demonstrated a brutal hand in leading North Korea. He has carried out a series of purges of senior-level officials, including the execution of Jang Song-taek, his uncle by marriage, in 2013. In May 2015, Defense Minister Hyon Yong-chol was reportedly executed. South Korean intelligence sources say that about half of the top 200 military and bureaucratic officials have been replaced since Kim took power.⁷ Analysts differ over whether this means Kim has further cemented his hold on power or whether this could portend insecurity and potential instability within the regime.

Kim has yet to meet with a foreign head-of-state and has not traveled overseas since assuming power. Although he was expected to visit Moscow in May 2015 to attend a ceremony celebrating the 70^th anniversary of Russia's defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II, Kim cancelled at the last minute. Kim similarly rebuffed an invitation from Beijing to attend China's World War II commemoration in September 2015.

Compared to the pattern over the previous two decades, North Korea-China relations have been unusually poor since 2013. This distance from Beijing may have spurred Pyongyang to expand its relations with Russia—sending scores of officials to Moscow, negotiating deals to improve North Korea's electric grid in exchange for North Korean natural resources, and signing agreements for infrastructure projects—but some observers doubt that many of these initiatives will be realized. Although better relations with Moscow may serve some of Pyongyang's interests, including another potential protector on the UNSC, Russia is unable to provide the economic ballast that China has traditionally given to North Korea.

History of Nuclear Negotiations

North Korea's nuclear weapons program has concerned the United States for three decades. In 1986, U.S. intelligence detected the start-up of a plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon, which were not subject to international monitoring. In the early 1990s, after agreeing to and then obstructing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to statements by former Clinton Administration officials, a preemptive military strike on the North's nuclear facilities was seriously considered as the crisis developed. Discussion of sanctions at the United Nations Security Council and a diplomatic mission from former President Jimmy Carter diffused the tension and eventually led to the U.S.-North Korea 1994 Agreed Framework, under which the United States agreed to arrange for North Korea to receive two light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants and heavy fuel oil in exchange for North Korea freezing and eventually dismantling its plutonium program under IAEA supervision. The document also outlined a path toward normalization of diplomatic and economic relations as well as security assurances.

Beset by problems from the start, the Agreed Framework faced multiple reactor construction and funding delays. Still, the fundamentals of the agreement were implemented: North Korea froze its plutonium program, heavy fuel oil was delivered to the North Koreans, and LWR construction commenced. However, North Korea had not complied with commitments to declare all nuclear facilities to the IAEA and put them under safeguards. In 2002, the George W. Bush Administration confronted North Korea about a suspected uranium enrichment program,⁸ which the North Koreans then denied publicly. With these new concerns, heavy fuel oil shipments were halted, and construction of the LWRs—well behind schedule—was suspended. North Korea then expelled IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon site, announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and restarted its reactor and reprocessing facility after an eight-year freeze.

Six-Party Talks

Under the George W. Bush Administration, negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue expanded to include China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. With China playing host, six rounds of the "Six-Party Talks" from 2003-2008 yielded occasional progress, but ultimately failed to resolve the fundamental issue of North Korean nuclear arms. The most promising breakthrough occurred in 2005, with the issuance of a Joint Statement in which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for aid, a U.S. security guarantee, and talks over normalization of relations with the United States. Despite the promise of the statement, the process eventually broke down due to complications over U.S. Treasury Department's freezing of North Korean assets in a bank in Macau (see section "

North Korea's Illicit Activities") and then degenerated further with North Korea's test of a nuclear device in October 2006.⁹

In February 2007, Six-Party Talks negotiators announced an agreement that would provide economic and diplomatic benefits to North Korea in exchange for a freeze and disablement of Pyongyang's nuclear facilities. This was followed by an October 2007 agreement that more specifically laid out the implementation plans, including the disablement of the Yongbyon facilities, a North Korean declaration of its nuclear programs, delivery of heavy fuel oil, and a U.S. promise to lift economic sanctions on North Korea and remove North Korea from the U.S. designation under the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and list of state sponsors of terrorism. The plutonium program was again frozen and placed under international monitoring with the United States providing assistance for disabling of key nuclear facilities. Under the leadership of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, the Bush Administration pushed ahead on the deal. It removed the TWEA designation in June 2008 after North Korea submitted a declaration of its plutonium program. After terms of a verification protocol were verbally agreed upon in October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from the terrorism list.¹⁰ However, disputes over the specifics of the verification protocol between Washington and Pyongyang stalled the process again. North Korea did continue to disable portions of its Yongbyon facility through April 2009, when it expelled international inspectors following a ballistic missile test and subsequent UNSC sanctions. In May 2009, North Korea tested a second nuclear device.

Multilateral negotiations on North Korea's nuclear program have not been held since December 2008. Observers note that Pyongyang's continued belligerent actions, its vituperative rhetoric, its claim to be a nuclear weapons power, and most importantly its failure to fulfill obligations undertaken in previous agreements have halted efforts to restart the Six-Party Talks.

Obama Administration North Korea Policy

"Strategic Patience" Approach

The Obama administration's policy toward North Korea, often referred to as "strategic patience," is to put pressure on the regime in Pyongyang while insisting that North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks. The main elements of the policy involve insisting that Pyongyang commit to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in the Six-Party Talks; closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea; attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea; and applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions. U.S. officials have stated that, under the right conditions, they seek a comprehensive package deal for North Korea's complete denuclearization in return for normalization of relations and significant aid, but have insisted on a freeze of its nuclear activities and a moratorium on testing before returning to negotiations. This policy has been closely coordinated with South Korea and accompanied by large-scale military exercises designed to demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

In addition to multilateral sanctions required by the United Nations, the Obama Administration has issued several executive orders to implement the U.N. sanctions or to declare additional unilateral sanctions. In August 2010, Executive Order (EO) 13551 targeted entities engaged in the export or procurement of a number of North Korea's illicit activities, including money laundering, arms sales, counterfeiting, narcotics, and luxury goods. The White House also designated five North Korean entities and three individuals for sanctions under an existing executive order announced by President George W. Bush that targets the sales and procurement of weapons of mass destruction. In April 2011, EO 13570 imposed sanctions on 15 more firms, both North Korean and others who dealt with North Korea. Following the November 2014 cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attributed to North Korean hackers, President Obama issued EO 13687, enabling the U.S. government to seize the assets of designated DPRK officials and those working on behalf of North Korea.

Critics claim that the "strategic patience" approach has allowed Pyongyang to control the situation and steadily improve its missile and nuclear programs. North Korea has flagrantly violated UNSC resolutions with rocket launches and nuclear tests. The policy not only depends on China showing greater willingness to pressure North Korea, but it also depends on U.S. allies maintaining unity, an approach that might falter if allies take divergent approaches. The collapse of the denuclearization talks has intensified concerns about proliferation as cash-strapped North Korea may turn to other sources of income. Because of North Korea's poor economic performance, there is a strong fear that it will sell its nuclear technology or fissile material to another country or a nonstate actor.¹¹ Evidence of nuclear cooperation with Syria and Libya has alarmed national security experts.¹²

North Korean Provocations and U.S. Response

Despite the overtures for engagement after Obama took office, a series of provocations from Pyongyang halted progress on furthering negotiations. These violations of international law initiated a periodic cycle of action and reaction, in which the United States focused on building consensus at the UNSC and punishing North Korea through enhanced multilateral sanctions. A long-range ballistic missile test in May 2009 and a second nuclear weapon test in November 2009 spurred the passage of UNSC Resolution 1874, which outlines a series of sanctions to deny financial benefits to the Kim regime. Three years later, this cycle repeated itself: North Korea launched two long-range missiles in 2012, the UNSC responded with rebukes, North Korea tested a nuclear device in February 2013, and the United States again wrangled yet harsher sanctions through the UNSC (Resolutions 2087 and 2094). As of mid-January 2016, the UNSC was debating how to respond to the January 6 nuclear test, even as some analysts expected North Korea to conduct another test of a nuclear weapon or a long-range ballistic missile later in the year.

The major exception to the pattern of mutual recrimination occurred in February 2012, shortly after the death of Kim Jong-il, the previous leader of North Korea and father of Kim Jong-un. The so-called "Leap Day Agreement" committed North Korea to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, as well as the readmission of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. In exchange, the Obama Administration pledged 240,000 metric tons of "nutritional assistance"¹³ and steps to increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges with North Korea. North Korea scuttled the deal only two months later by launching a long-range rocket, followed by a third nuclear test in February 2013.

North Korean Demands and Motivation

Since President Obama took office, North Korea has demanded that it be recognized as a nuclear weapons state and that a peace treaty with the United States must be a prerequisite to denuclearization. The former demand presents a diplomatic and semantic dilemma: despite repeatedly acknowledging that North Korea has tested nuclear devices, U.S. officials have insisted that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is "unacceptable."

After years of observing North Korea's negotiating behavior, many analysts believe that such demands are simply tactical moves by Pyongyang and that North Korea has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons in exchange for aid and recognition.¹⁴ The multinational military intervention in 2011 in Libya, which abandoned its nuclear weapon program in exchange for the removal of sanctions, may have had the undesirable side effect of reinforcing the perceived value of nuclear arms for regime security. North Korean leaders may believe that, without the security guarantee of nuclear weapons, they are vulnerable to overthrow by a rebellious uprising aided by outside military intervention. In April 2010, North Korea reiterated its demand to be recognized as an official nuclear weapons state and said it would increase and modernize its nuclear deterrent. On April 13, 2012, the same day as the failed rocket launch, the North Korean constitution was revised to describe the country as a "nuclear-armed nation." In March 2013, North Korea declared that its nuclear weapons are "not a bargaining chip" and would not be relinquished even for "billions of dollars."¹⁵ North Korea has also suggested that it will not relinquish its nuclear stockpile until all nuclear weapons are eliminated worldwide.¹⁶ The apparent intention of Pyongyang to retain its nascent nuclear arsenal raises difficult questions for Washington about the methods and purpose of diplomatic negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. Debate continues on the proper strategic response. Options range from trying to squeeze the dictatorship to the point of collapse, to buying time and trying to prevent proliferation and other severely destabilizing events.

Identifying patterns in North Korean behavior is challenging, as Pyongyang often weaves together different approaches to the outside world. North Korean behavior has vacillated between limited cooperation and overt provocations, including testing several long-range ballistic missiles over the last 20 years and four nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2016. Pyongyang's willingness to negotiate has often appeared to be driven by its internal conditions: food shortages or economic desperation can push North Korea to re-engage in talks, usually to extract more aid from China or, in the past, from the United States and/or South Korea. North Korea has proven skillful at exploiting divisions among the other five parties and taking advantage of political transitions in Washington to stall the nuclear negotiating process.

China's Role

U.S. policy to pressure North Korea depends heavily on China's influence. In addition to being North Korea's largest trading partner by far—accounting for about 70% of North Korea's total trade—China also provides food and energy aid that is an essential lifeline for the regime in Pyongyang. China's overriding priority appears to be to prevent the collapse of North Korea. Analysts assess that Beijing fears the destabilizing effects of a humanitarian crisis, significant refugee flows over its borders, and the uncertainty of how other nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on the peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. Beijing is supporting joint industrial projects between China's northeastern provinces and North Korea's northern border region. Some Chinese leaders also may see strategic value in having North Korea as a "buffer" between China and democratic, U.S.-allied South Korea.

However, since 2010 an increasing number of Chinese academics have called for a reappraisal of China's friendly ties with North Korea, citing the material and reputational costs to China of maintaining such ties. The rhetorical emphasis Chinese leaders now place on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula—reportedly even in meetings with North Korean officials—may suggest that Beijing's patience could be waning. In what is viewed by many observers as a diplomatic snub, Chinese President Xi Jinping has had several summits with South Korean President Park Geun-hye but has yet to meet with the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.

Despite this apparent cooling in relations, Beijing remains an obstacle to many U.S. policy goals. Imposing harsher punishments on North Korea in international fora, such as the United Nations, is hindered by China's seat on the UNSC. However, Chinese trade with and aid to North Korea is presumed to be a fraction of what it might be if Beijing decided to fully support Kim Jong-un. This assumption is a key factor driving the U.S. and South Korean approach, which seeks to avoid pushing China to a place where it feels compelled to provide more diplomatic and economic assistance to North Korea.

North Korea's Internal Situation

Kim Jong-un appears to have consolidated power at the apex of the North Korean regime, though uncertainty remains about the regime and its priorities, given the opaque nature of the North Korean state. The Kim regime has been promoting a two-track policy (the so-called byungjin line) of economic development and nuclear weapons development, explicitly rejecting the efforts of external forces to make North Korea choose between one or the other. Initially, some observers held out hope that the young, European-educated Kim could emerge as a reformer, but his behavior since has not indicated a plan to change the country's political system. In fact, his ruthless drive to consolidate power demonstrates a keen desire to keep the dictatorship intact.

Kim Jong-un's Rule

Kim Jong-un has displayed a different style of ruling than his father while hewing closely to the policies established before his December 2011 succession as supreme leader. Kim has allowed Western influences, such as clothing styles and Disney characters, to be displayed in the public sphere, and he is informal in his frequent public appearances. In a stark change from his father's era, Kim Jong-un's wife was introduced to the North Korean public. Analysts depict these stylistic changes as an attempt to make Kim seem young and modern and to conjure associations with the "man of the people" image cultivated by his grandfather, the revered founder of North Korea, Kim Il-sung.

Rhetoric from the Kim Jong-un regime has emphasized improving the quality of life for North Korean citizens. North Korea has been experimenting with economic reforms: breaking up farming collectives into individual household units to increase supply incentives, allowing private investments into businesses (with official approval), and allowing businesses to pay workers based on performance, for example. The range of modern amenities available to the privileged residents of Pyongyang has expanded to include items like modified smartphones and European cosmetics—luxuries unheard of outside the uppermost elite just years ago—while most North Koreans outside the capital region continue to live in meager circumstances.

The Kim Jong-un regime has promoted the rapid growth of special economic zones (SEZs). The Kim regime appears to believe that SEZs can be one way for North Korea to import foreign capital, technology, and business knowledge without spreading unorthodox ideas among the wider population. (Reportedly, Chinese officials for decades have encouraged North Korea to emulate the example of China, in which SEZs played a critical role in the transition from a communist economic system to a market-based system.) The prospects for the North Korean SEZs are mixed; the strategic location and deep-water port of the Rajin-Sonbong (Rason) SEZ have led to major development in recent years, but the poor infrastructure and weak investment protections at other SEZs do not bode well for foreign investment.¹⁷

Purges of Jang Song-taek and Other High-Level Officials

The purge and execution in December 2013 of Jang Song-taek, North Korea's second most powerful figure, reverberated in policy circles both for its reported brutality and for its potential implications for political stability in Pyongyang. The move was announced by official North Korean media outlets, including footage of Jang being hauled away by security forces. Jang's removal was unusual because of his elite status (in addition to his official titles, he was Kim Jong-un's uncle by marriage) and because of how publically it was conveyed both to the outside world and to North Koreans. Jang's downfall completed nearly a total sweep of late ruler Kim Jong-il's inner circle. Jang's departure eliminated one of Beijing's main contact points with the regime; Jang had been seen as relatively friendly to Chinese-style economic reforms and business ties. It is likely that the chilly state of Pyongyang-Beijing relations since 2014 is partly due to the purge of Jang.

While Jang Song-taek was the most prominent official to be executed to date, Kim Jong-un has also purged dozens of other high-ranking officials since he came to power. In May 2015, Defense Minister Hyon Yong-chol reportedly was executed. Of the seven men who had been presumed to be part of Kim Jong-il's inner circle and had walked with Kim Jong-un during his father's funeral, five have been purged or demoted, including Ri Yong-ho, then-Chief of Staff of the North Korean military, who was purged in 2012. Kim executed 17 high-ranking officials in 2012, 10 in 2013, 41 in 2014, and at least 15 in 2015.¹⁸ The purges seem to have increased for a period after Jang's execution in late 2013. According to South Korean intelligence sources, roughly 20-30% of senior party officials and over 40% of senior military officials have been replaced since Kim took power.¹⁹ Many analysts interpret this trend as a sign of Kim's insecurity and argue that the regime might become unstable, as top officials within the regime face more uncertainty with regard to their positions and lives.²⁰ On the other hand, the purges may have eliminated potential rivals to Kim's absolute control over the North Korean state.

Information Flows In and Out of North Korea

The North Korean regime remains extraordinarily opaque, but a trickle of news works its way out through defectors and other channels. These forms of grass-roots information gathering, along with the public availability of high-quality satellite imagery, have democratized the business of intelligence on North Korea. In 2011, the Associated Press became the first Western news agency to open a bureau in Pyongyang, though its reporters are subject to severe restrictions. Previously, South Korean intelligence services had generally provided the bulk of information known about the North.

Pyongyang appears to be slowly losing its ability to control information flows from the outside world into North Korea. Surveys of North Korean defectors reveal that some within North Korea are growing increasingly wary of government propaganda and turning to outside sources of news, especially foreign radio broadcasts, which are officially illegal.²¹ After a short-lived attempt in 2004, North Korea in 2009 restarted a mobile phone network, in cooperation with the Egyptian telecommunications firm Orascom. The mobile network reportedly has over 2.4 million subscribers, and foreigners using mobile phones in North Korea can now make international calls and access the Internet.²² Although phone conversations in North Korea are monitored, the spread of cell phones should enable faster and wider dissemination of information. A paper published by the Harvard University Belfer Center in 2015 argues that a campaign to spread information about the outside world within North Korea could produce positive changes in the political system there.²³

North Korean Security Threats

North Korea's Weapons of Mass Destruction

North Korea has active nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs. The 2015 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Worldwide Threat Assessment stated, "Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, North Korean leaders are focused on developing missile and WMD capabilities, particularly building nuclear weapons."²⁴ The sections below describe what is known from open sources about these programs; for more information, see CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by [author name scrubbed].

Nuclear

U.S. analysts remain concerned about the pace and success of North Korea's nuclear weapons development. The DNI assesses that North Korea views its nuclear capabilities as intended for "deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy." North Korea has said that it will not get rid of its nuclear weapons until all the other nuclear weapons states do so. North Korea announced on January 6, 2016, that it successfully tested a "hydrogen bomb" (its fourth nuclear weapon test since 2006 and first since February 2013). The U.S. government confirmed that the underground explosion was a nuclear test, but a White House spokesman said that initial data was "not consistent" with North Korean claims of detonating a full-fledged thermonuclear hydrogen bomb. North Korea's first three nuclear weapons tests were of fission devices.²⁵

Generally, countries would test a boosted fission weapon as the next step after testing fission weapons, on the path to developing a hydrogen bomb. This type of device would be lighter in weight and smaller in size than a fission weapon with comparable yield. The U.S. intelligence community has said that the prime objective of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is to develop a nuclear warhead that is "miniaturized" or sufficiently small to be mounted on long-range ballistic missiles, but assessments of progress have differed. The official position of the DNI is that "North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile."²⁶ Miniaturization likely would require additional nuclear and missile tests. Perhaps the most acute near-term threat to other nations is from the medium-range Nodong missile, which could reach all of the Korean Peninsula and some of mainland Japan. Some experts assess that North Korea likely has the capability to mount a nuclear warhead on the Nodong missile.²⁷

The North Korean nuclear program began in the late 1950s with cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union on a nuclear research program near Yongbyon. Its first research reactor began operation in 1967. North Korea used indigenous expertise and foreign procurements to build a small nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (5 MWe). It was capable of producing about 6 kilograms (kg) of plutonium per year and began operating in 1986.²⁸ Later that year, U.S. satellites detected high explosives testing and a new plant to separate plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel (a chemical reprocessing plant). Over the past two decades, the reactor and reprocessing facility have been alternately operational and frozen under safeguards put in place as the result of the 1994 Agreed Framework and again in 2007, under the Six Party Talks. Since the Six Party Talks' collapse in 2008, North Korea has restarted its 5MW(e) reactor, has made steps to restart the reprocessing plant, has openly built a uranium enrichment plant for an alternative source of weapons material, and is constructing a new experimental light water reactor. It is generally estimated in open sources that North Korea has produced between 30 and 40 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons.

While North Korea's weapons program has been plutonium-based from the start, intelligence emerged in the late 1990s pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium Trump Administration Policy 2017: "Maximum Pressure" and Hostile Rhetoric

Initially, the Trump Administration responded by adopting a "maximum pressure" policy that sought to coerce Pyongyang into changing its behavior through economic and diplomatic measures. Many of the elements of the officially stated policy were similar to those employed by the Obama Administration: ratcheting up economic pressure against North Korea, attempting to persuade China—by far North Korea's most important economic partner—and others to apply more pressure against Pyongyang, and expanding the capabilities of the U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances to counter new North Korean threats. The Administration successfully led the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—including North Korea's traditional supporters China and Russia—to pass four new sanctions resolutions that have expanded the requirements for U.N. member states to halt or curtail their military, diplomatic, and economic interaction with the DPRK. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations pushed countries around the globe to significantly cut and/or eliminate their ties to North Korea, often in ways that go beyond UNSC requirements. In a departure from previous Administrations, the Trump Administration emphasized the option of launching a preventive military strike against North Korea.³

Over the course of his presidency, to date, Trump and senior members of his Administration have issued seemingly contradictory statements on North Korea, particularly on the questions of U.S. conditions for negotiations, and whether the United States is prepared to launch a preventive strike against North Korea.⁴ The shifts in the Administration's public statements at times have created confusion about U.S. policy.

2018: Shift to Diplomacy in Early 2018

In early 2018, following months of outreach by South Korean officials hoping to lower tensions, North Korea accepted an invitation from ROK President Moon Jae-in to attend the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea. Pyongyang sent a high-level delegation, including Kim Jong-un's sister, providing an opening for warmer North-South relations. Shortly afterward, President Trump accepted an invitation, delivered by ROK officials, to meet with Kim. Before the June 2018 Singapore Summit between Kim and Trump, Kim—having never met with a foreign head of state nor left North Korea since becoming leader—met twice with Moon and twice with Chinese President Xi Jinping to set the stage for the unprecedented meeting between U.S. and DPRK heads of state.

Opinions vary on why Kim adjusted course to launch a "charm offensive" after a series of provocations in the previous years. It was likely a combination of several factors that drove Kim to pursue diplomacy. These factors include (1) harsh rhetoric from the Trump Administration that emphasized military confrontation, (2) the increasingly punishing sanctions that limited the North's ability to grow its economy, (3) Moon Jae-in's aggressive outreach to North Korea, including during the 2018 Winter Olympics, and (4) Kim's confidence that he had secured a limited nuclear deterrent against the United States, providing him with additional leverage. Regardless of what spurred him to action, he found willing counterparts in Moon, Xi, and Trump to respond to his overtures.

The June 2018 Trump-Kim Singapore Summit

On June 12, 2018, President Trump and Kim met in Singapore to discuss North Korea's nuclear program, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the future of U.S. relations with North Korea. Following the summit, Trump and Kim issued a brief joint statement in which Trump "committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK," and Kim "reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."⁵ The Singapore document is shorter on details than previous nuclear agreements with North Korea and acts as a statement of principles in the following four areas:

• Normalization. The two sides "commit to establish" new bilateral relations.
• Peace. The United States and DPRK agree to work to build "a lasting and stable peace regime."
• Denuclearization. North Korea "commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."
• POW/MIA Remains. The two sides will work to recover the remains of thousands of U.S. troops unaccounted for during the Korean War.

The agreement made no mention of the DPRK's ballistic missile program. The two sides agreed to conduct follow-on negotiations, to be led on the U.S. side by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

In the press conference following the summit, Trump announced that the United States would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which Trump called "war games" and "provocative."⁶ He said the move, which was not accompanied by any apparent commensurate move by Pyongyang and reportedly surprised South Korea and U.S. military commanders, would save "a tremendous amount of money."⁷ Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. The week after the summit, the Defense Department announced that the annual U.S.-South Korea "Ulchi Freedom Guardian" exercises scheduled for August would be cancelled.

Many analysts observed that the agreement covered ground that had been included in previous agreements with North Korea, although those agreements were not made by the DPRK leader himself. Supporters of the agreement point out that the suspension of missile and nuclear tests would reduce North Korea's ability to further advance its capability. Critics of the agreement point out the lack of a timeframe or any reference to verification mechanisms for the denuclearization process, as well as the lack of commitment by Kim to dismantle the DPRK's ballistic missile program.⁸ The definition of denuclearization, the sequencing of the process of denuclearization, as well as the establishment of a peace regime, and normalization of diplomatic ties were left uncertain.⁹ Some analysts believe that the regime's attempt to secure a peace treaty ending the Korean War as a precondition for denuclearization talks is a ploy designed to stall for time and gain recognition as a de jure nuclear state.¹⁰ Some veterans of previous negotiations with the DPRK caution that North Korea may seek to delay and prolong the process while sanction pressure eases. Although U.S. and international sanctions remain in place, maintaining the political momentum to fully implement existing sanctions is challenging in the midst of an engagement initiative.

International and U.S. Sanctions U.N. Sanctions

U.N. sanctions have been a major tool for imposing costs on North Korea, as they represent the collective will of the international community in holding the regime to account for pursuing weapons programs in violation of its international obligations, and must be implemented by all member states. Led by the United States, the UNSC in 2006 adopted its first resolution requiring member states to impose sanctions against North Korea, following North Korea's first nuclear test in October of that year. The UNSC has responded by passing additional sanctions resolutions—a total of 10 were adopted between 2006 and December 2017—that have expanded the requirements of U.N. member states to halt or curtail their military, diplomatic, and economic interaction with the DPRK. At first, the sanctions primarily targeted arms sales, trade in materials that could assist North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, North Korean individuals and entities involved in its WMD activities, and transfers of luxury goods to North Korea.

North Korea's fourth nuclear test in January 2016 spurred a marked expansion of U.N. sanctions. Since then, six sanctions resolutions have been adopted, the most recent in December 2017, expanding sanctions to ban many types of financial interactions with North Korean entities, trade in entire industrial sectors (such as imports of DPRK coal, agriculture and agricultural products, seafood, textiles, and all weapons and military services), and interactions with North Korea and North Koreans in broad classes of activities (such as joint ventures with North Korean entities and the use of North Korean overseas workers). As a result, nearly all of North Korea's major export items are now banned in international markets. According to customs data published by its trading partners, the value of North Korean exports in 2017 declined by more than 30% compared with 2016.¹¹

The Obama and Trump Administrations from early 2016 until at least the spring of 2018 also pushed countries around the globe to significantly cut and/or eliminate their ties to North Korea, often in ways that went beyond UNSC requirements. It is unclear to what extent the Trump Administration has continued this aggressive approach since it began its diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang in the spring of 2018.

U.S. Sanctions

In addition to leading the sanctions effort in the UNSC, the United States also has imposed its own unilateral sanctions on North Korea in order to exert greater pressure. Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump have issued a series of executive orders targeting North Korea and North Korean entities. In 2016, the Obama Administration designated North Korea as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern, and in 2017, the Trump Administration redesignated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. Since 2015, Congress has passed two North Korea-specific statutes, including the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122), and the Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act (Title III of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act [CAATSA]; P.L. 115-44). Collectively, U.S. sanctions have the following consequences for U.S.-North Korea relations:

• trade is limited to food, medicine, and other humanitarian-related goods, all of which require a license;
• financial transactions are prohibited;
• U.S. new investment is prohibited, and the President has new authority to prohibit transactions involving North Korea's transportation, mining, energy, or financial sectors.
• U.S. foreign aid is minimal, emergency in nature, and administered through centrally funded programs to remove any possibility of the government of North Korea benefiting;
• U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and transaction with those North Korean individuals, entities, and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC);
• foreign financial institutions could become subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated DPRK entities;
• U.S. persons and entities are prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers' Party, and others; and
• U.S. travel to North Korea is limited and requires a special validation passport issued by the State Department.

North Korean Demands and Motivations

Over the years, North Korea's stated demands in negotiating the cessation of its weapons programs have repeatedly changed, and have at times included U.S. recognition of the regime as a nuclear weapons state and a peace treaty with the United States as a prerequisite to denuclearization.¹⁴ Identifying patterns in North Korean behavior is challenging, as Pyongyang often weaves together different approaches to the outside world. North Korean behavior has vacillated between limited cooperation, including multiple agreements on denuclearization, and overt provocations, including testing several long-range ballistic missiles over the last 20 years and six nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017. Pyongyang's willingness to negotiate has often appeared to be driven by its internal conditions: food shortages or economic desperation can push North Korea to reengage in talks, usually to extract more aid from China or, in the past, from the United States and/or South Korea. North Korea has proven skillful at exploiting divisions among the other five parties and taking advantage of political transitions in Washington to stall the nuclear negotiating process.

The seeming fickleness of North Korea's demands has contributed to debates over the utility of negotiating with North Korea. A small group of analysts argue not only that negotiations are necessary to reduce the chances of conflict, but also that they are feasible, because Kim Jong-un's "real goal is economic development," in the words of one North Korea-watcher.¹⁵ Implied in this vision is the concept of a basic bargain in which North Korea would obtain a more secure relationship with the United States, a formal end to the Korean War, as well as economic benefits and sanctions removal in exchange for nuclear weapons and missile dismantlement. Kim Jong-un's increased emphasis on economic development in 2018, discussed below, is often mentioned as a sign that he has made a decision to denuclearize; without breaking free of North Korea's isolation and obtaining relief from sanctions, it will be difficult for him to achieve his economic goals.

Many analysts believe, however, that the North Korean regime, regardless of inducements, will not voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons capability. After years of observing North Korea's negotiating behavior, many analysts now believe that Pyongyang's demands are tactical moves and that North Korea sees having a nuclear capability as essential to regime survival and has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons in exchange for aid and recognition.¹⁶

Pyongyang's frequent statements of its determination to maintain its nuclear weapons program, also have led analysts to doubt the idea that the pledge at the Singapore summit has dramatically shifted its intentions. In April 2010, for instance, North Korea reiterated its demand to be recognized as an official nuclear weapons state and said it would increase and modernize its nuclear deterrent.¹⁷ On April 13, 2012, the same day as a failed rocket launch, the North Korean constitution was revised to describe the country as a "nuclear-armed nation." In March 2013, North Korea declared that its nuclear weapons are "not a bargaining chip" and would not be relinquished even for "billions of dollars."¹⁸ Following the successful test of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile in November 2017, official North Korean news outlets announced that the DPRK had "finally realized the great historic cause of completing the state nuclear force."¹⁹ North Korea has also suggested that it will not relinquish its nuclear stockpile until all nuclear weapons are eliminated worldwide.²⁰

The multinational military intervention in 2011 in Libya, which abandoned its nuclear weapon program in exchange for the removal of sanctions, may have had the undesirable side effect of reinforcing the perceived value of nuclear arms for regime security. North Korean leaders may believe that, without the security guarantee of nuclear weapons, they are vulnerable to overthrow by a rebellious uprising aided by outside military intervention.

Some observers assert that the 2018 Singapore summit conferred a degree of legitimacy on North Korea as a nuclear state, in that the U.S. President sat down with Kim as he would any other world leader and agreed to the "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."²¹ The summit may have satisfied some of North Korea's past demands: the cancelation of U.S.-ROK military exercises, the easing of sanctions implementation, and the prestige conferred by meeting with other heads of state, including the President of the United States.

History of Nuclear Negotiations²²

Prior to the Trump Administration's efforts, the United States engaged in four major sets of formal nuclear and missile negotiations with North Korea: the bilateral Agreed Framework (1994-2002), the bilateral missile negotiations (1996-2000), the multilateral Six-Party Talks (2003-2009), and the bilateral Leap Day Deal (2012). In general, the proposed formula for these negotiations has been for North Korea to halt, and in some cases disable, its nuclear or missile programs in return for economic and diplomatic concessions.

Agreed Framework

In 1986, U.S. intelligence detected the startup of a plutonium production reactor and reprocessing plant at Yongbyon that were not subject to international monitoring as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which North Korea joined in 1985. In the early 1990s, after agreeing to and then obstructing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of these facilities, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. According to statements by former Clinton Administration officials, a preemptive military strike on the North's nuclear facilities was seriously considered as the crisis developed. Discussion of sanctions at the UNSC and a diplomatic mission from former President Jimmy Carter persuaded North Korea to engage in negotiations and eventually led to the U.S.-North Korea 1994 Agreed Framework, under which the United States agreed to arrange for North Korea to receive two light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants and heavy fuel oil in exchange for North Korea freezing and eventually dismantling its plutonium program under IAEA supervision. The document also outlined a path toward normalization of diplomatic and economic relations as well as security assurances.

The Agreed Framework faced multiple reactor construction and funding delays. Still, the fundamentals of the agreement were implemented: North Korea froze its plutonium program, heavy fuel oil was delivered to the North Koreans, and LWR construction commenced. However, North Korea did not comply with commitments to declare all nuclear facilities to the IAEA and put them under safeguards. In 2002, the George W. Bush Administration confronted North Korea about a suspected secret uranium enrichment program, the existence of which the North Koreans denied publicly.²³ As a result, the United States halted heavy fuel oil shipments and construction of the LWRs, which were already well behind schedule. North Korea then expelled IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon site, announced its withdrawal from the NPT, and restarted its reactor and reprocessing facility after an eight-year freeze.

Missile Negotiations

Separately, in response to congressional pressure due to opposition to the Agreed Framework's terms, the Clinton Administration in 1996 began pursuing a series of negotiations with North Korea that focused on curbing the DPRK's missile program and ending its missile exports, particularly to countries in the Middle East. In September 1999, North Korea agreed to a moratorium on testing long-range missiles in exchange for the partial lifting of U.S. sanctions and a continuation of bilateral talks. Then-Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Pyongyang in October 2000 to finalize the terms of a new agreement, under which North Korea would end ballistic missile development and missile exports in exchange for international assistance in launching North Korean satellites. A final agreement proved elusive, however. North Korea maintained its moratorium until July 2006.

Six-Party Talks Under the George W. Bush Administration, negotiations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue expanded to include China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. With China playing host, six rounds of the "Six-Party Talks" from 2003 to 2008 yielded occasional progress, but ultimately failed to resolve the fundamental issue of North Korean nuclear arms. The most promising breakthrough occurred in 2005, with the issuance of a Joint Statement in which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for aid, a U.S. security guarantee, and talks over normalization of relations with the United States. Despite the promise of the statement, the process eventually broke down, primarily due to an inability to come to an agreement on measures to verify North Korea's compliance. Obama Administration's "Strategic Patience" Policy and Leap Day Agreement

The Obama Administration's policy toward North Korea, often referred to as "strategic patience," was to put pressure on the regime in Pyongyang while insisting that North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks. The main elements of the policy involved insisting that Pyongyang commit to steps toward denuclearization as previously promised in the Six-Party Talks; closely coordinating with treaty allies Japan and South Korea; attempting to convince China to take a tougher line on North Korea; and applying pressure on Pyongyang through arms interdictions and sanctions. U.S. officials stated that, under the right conditions, they would seek a comprehensive package deal for North Korea's complete denuclearization in return for normalization of relations and significant aid, but insisted on a freeze of its nuclear activities and a moratorium on testing before returning to negotiations. This policy was accompanied by large-scale military exercises designed to demonstrate the strength of the U.S.-South Korean alliance.

In addition to multilateral sanctions required by the U.N., the Obama Administration issued several executive orders to implement the U.N. sanctions or to declare additional unilateral sanctions. These included sanctioning entities and individuals involved in the sale and procurement of weapons of mass destruction, as well as those engaging in a number of North Korean illicit activities that help fund the WMD programs and support the regime, including money laundering, arms sales, counterfeiting, narcotics, and luxury goods. Following the November 2014 cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attributed to North Korean hackers, President Obama issued E.O. 13687, enabling the U.S. government to seize the assets of designated DPRK officials and those working on behalf of North Korea.

Despite the overtures for engagement after Obama took office, a series of provocations by Pyongyang halted progress on restarting negotiations. These violations of international law initiated a periodic cycle of action and reaction, in which the United States focused on building consensus at the UNSC and pressuring North Korea through enhanced multilateral sanctions. The major exception to the pattern of mutual recrimination occurred in February 2012, shortly after the death of Kim Jong-il, the previous leader of North Korea and father of Kim Jong-un. The so-called "Leap Day Agreement" committed North Korea to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment activities at the Yongbyon nuclear facility, as well as the readmission of IAEA inspectors. In exchange, the Obama Administration pledged 240,000 metric tons of "nutritional assistance"²⁴ and steps to increase cultural and people-to-people exchanges with North Korea. North Korea scuttled the deal only two months later by launching a long-range rocket, followed by a third nuclear test in February 2013. China's Role

The U.S. policy of putting economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea depends heavily on China. In addition to being North Korea's largest trading partner by far—accounting for over 90% of North Korea's total trade since 2015—China also provides food and energy aid that is an essential lifeline for the regime and is one of Pyongyang's few diplomatic partners. Although not supportive of Pyongyang's nuclear goals—as seen in its voting for increasingly restrictive UNSC sanctions—China's overriding priority appears to be to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, and therefore to prevent the collapse of North Korea. Analysts assess that Beijing fears the destabilizing effects of a humanitarian crisis, significant refugee flows over its borders, and the uncertainty of how other nations, particularly the United States, would assert themselves on the peninsula in the event of a power vacuum. China also sees strategic value in having North Korea as a "buffer" between China and democratic, U.S.-allied South Korea.

Beijing often has been an obstacle to U.S. policy goals with regard to North Korea. Imposing harsher punishments on North Korea in international fora, such as the U.N., is frequently hindered by China's seat on the UNSC, where Beijing often waters down U.S. efforts to punish North Korea. Chinese companies often have been found to violate sanctions against North Korea, and the Chinese government's enforcement of sanctions has been uneven, with authorities often turning a blind eye to violations.²⁵ However, according to a number of indicators China in 2017 significantly increased its enforcement of UNSC sanctions, perhaps to convince the United States not to follow through on the Trump Administration's threats of a military strike against North Korea. Additionally, Chinese trade with and aid to North Korea is presumed to be a fraction of what it might be if Beijing decided to fully support North Korea, likely due in part to Beijing's desire to appear to the international community as a responsible leader instead of an enabler of a rogue regime. This assumption is a key factor driving the U.S. and South Korean approach, which seeks to avoid pushing China to a place where it feels compelled to provide more diplomatic and economic assistance to North Korea.

Relations between Beijing and Pyongyang suffered after Kim Jong-un's rise to power in 2011. Beijing appeared displeased with Kim Jong-un, particularly after he executed his uncle Jang Song-taek in 2013, who had been the chief interlocutor with China. Chinese President Xi Jinping had several summits with former South Korean President Park Geun-hye, as well as with current President Moon, without meeting with Kim. In addition, an increasing number of Chinese academics called for a reappraisal of China's friendly ties with North Korea, citing the material and reputational costs to China. Chinese public opinion also seemed to turn against North Korea: two-thirds of 8,000 respondents on a Weibo (a Twitter-like Chinese social media platform) poll indicated that they favored a U.S. preemptive airstrike on North Korea's nuclear sites. Content ridiculing Pyongyang's leadership was regularly deleted by state censors.²⁶ In 2017, China agreed to increasingly stringent UNSC sanctions resolutions and to an unprecedented degree appeared to be implementing these measures.

Trump and Kim's aggressive pursuit of a diplomatic opening in 2018 appeared to restore some of the previous closeness of the North Korea-China relationship. After Trump agreed to meet the North Korean leader, Kim traveled outside North Korea for the first time to Beijing, a move that suggested he was seeking to reaffirm a close relationship with China ahead of the meeting. (He traveled to China again in May.) Having achieved some results that China likely perceives as victories—the deescalation of hostilities, the turn to diplomacy and, notably, the cancelation of U.S.-South Korean military exercises that have long irked Beijing—Kim likely has new goodwill and leverage in his relationship with Beijing. North Korea's Internal Situation Kim Jong-un's Political Position

Kim Jong-un is the third generation of the Kim family to rule North Korea. His grandfather, Kim Il-sung, North Korea's first ruler, reigned from 1948 until his death in 1994. His father, Kim Jong-il, ruled for nearly 17 years until his death in December 2011, when Kim Jong-un was believed to be in his late 20s.

Although much uncertainty remains about the Pyongyang regime and its priorities given the opaque nature of the state, Kim Jong-un's bold emergence on the global stage in 2018 may be revealing. For many North Korea watchers, Kim's confidence in asserting himself on the world diplomatic stage reinforces the impression that he has consolidated power at the apex of the North Korean regime. Some analysts credit Kim with successfully pursuing a plan to both ensure the survival of his regime but also build up his country's struggling economy. Kim has promoted a two-track policy (the so-called byungjin line) of economic development and nuclear weapons development, explicitly rejecting the efforts of external forces to make North Korea choose between one or the other. Having achieved what some observers call a "limited nuclear deterrent," Kim has pursued better economic opportunities by launching a "charm offensive" to restore better relations with South Korea and China. In addition, Kim has achieved at least a temporary breakthrough with the United States and therefore staved off more punishing sanctions.

Initially, some observers held out hope that the young, European-educated Kim could emerge as a political reformer, but his behavior has not borne out these hopes. In fact, his ruthless drive to consolidate power demonstrates a keen desire to keep the dynastic dictatorship intact. Since he became supreme leader in late 2011, Kim has demonstrated a brutal hand in leading North Korea. He has carried out a series of purges of senior-level officials, including the execution of Jang Song-taek, his uncle by marriage, in 2013. In February 2017, Kim's half-brother Kim Jong-nam was killed at the Kuala Lumpur airport in Malaysia by two assassins using the nerve agent VX; the attack was widely believed to have been authorized by Kim Jong-un.²⁷ South Korean intelligence sources say that over 300 senior military and civilian officials were replaced in Kim's first four years in office.²⁸ Kim Jong-un has displayed a different style of ruling than his father, who generally was considered aloof and remote, gave few public speeches, and attempted to severely limited access to outside influences. Kim has allowed Western influences, such as clothing styles and Disney characters, to be displayed in the public sphere, and he is informal in his frequent public appearances. In a stark change from his father's era, Kim Jong-un's wife was introduced to the North Korean public, although the couple's offspring (they are believed to have three children) remain hidden from the public.²⁹ Analysts depict these stylistic changes as Kim attempting to seem young and modern and to conjure associations with the "man of the people" image cultivated by his grandfather Kim Il-Sung, the revered founder of North Korea. North Korea Economic Conditions

North Korea is one of the world's poorest countries, with an estimated per capita GDP of under $2,000, about 5% of South Korea's level.³⁰ North Korea is also one of the world's most centrally planned economies. Under Kim, a series of economic policy changes appear to have spurred economic growth and lifted the living standards—including access to a wider array consumer products—for a sizable portion of ordinary North Koreans.³¹ Increased domestic production, from the loosening of restrictions, along with sanctions-evasion activities, may help to explain how North Korea appears to have weathered the steady tightening of international sanctions since early 2016, in particular the dramatic decline in North Korea's exports from 2016 to 2017, when international sanctions became much stricter.

Under Kim's changes, market principles have been permitted, in a limited manner, to govern some sectors of North Korean business, industry, and agriculture.³² The government has at least partially legalized consumer and business-to-business markets, both of which formerly had a quasi-legal existence, leading to an expansion not only in the number and size of markets but also the ancillary services—such as distribution systems—that enable their operations.³³ In his speeches and public factory visits, Kim often emphasizes domestic manufacturing, calling for a shift in consumption from imported to domestically produced goods.³⁴ The marketization process has been facilitated by international trade with China, which since 2016 has accounted for over 90% of North Korea's trade.³⁵

North Korea's agricultural liberalization moves, along with more favorable planting conditions, appear to have contributed to much larger harvests since 2010 than previous decades. In another sign of increased stability in food production, North Korean food prices generally appear to have been stable since around 2012.³⁶ However, even as the elite and those with access to hard currency appear to be faring better, the food security situation for many North Koreans remains tenuous. The United Nations Resident Coordinator for North Korea estimates that over 10 million North Koreans, or over 40% of the population, "continue to suffer from food insecurity and undernutrition."³⁷

Analysts debate the extent to which Kim's changes can be considered "reforms" because it is unclear whether they are as sweeping as those adopted in the past by socialist countries that made a more definitive break from past economic policies. North Korea's penal code, for instance, expressly prohibits private enterprise.³⁸ There is conflicting evidence of the government's willingness to tolerate marketization, particularly if it increases the spread of foreign ideas that the communist party feels could threaten its grip on power. Periodically, reports emerge of official crackdowns in various localities against market activity.³⁹

Many North Koreans have limited access to health care and face significant food shortages. The regime claims it provides universal health care, but most of the country's hospitals are in a dismal state.⁴⁰ In Pyongyang, health facilities are better than in the rest of the country, but only the elite have access to those facilities. The regime decides where families can live depending on their degree of loyalty to the state, and it tightly controls who can reside in and enter the capital. As a result, few people can get quality medical care, and many North Koreans cannot afford the necessary medications or bribes for their doctors.⁴¹

Increasing Access to Information Inside North Korea

Pyongyang appears to be slowly losing its ability to fully control information flows from the outside world into North Korea. Surveys of North Korean defectors reveal that some within North Korea are growing increasingly wary of government propaganda and turning to outside sources of news.⁴² The North Korean government tries to prevent its citizens from listening to foreign broadcasts. It often attempts to jam foreign stations, including VOA, RFA, and the BBC.⁴³ The government also alters radios to prevent them from receiving outside broadcasts, but defectors report that some citizens have illegal radios—or legal ones that have been modified—to receive foreign programs.⁴⁴ According to a 2015 survey of North Korean defectors, 29% of them listened to foreign broadcasts while they were in North Korea.⁴⁵

After a short-lived attempt in 2004, North Korea in 2009 restarted a mobile phone network, in cooperation with the Egyptian telecommunications firm Orascom. The mobile network reportedly had over 3 million subscribers in 2017.⁴⁶ The regime has allowed increased mobile-phone use, perhaps because it provides better surveillance opportunities. Some reports suggest that North Korean cadres consume foreign media, and that some are even involved in smuggling and selling operations.⁴⁷ Although illegal to purchase and operate, Chinese cellphones can be used near the border to make international calls.

Although phone conversations in North Korea are monitored, the spread of cell phones likely enables faster and wider dissemination of information. A paper published by the Harvard University Belfer Center in 2015 argues that a campaign to spread information about the outside world within North Korea could produce positive changes in the political system there.⁴⁸ In the 2015 survey of North Koreans, 28% of respondents reported that they owned domestic mobile phones—and 15% of them said they used their phones to access "sensitive media content."⁴⁹ Increased access to information could be "the Achilles Heel of the Kim" regime, according to Thae Yong-ho, who served as North Korean deputy ambassador to Britain until his defection in 2016. For decades, the regime has indoctrinated its citizens—using plays, movies, and books—to instill a sense of loyalty to the Kim family and portray the outside world as economically, culturally, and militarily inferior to North Korea. Outside sources of information could inform the people about the reality of their living conditions and encourage them to question their regime.⁵⁰ North Korean Security Threats North Korea's Military Capabilities

North Korea fields one of the largest militaries in the world, estimated at 1.28 million personnel in uniform, with another 600,000 in reserves.⁵¹ Defense spending may account for as much as 24% of the DPRK's national income, on a purchasing power parity basis.⁵² The North Korean military has deployed approximately 70% of its ground forces and 50% of its air and naval forces within 100 kilometers of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) border, allowing it to rapidly deploy for full-scale conflict with South Korea.⁵³

North Korea does not have the resources to modernize its entire military, and the U.S. intelligence community has assessed that North Korea is developing its WMD capabilities to offset deficiencies in its conventional forces.⁵⁴ In particular, North Korea has made the development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles a top priority. North Korea also has a large stockpile of chemical weapons and may have biological weapons as well. Analysts assess that in recent years Pyongyang has developed the ability to conduct offensive cyber operations, and the U.S. intelligence community assesses North Korea is among the four countries that "will pose the greatest cyber threats to the United States" in 2018.⁵⁵ A 2014 Defense White Paper from South Korea's Defense Ministry asserts that North Korea has 6,000 cyber warfare troops.⁵⁶ The sections below describe what is known from open sources about these programs.

North Korea's Conventional Military Forces

North Korea's conventional military capabilities have atrophied significantly since 1990, due to antiquated weapons systems and inadequate training, but North Korea could still inflict enormous damage on Seoul with artillery and rocket attacks.⁵⁷ Security experts agree that, if there were a war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States and South Korea would prevail, but at great cost.⁵⁸ Analysts estimate that North Korean artillery forces, fortified in thousands of underground facilities, could fire thousands of artillery rounds at metropolitan Seoul in the first hour of a war.⁵⁹ Most North Korean major combat equipment is old and inferior to the modern systems of the U.S. and ROK militaries. With few exceptions, North Korean tanks, fighter aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and some ships are based on Soviet designs from the 1950s-1970s.

To compensate for its obsolete traditional forces, in recent years North Korea has sought to improve its asymmetric capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), offensive cyber operations, special operations forces, GPS jamming, stealth and infiltration, and electromagnetic pulse.⁶⁰ In recent years, North Korea also has made some advancements in the following areas: long-range artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, infantry weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, ballistic missile-capable submarines, and special operations forces.⁶¹ In the maritime domain, North Korea constructed two new helicopter-carrier corvettes and may be developing a new, larger model of submarine (perhaps to launch ballistic missiles).

The North Korean military suffers from institutional weaknesses that would mitigate its effectiveness in a major conflict. Because of the totalitarian government system, the North Korean military's command and control structure is highly centralized and allows no independent actions. North Korean war plans are believed to be highly "scripted" and inflexible in operational and tactical terms, and mid-level officers do not have the training and authority to act on their own initiative.⁶² The country's general resource scarcity affects military readiness in several ways: lack of fuel prevents pilots from conducting adequate flight training, logistical shortages could prevent troops from traveling as ordered, lack of spare parts could reduce the availability of equipment, and food shortages will likely reduce the endurance of North Korean forces in combat, among other effects.

Nuclear Weapons⁶³

U.S. analysts remain concerned about the pace and success of North Korea's nuclear weapons development. In the past, the U.S. intelligence community has characterized the purpose of North Korean nuclear weapons as intended for "deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy."⁶⁴ While the United States is in talks with North Korea about abandoning its nuclear weapons program, or "denuclearization," the intelligence community has expressed skepticism of Pyongyang's willingness to carry out that goal. In its most recent assessment to Congress, the DNI said in March 2018 that "Pyongyang's commitment to possessing nuclear weapons and fielding capable long-range missiles, all while repeatedly stating that nuclear weapons are the basis for its survival, suggests that the regime does not intend to negotiate them away."⁶⁵ North Korean Foreign Ministry official Choe Son Hui said in October 2017 that the North Korean nuclear arsenal is meant to deter attack from the United States and that keeping its weapons is "a matter of life and death for us."⁶⁶

North Korea in public statements has indicated it was building its nuclear force with an emphasis on developing "smaller, lighter, and more diversified" warheads, signaling a move to produce and deploy nuclear weapons. North Korea has tested nuclear explosive devices six times since 2006, including a hydrogen bomb (or two-stage thermonuclear warhead with a higher yield than previously tested devices) in September 2017 that it said it was perfecting for delivery on an intercontinental ballistic missile. According to U.S. and international estimates, each test produced underground blasts that were progressively higher in magnitude and estimated yield. In early 2018, North Korea announced that it had achieved its goals and would no longer conduct nuclear tests and would close down its test site.⁶⁷ However, fissile material production and related facilities have not been shuttered.

The North Korean nuclear program began in the late 1950s with cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union on a nuclear research program near Yongbyon. Its first research reactor began operation in 1967. North Korea used indigenous expertise and foreign procurements to build a small (5MW(e)) nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. It was capable of producing about 6 kilograms (kg) of plutonium per year and began operating in 1986.⁶⁸ Later that year, U.S. satellites detected high explosives testing and a new plant to separate plutonium from the reactor's spent fuel (a chemical reprocessing plant). Over the past two decades, the reactor and reprocessing facility have been alternately operational and frozen under safeguards put in place as the result of the 1994 Agreed Framework and again in 2007, under the Six Party Talks. Since the Six Party Talks' collapse in 2008, North Korea has restarted its 5MW(e) reactor and its reprocessing plant, has openly built a uranium enrichment plant for an alternative source of weapons material, and is constructing a new experimental light water reactor. It is generally estimated in open sources that North Korea had produced between 30 and 40 kilograms of separated plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen nuclear weapons.

While North Korea's weapons program was plutonium-based from the start, intelligence emerged in the late 1990s pointing to a second route to a bomb using highly enriched uranium (HEU). North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power.⁶⁹. North Korea openly acknowledged a uranium enrichment program in 2009, but has said its purpose is the production of fuel for nuclear power. In November 2010, North Korea showed visiting American experts early construction of a 100 MWT light-water reactor and a newly built gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant, both at the Yongbyon site. The North Koreans claimed the enrichment plant was operational, but this has not been independently confirmed. U.S. officials have said that it is likely other clandestine enrichment facilities exist. Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors. An enrichment capability could potentially provide North Korea with a faster way of making nuclear material for weapons and therefore is of great concern to policymakers. Estimates of enriched uranium stockpiles are not publicly available due to the lack of open-source information about the size and capacity of the program.

Open-source reports, citing U.S. government sources, in July 2018 identified one such site at Kangson.⁷⁰

It is difficult to estimate warhead and material stockpiles due to lack of transparency and uncertainty about weapons design. U.S. official statements have not given warhead total estimates, but recent scholarly analyses give low, medium, and high scenarios for the amount of fissile material North Korea could produce by 2020, and therefore the potential number of nuclear warheads. If production estimates are correct, the low-end estimate for that study was 20 warheads by 2020, with a maximum of 100 warheads by 2020.⁷¹ Ballistic Missiles⁷²

North Korea places a high priority on the continued development of its ballistic missile technology. Despite international condemnation and prohibitions in UNSC resolutions, since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011 North Korea has conducted over 80 ballistic missile test launches, apparently aimed at increasing the range of its offensive weapons and improving its ability to evade or defeat U.S. missile defense systems. In 2016, North Korea conducted 26 ballistic missile flight tests on a variety of platforms. In 2017, North Korea test launched 18 ballistic missiles (with five failures), including two launches in July and another in November that many ascribe as ICBM tests (intercontinental ballistic missiles). North Korea also has an arsenal of approximately 700 Soviet-designed short-range ballistic missiles, according to unofficial estimates, although the inaccuracy of these antiquated missiles obviates their military effectiveness.⁷³

The U.S. intelligence community has said that the prime objective of North Korea's nuclear weapons program is to develop a nuclear warhead that is "miniaturized" or sufficiently small to be mounted on long-range ballistic missiles, but assessments of progress differ. Miniaturization may require additional nuclear and missile tests. Perhaps the most acute near-term threat to other nations is from the medium-range Nodong missile, which could reach all of the Korean Peninsula and some of mainland Japan, including some U.S. military bases.⁷⁴ Some experts for years have assessed that North Korea likely has the capability to mount a nuclear warhead on the Nodong missile.⁷⁵

A December 2015 Department of Defense (DOD) report identifies two hypothetical ICBMs on which North Korea could mount a nuclear warhead and deliver it to the continental United States: the KN-08 and the Taepodong-2. North Korea has publicly displayed what are widely considered mock-ups or engineering models of the KN-08 and KN-14 ICBMs. In 2016, the intelligence community assessed that "North Korea has already taken initial steps toward fielding this [ICBM] system, although the system has not been flight-tested." In July 2017, the DPRK conducted what most have now assessed to be two ICBM tests. A December 2017 Department of Defense report recognized these tests but also said that additional testing may be required.⁷⁶

North Korea has demonstrated limited but growing success in its medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) program and its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test program. Moreover, North Korea appears to be moving slowly toward solid rocket motors for its ballistic missiles. Solid fuel is a chemically more stable option that also allows for reduced reaction and reload times. Successful tests of the Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) solid fuel MRBM in 2017 led North Korea to announce it would now mass-produce those missiles.

A recent focus in North Korea's ballistic missile test program appears to be directed at developing a capability to defeat or degrade the effectiveness of missile defenses, such as Patriot, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), and the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, all of which are deployed in the region. Some of the 2016 missile tests were lofted to much higher altitudes and shorter ranges than an optimal ballistic trajectory. On reentry, a warhead from such a launch would come in at a much steeper angle of attack and at much faster speed to its intended target, making it potentially more difficult to intercept with missile defenses. North Korea demonstrated in 2017 the ability to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile launched in relatively short order. This is consistent with a possible goal of being able to conduct large ballistic missile attacks with large raid sizes, a capability that could make it more challenging for a missile defense system to destroy each incoming warhead. Finally, North Korea's progress with SLBMs might suggest an effort to counter land-based THAAD missile defenses by launching attacks from positions at sea that are outside the THAAD system's radar field of view, but not necessarily outside the capabilities of Aegis BMD systems deployed in the region.

In the past, the United States has attempted to negotiate limits to North Korea's missile program. 100 warheads by 2020.²⁹

Chemical and Biological Weapons

According to congressional testimony by Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea has "one of the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles."³⁰ North Korea is widely reported to possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, and sarin gas. Open source reporting estimates that North Korea has approximately 12 facilities where raw chemicals, precursors, and weapon agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for chemical weapons.³¹ North Korea is estimated to have a chemical weapon production capability up to 4,500 metric tons during a typical year and 12,000 tons during a period of crisis, with a current inventory of 2,500 to 5,000 tons, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.³² A RAND analysis says that "1 ton of the chemical weapon sarin could cause tens of thousands of fatalities" and that if North Korea at some point decides to attack one or more of its neighbors, South Korea and Japan would be "the most likely targets."³³ North Korea is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) which bans the use and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

North Korea is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons production capability. The United States intelligence community continues to judge that North Korea has a biotechnology infrastructure to support such a capability, and "has a munitions production capacity that could be used to weaponize biological agents."³⁴ South Korea's Ministry of National Defense estimated in 2012 that the DPRK possesses anthrax and smallpox, among other weapons agents.³⁵

North Korea's Missile Programs³⁶

North Korea places a high priority on the continued development of its ballistic missile technology.³⁷ Despite international condemnation and prohibitions in UNSC resolutions, North Korea twice in 2012 launched long-range rockets carrying ostensible satellite payloads and in spring and summer 2014 fired approximately 10 shorter range ballistic missiles.³⁸ North Korea has an arsenal of approximately 700 Soviet-designed short-range ballistic missiles, according to unofficial estimates, although the inaccuracy of these antiquated missiles obviates their military effectiveness.³⁹ A U.S. government report said in 2013 that North Korea has deployed small numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (unofficial estimate: about 100 and fewer than 30, respectively) that could reach Japan and U.S. bases there, but the intermediate-range missiles have never been flight-tested.⁴⁰ North Korea has made slow progress toward developing a reliable long-range ballistic missile; the December 2012 launch was the first successful space launch after four consecutive failures in 1998, 2006, 2009, and April 2012.

After its first long-range missile test in 1998, North Korea and the United States held several rounds of talks on a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange for the Clinton Administration's pledge to lift certain economic sanctions. Although Kim Jong-il made promises to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, negotiators could not conclude a deal. These negotiations were abandoned at the start of the Bush Administration, which placed a higher priority on the North Korean nuclear program. Ballistic missiles were not on the agenda in the Six-Party Talks. In 2006, UNSC Resolution 1718 barred North Korea from conducting missile-related activities. North Korea flouted this resolution with its April 2009 test launch. The UNSC then responded with Resolution 1874, which further increased restrictions on the DPRK ballistic missile program. The 2012 Leap Day Agreement included a moratorium on ballistic missile tests, which North Korea claimed excludes satellite launches.

A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in 1999 predicted that North Korea would successfully test an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015, but North Korea's inconsistent progress has disproved that assessment.⁴¹ The author of a 2012 RAND technical report on the North Korean nuclear missile threat asserts that the Unha-3 rocket, which successfully lifted an estimated 100 kg satellite payload into orbit in December 2012, is incapable of carrying a nuclear warhead at inter-continental range. "If [North Koreans] wanted an ICBM, they have to develop a new rocket, using different technology. This would take a very long time, require a lot of work, and cost a lot of money."⁴² A net assessment by the International Institute for Strategic Studies concluded in 2011 that a future North Korean ICBM "would almost certainly have to undergo an extensive flight-test program that includes at least a dozen, if not two dozen, launches and extends over three to five years."⁴³ Such a program would make North Korean intentions obvious to the world. Others, however, argue that North Korea might take a radically different approach and accept one successful test as sufficient for declaring operational capability.

Official reports indicate that North Korea has also been developing a road-mobile ICBM, dubbed the KN-08, although this missile has never been flight-tested.⁴⁴ Analysts examining commercial satellite imagery believe that North Korea has conducted multiple tests of KN-08 rocket engines, but the system—should it function successfully—is likely more than a year away from even an initial deployment.⁴⁵ In a military parade in October 2015, North Korea displayed what appears to be a modified version of the KN-08. An analysis by missile experts outside the U.S. government concluded that the modifications to the missile "will likely delay its entry into service until 2020 or beyond."⁴⁶

The potential ability of North Korea to miniaturize a nuclear warhead and mate it to a ballistic missile, especially an ICBM, is a key concern of the United States. The DNI stated in April 2013, "North Korea has not yet demonstrated the full range of capabilities necessary for a nuclear armed missile."⁴⁷ Yet experts at the Institute for Science and International Security assessed in February 2013 that "North Korea likely has the capability to mount a plutonium-based nuclear warhead on the shorter range [800-mile] Nodong missile."⁴⁸ General Curtis Scaparrotti, the commander of U.S. Forces Korea, stated in October 2014, "I don't know that [North Korea has a functioning, miniaturized nuclear device].... What I'm saying is, is that I think given their technological capabilities, the time that they been working on this, that they probably have the capabilities to put this together."⁴⁹ And in April 2015, Admiral William Gortney, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, seemingly veered from the official U.S. intelligence community assessment when he said that it was his assessment that North Korea has "the ability to put a nuclear weapon on a KN-08 and shoot it at the homeland."⁵⁰ Until North Korea tests such a device, the outside world will remain uncertain about North Korean nuclear capabilities.

In 2015, North Korea revealed that it has been developing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability, announcing the first test launch (apparently, an ejection test) in May 2015. The second reported SLBM test, in December 2015, was a failure, according to outside analyses of footage released by North Korean media.⁵¹ SLBM technology is extremely difficult to develop, and the reports of testing do not indicate that North Korea's prototype ballistic missile submarines represent an imminent threat. One expert on North Korean military matters concluded in May 2015 that "... under optimal conditions this [SLBM capability is] an emerging regional threat rather than an imminent threat. It does not represent an emerging intercontinental threat."⁵²

Foreign Connections

North Korea's proliferation of missile Recent talks have not specifically included references to missiles. Chemical and Biological Weapons

North Korea has active biological and chemical weapons programs, according to U.S. official reports. According to 2015 congressional testimony by Curtis Scaparrotti, then Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, North Korea has "one of the world's largest chemical weapons stockpiles."⁷⁷ North Korea is widely reported to possess a large arsenal of chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, and sarin gas. Open-source reporting estimates that North Korea has approximately 12 facilities where raw chemicals, precursors, and weapon agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for chemical weapons.⁷⁸ North Korea is estimated to have a chemical weapon production capability up to 4,500 metric tons during a typical year and 12,000 tons during a period of crisis, with a current inventory of 2,500 to 5,000 tons, according to the South Korean Ministry of National Defense.⁷⁹ A RAND analysis says that "one ton of the chemical weapon sarin could cause tens of thousands of fatalities" and that if North Korea at some point decides to attack one or more of its neighbors with chemical weapons, South Korea and Japan would be "the most likely targets."⁸⁰ North Korea is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which bans the use and stockpiling of chemical weapons. North Korea's apparent use of VX nerve agent to assassinate Kim's older brother, Kim Jong Nam, in a Malaysian airport in March 2017 focused attention on the North Korean chemical stockpile.

North Korea is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons production capability. The U.S. intelligence community continues to judge that North Korea has a "longstanding [biological weapons] capability and biotechnology infrastructure" to support such a capability, and "has a munitions production capacity that could be used to weaponize biological agents."⁸¹ South Korea's Ministry of National Defense estimated in 2012 that the DPRK possesses anthrax and smallpox, among other weapons agents.⁸²

Foreign Connections North Korea's proliferation of WMD and missile-related technology and expertise is another serious concern for the United States. Pyongyang has sold missile parts and/or technology to several countries, including Egypt, Iran, Libya, Burma, Pakistan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.⁵³83 Sales of missiles and telemetric information from missile tests have been a key source of hard currency for the Kim regime.

North Korea assisted Syria with building a nuclear reactor, destroyed by Israel in 2007, that may have been part of a Syrian nuclear weapons program, according to U.S. official accounts.⁸⁴ The U.N. Panel of Experts has reported transfers of chemical weapons-related materials to Syria by North Korea.

North Korea and Iran have cooperated on the technical aspects of missile development since the 1980s, exchanging information and components.⁵⁴85 Reportedly, scientific advisors from Iran's ballistic missile research centers were seen in North Korea leading up to the December 2012 launch and may have been a factor in its success.⁵⁵86 There are also signs that China may be assistinghas assisted the North Korean missile program, whether directly or through tacit approval of trade in sensitive materials. Heavy transport vehicles from Chinese entities were apparently sold to North Korea and used to showcase missiles in a military parade in April 2012, prompting a U.N. investigation of sanctions violations.⁵⁶

Regional Missile Defense Systems

The United States, Japan, and (to a lesser extent) South Korea have deployed ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems to protect their territory and military forces from the threat of North Korean attacks. During the 2009 and 2012 North Korean long-range missile tests, U.S. and allied forces reportedly made ready and available a number of BMD systems, in addition to the intelligence gathering capabilities sent into the region. Japan deployed Patriot interceptor batteries around Tokyo and on its southwestern islands, in the event of an errant missile or debris headed toward Japanese territory.⁵⁷ Aegis BMD ships deployed to the area as well. In response to the heightened tensions in spring 2013, the U.S. military accelerated deployment of a ground-based Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) BMD system to Guam, two years ahead of schedule.

As part of the efforts by the United States and its allies to change China's strategic thinking about North Korea, the BMD deployments may have an impact. Chinese media made the Patriot deployments a major part of their coverage of the April 2012 launch.⁵⁸ A subtext to those reports was that North Korea's actions are feeding military developments in Asia that are not in China's interests. Many observers, particularly in the United States and Japan, argue that continued North Korean ballistic missile development increases the need to bolster regional BMD capabilities and cooperation. For more information, see CRS Report R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].

North Korea's Conventional Military Forces

North Korea's conventional military capabilities have atrophied significantly since 1990, due to antiquated weapons systems and inadequate training, but North Korea could still inflict enormous damage on Seoul with artillery and rocket attacks.⁵⁹ Security experts agree that, if there were a war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States and South Korea would prevail, but at great cost.⁶⁰ To compensate for its obsolete traditional forces, in recent years North Korea has sought to improve its asymmetric capabilities, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), offensive cyber operations, and special operations forces.

North Korea fields one of the largest militaries in the world, estimated at 1.2 million personnel in uniform, with another 600,000 in reserves.⁶¹ Defense spending may account for as much as 24% of the DPRK's national income, on a purchasing power parity basis.⁶² The North Korean military has deployed approximately 70% of its ground forces and 50% of its air and naval forces within 100 kilometers of the de-militarized zone (DMZ) border, allowing it to rapidly prepare for full-scale conflict with South Korea.⁶³ Analysts estimate that North Korean artillery forces, fortified in thousands of underground facilities, could fire thousands of artillery rounds at metropolitan Seoul in the first hour of a war.⁶⁴ Most North Korean major combat equipment, however, is old and inferior to the modern systems of the U.S. and ROK militaries. With few exceptions, North Korean tanks, fighter aircraft, armored personnel carriers, and some ships are based on Soviet designs from the 1950s-1970s.

Although North Korea does not have the resources to modernize its entire military, it has selectively invested in asymmetric capabilities to mitigate the qualitative advantage of U.S. and ROK forces. As described in other sections, North Korea has made the development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles a top priority. North Korea has a large stockpile of chemical weapons and may have biological weapons as well. Analysts assess that in recent years Pyongyang has developed the ability to conduct offensive cyber operations but its cyber warfare capabilities lag behind the most advanced nations.⁶⁵ Open-source intelligence reports indicate that North Korea may have developed an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) based on Russian technology and UAVs that can deliver a precision strike similar to a cruise missile.⁶⁶ In the maritime domain, North Korea constructed two new helicopter-carrier corvettes and may be developing a new, larger model of submarine (perhaps to launch ballistic missiles).

The North Korean military suffers from institutional weaknesses that would mitigate its effectiveness in a major conflict. Because of the totalitarian government system, the North Korean military's command and control structure is highly centralized and allows no independent actions. North Korean war plans are believed to be highly "scripted" and inflexible in operational and tactical terms, and mid-level officers do not have the training and authority to act on their own initiative.⁶⁷ The country's general resource scarcity affects military readiness in several ways: lack of fuel prevents pilots from conducting adequate flight training, logistical shortages could prevent troops from traveling as ordered, lack of spare parts could reduce the availability of equipment, and food shortages will likely reduce the endurance of North Korean forces in combat, among other effects.

North Korea's Cyberattack Capabilities

Security experts and U.S. officials have voiced increasing concern about North Korea's improving cyberattack capabilities. In March 2013, an attack on the computer systems of several South Korean media and financial institutions disrupted their functioning for days, in one of the most significant cyberattacks in the country's history; cybersecurity analysts identified North Korean hackers as the culprit.⁶⁸ The FBI determined that North Korean hackers were responsible for the November 2014 cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, an intrusion that disrupted the company's communication systems, released employees' personal information, and leaked yet-to-be released films. (Some reports speculate that the cyberattack on Sony Pictures could have been an attempt to punish the company for its production of a comedy in which American journalists assassinate Kim Jong-un at the instigation of the Central Intelligence Agency.) Perhaps in response to doubts about the attribution of the cyberattack to North Korea, U.S. officials revealed that the National Security Agency had penetrated North Korean computer networks years in advance of the Sony hacking.⁶⁹

North Korea's Human Rights Record

Although the nuclear issue has dominated negotiations with Pyongyang, U.S. officials regularly voice concerns aboutAccording to a U.N. panel of experts, a Chinese company sold heavy transport vehicles to North Korea, which the latter appeared to convert into missile transport-erector-launchers showcased in a military parade in April 2012.⁸⁷ North Korea's Illicit Activities

The North Korean regime engages in a number of illicit activities aimed at earning hard currency to support the Kim regime and its weapons programs, among other goals, and uses a global network of official and commercial entities to support and protect these enterprises.

Narcotics Production and Distribution

The North Korean regime has been involved in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals.⁸⁸ In general, the United States has not prioritized countering these illicit activities, but they are a source of foreign currency for the regime. One North Korean agency, known as Office 39, reportedly oversees many of the country's illicit dealings—which may generate between $500 million and $1 billion per year.⁸⁹

The regime produces methamphetamine and it supplies international smuggling networks. In 2013, Thai authorities arrested several individuals who allegedly were conspiring to smuggle 100 kg of North Korean-origin methamphetamines into the United States.⁹⁰ The DPRK reportedly ramped up its production of illegal narcotics around August 2017—perhaps because tighter sanctions have made it more difficult for the regime to obtain foreign currency—but that is difficult to verify.⁹¹ Indeed, it is not always clear who is directing North Korea's illicit activities—in other words, if those activities are being conducted by some state authority or by local criminal gangs.⁹²

Arms Dealing

North Korea has emerged as a provider of cheap Cold War-era weapons, and it has sold arms and equipment to several states, especially to those in the Middle East and North Africa. In August 2016, authorities seized the Jie Shun outside of the Suez Canal, and found over 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades in the vessel. The authorities were acting on a U.S. tip, and the shipment was allegedly destined for the Egyptian military.⁹³ North Korea also has cooperated with Iran and Syria. It has developed ballistic missiles with Iran, and it has shipped weapons and equipment, such as protective chemical suits, to Syria.

Money Laundering

The North Korean regime often relies on front companies—or companies acting on its behalf—so it can mask its illicit dealings and access the international financial system. These companies often are based in China, and some of the business partnerships are set up with the assistance of North Korean diplomats. The companies keep the regime's earnings in overseas bank accounts. They do not repatriate the funds to North Korea, thereby allowing the money to remain in the international financial system, where it is harder to track. In one case, a Chinese company used over 20 front companies—some of which were established in the British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong—to conduct transactions in U.S. dollars for a sanctioned North Korean bank.⁹⁴

Increasingly, the U.S. government has been sanctioning companies working on behalf of the North Korean regime. In November 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department banned a Chinese bank from the U.S. financial system. The bank, Bank of Dandong, reportedly acted "as a conduit for illicit North Korean financial activity."⁹⁵ Previously, in September 2005, the Treasury Department identified Banco Delta Asia, located in Macau, as a bank that distributed North Korean counterfeit currency, and helped to launder money for the country's criminal enterprises. The Department ordered that $24 million in North Korean accounts with the bank be frozen. The North Koreans, in response, boycotted the then-ongoing Six-Party Talks for several months until the funds were returned.⁹⁶

North Korea's Human Rights Record Although the nuclear issue has dominated interactions with Pyongyang, past Administrations have drawn attention to North Korea's abysmal human rights record. North Korea's abysmal human rights record.⁷⁰ Congress has passed bills and held hearings to draw attention to this problem and seek a resolution. multiple hearings on the topic. The plight of most North Koreans is dire. The State Department's annual human rights reports and reports from private organizations have portrayed a little-changing pattern of extreme human rights abuses by the North Korean regime over many years.⁷¹97 The reports stress a total denial of political, civil, and religious liberties and say that no dissent or criticism of leadership is allowed. Freedoms of speech, the press, and assembly do not exist. There is no independent judiciary, and citizens do not have the right to choose their own government. Reports also document the extensive ideological indoctrination of North Korean citizens.

Severe physical abuse is meted out to citizens who violate laws and restrictions. Multiple reports have described a system of prison camps (kwanliso), often portrayed as concentration camps, that house roughly 100,000 political prisoners, including family members who are considered guilty by association.⁷² Reports from survivors and escapees from the camps indicate that conditions are extremely harsh and that many do not survive. Reports cite starvation, disease, executions, and torture of prisoners as a frequent practice. (Conditions for nonpolitical prisoners in local-level "collection centers" and "labor training centers" are hardly better.) The number of political prisoners in North Korea appears to have declined in recent years, likely as a result of high mortality rates in the camps.⁷³

In addition to the extreme curtailment of rights, many North Koreans face limited access to health care and significant food shortages. UNICEF has reported that each year some 40,000 North Korean children under five became "acutely malnourished," with 25,000 needing hospital treatment. Food security is a constant problem for North Koreans, many of whom reportedly suffer from stunting due to poor nutrition. Many of these health and social problems are rooted in political decisions; access to resources in North Korea generally often is highly dependent upon geographic location, and the government decides where families can live depending on the degree of loyalty to the state.

Human Rights Diplomacy at the United Nations

During the past decade, the United Nations has been an important forum to recognize human rights violations in North Korea. Since 2004, the U.N. Human Rights Council has annually renewed the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in North Korea. Member states have also addressed the issue through annual resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly. Led by Japan and the European Union, the U.N. Human Rights Council established for the first time in March 2013 a commission98 There reportedly are four kwanliso camps in the country plus one complex that remains as a holdover from an earlier camp that was closed. Each camp contains 5,000 to 50,000 political prisoners.⁹⁹ Reports from survivors and escapees from the camps indicate that conditions are extremely harsh and that many do not survive. According to a Commission of Inquiry (COI) established in 2013 by the United Nations Human Rights Council to investigate North Korea's human rights violations, close to 400,000 prisoners perished while in captivity during the 31-year period.¹⁰⁰ Reports cite starvation, disease, executions, and torture of prisoners as a frequent practice. (Conditions for nonpolitical prisoners in local-level "collection centers" and "labor training centers" are hardly better.) The number of political prisoners in North Korea appears to have declined in recent years, likely as a result of high mortality rates in the camps.¹⁰¹ Human Rights Diplomacy at the United Nations For years, the United Nations has been the central forum calling attention to human rights violations in North Korea. In 2004, the U.N. created a new position, known as the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to report on the country's human rights conditions. In 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council established the Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate "the systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ... with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular where these violations may amount to crimes against humanity." The Commission of Inquiry (COI) conducted public hearings in South Korea, Japan, and the United States to collect information and shed light on the inhumane conditions in North Korea. The COI concluded in February 2014 that North Korea had committed "crimes against humanity" and the individuals responsible should face charges at the ICC. In November 2014, U.N. member states voted overwhelmingly (111 yes; 19 no; 55 abstaining) to recommend that the UNSC refer the human rights situation in North Korea to the ICC. Although it appears likely that either Russia or China (or both) will use their veto at the UNSC to prevent the ICC from taking up this case, the United Nations has become a central forum for pressuring North Korea to respect the human rights of its citizens.

Commentators have credited the U.N. process for pushing the regime to engage on the human rights issue, although official North Korean news outlets and public statements continue to accuse "hostile forces" of politicizing the human rights issue in order to bring down the regime. Pyongyang officials have appeared more concerned than in the past about international condemnation of North Korea's human rights record. When the COI results were announced, North Korea's U.N. diplomats tried unsuccessfully to change the language in a draft resolution. They sought to drop the ICC reference in exchange for an official visit by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in North Korea. This unusually strong resistance by North Korea may indicate a genuine fear of the consequences of an ICC investigation into "crimes against humanity." In October 2014, North Korean officials gave a briefing at the United Nations that mentioned for the first time North Korea's detention centers and "reform through labor" policies, though stopped short of acknowledging the harsher political prison camps (kwanliso). North Korea also announced that it had ratified a U.N. protocol on child protection in an apparent attempt to push back against the scathing U.N. report. It remains to be seen whether this round of U.N.-centered diplomacy leads to sustained dialogue on human rights issues with North Korea, or whether it causes North Korea to further isolate itself from the international community.

102 For the next year, the commission conducted public hearings to collect information and shed light on the inhumane conditions in the country. In its final report, the COI stated that the North Korean regime had committed "crimes against humanity" and that the UNSC "should refer the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the International Criminal Court" (ICC).¹⁰³ In 2014, the U.N. General Assembly voted overwhelmingly for a resolution, recommending that the UNSC refer North Korea to the ICC. However, no further action has been taken—allegedly because China and Russia are resistant to bringing the measure to a vote in the UNSC.¹⁰⁴ In March 2017, the U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution establishing a repository to archive evidence detailing the country's human rights violations. That evidence could be used to prosecute North Korean officials in the future.¹⁰⁵

North Korean Refugees

For two decades, food shortages, persecution, human rights abuses, and increasing awareness of better conditions in the outside world have prompted tens of thousands of North Koreans to flee to neighboring China, where they are forced to evade Chinese security forces and often become victims of further abuse, neglect, and lack of protection. If repatriated, they risk harsh punishment or execution. (See below section.) There is little reliable information on the size and composition of the North Korean population located in China. Estimates range up to 300,000. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has not been given access to conduct a systematic survey. Reports indicate that many women and children are the victims of human trafficking, particularly women lured to China seeking a better life but forced into marriage or prostitution.⁷⁴ 106 Some of the refugees who escape to China make their way to Southeast Asia, where they may seek passage to a third country, usually South Korea. In the period 2007-2011, an average of 2,678 North Koreans per year found refuge in South Korea, but in the period 2012-2014 the rate of refugees reaching South Korea dropped by 45% to about 1,474 North Koreans per year, reflecting tightened border security measures in North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il.⁷⁵

China's Policy on Repatriation of North Koreans

The February 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry implicated China for its "rigorous policy" of repatriating North Korea defectors back to their country.⁷⁶ Under the South Korean constitution, all North Korean defectors receive South Korean citizenship, and over 30,000 North Koreans have resettled in the South.¹⁰⁷ In recent years, the number of defectors has declined. In 2017, 1,127 North Koreans came to South Korea—a 21% decrease from 2016, and the lowest number since Kim Jung-un came to power in 2011, possibly due to tightened border patrols.¹⁰⁸

A small wave of elite defections in 2016, including a senior intelligence officer and a senior diplomat, highlighted the changing demographic profile of North Korean defectors.¹⁰⁹ While the annual number of defectors has decreased since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011, the number of defectors with good songbun (social status based on family background and political loyalty) has ticked up. This changing profile may reflect increased border security, making it harder for the less fortunate to escape. In addition, since the late 2000s, diplomats have become more responsible for earning foreign currency and procuring illicit goods for the regime.¹¹⁰ If unable to produce, some may fear returning to North Korea and choose instead to defect. If caught, the elite defectors are likely to be locked away in political prison camps or executed.

China's Policy on Repatriation of North Koreans

Many North Koreans have fled to China where there reportedly are between 50,000 and 200,000 escapees in hiding.¹¹¹ The February 2014 U.N. Commission of Inquiry implicated China for its "rigorous policy" of repatriating North Korea defectors back to their country. The COI's chair, Michael Kirby, suggested that Chinese officials could be "aiding and abetting crimes against humanity."¹¹² In response, China's representative to the U.N. Human Rights Council said that the COI report was "divorced from reality."¹¹³

For decades—and particularly since the 1990s, when a severe famine hit North Korea—China has been actively cooperating with the North Korean regime to find, arrest, and repatriate North Korean political refugees back to their home country.

According to a 2017 Human Rights Watch report, China "appears to have intensified its crackdown on groups of North Koreans," and redoubled its efforts to repatriate border crossers.¹¹⁴ China's repatriation policy for North Korean defectors contravenes the 1951 U.N. Refugee Convention, which China has signed. Instead of treating North Korean defectors as political refugees and granting them asylum, the Chinese government labels them as "illegal economic migrants" and deports them.⁷⁷115 China's policy is based on the Mutual Cooperation Protocol for the Work of Maintaining National Security and Social Order and the Border Areas between North Korea and China (signed in 1986 and revised in 1998), which is essentially a repatriation treaty for illegal border crossers.⁷⁸116 Assisting the refugees in any way is also illegal in China.⁷⁹117 If the political refugees are able to reach foreign embassies and consulates, Beijing has been willing to let the defectors leave the country.⁸⁰

118

North Korean defectors face imprisonment, torture, and even executions once back home, but Beijing has maintained its policy of repatriation partially to maintain China-North Korea ties on an even keel. According to a Chinese official, the North Korean regime treats the refugee issue as seriously as the Chinese governments treats the issue of Taiwan.⁸¹119 Therefore, Beijing is cautious in dealing with the issue. The Chinese government also fears that allowing refugees into China might open the floodgate of North Korean defections, destabilize its northeastern provinces socially and politically, or eventually cause the North Korean regime's collapse, which many Chinese analysts see as detrimental to China's interests.⁸²

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The North Korean Human Rights Act

In 2004, the 108^th Congress passed, and Congress passed—and then-President George W. Bush signed, —the North Korean Human Rights Act (H.R. 4011; P.L. 108-333). Among its chief goals are the promotion and protection of human rights in North Korea and the creation of a "durable humanitarian" option for its refugees. The North Korean Human Rights Act (NKHRA) authorized new funds to support human rights efforts and improve the flow of information, and required the President to appoint a Special Envoy on human rights in North Korea. Under the NKHRA, North Koreans may apply for asylum in the United States, and the State Department is required to facilitate the submission of their applications. The bill required that all non-humanitarian assistance must be linked to improvements in human rights, but provided a waiver if the President deems the aid to be in the interest of national security.

In 2008, Congress reauthorized NKHRA through 2012 under P.L. 110-346 with the requirement for additional reporting on U.S. efforts to resettle North Korean refugees in the United States. In August 2012, Congress approved the extension of the act (P.L. 112-172) through 2017. A "Sense of the Congress" included in the bill calls on China to desist in its forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees and instructs U.S. diplomats to enhance efforts to resettle North Korean refugees fromP.L. 108-333). The act (also referred to as the NKHRA) authorized new funds to support human rights efforts and improve the flow of information in North Korea. The NKHRA included a "Sense of Congress," calling for U.S. nonhumanitarian assistance to be linked to human rights improvements in the country. It also required the President to appoint a "Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea"—a position which former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson reportedly decided to end and fold into the responsibilities of the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.¹²¹ Under the NKHRA, North Koreans may apply for asylum in the United States, and the State Department is required to facilitate the submission of their applications. Congress reauthorized the NKHRA (P.L. 110-346) in 2008, 2012, and 2018, tweaking the language at each turn. After being disappointed by the slow implementation after its initial passage, Congress reauthorized the act and required additional reporting on efforts to resettle North Korean refugees in the United States and enhanced efforts to process North Korean refugees in third countries. The 2018 reauthorization bill, H.R. 2061, emphasized increasing freedom of information into North Korea, including by distributing media devices and additional instructions for the Broadcasting Board of Governors on radio broadcasts. On July 20, 2018, President Trump signed the bill into law (P.L. 115-198).

Figure 2. North Koreans Resettled in the United States Since 2006

Source: U.S. Refugee Processing Center (RPC). Data accessed February 2018.

Notes: Between 2001 and 2005, no North Korean refugees were resettled in the United States, according to the RPC.

North Korean Overseas Labor

In recent years, analysts have called attention to North Korea's overseas workers—in particular the laborers' working conditions and how the regime uses these workers to generate hard currency. The State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons Report has consistently cited North Korea's overseas-labor program, and in 2017, the Department said that "many North Korean laborers sent by the government to work abroad under bilateral contracts with foreign governments … face conditions of forced labor."¹²² The working conditions of overseas laborers vary, but some workers are said to be living and working under exploitative conditions—akin to "state-sponsored slavery."¹²³ The workers' families remain in North Korea and government minders keep watch over the workers while they are abroad.¹²⁴ The laborers toil between 12 and 16 hours per day—and sometimes 20 hours per day.¹²⁵ The North Korean regime reportedly takes between 30% and 80% of its overseas workers' earnings—contributing between $200 million and $2 billion to the regime's coffers each year and helping to prop up the country's economy.¹²⁶

North Korea's overseas-labor program has a decades-long history. The country first began sending its laborers to Russia in 1967, to Africa in the 1970s, and to the Middle East in the early 1990s.¹²⁷ According to the State Department, there are about 50,000 to 80,000 North Koreans working overseas—most of them in Russia and China, but 25 other countries allegedly employ these laborers as well (see Figure 3).¹²⁸

Figure 3. Countries with DPRK Workers in 2018

Source: Departments of Treasury, State, and Homeland Security, "North Korea Sanctions & Enforcement Actions Advisory," July 23, 2018.

The Trump Administration has pressured foreign governments to expel North Korean laborers, pushing a UNSC resolution in December 2017 that requires all member countries to send workers home by 2019. Moreover, Congress passed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (P.L. 115-44), which became law in August 2017. It largely prohibits North Korean-produced goods from entering the United States, and it stipulates that any foreign person or company that uses North Korean labor—"which is presumed to be forced labor"—may be sanctioned.¹²⁹

U.S. Engagement Activities with North Korea Official U.S. Assistance to North Korea¹³⁰ The 2012 NKHRA reauthorization maintained funding at the original levels of $2 million annually to support human rights and democracy programs and $2 million annually to promote freedom of information programs for North Koreans, but reduced appropriated funding to resettle North Korean refugees from $20 million to $5 million annually, reflecting the actual outlays of the program.

Implementation

Modest numbers of North Korean refugees have resettled in the United States. According to the State Department, as of December 2015, 192 North Korean refugees have been resettled in the United States.⁸³ Several U.S. agencies were involved in working with other countries to resettle such refugees, but North Korean applicants face hurdles. Some host countries delay the granting of exit permissions or limit contacts with U.S. officials. Other host governments are reluctant to antagonize Pyongyang by admitting North Korean refugees and prefer to avoid making their countries known as a reliable transit point. Another challenge is educating the North Korean refugee population about the potential to resettle in the United States, many of whom may not be aware of the program. An American nongovernmental organization called "NK in USA" seeks to aid the transition of refugees to normal lives in the United States.

Under the NKHRA, Congress authorized $2 million annually to promote freedom of information programs for North Koreans. It called on the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to "facilitate the unhindered dissemination of information in North Korea" by increasing Korean-language broadcasts of Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of America (VOA).⁸⁴ A modest amount has been appropriated to support independent radio broadcasters. The BBG currently broadcasts to North Korea 10 hours per day using two medium wave frequencies and multiple shortwave frequencies. RFA has also reached out to an increasing number of cell phone users in North Korea, including by introducing an iPhone app to listen to RFA.⁸⁵ Although all North Korean radios are altered by the government to prevent outside broadcasts, defectors report that many citizens have illegal radios that receive the programs. There have also been both public and private efforts in the past to smuggle in radios in order to allow information to penetrate the closed country.

North Korean Overseas Labor

In recent years, analysts of North Korean affairs have increasingly called attention to North Korean workers laboring overseas in programs organized by the North Korean regime. These programs have been cited in the State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons Report since 2003. The international focus on these labor export programs has tended to fall into two categories: the working conditions, which in some cases are described as akin to slave labor; and the North Korean government's use of these programs to generate hard currency, perhaps in violation of the United Nations Security Council sanctions against Pyongyang.

North Korea's overseas labor program has a decades-long history. The country first began sending its laborers to Russia in 1967, to Africa in the 1970s, and the Middle East starting in 1991.⁸⁶ According to reports, 16 countries employ these laborers at present (see below), and about 45 countries have employed them at some point in their history.⁸⁷ Estimates of the number of North Korean workers abroad today range from 20,000 to over 150,000, with Russia and China believed to host the largest number.⁸⁸ The usual estimate is about 50,000 to 65,000. Reportedly, the number of North Koreans working overseas has increased since Kim Jong-un came to power in 2011 and is continuing to increase.⁸⁹

The working conditions of the North Korean laborers abroad vary by industry and by host country, but they are said to be living and working under exploitative and repressive conditions. The workers typically work for three years without having a chance to return home and labor between 12 and 16 hours every day under dangerous and sub-standard conditions.⁹⁰ Some countries have been responsive to international criticism with regard to their practices. For example, a construction company in Qatar, which is under international scrutiny for adopting sub-standard labor practices in preparation for the 2022 FIFA World Cup and is host to 3,000 North Korean workers throughout the country, fired 90 North Korean laborers, presumably in an attempt to avoid further criticism.⁹¹

Some observers assert that many North Koreans voluntarily seek out overseas positions because they represent opportunities to earn more money and hard currency than is possible at home.⁹² Others argue that the North Korean government deceives workers into accepting foreign jobs with harsh working conditions.⁹³ The North Korean regime, by most accounts, takes up to 85-90% of their earnings.⁹⁴ This diversion of income earned abroad contributes about $3 billion per year in foreign currency for the regime, helping to prop up the economy and weakening the effectiveness of the sanctions against North Korea.⁹⁵ In March 2015, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the DPRK Marzuki Darusman said that he would investigate allegations that tens of thousands North Koreans are working overseas in slave-like conditions.⁹⁶

North Korea's Illicit Activities

Strong indications exist that the North Korean regime has been involved in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, as well as of counterfeit currency, cigarettes, and pharmaceuticals.⁹⁷ Much of the illicit activities are reportedly administered by "Office 39," a branch of the government that some analysts estimate generates up to $2 billion annually.⁹⁸ North Korean crime-for-profit activities have reportedly brought in important foreign currency resources, exemplified by a foiled plot to smuggle 100 kg of North Korean-origin methamphetamines into the United States in November 2013.⁹⁹ However, recent reports indicate that the scale of these activities has shrunk since the 2000s.¹⁰⁰ U.S. policy during the first term of the Bush Administration highlighted these activities, but they have generally been relegated since to a lower level of priority compared to other issues.

In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department identified Banco Delta Asia, located in Macau, as a bank that distributed North Korean counterfeit currency and allowed for money laundering for North Korean criminal enterprises. The Treasury Department ordered the freezing of $24 million in North Korean accounts with the bank. This action prompted many other banks to freeze North Korean accounts and derailed potential progress on the September 2005 Six-Party Talks agreement. After lengthy negotiations and complicated arrangements, in June 2007 the Bush Administration agreed to allow the release of the $24 million from Banco Delta Asia accounts and ceased its campaign to pressure foreign governments and banks to avoid doing business with North Korea. The UNSC has renewed efforts to pressure Pyongyang through the restriction of illicit activities and financial access following the 2009 and 2012 nuclear tests.

North Korea has sold conventional arms and military expertise to several Middle Eastern and North African states, although this arms trade has declined greatly from the Cold War era. In July 2014, international observers refocused attention on North Korean arms exports to the Middle East when Britain's Telegraph reported that the Palestinian militant group Hamas sought to purchase rockets from North Korea to replenish its stocks.¹⁰¹ The article also cited Israeli military commanders who apparently believe that North Korean experts provided logistical advice on Hamas's tunnel network. (North Korea has denied the report's validity.)¹⁰² There is a history of apparent Hamas-North Korea connections that provides evidence for the claim's plausibility, and past North Korean dealings or alleged dealings with Syria and/or Iran could have helped facilitate such possible connections.¹⁰³

U.S. Engagement Activities with North Korea

Official U.S. Assistance to North Korea¹⁰⁴

Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with over $1.2 billion in assistance, of which about 60% paid for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance. The U.S. government has not provided any aid to North Korea since early 2009; the United States provided all of its share of pledged heavy fuel oil by December 2008. Energy assistance was tied to progress in the Six-Party Talks, which broke down in 2009. From 2007 to April 2009, the United States also provided technical assistance to North Korea to help in the nuclear disablement process. In 2008, Congress took legislative steps to legally enable the President to give expanded assistance for this purpose. However, following North Korea's actions in the spring of 2009 when it test-fired a missile, tested a nuclear device, halted denuclearization activities, and expelled nuclear inspectors, Congress explicitly rejected the Obama Administration's requests for funds to supplement existing resources in the event of a breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks.

U.S. food aid ended in early 2009 due to disagreements with Pyongyang over monitoring of and access. In 2011, North Korea to the assistance. Since then, North Korea periodically has issued appeals to the international community for additional support. The abrogated Leap Day Agreement would have provided 240,000 metric tons of food and nutritional aid intended for young children, pregnant mothers, and the elderly.

POW-MIA Recovery Operations in North Korea

According to the U.S. Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA), nearly 7,700 U.S. personnel who fought during the Korean War are "unaccounted-for," approximately 5,300 of whom are believed to have been "lost in Korea."¹³¹ From 1990 to 1992, North Korean officials directly engaged with Members of Congress—especially Senator Bob Smith, then co-chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action Affairs—to discuss the recovery of U.S. prisoners of war-missing in action (POW-MIAs) in North Korea.¹⁰⁵132 In 1996, after a series of difficult negotiations, North Korea and the United States agreed to conduct joint investigations to recover the remains of thousands of U.S. servicemen unaccounted for during the Korean War. The U.S. military and the Korean People's Army conducted 33 joint investigations from 1996 to 2005 for these POW-MIAs. In operations known as "joint field activities" (JFAs), U.S. specialists recovered 229 sets of remains and have successfully identified 107 of those.¹⁰⁶ On May 25, 2005, the Department of Defense133 Operations in North Korea and negotiations over the terms of the program remained plagued with difficulties, however.¹³⁴ On May 25, 2005, DOD announced that it would suspend all JFAs, citing the "uncertain environment created by North Korea's unwillingness to participate in the Six-Party Talks," its declarations regarding its intentions to develop nuclear weapons, its withdrawal from the NPT, and concerns about the safety of U.S. members of the search teams.¹⁰⁷135 Between 1996 and 2005, the Department of DefenseDOD's Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) provided the North Korean military with over $20 million for assistance in recovering the suspected remains.¹⁰⁸ 136 Talks between the United States and North Korea on the joint recovery program resumed in 2011 and led to an agreement in October 2011. In January 2012, the Department of DefenseDOD announced that it was preparing a mission to return to North Korea in early 2012. However, Pyongyang's determination toannouncement that it would launch a rocket in contravention of the "Leap Day Agreement" and UNSC resolutions cast doubt on the credibility of North Korean commitments, and the Department of DefenseDOD suspended the joint mission in March 2012.¹⁰⁹137 The United States has not undertaken any JFAs with the KPA since May 2005. In October 2014, North Korean state media warned that the remains of U.S. POW-MIAs were in danger of being damaged or displaced by construction activities and floods, a warning that most likely conveyed Pyongyang's desire to return to broader bilateral negotiations with Washington.¹¹⁰138 The Department of Defense has said that the recovery of the remains of missing U.S. soldiers is an enduring priority goal of the United States and that it is committed to achieving the fullest possible accounting for POW-MIAs from the Korean War.

Most recently, Trump and Kim at the June 2018 Singapore summit committed "to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified."¹³⁹ According to Trump, this was a last-minute addition to the summit's agenda.¹⁴⁰ In late July, North Korea turned over 55 cases of remains to the United Nations Command, which in turn handed them to the U.S. military for repatriation and for the DPAA's examination of the contents. Reportedly, among the factors contributing to North Korea's delay in transferring the remains was North Korea's request for payment. According to the Washington Post, the United States has a policy of not paying for the repatriation of remains.¹⁴¹

Nongovernmental Organizations' Activities

Since the famines in North Korea of the mid-1990s, the largest proportion of aid has come from government contributions to emergency relief programs administered by international relief organizations such as the World Food Program. However, some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are playing smaller roles in capacity building and people-to-people exchanges, in areas such as agriculture, health, informal diplomacy, information science, and education. Despite turbulent relations between the U.S. and DPRK governments, manysome U.S.-based NGOs are able to maintain good working relationships with their North Korean counterparts and continue to operate through periods of tension. In the period January-June 2014, U.S. NGOs sent $19.5 million in humanitarian aid to North Korea.¹¹¹

The aims of such NGOs are as diverse as the institutions themselves. Some illustrative cases include NGO "joint ventures" between academic NGOs and those engaged in informal diplomacy. Several religious organizations with programs around the world are active in North Korea on a small scale. These religious NGOs generally have a humanitarian philosophy and aim to provide aid to the more vulnerable sectors of the North Korean population. Most of these organizations have an ancillary goal of promoting peaceful relations with North Korea through stronger people-to-people ties.

List of Other CRS Reports on North Korea

CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R44344, North Korea: A Comparison of S. 1747, S. 2144, and H.R. 757, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance Many NGOs have said that their DPRK operations have been hampered since 2016 by tighter U.S. and international sanctions and the general restrictions the Trump Administration imposed in 2017 on U.S. citizens traveling to North Korea, notwithstanding the exceptions for humanitarian work included in all of these measures. List of Other CRS Reports on North Korea CRS In Focus IF10467, Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Insight IN10916, The June 12 Trump-Kim Jong-un Summit,

CRS Report R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]

and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and OppositionR45033, Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R43865, North Korea: Back on the State Sponsors of Terrorism ListR45169, A Peace Treaty with North Korea?, by [author name scrubbed] et al.

CRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs

CRS Report R42126, Kim Jong-il's Death: Implications for North Korea's Stability and U.S. Policy, by [author name scrubbed]

Archived Reports for Background

, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R40684, North Korea's Second Nuclear Test: Implications of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R41160, North Korea's 2009 Nuclear Test: Containment, Monitoring, ImplicationsR41438, North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?R44912, North Korean Cyber Capabilities: In Brief, by [author name scrubbed]

et al.

CRS Report RL32493, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy AnalysisR40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RL33567, Korea-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,R41481, U.S.-South Korea Relations, coordinated by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and DiplomacyR43116, Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia-Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RS22973, Congress and U.S. Policy on North Korean Human Rights and Refugees: Recent Legislation and Implementation, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RL33324, North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. CurrencyRL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by [author name scrubbed]

Author Contact Information

[author name scrubbed], Specialist in Nonproliferation, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions Prior to Removal from Terrorism Designation, by [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report R41043, China-North Korea Relations, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]

CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by [author name scrubbed]

Footnotes

24. James Clapper, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2015. 58. Daniel Coats, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, March 6, 2018. Soyoung Kim and Cynthia Kim, "North Korea says will Stop Nuclear Tests, Scrap Test Site," Reuters, April 20, 2018, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/north-korea-says-will-stop-nuclear-tests-scrap-test-site-idUSKBN1HR37J. 5 MW(e) is a power rating for the reactor, indicating that it produces 5 million watts of electricity per day (a very small reactor). Reactors are also described in terms of million watts of heat (MW thermal). Ankit Panda, "Exclusive: Revealing Kangson, North Korea's First Covert Uranium Enrichment Site," Diplomat, July 13, 2018, at https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/exclusive-revealing-kangson-north-koreas-first-covert-uranium-enrichment-site/. David Albright, "Future Directions in the DPRK'S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020," February 2015, http://38North.org/2015/02/dalbright022615/. North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 144-146. David Albright, "North Korean Miniaturization," US-Korea Institute at SAIS, February 22, 2013. "ICBMs are extremely complex systems that require multiple flight tests to identify and correct design or manufacturing defects. ICBM trajectories impart significant structural and thermal stresses on the reentry vehicle (RV), requiring repeated testing to ensure that the RV will survive and that the warhead will operate as designed." U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, December 2017, https://media.defense.gov/2018/May/22/2001920587/-1/-1/1/REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-DEMOCRATIC-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-KOREA-2017.PDF. Statement of Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti, then Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 16, 2015. "North Korea," NTI, June 2018, http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/. Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper, December 2010. Bennett, Bruce W. "N.K WMDs Carry Catastrophic Potential," The RAND Blog, November 19, 2014. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2010, http://www.dni.gov/reports/20110208_report_wmd.pdf; Daniel Coats, "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Statement for the Record" Office of the Director of Intelligence, March 6, 2018. "North Korea," NTI, April, 2015, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/. For more information, see CRS Report R42849, Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, by [author name scrubbed]. 86. Marcus Noland, "North Korean Illicit Activities," Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 11, 2013. 101. "Meaning of High Level DPRK Diplomat's Defection," Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 17, 2016, at http://beyondparallel.csis.org/defection-signals-nk-elite-discontent/. 137. White House, "Press Conference by President Trump," press conference transcript, Capella Hotel, Singapore, June 12, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/press-conference-president-trump/. Adam Taylor and Dan Lamothe, "U.S. Military Takes Possession of Remains that North Korea Says Belong to Americans Who Died in the Korean War," Washington Post, July 27, 2018.

1.	"Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea," the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 16, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-vision-for-the-alliance-of-the-United-States-of-America-and-the-Republic-of-Korea.
2.	Daniel Pinkston, "Did the Kim Regime Exaggerate N.Korea's Nuclear Capability?" NK News, January 7, 2016.
3.	John Kerry, "Remarks before the Daily Press Briefing," U.S. Department of State, January 7, 2016.
4.	See "North Korea's Creeping Economic Reforms Show Signs of Paying Off," The Guardian, March 5, 2015; "North Korea Dabbles in Reform," New York Times, January 21, 2015; and "A Quiet Economic Reform is Sweeping North Korea's Capital," Associated Press, March 3, 2015.
5.	Anna Fifield, "North Korea's Growing Economy—and America's Misconceptions About It," Washington Post, March 13, 2015.
6.	Marcus Noland, "The Elusive Charm of the 28 June Reforms," Witness to Transformation blog. January 12, 2016.
7.	"North Korea Executes Minister by Anti-aircraft Fire, Says Seoul," Financial Times, May 13, 2015.
8.	Material for nuclear weapons can be made from reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium. The uranium enrichment program provided North Korea with a second pathway for creating nuclear bomb material while its plutonium production facilities were frozen.
9.	For more details on problems with implementation and verification, see CRS Report RL33590, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, by [author name scrubbed].
10.	For more information on the terrorism list removal, see CRS Report RL30613, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?, by [author name scrubbed].
11.	James R. Clapper, "Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community," Director of National Intelligence, January 29, 2014.
12.	See CRS Report R43480, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
132017 Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, December 15, 2017.
2.	U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, for Reappointment to the Grade of General and Reappointment to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 115th Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 2017. Others analysts contend that these tests have not yet in actuality proven that the DPRK has achieved intercontinental ranges with its missiles. Regardless, these developments, combined with the possibility that the regime in Pyongyang has miniaturized a nuclear weapon, suggest that North Korea could now be only one technical step—mastering reentry vehicle technology—away from being able to credibly threaten the continental United States with a nuclear weapon.
3.	Preventive military attacks are launched in response to less immediate threats, often motivated by the desire to fight sooner rather than later, generally due to an anticipated shift in the military balance, or acquisition of a key capability, by an adversary. In contrast, preemptive attacks are based on the belief that the adversary is about to attack, and that striking first is better than allowing the enemy to do so. International law tends to hold that preemptive attacks are an acceptable use of force, as are those that are retaliatory in nature. Justifying preventive attacks legally is a more difficult case to make under extant international law.
4.	For a summary of threats and tests by North Korea and U.S. responses in 2017 and 2018, see Arms Control Association, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear-Missile Diplomacy," at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron#2017.
5.	The White House, "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit," June 12, 2018.
6.	The White House, "Press Conference by President Trump," June 12, 2018.
7.	A Pentagon analysis cited the cost of the exercise as $14 million. Many defense analysts have pointed out the possible effect on military readiness to canceling such exercises. See "Ending Exercises Saved $14 Million," Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2018.
8.	Richard N. Haass, "The Singapore Summit's Uncertain Legacy," Project Syndicate, June 16, 2018.
9.	For example, Trump Administration officials have asserted that North Korean "denuclearization" would include the dismantling of Pyongyang's chemical and biological weapons programs. Testimony of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, in U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, An Update on American Diplomacy to Advance our National Security Strategy, hearings, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., July 25, 2018 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2018). It is unclear whether North Korea agrees with this inclusion. Rick Gladstone, "Trump and Kim May Define 'Korea Denuclearization' Quite Differently," New York Times, June 10, 2018.
10.	Kim Hoe Ryong and Victor Cha, "Flipping the Script," Korea Joongang Daily, February 29, 2016, at http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3015600.
11.	Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) 2018 and 2017 annual publication, 북한 대외무역 동향 (North Korea's Foreign Trade Trends); South Korean Ministry of Unification (for inter-Korean trade); CRS analysis of Global Trade Atlas database.
12.	UNSC sanctions resolutions against North Korea are UNSC Res 1718 (October 2006); 1874 (June 2009); 2087 (January 2013); 2094 (March 2013); 2270 (March 2016); 2321 (November 2016); 2356 (June 2017); 2371 (August 2017); 2375 (September 2017); and 2397 (December 2017).
13.	These provisions include banning correspondent banking relationships with DPRK banks; prohibiting private and public financing for trade within DPRK; prohibiting the use of financial services to clear funds for DPRK entities; closing existing offices of DPRK banks; and prohibiting the opening of new DPRK bank offices.
14.	Duyeon Kim, "The Panmunjom Declaration: What It Wasn't Supposed to Be," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1, 2018; and "Analysts Mixed on North's Nuclear Pledge as Condition of Peace Treaty Ahead of Moon-Kim Summit," Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2018.
15.	John Delury, "Instead of Threatening North Korea, Trump Should Try This," Washington Post, April 23, 2017.
16.	See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2011); North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks, International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 269, June 16, 2015.
17.	Kim Hyun-wook, "Nuclear Posture Review and Its Implications on the Korean Peninsula," Council on Foreign Relations Asia Unbound blog post, May 1, 2010.
18.	Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy," New York Times, March 31, 2013.
19.	"North Korea Completes its 'State Nuclear Force': What Next from the U.S.?" NKNews, November 30, 2017.
20.	"DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution," Korean Central News Agency (North Korea), January 24, 2013.
21.	Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda, "North Korea Is a Nuclear Power. Get Used to It," New York Times, June 12, 2018; and Victor Cha and Sue Mi Terry, "Assessment of the Singapore Summit," CSIS Critical Questions, June 12, 2018.
22.	For more on the history of U.S.-DPRK nuclear and missile negotiations, see CRS Report R45033, Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
23.	Material for nuclear weapons can be made from reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium. The uranium enrichment program provided North Korea with a second pathway for creating nuclear bomb material while its plutonium production facilities were frozen.
The United States maintains that its food aid policy follows three criteria: demonstrated need, severity of need compared to other countries, and satisfactory monitoring systems to ensure food is reaching the most vulnerable. Strong concerns about diversion of aid to the North Korean military and elite exist, although assistance provided in 2008-2009 had operated under an expanded system of monitoring and access negotiated by the Bush Administration. Obama Administration officials were reportedly divided on whether to authorize new humanitarian assistance for North Korea in 2011 and 2012, but ultimately decided to offer 240,000 metric tons of food aid as a confidence-building measure within the Leap Day Agreement. Several Members of Congress have spoken out against the provision of any assistance to Pyongyang because of concerns about supporting the regime.
1425.	Derek Grossman, "China's Reluctance on Sanctions Enforcement in North Korea," Rand Corporation, January 3, 2018; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2017 Annual Report to Congress, November 15, 2017, pp. 333-338; Kent Boydston, "How Good is China at Sanctions Enforcement?" Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 5, 2017, at https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/how-good-china-sanctions-enforcement.
26.	Jane Perlez and Choe Sang Hun, "China Struggles for Balance in Response to North Korea's Boldness," New York Times, February 7, 2016, at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/08/world/asia/china-struggles-for-balance-in-response-to-north-koreas-boldness.html.
27.	Jung H. Pak, "The Education of Kim Jong-un," Brookings Institution, February 2017.
28.	"North Korea Executes Minister by Anti-aircraft Fire, Says Seoul," Financial Times, May 13, 2015.
29.	"The Mysterious Lives of the 3 Kids Who Are Believed to be Kim Jong Un's," Business Insider, June 13, 2018.
30.	Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook, June 18, 2018.
31.	The Bank of Korea, using comparisons with South Korean prices and value added ratios, estimates that North Korea's GDP grew by 3.9% in 2016. The previous eight years, according to the Bank of Korea's calculations, annual changes in North Korea's GDP ranged from a low of -1.1% to a high of 1.3%. Bank of Korea, "Gross Domestic Product Estimates for North Korea in 2017," July 22, 2017. See also Andrei Lankov, "Why Unconditional Economic Aid Won't Change – Or Help – North Korea," NKNews, June 6, 2018. As mentioned above, the Bank of Korea estimates that in 2017 North Korea's economy contracted by 3.5%.
32.	For example, in the cities, the changes permitted managers to set salaries and hire or fire workers. In the countryside, in an effort to increase production incentives, agricultural policy changes allowed farmers to keep a larger portion of their harvest, relaxed the system of fixed rations, and reduced the size of farming collectives to individual households.
33.	In Ho Park, The Creation of the North Korean Market System, Daily NK, Seoul, South Korea, 2017.
34.	Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, "The North Korean Economy in June 2018: An Overview," NKNews, July 9, 2018.
35.	In 2016, then-South Korean President Park Geun-hye shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), an industrial park located in North Korea in which more than 100 South Korean companies employed over 50,000 North Korean workers. At its peak in 2014 and 2015, the KIC appears to have accounted for approximately 20% to 30% of North Korea's estimated total exports.
36.	Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, "Between Sanctions, Drought and Tensions: How Bad is North Korea's Food Situation?" 38North.org, November 14, 2017.
37.	UN Resident Coordinator for DPR Korea, DPR Korea Needs and Priorities 2018, March 2018, https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities-march-2018.
38.	Peter Ward, "Just How Planned Is the North Korean Industrial Economy?," NKPro, May 3, 2018.
39.	See, for instance, Kim Yoo Jin, "North Koreans Protest Unfair Market Crackdowns," DailyNK, July 3, 2018.
40.	"The Dire Reality of "Universal Health Care" in North Korea," Daily NK, June 2, 2015; Samuel Ramani, "North Korea's Public Health Campaign," The Diplomat, June 21, 2016.
41.	U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017, p. 11; Steven Borowiec, "After Leaving North Korea, Writers Are Penning Stories about Their Home," LA Times, July 29, 2015.
42.	Marcus Noland, "Pyongyang Tipping Point," Wall Street Journal op-ed, April 12, 2010.
43.	Leo Byrne, "BBC Launches Korean Language Service Covering North Korea," NKNews, September 25, 2017; "The Air around North Korea Is Getting Crowded," The Economist, October 5, 2017; "North Korea Steps Up Jamming," Radio Free Asia, December 19, 2012.
44.	Nat Kretchun, Catherine Lee, and Seamus Tuohy, "Compromising Connectivity," Intermedia, 2017, p. 11.
45.	About 14% of those defectors said they listened daily; 46% said they listened weekly. Nat Kretchun, Catherine Lee, and Seamus Tuohy, "Compromising Connectivity," Intermedia, 2017, pp. 10, 11.
46.	Koryolink Cellphone Service Will Continue Operations in North Korea: Orascom," NK News, December 21, 2017.
47.	Lee Sang Yong. "Hallyu's Hooks Deep into North Korean Society," Daily NK, April 29, 2016, at http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?num=13873&cataId=nk01500.
48.	Jieun Baek, "Hack and Frack North Korea: How Information Campaigns Can Liberate the Hermit Kingdom," Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2015.
49.	The 2015 BBG Survey included a sample size of 350 people—they were refugees, travelers, and/or recent defectors.
50.	Carol Morello, "Soaps and Dramas May Achieve Change in North Korea More than Military Force, Defector Says," Washington Post, November 1, 2013; U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017, p. 16.
51.	The Military Balance 2018 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2018), p. 265.
52.	James Hackett and Mark Fitzpatrick, The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula, IISS, June 2018.
53.	U.S. Department of Defense, 2017 Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, December 15, 2017, p. 9.
54.
55.	Lee Yong-jong and Sarah Kim, "Cyberwarfare is North's New Priority, Experts Say," Korea JoongAng Daily, November 14, 2013; and Daniel R. Coats, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 13, 2018, p. 5.
56.	Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, "2014 Defense White Paper," p. 27, at http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201506161156164570.pdf.
57.	U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2013, Washington, DC, February 2014, p. 8.
See, for example, Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (New York: Routledge, 2011); "North Korea: Beyond the Six-Party Talks," International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 269, June 16, 2015.
15.	Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Vows to Keep Nuclear Arms and Fix Economy," New York Times, March 31, 2013.
16.	"DPRK NDC Issues Statement Refuting UNSC Resolution," Korean Central News Agency (North Korea), January 24, 2013.
17.	Andray Abrahamian, "The ABCs of North Korea's SEZs," US-Korea Institute at SAIS, November 19, 2014.
18.	Han-bum Cho, "The Purge of Hyon Yong-chol and Risk Factors of the Kim Jong-un Regime," Korea Institute for National Unification, Seoul, 13 May 2015: 3.
19.	"Over 40% of N.Korean Brass Replaced in Purges," Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 2015.
20.	Maeve Shearlaw, "Purges and Political Manoeuvres: How Volatile Is Kim Jong-un?" The Guardian [London], May 13, 2015.
21.	Marcus Noland, "Pyongyang Tipping Point," Wall Street Journal op-ed, April 12, 2010.
22.	Martyn Williams, "Koryolink Subscriptions Hit 2.4 Million," North Korea Tech blog, September 8, 2014, http://www.northkoreatech.org/2014/09/08/koryolink-subscriptions-hit-2-4-million.
23.	Jieun Baek, "Hack and Frack North Korea: How Information Campaigns Can Liberate the Hermit Kingdom," Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, April 2015.
24.	James Clapper, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 16, 2011.
25.	See also CRS Insight IN10428, North Korea's January 6, 2016, Nuclear Test, by [author name scrubbed].
26.	James Clapper, "DNI Statement on North Korea's Nuclear Capability," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Press Release, April 11, 2013.
27.	David Albright, "North Korean Miniaturization," US-Korea Institute at SAIS, February 22, 2013.
28.	5 MWe is a power rating for the reactor, indicating that it produces 5 million watts of electricity per day (very small). Reactors are also described in terms of million watts of heat (MW thermal).
29.	David Albright, "Future Directions in the DPRK'S Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios for 2020," February 2015, http://38north.org/2015/02/dalbright022615/.
30.	Statement of Gen. Curtis M. Scaparrotti Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 16, 2015.
31.	"North Korea," NTI, April 2015, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/.
32.	Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 2010 Defense White Paper, December 2010.
33.	Bennett, Bruce W. "N.K WMDs Carry Catastrophic Potential," The RAND Blog, November 19, 2014.
34.	Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 31 December 2010, http://www.dni.gov/reports/20110208_report_wmd.pdf.
35.	"North Korea," NTI. April, 2015. http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea/.
36.	For more information, see CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, by [author name scrubbed].
37.	Stephen Haggard, Daniel Pinkston, Kevin Stahler, and Clint Work, "Interpreting North Korea's Missile Tests: When Is a Missile Just a Missile?" Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 7, 2014, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=13532.
38.	North Korea claims that the purpose of these rocket launches is to place a satellite in orbit, and thus it is entitled to develop space launch vehicles as a peaceful use of space. However, long-range ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles use similar technology, and, because of this overlap, the UNSC acted to prohibit any North Korean use of rocket technology in Resolutions 1718 and 1874.
39.	North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), pp. 144-146p 47.
4059.	National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-13, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH, June 2013, p. 17, and IISS (2011), pp. 131-135, 141-145.
41.	David Wright, "Questions About the Unha-3 Failure," 38 North, May 2012, http://38north.org/2012/05/dwright050412; National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015 (unclassified summary), September 1999, http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Foreign%20Missile%20Developments_1999.pdf.
42.	Evan Ramstad, "After First Glance, North Korea's Missiles Not As Fearsome," Wall Street Journal, December 13, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/korearealtime/2012/12/13/after-first-glance-north-koreas-missiles-not-as-fearsome/.
43.	IISS (2011), p. 155.
44.	NASIC (2013), pp. 20-22. This report refers to the KN-08 by its Korean name Hwasong-13.
45.	Nick Hansen, "North Korea's Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Major Upgrade Program Completed; Facility Operational Again," 38 North blog, U.S.-Korea Institute, October 1, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/10/sohae100114.
46.	John Schilling, Jeffrey Lewis, and David Schmerler, "A New ICBM for North Korea?" 38 North blog, U.S.-Korea Institute, December 22, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/12/icbm122115.
47.	James Clapper, "DNI Statement on North Korea's Nuclear Capability," Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Press Release, April 11, 2013.
48.	David Albright, "North Korean Miniaturization," U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, February 22, 2013, http://38north.org/2013/02/albright021313.
49.	"Commander, U.S. Forces Korea, General Curtis Scaparrotti and Rear Admiral John Kirby, Press Secretary," U.S. Department of Defense, Press Briefing, Washington, DC, October 24, 2014.
50.	Department of Defense Press Briefing by Admiral Gortney, Commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, April 07, 2015.
51.	Catherine Dill, "Video Analysis of DPRK SLBM Footage," Arms Control Wonk blog, January 12, 2016, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1200759/video-analysis-of-dprk-slbm-footage.
52.	Joseph S. Bermudez, "Underwater Test-Fire of Korean-style Powerful Strategic Submarine Ballistic Missile," 38 North blog, U.S.-Korea Institute, May 13, 2015, http://38north.org/2015/05/jbermudez051315.
53.	Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, January 22, 2010 and IISS (2011), pp. 180-181.
54.	For more information, see CRS Report R42849, Iran's Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, by [author name scrubbed].
55IISS (2011), pp. 52-53. Even if the DPRK uses only its conventional munitions (which most analysts believe would be unlikely given North Korea's arsenal of WMD capabilities), some estimates range from tens to hundreds of thousands of dead in the first days of fighting, given that DPRK artillery is thought by some to be capable of firing 10,000 rounds per minute at Seoul. For more, see CRS Report R44994, The North Korean Nuclear Challenge: Military Options and Issues for Congress, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
60.	Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, "2014 Defense White Paper," p. 54, at http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICTNEBOOK_201506161156164570.pdf; and Department of Defense, "Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," at http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Report_to_Congress_on_Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_DPRK.pdf.
61.	U.S. Department of Defense, 2017 Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, December 15, 2017, pp. 11-13.
62.	IISS (2011), p. 54.
63.	For more, see CRS Report RL34256, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues, by [author name scrubbed].
64.	James Clapper, Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2016.
65.
66.	Leo Byrne, "N. Korea 'Not Planning Negotiations over Nuclear Weapons," NKNews, October 20, 2017.
67.	68.
69.	Enrichment (as well as reprocessing) technology can be used to produce material for nuclear weapons or fuel for power reactors.
70.	71.
72.	For more, see CRS In Focus IF10472, North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
73.
74.	U.S. Department of Defense, 2000 Report to Congress: Military Situation on the Korean Peninsula, September 12, 2000, at https://archive.defense.gov/news/Sep2000/korea09122000.html.
75.	76.	77.	78.	79.	80.	81.	82.
83.	Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—China and Northeast Asia, January 22, 2010 and IISS (2011), pp. 180-181.
84.	For more, see CRS Report R43480, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic Missile and Nuclear Cooperation, coordinated by [author name scrubbed].
85.	Javier Serrat, "North Korea, Iran Highlight Proliferation Risks of Knowledge Transfers," World Politics Review, December 10, 2012, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12554/north-korea-iran-highlight-proliferation-risks-of-knowledge-transfers; John S. Park, "The Leap in North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program: The Iran Factor," National Bureau of Asian Research, December 19, 2012, http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=638.
5687.	Peter Enav, "Experts: North Korea Missile Carrier Likely from China," Associated Press, April 19, 2012. Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1874, Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), April 11, 2013, pp. 26-27.
5788.	For both 2012 launches, the North Korean rocket trajectory was to have taken it in the upper atmosphere above two small Japanese islands in the Ryukyu island chain. more information, see CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
5889.	"朝鲜宣布发射卫星引发世界关注 (The DPRK's Announcement of a Satellite Launch Triggers the World's Attention)," People's Daily Online, webpage, April 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/GB/8212/191606/240872/index.html. Joseph V. Micallef, "How North Korea Uses Slave Labor Exports to Circumvent Sanctions," Military.com, July 10, 2017.
5990.	U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2013, Washington, DC, February 2014, p. 8Sari Horwitz, "5 Extradited in Plot to Import North Korean Meth to U.S.," Washington Post, November 20, 2013.
6091.	North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), p 47.
61Julian Ryall, "North Korea 'Ramps Up Manufacture of Illegal Drugs' Amid Sanctions," Deutsche Welle, August 21, 2017; Brendon Hong, "Kim Jong-un Breaking Bad: The Secret World of North Korean Meth," The Daily Beast, February 7, 2016.	92.	The Military Balance 2015 (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015), p. 261.
6293.	IISS (2011), p. 47Joby Warrick, "A North Korean Ship was Seized off Egypt with a Huge Cache of Weapons Destined for a Surprising Buyer," Washington Post, October 1, 2017.
6394.	DOD (2014), p. 12.
64.	IISS (2011), pp. 52-53.
65.	Lee Yong-jong and Sarah Kim, "Cyberwarfare is North's New Priority, Experts Say," Korea JoongAng Daily, November 14, 2013.
66.	IISS (2015), p. 227 and DOD (2014), p. 9.
67.	IISS (2011), p. 54.
68.	Mark Clayton, "In Cyberarms Race, North Korea Emerging As a Power, Not a Pushover," Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 2013.
69.	David Sanger and Martin Fackler, "N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony Attack, Officials Say," New York Times, January 18, 2015.
70.	John Kerry, "Remarks at Event on Human Rights in the D.P.R.K.," U.S. Department of State, remarks as prepared for delivery at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York, NY, September 23, 2014.
71.	See U.S. Department of State, 2014 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Democratic People's Republic of Korea available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper.
72Nicole Einbinder, "How North Korea Uses Front Companies to Help Evade Sanctions," PBS Frontline, October 3, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Four Chinese Nationals and China-Based Company Charged with Using Front Companies to Evade U.S. Sanctions Targeting North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Programs," press release, September 26, 2017.
95.	Don Weinland, "US Bars Chinese Bank Linked to North Korea Weapons Programme," November 3, 2017.
96.	David Lague and Donald Greenleesjan, "Squeeze on Banco Delta Asia Hit North Korea Where It Hurt - Asia - Pacific - International Herald Tribune," New York Times, January 18, 2007.
97.	U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017.
98.	Ibid.
99.	According to the U.S. State Department, there reportedly are six categories of prison camps in North Korea. They are: kwanliso (political penal-labor camps), kyohwaso (correctional or re-education centers), kyoyangso (labor-reform centers), jipkyulso (collection centers for low level criminals), rodong danryeondae (labor-training centers), and kuryujang or kamok (interrogation facilities or jails). U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017.
100.	Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 7, 2014, paragraph 781, footnote 1169, p. 245.
David Hawk, "North Korea's Hidden Gulag: Interpreting Reports of Changes in the Prison Camps," Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington, DC, August 27, 2013.
73102.	United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, "UN Commission Report Places Spotlight on Human Rights in North Korea," press release, February 17, 2014, at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ReportPlacesSpotlightOnHRInNorthKorea.aspx.
103.	United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, February 7, 2014, pp. 4, 6, 20.
104.	Brian Padden, "South Korea Urges UN to Refer DPRK Leaders to ICC," Voice of America, February 28, 2017; Agatha Kratz, "North Korea: A Role for the EU on Human Rights," European Council on Foreign Relations, January 6, 2016.
105.	Stephanie Nebehay, "North Korea Crimes to be Documented for Prosecution Someday - U.N," Reuters, March 24, 2017.
106.	U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2013—Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, June 19, 2013, at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013.
107.	U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017, p. 16; Vanessa Sauter, "Does Trump's North Korea Travel Ban Actually Ban Any North Koreans?" Lawfare, September 26, 2017.
108.	Richard Skretteberg, "Ten Things You Should Know about Refugees from North Korea," Norwegian Refugee Council, February 16, 2018.
109.
110.	John Park and Jim Walsh, Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences, MIT Security Studies Program, 2016.
111.	Richard Skretteberg, "Ten Things You Should Know About Refugees from North Korea," Norwegian Refugee Council, February 16, 2018.
112.	United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, February 7, 2014, p. 9; Roberta Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure," Brookings, July 7, 2014.
113.	Madison Park, "China, North Korea Slam U.N. Human Rights Report as 'Divorced from Reality,'" CNN, March 18, 2014.
114.	Phil Robertson, "North Korean Refugees Trapped by China's Expanding Dragnet," Human Rights Watch, September 18, 2017.
115.	"N. Korean Refugees Caught in China," The Japan Times, November 18, 2013.
116.	Gabriel Auteri, "Legal Roadblocks Hinder North Korean Migrants' Efforts to Escape Oppressive Conditions," Human Rights Brief, March 7, 2013.
117.	George W. Bush Institute, "Infographic: North Korea's Refugees," Freedom Square, July 30, 2014.
118.	Roberta Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure," International Journal of Korean Studies, Summer/Fall 2014.
119.	Sokeel J. Park, "Divided Over North Korean Refugees," ISN, March 1, 2012.
120.	Roberta Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure," International Journal of Korean Studies, Summer/Fall 2014.
121.	Josh Rogin, "Tillerson Scraps Full-time North Korean Human Rights Envoy," Washington Post, August 31, 2017.
122.	U.S. State Department, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2017.
123.	Pete Pattisson, "North Koreans working as 'state-sponsored slaves' in Qatar," The Guardian, November 7, 2014.
124.	Jason Aldag, "How North Korea takes a cut from its workers abroad," Washington Post, November 1, 2017; Peter S. Goodman, Choe Sang-Hun and Joanna Berendt, "Even in Poland, Workers' Wages Flow to North Korea," New York Times, December 31, 2017.
125.	U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017, p. 26.
126.	Peter S. Goodman, Choe Sang-Hun and Joanna Berendt, "Even in Poland, Workers' Wages Flow to North Korea," New York Times, December 31, 2017; Jason Aldag, "How North Korea takes a cut from its workers abroad," Washington Post, November 1, 2017; Stephanie Nebehay, "U.N. Expert to Probe Conditions of North Korean Workers Abroad," Reuters, 16 March 2015.
127.	Chang-Hoon Shin and Myong-Hyun Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea, November 2014, p. 21.
128.	U.S. Department of State, Democratic People's Republic of Korea 2016 Human Rights Report, March 3, 2017, p. 26; Shin and Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea, November 2014, p. 21.
129.	U.S. State Department, U.S. Government Efforts To Advance Business and Human Rights in 2017, November 27, 2017, at https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/275861.htm; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "CBP Combats Modern-Day Slavery with the Passage of the Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act," press release, November 7, 2017, at https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-combats-modern-day-slavery-passage-countering-america-s.
130.	For more, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
131.	Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency, "Progress on Korean War Personnel Accounting," June 18, 2018.
132.	C. Kenneth Quinones, "The US-DPRK 1994 Agreed Framework and the US Army's Return to North Korea," in Rudiger Frank, James Hoare, et al., editors, Korea Yearbook Volume 2: Politics, Economy and Society (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008).
133.	Separately, from 1990 to 1994, North Korea unilaterally handed over 208 boxes of remains, some of them commingled. U.S. specialists have identified 104 soldiers from those remains so far.
134.	For examples, see Dan Lamothe and Paul Sonne, "For the U.S., a Frustrating History of Recovering Human Remains in North Korea," Washington Post, July 4, 2018; and Andrew Jeong, "U.S. Is Beholden to North Korea for Return of War Remains," Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2018.
135.	"U.S. Halts Search for Its War Dead in North Korea," New York Times, May 26, 2005.
136.	April 2005 email correspondence between CRS and with DPMO.
Ibid., pp. 33-37.
74.	United States Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2013—Korea, Democratic People's Republic of, June 19, 2013, available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2013.
75.	Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification, Major Statistics in Inter-Korean Relations, accessed July 14, 2015, http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1822.
76.	Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, November 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/Documents.aspx.
77.	"N. Korean Refugees Caught in China," The Japan Times. November 18, 2013.
78.	Gabriel Auteri, "Legal Roadblocks Hinder North Korean Migrants' Efforts to Escape Oppressive Conditions," Human Rights Brief, March 7, 2013.
79.	George W. Bush Institute, "Infographic: North Korea's Refugees," Freedom Square, July 30, 2014.
80.	Roberta Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure," International Journal of Korean Studies, Summer/Fall 2014.
81.	Sokeel J. Park, "Divided Over North Korean Refugees," ISN, March 1, 2012.
82.	Roberta Cohen, "China's Forced Repatriation of North Korean Refugees Incurs United Nations Censure," International Journal of Korean Studies, Summer/Fall 2014.
83.	U.S. State Department, Refugee Processing Center, http://www.wrapsnet.org/Reports/AdmissionsArrivals.
84.	Broadcast content includes news briefs, particularly news about the Korean Peninsula; interviews with North Korean defectors; and international commentary on events occurring in North Korea. The BBG cites a Peterson Institute for International Economics survey in which North Korean defectors interviewed in China and South Korea indicated that they had listened to foreign media including RFA. RFA broadcasts five hours a day. VOA broadcasts five hours a day with three of those hours in prime-time from a medium-wave transmitter in South Korea aimed at North Korea. VOA also broadcasts from stations in Thailand; the Philippines; and from leased stations in Russia and eastern Mongolia. In January 2009, the BBG began broadcasting to North Korea from a leased medium-wave facility in South Korea. The BBG added leased transmission capability to bolster medium-wave service into North Korea in January 2010. RFA broadcasts from stations in Tinian (Northern Marianas) and Saipan, and leased stations in Russia and Mongolia.
85.	Broadcasting Board of Governors FY2013 Budget Request, http://www.bbg.gov/wp-content/media/2012/02/FY-2013-BBG-Congressional-Budget-Request-FINAL-2-9-12-Small.pdf.
86.	Chang-Hoon Shin and Myong-Hyun Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea, November 2014.
87.	Shin and Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea, November 2014.
88.	"150,000 N.Koreans Sent to Slave Labor Abroad," Chosun Ilbo, November 13, 2014.
89.	"ILO Calls on Mongolia to Protect North Korean Workers," The Korea Times, June 10, 2015.
90.	Shin and Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea, November 2014.
91.	Hyo-jin Kim, "A Qatar Construction Company Fires 90 North Korean Workers," The Korea Times [Seoul], May 7, 2015, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/05/116_178523.html.
92.	Andrei Lankov, "North Korean Workers Abroad Aren't Slaves," NK News, November 27, 2014.
93.	Shin and Go, Beyond the UN COI Report on Human Rights in North Korea, November 2014.
94.	"150,000 N.Koreans Sent to Slave Labor Abroad," Chosun Ilbo, November 13, 2014.
95.	Stephanie Nebehay, "U.N. Expert to Probe Conditions of North Korean Workers Abroad," Reuters, 16 March 2015.
96.	Ibid.
97.	For more information, see CRS Report RL33885, North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
98.	"Defectors Detail How North Korea's Office 39 Feeds Leader's Slush Fund," Wall Street Journal Online, September 15, 2014.
99.	Sari Horwitz, "5 Extradited in Plot to Import North Korean Meth to U.S.," Washington Post, November 20, 2013.
100.	Marcus Noland, "North Korea Illicit Activities," North Korea: Witness to Transformation blog, Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 11, 2013, http://www.piie.com/blogs/nk/?p=9650.
101.	Con Coughlin, "Hamas and North Korea in Secret Arms Deal," Telegraph, July 26, 2014. North Korea is renowned for its expertise in sophisticated tunneling projects.
102.	Emily Rauhala, "North Korea Denies Selling Missiles to Hamas," time.com, July 29, 2014.
103.	Andrea Berger, "North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah: Arm in Arm?," 38North blog, U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, August 5, 2014, http://38north.org/2014/08/aberger080514.
104.	For more, see CRS Report R40095, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].
105.	C. Kenneth Quinones, "The US-DPRK 1994 Agreed Framework and the US Army's Return to North Korea," in Rudiger Frank, James Hoare, et al., editors, Korea Yearbook Volume 2: Politics, Economy and Society (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008).
106.	Separately, from 1990 to 1994, North Korea unilaterally handed over 208 boxes of remains, some of them commingled. U.S. specialists have identified 104 soldiers from those remains so far.
107.	"U.S. Halts Search for Its War Dead in North Korea," New York Times, May 26, 2005.
108.	April 2005 email correspondence between CRS and with DPMO.
109.	Jim Garamone, "U.S. Suspends MIA Search in North Korea," American Forces Press Service, March 21, 2012., http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=67639.
110138.	Choe Sang-hun, "North Korea Says G.I.s' Remains May Vanish," New York Times, October 13, 2014.
111.	"US NGO Aid to NK Increases Fourfold," Daily NK, August 7, 2014139. White House, "Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit," joint statement, June 12, 2018, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/.	140.	141.