North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

September 29, 2010 – May 31, 2023 R41438

North Korea: Legislative Basis for
U.S. Economic Sanctions
Updated May 31, 2023
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R41438

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

Summary
U.S. economic sanctions imposed on North Korea are instigated by that country’s activities
related to weapons proliferation, especially its tests since 2006 of nuclear weapons and missile
technology; regional disruptions; international terrorism; narcotics trafficking; undemocratic
governance; and illicit activities in international markets, including money laundering,
counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling, cyberattacks, and sanctions evasion.
The sanctions have the following consequences for U.S.-North Korea relations:
• Trade is limited to food, medicine, and other humanitarian-related goods, all of
which require a license. Imports from North Korea are prohibited as of June
2011; exports to North Korea of most U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology
are prohibited as of March 2016. Trade in luxury goods is banned. The
Department of Commerce denies export licenses for reasons of nuclear
proliferation, missile technology, U.N. Security Council requirements, and
international terrorism.
• Arms sales and arms transfers are fully denied.
• Financial transactions are prohibited. U.S. persons are prohibited from
providing financial services for the purpose of evading sanctions, or from
providing financial services to a person or entity designated for sanctions. The
President, in September 2017, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
designate for sanctions any foreign financial institution that conducts or
facilitates “any significant transaction on behalf of any [designated] person,” or
“in connection with trade with North Korea.”
• North Korea is designated as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering
concern by the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), effective December 9, 2016.
• U.S. new investment is prohibited, and investment in North Korea’s
transportation, mining, energy, or financial sectors is prohibited. North Korea is
also ineligible to participate in any U.S. government program that makes credit,
credit guarantees, or investment guarantees available.
• U.S. foreign aid is minimal and mostly limited to refugees fleeing North Korea;
broadcasting into the country; nongovernmental organization programs dedicated
to democracy promotion, human rights, and governance; and emergency food
aid. In past years, aid related to disabling and dismantling the country’s nuclear
weapons program has been made available. By law, U.S. representatives in the
international financial institutions (IFI) are required to vote against any support
for North Korea due to its nuclear weapons ambitions and international terrorism.
Human rights and environmental activities would also likely result in U.S.
objections to North Korea’s participation in the IFI.
• U.S.-based assets are blocked for North Korean individuals, entities, aircraft,
and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and
transaction with these designees and, foreign financial institutions could become
subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated persons.
• Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers’ Party, and others—banks, shipping
companies, seagoing vessels, state agencies, and other individuals affiliated with
the state’s security regime—are identified as being among those engaged in illicit
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

and punishable activities, possibly including nuclear or ballistic missile
programs, undermining cybersecurity, censorship, and sanctions evasion. As a
result, their assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen and U.S. persons and entities
are prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with the designees.
• U.S. travel requires a special validation passport issued by the State
Department. Such passports are reserved only for travel in the U.S. national
interest and are intended for professional reporters, officials with the American
Red Cross or International Committee of the Red Cross, or those who have a
“compelling humanitarian” justification.
In addition to economic and diplomatic restrictions on the U.S.-North Korea bilateral
relationship, other states’ failure or resistance to comply with Security Council requirements,
sanctions evasion, and transactions with persons and entities subject to U.S. sanctions as part of
the United States’ policy toward North Korea invites the United States to impose secondary
sanctions. Third parties—individuals, entities, or governments—may find their U.S.-based assets
blocked, transactions and contracts with U.S. persons prohibited, use of the U.S. financial system
denied, and U.S. support in the international financial institutions curtailed.
From the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States had imposed fairly
comprehensive economic, diplomatic, and political restrictions on North Korea. In 1999,
however, President Clinton announced the United States would lift many restrictions on U.S.
exports to and imports from North Korea in areas other than those controlled for national security
concerns. The Departments of Commerce, the Treasury, and Transportation issued new
regulations a year later that implemented the new policy. On June 26, 2008, President George W.
Bush delisted the Government of North Korea as a state sponsor of international terrorism, and
removed restrictions based on authorities derived from the terrorism designation or those stated in
the Trading With the Enemy Act, replacing them with more circumscribed economic restrictions
related to proliferation concerns.
Less than a decade later, however, the Obama Administration found North Korea to be a
jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern in mid-2016. The Trump Administration
reimposed the terrorism designation in late 2017. And the U.N. Security Council, from 2009 to
2017, adopted a series of resolutions requiring its member states to deny revenue and trade to
North Korea in the wake of its increasing belligerent tests of nuclear weapons, satellite launches,
and missile delivery systems.
The U.S. sanctions are a result of requirements incorporated into U.S. law by Congress, decisions
made in the executive branch to exercise discretionary authorities, and obligations placed on
member states of the United Nations by the U.N. Security Council. Though the President, in
accordance with the Constitution, leads the way in conducting foreign policy, Congress holds
substantial power to shape foreign policy by authorizing and funding programs, advising on
appointments, and specifically defining the terms of engagement in accordance with U.S. political
and strategic interests. This report presents the legislative basis for U.S. sanctions policy toward
North Korea. These sanctions are a critical tenet of the larger bilateral relationship, and this report
highlights Congress’s role and responsibility in determining the nature of U.S.-North Korea
relations.
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Background
The United States imposes economic sanctions on North Korea (DPRK) for activities related to
weapons proliferation, particularly its pursuit of nuclear weapons capability and a missile
delivery system; regional disruptions; narcotics trafficking; undemocratic governance; and illicit
activities in international markets, including money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and
currency, bulk cash smuggling, cyberattacks, and sanctions evasion. The entirety of North Korea
is identified by the United States as a “jurisdiction of money laundering concern,” which makes
DPRK-origin or DPRK-related transactions to or through the U.S. financial system off limits.
And the Government of North Korea is designated as a state sponsor of acts of international
terrorism, which quashes most U.S. foreign aid, trade, investment, and support in international
financial institutions.
United States law has been applied to North Korea in the following ways in response to the North
Korean government’s objectionable activities:1
• North Korea poses a threat to U.S. national security because of “the current
existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the
Korean Peninsula,” as declared by President George W. Bush on June 26, 2008,
under the terms of the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA);2
• North Korea is cited by the United Nations Security Council3 for its nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles pursuits, withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and contribution to regional tensions; the
United States meets the requirements as a member state of the United Nations
pursuant to the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to implement sanctions
adopted by the U.N. Security Council;
• North Korea committed an unprovoked attack that resulted in the sinking of a
South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan; announced a new nuclear test and missile
launches in 2009; and engaged in money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and
currency, bulk cash smuggling, and narcotics trafficking, all in violation of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions, leading President Barack Obama to expand the
national emergency in 2010, 2011, 2015, and 2016. President Donald Trump, in
2017, cited the “provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions and policies of
the Government of North Korea”; its intercontinental ballistic missile launches;

1 Appendix A lists U.S. statutory authorities used to form the economic sanctions regime.
2 Executive Order 13466, “Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean Nationals,”
73 F.R. 36787, June 26, 2008; 31 C.F.R. Part 510, November 4, 2010. The same day, the President found that
continuing the national emergency first proclaimed under authority of the Trading With the Enemy Act (Presidential
Proclamation 2914; December 16, 1950; 15 F.R. 9029) was “no longer in the national interest of the United States.”
Presidential Proclamation 8271; June 26, 2008; 73 F.R. 36785.
The President is required to continue annually any national emergency he issues under the National Emergencies Act,
or it expires, along with the sanctions established under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).
President Joseph R. Biden most recently renewed the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 in a
notice of June 13, 2022 (87 F.R. 36049).
3 Appendix B compares U.N. Security Council resolutions with steps taken by the United States, in both legislation
and executive orders. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), October 14, 2006; UNSC Resolution
1874 (2009), June 12, 2009; UNSC Resolution 2087 (2013), January 22, 2013; UNSC Resolution 2094 (2013), March
7, 2013; UNSC Resolution 2270 (2016), March 2, 2016; UNSC Resolution 2321 (2016), November 30, 2016; UNSC
Resolution 2356 (2017), June 2, 2017; UNSC Resolution 2371 (2017), August 5, 2017; UNSC Resolution 2375 (2017),
September 11, 2017; and UNSC Resolution 2397 (2017), December 22, 2017.
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its nuclear tests; violation of Security Council resolutions; and human rights
abuses to continue the national emergency and impose additional sanctions;4
• North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government, and
stated as such in the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as amended, and further
restricted under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
• North Korea has engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the
State Department finds pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act; Export
Administration Act of 1979;5 Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act
of 2000; and a national emergency declared by President George H. W. Bush
relating to the proliferation of such weapons;
• North Korea is not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, the State
Department has determined, under terms of the Arms Export Control Act;
• The Government of North Korea supports acts of international terrorism, under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Export Controls Act of 2018, and Arms
Export Control Act;6
• North Korea has detonated a nuclear explosive device, President George W. Bush
has determined,7 pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, the Atomic Energy
Act, and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945;
• North Korea engaged in “provocative, destabilizing, and repressive actions and
policies,” including “destructive, coercive cyber-related actions during November

4 Executive Order 13551 of August 30, 2010, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to North Korea,” 75
F.R. 53837, September 1, 2010; Executive Order 13570 of April 18, 2011, “Prohibiting Certain Transactions With
Respect to North Korea,” 76 F.R. 22291, April 20, 2011; Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015, “Imposing
Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea,” 80 F.R. 819, January 6, 2015; Executive Order 13722 of March
15, 2016, “Blocking Property of the Government of North Korea and the Workers’ Party of Korea, and Prohibiting
Certain Transactions With Respect to North Korea,” 81 F.R. 14943, March 18, 2016; and Executive Order 13810 of
September 20, 2017, “Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea,” 82 F.R. 44705. Both Presidents
Obama and Trump cited the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-264; 22 U.S.C. 287c) authorities in
addition to those provided in NEA and IEEPA.
5 The Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA’18; Title XVII, Subtitle B, Part I, P.L. 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.)
repealed most of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA’79; P.L. 96-72). The provisions in EAA’79 relating to
weapons proliferation (Section 11A, multilateral export control violations, 50 U.S.C. 2410a; Section 11B, missile
proliferation control violations, 50 U.S.C. 2410b; and Section 11C, chemical and biological weapons proliferation
sanctions, 50 U.S.C. 2410c), however, are retained in Section 1766 of ECA’18 (50 U.S.C. 4601 note), but are required
to be renewed by emergency authority provided the President in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). President George W. Bush stated the initial declaration of emergency relating to the expiration
of export control authorities in Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (66 F.R. 44025). President Biden most
recently continued the emergency with a notice of August 4, 2022 (87 F.R. 48077).
6 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Secretary, Public Notice 1048, “Determination Pursuant to Section 6(j) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979; North Korea,” 53 F.R. 3477, January 20, 1988. Office of the President,
Memorandum to the Secretary of State, “Certification of Rescission of North Korea’s Designation as a State Sponsor of
Terrorism,” 73 F.R. 37351, June 26, 2008. U.S. Department of State, Public Notice 6415, “Rescission of Determination
Regarding North Korea,” 73 F.R. 63540, October 11, 2008. U.S. Department of State, Public Notice 10211,
“Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST),” 82 F.R. 56100,
November 27, 2017.
7 On December 7, 2006, President Bush determined that North Korea, a non-nuclear-weapon state, had detonated a
nuclear explosive device, citing Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act and Section 129 of the Atomic Energy
Act. Presidential Determination No. 2007-07. Public Papers of the President. December 18, 2006.
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and December 2014,” actions in violation of a multitude of U.N. Security
Council resolutions, and the commission of serious human rights abuses;8 and
• North Korea “used chemical weapons in violation of international law or lethal
chemical weapons against its own nationals.” On February 22, 2018, the
Secretary of State determined that the government of North Korea was
responsible for the lethal 2017 nerve agent attack on Kim Jong Nam, the half-
brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, in Malaysia. Sanctions went into
effect on March 5, 2018, though they are largely redundant with restrictions
already in place.9
At the President’s discretion, the Government of North Korea also could be subject to economic
sanctions provided in three provisions of law addressing human rights conditions: the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,10 and the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000.11 Sanctions under these acts would be largely redundant with
restrictions already in place.
The United States’ concerns about North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability emerged
in the 1980s when that country’s nuclear weapons program became apparent.12 In the 1990s, the
two countries negotiated and signed, in 1994, an Agreed Framework to freeze North Korea’s
plutonium-based nuclear energy program and provide heavy fuel oil until light-water reactors
could be brought online, all funded to varying degrees by the European Union, Japan, South
Korea, and the United States. Through the late 1990s, the United States and North Korea engaged

8 Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015, “Imposing Additional Sanctions With Respect to North Korea, 80 F.R.
819, January 6, 2015. The Executive Order also draws on authorities granted the President in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)) to deny entry into the United States of any person designated pursuant to IEEPA
authorities. See Presidential Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011, “Suspension of Aliens Subject to United Nations
Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions,” 76 F.R. 44751.
9 Department of State Public Notice 10340, “Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Determinations
Regarding Use of Chemical Weapons by North Korea Under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and
Warfare Elimination Act of 1991,” 83 F.R. 9362, March 5, 2018.
10 Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-292; 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.), North Korea is
identified as a Tier 1 country of particular concern (CPC), the worst ranking available. The U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom recommended, in part, that the United States should “Integrate security and human
rights as complementary objectives in broader U.S. policy toward—and in bilateral negotiations with—North Korea; ...
Impose targeted and broad sanctions—including coordinated, multilateral sanctions with international partners—as
appropriate for religious freedom violations in North Korea and consider lifting certain sanctions in return for concrete
progress in religious freedom and related human rights.” U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, 2023
Annual Report, April 2023, pp. 32-33. See also Department of State, Office of International Religious Freedom, 2022
Report on International Religious Freedom, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 2022 International
Religious Freedom Report,” 20 pp., May 15, 2023.
11 Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (Division A of P.L. 106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.), the State
Department identifies the DPRK government as a Tier 3 government, the worst ranking available, for its failure to
“fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking [in persons] and … not making efforts to do
so….” The DPRK government is noted for its continuing policies and patterns of “human trafficking in prison camps as
part of an established system of political repression, in labor training centers, in the mass mobilizations of adults and
children, and through its imposition of forced labor conditions on DPRK overseas workers. The government used
proceeds from state-sponsored forced labor to fund government functions, as well as other illicit activity.” In addition,
the State Department calls out several other countries for using North Korean forced labor in violation of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 2397 (2017). Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2022, pp. 326-328.
Presidential Determination No. 2023-02 of October 14, 2022, “Presidential Determination With Respect to Efforts of
Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” 87 F.R. 64361.
12 The Arms Control Association maintains a Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,
available at https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron, updated through April 6, 2022 (accessed May 31,
2023).
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in negotiations, initially to curtail missile tests and expanded to include differences on nuclear
weapons and international terrorism. In October 2002, it came to light in negotiations between
U.S. and North Korean government officials that North Korea was pursuing a uranium-based
nuclear weapons capability. Diplomacy over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program then
entered a new phase; the Agreed Framework was abandoned and the United States, North Korea,
South Korea, China, Japan, and Russia convened a new forum—the Six Party Talks, which held
its first negotiations in August 2003. Despite several steps forward, including the United States
ending decades-long sanctions imposed at the outset of the 1950-1953 conflict and its delisting of
North Korea as a supporter of international terrorism, the Six Party Talks collapsed in late 2008.
During this period and continuing through the present, North Korea has engaged in a number of
acts that the international community deems provocative. It has tested short-, mid-, and long-
range ballistic missiles since mid-2006, with varying degrees of success, abrogating a moratorium
it complied with since 1998. In 2022, it resumed testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and
in April 2023 it reportedly tested a solid-fuel ICBM.13 In early 2009, North Korea began to test
satellite launches, contrary to U.N. Security Council restrictions, and may have succeeded in
placing a satellite in orbit in 2012. Most recently, it has tested missile launches from the sea.
On October 9, 2006, May 25, 2009, February 12, 2013, January 6, 2016, September 9, 2016, and
again on September 3, 2017, North Korea reported that it had detonated a nuclear explosive
device. The international community responded to the missile tests and nuclear detonations by
taking the issue to the U.N. Security Council, which adopted resolutions that condemned the
weapons tests and called on member states to impose economic sanctions.
On March 26, 2010, a South Korean Navy ship, the Cheonan, was struck by a torpedo while
sailing in the West Sea. The ship sank and 46 crew members were killed. The South Korean
Ministry of National Defense formed a Civilian-Military Joint Investigation Group—with
participants from five other nations including the United States—which found that the Cheonan
was torpedoed by a North Korean submarine. North Korea denied involvement. The U.N.
Security Council, in a presidential statement, condemned the attack, and acknowledged both the
findings of the Investigation Group and the disavowal by North Korea.14
President Obama assigned responsibility to North Korea for the sinking of the Cheonan when, on
August 30, 2010, he announced he was expanding the scope of the national emergency declared
in 2008, and the United States was taking additional steps to curtail economic activity with North
Korea:
the continued actions and policies of the Government of North Korea, manifested most
recently by its unprovoked attack that resulted in the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy
ship Cheonan and the deaths of 46 sailors in March 2010; its announced test of a nuclear
device and its missile launches in 2009; its actions in violation of UNSCRs 1718 and 1874,
including the procurement of luxury goods; and its illicit and deceptive activities in
international markets through which it obtains financial and other support, including
money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods and currency, bulk cash smuggling, and
narcotics trafficking, destabilize the Korean peninsula and imperil U.S. Armed Forces,

13 United States Mission to the United Nations, “Joint Statement Delivered by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
at the UN Security Council Stakeout on the Recent ICBM Launch by the DPRK,” press statement, April 17, 2023;
Gallo, William, “North Korea Touts Test of New Solid-Fuel ICBM,” Voice of America, April 13, 2023 (updated April
14, 2023); Choi, Soo-Hyang and Park, Ju-min, “North Korea Says It Tested New Sold-Fuel ICBM, Warns of ‘Extreme’
Horror,” Reuters, April 14, 2023; CRS In Focus IF10246, U.S.-North Korea Relations.
14 Civilian-Military Joint Investigation Group, On the Attack Against the ROK Ship Cheonan, Ministry of National
Defense, Republic of Korea, September 2010; U.N. Security Council, Presidential Statement (U.N. document,
S/PRST/2010/13, July 9, 2010).
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allies, and trading partners in the region, and thereby constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United
States.15
President Obama’s explicit identification of all features of North Korea’s objectionable behavior
constituting the threat is unusual compared to other invocations of his IEEPA authorities.16 The
statute requires only that the President find that a threat to U.S. national security, foreign policy,
or economy exists, and that its source is “in whole or substantial part outside the United States.”
The President identified North Korea’s attack of the Cheonan and other acts of regional
destabilization, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them,
noncompliance with U.N. requirements, money laundering, counterfeiting, smuggling, and
narcotics trafficking as compounding the threat. To this list, the President added, in January 2015,
“cyber-related actions ... and commission of serious human rights abuses,” the latter a nod to
ground-breaking efforts in December 2014 in the United Nations General Assembly to refer
reports of human rights atrocities in North Korea’s prison system to both the U.N. Security
Council and the International Criminal Court. Justifying the declaration of the emergency based
on these wide-ranging activities accomplishes a number of goals
• It confirms the United States’ full support of and participation in implementation
of the U.N. Security Council resolutions.
• It provides a clear list of concerns members of the U.S. diplomatic corps might
raise and emphasize when speaking with North Korea’s trading partners and
benefactors.
• It states indisputable goals for North Korea to strive toward, meet, and surpass.
It should be noted, however, that each of these forms of objectionable behavior likely would be
grounds, under current law, for restricting trade, aid, arms sales, and access to assets even if the
national emergency were to be revoked.
U.S. Economic Sanctions Currently in Place
United States economic sanctions imposed on North Korea, as a result both of requirements in
U.S. law and decisions made in the executive branch to exercise discretionary authorities, have
the following impact:
• Trade is limited to food, medicine, and other humanitarian-related goods, all of
which require a license. Imports from North Korea are prohibited as of June
2011; exports to North Korea of most U.S.-origin goods, services, or technology
are prohibited as of March 2016. Export licenses and financing for trade in food
and medicine for North Korea is subject to limits imposed on any foreign country
the government of which is designated as a state sponsor of acts of international
terrorism. U.S. persons are further prohibited from engaging in transactions with
the Government of North Korea or the Workers’ Party of Korea related to trade in
metal, graphite, coal, or software. Trade in luxury goods is banned. The
Department of Commerce denies export licenses for reasons of nuclear
proliferation, missile technology, U.N. Security Council requirements, and

15 Executive Order 13551, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to North Korea,” 75 F.R. 53837,
September 1, 2010.
16 50 U.S.C. 1701 notes.
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international terrorism. Using a North Korea-flagged vessel for any transaction is
prohibited.
• Arms sales and arms transfers are fully denied.
• Financial transactions are prohibited. U.S. persons are prohibited from
providing financial services for the purpose of evading sanctions, or from
providing financial services to a person or entity designated for sanctions. The
President, in September 2017, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
designate for sanctions any foreign financial institution that conducts or
facilitates “any significant transaction on behalf of any [designated] person,” or
“in connection with trade with North Korea.”17
• North Korea is designated as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering
concern by the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN), effective December 9, 2016, and finalized November 2,
2017. FinCEN had issued advisories and warnings about North Korea’s deceptive
and illicit banking practices as early as 2005. U.S. banks are prohibited from
providing U.S. correspondent accounts to third-country banks to process
transactions for North Korean financial institutions.18
• U.S. new investment is prohibited, and investment in North Korea’s
transportation, mining, energy, or financial sectors is prohibited. North Korea is
also ineligible to participate in any U.S. government program that makes credit,
credit guarantees, or investment guarantees available.
• U.S. foreign aid is minimal and mostly limited to refugees fleeing North Korea;
broadcasting into the country; nongovernmental organization programs dedicated
to democracy promotion, human rights, and governance; emergency food aid;
and costs associated with the recovery of the remains of U.S. Armed Forces
personnel.19 In past years, aid related to disabling and dismantling the country’s
nuclear weapons program has been made available. By law, U.S. representatives
in the international financial institutions (IFI) are required to vote against any
support for North Korea due to its nuclear weapons ambitions and international
terrorism. Human rights and environmental activities would also likely result in
U.S. objections to North Korea’s participation in the IFI.
• U.S.-based assets are blocked for North Korean individuals, entities, aircraft,
and vessels designated by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC). U.S. persons are prohibited from entering into trade and
transaction with these designees and, most recently, foreign financial institutions

17 Section 4, Executive Order 13810 of September 20, 2017; 82 F.R. 44706.
18 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). “Advisory on North Korea’s
Use of the International Financial System,” FIN-2017-A008, November 2, 2017; and “Imposition of Special Measure
Against Bank of Dandong as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,” 31 C.F.R. Part 1010, 82
F.R. 51758.
19In the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division K, P.L.
117-328); see Section 7007, prohibiting direct funding for certain countries (136 Stat. 5002); and Section 7043(e),
which provides for broadcasting and human rights promotion relating to North Korea, but also prohibits foreign
assistance to any foreign government that the Secretary of State determines “engages in significant transactions
contributing materially to the malicious cyber-intrusion capabilities of the Government of North Korea” (136 Stat.
5055). POW/MIA recovery of remains from North Korea is exempted from aid restrictions in annual Department of
Defense appropriations, most recently at Section 8049 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023
(Division C, P.L. 117-328).
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could become subject to U.S. sanctions for facilitating transactions for designated
persons.
• Kim Jong-un, the Korean Workers’ Party, and others—banks, shipping
companies, seagoing vessels, state agencies, and other individuals affiliated with
the state’s security regime—are identified as being among those engaged in illicit
and punishable activities, including nuclear or ballistic missile programs,
undermining cybersecurity, censorship, and sanctions evasion. As a result, their
assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen and U.S. persons and entities are
prohibited from entering into trade and transactions with the designees.
• U.S. travel to or through North Korea requires a special validation passport
issued by the State Department. Such passports are reserved only for travel in the
U.S. national interest and are intended for professional reporters, officials with
the American Red Cross or International Committee of the Red Cross, or those
who have a “compelling humanitarian” justification.20
North Korea-related U.S. sanctions are a result of requirements incorporated into U.S. law by
Congress, decisions made in the executive branch to exercise discretionary authorities, and
obligations placed on the United States, as a member state of the United Nations, by the U.N.
Security Council. Economic sanctions may restrict or prohibit all manner of bilateral
relationships, but broadly can be categorized as impeding aid, trade, travel, and the finances
related to these activities. Three Executive Branch Departments—State, Commerce, and the
Treasury—together have the lion’s share of responsibilities to administer the restrictions affecting
these activities.
Trade
The United States curtails trade with North Korea for reasons of regional stability, that country’s
support for acts of international terrorism, lack of cooperation with U.S. antiterrorism efforts,
proliferation, and its status as a Communist country and a nonmarket economy. The United States
also prohibits transactions relating to trade with certain North Korean entities identified as those
who procure luxury goods, launder money, smuggle bulk cash, engage in counterfeiting goods
and currency, and traffic in illicit narcotics.
National Emergency Because of Threat to U.S. National Security
Trade with North Korea is significantly restricted because of that country’s demonstrated pursuit
of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. In addition, the Department of Commerce has
treated North Korea as a state sponsor of international terrorism, even in the period that the North
Korean government was removed from the terrorism list, from mid-2008 through most of 2017.21
Then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson redesignated the Government of North Korea as a state
sponsor of international terrorism in late 2017.
Commerce’s primary means of controlling exports is through the administration of Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), in which goods to be controlled for a variety of reasons—

20 U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Passport for Travel to North Korea,” September 1, 2017
(expires September 30, 2024), https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/how-apply/passport-for-travel-to-
north-korea.html (accessed May 2023).
21 See, especially, “Anti-terrorism: North Korea” at 15 C.F.R. Part 742.19; “Anti-terrorism Controls” at 15 C.F.R. Part
742, Supplement No. 2; and “Embargoes and Other Special Controls” at 15 C.F.R. Part 746, particularly Part 746.4
relating to North Korea. 15 C.F.R. Part 746, Supplement No. 1, states “Examples of Luxury Goods” to augment Part
746.4(b)(1).
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national security, foreign policy, short supply, or compliance with international agreements, to
name a few—are categorized. Recipient countries are also characterized, from allies for which
little licensing is required, to rogue states for which export licensing is all but completely denied.
Commerce identifies North Korea among the most restricted trade destinations—Country Group
E:1, Terrorist Supporting Countries—which severely limits its access to computers, software,
national security-controlled items, items on the Commerce Control List (CCL),22 and service or
repair of such items. A U.S. exporter intending to ship any goods subject to the EAR, except for
food and medicine not on the CCL, is required to obtain an export license.
Commerce also identifies North Korea in the two most restrictive country groups—Country
Group D, which requires export controls related to national security and weapons proliferation
(nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technology), and Country Group E, identifying foreign
countries subject to U.S. exports restrictions for reasons of international terrorism.23 As a result,
U.S. exporters are likely to be denied licenses to export any controlled item if North Korea is the
destination. In June 2007, Commerce eased licensing requirements so that food, medicine, and
humanitarian assistance items could be made available, but at the same time imposed new
licensing prohibitions on the export and reexport of luxury goods to implement the terms of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1718.24
Thus, a U.S. company may apply for a license to export to North Korea, but for nearly all items
other than food and medicine, there is a presumption of denial. The EAR identify license
exceptions; those wishing to export to North Korea, however, are not eligible for these exceptions
except in highly circumscribed instances.25

22 The Secretary of Commerce establishes and administers the Commerce Control List (CCL), goods controlled for
national security reasons and stated at 15 C.F.R. Part 774, Supplement No. 1, pursuant originally to Section 5(c) of the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. App. 2404(c)). Most of the 1979 Act, including section 5,
was repealed with the enactment of the Export Controls Act of 2018 (Title XVII, Subtitle B, Part I, P.L. 115-232; 50
U.S.C. 4811 et seq.). Section 1768(a) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 4826) provides that:
All delegations, rules, regulations, orders, determinations, licenses, or other forms of administrative
action that have been made, issued, conducted, or allowed to become effective under the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.) (as in effect on the day before the enactment
of this Act and as continued in effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)), or the Export Administration Regulations, and are in effect as of the
date of the enactment of this Act [August 13, 2018], shall continue in effect according to their
terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked under the authority of this part.
23 15 C.F.R. Part 740 Supp. 1. For arms embargoed country designations, see 22 C.F.R. Part 126.1.
24 Department of Commerce. Bureau of Industry and Security. 15 C.F.R. Parts 732, 738, 740, 742, 746, 772, and 774.
“North Korea: Imposition of New Foreign Policy Controls.” 15 C.F.R. Part 746.4(b)(1), for example, provides the
following:
…luxury automobiles; yachts; gems; jewelry; other fashion accessories; cosmetics; perfumes; furs;
designer clothing; luxury watches; rugs and tapestries; electronic entertainment software and
equipment; recreational sports equipment; tobacco; wine and other alcoholic beverages; musical
instruments; art; and antiques and collectible items, including but not limited to rare coins and
stamps are subject to a general policy of denial. For further information on luxury goods, see
supplement no. 1 to part 746.
This language generally is stated at 15 C.F.R. Part 746.4(b)(1). See also Supplement No. 1 to 15 C.F.R. Part 746—
Examples of Luxury Goods following 15 C.F.R. Part 746. 15 C.F.R. Part 700—the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR)—are undergoing revision, including several related to North Korea, to reflect to enactment of the Export
Controls Act of 2018.
25 15 C.F.R. Part 746.4(b)(4) provides that licenses “are subject to a general policy of approval” if the intended export
is a humanitarian item “(e.g., blankets, basic footwear, heating oil, and other items meeting subsistence needs) intended
for the benefit of the North Korean people; items in support of United Nations humanitarian efforts; and agricultural
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The Office of Foreign Assets Control, within the Department of the Treasury, must approve any
U.S. importation from North Korea, and weighs all requests in the context of proliferation, money
laundering, counterfeiting, bulk cash smuggling, narcotics trafficking, international terrorism, or
other illicit economic activity, and who in North Korea might profit. Any transfer involving the
Government of North Korea, any senior DPRK government official, or a DPRK person or entity
designated as a Specially Designated National pursuant to any of the series of executive orders
relating to North Korea, to a person under U.S. jurisdiction is prohibited.26 The President, in
Executive Order 13570 of April 18, 2011, stated the following:
Except to the extent provided in statutes or in licenses, regulations, orders, or directives
that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or
any license or permit granted prior to the date of this order, the importation into the United
States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services, or technology from North Korea is
prohibited.27
United States persons are also prohibited from registering a vessel in North Korea; obtaining
authorization to fly the North Korean flag on a vessel; or owning, leasing, operating, or insuring
any vessel so flagged.28
Terrorism
The Government of North Korea is designated as a state sponsor of acts of international terrorism
under several statutes governing U.S. export policy, arms trade, and foreign assistance.29

commodities or medical devices items that are determined by BIS [Bureau of Industry and Security], in consultation
with the interagency license review community, not to be luxury goods are subject to a general policy of approval.” 15
C.F.R. Part 746.4(c) provides that some licensing is possible for items used by news media, U.S. government,
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), safe operation of
civil aircraft, operation technology related to other legally exported commodities, and some gift parcels if no luxury
goods are included. 15 C.F.R. Part 700—the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)—are likely to be rewritten or
substantially amended in the near future to reflect to enactment of the Export Controls Act of 2018; see footnote 22.
26 31 C.F.R. Part 510, reissued February 22, 2018; 83 F.R. 9182. (Some regulations in this part have been amended to
incorporate updates to sanctions programs overall.)
27 Section1, Executive Order 13570, 76 F.R. 22291, April 18, 2011.
28 Executive Order 13466, “Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean
Nationals,” 73 F.R. 36787, June 26, 2008. See also 31 C.F.R. Part 510, issued November 4, 2010, and reissued
February 2, 2018; 83 F.R. 9182.
29 Originally designated pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA’79; P.L. 96-72; 50
U.S.C. app. 2405). The Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA’18; Part I, Subtitle B, Title XVII, of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019; P.L. 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.) repealed all but three
sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979, including Section 6(j). In its place, Section 1768, ECA’18 (50
U.S.C. 4826) continues under Section 1754(c) (50 U.S.C. 4813), any designation or related determination, delegation,
rule, regulation, license, or order made under Section 6(j), EAA’79. In addition, Section 1768, ECA’18, provides that
any reference elsewhere in law to Section 6(j), EAA’79 shall be deemed to be a reference to Section 1754(c), ECA’18.
Also currently listed as supporters of international terrorism are Iran, Syria, and Sudan. See also Section 40 of the Arms
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) and Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371). Each
of these sections of law authorizes the promulgation of a list of supporters of international terrorism, though no list has
been generated under either section. It is generally considered that the list maintained pursuant to the Export
Administration Act of 1979, and now the Export Controls Act of 2018, applies to all three laws.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson designated the Government of North Korea as a state sponsor of acts of international
terrorism on November 17, 2017: Department of State Public Notice 10211, “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK) Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST),” November 27, 2017, 82 F.R. 56100. The timing suggests
that this step was taken largely in response to a requirement from Congress for the Secretary to determine, not later
than early November 2017, “whether North Korea meets the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.”
Section 324, Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act (Title III, Countering America’s Adversaries
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Most elements of trade, Beneficiary Developing Country status, sales of items on the U.S.
Munitions List, most foreign aid, Export-Import Bank funding, and support in international
financial institutions are denied to countries the governments of which are found to be supporting
international terrorism under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (now superseded by the
Export Controls Act of 2018 [ECA’18]). North Korea was first added to the list effective January
20, 1988. Placement on the Section 6(j) (now Section 1754(c) of the ECA’18) list not only results
in the constriction of trade possibilities; placement also may trigger denial of beneficial trade
designation (normal trade relations [NTR] or Generalized System of Preferences [GSP]),
unfavorable tax status for investors, new limits on diplomatic relations, opposition in international
financial institutions, and stricter licensing requirements for trade with the United States in food
and medicine.30
North Korea is also among those countries listed as being in violation of Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act, which prohibits the selling or licensing of defense articles or defense services
to any country that the President finds “is not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism
efforts.” The President is required to make such a determination annually, and the prohibition
may be waived on grounds that it is in the national interest to do so.31
Nonmarket Economy
The Trade Agreement Extension Act of 1951 required the suspension of Most-Favored-Nation
trade status (MFN, which is now known as Normal Trade Relations (NTR)) for all Communist
countries except Yugoslavia. As a result, North Korea was denied MFN trade status on September
1, 1951.
North Korea remains listed in the headnotes of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
States (HTSUS) as a Rate of Duty Column 2 country (along with Cuba, Russia, and Belarus). As
a result, while trade is not prohibited with North Korea under the relevant trade laws, tariffs are
set at the highest rates for imports from that country.32 A side result of being denied NTR status is
that any such country is also denied preferential trade treatment under the GSP, pursuant to the
Trade Act of 1974.33 As a nonmarket economy found to deny its citizens the right or opportunity
to emigrate, North Korea is not eligible to participate in any U.S. government program that makes

Through Sanctions Act; P.L. 115-44; 131 Stat. 954). Previously, Secretary of State George Shultz had designated the
DPRK government on January 20, 1988, following the mid-air bombing of Korean Air Lines flight 858, reportedly
brought about by DPRK government agents in late 1987. On June 26, 2008, President George W. Bush certified that
the Government of North Korea had met the requirements of U.S. law to be found to no longer support acts of
international terrorism. Memorandum of June 26, 2008; 73 F.R. 37351. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, a few
months later, rescinded North Korea’s listing as a terrorist supporter, as required by law. Department of State Public
Notice 6415; October 11, 2008; 73 F.R. 63540. CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions Prior to
Removal from Terrorism Designation, and CRS Report R43835, State Sponsors of Acts of International Terrorism—
Legislative Parameters: In Brief, provide details on the statutes relating to a terrorism designation.
30 See Section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618;19 U.S.C. 2462); Section 901(j) of the International Revenue
Code (26 U.S.C. 901(j)); 10 United States Code §2327 (General Military Law); Section 40 of the State Department
Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-885; 22 U.S.C. 2712); Section 205 of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 (P.L. 84-885; 22 U.S.C. 4305); Section 1621 of the International Financial Institutions Act (P.L. 95-118;
22 U.S.C. 262p-4q); Section 501 of Miscellaneous Appropriations, 2000 (H.R. 3425, enacted by reference in P.L. 106-
113; 22 U.S.C. 2395a note); and Section 906 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (H.R. 5426,
enacted by reference in P.L. 106-387; 22 U.S.C. 7205), as amended.
31 22 U.S.C. 2781. The most recent certification, Department of State Public Notice 12084 (88 F.R. 33184; May 8,
2023), includes Cuba, the DPRK, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. This section of law was added to the Arms Export
Control Act in late 1996; North Korea has been included on the list each year since its inception.
32 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, general note 3(b).
33 Section 502(b)(1) of P.L. 93-618 (19 U.S.C. 2461).
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credit, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees available, nor may the President enter into any
commercial agreement with the country.34
Proliferator
On several occasions, North Korean entities have been found to be in violation of U.S. missile
nonproliferation laws.35 Once a finding is made, the imposition of sanctions is mandatory, though
sanctions may be waived if the President finds it “essential to the national security of the United
States” to do so. The severity of the sanction depends on the type of material or technology
transferred. The duration of the sanction also depends on the material or technology involved;
generally sanctions are imposed for two years or more.
Sanctions include, at a minimum, a denial of contracts with agencies of the U.S. government,
denial of licenses for items on the U.S. Munitions List (USML),36 and, at a maximum, a denial of
all licenses for importing into the United States for the foreign person or entity.
Because North Korea is a nonmarket economy,37 all relevant activities of the Government of
North Korea are also sanctioned when entities in North Korea are found to have engaged in
proliferation under U.S. law.
With the nuclear weapons test of October 8, 2006, President Bush exercised the authority granted
his office to cut off all foreign aid except humanitarian and food aid, deny sales or transfers of
defense articles and defense services, deny export licenses for items on the USML, deny foreign
military financing, deny credit underwritten or provided by government coffers, withhold U.S.
support in the international financial institutions, deny export licenses for dual-use items, and
withhold Export-Import Bank support.38 At the time, the United States already maintained a fairly

34 Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974, popularly referred to as the Jackson-Vanik amendment (19 U.S.C. 2432), and
Section 409 of that Act (19 U.S.C. 2439).
35 Section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2797b), Section 11B of the Export
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. App. 2410b), and Sections 2 and 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as amended. North Korea was added to the latter
Act on October 13, 2006, with the signing into law of the North Korea Nonproliferation Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-353;
120 Stat. 2015). Section 1766 of the ECA’18 repealed all but three sections of the Export Administration Act of 1979;
the remaining three—Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C—are continued under the authorities of the National Emergencies
Act (P.L. 94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601) and International Emergency Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-223; 50 U.S.C. 1702).
President Biden most recently continued the emergency that continue the application of Sections 11A, 11B, and 11C
with a notice of August 6, 2021 (86 F.R. 43901).
36 “In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the President is authorized to
control the import and export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons
of the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and services.” To accomplish this, the President
is authorized to designate items to be controlled—the United States Munitions List (USML). Section 38(a)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)). The USML may be found at 22 C.F.R. Part 121.1.
37 Section 74(a)(8)(B) of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(B)) applies restrictions to a
government of a country deemed to be a nonmarket economy when an entity under the jurisdiction of that government
engages in missile proliferation activities, because the separation between government and commerce is not distinct.
Section 74 provides, in part: “…in the case of countries with non-market economies … the term ‘person’ means … all
activities of that government relating to the development or production of any missile equipment or technology; and …
all activities of that government affecting the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment,
and military aircraft….”
38 Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2799aa-1), popularly referred to as the Glenn
amendment; Section 2(b)(4) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173; 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4)); and Title VI of
the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division K, P.L. 117-
328), relating to Export-Import Bank funding. On December 7, 2006, President Bush determined that North Korea, a
non-nuclear-weapon state, had detonated a nuclear explosive device, citing Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control
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comprehensive sanctions regime on North Korea, thus most of these relationships were already
broken or limited.
Access to Landing or Ports
President Trump, in Executive Order 13810 of late 2017, determined that “no aircraft in which a
foreign person has an interest that has landed” in North Korea would be permitted to land in the
United States within 180 days from its departure from North Korea. Seagoing vessels are
similarly restricted. The order allows for completion of standing contracts.39
Aid
International Terrorism, Human Rights
Because the Secretary of State has identified the Government of North Korea as a state sponsor of
acts of international terrorism, it is denied most aid under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.40
North Korea’s access to U.S. foreign assistance is also limited in annual foreign operations
appropriations measures.41 In most instances, it is not expressly stated that the restriction or
prohibition is associated with North Korea’s place on the terrorist list. Even if the appropriations
law prohibits the availability of foreign aid, there are numerous exceptions to the law. Thus,
programs in nonproliferation, demining, child survival, conservation and biodiversity, food aid,
debt buybacks, health and disease prevention, unanticipated contingencies, international disaster
assistance, and antiterrorism may be funded or supported in spite of country-specific restrictions.
Under the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,42
North Korea is generally denied direct foreign aid, economic support funds (ESF) for energy-

Act and Section 129 of the Atomic Energy Act. Presidential Determination No. 2007-07. Public Papers of the
President. December 18, 2006.
39 Section 2, Executive Order 13810 of September 20, 2017; 82 F.R. 44706.
40 Section 620A of that Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2371) prohibits most aid under its
auspices as well as that of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480; 7 U.S.C. 1691 et
seq.), Peace Corps Act (P.L. 87-293; 22 U.S.C. 2501 et seq.), and Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173; 12
U.S.C. 635 et seq.). The section, however, also provides the President the authority to waive its application on
humanitarian or national security grounds in some instances.
41 When appropriations law prohibits the availability of foreign aid, however, numerous exceptions to the law allow aid
to be made available for targeted programs. Thus, programs in nonproliferation, demining, child survival, conservation
and biodiversity, food aid, debt buybacks, health and disease prevention, unanticipated contingencies, international
disaster assistance, and antiterrorism may be funded or supported in spite of country-specific restrictions. The President
also is authorized, under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2364) to furnish foreign aid
“without regard to any provision of this Act, the Arms Export Control Act, any law relating to receipts and credits
accruing to the United States, and any Act authorizing or appropriating funds for use under this Act….”
42 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division K; P.L. 117-
328). See particularly Section 7007—Prohibition Against Direct Funding for Certain Countries (136 Stat. 5002);
Section 7021—Prohibition on Assistance to Governments Supporting International Terrorism (136 Stat. 5016); Section
7027—Eligibility for Assistance (136 Stat. 5020); and Section 7043(e)—East Asia and the Pacific, which prohibits
funds to any country of which the government “engages in significant transactions contributing materially to the
malicious cyber-intrusion capabilities of North Korea” (136 Stat. 5055). The section, in addition, allows for the
continued funding of broadcasting and human rights promotion programs related to North Korea. See also, Section
7048(b)—United Nations (136 Stat. 5070).
Subsequent to its nuclear tests, North Korea is also denied U.S. Export-Import Bank support under this Act—see Title
VI, paragraph providing for the program account of the Ex-Im Bank (136 Stat. 4997). In the North Korean Human
Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333; 22 U.S.C. 7801 through 7817), as amended, Congress authorizes funding through
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related programs, and direct loans, credits, insurance and guarantees of the Export-Import Bank.
The prohibitions on direct foreign aid to North Korea and its designation as a Tier 3 country
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 also make that country ineligible for
Millennium Challenge Account programs.43
At the President’s discretion, North Korea is also subject to the economic sanctions provided in
three provisions of law addressing human rights conditions: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,44
under which North Korea is annually castigated for its human rights record; the International
Religious Freedom Act of 1998,45 under which the Administration has identified North Korea as a
“country of particular concern” since 2001; and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000,46
under which the Administration has, since 2003, classified North Korea as a Tier 3 (most severe)
offender of standards pertaining to the trafficking of persons for slavery or sex trade. Because of
North Korea’s failure to comply with minimum standards relating to trafficking in persons,
President Obama, in 2010, strengthened the sanctions against North Korea to deny foreign
assistance and also to deny “funding for participation by officials or employees of such
governments in educational and cultural exchange programs for the subsequent fiscal year.”47 Any
sanctions imposed pursuant to these acts would be largely redundant, however, with penalties
already prescribed to North Korea for the above-stated reasons.
Under Department of Defense Appropriations, 2023, North Korea is denied assistance under that
act “unless specifically appropriated for that purpose.”48
Nonmarket Economy
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 singles out Marxist-Leninist countries for denial of
guarantees, insurance, credit, or other Bank funding programs. North Korea is specifically cited
as a Marxist-Leninist country for purposes of the Export-Import Bank.49

FY2022 for various aid and diplomacy programs for refugees from North Korea (migration and refugee assistance); up
to $3 million per year for broadcasting into the country; $2 million per year in economic support funds for programs
promoting democracy, human rights, and governance; and $5 million in Economic Support Funds to promote human
rights, address needs of North Korean refugees, improve accountability of humanitarian assistance inside the country,
improve the flow of information into and out of the country, and promote a peaceful reunification of the peninsula
under a democratic government. Section 107 of the 2004 Act also established the position of Special Envoy on North
Korean Human Rights Issues, to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate (22
U.S.C. 7817). The North Korea Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-198; 132 Stat. 1519)
consolidated these programs and their authorizations in the 2004 Act and repealed the authorization of appropriations
for $10 million through FY2021 stated at Section 403 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of
2016 (formerly at 22 U.S.C. 9253).
43 Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 (Division D of Title VI of P.L. 108-199; 22 U.S.C. 7701 et seq.); Millennium
Challenge Corporation, “Millennium Challenge Corporation Candidate Country Report for Fiscal Year 2023,” Notice
of September 1, 2022; 87 F.R. 54716.
44 Sections 116 and 502B of P.L. 87-195 (22 U.S.C. 2151n and 2304, respectively), as amended.
45 P.L. 105-292 (22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq.). Department of State. Most recently, “Secretary of State’s Determination
Under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 and Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of
2016,” Public Notice 11943; 87 F.R. 80247; November 30, 2022.
46 P.L. 106-386 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.). Department of State. Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2022, pp. 326-328.
Presidential Determination No. 2023-02 of October 14, 2022, “Presidential Determination With Respect to Efforts of
Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons,” 87 F.R. 64361.
47 Section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of P.L. 106-386; Presidential Determination No. 2011-15 of September 10, 2010 (75 F.R.
67017).
48 Section 8049 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023 (Division C of P.L. 117-328).
49 Section 2(b)(2) of P.L. 79-173 (12 U.S.C. 635(b)(2)), amended in 1986 to include this ban on funding to Marxist-
Leninist states.
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The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 denies most nonhumanitarian foreign assistance to any
Communist country. North Korea is among five countries so designated, though the law is not
limited to those countries named.50
Several laws deny benefits or assistance to Communist countries, but do not explicitly name any
particular state. Because North Korea has been denied such benefits or aid in the course of the
events of the early 1950s and thereafter, these other sections of law would probably be redundant
if applied to or cited for North Korea.
In some instances, the President may determine that, for purposes of a particular law, North Korea
is no longer a “Marxist-Leninist state.” If, however, all other aspects of the U.S.-North Korea
relationship were to improve, it would probably be necessary for Congress to remove North
Korea from the list set out in the Export-Import Bank Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
or necessary for the President to exercise waiver authority made available to his office under
those acts, to make these other laws inapplicable to North Korea.51
Arms Sales and Arms Transfers
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), administered by the Department of
State, begins “It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals for exports
and imports of defense articles and defense services, destined for or originating in certain
countries.” Reasons include requirements of the U.N. Security Council, terrorism, and policies
that include arms embargoes and sanctions. Countries broadly restricted for arms trade include
Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.52
The first ITAR was issued on August 26, 1955; North Korea has been listed as a restricted
country from the ITAR’s inception. North Korea is also restricted under ITAR as the United
States denies North Korea conventional arms to comply with U.N. Security Council
requirements.53
Importing of defense articles and defense services is similarly restricted by the Department of
Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the regulations of which state the
following:

50 Section 620(f) of P.L. 87-195 (22 U.S.C. 2370(f)). Consider also subsection (h) of that section, which requires the
President to “adopt regulations and establish procedures to insure that United States foreign aid is not used in a manner
which, contrary to the best interests of the United States, promotes or assists the foreign aid projects or activities of any
country that is a Communist country for purposes of subsection (f).”
51 For example: Section 620(h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2370(h)), Sections
502(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A) of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2462(b)(2)(A)), and Section 43 of the
Bretton Woods Agreements Act (P.L. 79-171; 22 U.S.C. 286aa), the latter of which requires the U.S. Executive
Directors to the International Monetary Fund “to actively oppose any facility involving use of Fund credit by any
Communist dictatorship.... ”
52 22 C.F.R. Part 126.1(a) and (d), authorized pursuant to Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22
U.S.C. 2778).
53 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006), October 14, 2006 (U.N. document S/Res/1718 (2006)); U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1874 (2009), June 12, 2009 (U.N. document S/Res/1874 (2009)).
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It is the policy of the United States to deny licenses and other approvals with respect to
defense articles and defense services originating in certain countries or areas. This policy
applies to Afghanistan, Belarus (one of the states composing the former Soviet Union),
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mongolia, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam. This policy
applies to countries or areas with respect to which the United States maintains an arms
embargo (e.g., Burma, China, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia,
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and UNITA (Angola)). It also applies when an import would not
be in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States.54
Again, the President has the authority to change these regulations by removing North Korea from
the list of restricted countries.
Access to Assets
Declaration of National Emergency55
On June 26, 2008, when the Six Party Talks appeared to be making progress, President Bush
determined it was no longer in the national interest to continue certain restrictions imposed on
trade and transactions with North Korea, in place since 1950.56 At the same time, however, he
found that57
… the current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on
the Korean Peninsula constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal
with that threat. I further find that, as we deal with that threat through multilateral
diplomacy, it is necessary to continue certain restrictions with respect to North Korea that
would otherwise be lifted pursuant to a forthcoming proclamation that will terminate the
exercise of authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act…. Accordingly, I hereby
order… the following are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn,
or otherwise dealt in:

54 27 C.F.R. Part 447.52(a), also authorized under Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act; and President Barack
Obama, “Administration of Reformed Export Controls,” Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013, 78 F.R. 16129.
55 For background on the use of national emergency and international economic emergency authorities, see CRS Report
R45618, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use, coordinated by Christopher
A. Casey.
56 The President. “Termination of the Exercise of Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act With Respect to
North Korea,” Proclamation 8271 (June 26, 2008; 73 F.R. 36785). On December 16, 1950, President Truman invoked
authority granted his office under the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) to declare that a U.S. national emergency
existed because of the outbreak of the Korean War (and events elsewhere, as “world conquest by communist
imperialism is a goal of the forces of aggression that have been loosed upon the world”) (Proclamation 2914; 15 F.R.
9029). A few days later, the Department of the Treasury issued Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR; 31 C.F.R.
Part 500; 15 F.R. 9040, December 19, 1950, and subsequently amended) to forbid any financial transactions involving,
or on behalf of, North Korea and China, including transactions related to travel or the access to North Korean assets
that were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Korea-related FACR have been modified on numerous occasions to take into
consideration new circumstances (i.e., transactions relating to technology not in existence at the time the regulations
were issued) or to ease restrictions in response to changing conditions (i.e., signing of the Agreed Framework,
emerging reports of famine, North Korea’s announced moratorium on missile testing).
57 Executive Order 13466, “Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean
Nationals,” 73 F.R. 36787, June 26, 2008. 31 C.F.R. Part 510, November 4, 2010.
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• all property and interests in property of North Korea or a North Korean national that
… were blocked as of June 16, 2000,58 and remained blocked immediately prior to the
date of this order.
• United States persons may not register a vessel in North Korea, obtain authorization
for a vessel to fly the North Korean flag, or own, lease, operate, or insure any vessel
flagged by North Korea.
In a series of executive orders, the Presidents in succession have used the national emergency to
block access to assets of designated individuals and entities
• Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008 (President Bush; 73 F.R. 36787)—
continuing the block of assets that were blocked as of June 16, 2000;
• Executive Order 13551 of August 30, 2010 (President Obama; 75 F.R. 53837)—
blocking assets of Kim Yong Chol, and the entities Green Pine Associated
Corporation, Reconnaissance General Bureau, and Office 39;59
• Executive Order 13570 of April 18, 2011 (President Obama; 76 F.R. 22291)—to
prohibit the import of goods, services, or technology form North Korea;
• Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015 (President Obama; 81 F.R. 14943)—
blocking assets that come under U.S. jurisdiction of any agency, instrumentality,
or controlled entity of the North Korean government or the Workers’ Party of
Korea, or any official of those entities; those found to materially support
transactions with or act on behalf of those blocked entities;60
• Executive Order 13722 of March 15, 2016 (President Obama; 81 F.R. 14943)—
blocking property and interests in property that come under U.S. jurisdiction of
the Government of North Korea, the Workers’ Party of Korea, and designated
entities that operate in DPRK’s transportation, mining, energy, or financial
services sectors (or other sectors as designated). Designees include Kim Jong-
un;61 and
• Executive Order 13810 of September 20, 2017 (President Trump; 82 F.R.
44705)—blocking property and interests in property that come under U.S.
jurisdiction of designated persons and entities that operate in the DPRK’s

58 In 1999, President Clinton announced he would lift many restrictions on U.S. exports to and imports from North
Korea in areas other than those controlled for national security concerns; the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and
Transportation issued new regulations a year later, effective June 16, 2000, to implement the new policy.
59 OFAC may add to this list at any time. The Specially Designated Nationals list may be searched online at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (accessed May 2023).
60 OFAC, on January 2, 2015, designated three entities and 10 individuals under this executive order: Reconnaissance
General Bureau, Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, and Korea Tangun Trading Corporation; and Kil
Jong Hun, Kim Kwang Yon, Jang Song Chol, Yu Kwang Ho, Kim Yong Chol, Jang Yong Son, Kim Kyu, Ryu Jin,
Kang Ryong, Kim Kwang Chun—all officers of either the government or the sanctioned entities. Department of the
Treasury. “Treasury Imposes Sanctions Against the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” press
release, January 2, 2015, Department of the Treasury Notice, 80 F.R. 13667, March 16, 2015. Treasury designated an
additional four individuals—Sok Chol Kim, Kwang Hyok Kim, Chong Chol Ri, and Su Man Hwang—and one entity—
EKO Development and Investment Company—effective November 13, 2015. Department of the Treasury Notice,
November 18, 2015, 80 F.R. 72147.
61 Pursuant to Executive Order 13722, OFAC has designated a number of entities, vessels, aircraft, and individuals,
including Kim Jong-un, chairman of the Korea Workers’ Party and leader of the country, national banks, shipping and
trading companies, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of People’s Security Correctional Bureau, and others.
According to OFAC archives, Kim was specifically named as a designee on July 6, 2016. His designation, however, is
first stated in a “Notice of OFAC Sanctions Actions” at 83 F.R. 51047-51068, October 10, 2018, in which 462 persons
were designated as subject to North Korea sanctions.
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“construction, energy, financial services, fishing, information technology,
manufacturing, medical, mining, textiles, or transportation industries”; persons
who own, control, or operate any of North Korea’s sea-, land-, or airports; or
those who generate income for the government or Workers’ Party.
Generally, the President has the authority to change regulations, as long as those changes meet the
requirements of any relevant law. He must also annually revisit his declaration of a state of
national emergency; it expires if the President does not renew it. He could allow the declaration
to expire, or he could lift it at any time. And Congress could terminate a declaration of national
emergency by passing a joint resolution under terms of the National Emergencies Act.
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
On June 28, 2005, President George W. Bush expanded the authority granted his office to address
the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—authority first exercised by
President George H. W. Bush in 1990—to freeze assets and property of those engaged in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 41st President had declared that the United
States faced a national emergency relating to weapons proliferation (in the absence, at the time, of
a reauthorized Export Administration Act), and thus took steps in 1990 to control the exports of
certain goods and services, and authorized a ban on foreign aid and credit, procurement contracts,
imports and exports, support in international financial institutions, and landing rights.62 Fifteen
years later, the 43rd President’s executive order took additional steps to block property and assets
under U.S. jurisdiction of any person found, in part
... to have engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially
contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such
weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport,
transfer or use such items, by any person or foreign country of proliferation concern;
... to have provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, technological or other
support for, or goods or services in support of, any activity or transaction described [above]
... or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order
...63
At its outset, Executive Order 13382 identified eight foreign entities as contributors to
proliferation, of which three were North Korean. The Office of Foreign Assets Control
subsequently added North Korean entities and individuals to this restricted list; of the 833 entities
and individuals designated as weapons proliferators, 46 are cited as located in the DPRK.64

62 Executive Order 12735 of November 16, 1990. On the same day, the President announced his intention to pocket
veto H.R. 4653—the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990—with which Congress intended to reauthorize the
then-expired Export Administration Act of 1979. In his announcement, President Bush stated his intentions to curtail
significantly trade in goods and services that lent themselves to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. See
“Memorandum of Disapproval for the Omnibus Export Amendments Act of 1990,” Public Papers of the President,
November 16, 1990. 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1839. E.O. 12735 was subsequently overhauled by President Clinton
with the issuance of Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994; 59 F.R. 59099; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note). The national
emergency therein is renewed annually. President Trump issued further administrative updates to the use of sanctions
in U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly in instances where chemical or biological weapons determinations are
made, with Executive Order 13883 of August 1, 2019 (84 F.R. 38113 22 U.S.C. 5605 note).
63 Executive Order 13382, Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters
(June 28, 2005; 70 F.R. 38567).
64 See Department of the Treasury. Office of Foreign Assets Control. “Nonproliferation: What You Need to Know
About Treasury Restrictions.” Information Bulletin, most recently updated September 19, 2012,
(continued...)
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Counterfeiting and Money-Laundering
Banco Delta Asia
On September 12, 2005, the Department of the Treasury found that Banco Delta Asia—a Macau-
based bank in which North Korea had holdings of more than $ U.S. 50 million—was a “financial
institution of primary money laundering concern.”65 The Department of the Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Center (FinCEN) found that North Korea may reap as much as $500 million
annually from counterfeiting, and another $100 million to $200 million annually from narcotics
trafficking. The finding authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require “special measures”66
on the part of U.S. financial institutions and financial agencies that involve increased record
keeping and reporting on Banco Delta Asia’s transactions. Treasury issued a final rule, effective
April 18, 2007, to impose the most stringent fifth special measure—to prohibit certain bank
transactions—and issued regulations to implement the rule.67 The finding and initial proposed
rulemaking had a chilling effect on Banco Delta Asia’s international business relations.
Department of the Treasury officials testified that
some two dozen financial institutions across the globe have voluntarily cut back or
terminated their business with North Korea, notably including institutions in China, Japan,
Vietnam, Mongolia, and Singapore. The result of these voluntary actions is that it is
becoming very difficult for the Kim Jong-Il regime to benefit from its criminal conduct.68
North Korea’s funds held in Banco Delta Asia were released in 2007.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/8581/download?inline (accessed May 2023). See also testimony of Robert W. Werner,
Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury, before the House Committee on
Financial Services, February 16, 2006.
On January 9, 2007, the Department of the Treasury announced that it had designated Bank Sepah, a state-owned
Iranian financial institution, as an entity materially contributing to Iran’s proliferation activities. Bank Sepah,
coincidentally, according to Treasury, is credited with transferring more than $500,000 for an associate of the Korean
Mining Development Corporation. That entity was cited on December 28, 2006, under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, for exporting missile technology to Iran. Department of the Treasury. Press release.
Iran’s Bank Sepah Designated by Treasury: Sepah Facilitating Iran’s Weapons Program. January 9, 2007. HP-219;
Weisman, Steven. “U.S. Prohibits All Transactions with a Major Iranian Bank,” The New York Times. January 10,
2007. p. 3. Korean Mining Development Corporation is cited multiple times under Executive Order 13882.
65 Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5318A, as enacted by the USA PATRIOT Act (Section 311 of P.L. 107-56; 115 Stat. 298).
Effective September 12, 2005, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network issued a
finding (70 F.R. 55214) and a notice of proposed rulemaking (to amend 31 C.F.R. Part 103; 70 F.R. 55217).
Documentation on the use of this authority may be found at https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/terrorism-and-
illicit-finance/311-actions (accessed May 2023).
66 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b) defines “special measures” as (1) record keeping and reporting of certain financial transactions;
(2) collection of information relating to beneficial ownership; (3) collection of information relating to certain payable-
through accounts; (4) collection of information relating to certain correspondent accounts; and (5) prohibitions or
conditions on opening or maintaining in the United States correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts.
67 U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations—Imposition of Special Measure Against Banco Delta Asia, Including Its Subsidiaries Delta Asia Credit
Limited and Delta Asia Insurance Limited, as a Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,” Final
Rule, 31 C.F.R. Part 103 (72 F.R. 12730).
68 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs hearings, September 12, 2006, testimony of Treasury
Deputy Under Secretary Daniel Glaser. Congressional Quarterly.
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Access to the U.S. Financial System
Money Laundering Concern Determined in 2016
Congress called on the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
Attorney General, to determine not later than mid-August 2016 “whether reasonable grounds
exist for concluding that North Korea is a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern.”69
On May 27, 2016, Treasury’s Acting Director of FinCEN found that such reasonable grounds
exist. In December 2016, FinCEN finalized a rule that prohibits U.S. banks from providing U.S.
correspondent accounts to third-country banks to process transactions for North Korean financial
institutions.70 The Department of the Treasury, on announcing the finding, noted the following:
While current U.S. law already generally prohibits U.S. financial institutions from
engaging in both direct and indirect transactions with North Korean financial institutions,
this NPRM [notice of proposed rulemaking], if finalized, would require U.S. financial
institutions to implement additional due diligence measures in order to prevent North
Korean banking institutions from gaining improper indirect access to U.S. correspondent
accounts. While North Korea’s financial institutions do not maintain correspondent
accounts with U.S. financial institutions, North Korean financial institutions frequently
conduct transactions on behalf of the North Korean government and state-controlled
corporations. The NPRM, if finalized, would prohibit the use of third-country banks’ U.S.
correspondent accounts to process transactions for North Korean financial institutions.71
Other Actions Related to Money Laundering
Executive Order 13551 also addresses money laundering and counterfeiting as one of North
Korea’s many objectionable behaviors to be deterred. The order requires the access to property
and interests in property be blocked for any individual or entity identified by the Secretary of the
Treasury to have, directly or indirectly72
• imported, exported, or reexported to, into, or from North Korea any arms or
related materiel;
• provided training, advice, or other services or assistance, or engaged in financial
transactions, related to the manufacture, maintenance, or use of any arms or
related materiel to be imported, exported, or reexported to, into, or from North
Korea, or following their importation, exportation, or reexportation to, into, or
from North Korea;
• imported, exported, or reexported luxury goods to or into North Korea;

69 Section 201(c), North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122; 22 U.S.C. 9221(c)).
70 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). “Finding That the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea Is a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern,” Notice of finding, 81 F.R.
35441; June 2, 2016. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. “Imposition of a
Special Measure Against North Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern,” Notice of proposed
rulemaking, 81 F.R. 35665; June 3, 2016. Final rule entered into effect December 9, 2016; 81 F.R. 78715. FinCEN
opened a review of the 2016 final rule on North Korea as a money laundering jurisdiction in late 2022, with an eye
toward its continuation or renewal; see 87 F.R. 66776, November 4, 2022.
71 U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Treasury Takes Action to Further Restrict North Korea’s Access to the U.S.
Financial System,” June 1, 2016, press release.
72 Executive Order 13551, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to North Korea,” 75 F.R. 53837,
September 1, 2010.
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• engaged in money laundering, the counterfeiting of goods or currency, bulk cash
smuggling, narcotics trafficking, or other illicit economic activity that involves or
supports the Government of North Korea or any senior official thereof;
• materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological
support for, or goods or services to or in support of, prohibited activities or any
person whose property and interests in property are blocked; or
• be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf
of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked.
Targeting Foreign Financial Institutions
In September 2017, President Trump authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to “prohibit the
opening and impose strict conditions on the maintenance of correspondent accounts or payable-
through accounts in the United States” of any foreign financial institution found to have
“conducted or facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of any person” already designated
for U.S. sanctions, or to have conducted or facilitated such a transaction related to trade with
North Korea. In addition, the U.S.-based assets of any foreign financial institution found to
engage in such transactions are to be blocked.
Sanctions Required by the United Nations
U.N. Security Council Resolutions—10 have been adopted between 2006 and September 2017—
that form the requirements of the U.N. member states often incrementally clarify, expand on,
enhance, or strengthen the previous U.N. actions. Resolutions, however, are not revoked until the
problem at hand is resolved, nor are they amended (with a few exceptions).
U.N. Security Council resolutions also establish considerable opportunity for member states to
appeal to the Sanctions Committee—established to implement the DPRK resolutions with
representatives from each of the 15 Security Council states—for an exception prior to executing a
transaction. Overall, the Security Council has sought to protect DPRK’s civilian population from
the consequences of economic sanctions. UNSCR 2371 (2017), agreed to in August 2017, for
example, provides the following:
[The United Nations Security Council] Reaffirms that the measures imposed by
resolutions 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321
(2016), 2356 (2017), and this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian
consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK or to affect negatively or restrict
those activities, including economic activities and cooperation, food aid and humanitarian
assistance, that are not prohibited by resolutions ... , and the work of international and non-
governmental organizations carrying out assistance and relief activities in the DPRK for
the benefit of the civilian population of the DPRK and decides that the Committee may, on
a case-by-case basis, exempt any activity from the measures imposed by these resolutions
if the committee determines that such an exemption is necessary to facilitate the work of
such organizations in the DPRK or for any other purpose consistent with the objectives of
these resolutions, and further decides that the measures specified in paragraph 8 (d) of
resolution 1718 (2006) shall not apply with respect to financial transactions with the DPRK
Foreign Trade Bank or the Korea National Insurance Corporation if such transactions are
solely for the operation of diplomatic or consular missions in the DPRK or humanitarian
assistance activities that are undertaken by, or in coordination with, the United Nations....
Similar language to exempt humanitarian activities is provided in each resolution, and such
exemptions are stated throughout each resolution but tailored to particular kinds of transactions.
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The Sanctions Committee of the Security Council may designate entities, individuals, vessels,
and aircraft to be subject to economic sanctions at any time. In addition, beginning in 2013, the
Security Council added annexes to resolutions to name designees, as well as to make the ban on
exporting luxury goods to DPRK more explicit, and to define goods and services with military
applications that are also subject to an export prohibition.
The United Nations requires its member states to restrict trade and engagement with North Korea
as follows:
Table 1. U.N. Security Council Sanctions Requirements for North Korea Activities
Based on S/Res/1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2012), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356
(2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017), and 2397 (2017)
Targeted Activities
Measures To Be Taken By U.N. Member States
Arms and related materiel
Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK, through
their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft,
and whether or not originating in their territories, of all arms and related
materiel, including small arms and light weapons and their related materiel, a
ban on related financial transactions, technical training including hosting of
trainers, advisors, or other officials for the purpose of military-, paramilitary-,
or police related training, services or assistance related to manufacture,
maintenance or use, and with respect to the shipment of items to or from
the DPRK for repair, servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering and
marketing.
Prevent the supply, sale, or transfer of any item, even if not covered by the
arms embargo, if such an item could directly contribute to the development
of the DPRK’s operational capabilities of its armed forces, or to exports that
support/enhance the capabilities of armed forces of another Member State
outside the DPRK.
Exemptions: “[A]ctivity is exclusively for humanitarian purposes or exclusively
for livelihood purposes which wil not be used by DPRK individuals or entities
to generate revenue, and also not related to any activity prohibited” by any of
the relevant UNSC resolutions; or the “[Sanctions] Committee has
determined on a case-by-case basis that a particular supply, sale, or transfer
would not be contrary to the objectives of” any of the relevant UNSC
resolutions.
Arms and related materiel related
Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of items relevant to
to proliferation
nuclear, ballistic missiles, and other weapons of mass destruction-related
programs.
List of restricted items: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/
prohibited-items (accessed June 2022).
Prevent trade in any item that a Member State determines could contribute
to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile programs, other weapons of mass
destruction programs, or other prohibited activities.
No exemptions.
Proliferation networks
Expel DPRK diplomats, government representatives, other DPRK nationals
acting in a governmental or representative office capacity, and foreign
nationals that are working on behalf or at the direction of a designated
person and/or entity or of a person and/or entity assisting in sanctions
evasions or violating the resolutions.
Exemptions: Presence is required to fulfil U.N. business; a judicial process;
medical, safety, or other humanitarian purposes; or case-by-case
determination “that the expulsion of the individual would be contrary to the
objectives of” the relevant UNSC resolutions.
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Targeted Activities
Measures To Be Taken By U.N. Member States
Diplomatic services
Close representative offices of designated persons and entities, as well as on
any persons or entities acting on behalf of such designated persons or
entities, as well as prohibit them from participating in joint ventures and any
other business arrangements.
Reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts
and restrict the entry into or transit through territory of DPRK government
members, officials, DPRK armed forces, or members/officials which are
associated with prohibited programmes or activities.
Limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission and
consular post, and one per accredited DPRK diplomat and consular officer.
Prohibit the DPRK from using real property (owned or leased) in their
territory for non-diplomatic or -consular activities purposes.
Transportation, flagged vessels,
Inspect cargo destined to or originating from the DPRK or brokered by the
ports, aircraft
DPRK that is within or transiting their territories, including cargo on DPRK
flagged aircraft or vessels, carried by rail or road, as well as personal luggage.
Prohibit leasing or chartering flagged vessels, aircraft or providing crew
services to the DPRK, designated persons and entities, or any persons or
entities whom the Member State determines have assisted in sanctions
evasions or in violation of the resolutions.
Prohibit procuring vessel and aircraft services from the DPRK.
Deregister any vessel that is owned, operated or crewed by the DPRK;
refuse to register any such vessel that is deregistered by another Member
State.
Deregister any vessels for which there are reasonable grounds to believe are
involved in prohibited activities or transporting prohibited items. Do not
register any vessel that has been deregistered by another Member State. Do
not provide insurance or reinsurance for such vessels.
Prohibit one’s nationals, entities, and persons from registering vessels in the
DPRK or to obtain authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK flag. Prohibit
any DPRK-flagged vessel from owning, leasing, operating, or providing vessel
classification, certification, associated service, and insurance under a Member
State’s authority.
Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly one’s
territory if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contained
prohibited items.
Deny port entry if there are reasonable grounds that a vessel is owned,
control ed, directly or indirectly, by a designated individual and/or entity.
Inspect vessels on the high seas if there are reasonable grounds to believe its
cargo is prohibited. All States are required to cooperate with inspections.
Seize, inspect, and impound any vessel for which there are reasonable
grounds to believe its cargo is prohibited.
Prohibit ship-to-ship transfers of any goods supplied, sold, or transferred to
or from the DPRK.
Sanctions Committee may designate specific vessels for restrictions.
Exemptions: In limited instances, case-by-case basis, it is determined that
“information demonstrating that such activities are exclusively for livelihood
purposes which wil not be used by DPRK individuals or entities to generate
revenue” and sensitive information is removed.
Further exemptions: In limited instances, emergency purposes.
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Targeted Activities
Measures To Be Taken By U.N. Member States
Bunkering services
Prohibit providing fuel, supplies, other bunkering servicing to DPRK vessels if
reasonable grounds and information exist that they are carrying prohibited
items.
Exemptions: Humanitarian purposes, or inspection is completed and it is
determined cargo constitutes “legal economic activities.”
Travel
Prevent entry into or transit through one’s territories of designated
individuals; individuals acting on behalf of or at the direction of designated
individuals; any individual whom a State determines is assisting in the evasion
of sanctions, violating the provisions of the resolutions, working on behalf/at
the direction of designated individuals; and individuals traveling for the
purposes of carrying out activities related to the shipment of items for repair,
servicing, refurbishing, testing, reverse-engineering, and marketing.
Exemptions: Travel is for humanitarian need, to meet religious obligations, or
would further the objectives of relevant UNSC resolutions; or presence is
required to fulfil a judicial process; medical, safety, or fulfil U.N.
commitments.
Assets
Freeze assets, funds, and economic resources of entities of the Government
of the DPRK and Korean Workers’ Party, that a Member State determines
are associated with prohibited activities, including designated persons and
entities, as well as any persons or entities acting on behalf of or at their
direction, or those owned or control ed by them. “Assets include tangible,
intangible, movable, immovable, actual or potential, which may be used to
obtain funds, goods or services, such as vessels, including maritime vessels.”
Sanctions Committee may designate vessels to be frozen. Vessels control ed
or operated by Offshore Marine Management (OMM) are explicitly subject to
freeze.
Exemptions: To meet basic expenses (food, rent, medicine, taxes, insurance,
utilities, legal and banking fees); extraordinary expenses as identified by the
Sanctions Committee; and satisfying a lien judgment; assets applied to DPRK’s
participation in U.N.; or case-by-case determinations relating to the costs of
delivering humanitarian assistance, or denuclearization.
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

Targeted Activities
Measures To Be Taken By U.N. Member States
Other finances
Prevent providing financial services, including bulk cash and gold, the opening
of banking subsidiaries, public financial support, new commitments for grants,
and financial assistance or concessional loans that could contribute to the
DPRK’s prohibited programs/activities, or to the evasion of sanctions.
Prohibit opening of new branches, subsidiaries, and representative offices of
DPRK banks; close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices;
and terminate joint ventures, ownership interests or correspondent banking
relationships with DPRK banks.
Prohibit opening new representative offices, subsidiaries, or bank accounts in
the DPRK. Close existing offices, subsidiaries and banking accounts in the
DPRK if there are reasonable grounds that it could contribute to DPRK’s
prohibited programs.
Prohibit public and private financial support for trade with the DPRK,
including granting of export credits, guarantees, or insurance to one’s
nationals, or entities involved in such trade.
Prohibit the opening, maintenance, and operation of all joint ventures or
cooperative entities, new or existing, with DPRK entities or individuals.
Close any existing joint venture or cooperative entity within 120 days of
September 11, 2017, unless approved by the committee on a case-by-case
basis.
Exemptions: Humanitarian and developmental purposes “directly addressing
the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization”;
activities under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; or wind-
down costs of closing branches.
Further exemptions: Does not apply to existing China-DPRK hydroelectric
power infrastructure projects or the Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail
project, intended solely to transport Russia-origin coal.
Specialized teaching and training;
Prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK nationals of disciplines which
scientific and technical cooperation could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and
development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including teaching of
advanced physics, advanced computer simulation and related computer
sciences, geospatial navigation, nuclear engineering, aerospace engineering,
aeronautical engineering, and related disciplines.
Suspend scientific and technical cooperation involving persons or groups
officially sponsored by or representing the DPRK except for medical
exchanges.
Exemptions: Determined on a case-by-case basis by the committee (fields of
nuclear science and technology, aerospace and aeronautical engineering and
technology, advanced manufacturing production techniques and methods);
and determined by the engaging State and notified to the committee in
advance of such determination (all other scientific or technical cooperation).
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

Targeted Activities
Measures To Be Taken By U.N. Member States
Coal, minerals, seafood, textiles,
Prohibit the DPRK from supplying, selling, transferring, directly or indirectly,
statues, new helicopters, and other of coal, iron and iron ore, gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, copper, nickel,
sectors ban
silver, zinc, and rare earth minerals, lead and lead ore, food and agricultural

products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including
magnesite and magnesia, wood and vessels.
Prohibit procuring such material from the DPRK, by their nationals, or by
using their flag vessels or aircraft, whether or not originating in the territory
of the DPRK.
Prohibit the supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of all industrial machinery,
transportation vehicles, iron, steel, and other metals.
Prohibit export of seafood from DPRK.
Prohibit export of textiles from DPRK.
Prohibit the supply, sale, or transfer of DPRK statuary.
Prohibit the supply, sale, or transfer to DPRK of new helicopters, and new or
used vessels.
Exemptions: Only applicable to iron and iron ore: contracts had 30 days to be
completed (from August 5, 2017); coal transit through the port of Rajin
(Rason) requires prenotification to Sanctions Committee.
Further exemption: Spare parts needed to maintain the safe operation of DPRK
commercial civilian passenger aircraft. Case-by-case determinations by the
Sanctions Committee for trade in vessels.
Exemption for seafood: Case-by-case approval by Sanctions Committee of
seafood contracts completion within 45 days of August 5, 2017.
Exemption for textiles: Case-by-case approval by Sanctions Committee of
textile contracts completion within 135 days of September 11, 2017.
Fuel ban
Prohibit selling or supplying aviation fuel, jet fuel, rocket fuel, condensates,
and natural gas liquids to the DPRK.
Prohibit the supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of all refined petroleum
products in excess of the aggregate amount of 500,000 barrels during periods
of 12 months beginning on January 1, 2018.
Prohibit the supply, sale, or transfer of crude oil that exceeds the aggregate
amounts of 4 mil ion barrels or 525,000 tons per 12-month periods from
December 22, 2017. Member States are required to report the amount of
crude oil provided to the DPRK to the 1718 Committee every 90 days.
Exemptions: Case-by-case basis determination of “verified essential
humanitarian needs”; and civilian passenger aircraft outside DPRK for round-
trip flights to/from DPRK.
Exemption for crude oil: Case-by-case basis determination of crude oil
shipments “which is exclusively for livelihood purposes of DPRK nationals.”
Exemption for refined petroleum products: Case-by-case basis determination of
refined petroleum products shipments are “exclusively for livelihood
purposes of DPRK nationals.”
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

Targeted Activities
Measures To Be Taken By U.N. Member States
Exported labor
Prohibit providing work authorizations for DPRK nationals.
Repatriate to the DPRK all DPRK nationals earning income in their
jurisdiction and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés within 24
months from December 22, 2017.
Exemption: Case-by-case determinations for delivery of humanitarian
assistance, denuclearization, or other services related to the objectives of
UNSC resolutions.
Further exemption: Does not apply to contracts already finalized.
Exemption relating to repatriation: Member state may take into account
international law, including laws relating to refugees and international human
rights, when considering repatriation.
Luxury goods ban
Prevent direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of luxury
goods, including those items listed in Annex IV of resolution 2094 (2013),
Annex IV of resolution 2270 (2016), and Annex IV of resolution 2321 (2016).
No exemptions.
Source: U.N. Security Council 1718 Committee: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718 (accessed
June 2022). CRS edited for length.
The U.N. Sanctions Committee, originally established by UNSC Resolution 1718 (2006) and
comprising representatives of each of the 15 states serving on the Security Council, as of mid-
2022, has designated 75 North Korean entities, 80 individuals, and 59 vessels for sanctions that
target their foreign-based assets, freedom to enter into trade and contracts, and ability to travel, as
required in the various resolutions. Designees appear to span a range of activities, including trade
and development related to missiles, satellites, aerospace, munitions, energy, mining, space
technology, shipping, and electronics. Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009), the U.N. Secretary-
General established a Panel of Experts, with a maximum of seven experts, to analyze reports and
make recommendations regarding implementation of UNSC Resolutions against North Korea.73
Veto in the Security Council
On May 26, 2022, after weeks of negotiating with other Security Council members, U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield called for a vote on a resolution to
condemn North Korea’s 2022 missile launches, including the March 24 ICBM test. North Korea’s
missile tests are in violation of UNSC Resolution 2397 (2017), in which the Security Council
affirmed that it would
take further significant measures in the event of a further DPRK nuclear test or launch, and
decides that, if the DPRK conducts a further nuclear test or a launch of a ballistic missile
system capable of reaching intercontinental ranges or contributing to the development of a
ballistic missile system capable of such ranges, then the Security Council will take action
to restrict further the export to the DPRK of petroleum.... 74
From the outset of negotiations, China and Russia—Permanent-Five member states with veto
power—did not support the resolution; they ultimately vetoed the measure by a vote of 13-2.75

73 Full texts of the panel of experts reports can be found at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/annual-
reports (accessed May 2023). To date, the panel has filed 16 annual reports; most recently, the panel filed a summary of
its activities covering 2022 on December 31, 2022.
74 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2397 (2017), paragraph 28, p. 7/11, December 22, 2017.
75 United Nations. “Non-proliferation/Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—Security Council, 9048th Meeting,”
May 26, 2022; United States Mission to the United Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield at
the UN Security Council Stakeout Following a Vote on a U.S-Drafted Resolution on the DPRK,” May 26, 2022.
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

The resolution sought to extend prohibitions on missile launches to apply also to cruise missiles
“or any other delivery system capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” It would have, among
other things, lowered the volume of oil North Korea is allowed to import (a “livelihood cap”
established to minimize the punitive impact of energy-sector sanctions on the civilian
population), banned trade in tobacco, clarified procedures for exempting trade on humanitarian
grounds, and addressed cyber attacks—including “malicious information and communication
technology” activities—that have included attacks for monetary gain as well as for maliciously
corrupting U.N. information systems.76
Some have speculated that the failed vote marks a turning point on coordinated and cooperative
efforts to bring North Korea closer to international norms. A spokesperson for China’s Foreign
Ministry, after the UNSC vote, intimated that further nuclear testing will not be followed by
China’s support for increased economic pressure.77
Under a new rule adopted in April 2022, the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) is tasked with
discussing any vote in the Security Council where any of the Permanent-Five member states
blocks passage of a resolution. The UNGA held this debate on June 8, 2022.78 The open
discussion affords observers a rare window into the arguments of proponents and opponents alike.
In brief, North Korea contended that its tests have been conducted in the safest manner and are a
matter of its right to self-defense. China noted that its opposition to the resolution was based on
the fact that no consensus was achieved over the weeks of negotiations. And Russia argued that
sanctions have worsened the humanitarian situation in North Korea and, at the same time, “have
failed to guarantee security on the Korean Peninsula.” The United States countered these points,
and particularly expressed concern that the “veto by China and the Russian Federation in the
Council has given the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea tacit approval as that country
finalizes preparations for a seventh nuclear test.”
Concluding Observations
The U.S. economic sanctions imposed on North Korea exemplify both the independent and
intertwined aspects of the relationship between the legislative and executive branches. Congress
defers the broadest power to the President, in the National Emergencies Act and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, to curtail trade and transactions between the United States and
North Korea. Congress authorizes the President to fine-tune the relationship with North Korea for
foreign policy and national security reasons with each waiver authority it incorporates into
legislation. At the same time, Congress closely influences the President’s choices by enacting
issue-driven legislation—addressing human rights matters or proliferation concerns, for
example—and by adopting North Korea-specific statutes—most particularly the
• North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-333),
• inclusion of North Korea into the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-178; as amended by the North Korea Nonproliferation Act
of 2006, P.L. 109-253),

76 Security Council Report. “DPRK (North Korea): Yesterday’s Vote on a Sanctions Resolution,” What’s In Blue, May
27, 2022.
77 Chung, Chaewon. “China Signals It Won’t Support New Sanctions if North Korea Tests Nuclear Weapon,” NK
News, June 2, 2022.
78 United Nations. General Assembly. “General Assembly Holds Landmark Debate on Security Council’s Veto of Draft
Text Aimed at Tightening Sanctions against Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” press release of June 8, 2022.
GA/12423.
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

• North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-346),
• North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122),
• Korean Interdiction and Modernization of Sanctions Act (Title III of the
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act; P.L. 115-44),
• North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-198),
• Asia Reassurance Initiative of 2018 (P.L. 115-409), and
• Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019
(Division F, Title LXXI, Sections 7101-7155, National Defense Authorization
Act for FY2020) (P.L. 116-92).
As Congress and the President consider proposals to reform foreign aid, streamline export
controls, fund defense and international programs, keep proliferation regimes relevant, assess and
enter into treaties and international agreements, and participate in multilateral fora, the
effectiveness of economic sanctions as a foreign policy and national security tool continues to be
a central consideration. U.S. policy toward North Korea, expressed both unilaterally and in the
United States’ position in multilateral fora, is further complicated by other matters—not the least
of which include relations with other states in the region, security responsibilities with South
Korea and Japan, trade with China, a determination to keep key stakeholders engaged in
nonproliferation efforts in both North Korea and elsewhere, and finding the means to balance all
U.S. foreign policy and national security interests in a meaningful way.

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Appendix A. North Korea—Economic Sanctions Currently Imposed in
Furtherance of U.S. Foreign Policy or National Security Objectives
Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Comprehensive foreign policy
Block assets, prohibit
Sec. 104, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
President
Mandatory designations in Sec.
reasons, including weapons
transactions
9214)
104(a) and (g); discretionary
proliferation, sanctions evasion,
Additional mandatory
designations in Sec. 104(b)
violation of UNSC resolutions,
designations for trading with
President may waive for 30
censorship, undermining
DPRK “significant quantities” of
days to 1 year for humanitarian
cybersecurity
coal, textiles, seafood, iron,
purposes.
iron ore (or services or
President may waive for 30
technology related to the
days to 1 year if it is important
above); or refined petroleum
to national security interests,
products or crude oil above
furthers the enforcement of
UNSC limits; facilitating
the act, or “is for an important
violation of UNSC sanctions
law enforcement purpose.”
requirements; facilitating use of
DPRK labor that benefits the
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
central government;
9251) authorizes President to
administering the use of or
suspend sanctions (other than
trade to DPRK of vessels; or
those required in sec. 104(g),
contributing to or participating
201B, and 201C) for up to one
in an act of bribery,
year, renewable in 180-day
misappropriation, theft, or
increments.
embezzlement that benefits a
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
DPRK official or the DPRK
9252) authorizes President to
government
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
CRS-29

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Comprehensive foreign policy
Prohibit indirect
Sec. 201A, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Related to Sec. 104
Related to Sec. 104
reasons
correspondent accounts with
9221a)
designations
designations
U.S. financial institutions
President may waive for 30
days to 1 year for humanitarian
purposes.
President may waive for 30
days to 1 year if it is important
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Comprehensive foreign policy
Block assets, and prohibit
Sec. 201B, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Secretary of the Treasury,
None stated; related to Sec.
reasons
payable-through and
9221b)
related to Sec. 104
104 designations
correspondent accounts, of
designations; required on or
Explicitly not waivable under
foreign financial institutions
after 120 days from enactment
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
found to have provided
of Otto Warmbier North
9251)
“significant financial services”
Korea Nuclear Sanctions and
to any designee under Sec.
Enforcement Act of 2019
104(a), (b), or (g)
(signed into law December 20,
2019)
CRS-30

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Comprehensive foreign policy
Prohibit any person or entity
Sec. 201C, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Secretary of the Treasury, in
Related to Sec. 104
reasons
outside the United States that
9221c)
consultation with the Secretary designations
is “owned or control ed by
of State; related to Sec. 104
Explicitly not waivable under
U.S. financial institutions” from
designations
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
engaging in any transaction
9251)
with the DPRK government or
any designee under Sec. 104(a),
(b), or (g)
Comprehensive foreign policy
Prohibits U.S. executive agency
Sec. 204, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Related to Sec. 104
Related to Sec. 104
reasons
from entering into
9224)
designations; Administrator of
designations
procurement contracts with
General Services
President may waive for 30
Sec. 104 designees
days to 1 year if it is important
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Comprehensive foreign policy
Vessel, aircraft, or conveyance
Sec. 205(d), NKSPEA (22
Related to Sec. 104
Related to Sec. 104
reasons
may be seized and forfeited
U.S.C. 9225)
designations, discretionary
designations
(pursuant to chapter 46 of 18
President may waive for 30
U.S.C. or part V, Title IV, Tariff
days to 1 year if it is important
Act of 1930)
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
CRS-31

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions for up to
one year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Comprehensive foreign policy
Deny entry into the U.S. to
Sec. 206, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Secretary of State, Secretary of
Related to Sec. 104
reasons
designated persons, corporate
9226)
Homeland Security,
designations
officers of designees, or
discretionary
President may waive for 30
principal shareholders of
days to 1 year for humanitarian
designees
purposes.
President may waive for 30
days to 1 year if it is important
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
CRS-32

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
General foreign policy reasons
Limits the export of goods or
Export Controls Act of 2018
Secretary of Commerce, in
President, Secretary of
services
(Title XVII, Subtitle B, Part I,
coordination with the
Commerce, generally
P.L. 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4811 et Secretaries of State and
seq.)
Defense, generally
[15 C.F.R. Part 730-774]
General foreign policy reasons
Limits proportionate share to
Sec. 307, Foreign Assistance
Statutory requirement
No waiver; exemption for
international organizations
Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22
certain IAEA programs
which, in turn, expend funds in
U.S.C. 2227)
North Korea
General foreign policy reasons
Prohibits bilateral assistance
Sec. 7007, Department of
Statutory requirement
No waiver
State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2023
(Division K, P.L. 117-328 )
General foreign policy reasons
Prohibits Economic Support
Sec. 7043(e), Department of
Statutory requirement
No waiver
Funds
State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2023
(Division K, P.L. 117-328)
General foreign policy reasons
Prohibits DOD funds
Sec. 8049, Department of
Statutory requirement
No waiver
Defense Appropriations, 2023
(Division C, P.L. 117-328)
Failure to comply with UNSC
Requires U.S. opposition in the
Sec. 73, Bretton Woods
Statutory requirement
President may waive for 180
sanctions
international financial
Agreements Act (22 U.S.C.
days, renewable, if he finds that
institutions of any foreign
286yy), as added by Otto
the target foreign government
government that fails to
Warmbier North Korea
lacks capacity to comply; is
comply with UNSC sanctions
Sanctions and Enforcement Act
taking “effective steps to
requirements
of 2019
prevent recurrence of such
failure”; or it is in the U.S.
national interest to waive the
opposition.
CRS-33

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Diplomatic relations severed
Prohibits most foreign aid and
Sec. 620(t), Foreign Assistance
Statutory requirement
No waiver
agricultural sales under P.L. 480 Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22
U.S.C. 2370(t))
National security controls,
Limits the export of goods or
Export Controls Act of 2018
President
President
Communism
services
(Title XVII, Subtitle B, Part I,
P.L. 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4811 et
seq.)
[15 C.F.R. Part 730-774]
Communism
Prohibits foreign aid
Sec. 620(f), Foreign Assistance
Statutory requirement
President
Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22
U.S.C. 2370(f))
Communism
Limits proportionate share to
Sec. 307, Foreign Assistance
Statutory requirement
No waiver; exemption for
international organizations
Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22
certain IAEA programs
which, in turn, expend funds in
U.S.C. 2227)
North Korea
Communism
Prohibits Export-Import Bank
Sec. 2(b)(2), Export-Import
Statutory requirement
President
funding to Marxist-Leninist
Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173;
states
12 U.S.C. 635(b)(2))
Communism
Prohibits support in the IFIs
Sec. 43, Bretton Woods
Statutory requirement
Secretary of the Treasury
Agreements Act (P.L. 79-171;
22 U.S.C. 286aa)
Communism
Denies favorable trade terms
Sec. 401, Trade Act of 1974
Statutory requirement
President
(19 U.S.C. 2431)
Nonmarket economy and
Denies favorable trade terms
Sec. 402, Trade Act of 1974
Statutory requirement
President
emigration
(19 U.S.C. 2432)
Nonmarket economy and
Denies favorable trade terms
Sec. 409, Trade Act of 1974
President
President
emigration
(19 U.S.C. 2439)
Communism and market
Denies favorable trade terms
Sec. 406, Trade Act of 1974
President
President
disruption
(19 U.S.C. 2436)
CRS-34

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Terrorism. Communism
Prohibits the acquisition of
Sec. 205, State Department
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
property in U.S. for diplomatic
Basic Authorities Act (P.L. 84-
mission
885; 22 U.S.C. 4305)
Cybersecurity
Blocks assets, prohibits
Sec. 209, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
President
President may waive for 30
transactions
9229)
days to 1 year if it is important
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Cybersecurity
Blocks assets, prohibits
Sec. 210, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
President
President
transactions
9230)
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
[related to Executive Order
9251) authorizes President to
13687 and EO 13694, as
suspend sanctions for up to
amended]
one year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
CRS-35

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Cybersecurity
Blocks assets, prohibits
Executive Order 13694 of
President
President
transactions
April 1, 2015, as amended by
EO 13757 of December 29,
2016
Human rights
Prohibit imports of goods
Sec. 302A, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Commissioner of U.S. Customs President may waive for 30
made by DPRK prison labor
9241a)
and Border Protection
days to 1 year if it is important
[related to Sec. 307, Tariff Act
to national security interests,
of 1930; 19 U.S.C. 1307]
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Human rights
Blocks assets, prohibitions
Sec. 302B, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
President
President may make exception
transactions
9241b)
for labor meeting international
[related to Sec. 302A,
standards.
NKSPEA]
President may waive for 30
days to 1 year if it is important
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions for up to
CRS-36

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
one year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Human rights (censorship)
Blocks assets, prohibits
Sec. 304, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
President, related to Sec. 104,
President
transactions
9243)
NKSPEA
President may waive for 30
[related to Sec. 302A,
days to 1 year if it is important
NKSPEA]
to national security interests,
furthers the enforcement of
the act, or “is for an important
law enforcement purpose.”
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Terrorism
Limits the export of goods and
Sec. 1754(c), Export Controls
Secretary of State
Secretary of State, after the
services
Act of 2018 (Title XVII,
President notifies Congress.
Subtitle B, Part I, P.L. 115-232;
50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.)
Terrorism
Prohibits licenses for arms
Sec. 38, Arms Export Control
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
exports/imports
Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C.
2778)
CRS-37

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
[22 C.F.R. Part 126.1; 27 C.F.R.
Part 447.52]
Terrorism
Prohibits transactions related
Sec. 40, Arms Export Control
Secretary of State
Secretary of State, after the
to defense articles and defense
Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C.
President notifies Congress.
services
2780)
President may waive on a case-
by-case basis.
Congress may block a
rescission by joint resolution.
Terrorism, failure to cooperate
Prohibits transactions related
Sec. 40A, Arms Export
President
President, at annual review, or
with U.S. efforts
to defense articles and defense
Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22
waived by the President if he
services
U.S.C. 2781)
finds it “important to the
national interests of the United
States.”
Terrorism
Prohibits most aid under the
Sec. 620A, Foreign Assistance
Secretary of State
Secretary of State, after the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195; 22
President notifies Congress.
Agricultural Trade
U.S.C. 2371)
President may waive if he finds
Development and Assistance
“that national security interests
Act of 1954, Peace Corps Act,
of humanitarian reasons justify
and Export-Import Bank Act of
a waiver.”
1945
Terrorism
Prohibits imports
Sec. 505, International Security
President
President
and Development Cooperation
Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83; 22
U.S.C. 2349aa-9)
Terrorism
Denies Export-Import Bank
Sec. 2(b)(1)(B), Export-Import
President
President
financing
Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173;
12 U.S.C. 635(b)(1)(B))
Terrorism
Opposes loans or funding
Sec. 1621, International
Secretary of the Treasury, if a
Secretary of the Treasury (no
through international financial
Financial Institutions Act (P.L.
country is listed under §6(j),
waiver authority)
institutions
95-118; 22 U.S.C. 262p-4q)
EAA, or §620A, FAA’61.
Terrorism
Opposes loans or funding
Sec. 6, Bretton Woods
Secretary of the Treasury, if a
Secretary of the Treasury (no
through the International
Agreements Act Amendments
country is listed under §6(j),
waiver authority)
Monetary Fund
EAA, or §620A, FAA’61.
CRS-38

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
of 1978 (P.L. 95-435; 22 U.S.C.
286e-11)
Terrorism
Prohibits bilateral assistance
Sec. 7021, Department of
Statutory requirement
No waiver
State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs
Appropriations, 2023 (Division
K, P.L. 117-328)
Terrorism
Limits export licensing for food Secs. 906, 908 Trade Sanctions
Statutory requirement
President, based on national
and medicine; prohibits
Reform Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-
security interests or
government financing for such
387; 22 U.S.C. 7205, 7207)
humanitarian reasons.
exports
Terrorism
Limits provision of services to
Sec. 40, State Department
Secretary of State
Secretary of State
security forces, law
Basic Authorities Act (P.L. 84-
enforcement, military,
885; 22 U.S.C. 2712)
intelligence community
Terrorism, excessive military
Prohibits the cancellation or
Sec. 501, Miscellaneous
Statutory requirement
President
expenditure, human rights
reduction of certain debt
Appropriations, 2000 (H.R.
violations
3425, enacted by reference in
P.L. 106-113; 22 U.S.C. 2395a
note)
National emergency,
Blocks assets of named
International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
proliferation of weapons of
proliferators of weapons of
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13382, June 28, 2005; 50 U.S.C.
mass destruction
mass destruction
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
1701 note]
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
National emergency
Prohibits imports, exports,
International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
transactions related to
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13466, June 26, 2008; 50 U.S.C.
transportation
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
1701 note]
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
[31 C.F.R. Part 510]
CRS-39

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
National emergency,
Blocks assets of, and
International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
proliferation of weapons of
transactions with or on behalf
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13551, August 30, 2010; 50
mass destruction, attack of the
of, named entities
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
U.S.C. 1701 note]
Cheonan, nuclear detonations,
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
[expands on the national
missile launches, violation of
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) emergency declared in E.O.
UNSCR resolutions,
13466]
counterfeiting of goods and
Sec. 5, United Nations
currency, money laundering,
Participation Act of 1945 (P.L.
smuggling, narcotics trafficking,
79-264; 22 U.S.C. 287c)
destabilizing the region
[31 C.F.R. Part 510]
National emergency, to ensure
“Except to the extent provided International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
implementation of import
in statutes or in licenses,
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13570, April 18, 2011; 50
restrictions agreed to in the
regulations, orders, or
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
U.S.C. 1701 note]
U.N. Security Council
directives that may be issued
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
[expands on the national
pursuant to this order…”
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) emergency declared in E.O.
prohibits “importation into the
13466]
United States, directly or
Sec. 5, United Nations
indirectly, of any goods,
Participation Act of 1945 (P.L.

services, or technology from
79-264; 22 U.S.C. 287c)
North Korea”
National emergency,
Prohibits transactions with and
International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
provocative, destabilizing, and
blocks assets of any entity of
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13687 of January 2, 2015; 50
repressive actions of DPRK,
the Government of North
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
U.S.C. 1701 note]
including cyber-related actions;
Korea or the Workers’ Party
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
[expands on the national
violation of UNSC resolutions;
of Korea
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) emergency declared in E.O.
human rights abuses
Immigration and Nationality
13466]
Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f))
National emergency, nuclear
Prohibits transactions with and
International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
weapons and missile programs
blocks assets of any entity of
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13722 of March 15, 2016; 50
the Government of North
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
U.S.C. 1701 note]
Korea or the Workers’ Party
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
[expands on the national
of Korea.
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) emergency declared in E.O.
Prohibits transactions with and
13466]
blocks assets of any person
found to engage in or facilitate
CRS-40

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
any of the fol owing activities
Sec. 5, United Nations
[“in view of UNSC Resolution
to the benefit of the
Participation Act of 1945 (P.L.
2270 of March 2, 2016”]
Government of North Korea
79-264; 22 U.S.C. 287c)
or the Workers’ Party of
North Korea Sanctions and
North Korea: (i) operate an
Policy Enhancement Act of
entity in North Korea’s
2016 (P.L. 114-122; 22 U.S.C.
transportation, mining, energy,
9201 et seq.)
or financial services sector; (i )
transactions related to metal,
Immigration and Nationality
graphite, coal, or software; (ii )
Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f))
human rights violations; (iv)

exporting of workers from
North Korea; (v) significant
activities undermining
cybersecurity; (vi) censorship;
(vii) materially supported a
blocked person or entity; (vii )
owned by a blocked person or
entity; and (ix) attempt to
engage in any of the above
restricted activities.
Prohibits all exportation from
the United States to North
Korea.
Prohibits new investment in
North Korea by a U.S. person.
Prohibits financing or
guarantee by a U.S. person for
a foreign person to engage in
any of the above-restricted
activities.
National emergency, nuclear
Authorizes the Treasury
International Emergency
President [Executive Order
President
weapons and missile programs
Secretary to designate for
Economic Powers Act (P.L. 95-
13810 of September 20, 2017;
sanctions anyone who
223; esp. at 50 U.S.C. 1702);
50 U.S.C. 1701 note]
• operates in “construction,
National Emergencies Act (P.L.
energy, financial services,
94-412; 50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)
CRS-41

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
fishing, information technology,
Sec. 5, United Nations
[expands on the national
manufacturing, medical, mining,
Participation Act of 1945 (P.L.
emergency declared in E.O.
textiles, or transportation
79-264; 22 U.S.C. 287c)
13466]
industries in North Korea”;
Immigration and Nationality
[“in view of UNSC Resolution
• owns or controls a DPRK
Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f))
2321 of November 30, 2016,
port—sea, air, or land;
UNSCR 2356 of June 2, 2017,
• Engages “in at least one
UNSCR 2371 of August 5,
significant importation from or
2017, and UNSCR 2375 of
exportation to North Korea”;
September 11, 2017”]
• Is a North Korean person;
• Is a North Korean person
who raises revenues for the
DPRK government or the
Workers’ Party;
• Evades sanctions.
Prohibits any aircraft or vessel
(that has any foreign
ownership) that has landed or
entered a port in the DPRK to
enter the U.S. within 180 days.
Ful y blocks any funds that
arrive in the U.S. that originate
from, are destined for, or pass
through, a foreign account that
is owned or control ed by a
DPRK person, or any account
that has been used to transfer
funds in which a DPRK person
has an interest.
Prohibits a US person from
facilitating in any way such a
transaction.
Targets foreign financial
institutions—those that
conduct transactions on behalf
CRS-42

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
of anyone designated for
sanctions, transactions related
to DPRK trade. Such
institutions are denied access
to the U.S. banking system (no
correspondent accounts or
payable-through accounts),
their U.S.-based assets and
property are blocked.
Proliferation of weapons of
Restricts export licenses,
Sec. 203, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
Department of Commerce,
Secretary of State, if in the
mass destruction: missiles
withholds foreign assistance
9223)
President, Secretary of State
national interest
Sec. 203(b)(2) imposes
restriction for 5 years
Sec. 401, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9251) authorizes President to
suspend sanctions (other than
those required in sec. 104(g),
201B, and 201C) for up to one
year, renewable in 180-day
increments.
Sec. 402, NKSPEA (22 U.S.C.
9252) authorizes President to
terminate sanctions if DPRK
dismantles its nuclear and
missile programs and resolves
human rights issues.
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits a range of
Sec. 73, Arms Export Control
President
President
mass destruction: missiles
transactions—U.S.
Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C.
Government contracts, export
2797b)
licenses, imports into United
States
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits foreign aid, military
Sec. 101, Arms Export Control President
President
mass destruction: nuclear
aid
Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C.
enrichment transfers
2799aa)
CRS-43

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits foreign aid (except
Sec. 102, Arms Export Control President
President
mass destruction: nuclear
humanitarian), military aid,
Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C.
reprocessing transfers, nuclear
USG defense sales and
2799aa-1)
detonations
transfers, export licenses for
USML goods and services, U.S.
Government-backed credits,
support in the international
banks, agricultural credits or
financing, U.S. commercial bank
financing, licenses for export of
certain goods and services
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits Export-Import Bank
Sec. 2(b)(4) of the Export-
Statutory requirement
President
mass destruction: nuclear
financing
Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L.
detonations
79-173; 12 U.S.C. 635(b)(4))
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits Export-Import Bank
Title VI of the Department of
Statutory requirement
No waiver
mass destruction: nuclear
financing
State, Foreign Operations, and
detonations
Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2023
(Division K, P.L. 117-328)
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits a range of
Sec. 11B, Export
President
President
mass destruction: missiles
transactions—contracts,
Administration Act (P.L. 96-72;
export licenses, imports into
50 U.S.C. App. 2410b), as
U.S.
continued by Sec. 1766, Export
Controls Act of 2018 (Part I,
Subtitle B, Title XVII, P.L. 115-
232), requiring annual
continuation under IEEPA
authorities
Proliferation of weapons of
Prohibits a range of
Sec. 3, Iran, North Korea, and
President
President
mass destruction
transactions—arms sales and
Syria Nonproliferation Act of
exports, dual-use exports,
2000 (P.L. 106-178; 50 U.S.C.
procurement contracts,
1701 note)
assistance, imports, support in
the international banks, credit,
air landing rights
CRS-44

Statutory basis
Authority
Authority to
Rationale
Restriction
[regulation]
to impose
lift or waive
Use of chemical or biological
In two rounds, prohibits (I)
Chemical and Biological
President (delegated to
President
weapons
foreign assistance, arms sales,
Weapons Control and Warfare Secretary of State)
USML/CCL export licenses,
Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW
foreign military financing, USG
Act; Title III, P.L. 102-182l 22
credits or financial assistance;
U.S.C. 5601 et seq.).
and (2) support in the IFIs, US
bank loans and credits, wider
exports, imports, normal
diplomatic relations, air landing
rights
Human rights (trafficking in
Prohibits nonhumanitarian
Sec. 110, Trafficking Victims
President
President, waiver if in the
persons)
foreign aid, cultural exchanges,
Protection Act of 2000 (P.L.
national interest
support in international
106-386; 22 U.S.C. 7107)
financial institutions
Counterfeiting, money-
Prohibits certain commercial
31 U.S.C. 5318A (generally
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of the Treasury
laundering
bank transactions
referred to by its amendatory
(delegated to Financial Crimes
vehicle—Sec. 311, USA
Enforcement Network
PATRIOT Act)
(FinCEN), which declared
(See also Sec. 201(c), NKSPEA) DPRK as a “primary
jurisdiction of money
laundering concern” effective
June 2, 2016 (final rule entered
into effect December 9, 2016).
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Notes: Most of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-72) was repealed with the enactment of the Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECA’18; Title XVII, Subtitle B,
Part I, P.L. 115-232; 50 U.S.C. 4811 et seq.). This affects several aspects of the sanctions regime imposed on North Korea, including export controls established for
foreign policy and national security reasons, and terrorism designations. Section 1768(a) of the ECA’18 (50 U.S.C. 4826) provides that:
All delegations, rules, regulations, orders, determinations, licenses, or other forms of administrative action that have been made, issued, conducted, or allowed to
become effective under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.) (as in effect on the day before the enactment of this Act and as continued in
effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)), or the Export Administration Regulations, and are in effect as of the
date of the enactment of this Act [August 13, 2018], shall continue in effect according to their terms until modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked under the
authority of this part.
Section 315(a) of the KIMS Act (P.L. 115-44; 131 Stat. 947) added Section 16 to the Ports and Waterways Safety Act (at 33 U.S.C. 1232c), to prohibit the entry into U.S.
navigable waters, port, or operation of any vessel that is (1) registered as owned or operated by or on behalf of the Government of North Korea or a North Korean
person; (2) owned or operated by or on behalf of a foreign country that has been identified under Section 205(a)(1)(A), NKSPEA; or (3) owned or operated by or on
CRS-45

behalf of a foreign country identified by the President as failing to comply with UNSC requirements related to North Korea. Section 16, however, was repealed, perhaps
inadvertently, in a larger reorganization of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act by Section 402(e) of the Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (P.L.
115-282).
NKSPEA = North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122; 22 U.S.C. 9201 et seq.), as amended; USML = United States Munitions List; CCL =
Commerce Control List; IEEPA = International Emergency Economic Powers Act; USG = United States Government; IFI = International Financial Institutions.

CRS-46

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

Appendix B. DPRK Sanctions: Comparison of U.N.
Security Council Requirements and U.S. Sanctions
Acronyms and terms are defined in notes following the table
U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
Financial Services
UNSCR 1874 (2009) prohibits providing
Sec. 104(b)(1)(F),
EO 13466 (2008)
financial services that could contribute
NKSPEA, as
prohibits any
to DPRK’s nuclear-, missile-, or WMD-
amended,
transaction by a
related programs.
authorizes (but
U.S. person the

does not require)
purpose of which is
the President to
to evade
UNSCR 1874 (2009) “calls on” member
designate any
sanctions.
states not to enter into new financial
person who
commitments for aid or loans,

transfers funds in
including “public financial support for violation of UNSC
EO 13551 (2010)
trade” to DPRK.
requirements.
blocks the assets of

specific DPRK

individuals and
UNSCR 2087 (2013) “calls on” member
Sec. 104(b)(1)(N),
entities, pursuant to
states to exercise vigilance on those within NKSPEA, as
emergency
their jurisdictions working on behalf of
amended,
authorities and
DPRK financial institutions and their
authorizes (but
requirements of
branches, representatives, and
does not require)
UNSCRs 1718
subsidiaries.
the President to
(2006) and 1874

designate any
(2009). Also blocks
UNSCR 2087 (2013) “calls on” member
person who
assets of anyone
states to exercise vigilance relating to the
facilitates
found to:
use of bulk cash to evade sanctions.
operations of any —engage in arms

DPRK financial
trade with DPRK;
institution.
UNSCR 2094 (2013) expands the list of
—provide
prohibited military-use goods, and

training, advice,
prohibits “brokering or intermediary
Sec. 201(b),
or other services
services, including . . arranging for the
NKSPEA requires
related to arms
provision, maintenance, or use of
the President to
manufacture,
prohibited items. .or the supply, sale, or
determine whether
maintenance, or
transfer to or exports from other states.”
DPRK is a
use;

“jurisdiction of
—trade in luxury
primary money
UNSCR 2094 (2013) “calls on” member
goods;
laundering
states to prohibit financial institutions from concern.” [Such a
—engage in
opening offices or subsidiaries in
determination was
money
DPRK if such offices would benefit
made in June 2016.] laundering,
DPRK’s weapons programs.
counterfeiting of

goods or
Sec. 104(a)(6),
currency,
UNSCR 2094 (2013) prohibits providing
NKSPEA, requires
trafficked in bulk
“public financial support for trade” to
President to
cash, narcotics or
DPRK if such aid would benefit DPRK’s
designate any
other illicit
weapons programs.
person who
economic

engages in bulk
activity; or
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits the
money
—engage in
opening and operation of new
laundering, bulk
sanctions
branches, subsidiaries, and
cash smuggling,
evasion.
representative offices of DPRK banks. or narcotics
trafficking that

Congressional Research Service

47

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits new joint
supports the DPRK
EO 13722 (2016)
ventures, ownership, or
government.
blocks property in
correspondent relationships with

the U.S. of and
DPRK banks.
person or entity
Sec. 104(b)(1)(G),

that operates in any
NKSPEA, as
industry in the
UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires member
amended,
DPRK economy,
states to terminate joint ventures,
authorizes (but
“such as
ownership, or correspondent
does not require)
transportation,
relationships with, and close existing
the President to
mining, energy,
branches, subsidiaries, and representative
designate any
or financial
offices of, DPRK banks.
person who
services.” In

facilitates
addition, EO 13722
transfers bulk
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits the opening
blocks assets of
cash, precious
of new representative offices,
anyone who:
metals, gems, other
branches, or banking accounts in
valuables not
—trades in metal,
DPRK.
already covered.
graphite, coal, or

software, with the

UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires the closing
government of
Sec. 104(a)(14),
of existing representative offices,
DPRK or the
NKSPEA, as
branches, or banking accounts in
Workers’ Party;
amended, requires
DPRK, if there is credible information
—engages in or
President to
that the accounts and services contribute
facilitates human
designate any
to DPRK’s weapons programs.
rights abuses in
person who

DPRK;
maintains a
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits public and correspondent
—exports labor
private financial support for trade
account for a
from DPRK;
with DPRK (e.g., export credits,
DPRK financial
—engages in or
guarantees, insurance) where such support institution.
facilitates
could contribute to DPRK’s weapons

undermining
programs.
cybersecurity on
Sec. 201A,

behalf of DPRK;
NKSPEA, as
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits transfers of
amended, prohibits
—engages in or
gold to or from DPRK.
indirect
facilitates
censorship;

correspondent
accounts.
—engages in
UNSCR 2270 (2016) “calls on” member
sanctions evasion;
states to use targeted sanctions to
or
curtail the financing of DPRK’s weapons
programs, fol owing guidelines of the
—attempts to
Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
engage in any of
a

these behaviors.
UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member
In addition, the
states to limit bank accounts of DPRK
Order prohibits all
diplomatic missions to one, and one
export from the
per accredited diplomat and consular
U.S. to DPRK; new
officer.
investment in
DPRK; and

financing,
UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits DPRK from
facilitation, or
using consular property in member
guarantee of a
states for other than diplomatic or
transaction by a US
consular activities (no commerce
person for a
permitted).
prohibited

transaction or
designee.
Congressional Research Service

48

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits the

providing of insurance to DPRK vessels.
EO 13810 of
UNSCR 2397 (2017) prohibits the
September 20,
providing of insurance to any DPRK
2017, blocks any
vessel for which there are reasonable
funds that arrive in
grounds that it is violating UNSC
the US that
requirements.
originate from, are

destined for, or
pass through, a
UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member
foreign account
states to close representative offices,
that is owned or
subsidiaries, and banking accounts in
controlled by a
DPRK.
DPRK person, or

any account that
UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits private
has been used to
and public financing for trade within
transfer funds in
DPRK.
which a DPRK

person has an
interest. Prohibits a
UNSCR 2321 (2016) “calls on” member
US person from
states to be alert to bulk cash used to
facilitating in any
evade sanctions.
way such a

transaction.
UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibits the opening

of new, or expanding existing, joint
EO 13810 of
ventures or cooperative entities with
September 20,
DPRK entities or individuals.
2017, targets

foreign financial
UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibits the use of
institutions—
financial services to clear funds for
those that conduct
DPRK entities. Broadens the application of
transactions on
the term “banks” to include any entity that
behalf of anyone
provides a financial service.
designated for
sanctions,
transactions related
to DPRK trade.
Such institutions
are denied access
to the U.S. banking
system (no
correspondent
accounts or
payable-through
accounts), their
U.S.-based assets
and property are
blocked.
Arms and Related
UNSCR 1718 (2006) prohibits supply,
Secs. 2, 38, 40, 42,
The U.S. maintains
Materiel Embargo
sale, or transfer to DPRK of battle
71, AECA (general
a prohibition on
tanks, armored combat vehicles, artil ery
authorities
trading in arms
systems, combat aircraft, attack
governing arms
and related
helicopters, warships, missiles, or missile
trade)
material with
systems, or related spare parts. The

DPRK in
measure also prohibits DPRK from
regulations—22
exporting such goods.
Sec. 104(a)(1),
C.F.R. Part 120-130
NKSPEA, requires
(See, especial y, 22
President to
Congressional Research Service

49

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
UNSCR 1874 (2009) expands the above
designate any
C.F.R. Part 126;
list of prohibited goods, and to prohibit
person who trades
State Department
financial transactions related to such trade. in goods or
International Traffic
UNSCR 2087 (2013) expands the above
services that
in Arms
list of prohibited goods.
benefit DPRK’s
Regulations), based
weapons programs.
primarily on AECA
UNSCR 2094 (2013) expands the above
authorities; and 15
list of prohibited goods.
Sec. 104(a)(9),
NKSPEA, requires
C.F.R. Part 700-799
UNSCR 2270 (2016) expands the above
President to
(see, especial y, 15
list of prohibited goods.
designate any
C.F.R. Part 746.4;
UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the above
person who trades
Department of
list of prohibited goods.
in arms or
Commerce Export
UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires the
related materiel
Administration
Sanctions Committee to adopt a
to or from DPRK.
Regulations), based
“conventional arms dual-use list” for
primarily on EAA.
Sec. 203(a),
prohibited goods.
NKSPEA, requires

UNSCR 2371 (2017) requires the
DPRK to be treated EO 13551 (2010)
Sanctions Committee to expand the list of
as a state sponsor blocks the assets
prohibited goods, including additional
of international
of specific DPRK
conventional arms-related items.
terrorism to the
individuals and
UNSCR 2375 (2017) expands the list of
extent it impedes
entities, pursuant to
prohibited goods to include additional
the export of U.S.
emergency
dual-use goods, conventional arms-related
dual-use goods
authorities and
items, and other materials.
and services, and
requirements of
munitions.
UNSCRs 1718

(2006) and 1874
(2009). Also blocks
Sec. 203(b),
assets of anyone
NKSPEA, as
found to:
amended, requires
the President to
—engage in arms
withhold foreign aid trade with DPRK;
to third countries
—provide training,
that provide DPRK
advice, or other
defense articles and
services related to
defense services.
arms manufacture,
maintenance, or
use;
—trade in luxury
goods;
—engage in money
laundering,
counterfeiting of
goods or currency,
trafficked in bulk
cash, narcotics or
other il icit
economic activity;
or
—engage in
sanctions evasion.
Nonproliferation
UNSCR 1718 (2006) prohibits supply,
Sec. 2, 3, Iran,
See arms embargo
and Proliferation
sale, or transfer to DPRK of specific
North Korea, Syria
regulations, above.
Networks
items, materials, equipment, goods,
Non-proliferation
and technology related to nuclear,
Act, authorizes the
ballistic missile, or other WMD-related
President to block
Congressional Research Service

50

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
program. The measure also prohibits
assets of and
DPRK from exporting such goods.
transactions with
any foreign person
designated as having
transferred
goods, services,
or technology
related to
certain weapons
programs of Iran,
Syria, or North
Korea.

UNSCR 1874 (2009) expands the above

list of prohibited goods and prohibits
financial transactions related to such trade.

UNSCR 2087 (2013) expands the above

list of prohibited goods.

UNSCR 2094 (2013) expands the above

list of prohibited goods.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) expands the above

list of prohibited goods.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the above

list of prohibited goods.
Interdiction,
UNSCR 1718 (2006) “calls on” member
Sec. 104(b)(1)(M),
EO 13722 (2016)
Inspection, and
states to inspect cargo to/from DPRK,
NKSPEA, as
blocks property in
Transportation
“as necessary.”
amended,
the U.S. of and
(See also
authorizes (but
person or entity
“Helicopters and
does not require)
that operates in any
Vessels [including
the President to
industry in the
aircraft, landing
designate any
DPRK economy,
and flyover rights,
person who
“such as
port use],” below)
engages in
transportation,
transactions in
mining, energy,
DPRK’s
or financial
transportation,
services.”
mining, energy,
EO 13810 of
or financial
September 20,
services sectors.
2017, authorizes
sanctions on
anyone who
operates in
construction,
energy, financial
services, fishing,
information
technology,
manufacturing,
medical, mining,
textiles, or
transportation
industries in the
DPRK.
Congressional Research Service

51

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order

UNSCR 1874 (2009) expands this to “call

on” states to inspect all cargo to/from
DPRK, including seaports and
airports.

UNSCR 2094 (2013) requires member

states to inspect all cargo transiting their
territory that originates in or is destined
for DPRK “if the State concerned has
credible information” that the cargo is
prohibited under earlier resolutions. Any
vessel that resists inspection shall be
denied entry.

UNSCR 2094 (2013) “calls on” member

states to deny permission to aircraft
to take off, land, or fly over if the aircraft is
suspected of carrying prohibited cargo.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires member

states to inspect all cargo transiting
airports, seaports, and free trade zones
that is headed to/from DPRK, or has been
brokered by a DPRK national, or is
carried on a DPRK-flagged vessel.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the

definition of “cargo,” and thus subject to
inspection, to include personal luggage
and checked bags.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) adds “rail” and

“road” to the list of transit means to be
inspected.

UNSCR 2371 (2017) authorizes the
Sec. 16, Ports and
EO 13810 of
Sanctions Committee to designate
Waterways Safety
September 20, 2017
additional vessels to be subject to
Act, as amended by
authorizes
sanctions—assets freeze, seizure, denial
KIMS Act, denies
sanctions on
of entry into port.
entry into U.S.
anyone who owns

ports to any
or controls a
foreign vessel
DPRK port—sea,
UNSCR 2375 (2017) directs the 1718
designated as
air, or land.
Committee to designate vessels
noncompliant with
transporting prohibited items from DPRK.
UNSC resolutions.

UNSCR 2397 (2017) requires member
states to de-register any vessel for
which there are reasonable grounds that it
violates UNSC requirements. Prohibits a
state from registering a vessel that has
been de-registered by another.

UNSCR 2397 (2017) requires member
states to seize, inspect, and impound
any vessel in their jurisdiction for which
there are reasonable grounds that it
violates UNSC requirements
Congressional Research Service

52

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
Bunkering Services UNSCR 1874 (2009) prohibits the
Sec. 104(a)(12),

(providing fuel,
providing of bunkering services to
NKSPEA, as
supplies, or
vessels suspected of carrying prohibited
amended, requires
servicing)
cargo.
President to

designate any
person who
provides
bunkering
services to vessels
from DPRK.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits sel ing or
Sec. 104(a)(11),

supplying aviation fuel, gasoline, jet
NKSPEA, as
fuels, rocket fuels, to DPRK.
amended, requires
President to
designate any
person who trades
in various aviation,
jet, and rocket
fuels to DPRK.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) “calls on” member

states to provide no more aviation fuel
than is required for a “margin for safety of
flight.”

UNSCR 2375 (2017) requires a ful ban on

the supply, sale, or transfer of all
condensates and natural gas liquids
to DPRK.
Assets Freeze
UNSCR 1718 (2006) freezes funds,
National
EO 13466 (2008)
financial assets, and economic
Emergencies Act;
blocks all
resources of those designated by the
International
property and
Sanctions Committee or Security Council
Emergency
interests in
for supporting DPRK’s nuclear-, missile-,
Economic Powers
property of
or WMD-related programs.
Act
DPRK that was

blocked as of
June 16, 2000,
UNSCR 1874 (2009) authorizes each
Sec. 104(a)(4),
and remained
member state to freeze funds, financial
NKSPEA, requires
blocked as of
assets, and economic resources if the
President to
June 26, 2008 (in
member state finds them to be supporting
designate any
effect,
DPRK’s nuclear-, missile-, or WMD-
person who
grandfathering in
related programs.
engages in
sanctions in place

censorship by the
under TWEA
DPRK government.
UNSCR 2094 (2013) requires each
authorities).
member state to freeze funds, financial

assets, and economic resources if the
Sec. 104(a)(5),
EO 13551 (2010)
member state finds them to be trading in
NKSPEA, requires
blocks the assets
bulk cash, evading sanctions, or
President to
of specific DPRK
supporting DPRK’s nuclear-, missile-,
designate any
individuals and
or WMD-related programs.
person who
entities, pursuant to

engages in human
emergency
rights abuses by
UNSCR 2270 (2016) defines assets to
authorities and
the DPRK
include economic resources “of every
requirements of
government.
kind, tangible or intangible, movable or
UNSCRs 1718

(2006) and 1874
Congressional Research Service

53

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
immovable, actual or potential. .including
Sec. 104(a)(7),
(2009). Also blocks
vessels. . ”
NKSPEA, requires
assets of anyone

President to
found to:
designate any
UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires the closing
—engage in arms
person who
of representative offices of designated
trade with DPRK;
engages in
entities.
undermining
—provide

cybersecurity on
training, advice,
or other services
UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires the
behalf of the DPRK
related to arms
freezing of assets of the DPRK
government. Sec.
manufacture,
government or Workers’ Party of
209(b) of that Act
maintenance, or
Korea.
also requires the
use;

President to
designate any
—trade in luxury
UNSCR 2321 (2016) freezes any vessel
person who
goods;
(as an asset) found by the Sanctions
undermines
—engage in
Committee to be engaged in DPRK’s
cybersecurity
money
weapons programs.
through the use
laundering,
of computer
counterfeiting of
networks or
goods or
systems against
currency,
foreign persons,
trafficked in bulk
governments, or
cash, narcotics or
other entities on
other illicit
behalf of the DPRK
economic
government.
activity; or

—engage in
Sec. 104(c),
sanctions
NKSPEA requires
evasion.
the President to

block the assets
EO 13722 (2016)
and prohibit
blocks property in
transactions with the U.S. of and
the DPRK
person or entity
government or
that operates in any
Workers’ Party
industry in the
of Korea.
DPRK economy,

“such as
Sec. 304(b),
transportation,
NKSPEA, requires
mining, energy,
the President to
or financial
impose sanctions
services.” In
on anyone
addition, EO 13722
identified in a
blocks assets of
report required by
anyone who:
the section who
—trades in metal,
engages in human
graphite, coal, or
rights abuses or
software, with the
censorship.
Government of
DPRK or the
Workers’ Party;
—engages in or
facilitates human
rights abuses in
DPRK;
Congressional Research Service

54

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
—exports labor
from DPRK;
—engages in or
facilitates
undermining
cybersecurity on
behalf of DPRK;
—engages in or
facilitates
censorship;
—engages in
sanctions
evasion; or
—attempts to
engage in any of
these behaviors.
In addition, the
Order prohibits all
export from the
U.S. to DPRK;
new investment
in DPRK; and
financing,
facilitation, or
guarantee of a
transaction by a
US person for a
prohibited
transaction or
designee.

EO 13687 (2015)
freezes assets in the
U.S. of
instrumentalities
, agencies,
controlled
entities, or
officials of the
DPRK
government or
Workers’ Party
of Korea.

EO 13722 (2016)
freezes assets in
the U.S. of the
DPRK
government or
Workers’ Party
of Korea.
Travel Ban
UNSCR 1718 (2006) prohibits travel of
Immigration and

(includes
those designated (and their family
Nationality Act (8
diplomatic entry)
members) by the Sanctions Committee
U.S.C. 1102).
Congressional Research Service

55

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
or Security Council for supporting DPRK’s

nuclear-, missile-, or WMD-related
Sec. 206, NKSPEA,
programs.
authorizes the
Secretary of State
to deny entry
into the U.S. of
any designated
person, corporate
official of a
designee, or
shareholder of a
designee.

UNSCR 2094 (2013) applies the visa denial

to those evading sanctions, and requires
the expulsion of DPRK nationals who are
found to be in violation of relevant
UNSCRs.

UNSCR 2094 (2013) “calls on” member

[Article 9, Section 1
states to prohibit DPRK’s diplomats
of the Vienna
from benefiting from sanctions evasion.
Convention on
Diplomatic
Relations
authorizes member
states to expel
foreign diplomats.]b

UNSCR 2270 (2016) approves of member

Vienna Convention.
states expelling DPRK diplomats if
they are found to be working on behalf of
a designated entity or person, or assisting
in sanctions evasion.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) approves of member

states expelling foreign nationals if
they are found to working on behalf of a
designated entity or person, or assisting in
sanctions evasion.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) requires member

states to expel DPRK nationals who
are representatives of designated
entities.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member

Vienna Convention.
states to reduce DPRK diplomatic
staff numbers in their states.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member

states to restrict travel to or through their
states of DPRK government officials,
and DPRK military, if such individuals
are associated with DPRK’s weapons
programs.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member

states to expel any foreign national
working for a DPRK bank or financial
institution.
Congressional Research Service

56

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
Specialized
UNSCR 1718 (2006) prohibits the
Sec. 104(a)(2),
EO 13551 (2010)
Training and
providing of training or assistance to
NKSPEA, requires
blocks the assets of
Teaching
DPRK related to a wide range of arms and
President to
specific DPRK
material with military applications, specific
designate any
individuals and
items, materials, equipment, goods, and
person who
entities, pursuant to
technology related to nuclear, ballistic
provides training,
emergency
missile, or other WMD-related program.
advice, or other
authorities and

services or
requirements of
assistance related
UNSCRs 1718
UNSCR 1874 (2009) expands the above
to DPRK’s weapons (2006) and 1874
list of prohibited goods, and to prohibit
programs.
(2009). Also blocks
financial transactions related to such
assets of anyone
training or assistance.
found to:

—engage in arms
UNSCR 1874 (2009) “calls on” member
trade with DPRK;
states to be vigilant about teaching DPRK
—provide
nationals in disciplines related to nuclear
training, advice,
and missile proliferation.
or other services

related to arms
UNSCR 2087 (2013) expands the above
manufacture,
list of prohibited goods and prohibits
maintenance, or
financial transactions related to such
use;
training or assistance.
—trade in luxury

goods;
UNSCR 2270 (2016) clarifies that the
—engage in money
training ban adopted in 2009 includes a
laundering,
prohibition on hosting trainers,
counterfeiting of
advisors, or other officials related to
goods or currency,
military training.
trafficked in bulk
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits specialized
cash, narcotics or
teaching or training of DPRK nationals that
other il icit
could contribute to DPRK’s WMD
economic activity;
programs. Names specific fields of
or
study.
—engage in

sanctions evasion.
UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the ban on
specialized teaching or training.
Scientific and
UNSCR 2321 (2016) suspends scientific

Technical
and technical cooperation with DPRK
Cooperation
except for medical exchanges, unless the
Sanctions Committee determines such
cooperation does not contribute to
DPRK’s weapons programs.
Trade Ban on
UNSCR 2270 (2016), as amended by
Sec. 104(a)(8),
EO 13570 (2011)
Natural Resources UNSCR 2321 (2016), and further amended NKSPEA, requires
prohibits
by UNSCR 2371 (2017), prohibits trade in
President to
importation into
DPRK coal, iron, or iron ore; ends
designate any
the United
contracts extending beyond 30 days
person who trades
States from
from the adoption of the 2017
in precious
DPRK of any
resolution; and eliminates the caps
metals, graphite,
goods, services,
and “livelihood purposes” exceptions
raw metals,
or technology.
relating to coal stated in previous
aluminum, steel,

resolutions.
coal, software,
related to DPRK’s

Congressional Research Service

57

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
weapons programs,
See EO 13722
the Workers’ Party, (2016), above.
armed forces,

internal security or
intelligence
EO 13810 of
activities, prison or
September 20,
forced labor.
2017, authorizes
sanctions on
Sec. 104(b)(1)(D),
anyone who
NKSPEA, as
engages in “at least
amended,
one significant
authorizes (but
importation from
does not require)
or exportation to
the President to
North Korea.... ”
designate any
person who trades
in coal, iron, or
iron ore in
excess of UNSC
limits.
Sec. 104(g),
NKSPEA, as
amended, requires
the President to
designate anyone
who engages in
trade in coal,
textiles, seafood,
iron, iron ore (or
facilitates that
trade), or
petroleum
products or
crude oil above
UNSC limits.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits trade in
Sec. 104(a)(10),
See EO 13722
DPRK gold, titanium ore, vanadium
NKSPEA, as
(2016), above.
ore, and rare earth elements.
amended, requires

President to
designate any
UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits trade in
person who trades
DPRK copper, nickel, silver, and zinc.
in copper,

vanadium, gold,
UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibits trade in
titanium, silver,
DPRK lead and lead ore.
nickel, zinc, or

rare earth
elements with
UNSCR 2397 (2017) prohibits the
DPRK.
purchase of food, agricultural
products, machinery, electrical

equipment, earth and stone,
Sec. 104(b)(1)(H),
magnesite and magnesia, wood, and
NKSPEA, as
vessels from DPRK.
amended,

authorizes (but
does not require)
UNSCR 2397 (2017) prohibits the
the President to
providing to DPRK of industrial
designate any
machinery, transportation vehicles,
person who
Congressional Research Service

58

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
iron, steel, other metals (not including
facilitates transfers
spare parts of civil aircraft safety).
of crude oil,
petroleum,
liquefied natural
gas, other
natural gas to
the DPRK
government.
Trade Ban on
UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibits trade in
Sec. 104(b)(1)(K),
See EO 13570
Food Products
DPRK seafood.
NKSPEA, as
(2011), above.
amended,

authorizes (but
does not require)
See EO 13722
the President to
(2016), above.
designate any
EO 13810 of
person who
September 20,
purchases food or
2017, authorizes
agricultural
sanctions on
products from
anyone who
the DPRK
engages in “at least
government.
one significant
importation from
or exportation to
North Korea.... ”
Trade Ban on
UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits trade in

See EO 13570
Statues
DPRK-origin statuary.
(2011), above.

See EO 13722
(2016), above.

EO 13810 of
September 20,
2017, authorizes
sanctions on
anyone who
engages in “at least
one significant
importation from
or exportation to
North Korea.... ”
Ban on Trade and
UNSCR 2094 (2013) “calls on” member
Sec. 104(a)(13),
See EO 13570
Use of Helicopters states to deny permission to aircraft
NKSPEA, as
(2011), above.
and Vessels
to take off, land, or fly over if the
amended, requires

(including aircraft,
aircraft is suspected of carrying prohibited
President to
landing and flyover cargo.
designate any
See EO 13722
rights, port use)
person who
(2016), above.
registers a vessel

owned by the
EO 13810 of
Government of
September 20,
DPRK.
2017, authorizes
sanctions on
anyone who
engages in “at least
one significant
importation from
Congressional Research Service

59

North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
or exportation to
North Korea.... ”

UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits the leasing

or chartering of vessels or aircraft, or
providing crew services, to DPRK,
designated entities and individuals, and
anyone found to be engaged in sanctions
evasion.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) “calls on” member

states to revoke vessel registrations of
those granted designated entities and
individuals or those engaged in sanctions
evasion; and “calls on” member states not
to register a vessel that has been
deregistered by another state.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits

EO 13466 (2008)
registering a vessel in DPRK or using
prohibits U.S.
a DPRK flag for a foreign vessel.
persons from
registering a
vessel in DPRK,
using the DPRK
flag for a vessel,
or owning,
leasing,
operating, or
insuring a DPRK-
flagged vessel.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits aircraft

EO 13810 of
landing and flyover rights to DPRK
September 20,
aircraft.
2017, prohibits any
aircraft or vessel
that is foreign-
owned to enter the
United States if it
has landed or
entered a port of
North Korea within
the last 180 days.

UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits entry into

port of DPRK vessels owned or
control ed by a designated entity or
individual, or contains prohibited cargo.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the ban on

providing crew services to DPRK to be
prohibited without exception.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the ban on

registering vessels in DPRK to be
prohibited without exception.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member

states to deflag, and deny entry to
port, vessels found by the Sanctions
Committee to be engaged in DPRK’s
weapons programs.
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order

UNSCR 2321 (2016) requires member

states to deregister vessels owned by
DPRK, and prohibits the registration of
vessels deregistered by a third state.

UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits trade in

DPRK new helicopters and vessels.

UNSCR 2375 (2017) authorizes the

Sanctions Committee to designate for
sanctions vessels transporting
prohibited items from DPRK.

UNSCR 2397 (2017) prohibits providing
new or used vessels to DPRK.
Ban on Exported
UNSCR 2321 (2016) prohibits the
Sec. 104(b)(1)(L),
See EO 13570
Labor
procuring of crew services from DPRK
NKSPEA, as
(2011), above.
for vessels or aircraft.
amended,

authorizes (but
does not require)
See EO 13722
UNSCR 2321 (2016) “calls on” member
the President to
(2016), above.
states to exercise vigilance over wages
designate any
paid to DPRK exported labor that may person who
finance the weapons programs.
facilitates the

export of DPRK
UNSCR 2371 (2017) prohibits member
labor.
states from increasing their use of
Sec. 302A,
DPRK exported labor.
NKSPEA, as

amended, blocks
UNSCR 2375 (2017) prohibits entering
import into the
into new contracts for DPRK exported
U.S. of any goods
labor (existing contract completion is
made by DPRK
allowed). Introduces a ban on Member
labor (in violation
States from providing work authorizations
of Sec. 307, Tariff
for DPRK nationals, other than those for
Act of 1930; 19
which written contracts have been
U.S.C. 1307,
finalized prior to September 11, 2017.
relating to use of
prison or

coerced labor).
UNSCR 2397 (2017) requires member
Sec. 302B,
states to repatriate DPRK exported
NKSPEA, as
labor within 2 years (with exceptions).
amended, requires
the President to
impose sanctions
on any foreign
person who
employs DPRK
labor.
Trade Ban on
UNSCR 1718 (2006) prohibits the sale,
Sec. 104(a)(3),
On January 26,
Luxury Goods
supply, or transfer of “luxury goods” (but
NKSPEA, requires
2007, the
does not define the term).
President to
Department of

designate any
Commerce issued
person who trades
foreign policy
UNSCR 2094 (2013) establishes the first
in luxury goods
controls for
luxury good list.
to/from DPRK.
DPRK that

included luxury
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
UNSCR 2270 (2016) expands the
goods. See 72 FR
definition of “luxury goods.”
3722-3730.

EO 13551 (2010)
UNSCR 2321 (2016) expands the above
blocks the assets of
list of prohibited goods.
specific DPRK
individuals and

entities, pursuant to

emergency
authorities and
requirements of
UNSCRs 1718
(2006) and 1874
(2009). Also blocks
assets of anyone
found to:
—engage in arms
trade with DPRK;
—provide training,
advice, or other
services related to
arms manufacture,
maintenance, or
use;
—trade in luxury
goods;
—engage in money
laundering,
counterfeiting of
goods or currency,
trafficked in bulk
cash, narcotics or
other il icit
economic activity;
or
—engage in
sanctions evasion.

EO 13570 (2011)
prohibits
importation into
the United States
from DPRK of any
goods, services, or
technology.

EO 13810 of
September 20,
2017, authorizes
sanctions on
anyone who
engages in “at least
one significant
importation from
or exportation to
North Korea.... ”
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
Other Trade and
UNSCR 2270 (2016) expands the list of

See EO 13570
Investment
prohibited goods—initial y identifying
(2011), above.
arms, dual-use goods, and luxury goods

(2006)—to now include “any item,
except food or medicine, if the State
See EO 13722
determines that such item could
(2016), above.
directly or indirectly contribute to

the development of the DPRK’s
EO 13810 of
operational capabilities of its armed
September 20,
forces ... .”
2017, authorizes

sanctions on
UNSCR 2270 (2016) prohibits
anyone who
participating in joint ventures with
engages in “at least
designated entities or individuals.
one significant
importation from

or exportation to
UNSCR 2375 (2017) expands the
North Korea.... ”
prohibition on joint ventures and
cooperative entities to apply to all
DPRK entities or individuals, except
China-DPRK hydroelectric power
infrastructure projects and the Russia-
DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project,
used for transshipment of Russia-origin
coal.
Other Targets

Sec. 104(b)(1),

NKSPEA,
authorizes (but
does not require)
the President to
designate any
person who
facilitates bribery
or corruption by
the DPRK
government.

UNSCR 2375 (2017) prohibits the export
Sec. 104(b)(1)(E),

by the DPRK of textiles (including fabrics
NKSPEA, as
and partially or ful y completed apparel
amended,
products).
authorizes (but
does not require)
the President to
designate any
person who trades
in textiles with
DPRK.

UNSCR 2375 (2017) requires a ful ban on
Sec. 104(b)(1)(H),

the supply, sale, or transfer of all
NKSPEA, as
condensates and natural gas liquids
amended,
to DPRK.
authorizes (but

does not require)
the President to
UNSCR 2375 (2017) limits all refined
designate any
petroleum products in terms of the
person who
amount allowed (for supply, sale, or
facilitates transfers
transfer to DPRK) with very specific
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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

U.N. Security Council Resolution

Requirements
U.S. Law
Executive Order
preconditions and fol ow-up action
of crude oil,
required by Member States, the 1718
petroleum,
Committee and the Committee Secretary.
liquefied natural

gas, other
natural gas to the
UNSCR 2375 (2017) imposes 12-month
DPRK government.
caps, based on the previous year’s
transactions to form a baseline, on the
supply, sale, or transfer of crude oil to
DPRK.

UNSCR 2397 (2017) prohibits providing
crude oil above livelihood limits.

UNSCR 2397 (2017) prohibits providing
refined petroleum products,
including diesel and kerosene, above
livelihood limits determined by previous
trade.

Sec. 104(b)(1)(I),

NKSPEA, as
amended,
authorizes (but
does not require)
the President to
designate any
person who
engages in DPRK
government-
sponsored online
commerce,
including online
gambling.

Sec. 104(b)(1)(J),
EO 13810 of
NKSPEA, as
September 20,
amended,
2017, authorizes
authorizes (but
sanctions on
does not require)
anyone who
the President to
operates in
designate any
construction,
person who
energy, financial
purchases fishing
services, fishing,
rights from the
information
DPRK government.
technology,
manufacturing,
medical, mining,
textiles, or
transportation
industries in the
DPRK.

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North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions

Author Information

Dianne E. Rennack

Specialist in Foreign Policy Legislation

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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Congressional Research Service
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