The European Union: Questions and Answers
January 26, 2024
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic partnership that represents a unique form
of cooperation among sovereign countries. The EU is the latest stage in a process of integration
Kristin Archick
begun after World War II, initially by six Western European countries, to foster interdependence
Specialist in European
and make another war in Europe unthinkable. The EU currently consists of 27 member states,
Affairs
including most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and has helped to promote peace,
stability, and economic prosperity throughout the European continent.
How the EU Works
The EU has been built through a series of binding treaties. Over the years, EU member states have harmonized laws and
adopted common policies on an increasing number of economic, social, and political issues. EU members share a customs
union; a single market in which capital, goods, services, and people move freely; a common trade policy; and a common
agricultural policy. Twenty EU member states use a common currency (the euro), and 23 members participate in the
Schengen area of free movement in which internal border controls have been eliminated. In addition, the EU has been
developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which includes a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
and pursuing cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) on common internal security challenges.
Challenges Facing the EU
The EU is generally considered a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity, but the bloc is grappling with several
challenges. The EU has demonstrated solidarity in responding to Russia’s war against Ukraine (launched in February 2022),
but the conflict has raised significant security concerns. The war also has galvanized debate on several long-standing EU
initiatives, including related to EU defense, energy and climate policies, and EU enlargement. Other key issues facing the EU
include democratic backsliding in some member states, the presence of populist and to some extent anti-EU political parties
throughout the bloc, managing relations with the United Kingdom (UK) following its exit from the EU in January 2020
(
Brexit), ongoing migration concerns, and complex relations with China.
U.S.-EU Relations
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the European integration project since its
inception in the 1950s as a means to prevent another catastrophic conflict on the European continent and to foster democratic
allies and strong trading partners. Today, the United States and the EU have a dynamic political partnership and share a huge
trade and investment relationship. U.S. and EU officials traditionally have viewed the partnership as mutually beneficial. At
the same time, U.S.-EU policy differences on a range of foreign policy and economic issues emerge periodically. During the
Trump Administration, U.S.-EU relations faced considerable strain given President Trump’s criticisms of the EU and
numerous U.S.-EU policy divisions.
President Biden has committed to partnering with the EU on a wide range of global concerns, and the conflict in Ukraine has
bolstered U.S.-EU ties. The United States and the EU have demonstrated steadfast support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity
and have cooperated extensively in imposing sanctions on Russia and other responses. Resolving U.S.-EU trade disputes and
promoting technological cooperation also have been priorities for the Biden Administration. However, new U.S. tax subsidies
for clean energy technologies (in P.L. 117-169, commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022) have generated
tensions with the EU. Other issues, including managing relations with China and responding to challenges related to the 2023
Israel-Hamas conflict, also may test the U.S.-EU partnership. EU concerns persist about ongoing U.S. political polarization
and whether a future U.S. Administration would maintain current U.S. policies toward Russia, Ukraine, and the EU.
This report serves as a primer on the EU. It also discusses U.S. relations with the EU that may be of interest to Congress. For
more information, see CRS In Focus IF12302,
U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress.
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
Contents
What Is the European Union?.......................................................................................................... 1
How Does the EU Work? ................................................................................................................ 1
How Is the EU Governed? ............................................................................................................... 2
What Is the Lisbon Treaty?.............................................................................................................. 3
What Are the Euro and the Eurozone? ............................................................................................ 4
Why and How Is the EU Enlarging? ............................................................................................... 6
Does the EU Have a Foreign Policy? .............................................................................................. 7
Does the EU Have a Defense Policy? ............................................................................................. 8
What Is the Relationship of the EU to NATO? ............................................................................... 9
What Is Justice and Home Affairs? ............................................................................................... 10
What Is the Schengen Area? .......................................................................................................... 10
Does the EU Have a Trade Policy and Process? ............................................................................ 11
How Do EU Countries and Citizens View the EU? ...................................................................... 12
What Is Brexit, and How Has It Affected the EU? ........................................................................ 14
How Might the EU Evolve in the Future? ..................................................................................... 15
Does the United States Have a Formal Relationship with the EU? ............................................... 16
Who Are U.S. Officials’ Counterparts in the EU? ......................................................................... 16
What Is the History of U.S.-EU Relations? ................................................................................... 17
What Is the Current State of U.S.-EU Relations? .......................................................................... 18
Figures
Figure A-1. European Union Member States and Candidates ....................................................... 22
Appendixes
Appendix. Map of the European Union and Aspirant Countries ................................................... 22
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 22
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
What Is the European Union?
The European Union (EU) is a unique political and economic partnership that currently consists
of 27 member states (see the map in the
Appendix).1 Built through a series of binding treaties,
the EU is the latest stage in a process of integration begun after World War II to promote peace
and economic recovery in Europe. Its founders hoped that by creating specified areas in which
member states agreed to share sovereignty—initially in coal and steel production, trade, and
nuclear energy—it would promote interdependence and make another war in Europe unthinkable.
Since the 1950s, this European integration project has expanded to encompass other economic
sectors; a customs union; a single market in which capital, goods, services, and people move
freely; a common trade policy; a common agricultural policy; aspects of social and environmental
policy; and a common currency (the euro) that is used by 20 member states. EU members also
have taken steps toward political integration, with decisions to develop a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP) and efforts to promote cooperation in the area of Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA). Most EU members participate in the Schengen area of free movement, which
allows individuals to travel without passport checks among most European countries.
The EU is generally considered a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity, but it faces a
number of challenges. Although the EU has demonstrated solidarity in responding to Russia’s war
against Ukraine (launched in February 2022), the conflict has contributed to high energy prices
and inflation in the EU and has long-term strategic implications for the bloc. Other key issues for
the EU include democratic backsliding in some member states, the presence of populist and to
some extent anti-EU political parties throughout the bloc, ongoing migration concerns, managing
relations with the United Kingdom (UK) following its exit from the EU in January 2020 (
Brexit),
and addressing political and economic concerns posed by China. Renewing strong ties with the
United States also has been a key EU priority following heightened tensions during the Trump
Administration. The overall tenor of U.S.-EU relations has improved under the Biden
Administration, and the two partners have cooperated closely in addressing Russia’s aggression in
Ukraine. U.S.-EU differences, however, persist on issues such as clean energy subsidies and
China and pose tests for the U.S.-EU partnership. This report serves as a primer on the EU and
discusses U.S.-EU relations that may be of interest to the 118th Congress.
How Does the EU Work?
EU member states work together through common institutions (see
“How Is the EU Governed?”)
to set policy and promote their collective interests. Decisionmaking processes and the role of the
EU institutions differ depending on the subject under consideration. On a multitude of economic,
social, and internal security policies, member states have pooled their sovereignty to varying
degrees and EU institutions hold decisionmaking authority. EU legislation in such areas often has
a supranational quality, because it is subject to a complex majority voting system among member
states as well as European Parliament approval and is legally binding on member governments. In
certain other areas—especially foreign and security policy—member states have agreed to
cooperate but retain full sovereignty. Decisionmaking in such fields is intergovernmental and
requires the unanimous agreement of all EU countries; any one national government can veto a
decision. EU institutions generally play a more limited role in the decisionmaking process in such
policy areas but may be involved in implementation and oversight.
1 The current 27 members of the EU are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden.
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
How Is the EU Governed?
The EU is governed by several institutions that embody the EU’s dual supranational and
intergovernmental character:
• The
European Council acts as the strategic guide for EU policy. It is composed of
the Heads of State or Government of the EU’s member states and the President of
the European Commission; it meets several times a year in what are often termed
“EU summits.” The European Council is headed by a President, who organizes
the council’s work and facilitates consensus.
• The
European Commission upholds the common interest of the EU as a whole
and serves as the EU’s executive. It implements EU decisions and common
policies, ensures that the provisions of the EU’s treaties are carried out properly,
and has the sole right of legislative initiative in most policy areas. It is composed
of 27 Commissioners, one from each EU country. Commissioners serve five-year
terms; one Commissioner serves as European Commission President and the
others hold distinct portfolios (e.g., agriculture, energy, trade). On many issues,
the European Commission handles negotiations with outside countries.
• The
Council of the European Union (also informally called the
Council, or the
Council of Ministers) represents the national governments. The Council of the
EU enacts legislation, usually based on proposals put forward by the European
Commission and agreed to (in most cases) by the European Parliament. Different
ministers from each country participate in council meetings depending on the
subject under consideration (e.g., foreign ministers would meet to discuss the
Middle East, agriculture ministers to discuss farm subsidies). Most decisions are
subject to a complex majority voting system, but some areas—such as foreign
and defense policy, taxation, or accepting new members—require unanimity. The
Presidency of the Council of the EU rotates among the member states, changing
every six months; the country holding the Presidency helps set agenda priorities
and organizes most of the work of the Council of the EU.
• The
European Parliament represents the citizens of the EU. It currently has 705
members who are directly elected for five-year terms (the most recent elections
were in May 2019; the next elections are due in June 2024). Each EU country has
a number of seats roughly proportional to the size of its population. Although the
European Parliament cannot initiate legislation, it shares legislative power with
the Council of the EU in many policy areas, giving it the right to accept, amend,
or reject the majority of proposed EU legislation in a process known as the
“ordinary legislative procedure” or “co-decision.” The European Parliament also
decides on the allocation of the EU’s budget jointly with the Council of the EU.
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) caucus according to political
affiliation, rather than nationality; there are seven political groups and several
dozen nonattached MEPs in the European Parliament currently.2
Other institutions also play key roles. The
Court of Justice interprets EU laws, and its rulings are
binding; a
Court of Auditors monitors financial management; the
European Central Bank
manages EU monetary policy and the euro; and
advisory committees represent economic, social,
and regional interests. Also see the text box below on “Key EU Positions and Current Leaders.”
2 Also see CRS In Focus IF11211,
The European Parliament and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick.
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
What Is the Lisbon Treaty?
On December 1, 2009, the EU’s latest institutional reform endeavor—the Lisbon Treaty—came
into force following its ratification by all of the EU’s then-27 member states. It is the final
product of an effort begun in 2002 to reform the EU’s governing institutions and decisionmaking
processes. It amends, rather than replaces, the EU’s two core treaties—the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Changes introduced by the
Lisbon Treaty seek to
• enable the EU to function more effectively;
• enhance the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor; and
• increase democracy and transparency within the EU.
To help accomplish these goals, the Lisbon Treaty established two new leadership positions:
• The President of the European Council, a single individual who chairs the
meetings of the EU Heads of State or Government, serves as coordinator and
spokesman for their work, seeks to ensure policy continuity, and strives to forge
consensus among the member states.
• A dual-hatted position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy to serve essentially as the EU’s chief diplomat. The High
Representative is both an agent of the Council of the EU—and thus speaks for
the member states on foreign policy issues—as well as a Vice President of the
European Commission, responsible for managing most of the commission’s
diplomatic activities and foreign assistance programs.
Other key measures in the Lisbon Treaty included the following:
• Simplifying the EU’s qualified majority voting system and expanding its use to
policy areas previously subject to member state unanimity in the Council of the
EU. This change was intended in part to speed EU decisionmaking, but member
states still tend to seek consensus as much as possible.
• Increasing the relative power of the European Parliament by strengthening its
role in the EU’s budgetary process and extending the use of the “co-decision”
procedure to more policy areas, including agriculture and home affairs issues.3 As
such, the treaty gives the European Parliament a say equal to that of the member
states in the Council of the EU over the vast majority of EU legislation (with
some exceptions, such as most aspects of foreign and defense policy).
For the first time in the EU’s history, the Lisbon Treaty also introduced an “exit clause”—Article
50 of the TEU—which outlines procedures for a member state to leave the EU. A member state
that decides to leave would invoke Article 50 by notifying the European Council of its intentions,
which would trigger a two-year period for withdrawal negotiations to be concluded; the EU may
also decide to extend the time for negotiations.
3 The Lisbon Treaty technically renames the “co-decision” procedure as the “ordinary legislative procedure.”
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
Key EU Positions and Current Leaders
The current
President of the European Council is Charles Michel, a former prime minister of Belgium. The
president is appointed by the member states for a 2½-year term (renewable once).
The current
President of the European Commission is Ursula von der Leyen of Germany, a former German
defense minister. The commission president is appointed by agreement among the member states, subject to the
approval of the European Parliament. In selecting the commission president, member states must take into
account the results of the most recent European Parliament elections.
Belgium holds the
Presidency of the Council of the EU (often termed the
EU Presidency) from January to June
2024; Hungary wil hold the presidency from July to December 2024.
Every 2½ years (twice per 5-year parliamentary term), Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) elect the
President of the European Parliament. In January 2022, Maltese MEP Roberta Metsola was elected as president
of the European Parliament; Metsola is from the center-right European People’s Party parliamentary group.
The current
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is Josep Borrell of
Spain. The high representative is chosen by agreement among the member states but, like the other members of
the European Commission, must be approved by the European Parliament.
What Are the Euro and the Eurozone?
Twenty of the EU’s 27 member states use a common single currency, the euro, and are often
collectively referred to as “the eurozone.”4 The gradual introduction of the euro began in January
1999 when 11 EU member states became the first to adopt it and banks and many businesses
started using the euro as a unit of account. Euro notes and coins replaced national currencies in
participating states in January 2002. Eurozone participants share a common central bank—the
European Central Bank (ECB)—and a common monetary policy. However, they do not have a
common fiscal policy, and member states retain control over decisions about national spending
and taxation, subject to certain conditions designed to maintain budgetary discipline.
In 2009-2010, a serious crisis in the eurozone developed, beginning in Greece. Over the previous
decade, the Greek government had borrowed heavily from international capital markets to pay for
its budget and trade deficits. As investors became increasingly nervous during 2009 about
Greece’s high sovereign (or public) debt level amid the global financial crisis, markets demanded
higher interest rates for Greek bonds, which drove up Greece’s borrowing costs. By early 2010,
Greece risked defaulting on its public debt. Market concerns quickly spread to several other
eurozone countries with high, potentially unsustainable levels of public debt, including Italy and
Spain (the eurozone’s third- and fourth-largest economies, respectively).
European leaders and EU institutions responded to the crisis and sought to stem its contagion
with a variety of policy mechanisms. To avoid default, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus
received loans from the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but were required to
impose strict austerity measures. Eurozone leaders also approved a recapitalization plan for
Spanish banks. Other key initiatives included creating a permanent EU financial assistance
facility (the European Stability Mechanism) to provide emergency support to eurozone countries
and a single bank supervisor for the eurozone, as well as ECB efforts to calm the financial
markets by purchasing large portions of European sovereign debt and providing significant
infusions of credit into the European banking system.
4 The 20 members of the EU that use the euro are Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
and Spain.
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
The eurozone crisis began to abate in late 2012, as market confidence became more positive and
the situation started to stabilize in most eurozone countries. Ireland exited the EU-IMF financial
assistance program in 2013; Portugal did so in 2014, and Cyprus did so in 2016. EU aid to
Spanish banks ceased in 2014. Nevertheless, many EU member states continued to experience
weak economic growth and high unemployment. Greece’s economy and banking system
remained in particular distress.
In the first half of 2015, prospects grew that Greece might exit the eurozone (dubbed
Grexit) as
the Greek government sought further financial aid from its eurozone creditors but also demanded
debt relief and an easing of austerity. For months, negotiations foundered. In June 2015, Greece
failed to make a payment to the IMF, and the government closed the banks and imposed capital
controls. In July 2015, however, the Greek government acceded to EU demands for more
austerity and economic reforms in exchange for the badly needed financial assistance. Between
2010 and 2018, Greece received a total of $330 billion in loans from the EU, the ECB, and the
IMF.5 Greece officially exited the EU-IMF financial assistance program in August 2018.
From its start, the eurozone crisis generated tensions among member states over the proper
balance between imposing austerity measures and stimulating growth and the need for greater EU
fiscal integration. Traditionally fiscally conservative member states, including Germany and the
Netherlands, largely opposed integration steps that might lead to “bailing out” more indebted
countries in the future. Eurozone leaders have discussed additional measures to improve the
eurozone’s economic governance and stability, but proposals such as establishing a common
eurozone budget have long been controversial.6
Some analysts suggest the EU’s response to the economic crisis resulting from the Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic could open the door to further EU economic integration. In
July 2020, EU leaders (acting in the European Council) reached political agreement on a €750
billion recovery fund consisting of both grants and loans for member states, attached to a €1.1
trillion EU budget for 2021-2027.7 Financing for the COVID-19 recovery fund includes the
unprecedented issuing of EU bonds backed jointly by member states. Many EU officials,
including ECB President Christine Lagarde, maintained that the COVID-19 recovery plan—and
issuing common EU debt—represented a “one-off response to exceptional circumstances.”8 Some
in the EU suggest that common EU borrowing should be considered to deal with new challenges
such as the economic shocks caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine, financing Ukraine’s
reconstruction in the longer term, or supporting EU industries and innovation viewed as key to
the bloc’s future competitiveness and clean energy transition. Germany and other fiscally
conservative member states remain opposed to additional common borrowing.9
5 Bart Oosterveld and Alexatrini Tsiknia, “This Greek Tragedy Is Not Over Just Yet,” Atlantic Council, August 21,
2018.
6 Sam Fleming and Mehreen Khan, “EU Finance Ministers Approve Separate ‘Eurozone Budget’ Tool,”
Financial
Times, October 10, 2019; Magnus G. Schoeller, “Preventing the EU Budget: Issue Replacement and Small State
Influence in the EMU,”
Journal of European Public Policy, July 24, 2020.
7 European Commission,
The 2021-2027 EU Budget – What’s New?, at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/
long-term-eu-budget/2021-2027/whats-new_en. The EU formally approved the 2021-2027 budget in December 2020
and finalized the recovery fund in February 2021.
8 As quoted in Bjarke Smith-Meyer, “European Central Bank President Dismisses News Reports and Calls the
Pandemic Recovery Fund a One-off,”
Politico Europe, September 28, 2020.
9 Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, “Will the Russia-Ukraine War Speed European Fiscal Integration?,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, May 30, 2022; Jorge Valero and Jillian Deutsch, “EU Should Seek Joint Borrowing for
Ukraine Impact, Official Says,” Bloomberg.com, June 30, 2022; European Council President Charles Michel, “Going
Big for EU Industry,”
Politico Europe, January 15, 2023; Maria Martinez and Jan Strupczewski, “Germany Dashes
Hopes for New EU Common Borrowing,” Reuters, February 16, 2023.
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
Why and How Is the EU Enlarging?
The EU has long viewed the enlargement process as an opportunity to promote stability and
prosperity across Europe. The EU began as the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 with
six members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). In 1973,
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined what had then become the European
Community. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. In 1995, Austria,
Finland, and Sweden acceded to the present-day European Union. In 2004, the EU welcomed
eight former communist countries—the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia—plus Cyprus and Malta as members. Bulgaria and Romania
joined the EU in 2007, and Croatia acceded in 2013.
To be eligible for EU membership, countries must first meet a set of established criteria,
including having a functioning democracy and market economy. Once a country becomes an
official candidate, accession negotiations are a long and complex process in which the applicant
must adopt and implement a massive body of EU laws and regulations. Analysts contend that the
carefully managed process of enlargement is one of the EU’s most powerful policy tools that has
helped to transform many European countries into more democratic and affluent societies. At the
same time, EU enlargement is also a political process. Most significant steps on the path to
accession require the unanimous agreement of the EU’s existing member states. Thus, a
prospective candidate’s relationships or conflicts with individual members may influence a
country’s accession prospects and timeline.
The EU currently recognizes nine countries as official candidates for membership; all are at
different stages of the accession process. Joining the EU typically takes many years (if not
decades). Montenegro and Serbia are the farthest along in their accession negotiations, and
Albania and North Macedonia officially began negotiations in July 2022. Turkey has been a
candidate country since 1999, but its accession negotiations are stalled amid heightened EU
concerns about democratic backsliding in Turkey and other tensions in EU-Turkey relations. The
EU named Ukraine and Moldova as official candidates for membership in June 2022, Bosnia and
Herzegovina as an official candidate in December 2022, and Georgia as an official candidate in
December 2023. The EU regards Kosovo as a potential future candidate (see th
e Appendix).
The EU maintains that the enlargement door remains open to any European country that fulfills
the EU’s political and economic criteria for membership. At the same time, some European
leaders and publics have been cautious about additional expansion, especially to Turkey (given its
large size, predominantly Muslim culture, and relatively less prosperous economy). Concerns
about continued EU enlargement have ranged from fears of unwanted migrant labor to the
implications of an ever-expanding EU on the bloc’s institutions, finances, and overall identity.
Assessments of weakening rule of law in several existing EU members also have contributed to
decreased enthusiasm for further enlargement.
Russia’s war against Ukraine has boosted political and public support across many EU countries
for EU enlargement to Ukraine and other aspirants. Germany, France, and some EU leaders have
called for significant reform of the bloc’s structures and decisionmaking processes to enable a
larger EU to function effectively. Other EU member states and officials are reluctant to engage in
another major EU reform effort, a typically fraught and prolonged process.10 (Also see
“How
Might the EU Evolve in the Future?,” below.)
10 See, for example, Laurenz Gerhke, “Scholz Pitches Major EU Enlargement—With Reform,”
Politico Europe,
(continued...)
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
Does the EU Have a Foreign Policy?
The EU has a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in which member states adopt
common policies, undertake joint actions, and pursue coordinated strategies in areas in which
they can reach consensus. CFSP was established in 1993; the eruption of hostilities in the Balkans
in the early 1990s and the EU’s limited tools for responding to the crisis convinced EU leaders
that the Union had to improve its ability to act collectively in the foreign policy realm. Previous
EU attempts to further such political integration had foundered for decades on member state
concerns about protecting national sovereignty and different foreign policy prerogatives.
CFSP decisionmaking is dominated by the member states and requires unanimous agreement of
all national governments. Member states also must ensure that national policies are in line with
agreed EU strategies and positions (e.g., imposing sanctions on a country). However, CFSP does
not preclude individual member states pursuing their own national foreign policies or conducting
their own national diplomacy.
CFSP remains a work in progress. Although the EU has made strides in forging common policies
on a range of international issues, from the Balkans to Iran, some argue that the credibility of
CFSP often suffers from an inability to reach consensus. Others note that some differences in
viewpoint are inevitable among a multitude of countries with different historical relationships and
varying national interests. The EU’s 2009 Lisbon Treaty sought to bolster CFSP by increasing the
EU’s visibility on the world stage and making the EU a more coherent foreign policy actor. As
noted, the treaty established a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
Policy to serve essentially as the EU’s chief diplomat. The Lisbon Treaty also created an EU
diplomatic corps (the European External Action Service) to support the High Representative.
In recent years, many European leaders have renewed calls for the EU to become a more
assertive, independent global actor—often referred to as
strategic autonomy. Although this
concept initially described the need for greater EU action in the security and defense fields, the
EU has recently widened it to include other areas, such as trade, digital technology, and climate
change, among others.11 For some in the EU, Russia’s war against Ukraine has given further
impetus to promoting the EU as a robust international leader and the conflict may bolster the
EU’s drive for strategic autonomy and efforts to strengthen CFSP’s credibility. At the same time,
the EU has struggled to forge a united response to the Israel-Hamas conflict that began in October
2023, exposing divisions among EU leaders and member states, and raising questions about the
EU’s role as a geostrategic actor.12 EU officials have been considering ways to improve CFSP
decisionmaking, with some advocating for eliminating or curtailing the unanimity requirement for
certain CFSP decisions. Some EU members, however, are hesitant to support possible changes to
CFSP decisionmaking rules or other reforms that could limit national sovereignty and would
require EU treaty changes.13 (Also see
“How Might the EU Evolve in the Future?,” below.)
August 29, 2022; Masa Ocvirk, “Charles Michel’s Speech on EU Enlargement: New Momentum or Wishful
Thinking?,” Wilson Center, September 5, 2023; Piotr Buras and Engjellushe Morina, “Catch-27: The Contradictory
Thinking About Enlargement in the EU,” European Council on Foreign Relations, November 23, 2023.
11 EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission
Josep Borrell, “Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters,” European External Action Service, December 3, 2020.
12 See, for example, Matthew Karnitschnig, “Europe’s Power Outage,”
Politico Europe, October 12, 2023; Maria Luisa
Fantappiè and Nathalie Tocci, “Europe Is Stuck Over the Israel-Hamas War,” Instituto Affari Internazionali, November
10, 2023; Emiliano Alessandri and Domènec Ruiz Devesa, “The EU and the Israel-Hamas War: A Narrow but
Important Niche,” Middle East Institute, November 14, 2023.
13 See, for example, Jacopo Barigazzi and Jakob Hanke Vela, “EU’s Unanimity Rules Are Here for Now, Despite the
Chatter,”
Politico Europe, September 20, 2022.
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The European Union: Questions and Answers
Does the EU Have a Defense Policy?
Since 1999, the EU has been working to develop a Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP), formerly known as the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). CSDP seeks to
improve the EU’s ability to respond to security crises and to enhance European military
capabilities. The EU has created three defense decisionmaking bodies and has developed a rapid
reaction force and multinational “battlegroups.” Such EU forces are not a standing “EU army”
but rather a catalogue of troops and assets at appropriate readiness levels that may be drawn from
existing national forces for EU operations. CSDP operations focus largely on tasks such as
peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance. Many CSDP missions to date
have been civilian, rather than military, in nature, with objectives such as police and judicial
training (“rule of law”) or security sector reform. The EU is or has been engaged in CSDP
missions in regions ranging from the Balkans and the Caucasus to Africa and the Middle East.
Nevertheless, improving European military capabilities has been difficult, especially given many
years of flat or declining European defense budgets following the end of the Cold War. Capability
gaps exist in strategic air- and sealift, command and control systems, intelligence, and other force
multipliers. Some analysts have suggested pooling assets among several member states and the
development of national niche capabilities as possible ways to help remedy European military
shortfalls. In 2004, the EU established the European Defense Agency to help coordinate defense-
industrial and procurement policy in an effort to stretch European defense funds farther.
In recent years, renewed efforts to promote EU defense integration have been driven by mounting
concerns about a resurgent Russia, a desire to burnish the EU project in light of Brexit, and
questions about the former Trump Administration’s commitment to NATO and transatlantic
security. Since 2016, EU leaders have announced several initiatives to bolster EU security and
defense cooperation, including a European Defense Fund (EDF) to support joint defense research
and development activities. In 2017, the EU launched a new defense pact (known officially as
Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO) aimed at spending defense funds more efficiently,
jointly developing military capabilities, and increasing military interoperability. Some analysts
note that progress on EU defense cooperation remains slow and initiatives such as PESCO have
yet to deliver significant new high-end military capabilities.14
For some in the EU, Russia’s war against Ukraine has generated a greater sense of urgency about
building a stronger, more capable EU in the field of security and defense. At the same time,
Russia’s aggression has reinforced NATO’s importance for many in the EU and prompted EU
members Finland and Sweden to seek NATO membership.15 In March 2022, the EU released a
new EU security and defense strategy—known as
Strategic Compass—to improve EU military
and defense capabilities by 2030; the strategy also called for enhancing cooperation with partners,
including NATO.16 (Also see
“What Is the Relationship of the EU to NATO?,” below.)
14 European Commission, “European Defense Action Plan—FAQs,” fact sheet, November 30, 2016; Council of the
EU, “Defense Cooperation: Council Establishes Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with 25 Member States
Participating,” press release, December 11, 2017; Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Military Projects Face Delays, Leaked
Document Shows,”
Politico Europe, July 12, 2021; Aurélie Pugnet, “EU’s Flagship Defense Cooperation PESCO
Struggles to Show Life,” EurActiv.com, May 19, 2023.
15 Giorgio Leali and Barbara Moens, “Ukraine War Gives Macron’s Drive for EU Autonomy More Impetus,”
Politico
Europe, March 9, 2022; Steven Erlanger, “When It Comes to Building Its Own Defense, Europe Has Blinked,”
New
York Times, February 4, 2023.
16 European External Action Service,
A Strategic Compass for the EU, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage/106337/towards-strategic-compass_en.
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What Is the Relationship of the EU to NATO?
Since its inception, the EU has asserted that CSDP is intended to allow the EU to make decisions
and conduct military operations “where NATO as a whole is not engaged,” and that CSDP does
not seek to supplant NATO’s collective defense role. The United States has supported EU efforts
to develop CSDP, provided that it remains tied to NATO and does not rival or duplicate NATO
structures or resources. Advocates of CSDP argue that more robust EU military capabilities will
also benefit NATO given that 22 countries currently belong to both organizations.17 The Berlin
Plus arrangement—which was finalized in 2003 and allows EU-led military missions access to
NATO planning capabilities and common assets—was designed to help ensure close NATO-EU
links and prevent a wasteful duplication of European defense resources. Two Berlin Plus missions
have been conducted in the Balkans, and NATO and the EU have sought to coordinate their
activities on the ground in operations in Afghanistan and various hot spots in Africa.
At the same time, NATO-EU relations have been somewhat strained for years. More extensive
NATO-EU cooperation at the political level on a range of issues—from countering terrorism or
weapons proliferation to improving coordination of crisis management planning and defense
policies—has been stymied largely by EU tensions with Turkey (in NATO but not the EU) and
the ongoing dispute over the divided island of Cyprus (in the EU but not NATO).18 Bureaucratic
rivalry also has contributed to frictions between the two organizations.
The emergence of new security threats over the past decade, however, prompted some progress
toward enhanced NATO-EU cooperation. In 2016, NATO and the EU concluded two new
arrangements—one on countering migrant smuggling in the Aegean Sea and another on cyber
defense—and issued a joint declaration to “give new impetus and new substance” to their
strategic partnership, including boosting their common ability to counter hybrid threats.19 In 2018,
NATO leaders reaffirmed the importance of the NATO-EU partnership and both organizations
pledged to improve military mobility in Europe.20
Some U.S. experts remain concerned that a minority of EU member states (traditionally led by
France) would like to build an EU defense arm more independent from NATO in the longer term.
Consistent with the views of most past U.S. Administrations, the Biden Administration has sought
to encourage recent EU defense efforts but also stresses that EU defense initiatives must be linked
to and must help to bolster NATO. In 2021, the Biden Administration announced that the United
States would join a PESCO project to improve military mobility in Europe and launched a new
U.S.-EU dialogue on security and defense cooperation aimed in part at raising “the level of
ambition” for the NATO-EU partnership.21
17 Currently, five countries belong to the EU but not to NATO (Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden, although
Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022 and its accession is pending); nine other countries belong to NATO but not
the EU (Albania, Canada, Iceland, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
18 Turkey has long objected to Cypriot participation in NATO-EU meetings on the grounds that Cyprus is not a
member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and thus does not have a security relationship with the alliance. The
absence of Cyprus from PfP also hinders NATO and the EU from sharing sensitive intelligence information.
Meanwhile, Cyprus has reportedly blocked various proposals over the years for enhancing NATO-EU cooperation.
19 NATO, “Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and
the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” July 8, 2016.
20 NATO, “Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation,” July 10, 2018.
21 Jacopo Barigazzi, “U.S. to Join EU Project on Military Mobility,”
Politico Europe, May 5, 2021; U.S. Department of
State, “Joint Statement by the Secretary of State of the United States of America and the EU High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission,” press release, December 3, 2021.
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As noted above, the EU’s 2022 Strategic Compass strategy document calls for enhancing ties
between NATO and the EU. In January 2023, NATO and the EU signed a new declaration
pledging to enhance cooperation further in light of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and emerging
challenges, including China’s “growing assertiveness,” protection of critical infrastructures,
disruptive technologies, climate change, and “foreign information manipulation.”22 Some experts
argue that with Finland’s accession to NATO in April 2023 and Sweden’s expected accession in
the near future, 23 of the EU’s 27 member states will belong to both organizations and this could
help alleviate rivalry and improve NATO-EU cooperation. Others suggest that Finnish and
Swedish NATO accession—along with heightened concerns about Russia—may underscore
NATO’s dominance as Europe’s security guarantor and may weaken ambitions to develop a
separate EU defense capacity.23
What Is Justice and Home Affairs?
The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) field seeks to foster common internal security measures
while protecting the fundamental rights of EU citizens and promoting the free movement of
persons within the EU. JHA encompasses police and judicial cooperation, migration and asylum
policies, fighting terrorism and other cross-border crimes, and combating racism and xenophobia.
JHA also includes border control policies and rules for the Schengen area of free movement. For
many years, EU efforts to harmonize policies in the JHA field were hampered by member states’
concerns that such measures could infringe on their legal systems and national sovereignty. The
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and subsequent attacks in Europe galvanized progress
in the JHA area. Among other measures, key initiatives have included establishing an EU-wide
arrest warrant and bolstering Europol, the EU’s agency for law enforcement cooperation.
The EU’s 2009 Lisbon Treaty expanded the role of the EU institutions in JHA policymaking. The
treaty gave the European Parliament “co-decision” power over the majority of JHA policy areas
and made most decisions on JHA issues in the Council of Ministers subject to the qualified
majority voting system, rather than unanimity, in a bid to speed EU decisionmaking. In practice,
EU member states largely continue to strive for consensus on sensitive JHA policies. For some
issues in the JHA area, the Lisbon Treaty added an “emergency brake” that allows any member
state to halt a measure it believes could threaten its national legal system and, ultimately, to opt
out of the measure. Despite such safeguards, Ireland (along with the UK at the time) negotiated
the right to choose those JHA policies that it wished to take part in and to opt out of all others,
and Denmark extended its previous opt-out in some JHA areas to all JHA issues. The Lisbon
Treaty technically renamed JHA as the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice.
What Is the Schengen Area?
The Schengen area of free movement currently encompasses 23 EU member states plus 4 non-EU
countries.24 Within the Schengen area, internal border controls have been eliminated, and
individuals may travel without passport checks among participating countries. In effect, Schengen
22 NATO, “Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation,” January 10, 2023.
23 “Judy Asks: Is Finnish and Swedish NATO Membership Useful for Europe?,” CarnegieEurope.eu, April 28, 2022;
Lili Bayer, “EU and NATO Vow to Expand Cooperation,”
Politico Europe, January 10, 2023.
24 The 23 EU members that currently participate fully in the Schengen area of free movement are Austria, Belgium,
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. The four non-EU
members of the Schengen area are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.
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participants share a common external border where immigration checks for individuals entering
or leaving the Schengen area are carried out. The Schengen area is founded upon the Schengen
Agreement of 1985 (Schengen is the town in Luxembourg where the agreement was signed,
originally by five countries). In 1999, the Schengen Agreement was incorporated into EU law.
The Schengen Borders Code comprises a detailed set of rules governing both external and
internal border controls in the Schengen area, including common rules on visas, asylum requests,
and border checks. Participating countries may reintroduce internal border controls for a limited
period of time in cases of a serious security threat or exceptional circumstances, such as a
conference of world leaders or a major international sporting event.
Along with the abolition of internal borders, Schengen participants agreed to strengthen
cooperation between their police and judicial authorities in order to safeguard internal security
and fight organized crime. As part of these efforts, they established the Schengen Information
System (SIS), a large-scale information database that enables police, border guards, and other law
enforcement and judicial authorities to enter and consult alerts on certain categories of persons
and objects. Such categories include persons wanted for arrest, missing persons (including
children), criminal suspects, individuals who do not have the right to enter or stay in Schengen
territory, stolen vehicles and property, lost or forged identity documents, and firearms.
Three EU countries (Bulgaria, Romania, and Cyprus) are not yet full Schengen members but have
been working on meeting the necessary security and other requirements. In December 2023, EU
member states approved Bulgaria and Romania’s partial entrance into the Schengen free
movement area, starting with removing passport controls at internal air and sea borders from
March 31, 2024; the EU plans to decide on lifting controls at internal land borders with Bulgaria
and Romania at a later date.25 Ireland has an opt-out from the Schengen free movement area but
takes part in some aspects of the Schengen Agreement related to police and judicial cooperation,
including access to the SIS.
Does the EU Have a Trade Policy and Process?
The EU has a common external trade policy, which means that trade policy is an exclusive
competence of the EU and no member state can negotiate its own international trade agreement.
The EU’s trade policy is one of its most well-developed and integrated policies. It evolved along
with the common market—which provides for the free movement of goods within the EU—to
prevent one member state from importing foreign goods at cheaper prices due to lower tariffs and
then re-exporting the items to another member with higher tariffs. The scope of the common trade
policy has been extended partially to include trade in services, the defense of intellectual property
rights, and foreign direct investment. The European Commission and the Council of the EU work
together to set the common customs tariff, guide export policy, and decide on any trade protection
or retaliation measures. EU rules allow the Council of the EU to make trade decisions with
qualified majority voting, but in practice the council tends to employ consensus.
The European Commission negotiates trade agreements with outside countries and trading blocs
on behalf of the EU as a whole. Both the Council of the EU and the European Parliament must
approve all such trade agreements before they can enter into force. The process for negotiating
and concluding a new international trade agreement begins with discussions among all three EU
institutions, and the European Commission initiates an informal scoping exercise with the
25 Laura Hülsemann, “Romania, Bulgaria Set to Partially Enter Schengen Zone in March,”
Politico Europe, December
28, 2023; “European Commission, “Bulgaria and Romania to Join Schengen Area Starting with Air and Sea Borders:
Commission Welcomes Landmark Council Decision,” press release, December 30, 2023.
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potential partner country or trade bloc. The European Commission then requests authorization
from the Council of the EU to begin negotiations. The Council of the EU must then provide
authorization, which usually includes
negotiating directives (sometimes termed the
negotiating
mandate), which set out the overall objectives for the future agreement. The directives also are
shared with the European Parliament.
Following authorization by the Council of the EU, the European Commission then launches
formal negotiations for the new trade agreement. Within the European Commission, the
department that handles EU trade policy—the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade)—leads
the negotiations. Typically, there are a series of negotiation rounds. The duration of the
negotiations varies but can range from two to three years or longer. During the course of
negotiations, the European Commission is expected to keep both the Council of the EU and the
European Parliament apprised of its progress.
Once negotiations on a new trade agreement conclude, the proposed accord must be approved by
the Council of the EU and submitted to the European Parliament for its consent. Although the
European Parliament is limited to voting “yes” or “no” to the new accord, it can ask the European
Commission to review or address any concerns. If parts of the trade agreement fall under member
state competence, all EU countries must also ratify the agreement according to their national
ratification procedures. After the European Parliament gives its consent and following ratification
in the member states (if required), the Council of the EU adopts the final decision to conclude the
agreement, which then may be officially published and enter into force.26
How Do EU Countries and Citizens View the EU?
Most member states believe that the EU magnifies their political and economic clout (i.e., the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts). Nevertheless, tensions have always existed between
those members that seek an “ever closer union” through greater integration and those that prefer
to keep the bloc on a more intergovernmental footing in order to better guard their national
sovereignty. As a result, some member states have opted out of certain aspects of integration,
including the eurozone and the Schengen area (this included the UK, which traditionally was
reluctant to cede too much sovereignty during its tenure as an EU member state). Another classic
divide in the EU falls along big versus small state lines; small members often are cautious of
initiatives that they fear could allow larger countries to dominate EU decisionmaking.
In addition, different histories and geography may influence member states’ policy preferences.
The EU’s enlargement to the east brought in many members with histories of Soviet control,
which often prompted skepticism of past EU efforts to engage with Russia and at times caused
frictions with older EU member states. Meanwhile, southern EU countries that border the
Mediterranean may have greater political and economic interests in North Africa than EU
members located farther north. History and geography also may affect member state positions on
frequently contentious issues, from fiscal and monetary policy, defense integration, and EU
reforms to migration, energy and climate initiatives, trade, and managing relations with China.
The prevailing view among European publics has been historically favorable toward the EU.
Many EU citizens value the freedom to easily travel, work, and live in other EU countries. Recent
26 Some trade agreements submitted for Council of the EU and European Parliament approval are accompanied by
European Commission legislative proposals needed for implementation, which must also be adopted by both the
Council of the EU and the European Parliament. For more on the EU process for concluding new trade agreements, see
European Commission, “Making Trade Policy,” at https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-
region/making-trade-policy_en; and Council of the EU, “Infographic – EU Trade Negotiations,” at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/eu-trade-negotiations/.
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opinion polls indicate that a majority of EU citizens remain supportive of the EU in general and
satisfied with the EU’s response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.27
At the same time, there has always been a degree of “euroskepticism”—or anti-EU sentiments—
among some segments of the European public. Traditionally, such euroskepticism has been driven
by fears about the loss of national sovereignty or concerns about the EU’s “democratic deficit”—
a feeling that ordinary citizens have no say over decisions taken in faraway Brussels. For more
than a decade, however, economic difficulties and worries about income inequality, migration,
and globalization have heightened support for populist, antiestablishment, nationalist political
parties throughout the EU. Many of these parties also hold euroskeptic views.
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland,
Spain, and Sweden are among those EU countries with prominent populist and, to at least some
extent, euroskeptic parties. Although most euroskeptic parties are on the right or far right of the
political spectrum, a few are on the left or far left. Moreover, they hold a range of views on the
future of the EU, with some advocating for EU reforms and greater member state sovereignty and
others calling for an end to the eurozone or the EU itself. In recent years, some of the most
stridently euroskeptic parties, such as France’s National Rally and the Netherlands’ Freedom
Party, have focused more on calling for EU reforms than on promoting the dissolution of the
eurozone or the EU itself (in part due to the difficulties encountered by the UK as it sought to
leave the EU). At present, parties with euroskeptic views (to varying degrees) are leading or part
of governments in Hungary, Italy, and Finland; a euroskeptic party also is providing
parliamentary support for Sweden’s current coalition government. France’s National Rally
experienced significant support in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2022 and the
Netherlands’ Freedom Party came in first in parliamentary elections in 2023.28
In the May 2019 European Parliament elections, an array of antiestablishment and euroskeptic
parties secured up to 25% of seats.29 Traditionally such parties in the European Parliament have
struggled to form a cohesive opposition due to competing agendas and diverse views (including
on EU reforms, fiscal policy, migration, and Russia). In the current European Parliament, some of
the most hard-line euroskeptic parties on the right of the political spectrum have sought to
overcome their political fragmentation and have banded together to forge a larger euroskeptic
group to increase their political weight and influence. Euroskeptic parties in the current European
Parliament, however, remain a collective minority and must work with other political parties to
impact the legislative process. Polls suggest that euroskeptic parties could make substantial gains
in the upcoming European Parliament elections scheduled for June 2024, in part due to mounting
concerns about ongoing migration in many EU countries.30
27 Eurobarometer,
EP Autumn 2023 Survey: Six Months Before the 2024 European Elections, December 2023;
Eurobarometer,
Standard Eurobarometer 100 - Autumn 2023, December 2023.
28 Sylvie Corbet and Barbara Surk, “France Reshaped: Election Emboldens Le Pen, Undercuts Macron,” Associated
Press, June 20, 2022; Malu Cursino, “Ulf Kristersson: Swedish Parliament Elects New PM Backed by Far Right,”
BBC.com, Octoberber 17, 2022; Valentina Pop, “Italy’s Leader Looks to Mend EU Fences in Visit to Brussels,”
Financial Times, November 3, 2022; Essie Lehto, “Finland’s Right-wing Parties Strike Deal to Form Government,”
Reuters, June 15, 2023; Paul Kirby and Anna Holligan, “Dutch Election: Anti-Islam Populist Geert Wilders Wins
Dramatic Victory,” BBC.com, November 23, 2023.
29 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF11211,
The European Parliament and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick.
30 See, for example, Nicolas Camut, “Right-wing Set for Big Gains in 2024 EU Election, Polling Shows,”
Politico
Europe, August 9, 2023; Mared Gwyn Jones, “Interest in EU Elections on the Rise as Polls Project Unprecedented
Shift to the Right,”
Euronews, December 7, 2023; Jon Henley, “Make or Break for the EU? Europeans Vote in June
with Far Right on the Rise,”
Guardian, January 3, 2024.
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What Is Brexit, and How Has It Affected the EU?31
The UK was long considered one of the most euroskeptic members of the EU, with many British
leaders and citizens traditionally cautious of ceding too much sovereignty to Brussels. Brexit—or
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU—stems from a June 2016 public referendum in the UK on
whether the country should remain a member of the EU. UK voters favored leaving the EU by
52% to 48%. Several factors influenced this outcome, including economic dissatisfaction, fears
about globalization and immigration, and anti-elite sentiments. In March 2017, the UK
government invoked Article 50—the so-called
exit clause—of the Treaty on European Union.
The UK and the EU subsequently began negotiations on the terms of the UK’s withdrawal.
UK-EU negotiations on the withdrawal agreement proved complicated and lengthy. Challenges
related to maintaining an open border between Northern Ireland (part of the UK) and the
Republic of Ireland (an EU member state) were key stumbling blocks. In October 2019, in order
to ensure an open border on the island of Ireland and preserve the Northern Ireland peace process,
the UK and EU agreed that Northern Ireland would effectively remain in the EU’s single market
and customs union for goods post-Brexit. Known as the Northern Ireland protocol (to the UK-EU
withdrawal treaty), this arrangement sought to eliminate the need for regulatory and customs
checks on trade in goods on the Northern Ireland land border, but it also essentially created a
customs border in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK (i.e., Great
Britain) to safeguard the rules of the EU single market. The UK officially withdrew as a member
of the EU on January 31, 2020, but continued to apply EU rules and to participate in the EU’s
single market and customs union for an 11-month transition period.
Days before the end of the transition period, the UK and the EU concluded a 1,200-page Trade
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), along with accords on nuclear cooperation and on protecting
the security of classified information. The post-Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland in the
protocol also took effect after the end of the transition period, in January 2021. Implementation of
the protocol led to some trade disruptions between Northern Ireland and Great Britain, heightened
political and societal divisions within Northern Ireland, and strained UK-EU relations.
The EU rejected calls by the UK government and some in Northern Ireland for a fundamental
renegotiation of the protocol but engaged in talks with the UK on ways to overcome the
protocol’s operational challenges. In February 2023, the UK and the EU reached a new
agreement, the Windsor Framework, which leaves the basic architecture of the protocol in place
but seeks to reduce customs checks and paperwork for goods from Great Britain remaining in
Northern Ireland. Among other measures, the Windsor Framework also introduces a process to
allow Northern Ireland legislators to object to the application of certain EU rules in Northern
Ireland. UK and EU officials officially approved the Windsor Framework in late March 2023 and
the framework’s new trade rules came into force in October 2023.32 UK-EU relations appear to
have improved since the conclusion of the Windsor Framework; for example, in June 2023, the
UK and EU signed a memorandum of understanding on regulatory cooperation in financial
services and in September 2023, the UK rejoined two EU science research funding programs.33
31 For more background on Brexit, see CRS Report R46730,
Brexit: Overview, Trade, and Northern Ireland,
coordinated by Derek E. Mix.
32 Hard-line unionists (those who strongly support Northern Ireland’s position as part of the UK) remain unsatisfied
with the provisions in the Windsor Framework and political tensions persist within Northern Ireland. Also see, CRS
Report R46259,
Northern Ireland: The Peace Process, Ongoing Challenges, and U.S. Interests, by Kristin Archick.
33 See, for example, Nicola Newson,
The Future UK-EU Relationship: Report by the House of Lords European Affairs
(continued...)
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Despite Brexit, EU leaders assert that “the Union of 27 countries will continue.”34 Many
observers view the EU as having taken a tough line in the withdrawal agreement and subsequent
trade agreement negotiations—refusing to allow the UK to cherry-pick the benefits of the EU
without taking on the required obligations—in part to discourage other member states and
euroskeptic publics from contemplating a break with the EU that would further fracture the bloc.
Some in the EU continue to express concerns that the UK could become an economic competitor
in the longer term, especially if the UK were to diverge significantly from EU environmental,
labor, or state aid standards in ways that could give UK businesses a trade advantage. At the same
time, Brexit ultimately could lead to a more like-minded EU, able to pursue deeper integration
without UK opposition.
How Might the EU Evolve in the Future?
In light of Brexit and other challenges, the EU has faced questions about its future shape and
character in recent years. In 2017, during the commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the
Treaties of Rome (foundational EU treaties), EU leaders renewed their commitment to the
European integration project and pledged to make the EU “stronger and more resilient, through
even greater unity and solidarity.”35 Some experts argue that “more EU” and further integration is
necessary to better address the range of political and economic issues confronting the bloc. Others
are skeptical that national governments will be inclined to cede more authority to a Brussels
bureaucracy viewed as opaque and out of touch with the problems of average Europeans.
Considerable attention since 2016-2017 has focused on developing a “multispeed EU,” in which
some member states could agree to greater integration in certain areas and others could opt out.
Some European policymakers and analysts suggest that such a multispeed EU already exists in
practice, with varying membership on a range of EU initiatives, including the eurozone,
Schengen, justice and home affairs issues, and defense policy. Critics contend, however, that
making the multispeed concept central to the EU’s identity could be divisive, undermine EU
solidarity, and potentially lead to different classes of EU membership.36
Although the EU has not formally moved toward a multispeed EU, the EU has sought to respond
to recent challenges with new common policies and by pursuing greater integration in certain
areas (such as security and defense, as discussed in
“Does the EU Have a Defense Policy?”). In
May 2022, the EU concluded a year-long Conference on the Future of Europe, aimed at
promoting dialogue on a wide range of topics among citizens, experts, and EU officials; the
conference issued a final report with 49 proposals on issues such as European democracy and the
rule of law, the economy, health policy, climate change, and migration, among others. The EU
institutions are considering implementation of the conference proposals, some of which would
require treaty changes and could be controversial (see below).37
Russia’s war against Ukraine has galvanized debate further on the future of the EU. As previously
discussed, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine may boost EU efforts to strengthen its common foreign
Committee, House of Lords Library, September 8, 2023; Stefan Boscia, “After Brexit, Britain and Europe Embrace
Ever-closer Union,”
Politico Europe, September 26, 2023.
34 European Council, “Statement by the EU Leaders and the Netherlands Presidency on the Outcome of the UK
Referendum,” press release, June 24, 2016.
35 European Council,
The Rome Declaration, March 25, 2017.
36 Maia de la Baume, “Multispeed Europe: The EU’s Loch Ness Monster,”
Politico Europe, March 10, 2017; Matthew
Karnitschnig, “With Plenty of Pomp, Europe’s Leaders Renew Vows,”
Politico Europe, March 24, 2017.
37 European Commission,
Conference on the Future of Europe, at https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-
2024/new-push-european-democracy/conference-future-europe_en.
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and defense policies and has given impetus to enlarging the EU to include Ukraine and other
countries in the longer term. Such issues have sparked considerable discussion about whether EU
treaty reform may be necessary to alter EU decisionmaking rules and adapt EU institutions to
accommodate an even larger and more diverse membership. For years, Germany and France also
have called for eurozone reforms, and some analysts suggest the EU’s COVID-19 economic
recovery measures and the need to address the economic downturn stemming from the war in
Ukraine may lead to further EU economic integration. At the same time, EU initiatives in many
policy areas may be limited by diverging policy preferences among member states and between
EU institutions. Moreover, some member states are likely to be hesitant about embarking on
significant EU reforms that could lead to curtailing member state prerogatives and sovereignty.38
The leadership of key EU countries also may affect the EU’s evolution. Germany and France
traditionally play prominent roles in EU policymaking. French President Emmanuel Macron has
been a leading proponent of EU defense integration and EU strategic autonomy. German
Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who took office in late 2021, appears to share some of Macron’s
ambitions for the EU. Scholz outlined his vision for the EU in an August 2022 speech, which
included calling for EU reforms to help pave the way for further enlargement. At the same time,
the Franco-German partnership currently faces some tensions and divisions on a range of trade,
financial, defense, and foreign policy issues. Meanwhile, Central and Eastern European countries,
such as Poland and the Baltic states, have been instrumental in shaping the EU’s response to
Russia’s war against Ukraine and may play increasingly influential roles in determining the EU’s
future development. Efforts to revitalize or reform the EU also could be affected by member state
governments led or supported by euroskeptic parties.39
Does the United States Have a Formal Relationship
with the EU?
For decades, the United States and the EU (and its predecessor institutions) have maintained
diplomatic and economic ties. The 1990 U.S.-EU Transatlantic Declaration set out principles for
greater consultation, and established regular summit and ministerial meetings. In 1995, the New
Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and the EU-U.S. Joint Action Plan provided a framework for
promoting stability and democracy together, responding to global challenges, and expanding
world trade. The NTA also sought to strengthen individual, people-to-people ties across the
Atlantic, and launched a number of dialogues, including ones for business leaders and legislators.
The Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD) has been the formal mechanism for engagement
and exchange between the U.S. House of Representatives and the European Parliament since
1999, although inter-parliamentary exchanges between the two bodies date back to 1972.
Who Are U.S. Officials’ Counterparts in the EU?
During U.S.-EU summits, the U.S. President meets with the President of the European
Commission and the President of the European Council. The U.S. Secretary of State’s most
38 See, for example, Stefan Lehne, “Does the EU Need Treaty Change?,” CarnegieEurope.eu, June 16, 2022; Max
Bergmann, “The EU’s Next Big Deal: Enlargement for Treaty Reform,”
Politico Europe, August 2, 2022.
39 Eoin Drea, “The EU’s Balance of Power Is Shifting East,” ForeignPolicy.com, June 21, 2022, Erika Solomon,
“Condemned to Lead Europe, German Chancellor Struggles for Impact,”
New York Times, September 2, 2022; Jean
Pisani-Ferry, “Why Europe’s Franco-German Engine Is Stalling,” Project-Syndicate.org, January 31, 2023; Shahin
Vallée, “France and Germany’s Relationship Is at the Heart of the EU. Why Has It Gone Sour?,”
Guardian, November
20, 2023.
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frequent interlocutor in the EU context is the High Representative for the Union’s Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy. The U.S. Trade Representative’s key interlocutor is the European
Commissioner for Trade, who directs the EU’s common external trade policy. Other U.S.
Cabinet-level officials interact with European Commission counterparts or member state
ministers in the Council of Ministers formation as issues arise. Many working-level relationships
between U.S. and EU officials also exist. A delegation in Washington, DC, represents the
European Union in its dealings with the U.S. government, while the U.S. Mission to the European
Union represents Washington’s interests in Brussels.
What Is the History of U.S.-EU Relations?
Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have long viewed the European
integration project as a way to foster democratic allies and strong trading partners in Europe. In
the immediate aftermath of World War II, the United States supported the European integration
project as a way to promote political reconciliation (especially between France and Germany),
boost economic recovery, and prevent another catastrophic war on the European continent.
During the Cold War, the European integration project—and the peace and prosperity it helped to
engender in Western Europe—was considered central to deterring the Soviet threat. With the end
of the Cold War, the United States strongly backed EU efforts to extend the political and
economic benefits of membership to Central and Eastern Europe. The United States also
traditionally has supported the EU aspirations of Turkey and the Western Balkan states.
Over the past 25 years, the United States has often looked to the EU for partnership on common
foreign and security policy concerns worldwide, and the two partners have a strong track record
of cooperation. The United States and the EU have promoted peace and stability in various
regions and countries (including the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa); enhanced law
enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation; and sought to tackle cross-border challenges, such
as cybersecurity. In 2014, the United States and the EU began imposing targeted sanctions on
Russia in response to Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea and its support for separatists in
eastern Ukraine.
The United States and the EU also share an extensive and interdependent economic relationship.
Trade and investment ties have deepened and evolved over time. In recent years, total U.S. trade
in goods and services with the EU typically has been around $1 trillion per year. The United
States and the EU are each other’s largest source and destination for foreign direct investment.
Total stock of two-way direct investment was about $5 trillion in 2022 (historical-cost basis), and
U.S. and EU multinational firms employed over 6 million workers (in direct employment) in
2021 on both sides of the Atlantic.40 Historically, U.S.-EU cooperation has been a driving force
behind efforts to liberalize world trade and ensure the stability of international financial markets.
At times, however, the U.S.-EU relationship has faced serious challenges. U.S.-EU relations hit a
low point in 2003 over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which some EU members supported and
others strongly opposed. Data protection and balancing privacy and security have been key U.S.-
EU sticking points for years; EU concerns about what it views as insufficient U.S. data privacy
and protection safeguards have put pressure on U.S.-EU law enforcement information-sharing
agreements and commercial data transfers. Long-standing U.S.-EU trade disputes persist over
poultry, bioengineered food products, and protection of geographical indications.
40 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
International Trade and Investment, at https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-
investment.
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Significant strains in U.S.-EU relations emerged during the Trump Administration. Many EU
leaders were taken aback by former President Trump’s seeming hostility toward the bloc, his
expressed support for Brexit, and his reported contention that the EU engaged in unfair trade
practices that harmed U.S. economic interests.41 EU officials were concerned by the Trump
Administration’s imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs and what the EU regarded as
protectionist U.S. trade policies. Other U.S.-EU policy divisions also existed during the Trump
Administration, including on Russia, China, Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, climate change,
managing the COVID-19 pandemic, and the role of multilateral institutions such as the United
Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Despite the heightened difficulties, the EU pursued cooperation with the Trump Administration
where possible. The two sides attempted to deescalate trade tensions, in part through pursuing a
U.S.-EU trade liberalization agreement (although talks stalled amid discord on their scope,
especially with respect to agriculture). The EU sought to work with the Trump Administration on
areas such as counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and WTO reform. U.S. and EU scientific and
regulatory experts established technical dialogues on pandemic-related issues. In October 2020,
the Trump Administration and the EU launched a dialogue on China to discuss both common
concerns and differences in U.S. and European views.42
What Is the Current State of U.S.-EU Relations?
Upon entering office, President Biden “underscored his support for the [EU] and his commitment
to repair and revitalize the U.S.-EU partnership.”43 At a June 2021 U.S.-EU summit, the United
States pledged to work with the EU on a wide range of global concerns, including the COVID-19
pandemic and climate change.44 EU officials welcomed the renewed U.S. commitment to
multilateralism—signaled by President Biden’s decisions to reverse certain Trump Administration
policies and rejoin the World Health Organization and the Paris Agreement on climate change, as
well as by U.S. engagement on ways to revive the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. In its first year in
office, the Biden Administration also coordinated human rights-related sanctions on both Russian
and Chinese officials with the EU, restarted the U.S.-EU dialogue on China begun during the
Trump Administration, and launched high-level consultations with the EU on the Indo-Pacific.
Although some U.S.-EU tensions remained—and new controversies emerged related to EU
concerns about the U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Australia-
UK-U.S. security pact for the Indo-Pacific (known as AUKUS) announced in September 2021—
the overall tenor of U.S.-EU relations improved with the start of the Biden Administration.
Since early 2022, Russia’s war against Ukraine has largely dominated the U.S.-EU agenda and
bolstered U.S.-EU ties. The United States and the EU have demonstrated steadfast support for
Ukraine’s territorial integrity and have cooperated extensively on imposing sanctions on Russia
and other responses. The Biden Administration also supports EU efforts to end its dependency on
Russian energy imports. President Biden pledged to work with international partners to help boost
liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to the EU in 2022 and committed to enabling additional
U.S. LNG shipments through 2030. A U.S.-EU task force on energy security is seeking to
41 See, for example, “‘I Think the European Union Is a Foe,’ Trump Says Ahead of Putin Meeting in Helsinki,”
CBSNews.com, July 15, 2018.
42 For more information on U.S.-EU relations during the Trump Administration, see CRS Report R45745,
Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues, coordinated by Kristin Archick.
43 The White House, “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with European Commission President Ursula von
der Leyen,” press release, March 5, 2021.
44 The White House,
U.S.-EU Summit Statement, June 15, 2021.
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implement these and other goals related to transitioning away from fossil fuels and toward clean
energy. For many on both sides of the Atlantic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reinforced the
importance of the U.S.-EU partnership and its combined political and economic clout.45
U.S.-EU solidarity on Ukraine faces some pressures, however, amid an internal EU dispute over
Ukrainian grain imports, delays in new EU and U.S. funding, and U.S. “donor fatigue” and
political divisions.46 U.S.-EU differences also could arise as policymakers begin to consider
requirements for future peace negotiations or how to manage relations with Russia in the longer
term. The United States and the EU support a “comprehensive, just, and lasting peace” in Ukraine
based on “full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”47 The
Biden Administration and leaders of EU countries such as Poland and the Baltic states have been
particularly forceful in arguing against any efforts to encourage Ukrainian concessions in order to
give Russia a face-saving way out of the conflict or otherwise reward Russia’s aggression. As the
war in Ukraine enters its third year, however, some officials and analysts on both sides of the
Atlantic may increasingly argue that the time has come for enhancing U.S. and European
diplomatic efforts to pave the way for a negotiated settlement for Ukraine.48
Revitalizing U.S.-EU economic ties, resolving trade disputes, and promoting technological
cooperation have been other key areas of focus for the Biden Administration.49 In 2021, the
United States and the EU reached interim agreements to address a long-standing dispute over
civil aircraft subsidies and on the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs imposed on the EU during the
Trump Administration. U.S. and EU negotiators are seeking to overcome divisions on a deal to
discourage trade in high-carbon steel and aluminum, address global overcapacity, and enable a
permanent solution on the steel and aluminum tariffs.50
The Biden Administration also established a Trade and Technology Council (TTC) with the EU to
discuss issues such as emerging technologies, supply chain security, and digital governance, as
well as a separate Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue.51 The United States views the
TTC, in part, as a vehicle for U.S.-EU cooperation on challenges posed by China and other
nonmarket economies; TTC meetings also have discussed U.S.-EU export controls and other
sanctions on Russia. Additionally, the Biden Administration concluded a new commercial data
transfer arrangement with the EU to replace the Privacy Shield framework (negotiations began
45 Also see CRS Insight IN11897,
Russia’s War Against Ukraine: European Union Responses and U.S.-EU Relations,
by Kristin Archick.
46 See, for example, Steven Erlanger, “Has Support for Ukraine Peaked? Some Fear So,”
New York Times, October 14,
2023; Seung Min Kim and Linley Sanders, “Nearly Half of Americans Think the US Is Spending Too Much on
Ukraine Aid, an AP-NORC Poll Says,” Associated Press, November 22, 2023; Abigail Hauslohner et al., “Zelensky
Unable to Win Over Congress as Biden’s Ukraine Package Stalls,”
Washington Post, December 12, 2023; Gabriela
Baczynska, “EU Chief Confident All 27 Member States Will Agree on Aid to Ukraine,” Reuters, January 17, 2024.
47 The White House,
U.S.-EU Summit Joint Statement, October 20, 2023.
48 Holly Ellyatt, “The West’s Unity over Ukraine Could Be Starting to Crack,” CNBC.com, June 16, 2022; Essi Lehto
et al., “Blinken Warns Against Peace Efforts that Would Reward Russian Aggression,” Reuters, June 2, 2023;
Courtney Kube et al., “U.S. and European Officials Broach Topic of Peace Negotiations with Ukraine, Sources Say,”
NBCNews.com, November 3, 2023; Amy Kazmin and Christopher Miller, “Italy Links Ukraine Aid to ‘Negotiated
Settlement’ Efforts,”
Financial Times, January 10, 2024.
49 Also see, CRS In Focus IF10931,
U.S.-EU Trade and Economic Relations, by Shayerah I. Akhtar.
50 Cecilia Malmström, “Next Steps for Europe and the US on their Green Agenda: Steel and Critical Minerals,”
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 30, 2023; Philip Blenkinsop, “EU, U.S. Extend Steel Tariff
Detente Until End-March 2025,” Reuters, December 19, 2023.
51 For more information, see U.S. Department of State,
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC), at
https://www.state.gov/u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-ttc/; and European Commission, “Competition: EU-US
Hold Third Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue,” press release, March 30, 2023.
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during the Trump Administration after the EU’s top court invalidated Privacy Shield in 2020 on
grounds that it did not meet EU data protection standards).52 The Biden Administration also
worked with the EU in the WTO on an intellectual property rights waiver for COVID-19 vaccines
and an international deal on setting a 15% global minimum corporate tax rate.
Despite efforts to bolster U.S.-EU trade and economic relations, U.S. tax credits for the purchase
of electric vehicles and other clean energy subsidies in P.L. 117-169 (commonly referred to as the
Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, or IRA) sparked new trade frictions. The EU contended that
some measures in the IRA could harm EU industries, discriminate against EU firms, and breach
multilateral trade rules. Some in the EU suggest the IRA failed to take EU economic interests into
account at a time when many member states were struggling with high energy costs and inflation,
in part because of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the EU’s imposition of sanctions and other
responses.53 The Biden Administration asserts that EU companies could benefit from parts of the
IRA; since March 2023, U.S. and EU officials have been negotiating a new critical minerals
agreement (CMA) to facilitate EU access to certain IRA tax credits for electric vehicles. Some
Members of Congress question the Administration’s pursuit of a CMA as an executive agreement
without formal congressional approval.54 Meanwhile, some U.S. officials (including in Congress)
and business interests voice concerns about new EU digital trade and competition rules that they
view as unfairly targeting large U.S. technology firms.55
Managing relations with China also may test U.S.-EU relations. EU views on China have
hardened in recent years and have come to mirror more closely U.S. concerns about China’s
growing political and economic influence. The Biden Administration and the EU have committed
to intensify cooperation on the range of strategic and economic challenges posed by China; at the
same time, many in the EU remain wary about a possible new U.S.-China “Cold War” and are
reluctant to antagonize a major economic partner. Some in the EU question the U.S. commitment
to work together on China, while the EU recognizes the need for cooperation with China on
common global concerns, such as climate change. In addition, varying political and economic
interests among EU countries may impede or otherwise affect efforts to promote closer U.S.-EU
policy alignment toward China.56
Additionally, both the United States and the EU are seeking to navigate challenges posed by
Hamas’s October 2023 terrorist attacks on Israel, the ensuing conflict in the Gaza Strip, and wider
regional repercussions. The Biden Administration and the EU have affirmed Israel’s right to
defend itself “in line with international law” and reiterated support for a two-state solution as “the
viable path to lasting peace” between Israel and the Palestinians in the longer term.57 However,
divisions among EU officials and member states exist—including on the timing of a potential
52 In July 2023, the EU completed its process for granting final approval to the new U.S.-EU Data Privacy Framework,
allowing the new personal data transfer arrangement with the United States to take effect. See European Commission,
“Data Protection: European Commission Adopts New Adequacy Decision for Safe and Trusted EU-US Data Flows,”
press release, July 10, 2023.
53 Edward Alden, “Biden’s ‘America First’ Policies Threaten Rift with Europe,” ForeignPolicy.com, December 5,
2022; “Explainer: Why the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act Has Rattled Europe,” Reuters, February 1, 2023.
54 See, for example, Doug Palmer, “Biden Admin Bows Slightly to European Pressure in Trade Clash,”
Politico,
December 29, 2022; Jeff Mason et al., “United States, EU Agree to Start Talks on Critical Minerals Amid Trade
Tensions,” Reuters, March 10, 2023; Steven Overly and Barbara Moens, “U.S., EU Lawmakers Feel Cut Out of
Biden’s Electric Vehicle Trade Agenda,”
Politico, March 31, 2023.
55 See, for example, Leah Nylen and Samuel Stolton, “U.S. Slow to Respond to EU’s Landmark Tech Regulation,”
Politico, March 25, 2022; U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Wyden and Crapo Call on Biden Administration to
Fight EU Digital Trade Policies that Discriminate Against U.S. Workers and Employers,” press release, March 9, 2023.
56 Also see CRS In Focus IF10252,
The European Union and China, by Sarah E. Garding et al.
57 The White House,
U.S.-EU Summit Joint Statement, October 20, 2023.
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Israel-Hamas cease fire and on managing the conflict’s regional implications—and could
complicate U.S.-EU policy coordination. For example, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark
supported the January 2024 U.S.-led military strikes against the Iranian-backed Houthi militant
group in Yemen to deter further Houthi attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea.
France, Italy, Spain, and other EU members, however, expressed concern that the U.S.-led
military response could escalate tensions in the region. Some EU members also reportedly have
been reluctant to join a U.S.-led naval patrol operation in the Red Sea due to concerns about
being under U.S. command; the EU is planning its own new naval mission to guard against
further Houthi attacks and protect freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.58
Moreover, EU concerns exist about ongoing U.S. political polarization and whether a future U.S.
administration would maintain current U.S. policies toward Russia, Ukraine, the EU, and
European security more broadly. Some in the EU remain skeptical about whether the United
States will be a credible global leader and a reliable partner in the long term and argue that
Europe must be better prepared to address future challenges on its own. The EU has emphasized
enhancing defense cooperation and concluding new trade agreements (including with Canada,
Japan, and Latin America) in recent years and has sought to become a global standard setter on
data protection and climate change mitigation. These and other efforts to position the EU as a key
international player are likely to remain EU imperatives for the foreseeable future.59
58 Angelo Amante et al., “Europe Split Over US, UK Strikes on Houthis in Yemen,” Reuters, January 12, 2024; Jacopo
Barigazzi, “EU Makes Muddle Response to Crisis in the Red Sea,”
Politico Europe, January 12, 2024; Andrew Gray et
al., “EU States Give Nod to Red Sea Mission to Deter Houthis,” Reuters, January 16, 2024; Alexandra Brzozowski,
“EU to Move Ahead with Red Sea Mission to Deter Houthis,” EurActiv.com, January 17, 2024.
59 See, for example, Majda Ruge and Jeremy Shapiro, “No Laughing MAGA: What the Next US Presidential Election
Could Mean for Europe,” European Council on Foreign Relations, June 3, 2022; Steven Erlanger, “In Europe, Few
Even Want to Talk About Trump Part 2,”
New York Times, August 19, 2023; Edy Wax and James Angelos, “Europe
Prepares to Stand Alone as Trump Returns,”
Politico Europe, January 16, 2024; Henry Ridgwell, “Is Europe Ready for
Possible Return of President Trump?,” VOANews.com, January 19, 2024; Zoe Schneeweiss, “Lagarde Says Best
Defense Against Trump 2.0 Is Strong Europe,” Bloomberg.com, January 19, 2024.
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Appendix. Map of the European Union and
Aspirant Countries
Figure A-1. European Union Member States and Candidates
Source: Created by the Congressional Research Service.
Author Information
Kristin Archick
Specialist in European Affairs
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Disclaimer
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
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Congressional Research Service
RS21372
· VERSION 64 · UPDATED
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