Congressional Oversight Manual

October 21, 2004 – December 22, 2022 RL30240

Congressional Oversight Manual
December 22, 2022
Congress’s lawmaking role does not end when it passes legislation. Oversight is fundamental to
make sure that laws are working as intended and are being administered in an effective, efficient,
Ben Wilhelm, Coordinator
and economical manner. The information that oversight can bring to Congress is essential as the
Analyst in Government
body grapples with the complexities of American government and society.
Organization and
Management
A fundamental objective of the Congressional Oversight Manual is to assist Members,

committees, and legislative staff in carrying out this vital legislative function. It is intended to
Todd Garvey, Coordinator
provide a broad overview of the procedural, legal, and practical issues that are likely to arise as
Legislative Attorney
Congress conducts oversight. This includes information on the mechanics of oversight practice

based on House and Senate rules, common investigative techniques, and an inventory of statutes
that impact oversight activity. In addition, the Manual discusses important legal principles that
Christopher M. Davis,
have developed around Congress’s oversight practice. The Manual is organized both to address
Coordinator
specific questions and to support those seeking a general introduction to or broader understanding
Analyst on Congress and
of oversight practice.
the Legislative Process

CRS first developed the Congressional Oversight Manual more than four decades ago following

a December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and Investigations. The workshop was
organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides from both parties and CRS at the
request of the bipartisan House leadership. CRS produced the Manual with the assistance initially of a number of House
committee staffers. In subsequent years, CRS has sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate
staff and updated the Manual periodically.
Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the performance of the
oversight function: providing consultative support on matters ranging from routine oversight and basic information gathering
to the most complex and highest profile investigations conducted by Congress. Given the size and scope of the modern
executive establishment, Congress’s oversight role may be even more significant—and more demanding—than when
Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic Congressional Government (1885): “Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant
oversight of administration.”

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Contacts
Author Information ...................................................................................................................... 126

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Introduction to Congressional Oversight and the
Oversight Manual
Writing in 1993, the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress defined congressional
oversight as the “review, monitoring, and supervision of the executive and the implementation of
public policy.”1 This definition captures the functional core of Congress’s oversight of the
executive branch. Nonetheless it is the beginning, rather than an end, of understanding oversight
as it has been practiced since the First Congress. As outlined in this manual, the purposes,
practice, and tools of congressional oversight extend far beyond the confines of a simple
definition.
The Oversight Manual
CRS has published the Congressional Oversight Manual since 1978. In that time, it has been one
of the most comprehensive resources for information on congressional oversight and benefited
from the experience and knowledge of dozens of CRS experts. Since it was first published, the
work of Congress and the resources available to conduct oversight have significantly changed.
For instance, the spread of interconnected information technology systems and the development
of the internet allow for more rapid and wide-scale collection and preservation of information
about the activities of the government and have significantly increased the availability of that data
to both the public and Congress. In addition, Congress has developed a wide array of
management, oversight, and transparency laws that facilitate oversight, create internal controls
within the executive branch, and bring more government data to the public eye.2
CRS’s primary goal with the Oversight Manual is to provide an overview of oversight practice
that is useful to congressional stakeholders with varying experience. For those new to the Hill, the
Oversight Manual serves as a broad introduction to the rules and techniques of effective oversight
and the array of options available to Congress and its Members. For more experienced hands, the
Oversight Manual’s broad coverage should make it a useful desk reference for existing oversight
techniques and recent developments on relevant issues.
How to Use This Manual
The Oversight Manual is intended to be a guidebook for congressional oversight. To that end,
while it is designed to allow for cover-to-cover reading, CRS understands that many readers will
be looking for specific information relevant to particular oversight activity. Therefore, CRS has
organized the Oversight Manual in a manner that will allow for easy navigation from the table of
contents.
A large share of the Oversight Manual is devoted to a technical discussion of the legal and
procedural parameters of Congress’s oversight activities and a survey of certain well-established

1 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Organization of Congress: Final Report,
committee print, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., December 1993, S.Rept. 103-215; H.Rept. 103-413 (Washington: GPO, 1993),
p. 150. CRS has used an expanded version of this definition: “Congressional oversight refers to the review, monitoring,
and supervision of federal agencies, programs, activities, and policy implementation.” See, for example, CRS Report
97-936, Congressional Oversight by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser (2012, available to congressional
requestors on request).
2 See “Statutory Oversight Enablers” section below.
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techniques and tools. The initial sections provide a more general discussion of oversight,
including its purposes and a high-level review of the oversight process.
This manual covers a wide variety of topics related to oversight, although it may not discuss
every potential oversight issue or provide a precise answer to every question. This is particularly
true when it comes to two topics that receive frequent attention. The first is what might be
thought of as the “art” of oversight,3 including decisions such as the selection of oversight
priorities and strategies. Such decisions turn, in large part, upon the expert judgment of Members
and committees as to how their time and other resources would be best spent.
The second subject involves potential ways to adjust the laws and chamber rules governing
oversight. The Oversight Manual focuses on current oversight practices. CRS experts are
available to answer specific questions related to any aspect of oversight, to support specific
oversight activities, and to discuss potential adjustments to the rules and practices that enable
oversight.
Defining Oversight
Oversight is an activity that can be defined in many different ways. For instance, CRS has defined
congressional oversight as the review, monitoring, and supervision of federal agencies, programs,
activities, and policy implementation.4
Along similar lines, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 directed that standing committees
shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies
concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such
committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the
Congress by the agencies in the executive branch of the Government.5
This language could be taken to support a more formalist approach to oversight that was common
during that era.6 Today many observers would likely find this definition of oversight too limiting
given the development of new oversight channels such as offices of inspector general, increased
online transparency, and real-time reporting on government activity. Therefore, a slightly broader
definition, such as the one offered by the political scientist Joel D. Aberbach, might better reflect
the modern understanding of the activities that make up congressional oversight. Aberbach
defines oversight as
congressional review of the actions of federal departments, agencies, and commissions and
of the programs and polices they administer, including review during program and policy
implementation as well as after the fact.7
The next two parts of this section introduce two additional frameworks that readers may find
useful when thinking about the variety of oversight techniques and strategies available to
Congress.

3 For a report on oversight that engages with some of these issues, see Project on Government Oversight, The Art of
Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: Project on Government Oversight, 2015), https://docs.pogo.org/
publication/2015/POGO_The-Art-of-Congressional-Oversight-Handbook.pdf.
4 See CRS Report 97-936, Congressional Oversight by L. Elaine Halchin and Frederick M. Kaiser (2012, available to
congressional requestors on request).
5 60 Stat. 832, §136).
6 Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1964), p. 9.
7 Joel D. Aberbach, Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 1990), p. 218.
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The Oversight Toolbox
Much of the organization of the Congressional Oversight Manual is based on the idea that
congressional oversight is a collection of tools and techniques that allow Congress to monitor the
executive branch and gather information on its activities. This instrumental approach may make it
particularly useful for oversight practitioners tasked with identifying potential issues and
developing and executing effective oversight strategies.
The goals of oversight are usually built around either successfully investigating a specific issue or
creating a general environment of accountability and transparency between Congress and the
executive branch. Depending on the situation, it may be possible to achieve these goals through a
variety of strategies, and their selection can be thought of as picking the best tool for the job.
Police Patrols and Fire Alarms
Writing in 1984, the political scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz proposed a
model for organizing congressional oversight activities that remains a useful tool for
understanding oversight.8 In their article, the authors define two broad categories of congressional
oversight: “police patrols” and “fire alarms.”
Police patrol oversight occurs when Congress, on its own initiative, “examines a sample of
executive-agency activities, with the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative
goals and, by its surveillance, discouraging such violations.”9 This strategy involves regular and
general oversight activity by Congress and is consistent with a classic understanding of legislative
oversight being conducted directly by committees and Members. One example of this type of
oversight is the agency budget hearings held on an annual basis by the appropriations
subcommittees in both houses. Those hearings provide committee members an opportunity to
question leaders about the performance of their agencies, plans for the future, and specific issues
of concern.
Fire alarm oversight, on the other hand, occurs when “Congress establishes a system of rules,
procedures, and informal practices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to
examine administrative decisions, to charge executive agencies with violating congressional
goals, and to seek remedies from agencies, courts, and Congress itself.”10 Fire alarm oversight
creates a system that fosters transparency and uses other stakeholders and experts to monitor
more activities with greater depth than Congress could on its own. When potential problems are
identified, the expectation is that Congress will be better able to respond by focusing attention on
known issues and working from expert analysis that has already been conducted.
A relatively recent example of the role fire alarms can play in congressional oversight is the
response to the 2014 disclosure of significant wait times for care in some Veterans Health
Administration facilities and the deaths of veterans waiting for care on those lists. Media outlets,
including CNN,11 as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General
reported on these issues.12 Once Congress was aware of the severity of the issues with the

8 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire
Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 28, no. 1 (February 1984), pp. 165-179.
9 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 166.
10 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 166.
11 See CNN, “VA Hospital Investigation,” https://www.cnn.com/specials/us/va-hospitals.
12 See Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, Veterans’s Health Administration: Review of
Alleged Patient Deaths, Patient Wait Times, and Scheduling Practices at the Phoenix VA Health Care System, 14-
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Veterans Health Administration, Members responded with broad, bipartisan investigations into
the agency’s performance and passed legislation seeking to address key findings.13
The Purposes of Oversight
Congress has engaged in oversight throughout its history. Investigating how the executive branch
enforces laws, spends appropriations, and implements policies enables Congress to assess
whether federal agencies and departments are operating in an effective, efficient, and economical
manner and to gather information that may inform legislation. The expansion of the national
government and bureaucracy has only increased Congress’s need for and use of oversight to
check on and check the executive.14 This “checking” function serves to protect Congress’s
policymaking role and its place under Article I in the U.S. constitutional system of checks and
balances.
St. Clair’s Defeat: The First Congressional Investigation of the Executive Branch
On November 4, 1791, a coalition of local American Indian tribes defeated a U.S. military contingent under the
command of General Arthur St. Clair (who was also the governor of the Northwest Territory) in battle near what
is now the Ohio-Indiana border. This battle, commonly referred to as St. Clair’s Defeat, was the subject of what is
generally considered to be the first formal investigation by Congress.
The House of Representatives of the Second Congress established a special committee to investigate the battle.
The committee requested not only that General St. Clair and Secretary of War Henry Knox testify but also that
the Washington Administration produce documents related to the incident. Only a few years removed from the
debates of the Constitutional Convention and aware of the precedent-setting role of his Administration, President
Washington and his Cabinet (which included, among others, Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton) careful y
considered the appropriate response to the House’s request. As recorded by Jefferson in his notes, Washington
concluded that the executive branch should “communicate such papers as the public good would permit and
ought to refuse those the disclosure of which would injure the public.” Washington then decided that, in the case
of St. Clair’s Defeat, cooperation with Congress was appropriate.
In addition to being the first major oversight investigation by Congress, this case established two important
precedents that continue to shape the relationship between Congress and the presidency to this day. First is the
assumption that compliance with congressional request should be the default for presidential Administrations.
Second is the argument that the President may decline to provide certain information in some circumstances if
doing so would be in the public interest. The second point is directly related to the ongoing debate about the
scope and nature of executive privilege.
Sources: Louis Fisher, The Politics of Executive Privilege (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2004), pp. 10-11;
and Thomas Jefferson, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 1, edited by Richard H. Johnston, Albert E. Bergh, and
Andrew A. Lipscomb (Washington, DC: Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), pp. 303-305.
Congress’s oversight role is also significant because it shines the spotlight of public attention on
critical issues, which helps both lawmakers and the general public to make informed judgments
about executive performance. Woodrow Wilson, in his classic 1885 study Congressional
Government, emphasized that the “informing function should be preferred even to its
[lawmaking] function.” He added that unless Congress conducts oversight of administrative

02603-267, August 26, 2014.
13 See CRS Report R43704, Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act of 2014 (H.R. 3230; P.L. 113-146), by
Sidath Viranga Panangala et al.
14 See, for example, letter from Sen. Charles Grassley to President Donald Trump, June 7, 2017,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017-06-07%20CEG%20to%20DJT%20(oversight%20requests).pdf.
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activities, the “country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs
which it is most important it should understand and direct.”15
Oversight occurs in virtually all the activities of Congress and its Members and through a wide
variety of channels, organizations, and structures. These can include formal committee hearings
and informal Member contacts with executive officials, as well as casework performed by
Members, reviews and studies by staff and congressional support agencies, reports prepared by
executive branch agencies, and studies prepared by nongovernmental entities such as academic
institutions, private commissions, or think tanks.
Former Congressman Lee Hamilton succinctly stated that the purpose of oversight is to
“determine what happens after a law is passed.”16 Some of the main purposes achieved in making
that determination are outlined below.
Ensure Executive Compliance with Statutory Requirements and Legislative
Intent
Congress delegates substantial discretionary authority to agency officials to engage in rulemaking
and the management of the administrative state. To ensure that these officers faithfully execute
laws according to the intent of Congress, committees and Members can review the actions taken
and regulations formulated by departments and agencies.
The Congressional Review Act
The Congressional Review Act (CRA, P.L. 104-121) is a tool that Congress may use to overturn regulations issued
by federal agencies. The CRA, which was enacted in 1996, requires agencies to report on their rulemaking
activities to Congress. The CRA was intended to reassert control over agency rulemaking by establishing a special
set of expedited or “fast track” legislative procedures, particularly in the Senate, for considering legislation to
overturn rules.
For more information on the CRA see CRS Report R43992, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked
Questions, by Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report R45248, The Congressional Review Act:
Determining Which “Rules” Must Be Submitted to Congress, by Valerie C. Brannon and Maeve P. Carey.
Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations
A large federal bureaucracy makes it imperative for Congress to encourage and secure efficient
and effective program management and to make every dollar count toward the achievement of
program goals. A basic objective is strengthening federal programs through better managerial
operations and service delivery. Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to
Congress and enhance program performance.

15 Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), p. 303. More recently, Professor
Josh Chafetz, a scholar of Congress and its role in the federal government in the 21st century, has referred to this
function as “congressional overspeech.” Josh Chafetz, “Congressional Overspeech,” Fordham Law Review, vol. 89
(2020), p. 596.
16 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Congressional Oversight: A “How-To” Series of Workshops, committee
print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000, 63-104, p. 10.
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Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious
Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud
Instances of fraud and other forms of corruption, wasteful expenditures, incompetent
management, and the subversion of governmental processes can provoke legislative and public
interest in oversight.
Evaluate Program Performance
Systematic program performance evaluation remains an evolving technique of oversight. Modern
program evaluation uses social science and management methodologies—such as surveys, cost-
benefit analyses, and efficiency studies—to assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs.
Information about program performance may be useful to Congress as it makes decisions about
the structure of government programs and the amount of funding they will receive.
Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers
Many commentators, public policy analysts, and legislators state that Presidents and executive
officials may ignore or misinterpret congressional intent in various areas, such as the
impoundment of funds, executive privilege, and war powers.17 Increased oversight—as part of the
constitutional checks and balances system—can redress what many in the public and Congress
might view as executive arrogation of legislative prerogatives.
Gather Information for Potential Legislation
One of the major functions of Congress involves developing, debating, and passing legislation.
Congress gathers information to support its legislative work from a variety of sources, and
information gathered from agencies in the process of oversight can be an important part of that
process. Senator Sam Ervin described the importance of oversight to legislating as follows:
The Constitution and statutes give Congress a solemn duty to oversee the activities of the
executive branch. How else can Congress fully comprehend whether existing laws are
adequate and properly administered? How else can Congress determine what specific
additional laws are need to guide the nation?18
Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Implement
Program Objectives
Congress’s ability to evaluate the capacity of agencies and managers to carry out program
objectives can be accomplished in various ways. Numerous laws require agencies to submit
reports to Congress. Some of these are regular, occurring annually or semiannually, for instance,
while others are activated by a specific event, development, or set of conditions. Reporting
requirements may promote self-evaluation by the agency. Organizations outside of Congress—

17 See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Andrew Rudalevige, The
New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power After Watergate (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press, 2005); Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 3rd ed. (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2013); and
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Living Presidency: An Originalist Argument against Its Ever-Expanding Powers
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2020).
18 Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., “Introduction,” in James Hamilton, The Power to Probe (New York: Random House, 1976), p.
xiii.
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such as offices of inspector general, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and expert
commissions—also advise Members and committees on how well federal agencies are working.
GAO’s High-Risk List
Since 1990, GAO has operated its “High-Risk Program” to monitor and report on identified aspects of
government operations that GAO determines to be at high risk of waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Over
this period, GAO has added and removed a number of programs and operations from what is commonly referred
to as the High-Risk List based on evaluation criteria developed by GAO. Typically, GAO publishes an update to its
report on the High-Risk List every two years, coinciding with the start of a new Congress. The High-Risk List has
become a popular tool for Congress to identify programs and other activities that may benefit from additional
monitoring by committees.
Sources: GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas,
GAO-21-119SP, March 2, 2021, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-119sp; and U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Exploring GAO's High-Risk List and Opportunities for Reform, 113th
Cong., 1st sess., February 14, 2013 (Washington: GPO, 2013).
Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities
Congress exercises some of its most effective oversight through the appropriations process, which
provides the opportunity to assess agency and departmental expenditures in detail. Most federal
agencies and programs are required to receive recurring reauthorizations—on an annual, two-
year, five-year, or other basis—giving authorizing committees the opportunity to review agency
activities, operations, and procedures. As a consequence of these oversight efforts, Congress can
abolish or curtail obsolete or ineffective programs by cutting off or reducing funds. Congress
might also increase funding for effective programs.
Protect Individual Rights and Liberties
Congressional oversight can help safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens and others. By
revealing abuses of authority, oversight hearings and other efforts can halt executive misconduct
and help prevent its recurrence through, for example, new legislation or indirectly by heightening
public awareness.
Draw Public Attention to Issues
Congressional oversight can provide Congress and its Members with the opportunity to highlight
issues, activities of the government, and other events that they wish to bring to the attention of the
public. Congress may believe that it will be better able to achieve a goal if public pressure or
energy is directed to a particular matter and that oversight activities may be one way to generate
that attention.
Other Purposes
The purposes of oversight can also be stated in more precise terms. Like the general purposes
noted above, these more specific purposes unavoidably overlap because of the numerous and
multifaceted dimensions of oversight. A brief list includes the following:
 Review the agency rulemaking process
 Monitor the use of contractors and consultants for government services
 Encourage cooperation between agencies and between the branches
 Promote accountability within agencies
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 Examine agency personnel procedures
 Investigate constituent complaints and media critiques
 Signal priorities and demonstrate activity to constituents and interest groups
 Assess whether program design and execution
 Appraise federal evaluation activities
Thoughts on Oversight and Its Rationales from...
James Wilson (The Works of James Wilson, 1896, vol. II, p. 29), an architect of the Constitution and Associate
Justice on the first Supreme Court:
The House of Representatives … form the grand inquest of the state. They wil diligently inquire
into grievances, arising both from men and things.
Woodrow Wilson (Congressional Government, 1885, p. 297), perhaps the first scholar to use the term oversight to
refer to the review and investigation of the executive branch:
Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and
to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the
wisdom and wil of its constituents.
The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function.
John Stuart Mil (Considerations on Representative Government, 1861, p. 104), a British utilitarian philosopher:
[T]he proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw
the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a ful exposition and justification of all of them which any
one considers questionable.
Congress as an Oversight Body
This section lays out several key issues related to Congress’s role as a legislative body. It begins
with a broad discussion of the constitutional sources of Congress’s oversight authority and then
proceeds to more specific discussion about how Congress operates as an overseer, including
information on participants in oversight, jurisdictional issues, how stakeholders can coordinate
their work, and key House and Senate rules that relate to oversight. Next, the section considers
oversight as a practice and lays out one way to model oversight as a process. Finally the section
concludes with an extended discussion on Congress’s working relationship with the executive
branch.
Authority to Conduct Oversight
Congress’s authority to conduct oversight comes from the Constitution and is informed by
Supreme Court decisions, federal laws, and House and Senate rules. Oversight is an implicit
constitutional responsibility of Congress. According to historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., the
Framers believed “it was not considered necessary to make an explicit grant of such authority.
The power to make laws implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.”19
The investigative authority of Congress has been broadly interpreted by an array of Supreme
Court decisions. For example, in Watkins v. United States,20 the Court stated that the “power of
Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It

19 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Roger Burns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, 1792-1974, vol. 1 (New
York: Chelsea House, 1975), p. xiii.
20 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
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encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed laws.” There are limits to Congress’s power to investigate, including some found
in the Constitution itself (e.g., the protection accorded witnesses under the Fifth Amendment
against self-incrimination).
The Supreme Court on Congress’s Power to Oversee and Investigate
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177, 181-182 (1927): Congress, investigating the administration of the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) during the Teapot Dome scandal, was considering a subject “on which legislation
could be had or would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit.” The
“potential” for legislation was sufficient. The majority added, “We are of [the] opinion that the power of inquiry—
with process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975): Expanding on its holding in McGrain,
the Court declared, “To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end result.”
Constitutional Provisions
The Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and investigate executive branch
activities. The constitutional authority for Congress to conduct oversight stems from such explicit
and implicit provisions as
 The power of the purse. The Constitution provides: “No Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law.”21 Each year the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations
review the financial practices and needs of federal agencies. The
appropriations process allows Congress to exercise extensive control over the
activities of executive agencies. Congress can define the precise purposes for
which money may be spent, adjust funding levels, and prohibit expenditures
for certain purposes.
 The power to organize the executive branch. Congress has the authority to
create, abolish, reorganize, and fund federal departments and agencies. It has
the authority to assign or reassign functions to departments and agencies and
grant new forms of authority and staff to administrators. Congress, in short,
exercises ultimate authority over executive branch organization and generally
over policy.22
 The power to make all laws for “carrying into Execution” Congress’s own
enumerated powers as well as those of the executive branch. Article I grants
Congress a wide range of powers, such as the power to tax and coin money,
regulate foreign and interstate commerce, declare war, provide for the
creation and maintenance of armed forces, and establish post offices.23
Augmenting these specific powers is the Necessary and Proper Clause, also
known as the “Elastic Clause,” which gives Congress the authority to “make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”24

21 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 7.
22 U.S. Const. art. I, §9; see also U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
23 U.S. Const. art. I, §8.
24 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18.
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These provisions grant broad authority to regulate and oversee departmental
activities established by law.
 The power to confirm officers of the United States. The confirmation process
not only involves the determination of a nominee’s suitability for an
executive (or judicial) position but also provides an opportunity to examine
the current policies and programs of an agency along with those policies and
programs that the nominee intends to pursue.25
 The power of investigation and inquiry. A traditional method of exercising
the oversight function, an implied power, is through investigations and
inquiries into executive branch operations. Legislators often seek to know
how effectively and efficiently programs are working, how well agency
officials are responding to legislative directives, and how the public
perceives the programs. The investigatory method helps to ensure a more
responsible bureaucracy while supplying Congress with information needed
to formulate new legislation.
 Impeachment and removal. Impeachment provides Congress with a powerful
oversight tool to investigate alleged executive and judicial misbehavior and
to eliminate such misbehavior through the conviction and removal from
office of the offending individuals.26
Statutes and Oversight
There are also numerous laws that impact how Congress conducts oversight.27 Despite its lengthy
heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until enactment of the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.28 That act required House and Senate standing
committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies within their
jurisdictions.
Congress has also passed a number of laws, especially in the past half-century, that support its
oversight function directly and indirectly. Some of these statutes were designed to make executive
branch agencies more transparent. Others have established officials within agencies who are
required to perform certain routine oversight functions, including audits and investigations of
potential waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. In practice, a large amount of Congress’s
oversight activity can be traced to information gathered or disclosed through these laws. In
addition, Congress devotes significant attention to monitoring the effectiveness of these
oversight-enabling statutes and considering amendments to improve their effectiveness.
House and Senate Rules on Oversight
The House and Senate have often amended their formal rules to encourage and strengthen
committee oversight of the administration of laws. For example, House rules direct committees to
create oversight subcommittees, undertake futures research and forecasting, and review the
impact of tax expenditures within their respective jurisdictions. Senate rules require each standing

25 See U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
26 See U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
27 For a detailed discussion, including specific examples of relevant statutes, see “Statutory Oversight Enablers”,
below.
28 P.L. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
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committee to include regulatory impact statements in committee reports accompanying
legislation.
House Rules
House rules29 grant the Committee on Oversight and Reform a comprehensive role in the conduct
of oversight. For example, the committee has the authority or responsibility to:
 “review and study on a continuing basis the operation of government
activities at all levels, including the Executive Office of the President” (Rule
X, clause 3).
 “receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit to the
House such recommendations as it considers necessary or desirable in
connection with the subject matter of the reports” (Rule X, clause 4).
 “study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the
States and municipalities and between the United States and international
organizations of which the United States is a member” (Rule X, clause 4).
 conduct investigations, at its discretion and at any time, of matters that are
jurisdictionally conferred to another standing committee. The findings and
recommendations of the Oversight and Reform Committee in such an
investigation shall be made available to any other standing committee having
jurisdiction over the matter involved (Rule X, clause 4).
 report to the House “not later than April 15 in the first session of a Congress,
after consultation with the Speaker, the majority leader, and the minority
leader … the oversight plans submitted [by the committees] together with
any recommendations that [the Oversight and Reform Committee], or the
House leadership group described above, may make to ensure the most
effective coordination of these plans” (Rule X, clause 2).
 choose to adopt a “rule authorizing and regulating the taking of depositions
by a member or counsel of the committee including pursuant to subpoena
under clause 2(m) of Rule XI” (Rule X, clause 4).
 “evaluate the effect of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and
executive branches of the Government” (Rule X, clause 4).
House rules also provide authority for oversight by other standing committees as follows:
 Each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) shall
review and study “the application, administration, execution, and
effectiveness of laws and programs addressing subjects within its
jurisdiction” and determine whether they should be “continued, curtailed, or
eliminated” (Rule X, clause 2).
 Committees have the authority to “review and study the impact or probable
impact of tax policies” on subjects that fall within their jurisdiction (Rule X,
clause 2).
 Certain committees have special oversight authority (i.e., to review and
study, on an ongoing basis, specific subject areas that are within the
legislative jurisdiction of other committees). Special oversight is somewhat

29 The rules of the House of Representatives are available at https://rules.house.gov/rules-and-resources.
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akin to the broad oversight authority granted to the Committee on Oversight
and Reform by the 1946 Legislature Reorganization Act except that special
oversight is generally limited to named subjects (Rule X, clause 3).
 Each standing committee “having more than 20 members shall establish an
oversight subcommittee, or require its subcommittees to conduct oversight in
their respective jurisdictional areas” (Rule X, clauses 2 and 5).
 Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately
set out and clearly identified. They are also to include “a statement of general
performance goals and objectives, including outcome-related goals and
objectives, for which the measure authorizes funding” (Rule XIII, clause 3).
 “Each standing committee, or a subcommittee thereof, shall hold at least one
hearing during each 120-day period following the establishment of the
committee on the topic of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in
government programs that that committee may authorize.” Such hearings
shall “include a focus on the most egregious instances of waste, fraud, abuse,
or mismanagement in government programs as documented by any report the
committees have received” from the Comptroller General or an inspector
general. Committee and subcommittees shall also hold “at least one hearing
on issues raised by reports issued by the [Comptroller General] indicating
that federal programs or operations that the committee may authorize are at
high risk for waste, fraud, and mismanagement, known as the ‘high-risk list’
or ‘high-risk series’” (Rule XI, clause 2).
 The chair of each standing committee (except Appropriations, Ethics, and
Rules) shall “prepare, in consultation with the ranking minority member, an
oversight plan for that Congress not later than March 1 of the first session of
a Congress.” Committee plans shall be submitted simultaneously to the
Committees on Oversight and Reform and House Administration.
Additionally, “not later than April 15 in the first session of a Congress, after
consultation with the Speaker, the Majority Leader, and the Minority Leader,
the Committee on Oversight and Reform shall report to the House on the
oversight plans [of the committees] together with any recommendations that
it, or the House leadership group, may make to ensure the most effective
coordination of oversight plans and otherwise to achieve the[se] objectives.”
 “In developing their plans, each standing committee shall to the maximum
extent feasible
(A) “consult with other committees that have jurisdiction over the same or
related laws, programs, or agencies with the objective of ensuring
maximum coordination and cooperation among committees when
conducting reviews of such laws, programs, or agencies and include in
the plan an explanation of steps that have been or will be taken to ensure
such coordination and cooperation;
(B) “review specific problems with Federal rules, regulations, statutes, and
court decisions that are ambiguous, arbitrary, or nonsensical, or that
impose severe financial burdens on individuals;
(C) “give priority consideration to including in the plan the review of those
laws, programs, or agencies operating under permanent budget authority
or permanent statutory authority;
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(D) “have a view toward ensuring that all significant laws, programs, or
agencies within the committee’s jurisdiction are subject to review every
10 years;
(E) “have a view toward ensuring against duplication of Federal programs;
and
(F) “give priority consideration to including in the plan discussion of how the
committee’s work will address issues of inequities on the basis of race,
color, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity,
disability, age, or national origin” (Rule X, clause 2).
 “Not later than January 2 of each odd-numbered year, a committee shall
submit to the House a report on the activities of that committee. (2) Such
report shall include—
(A) “separate sections summarizing the legislative and oversight activities of
the committee during the applicable period;
(B) “a summary of the oversight plans submitted by the committee; …
(C) “a summary of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect
to [their oversight plans];
(D) “a summary of any additional oversight activities undertaken by that
committee and any recommendations made or actions taken thereon; and
(E) “a delineation of any [oversight] hearings” (Rule XI, clause 1).
In addition, the Speaker, with the approval of the House, may appoint special ad hoc oversight
committees for the purpose of reviewing specific matters within the jurisdiction of two or more
standing committees (Rule X, clause 2).
The House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
On April 23, 2020, the House adopted H.Res. 938, which created the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. Similar to previous select committees dedicated to a
specific issue, the select subcommittee was directed by the resolution to “conduct a ful and complete
investigation and study” and to issue a final report to the House on a number of specific issues related to the
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the federal government’s response. (See H.Res. 935 for the operational
text regarding the select subcommittee.) The select subcommittee, which was retained in the 117th Congress, has
held briefings and hearings, released reports, and requested information from the executive branch as the
pandemic and the government’s response evolved.
While a large number of committees and subcommittees in both chambers have oversight jurisdiction relevant to
specific aspects of the pandemic and pandemic response, the House was able to both use and adapt its standing
rules to create a subcommittee tasked with overseeing and investigating the issue as a whole.
Senate Rules
Under Senate rules,30 each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) shall
“review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those
laws, or parts of laws, within the legislative jurisdiction of the committee” (Rule XXVI, clause 8).
In addition to that general oversight requirement, “comprehensive policy oversight”
responsibilities are granted to specified standing committees. This duty is similar to special
oversight in the House. For example, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry is
authorized to study and review, on a comprehensive basis, matters relating to food, nutrition, and

30 The rules of the Senate are available at https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate
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hunger both in the United States and in foreign countries and rural affairs and report thereon from
time to time (Rule XXV, clause 1(a)).
All standing committees, except Appropriations, are required to include regulatory impact
evaluations in their committee reports accompanying each public bill or joint resolution (Rule
XXVI, clause 11). The evaluations are to include matters such as:
 an estimate of the numbers of individuals and businesses that would be
regulated,
 a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on personal
privacy, and
 a determination of the amount of additional paperwork that will result from
the regulations.
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs exercises oversight jurisdiction
over government operations generally, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Selected oversight duties assigned to the committee under Rule XXV, clause 2(k) include:
 reviewing and studying on a continuing basis the operation of government
activities at all levels to determine their economy, effectiveness, and
efficiency;
 receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General and submitting
recommendations as it deems necessary to the Senate;
 evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and
executive branches of the government; and
 studying intergovernmental relationships between the United States and the
states and municipalities and international organizations of which the United
States is a member.
The Senate established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations under the Committee on
Government Operations on March 1, 1948 (during the 80th Congress) by adopting S.Res 189.
The subcommittee was an outgrowth of the 1941 “Truman Committee” (named for its chair,
Senator Harry Truman), which investigated fraud and mismanagement of the nation’s war
program. The Truman Committee ended in 1948, but the chair of the Government Operations
Committee transferred the functions of the Truman Committee to the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations. Since then this subcommittee (now a part of the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs) has investigated scores of issues, such as government waste,
fraud, and inefficiency.31
Congressional Participants in Oversight
Committees
The most common method of conducting oversight is through the committee system. Legislative
history demonstrates that the House and Senate have long used their standing committees—as
well as joint, select, or special committees—to investigate federal activities and agencies:

31 For more information, see Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations Historical Background,” March 24, 2022, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/
subcommittees/investigations/media/permanent-subcommittee-on-investigations-historical-background.
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 The House Committee on Oversight and Reform and the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs have broad oversight
jurisdiction over virtually the entire federal government. They have been
vested with broad investigatory powers over government-wide activities.
 The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have similar
responsibilities when examining and reviewing the fiscal activities of the
federal government. The House Committee on Appropriations also has a
“Surveys and Investigations” staff who are tasked with “pursu[ing] program
issues in depth, including those specific to an agency or Department and
those that are crosscutting and have government-wide impacts.”32 The work
of this staff is based on directives from subcommittees that must be issued on
a bipartisan basis by the chair and ranking member.33
 Each standing committee of Congress has oversight responsibilities for
reviewing government activities principally within its jurisdiction. These
panels also have the authority to establish oversight and investigative
subcommittees. The establishment of an oversight subcommittee does not
preclude a panel’s legislative subcommittees from conducting oversight.
Certain House and Senate committees have “special oversight” or
“comprehensive policy oversight” of designated subject areas, as noted
above.
Members
Oversight is generally considered a committee activity, but Members also have the ability to
pursue oversight without working through a committee. Both casework and other project work
conducted in Members’ personal offices, including in their district or state offices, can yield
insights about bureaucratic behavior and policy implementation. These discoveries, in turn, can
lead to the adjustment of agency policies and procedures and to changes in public law.
Casework—responding to constituent requests for assistance with a federal agency34—provides
an opportunity to examine bureaucratic activity and operations, if only in a selective way. Other
constituent service activities, such as responding to inquiries about federal grants or projects or
addressing concerns about program implementation or agency operations, may also provide
Members with similar insights. The accessibility of government websites also allows interested
constituents to monitor federal activities and expenditures and to share their findings or
observations with Members, relevant committees, and legislative staff.
Individual Members may also conduct their own investigations or ad hoc hearings or direct their
staff to conduct oversight studies. While individual lawmakers lack the authority to use
compulsory processes (e.g., subpoenas) or conduct official hearings, many other options are
available.35 Members might also request GAO, an inspector general or other appropriate
government official, a private research group, or some other entity to conduct an investigation.
Members might choose to publicize this work by releasing staff reports with their findings;

32 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Annual Report of Committee Activities, 116th Cong., 2nd sess.,
January 2, 2021, Rept. No. 116-716 (Washington: GPO, 2021), pp. 13-14.
33 Ibid.
34 See CRS Report RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources, by R.
Eric Petersen and Sarah J. Eckman.
35 See “Individual Member Authority to Conduct Oversight and Investigations” below.
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sharing information with their constituents, the media, and other stakeholders; or using what they
learn to support additional oversight or legislation.
Committee Staff
As issues become more complex, the professional staff of House and Senate committees can
provide the expertise required to conduct effective oversight and investigations. Committee staff
are expected to have the experience, knowledge, and analytical skills to conduct proficient and
thorough oversight for the committees and subcommittees they serve. Committees may also call
upon legislative support agencies for assistance, hire consultants, “borrow” staff from federal
departments, or employ academics and others with specialized expertise.
Committee staff, in summary, occupy a central position in the conduct of oversight. Their
informal contacts with executive officials at all levels constitute one of Congress’s most effective
techniques for performing its “continuous watchfulness” function.
Personal Staff
Constituent letters, complaints, and requests for projects and assistance frequently bring issues
and deficiencies in federal programs and administration to the attention of Members and their
personal office staff. The casework performed by a Member’s staff for constituents can be an
effective oversight tool.
Casework can be an important vehicle for pursuing both the oversight and legislative interests of
the Member. Members and their staff aides are mindful of the relationship between casework and
the oversight function. This connection is facilitated by a regular exchange of ideas among the
Member, legislative aides, and caseworkers on problems brought to the office’s attention by
constituents. Caseworkers may also become aware of certain issues through their interactions
with agency employees. Telephone and email inquiries, reinforced with written requests, can
focus agency attention on issues raised by caseworkers and Members’ constituents. Casework
might also prompt legislative initiatives to resolve those problems.
Caseworkers and other legislative staffers may seek to maximize service to their Member’s
constituents by reaching out to the staff of the subcommittees and committees that handle the
areas of concern to the Member’s constituents. Through this interaction, the staff of the pertinent
standing committee(s) can be made aware of the problems with the agency or program in
question, assess how widespread and significant they are, determine their causes, and recommend
corrective action.
Congressional Support Agencies and Offices
Many of the other agencies and offices within the legislative branch may be able to support
through their work assisting in the overall operations of the House and Senate. Additional offices
that might play a role in oversight include, among others, the House General Counsel’s Office,
the House Parliamentarian’s Office, the Senate Parliamentarian’s Office, the House Clerk’s
Office, the Secretary of the Senate’s Office, the Office of Senate Legal Counsel, the Senate and
House Historian’s Office, and the Senate Library.
For further detail on the role of GAO, CRS, CBO, and these other offices, see “Oversight
Information Sources and Consultant Services” later in this report.
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Oversight Coordination
A persistent challenge for Congress in conducting oversight is coordination among committees—
within each chamber as well as between the two houses. As the final report of the House Select
Committee on Committees of the 93rd Congress noted, “Review findings and recommendations
developed by one committee are seldom shared on a timely basis with another committee, and, if
they are made available, then often the findings are transmitted in a form that is difficult for
Members to use.”36 Oversight coordination between House and Senate committees is also
uncommon, and it occurs primarily in the aftermath of perceived major policy failures or
prominent inter-branch conflicts, as with the Iran-Contra affair and the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Inter-committee cooperation on oversight can be beneficial for a variety of reasons. For example,
it can help minimize unnecessary duplication and conflict and inhibit agencies from playing one
committee against another. There are formal and informal ways to achieve oversight coordination
among committees.
General Techniques of Encouraging Oversight Coordination
House Rule X and Senate Rule XXV provide broad authority to the standing committees of each
chamber to investigate matters within their respective jurisdictions. Committees undertake
oversight activities on their own initiative, by the full committee, or by one or more of its
subcommittees, and in some cases they may coordinate their activities with other committees (for
instance, by convening a joint hearing on a subject of mutual interest). Alternatively, to
supplement the existing standing committee system, the House or Senate can establish select or
special committees to probe issues and agencies, promote public understanding of national
concerns, or coordinate oversight of issues that span the jurisdiction of more than one standing
committee. Given the wide range of subjects each committee is responsible for, the creation of a
select committee can enable greater sustained focus on a particular area of congressional concern.
House rules also contain requirements of its standing committees to coordinate their oversight
plans and activities with one another “to the maximum extent feasible.”37 For instance, each
House committee is expected to assemble an oversight plan at the beginning of each new
Congress that documents its oversight goals for that Congress. When developing these plans,
committee chairs are directed “to consult with other committees that have jurisdiction over the
same or related laws, programs, or agencies with the objective of ensuring maximum
coordination and cooperation among committees when conducting reviews of such laws,
programs, or agencies and include in the plan an explanation of steps that have been or will be
taken to ensure such coordination and cooperation.”38 Oversight plans assembled by the House’s
standing committees are delivered to the Committee on Oversight and Reform and are printed as
a report of the Oversight and Reform Committee along with that committee’s own
recommendations.39 The Senate does not have a similar requirement.

36 U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Committees, Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 Part 2, Report of
the Select Committee on Committees U.S. House of Representatives to Accompany H. Res. 988 Together with
Supplemental Views, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 21, 1974 (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 68.
37 House Rule X(2)(d)(2).
38 House Rule X(2)(d)(2)(A).
39 See, for instance, U.S. Congress, Committee on Oversight and Reform, Authorization and Oversight Plan for All
House Committees, 117th Cong., 1st sess., April 2021, H.Rept. 117-17 (Washington: GPO, 2021).
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The Oversight Process in Congress
Congress’s oversight practice can range from day-to-day activities, such as assisting constituents
in their interactions with agencies, to much more formal actions, such as impeachment
proceedings and special committees and subcommittees tasked with investigating specific
issues.40
Planning for and executing oversight actions can be summarized in three questions posed below.
These questions, though not a comprehensive guide to the oversight process, succinctly describe
some of the broad contours and identify important issues that may warrant consideration. While
the process outlined within these questions appears to have a beginning, a middle, and an end,
oversight will not always follow a clear path. It has the potential to take Congress in unexpected
directions and may not always unfold in a typical, or even predictable, manner.
Question 1: Which Issues Warrant Oversight?
Any information that Members or their staff learn about activities of the executive branch might
become the basis for oversight. Such information can come from a wide variety of sources and in
many forms. Congress might receive information from constituents, agency officials (who may or
may not be acting as whistleblowers), inspectors general, GAO, interest groups, or the media.
Information can also come in other forms, including congressionally mandated reports and other
government publications, agency responses to questions during or outside of committee hearings,
or personal observations of executive branch activities.
The decision about which potential oversight matters to pursue is based on the judgment and
goals of congressional leaders, committees, and individual Members. These decisions may
include factors that are outside the scope of the Oversight Manual.41 However, there are logistical
and technical considerations that may be relevant to these discussions. Those considerations
might include Congress’s authority to conduct particular oversight activities, the resources
required to successfully complete an oversight project, and the anticipated outcome of successful
oversight.
Authority to Oversee
While Congress’s authority to conduct oversight is expansive, it is not unlimited. Cases may arise
where it is not entirely clear whether Congress has the authority to take a specific action or gather
particular information. This can be a complicated question that involves contested questions of

40 Because of the variety of options available to committees and Members in the performance of their duties, the
Oversight Manual does not attempt to provide a technical set of step-by-step directions for conducting oversight. For
such a guide for investigative hearings, see Morton Rosenberg, When Congress Comes Calling: A Study on the
Principles, Practices, and Pragmatics of Legislative Inquiry (Washington, DC: Constitution Project, 2017), pp. 33-38,
https://docs.pogo.org/report/2017/POGO_TCP_When_Congress_Comes_Calling.pdf. See also Project on Government
Oversight, The Art of Congressional Oversight (Washington, DC: Project on Government Oversight, 2015),
https://docs.pogo.org/publication/2015/POGO_The-Art-of-Congressional-Oversight-Handbook.pdf?_ga=
2.251130433.657894683.1669640965-2070138599.1666618231.
41 A classic study of congressional oversight by political scientist Morris Ogul identifies seven “opportunity factors”
that impact the likelihood of oversight. In Ogul’s discussion those factors are legal authority to conduct oversight, staff
resources, the subject matter at issue, committee structure, status of the interested Members on the relevant committee,
relations with the executive branch, and the priorities of Members. Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy
(Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), pp. 11-22.
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law and the appropriate separation of powers.42 Unresolved questions about the limits of
Congress’s oversight authority might not dissuade Congress from conducting oversight in those
areas. Nonetheless, understanding the issues that could arise might be useful when determining
whether to proceed.
Resources
Oversight has costs. Of particular importance are staff and Member time, both of which can be
scarce resources.43 Resource limitations might guide Members and committees to choose between
different oversight opportunities or between oversight and other activities. These constraints are
important for Congress to carefully consider when making decisions about when and how to
conduct oversight.
Anticipated Outcome
Another practical question that might be considered is the probable outcome for a particular
oversight action. It is not possible to know, in advance, what will result from an oversight activity.
With experience, Members and staff may develop a strong sense of how and where oversight
projects are likely to go and how long they might take.
Question 2: How to Get the Desired Information?
Once the decision to investigate a particular oversight matter has been made and goals for that
activity has been set, it is important to formulate a plan for conducting that oversight. Such a plan
does not have to be complex or formalized. There are many cases when a telephone call to an
agency contact or identification of publicly available documents could be enough to satisfy
Congress’s purposes.
What Information Is Available and Who Has It?
Having identified a specific or general goal for an oversight action, it will be useful to determine
what relevant information may be available and which agency or official is likely to have it. For
instance, when investigating an allegation of mismanagement within an agency, the agency’s own
records and officials may be a primary source of information on the operations of the agency.
There are instances, however, when it might be more difficult to make these determinations. First,
it might not be obvious that certain information would be useful to Congress’s activities even if it
is readily available. Second, it may be difficult to determine where documents or officials with
relevant information can be found even if Congress has a good sense of the type of information it
wants. This will be especially true when an issue involves the activities or jurisdiction of multiple
agencies. CRS is also available to assist with the identification and collection of relevant
materials.

42 See “Investigative Oversight” below.
43 See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on the Modernization of Congress, Final Report, 116th
Cong., 2nd sess., October 2020, pp. 98-127, https://modernizecongress.house.gov/imo/media/doc/
ModernizationCommittee_10152020r1Compressed%20(newest%20gpo%20report).pdf. The select committee was re-
established for the 117th Congress and continues to conduct hearings and issue recommendations, which are available at
https://modernizecongress.house.gov/.
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The Watergate Investigation and President Nixon’s Oval Office Tapes
Among the best known of all congressional oversight actions are the investigations of the Watergate break-in and
the Nixon Administration that culminated in the resignation of President Richard Nixon on August 9, 1974. The
most compelling information to come out of these investigations was taped conversations in the Oval Office
involving President Nixon himself. White House advisor John Dean first raised the possible existence of a taping
system in the Oval Office in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.
Committee investigative staff fol owed up on Dean’s comments, and another Administration official, Alexander
Butterfield, confirmed the existence of the taping system. The discovery of these tapes, which played an important
role in compelling President Nixon’s resignation, might never have occurred had Congress not already been
investigating the Watergate break-in.
Source: U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, The Final Report of the Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, committee print, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., June 1974, S.Rept. 93-981
(Washington: GPO, 1974); and James Hamilton, The Power to Probe (New York,: Random House, 1976), pp. 23-26.
How Can Congress Get the Information?
Sometimes gathering information will be the biggest challenge Congress faces when conducting
oversight. Much of this Manual is devoted to the variety of tools available to Congress to obtain
information even in the face of resistance from the executive branch.44
In many other cases, information will already be available to Congress, either because disclosure
is required by statute or because a federal agency, other organization, or individual has chosen to
release the information to Congress or the public. It will often be possible to obtain information
via direct communication between Members or staff and agency officials. There are strong
incentives for agencies to engage with Congress, and they may provide information upon request
in many instances.45
Question 3: What Can Be Done with This Information?
Most would agree that oversight has the ability to “throw light on activities of government” and
fosters an environment of increased accountability for officials.46 Oversight, especially oversight
that includes “police patrol” strategies, is likely to have these benefits across the government,
even though Congress does not have the capacity to directly monitor the activities of millions of
federal employees and contractors.47
Oversight can directly support Congress’s legislative function. Oversight provides information on
the state of the government that can be applied when Congress makes decisions on agency
budgets and program authorizations and may lead to other legislation.48 How the knowledge
gained from oversight can be applied in those other functions will depend on the nature of that
information and the priorities and preferences of Congress.

44 For an extended discussion of how Congress can obtain information, see “Oversight Through Legislative and
Investigative Processes” and “Investigative Oversight” below.
45 See, for example, CRS Report R46061, Voluntary Testimony by Executive Branch Officials: An Introduction, by Ben
Wilhelm.
46 See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Rules, Congressional Oversight: A “How-To” Series of Workshops,
committee print, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 2000, 63-104, pp. 11-12 (remarks by Lee Hamilton).
47 See generally McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked.”
48 See, for example, Kenneth Lowande, “Who Polices the Administrative State?,” American Political Science Review,
vol. 112, no. 4 (2018), pp. 874-890.
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Oversight Through Legislative and Investigative Processes
This section identifies major areas of congressional activity and how they relate to and facilitate
oversight. Congress has a central role in the development of the budget, the operations of
agencies and general management of the executive branch, confirmation of appointees to senior
positions across the government, and, of course, the consideration and approval of all legislation.
The Legislative Process
While oversight is frequently considered to be a separate track of congressional activity running
adjacent to the body’s exercise of legislative authority, there are important ways in which the two
activities overlap. Oversight, for instance, can impact decisions on legislation by providing
information that influences legislative priorities or identifies areas of interest. In some cases,
Congress establishes reporting and study requirements for GAO, inspectors general, and agencies
that generate recommendations for agency or congressional action, which in turn provide both
oversight information and ideas for potential legislation.
As Congress has expanded its use of statutory tools that facilitate oversight, it has devoted more
attention to developing such legislation, overseeing its implementation, and evaluating its
effectiveness.49
The Budget Process50
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974,51 as amended, enhanced the
legislative branch’s capacity to shape the federal budget. The act has had major institutional and
procedural effects on Congress:
 Institutionally, Congress created three new entities: the Senate Committee on
the Budget, the House Committee on the Budget, and the Congressional
Budget Office.
 Procedurally, the act established methods that permit Congress to determine
budget policy as a whole; relate revenue and spending decisions; determine
priorities among competing national programs; and ensure that revenue,
spending, and debt legislation are consistent with the overall budget policy.
The budget process coexists with the established authorization and appropriation procedures and
significantly affects each:
 On the authorization side, the Budget Act requires committees to submit
their budgetary “views and estimates” on matters under their jurisdiction to

49 One example of such legislation is the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352) which, among other things,
updated the system for Congress and the executive branch to identify and consider the elimination of reporting
requirements that are no longer useful. See CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements:
Annual Process Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), by Clinton T. Brass.
50 For a general overview of the budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process,
coordinated by James V. Saturno; and CRS In Focus IF11032, Budgetary Decisionmaking in Congress, by Megan S.
Lynch. CRS also reports regularly on legislative activity on the budget and appropriations as well as actions that affect
the budget process itself. See, for example, CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions,
by Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch; and CRS Report R45552, Changes to House Rules Affecting the
Congressional Budget Process Included in H.Res. 6 (116th Congress), by James V. Saturno and Megan S. Lynch.
51 P.L. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, codified at 2 U.S.C. §§607-688.
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the Committee on the Budget not later than six weeks after the President
submits a budget or at such time that the Budget Committee might request.
 On the appropriations side, new contract and borrowing authority must go
through the appropriations process. Subcommittees of the Appropriations
Committees are assigned a financial allocation that determines how much
may be included in the measures they report. (The tax and appropriations
panels of each house also submit budgetary views and estimates to their
respective Budget Committees.)
 In deciding spending, revenue, credit, and debt issues, Congress is sensitive
to trends in the overall composition of the annual federal budget
(expenditures for defense, entitlements, interest on the debt, and domestic
discretionary programs).52
These Budget Act reforms have the potential to strengthen oversight by enabling Congress to
better relate program priorities to financial claims on the national budget. Each committee,
knowing that it will receive a fixed amount of the total to be included in a budget resolution, has
an incentive to scrutinize existing programs to make room for new programs or expanded funding
of ongoing projects or to assess whether programs have outlived their usefulness.
The Authorization Process
Through its authorization power, Congress exercises significant control over government
agencies. The entire authorization process53 may involve a host of oversight tools—hearings,
studies, and reports—but the key to the process is the authorization statute.
An authorization statute creates and shapes government programs and agencies, and it contains
the statement of legislative policy for the agency. Authorization is the first lever in congressional
exercise of the power of the purse. It usually allows an agency to be funded, but it does not
guarantee financing of agencies and programs. Frequently, authorizations establish dollar ceilings
on the amounts that can be appropriated.
The authorization-reauthorization process is a significant oversight tool. Through this process,
Members can become informed about the work of an agency and are given an opportunity to
direct the agency’s effort.54
Expiration of an agency’s program can provide an opportunity for in-depth oversight. In recent
decades, there has been a mix of permanent authorizations—which do not require regular
reauthorization legislation—and periodic authorizations, which can be annual or multiyear.
Periodic reauthorizations increase the likelihood that an agency will be scrutinized systematically.
An agency’s understanding that it must come to the legislative committee for renewed authority
increases the influence of the committee. This condition helps to account for the appeal of short-
term authorizations.

52 See, for example, CRS Report R45941, The Annual Sequester of Mandatory Spending through FY2029, by Charles
S. Konigsberg; and CRS Insight IN11148, The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Limit, by
Grant A. Driessen and Megan S. Lynch.
53 See CRS Report R46497, Authorizations and the Appropriations Process, by James V. Saturno.
54 For an illustration of the authorization process serving as a tool to conduct oversight and inform policy decisions, see
CRS Report R46107, FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues, coordinated by
Bryce H. P. Mendez.
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The Congressional Budget Office’s “Unauthorized Appropriations and Expiring
Authorizations” Report
One resource that may be useful for determining potential oversight targets is the CBO’s annual report Expired
and Expiring Authorizations of Appropriations. By law, CBO is required to annually submit a report to Congress listing
programs and activities funded during that fiscal year that do not have an enacted authorization and do not have
an authorization enacted for the next fiscal year.
In addition to formal amendment of the agency’s authorizing statute, the authorization process
gives committees an opportunity to exercise informal, nonstatutory controls over the agency.
Nonstatutory controls used by committees to exercise direction over the administration of laws
include statements made in:
 committee hearings,
 committee reports accompanying legislation,
 floor debate, and
 contacts and correspondence with the agency.
If agencies fail to comply with these informal directives, the authorization committees can apply
sanctions or move to convert the informal directive to a statutory command.
The Appropriations Process
The appropriations process is among Congress’s most significant forms of oversight. Its strategic
position stems from the constitutional requirement that “no Money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”55 This “power of the purse”
allows the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations to play a prominent role in oversight.
The oversight function of the Committees on Appropriations derives from their responsibility to
examine the budget requests of the agencies as contained in the President’s budget. The decisions
of the committees are conditioned on their assessment of the agencies’ need for their budget
requests as indicated by past performance. In practice, the entire record of an agency is fair game
for the required assessment. This comprehensive overview and the “carrot and stick” of
appropriations recommendations (i.e., the authority of the committees to withhold or reduce
appropriations to uncooperative agencies) make the committees significant focal points of
congressional oversight and are a key source of their power in Congress and in the federal
government generally.56
Enacted appropriations legislation frequently contains at least five types of statutory controls on
agencies:
1. It specifies the purpose for which funds may be used.
2. It defines the specified funding level for the agency as a whole as well as for
programs and divisions within the agency.
3. It sets time limits on the availability of funds for obligation.

55 U.S. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 17. For a more detailed discussion of Congress’s appropriations power, see CRS Report
R46417, Congress’s Power Over Appropriations: Constitutional and Statutory Provisions, by Sean M. Stiff.
56 See, for example, CRS Report R46061, Voluntary Testimony by Executive Branch Officials: An Introduction, by Ben
Wilhelm.
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4. It may contain limitation provisions. For example, in Division A of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2022,57 Congress included the following
condition: “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this
Act may be used for first-class travel by the employees or agencies funded by
this Act in contravention of sections 301-10.122 through 301-10.124 of title 41,
Code of Federal Regulations.”58
5. It may stipulate how an agency’s budget can be reprogrammed (shifting funds
within an appropriations account) or transferred (shifted between appropriations
accounts).
Nonstatutory controls are a major form of oversight. Committee expectations and requirements
may be conveyed through committee reports and in hearings, letters to agency heads, and other
communications. Agencies are not legally obligated to abide by nonstatutory recommendations,
but failure to do so may result in a loss of funds and flexibility the following year.
An Example of Nonstatutory Control of Agency Appropriations
The conference report for the third Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2019 (P.L. 116-6) includes the
fol owing directive:
Paper Reduction Efforts.—The Conferees urge the Department of the Interior, EPA, Forest Service,
and Indian Health Service to work with the Office of Management and Budget to reduce printing
and reproduction costs and direct each agency to report to the Committees within 90 days of
enactment of this Act on steps being undertaken to achieve this goal and how much each agency
expects to save by implementing these measures.59
The Investigatory Process
Congress’s power to investigate is implied in the Constitution. Numerous Supreme Court
decisions have upheld the legislative branch’s right of inquiry, provided it stays within its
legitimate legislative sphere.60 The roots of Congress’s authority to conduct investigations extend
back to the British Parliament and the colonial assemblies.61 In addition, for its impeachment
power, the House of Representatives has been described as the “grand inquest of the nation.”62
Since the Framers expected lawmakers to employ the investigatory function, based upon
parliamentary precedents, it was seen as unnecessary to invest Congress with an explicit
investigatory power.63
Investigations and related activities may be conducted by:
 individual Members,

57 The Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for
FY2022.
58 P.L. 117-103, Division A, §710.
59 U.S. Congress, House Conference Committee, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for the Department of
Homeland Security for Fiscal Year 2019, And for Other Purposes, Conference Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 31,
116th Cong., 1st sess., February 13, 2019, H.Rept. 116-9 (Washington: GPO, 2019), p. 707.
60 See “Congress as an Oversight Body” below.
61 See Marshall Edward Dimock, Congressional Investigating Committees (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), pp.
46-56.
62 See generally William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests: The Historic Impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and
President Andrew Johnson (New York: William Morrow, 1992).
63 See, for example, McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
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 committees and subcommittees,
 staff or outside organizations and personnel under contract, or
 congressional support agencies such as GAO and CRS.
Investigations may serve several purposes:
 They can help to ensure honesty and efficiency in the administration of laws.
 They can secure information that assists Congress in making informed policy
judgments.
 They may aid in informing the public about the administration of laws.
The Confirmation Process
By establishing a public record of the policy views of nominees, congressional hearings allow
lawmakers to call appointed officials to account at a later time. Since at least the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978,64 which encouraged greater scrutiny of nominations, Senate committees
have set aside more time to probe the qualifications, independence, and policy views of
presidential nominees, seeking information on everything from their physical health to their
financial assets. The confirmation process can assist in oversight in at least three ways:
1. The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law.”65 The consideration of appointments to
executive branch leadership positions is a major responsibility of the Senate and
especially of Senate committees, which review and hold hearings regarding the
qualifications of nominees.
2. Confirmation hearings serve as an opportunity for senatorial oversight and
influence, providing a forum for the discussion of the policies and programs the
nominee intends to pursue. The confirmation process as an oversight tool can be
used to provide policy direction to nominees, inform nominees of congressional
interests, and seek commitments on future behavior.
3. Once the Senate has confirmed a nominee, oversight includes following up to
ensure that the nominee fulfills any commitments made during confirmation
hearings. Subsequent hearings and committee investigations can explore whether
such commitments have been kept.
The President has alternative authority to make appointments that do not require the advice and
consent of the Senate, including, under certain circumstances, recess appointments66 and
designations under the Vacancies Act.67

64 P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, codified at 5 U.S.C. App. §§101 et seq.
65 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
66 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 3. For more information on recess appointments, see CRS Report R44997, The Vacancies
Act: A Legal Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon.
67 5 U.S.C. §§3345 et seq. For more information on the Vacancies Act, see CRS Report RS21412, Temporarily Filling
Presidentially Appointed, Senate-Confirmed Positions, by Henry B. Hogue.
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The Impeachment Process
The impeachment power is a unique oversight tool available to Congress. Impeachment applies to
the President, Vice President, and other federal civil officers in the executive and judicial
branches.68 Impeachment offers Congress:
 an auxiliary constitutional method for obtaining information that might
otherwise not be made available and
 an implied threat of removal for an official whose conduct exceeds
acceptable boundaries.
Impeachment procedures differ from those of conventional congressional oversight. The most
significant procedural differences center on the roles played by each house of Congress. The
House of Representatives has the sole power to impeach.69 A simple majority is needed in the
House to approve articles of impeachment. The Senate has the sole power to try an
impeachment.70 A two-thirds majority is required in the Senate to convict and remove the
individual from office. Should the Senate deem it appropriate in a given case, it may, by majority
vote, impose an additional judgment of disqualification from holding further federal offices of
honor, trust, or profit.71
The impeachment process is infrequently used. The House has voted to impeach in 20 cases. The
Senate has voted to convict in eight cases, all pertaining to federal judges. The most recent
executive impeachment trial was that of President Donald Trump in 2021, and the most recent
judicial impeachment trial was that of U.S. District Court Judge G. Thomas Porteous Jr. in 2010.
A number of constitutional and procedural issues were addressed in the impeachment trial of
President Bill Clinton and other modern impeachment proceedings, although the answers to some
of these questions remain ambiguous. For example:
 The impeachment process has been continued from one Congress to the
next,72 although the procedural steps vary depending upon the stage in the
process.
 The Constitution defines the grounds for impeachment as “Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”73 However, the meaning and scope
of high Crimes and Misdemeanors remains in some dispute and depends on
the interpretation of individual legislators.74

68 U.S. Const. art. II, §4. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd
Garvey.
69 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 5. See CRS Report R45769, The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives, by
Elizabeth Rybicki and Michael Greene.
70 U.S. Const. art. II, §3, cl. 7. See CRS Report R46185, The Impeachment Process in the Senate, by Elizabeth Rybicki
and Michael Greene.
71 While the Constitution does not speak to the vote threshold necessary for disqualification, this has been the practice
of the Senate across history. See CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd
Garvey at 14-15.
72 For example, the House of Representatives impeached President Clinton on December 19, 1998, near the conclusion
of the 105th Congress. Shortly after the 106th Congress convened on January 3, 1999, the Senate conducted a trial.
73 U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
74 CRS Report R46013, Impeachment and the Constitution, by Jared P. Cole and Todd Garvey.
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 The Constitution provides for impeachment of the “President, Vice President,
and all civil Officers of the United States.”75 While the outer limit of the
“civil Officers” language is not altogether clear, past precedents suggest that
it covers at least federal judges and senior executive officers.
Investigative Oversight76
This section provides an overview of some of the more common legal issues that committees may
face in the course of conducting oversight and investigations. It begins by briefly describing the
historical development of the legislative “power of inquiry” and follows with a general summary
of Congress’s authority under the U.S. Constitution to perform oversight and investigations. It
then discusses the legal tools commonly used by congressional committees in conducting that
oversight as well as the mechanisms used by Congress to enforce its demands for information.
The section then briefly discusses possible legal limitations on the investigative power, including
those arising from the Constitution, common law, and statutory restrictions.
Historical Background
The rich and varied history of legislative investigations, which can be traced from the English
Parliament to American colonial legislatures and through to the U.S. Congress, has played a
leading role in establishing the nature and contours of the congressional “power of inquiry.”77
This history supports the unmistakable conclusion that the power to investigate has long been
considered an essential attribute of legislative bodies.
It is difficult to identify, at least with precision, the emergence of Parliament’s protean
investigatory powers. By the early 17th century however, Parliament had apparently recognized its
power to investigate by requiring—on a case-by-case basis—the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documents in furtherance of the body’s “duty to inquire into every Step of publick
management….”78 These early investigations carried out by parliamentary committees focused on
the king’s ministers, in order to oversee their execution of the law, as well as private parties.79 As
the gathering information relating to both the passage of new laws and the administration of
existing laws became seen as an essential ingredient of the legislative process, compulsory
investigatory powers were provided on a more general and permanent basis to established
parliamentary committees of inquiry.80 This overarching historical notion of the power of inquiry
as a necessary component of the legislative power was transported to America, where it was

75 U.S. Const. art. II, §4.
76 This report is not intended to address all the legal issues that committees, Members, and staff may encounter when
engaged in investigative activities. Legal questions on Congress’s investigatory powers should be directed to CRS
legislative attorneys.
77 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959) (“The power of inquiry has been employed by Congress
throughout our history, over the whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress might legislate or
decide upon due investigation not to legislate….”).
78 13 R. CHANDLER, HISTORY & PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 172 (1743); ERNEST J. EBERLING,
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
INVESTIGATE AND PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT 34 (1928) (noting that Parliament viewed the subpoena power as “too serious
a matter for general delegation”).
79 James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153,
161-62 (1926).
80 Id. at 163-64.
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incorporated into the practice of colonial governments and, after independence, to U.S. state
governments.81
The Constitutional Convention saw almost no discussion of Congress’s power to conduct
oversight and investigations, although individual Members of the convention appear to have
understood Congress to clearly possess “inquisitorial” powers.82 A proposal to explicitly provide
Congress with the power to punish for contempts, a power Parliament often used as a means to
effectuate its investigatory powers, was made but not acted upon.83 Nevertheless, it is likely that
the general view was that no express enumeration of the power of inquiry or the power to punish
for contempt was considered necessary because the Framers’ conception of legislative power,
based on centuries of consistent practice by both Parliament and colonial legislatures, included
the ability to gather information relevant to the conduct of the House and Senate’s legislative
functions.84 As one scholar has put it, the contemporary understanding of legislative power at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution “possessed a content sufficiently broad to include the use
of committees of inquiry with powers to send for persons and paper.”85
Long-standing and unbroken congressional practice confirms this view. Congress has exhibited a
robust view of its own investigatory powers from the very outset, especially in regard to the
legislature’s role in overseeing the administration of government.86 During the First Congress, the
House appointed five Members to investigate Senator Robert Morris’s prior activities as
superintendent of finance under the Articles of Confederation.87 The House later established the
first special investigating committee in 1792 for the purpose of inquiring into Major General
Arthur St. Clair’s disastrous military excursion into the Northwest Territory in which nearly 700
federal troops were killed by the Western Confederacy of American Indians.88 The mere act of
authorizing such a committee set an important precedent in that adoption of the resolution was
preceded by a debate over whether it was appropriate, and indeed constitutional, for the House to

81 Id. at 165-168 (highlighting examples of colonial and state legislatures engaging in investigations). While English
Parliamentary practice often informs the powers of Congress, it is clear that the usefulness of parliamentary precedents
in defining Congress’s investigatory powers is somewhat limited due to significant distinctions between the two
legislative bodies. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly suggested, Parliament’s investigatory and contempt powers
were derived from the bodies’ authority to exercise a “blend[]” of both legislative and judicial powers. Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 533 (1917) (concluding that the English contempt power “rested upon an assumed blending of
legislative and judicial authority possessed by the Parliament”). Congress, under the separation of powers doctrine,
exercises no judicial power. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 192 (1880) (suggesting that “no judicial power is vested in the
Congress”). Thus, unlike Parliament, any authority to investigate and subsequently enforce its orders must rest solely
on legislative authority provided to the body by the Constitution.
82 See e.g., 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 206 (1937) (remarks of George
Mason) (Members of Congress “are not only Legislators but they possess inquisitorial powers. They must meet
frequently to inspect the Conduct of the public offices”); JAMES WILSON 3 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES
WILSON 219 (1804) (noting the traditional power of legislators to act as “grand inquisitors of the realm”).
83 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 61, at 340; JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 171 (2017).
84 Landis, supra note 58, at 169-70.
85 Id. at 169.
86 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444, 80 S. Ct. 1502, 1516 (1960) (“The investigative function of [legislative]
committees is as old as the Republic.”); EBERLING, supra note 57, at 33.
87 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1514 (1790); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD,
1789-1801 20 (1997) (“Thus, within a year of its first meeting, in the face of an explicit constitutional challenge, the
House of Representatives flatly asserted a broad power to investigate the conduct of a former executive …”).
88 TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 17-19 (1974).
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investigate the matter or whether it was preferable to urge the President to carry out the inquiry.89
Although some asserted that the House lacked authority to inquire into executive operations, that
position was defeated, and the investigating committee was established with clear authority to
“call for such persons, papers and records as may be necessary to assist their inquiries.”90
The investigation itself also established important precedents for Congress’s authority to gather
information from the executive branch, including in relation to sensitive military matters. After
some discussion within Washington’s Cabinet of the President’s authority to withhold requested
information from Congress, the special committee obtained documents from both the War
Department and the Treasury Department as well as testimony from Cabinet officials Henry Knox
and Alexander Hamilton.91
Congress also acted swiftly to use federal law and internal rules to strengthen its investigatory
powers. In 1798, Congress enacted a statute recognizing its powers to not only obtain evidence
through testimony but to do so from witnesses under oath.92 The statute specifically authorized
the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and a chair of a select committee to
administer oaths to witnesses testifying before Congress.93 During this same time period, both the
House and Senate began to delegate to ad hoc select committees the authority to call for papers or
persons. Committee investigations have continued apace to the modern day, representing a
pervasive and nearly ubiquitous aspect of the legislative function,94 as has Congress’s use of
statutory provisions and internal chamber rules to support committee investigations. The
investigatory power is therefore thoroughly rooted in history and stands on an equal footing with
Congress’s other legislative powers.95
Constitutional Authority to Conduct Oversight and
Investigative Inquiries
Although the “power of inquiry” was not expressly provided for in the Constitution, the Supreme
Court has nonetheless described investigations as so central to the legislative function as to be
implicit in Article I’s vesting of “legislative Powers” in the Congress.96 In the seminal case of
McGrain v. Daugherty, a unanimous Supreme Court declared that “the power of inquiry—with
process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”97
Congressional investigations are therefore properly characterized as an implied constitutional

89 See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 490-94 (1792).
90 TAYLOR, supra note 67, at 22.
91 Id. at 23-24.
92 Act of May 3, 1798, ch. 36, 1 STAT. 554.
93 Id. The power to administer oaths was expanded to all standing committee chairs in 1817. Act of Feb. 8, 1817, ch.
10, 3 STAT. 345. See also McGrain, 273 U.S. at 167.
94 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957) (noting that Congress has “assiduously” performed
oversight “[f]rom the earliest times in its history”).
95 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187; WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 303 (15th ed. 1913) (asserting that the
“informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function”). See also J. William Fulbright,
Congressional Investigations: Significance for the Legislative Process, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 441 (1951) (describing
the power of investigation as “perhaps the most necessary of all the powers underlying the legislative function”).
96 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (“The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process.”).
97 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
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power of Congress.98 It is a power that serves to both ensure that Congress can make effective
and informed legislative decisions and to check executive power, thereby sustaining Congress’s
role in the United States’ constitutional scheme of separated powers.99
This power to gather information related to the legislative function is both critical in purpose, as
Congress “cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information,” and extensive in
scope, as Congress is empowered to obtain pertinent testimony and documents through
investigations into nearly any matter properly before the body.100 In Eastland v. United States
Servicemen’s Fund, for instance, the Supreme Court stated that the “scope of its power of inquiry
… is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the
Constitution.”101 Similarly, in Watkins v. United States, the Court emphasized that the “power of
the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process.”102 “That power,” the
Court established, “is broad” and “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes”103 and “comprehends probes into
departments of the federal government to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste.”104 Included
within the scope of the power is the authority to initiate investigations, hold hearings, request
testimony or documents from witnesses, and, in situations where either a government or private
party is not forthcoming, compel compliance with congressional requests through the issuance
and enforcement of subpoenas.105
The Supreme Court most recently reaffirmed both the importance and breadth of Congress’s
investigatory power in Trump v. Mazars.106 There, the Court observed that “[w]ithout information,
Congress would be shooting in the dark, unable to legislate ‘wisely or effectively.’” As such,
Congress’s investigatory powers must be understood to include “inquiries into the administration

98 Id.; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197 (concluding that the investigative power is “justified solely as an adjunct to the
legislative process”). Although the Supreme Court has at times referred to the investigative power as an “inherent”
power, id. at 187, it is perhaps more accurate to refer to it as an implied power. While an inherent power may not be
tethered to a textual grant of authority, an implied power is derived by implication from an enumerated power. See
Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–43
(2001).
99 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1955) (“Without the power to investigate—including of course the
authority to compel testimony, either through its own processes or through judicial trial—Congress could be seriously
handicapped in its efforts to exercise its constitutional function wisely and effectively.”) (citations omitted).
100 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175 (“A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess
it.”). Congress’s oversight function is subject to a variety of legal limitations. See Eastland v. United States
Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975) (“Although the power to investigate is necessarily broad it is not
unlimited…. We have made it clear [] that Congress is not invested with a ‘general’ power to inquire into private
affairs.’ The subject of any inquiry always must be one ‘on which legislation could be had.’”) (citations omitted);
Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031-32 (2020) (noting that the power to conduct investigations is
“subject to several limitations” including those arising from “constitutional rights”).
101 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504, n. 15 (quoting Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111).
102 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175 (noting that the “power of inquiry” was “intended to be effectively exercised, and
therefore to carry with them such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to that end.”).
106 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020).
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of existing laws, studies of proposed laws, and ‘surveys of defects in our social, economic or
political system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them.’”107
The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose
Broad as the investigative power may be, it is not unlimited.108 The Supreme Court has cautioned
that because the power to investigate derives from Article I’s grant of “legislative powers,” it may
be exercised only “in aid of the legislative function.”109 No inquiry “is an end in itself” but
instead “must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”110 The
Supreme Court has generally implemented this principle by requiring that compulsory committee
investigative actions—including subpoenas for documents or testimony—serve a valid legislative
purpose.
This “legislative purpose” requirement is quite generous, permitting investigations into any topic
upon which legislation could be had or over which Congress may properly exercise authority.111
This includes investigations undertaken by Congress to inform itself about how existing laws
function, whether new laws are necessary, and if old laws should be repealed or altered.112
Investigations into whether the executive branch is complying with its obligation to faithfully
execute laws passed by Congress also serve a legislative purpose, as do “probes into departments
of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”113 The Supreme Court
also appears to have recognized Congress’s legitimate role in informing the public “concerning
the workings of its government”—a task the legislature has “assiduously performed” since “the
earliest times in its history.”114
In practice, the legislative purpose requirement rarely acts as a significant restriction on
legislative investigations, especially those relating to government operations. This is principally
because the scope of what constitutes a permissible legislative purpose is broad but also because
the application of the legislative purpose test has generally been quite deferential to the
investigating committee. For example, in addition to broadly interpreting the scope of the types of
investigations that aid the legislative function, the Supreme Court has at times effectively adopted
a presumption that committees act with a legislative purpose when engaged in an investigation of

107 Id. (citing McGrain, 273 U.S at 161, 174-75).
108 The legislative purpose test generally governs the scope of the investigative power granted (implicitly) to each
house of Congress by the Constitution. That grant of power is then limited by other constitutional constraints. Id. at
2031-32. For a discussion of other constitutional limitations on congressional investigations see infra “Constitutional
Limitations.”
109 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
110 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
111 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111.
112 Id.
113 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
114 Id. at 200, n. 33; In re United States Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270,
1281 (D.D.C. 1973) (“It is apparent as well that a committee’s legislative purpose may legitimately include the
publication of information.”). But see Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 (1979) (holding that with respect to
Speech or Debate Clause immunity that “the transmittal of [] information by individual Members in order to inform the
public and other Members is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative
process”); Benford v. Am. Broad. Cos., 502 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (D. Md. 1980) (“The Supreme Court, however, has
never advocated a broad reading of the “informing function.”). Justice Brennan voiced perhaps the fullest explanation
of Congress’s “informing function” in his dissenting opinion in Gravel v. United States. 408 U.S. 606, 638-64 (1972)
(Brennan, J. dissenting). Brennan’s position, however, was not adopted by the majority opinion.
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governmental activity.115 This can be seen, for example, in McGrain, a case arising out of a
congressional investigation of the Attorney General’s failure to prosecute certain individuals
following the Teapot Dome scandal.116 Initially, a federal district court had invalidated the
congressional committee’s attempts to obtain testimony from the Attorney General’s brother, a
private citizen. The lower court reasoned that the committee’s purpose was not legislative in
nature but was undertaken to “determine the guilt of the Attorney General” and to “put him on
trial,” which Congress “has no power to do.”117 The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected
this characterization of the committee’s purpose, holding instead that:
[T]he subject to be investigated was the administration of the Department of Justice—
whether its functions were being properly discharged or were being neglected or
misdirected, and particularly whether the Attorney General and his assistants were
performing or neglecting their duties…. Plainly the subject was one on which legislation
could be had and would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was
calculated to elicit.118
In light of this oversight role, the Court held that “the only legitimate object the Senate could
have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was
such that the presumption should be indulged that this was the real object.”119
The judiciary’s application of the legislative purpose test is informed by other principles that have
previously reflected a reluctance to question a committee’s reasons for seeking information. The
Supreme Court has made clear that when “Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional
power,” the courts should not inquire into “the motives which spurred the exercise of” the
investigative power.120 Even evidence of bad intent will not “vitiate” an otherwise valid
investigation.121
Nor is a committee required to “declare in advance” the purpose of an inquiry or its ultimate
legislative or oversight goal.122 The Supreme Court has stated, “The very nature of the
investigative function—like any research—is that it takes the searchers up some ‘blind alleys’ and
into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no predictable end
result.”123
The judicial reluctance to question congressional motives and the general presumption that
committees act with a legislative purpose both play a significant role in limiting the effectiveness

115 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 178 (holding that “the only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject-matter was such that the presumption should be
indulged that this was the real object”); id. (“We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed …”) (citation omitted).
116 Id. at 150-54.
117 Ex parte Daugherty, 299 F. 620, 639-40 (S.D. Ohio 1924).
118 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 177.
119 Id. at 178.
120 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959) Judicial attempts to look inside the minds of Members
“misperceives the [c]ourt’s role, which is not to determine the validity of the legislative purpose by ‘testing the motives
of committee members’ based on public statements.” See Senate Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations v. Ferrer, 199
F. Supp. 3d 125, 137 (D.D.C. 2016).
121 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 (concluding that courts should not “test[] the motives of committee members” when
evaluating an investigation’s purpose).
122 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897) (noting that “it was certainly not necessary that the resolutions should
declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the investigation was concluded”).
123 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 509.
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of raising legislative purpose as a defense to an otherwise valid congressional subpoena.
However, the courts have acknowledged at least two general classes of investigations in which
Congress may generally lack a legislative purpose: investigations into private conduct with no
relation to the legislative function and investigations that usurp functions committed to another
branch of government.
Investigations into Private Conduct with No Relation to the
Legislative Function
Congress does not act with a legislative purpose when investigating private conduct that has no
nexus to the legislative function. In the 1880 decision of Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Supreme
Court held broadly that Congress does not “possess[] the general power of making inquiry into
the private affairs of the citizen.”124 But the Court has subsequently described the “loose
language” of Kilbourn and its narrow conception of Congress’s investigative power as “severely
discredited.”125 For example, in discussing the reach of Kilbourn, the Court appears to have made
a distinction between investigating purely private conduct of private citizens, which would not
typically serve a legislative purpose, and investigating the private conduct of public office
holders, which may, in some circumstances, serve a legislative purpose due to Congress’s role in
preserving good government.126 For example, in Hutcheson v. United States, the Court held that
“[a]t most, Kilbourn is authority for the proposition that Congress cannot constitutionally inquire
‘into the private affairs of individuals who hold no office under the government’ when the
investigation ‘could result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred.’”127
Despite its criticism of Kilbourn, the Court has still expressed concern that congressional
investigations into private conduct could infringe on personal privacy. In the 1957 decision of
Watkins v. United States, the Court, in an opinion overturning a criminal contempt of Congress
conviction on due process grounds, also discussed more generally Congress’s investigative
powers and described the legislative branch as having “no general authority to expose the private
affairs of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of Congress.”128 Although
acknowledging that “[t]he public is, of course, entitled to be informed concerning the workings of
its government,” that justification for government oversight “cannot be inflated into a general
power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of
individuals.”129 As such, an investigation into “individual affairs is invalid if unrelated to any
legislative purpose,” as are attempts to “expose for the sake of exposure.”130

124 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1881). In that case the Court invalidated the House’s imprisonment of a member of the public
during an investigation into the collapse of a private real estate pool. Taking a very restrictive view of Congress’s
investigation authorities, the opinion also questioned the House’s authority to punish witnesses for non-compliance
with investigative requests unless the inquiry was connected to either impeachment or the House’s power to judge the
election and qualification of its Members. Id.
125 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 613 n.16 (1962).
126 The Court also appears to have distinguished investigations into private conduct of the President. See infra
“Legislative Purpose and Investigations Involving the President.”
127 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 46.
128 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
129 Id. at 200.
130 Id. at 198, 200.
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Functions Committed to Another Branch of Government
A second class of investigations that may lack a legislative purpose are those that appear to usurp
functions exclusively committed to another branch of government. In Barenblatt v. United States
the Supreme Court explained, “Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, [Congress]
cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it
supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.”131 The Court elaborated on
this separation of powers line of reasoning in Watkins, where it stated that Congress is not “a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government.… Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to ‘punish’ those investigated are indefensible.”132 Most recently, in Mazars, the
Court reaffirmed that
Congress may not issue a subpoena for the purpose of “law enforcement,” because “those
powers are assigned under our Constitution to the Executive and the Judiciary.” Thus
Congress may not use subpoenas to “try” someone “before [a] committee for any crime or
wrongdoing.”133
While it is clear that Congress cannot arrogate to itself either the executive or judicial function by
attempting to directly enforce the law or otherwise prosecute and try an individual for
wrongdoing, it is not clear how this separation of powers constraint applies to investigations
touching on other exclusive functions of the executive or judicial branches.134 In Tenney v.
Brandhove, for example, the Court suggested that “[t]o find that a committee’s investigation has
exceeded the bounds of legislative power it must be obvious that there was a usurpation of
functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary or the Executive.”135
Legislative Purpose and Investigations Involving the President
The legislative purpose test appears to apply with greater scrutiny and less deference to Congress
when a committee is investigating the President. In Trump v. Mazars, President Trump brought
suit in his personal capacity to block his banks and accounting firm from complying with various
committee subpoenas for the President’s personal financial records.136 Applying the deferential
legislative purpose standard used by the Court in previous cases,137 the opinions below concluded
that the committees had a valid legislative purpose for seeking the President’s personal records.138

131 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
132 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
133 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (2020).
134 Congress’s impeachment function, which has at time been characterized as possessing “judicial” features, arguably
represents an exception to this general prohibition. See CRS Report R45983, Congressional Access to Information in
an Impeachment Investigation, by Todd Garvey at 6-11.
135 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
136 The challenged subpoenas were issued as part of different ongoing committee investigations: The House Committee
on Oversight and Reform sought information in connection to its review of federal ethics laws, the House Financial
Services Committee sought information in connection to its investigation into abuses of the financial system, and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence sought information in connection to its investigation into foreign
interference in U.S. elections. See generally CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10517, Trump v. Mazars: Implications for
Congressional Oversight, by Todd Garvey.
137 See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10301, Legislative Purpose and Adviser Immunity in Congressional Investigations, by
Todd Garvey.
138 Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2028-29.
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On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mazars presented the Court with its first opportunity to directly
consider the legislative purpose test in a congressional investigation of the President.
The Mazars opinion clarified that in the context of congressional investigations the President
must, as a constitutional matter, be treated differently than others.139 The opinion described the
courts below as having mistakenly “treated these cases much like any other,” applying standards
and principles established in “precedents that do not involve the President’s papers.”140
Subpoenas for the President’s personal records, the Court determined, involve significant
separation-of-powers concerns that trigger a different, more scrutinizing approach to the scope of
Congress’s power. But the Court rejected as inappropriate invitations to import the heightened
“demonstrated, specific need” or “demonstrably critical” standards that had been used in prior
cases involving executive privilege—a privilege not at issue in Mazars due to the personal nature
of the documents sought.141 Instead, the Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court identified at
least four “special considerations” to help lower courts to appropriately balance the “legislative
interests of Congress” with “the ‘unique position’ of the President” when a committee subpoena
seeks the President’s private papers.142
 First, a reviewing court should “carefully assess whether the asserted
legislative purpose warrants the significant step of involving the President
and his papers.”143 The Court elaborated that Congress’s “interests are not
sufficiently powerful to justify access to the President’s personal papers
when other sources could provide Congress the information it needs.”144
 Second, courts “should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably
necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective.”145 Specific demands,
the High Court reasoned, are less likely to “intrude” on the operation of the
Presidency.146
 Third, “courts should be attentive to the nature of the evidence offered by
Congress to establish that a subpoena advances a valid legislative
purpose.”147 To this end, Congress’s position is strengthened when a
congressional committee can provide “detailed and substantial evidence” of
its legislative purpose.148

139 Id. at 2026. See also United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 192 (CC Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (noting that the court
would not “proceed against the president as against an ordinary individual”). The Mazars opinion also treated a
congressional investigation as “different” from a “judicial proceeding.” Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2026.
140 Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2033.
141 Id. at 2032. (“We disagree that these demanding standards apply here.… We decline to transplant that protection
root and branch to cases involving nonprivileged, private information, which by definition does not implicate sensitive
Executive Branch deliberations.”). The Court also rejected the House’s proposed approach, which it characterized as
failing to “take adequate account of the significant separation of powers issues raised by congressional subpoenas for
the President’s information.” Id. at 2033.
142 Id. at 2035.
143 Id. at 2036.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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 Fourth, “courts should be careful to assess the burdens imposed on the
President by a subpoena.”149 Here the Court reasoned that in comparison to
the burdens imposed by judicial subpoenas, the burdens imposed on the
President by congressional subpoenas “should be carefully scrutinized, for
they stem from a rival political branch that has an ongoing relationship with
the President and incentives to use subpoenas for institutional advantage.”150
These “special considerations” appear to subject congressional subpoenas for the President’s
personal records to a less deferential standard than other congressional subpoenas. The Court
cautioned that “other considerations,” besides those specifically identified, might also be relevant,
as “one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list” of
factors to be considered by a reviewing court.151
Mazars’ “special considerations” appear to be tailored to Presidential records.152 To view the case
otherwise—for example, to apply the “special considerations” to congressional subpoenas issued
as part of a more typical oversight investigation into agency activity—would put the opinion in
tension with previous precedent, including the principles established in McGrain.153 Nothing in
the Mazars opinion appears to signal that the majority intended to alter previously established
principles in congressional investigations not involving the President.
Authority of Congressional Committees
The implied constitutional authority to conduct investigations resides independently in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate, but each chamber has delegated responsibility for
carrying out the investigative role to its standing and select committees.154 For example, under
House rules, a standing House committee may conduct “such investigations and studies as it

149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. It appears that the Mazars test may also apply to cases involving former Presidents in at least a narrow set of
“specific circumstances.” See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 39 F.4th 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“We do not accept the
Committee’s invitation to abandon the Supreme Court’s Mazars test in the Mazars case itself. Whatever may be the
appropriate standard when Congress issues a subpoena to a former President, the subpoena in this case, when issued,
sought a sitting President’s information. President Trump then brought this challenge while still in office; that same
challenge remains pending; and the subpoena remains unchanged in all respects. At least in these specific
circumstances, we do not understand that the Mazars test instantly ceased to apply—and a different standard
immediately took hold—on the day President Trump left office.”). See also Comm. on Ways and Means v. Dep’t of
Treasury, 45 F.4th 324, 333-34 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[I]t is likely law of the circuit that a Congressional request for a
sitting President’s personal information is evaluated under the heightened Mazars standard regardless of whether the
President in question remains in office.”).
152 It is not entirely clear how Mazars may apply to investigations focused on official conduct and seeking
governmental records. See CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10517, Trump v. Mazars: Implications for Congressional
Oversight, by Todd Garvey. It could be argued that the standards adopted in Mazars are applicable only when a
congressional committee directly targets the personal or private records of a President. Under that interpretation,
judicially imposed limits on Congress’s authority to obtain official records of the President would be reviewed under
the deferential “legislative purpose” standard applied in previous cases (though, even if the subpoena is validly issued
under this standard, the President might still invoke applicable privileges to withhold some records). On the other hand,
it could be argued that the “special considerations” test set forth in Mazars applies to requests for either personal or
official records. Even then, the considerations may apply differently to requests for official records compared to the
President’s private information.
153 See supra “The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose.”
154 See e.g., House Rule X(2); House Rule XI(1)(b); House Rule XI(2)(m); Senate Rule XXV; Senate Rule XXVI(1).
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considers necessary or appropriate in the exercise of its responsibilities.”155 In the Senate, each
standing committee “may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction.”156 As a
result, the power of inquiry and investigation is one that is exercised primarily by committees of
Congress rather than by the full House or Senate. And that investigative role is more than a
discretionary power; it is a statutory duty. Under 2 U.S.C. § 190d, “each standing committee of
the Senate and the House of Representatives shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the
application, administration, and execution of those laws … the subject matter of which is within
the jurisdiction of that committee.”157
The enabling chamber rule or resolution that gives a committee life is also the charter that defines
the grant and limitations of the committee’s investigative powers. The committee charter
constrains committees in two meaningful ways. First, as a creation of its parent house, a
congressional committee may inquire only into matters within the scope of the authority that has
been delegated to it—that is, within its jurisdiction.158 Second, in conducting investigations, a
committee must generally comply with any procedural requirements contained in its charter, its
own rules, or the rules of the parent chamber.159
Enforcement of these limitations by the courts, like judicial scrutiny of other internal
congressional matters, is generally quite limited.160 Indeed, the Speech or Debate Clause
generally prevents direct challenges to how a committee carries out its legislative and
investigative operations.161 As a result, it is generally only when the committee seeks to enforce a
subpoena or other investigative demands that a court is presented with the opportunity to
determine compliance with procedural rules.162 Even then, courts are generally reluctant to
examine internal matters unless a House, Senate, or committee rule implicates constitutional
rights.163 However, it does appear that when a court is forced to either construe the scope of a
committee’s jurisdiction or interpret committee rules, it will generally look to the words of the
rule or resolution itself and then, if necessary, to the usual sources of legislative history such as
floor debate, legislative reports, and prior committee practice and interpretation.164
Jurisdiction
A committee may not exercise compulsory investigative powers in connection to matters outside
of its jurisdiction.165 This jurisdictional limitation is fundamental to the operation of a committee,

155 House Rule XI(1)(b).
156 Senate Rule XXVI(1).
157 2 U.S.C. §§190d(a).
158 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957) (“Plainly these committees are restricted to the missions
delegated to them…. No witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.”).
159 See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1963).
160 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (“The courts should not go beyond the narrow confines of
determining that a committee’s inquiry may fairly be deemed within its province.”).
161 Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975).
162 Judicial review of subpoenas is also quite narrow. See “Limitations on Challenging a Subpoena” infra.
163 See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (declaring that the House’s rulemaking authority “is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the house, and, within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal”).
164 See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209. Courts have also construed delegations of investigatory powers narrowly when
necessary to avoid “passing on serious constitutional questions.” Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 274-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
165 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42, 44 (1953); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198, 206 (“Plainly these
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as it arises from the very nature of the “source” of the committee’s authority: the delegation from
the parent body.166 A committee “is restricted to the missions delegated to it by the parent body,”
and “no witness can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area.”167 For
standing committees, that jurisdictional delegation can generally be found in House Rule X and
Senate Rule XXV.168
The consequence of a committee exceeding its jurisdiction is apparent from United States v.
Rumely.169 There, the secretary of an organization that published and sold books of “particular
political tendentiousness” challenged his conviction for contempt of Congress on the grounds that
the committee that cited him for contempt had exceeded its jurisdiction.170 The resolution
establishing the committee, which the Supreme Court viewed as “the controlling charter of the
committee’s powers,” had authorized the committee to investigate “lobbying activities intended
to influence … legislation.”171 The Court interpreted “lobbying activities” to extend only to
“representation made directly to the Congress” and thus concluded that the committee had no
authority to investigate or enforce a subpoena against a witness who had sought only to influence
public opinion.172
In adopting this interpretation of “lobbying activities,” the Court expressly stated that it gave the
committee’s jurisdiction a “more restricted scope” in part so as to avoid the possibility that
enforcement of the subpoena would violate the witness’s First Amendment right to engage in
political speech.173 The Court has followed a similar approach in subsequent cases, at times
adopting a narrow interpretation of either a committee jurisdiction or the scope of an individual
investigation in order to avoid the possibility of a constitutional conflict on the grounds that
“[p]rotected freedoms should not be placed in danger in the absence of a clear determination by
the House or the Senate that a particular inquiry is justified by a particular legislative need.”174

committees are restricted to the missions delegated to them, i.e., to acquire certain data to be used by the House or the
Senate in coping with a problem that falls within its legislative sphere. No witness can be compelled to make
disclosures on matters outside that area.”).
166 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 206.
167 Id.
168 See House Rule X, 113th Cong. (2013); Senate Rule XXV, 114th Cong. (2013). Jurisdictional authority for “special”
investigations may be given to a standing committee, a joint committee of both houses, or a special subcommittee of a
standing committee, among other options.
169 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 42-48.
170 Id. at 42, 48.
171 Id. at 44.
172 Id. at 47.
173 Id. (“Certainly it does no violence to the phrase ‘lobbying activities’ to give it a more restricted scope. To give such
meaning is not barred by intellectual honesty. So to interpret is in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional
doubt.”).
174 See Watkins, 345 U.S. at 224; Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 275 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that if Congress
had intended a committee to begin an investigation “sure to provoke the serious and difficult constitutional questions
… it would have spelled out this intention in words more explicit than the general terms found in the authorizing
resolutions under consideration.” But see Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 121 (rejecting the avoidance approach adopted in
Rumely on the grounds that Congress had placed a clarifying “legislative gloss” on the meaning of the applicable
committee rule).
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Committee Rules
A committee must also generally comply with chamber and committee rules relating to the
conduct of investigations.175 For example, in Yellin v. United States, the Supreme Court
overturned a contempt conviction stemming from a witness’s refusal to answer questions in a
public hearing.176 The witness had argued that the conviction was improper because the
committee had failed to comply with its own rules regarding the availability of closed, or
executive, sessions.177 Those rules expressly required that in determining whether to close a
hearing, the committee consider the possible injury to the witness’s reputation that may result
from a public hearing.178 The Court held that in exercising investigative powers, a committee may
be “held to observance of its rules.”179 Finding that the committee had not given due
consideration to the witness’s requests for a private hearing, the Court overturned the contempt
conviction.180 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Gojack v. United States.181 There a
committee rule required that all “major investigations” be initiated only with the majority
approval of the committee.182 The underlying investigation that gave rise to the contempt
prosecution had not been authorized. Thus, the court reversed the conviction.183
Legal Tools Available for Oversight and Investigations
There is no single method or set of procedures for engaging in legislative oversight or conducting
an investigation.184 Although public attention often focuses on public hearings and subpoenaed
witnesses, congressional committees frequently rely on informal tools to gather the information
necessary to accomplish the committee’s investigative goals, such as staff-level communication
and contacts and voluntary compliance with document and briefing requests.185 In many ways,
these informal and voluntary tools represent the unseen but predominant components of
congressional investigations.

175 House Rule XI(2) and Senate Rule XXVI(2) require that committees adopt written rules of procedure and publish
them in the Congressional Record. The failure to publish such rules has resulted in the invalidation of a perjury
prosecution. United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to publish committee rule
setting one Senator as a quorum for taking hearing testimony was a sufficient ground to reverse a perjury conviction).
176 Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1963).
177 Id. at 113-14.
178 Id. at 114. The committee rule provided: “If a majority of the Committee or Subcommittee … believes that the
interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the
reputation of other individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an Executive Session for the purpose of
determining the necessity or advisability of conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing.” Id. at 114-15.
179 Id. (citing Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949)).
180 Id.
181 Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 703-04 (1966).
182 Id. at 706.
183 Id. at 712.
184 See, e.g., CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A CRITICAL AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Roger A. Bruns, David L. Hostetter
& Raymond W. Smock eds., 2011).
185 A congressional committee “gathers information through formal investigations, but also obtains information in a
number of other ways, including through requests made to relevant Federal agencies, to lobbyists with expertise in a
particular field, and to stakeholders.” SEC v. Comm. on Ways & Means of the United States House of Representatives,
161 F. Supp. 3d 199, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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Committees also have more formal mechanisms for collecting necessary testimony from relevant
witnesses. Chief among these tools are hearings and, when authorized, depositions.
Hearings
As previously noted, standing committees of the House and Senate are authorized to hold
hearings for purposes of receiving testimony.186 This testimony is often, but not always, received
under oath.187
Both the House and the Senate, as well as individual committees, have adopted a variety of rules
governing the conduct of hearings. These rules include quorum requirements, basic procedural
constraints, and witness and minority protections.188 For example, both chambers permit a
reduced quorum for taking testimony and receiving evidence. House committees are required to
have at least two Members present to take testimony.189 Senate rules allow the taking of testimony
with only one Member in attendance.190 Most committees have adopted the minimum quorum
requirement, and some require a higher quorum for sworn rather than unsworn testimony.191
Senate and House rules also limit the authority of their committees to meet in closed session.192
For example, the House requires testimony to be held in closed session if a majority of a
committee or subcommittee determines it “may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any
person.”193 Such testimony taken in closed session is normally releasable only by a majority vote
of the committee. Similarly, confidential material received in a closed session requires a majority
vote for release.
In oversight and investigative hearings, the chair usually makes an opening statement. In the case
of an investigative hearing, the opening statement can be an important means of defining the
subject matter of the hearing and thereby establishing the pertinence of questions asked the
witnesses.194 A witness does not have the right to make a statement before being questioned, but
the opportunity is usually accorded. Committee rules may prescribe the length of such statements
and also require that written statements be submitted in advance of the hearing.195 Questioning of
witnesses may be structured so that Members alternate for specified lengths of time.
A congressional investigative hearing is unique and generally should not be analogized to a
criminal proceeding, as the same constitutional rights do not attach. Because the Constitution is
generally applicable to all forms of government action, most provisions of the Bill of Rights

186 House Rule XI(m)(1); Senate Rule XXVI(1).
187 Many committees leave the swearing of witnesses to the discretion of the chair, while others require that all
witnesses be sworn. Compare House Comm. on Agriculture, Rule VII(b) (“The Chairman of the Committee, or any
member of the Committee designated by the Chairman, may administer oaths to any witnesses.), with Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, Rule II(4) (“All witnesses who testify to matters of fact shall be sworn unless the Committee waives
the oath.”).
188 As a general matter, House Rule XI and Senate Rule XXVI govern committee hearing procedures.
189 House Rule XI(2)(h)(2).
190 Senate Rule XXVI(7)(a)(2).
191 See, e.g., House Comm. on the Judiciary Rule II; Senate Comm. on Appropriations Rule II(3).
192 House Rule XI(2)(k)(5); Senate Rule XXVI(5)(b).
193 House Rule XI(2)(k)(5).
194 See Watkins, 354 U.S. at 209 (“There are several sources that can outline the ‘question under inquiry’ in such a way
that the rules against vagueness are satisfied. The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of
the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make the topic clear.”).
195 See, e.g., House Comm. on Foreign Affairs Rule 6; Senate Comm. on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Rule 3.
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apply to Congress’s investigative activities as they do to congressional legislation.196 For
example, witnesses in a committee hearing may assert their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.197 But not all constitutional rights are applicable to congressional investigations.198
Consider, for example, a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to present one’s own
evidence and to confront and cross-examine witnesses.199 The D.C. Circuit has held that “the
distinguishing factors” between a legislative investigation and a criminal proceeding “cause”
congressional investigations “to be outside the guarantees of the … the confrontation right
guaranteed in criminal proceedings by the Sixth Amendment.”200 A witness in a committee
hearing therefore has no right to offer his or her own evidence or cross-examine other witnesses,
though a committee may, at its discretion, afford a witness such an opportunity.201 The application
of another Sixth Amendment right, the right to effective assistance of counsel, may also not apply
in a congressional investigation.202 Nevertheless, House, Senate, and committee rules afford
witnesses a limited form of that right. Under House rules, the role of counsel is restricted to
advising a witness of his or her “constitutional rights,”203 and some committees have adopted
rules specifically prohibiting counsel from “coaching” witnesses during their testimony.204
Deposition Authority
Authorized congressional committees may also use depositions as a tool for gathering testimony
during an investigation. A deposition is a formalized interview, taken under oath, generally
transcribed or recorded, and governed by chamber and committee rules.205 The standing rules of
the House authorize only the Committee on Oversight and Reform to take depositions.206 In
recent Congresses, however, the House has provided deposition authority to additional

196 See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (2020) (noting that “recipients of legislative subpoenas retain their constitutional
rights throughout the course of an investigation”). For a discussion of constitutional and other limitations on
congressional investigations, see infra “Constitutional Limitations.”
197 See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1995); Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1955);
Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 221, 223 (1955).
198 See United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 678 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[W]hich constitutional rights are applicable depends
on the nature and consequences of the governmental action.”).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 679.
201 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1960) (“The procedures adopted by legislative investigating committees
have varied over the course of years. Yet, the history of these committees clearly demonstrates that only infrequently
have witnesses appearing before congressional committees been afforded the procedural rights normally associated
with an adjudicative proceeding. In the vast majority of instances, congressional committees have not given witnesses
detailed notice or an opportunity to confront, cross-examine and call other witnesses.”). These rights are, however,
often afforded in impeachment investigations. See CRS Report R45983, Congressional Access to Information in an
Impeachment Investigation, by Todd Garvey at 15.
202 See generally Andrew McCanse Wright, Congressional Due Process, 85 MISS. L.J. 401, 434-36 (2016).
203 House Rule XI(2)(k)(3).
204 See, e.g., Senate Perm. Subcomm. On Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs Rule 8
(providing that subcommittee rules should not be “construed as authorizing counsel to coach the witness or answer for
the witness”).
205 See Hearing on H. Res. 836 Before the H. Comm. on Rules, 110th Cong. 23-24 (2007) (statement of T.J. Halstead)
(generally describing a deposition as a “discovery device commonly used in litigation that typically involves the oral
questioning of a witness (the deponent) by an attorney for one party, outside the courtroom, and out of public view. A
deposition is taken following notice to the deponent, and is sometimes accompanied by a subpoena. The deposition
testimony is given under oath or affirmation and a transcript is made an authenticated.”).
206 House Rule X(4)(c)(3).
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committees through resolution. For example, in the 117th Congress, the House authorized all
standing committees other than the Committee on Rules to take depositions.207 In the Senate, the
Committees on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry; Ethics; Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations; Indian Affairs; Foreign
Relations; and Commerce, Science, and Technology and the Special Committee on Aging all
appear to have some form of deposition authority.208
The House Committee on Rules has previously adopted a number of procedural rules governing
the conduct of depositions in the House.209 Among other requirements, these rules establish that
 depositions may be taken by committee counsel without a committee
member present;
 witnesses may be accompanied by nongovernmental counsel “to advise them
of their rights;”
 questioning of the witness occurs in rounds, with equal time provided to both
the majority and minority;
 objections are ruled upon by the committee chair, with appeal available to the
full committee; and
 the chair and ranking member “shall consult regarding the release of
deposition testimony,” with disagreements referred to the full committee for
resolution.210
Staff depositions afford a number of significant advantages for committees engaged in complex
investigations, including the ability to obtain sworn testimony quickly and confidentially without
the necessity of Members devoting time to lengthy hearings that may be unproductive because
witnesses do not have the facts needed by the committee or refuse to cooperate. Depositions also
occur in private, which may be more conducive to candid responses than public hearings.
Depositions also provide committees with an opportunity to verify witness statements that might
defame or tend to incriminate third parties before they are repeated publicly and prepare for
hearings by screening witness testimony in advance, which may obviate the need to call other
witnesses. Congress has also enhanced the efficacy of the staff deposition process by establishing
the applicability of criminal prohibition against false statements to statements made during
congressional proceedings, including the taking of depositions.211
In the House, neither the Rules Committee deposition rules nor the Committee on Oversight and
Reform’s own rules provide a government witness with a right to be accompanied by agency
counsel. A deponent is instead entitled to be accompanied only by private, nongovernmental
counsel.212 This restriction has led to some conflict with the executive branch, which has asserted

207 See H.Res. 8 §3(b) 117th Cong. (2021) (“During the One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, the chair of a standing
committee (other than the Committee on Rules), and the chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, upon
consultation with the ranking minority member of such committee, may order the taking of depositions, including
pursuant to subpoena, by a member or counsel of such committee.”).
208 See U.S. Congress, Senate, Authority and Rules of Senate Committees, 2019-2020, 116th Cong., 1st sess., July 19,
2019, S. DOC. NO. 116-6 (2019).
209 See 167 Cong. Rec. H41 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 2021) (117th Congress Regulations for Use of Deposition Authority).
210 Id.
211 The false statement provision was amended in 1996 to apply to statements made during “any investigation or
review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress,
consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.” 18 U.S.C. §1001.
212165 Cong. Rec. H1216 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 2019) (“Witnesses may be accompanied at a deposition by personal,
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that a “congressional committee may not constitutionally compel an executive branch witness to
testify about potentially privileged matters while depriving the witness of the assistance of agency
counsel.”213 Denying agency counsel access to the deposition would, in the executive branch’s
view, “compromise the President’s constitutional authority to control the disclosure of privileged
information and to supervise the Executive Branch’s communications with congressional
entities.”214 The House has rejected this argument, concluding instead that the rule “ensures that
the Committee is able to depose witnesses in furtherance of its investigations without having in
the room representatives of the agency under investigation.”215 Moreover, the House notes, the
rule “protects the rights of witnesses by allowing them to be accompanied by personal counsel”
and permits the executive branch—“[t]o the extent [it] believes that an issue that would be raised
at the deposition may implicate a valid Privilege”—to protect its prerogatives by raising the
privilege with the committee.216 Although the executive branch and congressional committees
have often resolved these disputes through the accommodations process, that was not the case in
the 116th Congress. Conflicts between the House and various executive branch officials resulted
in directives from executive branch leadership—including the Attorney General—that officials
not comply with deposition subpoenas unless accompanied by executive branch counsel.217 The
House responded by holding the Attorney General in contempt of Congress.218
The Subpoena Power
When possible, committees generally seek to obtain voluntary compliance with their requests for
documents, testimony, and other information.219 Such an approach tends to be more efficient, as
many voluntary requests are complied with either in part or in full. Even when a request is met
with resistance, the disagreement may initiate the accommodations process, a long-standing
practice by which negotiations between the committee and the executive agency generally lead to
a resolution acceptable to both parties.220 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has observed,

nongovernmental counsel to advise them of their rights.”); H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform Rule 15(e) (“Witnesses
may be accompanied at a deposition by counsel to advise them of their rights.… Observers or counsel for other
persons, or for agencies under investigation, may not attend.”).
213 Attempted Exclusion of Agency Counsel from Congressional Depositions of Agency Employees, 43 Op. O.L.C. 1, 2
(2019).
214 Id. at 3. The President’s position derives from the separation of powers and the executive branch’s need to protect
privileged information rather than from the witness’s Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel.
215 H. REP. NO. 116-125, at 33 (2019).
216 Id.
217 See Jonathan Shaub, Masters From Two Equal Branches of Government: Trump and Congress Play Hardball,
LAWFARE (Apr. 27, 2019).
218 See H.Res. 497, 116th Cong. (2019).
219 See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77, 105 (2011)
(noting that “Congress routinely obtains massive amounts of information from the executive branch on a daily basis,”
often through “informal requests from congressional staffers for information from a particular staffer.”)
220 The D.C. Circuit has suggested that Congress and the executive branch have an “implicit constitutional mandate” to
accommodate each other’s needs during a conflict. United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(“Each branch should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a
realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation. This aspect of our
constitutional scheme avoids the mischief of polarization of disputes.”). See also Memorandum from Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Procedures Governing
Responses to Congressional Requests for Information (Nov. 4, 1982), reprinted in H. REP. NO. 99-435, pt. 2, at 1106
(1986) (noting that the “tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means of resolving conflicts
between the Branches.”).
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“Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete, so some means of
compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.”221 Thus, when Congress finds an inquiry
blocked by the withholding of information, or where the traditional process of negotiation and
accommodation222 is considered inappropriate or unavailing, a subpoena—for either testimony or
documents—may be used to compel compliance with congressional demands.223
The subpoena is a well-established component of Congress’s oversight and investigative
authority.224 In particular, the Court has repeatedly characterized the subpoena, and the process to
enforce it, as a “necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate.”225 In Watkins, the
Supreme Court described the obligations that attach to a congressional subpoena as follows:
It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to
obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to
respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the province of proper investigation.226
As such, an individual—whether a member of the public or an executive branch official—has a
legal obligation to comply with a duly issued and valid congressional subpoena unless a valid and
overriding privilege or other legal justification excuses that compliance.227
A properly authorized subpoena issued by a committee or subcommittee that has been delegated
that authority by the parent chamber has the same force and effect as a subpoena issued by the
House or Senate itself. Senate Rule XXVI(1) and House Rule XI(2)(m)(1) presently empower all
standing committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of documents.228 All standing committees in the House
and some standing committees in the Senate may also issue subpoenas for depositions.229

221 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927).
222 See United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the Framers relied “on the
expectation that where conflicts in scope of authority arose between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic
compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the manner most likely to result in efficient and effective
functioning of our governmental system”).
223 Id. Each standing committee has been delegated subpoena power by House or Senate rule. See House Rule
XI(2)(m)(3); Senate Rule XXVI(1).
224 The Supreme Court has determined that the “[i]ssuance of subpoenas … has long been held to be a legitimate use by
Congress of its power to investigate.” Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975).
225 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (per curiam); Eastland, 421 U.S. at
504-505 (“Issuance of subpoenas … has long been held to be a legitimate use by Congress of its power to
investigate.”).
226 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187.
227 Id.
228 Special or select committees may issue subpoenas when specifically delegated that authority by Senate or House
resolution. See infra “Specialized Investigations.” In the 117th Congress, the House amended Rule XI to clarify the
scope of committee subpoena power:
Subpoenas for documents or testimony may be issued to any person or entity, whether
governmental, public, or private, within the United States, including, but not limited to, the
President, and the Vice President, whether current or former, in a personal or official capacity, as
well as the White House, the Office of the President, the Executive Office of the President, and any
individual currently or formerly employed in the White House, Office of the President, or
Executive Office of the President.
H.Res. 8, 117th Cong. (2021).
229 See “Deposition Authority” supra.
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The rules governing issuance of committee subpoenas vary by committee. In the House, the vast
majority of committees now permit the committee chair to unilaterally issue a subpoena, usually
after giving notice to or consulting with the ranking member.230 In contrast, only the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations in the Senate currently permits the chair to issue a subpoena
without the consent of the ranking member.231
Limitations on Challenging a Subpoena
The Supreme Court has ruled that the separation of powers and the Speech or Debate Clause
restrict both a witness’s ability to mount a legal challenge to the subpoena’s validity and the
judiciary’s ability to enjoin a subpoena’s issuance.232 For example, the recipient of a
congressional subpoena generally may not challenge that subpoena’s validity prior to its
enforcement. Instead, the recipient may refuse to comply, risk being cited for criminal contempt
or becoming the subject of a civil enforcement lawsuit (discussed below), and then raise the
objections in the civil case or as a defense in the criminal prosecution.
Courts have been more amenable to third-party, pre-enforcement subpoena challenges. Such
lawsuits generally arise when a committee issues a subpoena for documents not to the target of
the investigation but rather to a third-party custodian of records.233 In such a scenario the party
with a personal interest in the records is “not in a position to assert its claim of constitutional right
by refusing to comply with a subpoena”234 and may instead bring suit against the neutral third
party to block compliance with the subpoena. The Supreme Court has suggested that the
Constitution “does not bar the challenge so long as members of the [issuing committee or
subcommittee] are not, themselves, made defendants in a suit to enjoin implementation of the
subpoena.”235
Responding to Non-Compliance: Subpoena Enforcement
Ultimately, the subpoena is only as effective as the means by which it is enforced. Without a
process by which Congress can coerce compliance or deter non-compliance, the subpoena would
be reduced to a formalized request rather than a constitutionally based demand for information.236
If a witness is initially reluctant to comply with a committee subpoena, Congress can sometimes
use the application of various forms of legislative leverage, along with an informal political
process of negotiation and accommodation, to obtain what it needs.237 With regard to executive

230 House rules provide that “[t]he power to authorize and issue subpoenas … may be delegated to the chair of the
committee under such rules and under such limitations as the committee may prescribe.” House Rule XI(2)(m).
231 See Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Rule 2 (“Subpoenas for witnesses, as well as documents and
records, may be authorized and issued by the Chairman, or any other Member of the Subcommittee designated by him
or her, with notice to the Ranking Minority Member.”).
232 U.S. CONST. art. I, §6, cl. 1. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503-07 (holding that the Speech or Debate Clause of the
Constitution provides “an absolute bar to judicial interference” with such compulsory process).
233 The Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) is an example of this type of
lawsuit.
234 United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
235 Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501. But see AT&T Co., 567 F.2d at 123-25 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
236 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 174 (observing that the “process to enforce” the investigatory power is “essential” to the
“legislative function”).
237 See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48
ADMIN L. REV. 109, 114 (1996) (arguing in 1996 that “Congress rarely makes use of its subpoena power” partly
because of the “benefits that each branch receives by cooperating with the other”). The D.C. Circuit has suggested that
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branch officials, Congress exercises substantial influence through the legislative control of
agency authority, funding, and, in the case of the Senate, confirmation of certain agency
officials.238 The use or threatened use of these powers in a way that would impose burdens on an
agency can encourage compliance with subpoenas (or make it more likely that requested
information will be provided without need to issue a subpoena) and solidify Congress’s position
when trying to negotiate a compromise during an investigative dispute with the executive
branch.239
Besides leveraging its general legislative powers, Congress currently employs an ad hoc
combination of methods to directly enforce its subpoenas. The two predominant methods rely on
the authority and participation of another branch of government. First, the criminal contempt
statute permits a single house of Congress to certify a contempt citation to the executive branch
for the criminal prosecution of an individual who has willfully refused to comply with a
committee subpoena.240 Once the contempt citation is received, any later prosecution lies within
the control of the executive branch.241 Second, Congress may try to enforce a subpoena by
seeking a civil judgment declaring that the recipient is legally obligated to comply.242 This
process of civil enforcement relies on the help of the courts to enforce congressional demands.
Criminal Contempt of Congress
The criminal contempt of Congress statute, enacted in 1857 and only slightly modified since,
makes the failure to comply with a duly issued congressional subpoena a criminal offense.243 The
statute, now codified under 2 U.S.C. § 192, provides that any person who “willfully” fails to

Congress and the executive branch have an “implicit constitutional mandate” to accommodate each other’s needs
during a conflict. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d at 127 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Each branch should take cognizance of an implicit
constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of the needs of the conflicting
branches in the particular fact situation. This aspect of our constitutional scheme avoids the mischief of polarization of
disputes.”).
238 CRS Report R45442, Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies, by Todd Garvey
and Daniel J. Sheffner (discussing various tools that Congress may use to compel or incentivize agency compliance
with congressional demands).
239 See Andrew McCanse Wright, Constitutional Conflict and Congressional Oversight, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 881, 931
(2014) (“Congress may use legislative authorizations and appropriations as leverage against the Executive Branch to
obtain requested information.”); Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and
Leverage, 52 DUKE L.J. 323, 325 (2002) (noting that oversight disputes are often “decided by the persistence of
Congress and its willingness to adopt political penalties for executive noncompliance. Congress can win most of the
time—if it has the will—because its political tools are formidable.”).
240 2 U.S.C. §§192, 194.
241 Although the criminal contempt statute provides that “it shall be” the U.S. Attorney’s “duty … to bring the matter
before the grand jury for its action,” the executive branch has asserted discretion in whether to present the matter to the
grand jury. See, e.g., Letter from Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A.
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 31, 2015); Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an
Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 102 (1984) [hereinafter
Olson Opinion].
242 See 2 U.S.C. §§288b, 288d; 28 U.S.C. §1365; Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 94 (D.D.C.
2008) (“The Court concludes that the Committee has an implied cause of action derived from Article I to seek a
declaratory judgment concerning the exercise of its subpoena power.”). See also CRS Report RL34097, Congress’s
Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, by Todd
Garvey (discussing the two predominant subpoena enforcement mechanisms).
243 Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, §1, 11 STAT. 155 (now codified at 2 U.S.C. §192).
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comply with a properly issued committee subpoena for testimony or documents is guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable by a substantial fine and imprisonment for up to one year.244
The criminal contempt statute outlines the process by which the House or Senate may refer the
non-compliant witness to the DOJ for criminal prosecution. Under 2 U.S.C. § 194, once a
committee reports the failure to comply with a subpoena to its parent body, the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House is directed to “certify[] the statement of facts … to the
appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand jury
for its action.”245 The statute does not expressly require approval of the contempt citation by the
committee’s parent body, but both congressional practice and judicial decisions suggest that
approval may be necessary.246
A successful contempt prosecution may lead to criminal punishment of the witness in the form of
incarceration, a fine, or both.247 Because the criminal contempt statute is punitive, its use is
mainly as a deterrent. In other words, while the threat of criminal contempt can be used as
leverage to encourage compliance with a specific request, a conviction does not necessarily lead
to release of the information to Congress.248
Although approval of a criminal contempt citation under § 194 appears to impose a mandatory
duty on the U.S. Attorney to submit the violation to a grand jury, the executive branch has
repeatedly asserted that it retains the discretion to determine whether to do so.249 As a result,
efforts to punish an executive branch official for non-compliance with a committee subpoena
through the criminal contempt of Congress statute will likely prove unavailing in certain
circumstances. For example, when the President directs or endorses the non-compliance of the
official, such as when the official refuses to disclose information pursuant to the President’s
decision that the information is protected by executive privilege, past practice suggests that the
DOJ is unlikely to pursue a prosecution for criminal contempt.250 As a result, it would appear that
there is not currently a credible threat of prosecution for violating 2 U.S.C. § 192 when an
executive branch official refuses to comply with a congressional subpoena at the direction of the

244 2 U.S.C. §192. The subpoena that gives rise to the contempt must have been issued for a legislative purpose, be
pertinent to the matter under inquiry, and relate to a matter within the House or Senate committee’s jurisdiction. See
Senate Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations v. Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125, 134–38 (D.D.C. 2016).
245 2 U.S.C. §194. The DOJ has previously obtained convictions under 2 U.S. C. §192 against executive branch
officials pursuant to plea deals without a vote of the House or Senate. See Prosecution of Contempt of Congress:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov’tl Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 23-4
(1983).
246 See HOUSE PRACTICE, ch. 17 §2; Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198, 201–02 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“It has been the
consistent legislative course that the Speaker is not under a ‘mandatory’ duty to certify the report of the committee, but
on the contrary that the committee’s report is subject to further consideration on the merits by the House involved.
When the House is in session the Speaker does not automatically transmit the report of alleged contempt to the United
States Attorney. Instead as a matter of routine a member of the committee offers a resolution for the consideration of
the House involved.”).
247 2 U.S.C. §192.
248 For example, during an investigation into the White House Travel Office, contested documents were turned over to
Congress on the day a contempt resolution against the White House Counsel was scheduled for a floor vote. See H.
REP. NO. 104-874, at 47 (1997).
249 See, e.g., Letter from Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 31, 2015) (declining to present criminal contempt citation to a grand
jury); Olson Opinion, supra note 220, at 102.
250 See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to John Boehner, Speaker of the House (June 28, 2012);
Olson Opinion, supra note 572, at 102.
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sitting President.251 The DOJ has been more willing to pursue a criminal contempt prosecution
against a witness whose non-compliance is based on the directive of a former President, at least
when the sitting President does not concur with the former President’s privilege assertion.252
Even when the official is not acting at the clear direction of the sitting President, the executive
branch has contended that it retains the authority to make an independent assessment of whether
the official (or former official) has in fact violated the criminal contempt statute.253 If the
executive branch determines either that the statute has not been violated or that a defense is
available that would bar the prosecution, then it may—in an exercise of discretion—leave a
congressional citation unenforced. The criminal contempt statute, therefore, may have limited
utility as a deterrent to non-compliance with congressional subpoenas by executive branch
officials faced with similar circumstances.254
Civil Enforcement of Subpoenas
Both the House and Senate have also enforced subpoenas through civil suits in the federal courts
by a process known as civil enforcement. Under this process, either chamber may unilaterally
authorize one of its committees or another legislative entity to file a suit in federal district court
seeking a court order declaring that the subpoena recipient is legally required to comply with the
demand for information.255
A successful civil enforcement suit generally has the benefit of securing compliance with the
congressional subpoena—meaning the committee may obtain the information it seeks. If the court
orders compliance with the subpoena and disclosure of the information, generally after finding
both that the subpoena is valid and that the individual has not invoked an adequate privilege
justifying non-compliance, continued defiance may lead to contempt of court as opposed to
contempt of Congress.256
Although the executive branch has at times disputed Congress’s authority to bring civil
enforcement lawsuits, at least against current or former executive branch officials, a handful of
cases dating back to the Nixon era have upheld House and Senate authority to bring such

251 See Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1146 (2009) (“As the president
is unlikely to authorize one of his subordinates (the United States Attorney) to file charges against another of his
subordinates who was acting according to his orders, it is safe to assume that the executive branch will generally
decline to prosecute an executive branch official for criminal contempt of Congress.”).
252 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Stephen K. Bannon Indicted for Contempt of Congress (Nov. 12, 2021)
(announcing the indictment of an advisor to former President Trump following President Biden’s decision not to
support the former President’s privilege assertions in the context of a congressional investigation into the events
surrounding the January 6, 2021, attempt by some supporters of the former President to prevent congressional
certification of the 2020 presidential election); CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10802, Beyond January 6th: White House
Confidentiality and Congressional Investigations, by Todd Garvey. For further discussion, see CRS Legal Sidebar
LSB10660, The Bannon Indictment and Prosecution, by Todd Garvey and Michael A. Foster.
253 See Letter from Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. Boehner, Speaker,
U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 31, 2015).
254 But see Fisher, supra note 218, at 347-59 (describing instances from 1975-2000 in which committee action on a
criminal contempt citation was effective in obtaining compliance with a congressional subpoena).
255 See 2 U.S.C. §§288b, 288d; 28 U.S.C. §1365; Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 94 (D.D.C.
2008).
256 18 U.S.C. §§401–402.
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lawsuits.257 Nevertheless, the scope of Congress’s authority to enforce subpoenas in court,
especially by the House, will likely remain the subject of continued litigation.
In the past, authorization for a subpoena enforcement lawsuit has typically been provided through
a simple House or Senate resolution.258 In the Senate, the adoption of an authorizing resolution is
part of the existing statutory framework governing that chamber’s enforcement of subpoena in
court.259 The House, however, clarified during the 116th Congress that even in the absence of a
specific authorizing resolution, the chair of each standing committee also “retains the ability to
initiate … any judicial proceeding before a Federal court … affirming the duty of the recipient of
any subpoena duly issued by that committee to comply with that subpoena” when authorized to
do so by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG).260 The House further explained that
authorization from BLAG in the subpoena enforcement context “is the equivalent of a vote of the
full House of Representatives.”261
A federal statute provides the jurisdictional basis for the Senate’s exercise of its civil enforcement
power.262 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1365, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (D.C.
District Court) has jurisdiction “over any civil action brought by the Senate or committee or
subcommittee of the Senate to enforce … any subpoena.”263 The law, however, makes clear that
the grant of jurisdiction is limited and “shall not apply” to an action to enforce a subpoena issued
to an executive branch official acting in his or her official capacity who has asserted a
“governmental privilege.”264 Yet at least one district court has suggested that the limitation found
within § 1365 does not necessarily bar the courts from exercising jurisdiction over Senate claims
to enforce a subpoena against an executive official under other jurisdictional provisions.265

257 See generally Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Holder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013); Committee on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). As of the
date of this report the D.C. Circuit is currently considering the question in pending litigation. See notes 174-79 infra.
258 See, e.g., H.Res. 706, 112th Cong. (2012) (Holder); H.Res. 980 110th Cong. (2008) (Miers and Bolten); S.Res. 377,
114th Cong. (2016) (Ferrer).
259 Since the statute’s enactment in 1979, the Senate has authorized the Office of Senate Legal Counsel to seek civil
enforcement of a subpoena for documents or testimony on various occasions but never against executive branch
officials. See CRS Report RL34097, Congress’s Contempt Power and the Enforcement of Congressional Subpoenas:
Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, by Todd Garvey, Table A-3 (Floor Votes on Civil Enforcement Resolutions in
the Senate, 1980-Present).
260 H.Res. 430, 116th Cong. (2019).
261 Id. See House Rule II (establishing that the BLAG “speaks for, and articulates the institutional position of, the
House in all litigation matters.”); 165 CONG. REC. H30 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2019) (statement of Rep. McGovern) (“If a
Committee determines that one or more of its duly issued subpoenas has not been complied with and that civil
enforcement is necessary, the BLAG, pursuant to House Rule II(8)(b), may authorize the House Office of General
Counsel to initiate civil litigation on behalf of this Committee to enforce the Committee’s subpoena(s) in federal
district court.”). See also CRS Report R45636, Congressional Participation in Litigation: Article III and Legislative
Standing, by Kevin M. Lewis at 43, n. 429.
262 2 U.S.C. §§288b, 288d; 28 U.S.C. §1365.
263 28 U.S.C. §1365.
264 Id. §1365(a) (“This section shall not apply to an action to enforce, to secure a declaratory judgment concerning the
validity of, or to prevent a threatened refusal to comply with, any subpoena or order issued to an officer or employee of
the executive branch of the Federal Government acting within his or her official capacity, except that this section shall
apply if the refusal to comply is based on the assertion of a personal privilege or objection and is not based on a
governmental privilege or objection the assertion of which has been authorized by the executive branch of the Federal
Government.”).
265 See Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 86–87 (“In any event, the fact that §288d may create an independent cause of action
for the Senate does not establish that the Senate (or the House) could not proceed under the [Declaratory Judgment Act
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The House has no corresponding statutory framework but has previously, and successfully,
authorized its committees to enforce their subpoenas in court.266 Nevertheless, the House’s
authority in this regard has been subject to some debate. The D.C. Circuit, for example, wrestled
with the question of civil enforcement in Committee on the Judiciary v. McGahn. In McGahn, the
House initiated a suit to enforce a committee subpoena for testimony from former White House
Counsel Don McGahn. A three-judge panel initially dismissed the case. Breaking from prior
district court decisions, the opinion held that the judiciary “lack[ed] authority to resolve disputes
between the Legislative and Executive Branches until their actions harm an entity ‘beyond the
[Federal] Government.’”267 That opinion, however, was reversed on appeal, with the full D.C.
Circuit holding en banc that neither the separation of powers nor principles of standing barred the
courts from hearing the House’s lawsuit.268 On remand, however, the three-judge panel again
rejected the House’s lawsuit, this time holding that the House lacked a cause of action.269 In
reaching that decision, the panel relied partly on the fact that “Congress has granted an express
cause of action to the Senate—but not to the House.”270 Like the first panel decision on standing,
this second panel decision on whether the committee had a cause of action was vacated after it
was accepted for en banc review.271 While that appeal was pending, the parties reached a
settlement by which Mr. McGahn sat for a closed-door transcribed interview.272 Pursuant to that
agreement, the D.C. Circuit fully vacated the panel opinion after finding that the committee
lacked a cause of action, but the en banc decision holding that the committee had standing to
pursue these subpoena enforcement claims remains in place.273 As such, the ultimate precedential
impact of the McGahn litigation appears to have been to remove the standing hurdle to House
committees utilizing the judiciary to enforce their subpoenas, at least in the D.C. Circuit.
The Historical Process: Inherent Contempt
Historically, the House and Senate relied on their own institutional power to not only enforce
congressional subpoenas but also to respond to other actions that either house viewed as

(DJA)]. Section 288d can simply be viewed as a more specific application of the general relief made available by the
DJA…. That conclusion is consistent with statements found in a contemporaneous Senate Report indicating that ‘the
statute is not intended to be a congressional finding that the federal courts do not now have the authority to hear a civil
action to enforce a subpoena against an officer or employee of the federal government.’”) (citing S. REP. NO. 95-170, at
91–92).
266 See H.Res. 706, 112th Cong. (2012) (Holder); H.Res. 980, 110th Cong. (2008) (Miers and Bolten). See Miers, 558 F.
Supp. 2d, at 78–88; Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d, at 3.
267 Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, 951 F.3d 510, 516 (D.C. Cir.
2020).
268 Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 760-61 (D.C. Cir.
2020).
269 Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, 973 F.3d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
270 Id. The conference report accompanying the legislation that established the Senate procedure explained that the
relevant House committees had not yet considered the proposal for judicial enforcement of House subpoenas. H. REP.
NO. 95-1756, 95th Cong., at 80 (1978). The Senate had authorized its committees to bring lawsuits for some time before
enactment of the 1978 law. See S. Res. 262, 70th Cong. (1928) (providing that “any committee of the Senate is hereby
to bring suit … in any court of competent jurisdiction if the committee is of the opinion that the suit is necessary to the
adequate performance of the powers vested in it”).
271 Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 32573 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 15, 2020).
272 See Agreement Concerning Accommodation, Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331 (D.C. Cir. May 12,
2021).
273 Comm. on the Judiciary v. McGahn, No. 19-5331, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 20759 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2021).
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obstructing its legislative processes or prerogatives.274 Indeed, the criminal contempt statute was
not enacted until 1857, and the courts do not appear to have entertained a civil action to enforce a
congressional subpoena against an executive official until the Watergate era.275 For much of
American history the House and Senate instead used what is known as the inherent contempt
power to enforce their investigative powers.
The inherent contempt power is a constitutionally based authority given to each house to
unilaterally arrest and detain an individual found to be “obstruct[ing] the performance of the
duties of the legislature.”276 The power is therefore broader in scope than the criminal contempt
statute in that it may be used not only to combat subpoena non-compliance but also in response to
other actions that could be viewed as “obstructing” or threatening either house’s exercise of its
legislative powers.277
In practice, the inherent contempt power has been exercised using a multi-step process. Upon
adopting a House or Senate resolution authorizing the execution of an arrest warrant by that
chamber’s Sergeant at Arms, the individual alleged to have engaged in contemptuous conduct is
taken into custody and brought before the House or Senate.278 A hearing or “trial” follows in
which allegations are heard and defenses raised.279 Although generally occurring before the full
body, it would appear likely that the contempt hearing could also permissibly take place before a

274 Congress first exercised its inherent contempt authority in 1795 when the House detained two private citizens for
attempted bribery of Members of the House. 2 ASHER C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
§1599 (1907) [hereinafter HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE]. The Supreme Court first affirmed Congress’s use of the
inherent contempt power in the 1821 decision of Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).
275 See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In
1928, members of a Senate special investigative committee brought suit to obtain documents associated with a disputed
Senate election, but the Supreme Court dismissed that claim on jurisdictional grounds due to a lack of Senate
authorization for the suit. Reed v. Delaware Cty. Comm., 277 U.S. 376, 389 (1928). JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO
PROBE: A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 197 (1976) (noting that the Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities’ lawsuit to enforce the subpoena issued to President Nixon was “the first civil action
to enforce a congressional subpoena issued to the executive”).
276 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147–48 (1935) (“No act is so punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the
performance of the duties of the legislature.”).
277 See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 543 (1917) (noting that inherent contempt has been used to “deal with either
physical obstruction of the legislative body in the discharge of its duties, or physical assault upon its members for
action taken or words spoken in the body, or obstruction of its officers in the performance of their official duties, or the
prevention of members from attending so that their duties might be performed, or finally with contumacy in refusing to
obey orders to produce documents or give testimony which there was a right to compel”).
278 The procedure followed by the House in the contempt citation that was at issue in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204
(1821), is typical of that employed in the inherent contempt cases. Thomas L. Shriner Jr., Legislative Contempt and
Due Process: The Groppi Cases, 46 IND. L. J. 480, 491 (1971) (“The House adopted a resolution pursuant to which the
Speaker ordered the Sergeant-at-Arms to arrest Anderson and bring him before the bar of the House (to answer the
charge). When Anderson appeared, the Speaker informed him why he had been brought before the House and asked if
he had any requests for assistance in answering the charge. Anderson stated his requests, and the House granted him
counsel, compulsory process for defense witnesses, and a copy, of the accusatory letter. Anderson called his witnesses;
the House heard and questioned them and him. It then passed a resolution finding him guilty of contempt and directing
the Speaker to reprimand him and then to discharge him from custody. The pattern was thereby established of
attachment by the Sergeant-at-Arms; appearance before the bar; provision for specification of charges, identification of
the accuser, compulsory process, counsel, and a hearing; determination of guilt; imposition of penalty.”).
279 Id. The subject of a trial for contempt of Congress is not afforded the same procedural protections as a defendant in
a criminal trial. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1972) (“The past decisions of this Court strongly indicate
that the panoply of procedural rights that are accorded a defendant in a criminal trial has never been thought necessary
in legislative contempt proceedings. The customary practice in Congress has been to provide the contemnor with an
opportunity to appear before the bar of the House, or before a committee, and give answer to the misconduct charged
against him.”).
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congressional committee who reports its findings to the whole House or Senate.280 If judged
guilty, the House or Senate may then direct that the witness be detained or imprisoned until the
obstruction to the exercise of legislative power is removed.281 Although the purpose of the
detention may vary, for subpoena non-compliance the use of the power has generally not been
punitive.282 Rather, the goal is to detain the witness until he or she discloses the information
sought but not beyond the end of the Congress.283
Despite its title, “inherent” contempt is more accurately characterized as an implied constitutional
power.284 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that although the contempt power is not
specifically granted by the Constitution, it is still “an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function” and thus implied from the general vesting of legislative powers in
Congress.285 The Court has viewed the power as one rooted in self-preservation, concluding that
the “power to legislate” includes an “implied right of Congress to preserve itself” by dealing
“with direct obstructions to its legislative duties” through contempt.286
Despite its potential reach, some observers have described the inherent contempt power as
cumbersome, inefficient, and “unseemly.”287 Presumably for these reasons, it does not appear that
either house has exercised its inherent contempt power to enforce subpoenas or to remove any
other obstruction to the exercise of the legislative power since the 1930s.288 Even so, the mere
threat of arrest and detention by the Sergeant at Arms can be used to encourage compliance with
congressional demands. For example, Senator Sam Ervin, when serving as chair of the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, invoked the inherent contempt power
several times to encourage compliance with the committee’s requests for information during its

280 The House has previously adopted resolutions authorizing a select committee to investigate contempt allegations
and then report its findings to the House. See 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE, supra note 602, §1630 (citing
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess., 371 (1865).
281 See 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE, supra note 602, §§1666, 1669, 1693.
282 Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 544 (1917) (noting that the Court had discovered “no single instance where in
the exertion of the power to compel testimony restraint was ever made to extend beyond the time when the witness
should signify his willingness to testify”). Indeed, the Court has suggested that the power “does not embrace
punishment for contempt as punishment.” Id. at 542. But see Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 148 (1935)
(affirming exercise of contempt power even after the obstruction to the legislative process had been removed).
283 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 207 n.45 (1957); Anderson, 19 U.S. at 231.
284 The contempt power is an implied aspect of the legislative power. Marshall, 243 U.S. at 537 (noting that “it was yet
explicitly decided that from the power to legislate given by the Constitution to Congress there was to be implied the
right of Congress to preserve itself, that is, to deal by way of contempt with direct obstructions to its legislative
duties.”). As opposed to an inherent power, which may not be tethered to a textual grant of authority, an implied power
is derived by implication from an enumerated power. See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional
Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 42–43 (2001).
285 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173–74 (1927); (“[T]he two houses of Congress, in their separate relations,
possess not only such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but such auxiliary powers as are
necessary and appropriate to make the express powers effective.…”).
286 Marshall, 243 U.S. at 537; Anderson, 19 U.S. at 228 (holding that in the absence of a contempt power the House
would be “exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may meditate against
it”).
287 See Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three
Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 BYU L. REV. 231, 254 (writing that “[t]here is something unseemly about a
House of Congress getting into the business of trial and punishment”); S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 97 (1977) (describing
Congress’s inherent contempt power, which requires a trial in the House or the Senate, as “time consuming and not
very effective”).
288 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 163 (3rd ed. 1982).
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investigation of the Nixon Administration.289 Although the power has long lain dormant, it
remains a tool that Congress may use to enforce subpoenas.290
Criminal Provisions Protecting the Investigative Power
Along with the criminal contempt statute already discussed, Congress has enacted various
criminal provisions to protect the integrity of congressional investigations. While these provisions
generally seek to deter witnesses from misleading or obstructing congressional committees in
their exercise of the investigative power, they cannot be enforced directly by Congress, nor can
committees compel enforcement by the executive branch. Instead, enforcement decisions—as
with all criminal provisions—are made wholly by the executive branch. A committee may refer a
possible offense to the DOJ with a recommendation that an investigation be initiated, but the
ultimate decision on prosecution is retained by the executive branch.291
Testimony Under Oath
A witness under oath before a congressional committee who willfully gives false testimony is
subject to prosecution for perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. The false statement must be
“willfully” made before a “competent tribunal” and involve a “material matter.”292 A quorum
must be present for a legislative committee to be competent for perjury purposes.293 Both houses
have adopted rules establishing less than a majority of members as a quorum for taking testimony,
normally two members for House committees294 and one member for Senate committees.295 The
requisite quorum must be present at the time the alleged perjurious statement is made, not merely
at the time the session convenes.296 No prosecution for perjury will lie for statements made only
in the presence of committee staff unless the committee has deposition authority and has taken
formal action to allow it.297
Unsworn Statements
Most statements made to congressional committees at both the investigatory and the hearing
phases of oversight are unsworn. Even when not under oath, providing willfully false testimony is

289 See Hamilton, supra note 251, at 96–97 (describing Chairman Ervin using a threat of inherent contempt to obtain
the testimony of White House aide Alexander Butterfield); id. at 160 (noting that President Nixon was “determined to
prohibit his top aides” from testifying before Congress until Chairman Ervin “threatened to dispatch the Senate
sergeant at arms to transport them to the Senate”).
290 Id. at 95 (“[T]he self-help powers of Congress remain an alternate method to nudge intransigent witnesses into
giving evidence to Congressional bodies.”).
291 See CRS Report R45653, Congressional Subpoenas: Enforcing Executive Branch Compliance, by Todd Garvey at
17-20.
292 18 U.S.C. §1621(a).
293 Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 90 (1949).
294 House Rule XI(2)(h)(2).
295 Senate Rule XXVI(7)(a)(2) allows its committees to set quorum requirements at less than the normal one-third for
taking sworn testimony. Almost all Senate committees have set their quorum requirements at one member.
296 Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 90.
297 Perjury requires that the false statement be made under “an oath authorized by law” and before a “competent
tribunal.” Unless expressly authorized to take a deposition under oath, conversations with committee staff generally do
not fall within the scope of the perjury statute. See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, No. S2 94 Cr. 760, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19125 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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still a criminal offense.298 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, false statements by a person in “any
investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee,
commission or office of the Congress, consistent with applicable rules of the House and Senate”
are punishable by a fine of up to $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or
both.299 Given the breadth, the statute would appear to apply to false statements made not only in
hearings and depositions but also other interviews with committee staff.
Obstruction of a Congressional Proceeding
Federal law also criminalizes certain acts that would obstruct a congressional investigation.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 it is unlawful to “corruptly” obstruct or attempt to obstruct the “due and
proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by
either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress.”300
Corruptly, for purposes of the statute, means “acting with an improper purpose, personally or by
influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding,
concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information.”301
Limitations on Congressional Authority
The previous section established the scope of Congress’s investigatory power. This section briefly
addresses how the exercise of this power may be constrained by the Constitution, the common-
law tradition, or federal statute.
Constitutional Limitations
As discussed, a congressional investigation must have a legislative purpose to be a valid exercise
of Congress’s authority under Article I of the Constitution.302 But the investigatory power is also
limited by constraints found elsewhere in the text and structure of the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has observed that when demanding information, “Congress, in common with all branches
of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution
on governmental action,” including “the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.”303 As a result,
“recipients of legislative subpoenas “retain their constitutional rights throughout the course of an
investigation.”304
First Amendment
Although the First Amendment, by its terms, is expressly applicable only to legislation that
abridges freedom of speech, press, religion (establishment or free exercise), or assembly, the
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment also restricts Congress in conducting oversight
and investigations.305 In Barenblatt v. United States, the Court stated that “where First

298 18 U.S.C. §1001.
299 Id.
300 Id. §1505.
301 Id. §1515(b).
302 See “The Constitutional Scope of the Investigative Power: Legislative Purpose” supra.
303 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
304 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (2020).
305 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957). See also Senate Permanent Subcomm., on Investigations v.
Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125, 138 (D.D.C. 2016) (“The underlying rationale of this precept is that ‘investigation is part
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Amendment rights are asserted to bar government interrogation resolution of the issue always
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the
particular circumstances shown.”306 In balancing the personal interest in privacy against the
congressional need for information, the Court has declared that “the critical element is the
existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding
disclosure from an unwilling witness.”307 When evaluating Congress’s interest in cases involving
the First Amendment, the Court has generally emphasized the requirements discussed above
concerning authorization for the investigation, delegation of power to investigate to the
committee involved, and the existence of a legislative purpose.308
Though finding the First Amendment applicable to congressional investigations, the Supreme
Court has never relied on the First Amendment to invalidate a congressional subpoena or to
reverse a criminal contempt of Congress conviction. And unlike the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, it is clear that the First Amendment does not give a witness an absolute
right to refuse to respond to congressional demands for information.309
Nevertheless, First Amendment concerns can inform Congress’s deliberations on whether to hold
a non-cooperative witness in contempt of Congress. The Special Subcommittee on Investigations
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (since renamed the Committee on
Energy and Commerce), in the course of its probe of allegations that deceptive editing practices
were employed in producing the television news documentary program The Selling of the
Pentagon, subpoenaed Frank Stanton, the president of CBS. He was directed to deliver to the
subcommittee the “outtakes” of the program.310 When, on First Amendment grounds, Stanton
declined to provide the subpoenaed materials, the subcommittee unanimously voted a contempt
citation. The full committee voted 25-13 to report the contempt citation to the full House.311 After
extensive debate, the House failed to adopt the committee report, voting instead to recommit the
matter to the committee.312 During the debate, several Members expressed concern that approval

of lawmaking’ and the ‘First Amendment may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or by
lawmaking.’”) (citing Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197).
306 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126 (1959).
307 Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198. A balancing test was also used in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), which
involved the claimed privilege of newsmen not to respond to demands of a grand jury for information. In its 5-4
decision, the Court concluded that the grand jury’s need for the information outweighed First Amendment
considerations, but the opinion indicates that “the infringement of protected First Amendment rights must be no
broader than necessary to achieve a permissible governmental purpose” and that “a State’s interest must be
‘compelling’ or ‘paramount’ to justify even an indirect burden on First Amendment rights.” Id. at 699-700; see also
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1963) (applying the compelling interest test
in a legislative investigation).
308 See, e.g., Barenblatt, 360 U.S. 109; Watkins, 354 U.S. 178; United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); see also 4
DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 15, §10, n. 15 and accompanying text (1994).
309 Barrenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126. For a recent rejections of First Amendment defenses asserted in response to
congressional subpoenas, see Ward v. Thompson, No. 22-16473, 2022 WL 14955000 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2022); Senate
Permanent Subcomm., on Investigations v. Ferrer, 199 F. Supp. 3d 125, 138-44 (D.D.C. 2016).
310 The outtakes were portions of the CBS film clips that were not actually broadcast. The subcommittee wanted to
compare the outtakes with the tape of the broadcast to determine if improper editing techniques had been used.
311 H. REPT. 92-349 (1971). CBS’s legal argument was based in part on the claim that Congress could not
constitutionally legislate on the subject of editing techniques and therefore the subcommittee lacked a valid legislative
purpose for the investigation. Id. at 9.
312 See 117 CONG. REC. 23922-23926, 24603-24659, 24720-24753 (1971).
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of the contempt citation would have a “chilling effect” on the press and would unconstitutionally
involve the government in the regulation of the press.313
Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment primarily protects congressional witnesses against subpoenas that are
unreasonably broad or burdensome.314 However, the extent of this protection is not clear and has
received little attention in the courts. In one of the few cases addressing the issue, the Supreme
Court held in the 1960 case McPhaul v. United States that a congressional subpoena seeking “all
records, correspondence, and memoranda” of an organization was not unreasonably broad. As the
Court explained:
“Adequacy or excess in the breath of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the
nature, purposes, and scope of the inquiry.” The subcommittee’s inquiry here was a
relatively broad one … and the permissible scope of materials that could reasonably be
sought was necessarily equally broad. It is not reasonable to suppose that the subcommittee
knew precisely what books and records were kept by the [organization], and therefore the
subpoena could only “specify … with reasonable particularity, the subjects to which the
documents … relate….” The call of the subpoena for “all records, correspondence and
memoranda” of the [organization] relating to the specified subject describes them “with all
of the particularity the nature of the inquiry and the [subcommittee’s] situation would
permit….” “The description contained in the subpoena was sufficient to enable
[organization] to know what particular documents were required and to select them
adequately.”315
As such, the permissible breadth of a subpoena should be considered in relation to the nature of
the committee investigation.
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment is available to a
witness in a congressional investigation.316 As such, a witness generally cannot be compelled to
provide personally incriminating testimony to a committee.317

313 See 117 CONG. REC. 24731-24732 (1971).
314 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); see also Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969). Following Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, it is conceivable that
congressional subpoenas to a third-party information holder could face new Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See id.at
2260-61 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that one possible consequence of applying the “broad principles that the
Court seems to embrace” may be that “[a]ll subpoenas duces tecum … compelling the production of documents will
require a demonstration of probable cause, and individuals will be able to claim a protected Fourth Amendment interest
in any sensitive personal information about them that is collected and owned by third parties”); id. at 2234 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (asserting that “by invalidating the Government’s use of court-approved compulsory process in this case,
the Court calls into question the subpoena practices of federal and state grand juries, legislatures, and other
investigative bodies”).
315 McPhaul, 364 U.S. at 382 (internal citations omitted).
316 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955). For further discussion,
see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1813, The Fifth Amendment in Congressional Investigations, by Todd Garvey.
317 The basis for asserting the privilege has been described by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia as
follows:
The privilege may only be asserted when there is reasonable apprehension on the part of the
witness that his answer would furnish some evidence upon which he could be convicted of a
criminal offense … or which would reveal sources from which evidence could be obtained that
would lead to such conviction or to prosecution therefore…. Once it has become apparent that the
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The Supreme Court has recognized that witnesses may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
during a congressional investigation only with regard to disclosures that are:
1. testimonial (“relate a factual assertion or disclose information”),318
2. self-incriminating (any disclosures that tends to show guilt or that furnishes any “link in
the chain of evidence” needed to prosecute),319 and
3. compelled (not voluntarily given).320
Oral testimony given pursuant to a subpoena and in response to committee questioning generally
qualifies as testimonial and compelled. Therefore, the central inquiry in a congressional
investigation setting is typically whether the responsive testimony would be “incriminating.” The
Supreme Court has taken a broad view of what constitutes incriminating testimony, reasoning that
the privilege protects any statement “that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might so be used.”321 Even a witness
who denies any criminal wrongdoing can refuse to answer questions to avoid being “ensnared by
ambiguous circumstances.”322
The scope of the privilege differs significantly when a committee is demanding that the witness
produce documents. The Supreme Court has made clear that the mere fact that the contents of a
document may be incriminating does not mean that the document itself is protected from
disclosure under the Fifth Amendment.323 It is only when the act of producing the documents is
itself incriminating that the Fifth Amendment is triggered. That “act of production” is the only
compelled act and “may have testimonial aspects and an incriminating effect,” because a witness
would in fact be admitting that “the papers existed, were in his possession or control, and were
authentic.”324
This “act of production” doctrine creates no bright-line rules, but the Court has previously
reasoned that where the existence and location of a document is a “foregone conclusion,” the
witness “adds little or nothing to the sum total of the government’s information by conceding that
he in fact has the papers.”325 In such a scenario, the privilege against self-incrimination is not
triggered because “[t]he question is not of testimony but of surrender.”326 To the contrary, it would
appear that where a committee has no “prior knowledge of either the existence or the

answers to a question would expose a witness to the danger of conviction or prosecution, wider
latitude is permitted the witness in refusing to answer other questions.
United States v. Jaffee, 98 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (D.D.C. 1951). The privilege is personal in nature and may not be
invoked on behalf of a corporation, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), small partnership, Bellis v. United States, 417
U.S. 85 (1974), labor union, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), or other “artificial” organization, Bellis, 417
U.S. at 90.
318 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
319 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
320 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 396 (1976).
321 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972).
322 Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (“[W]e have emphasized that one of the Fifth Amendment’s ‘basic functions
… is to protect innocent men … ‘who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.’’”) (quoting
Grunewald v. United States, 353 U. S. 391, 421 (1957)). But see Simpson v. United States, 241 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1957)
(privilege inapplicable to questions seeking basic identifying information, such as the witness’s name and address).
323 Doe, 487 U.S. at 610 (“Where the preparation of business records is voluntary, no compulsion is present.”).
324 Id. at 612.
325 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411.
326 In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 (1911).
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whereabouts” of the documents, the act of production will be testimonial in nature and therefore
potentially privileged.327
There is no required verbal formula for invoking the privilege. Instead, courts have suggested that
a committee should recognize any reasonable indication that the witness is asserting his
privilege.328 Where a committee is uncertain whether the witness is invoking the privilege against
self-incrimination or is claiming some other basis for declining to answer, the committee should
direct the witness to specify his or her privilege or objection.329 The committee retains the right to
review the assertion of the privilege by a witness to determine its validity, but the witness is not
required to provide further explanation if that explanation would put him or her in peril of self-
incrimination. In addition, the privilege will be recognized as waived if the waiver is made
“intelligently and unequivocally.”330
Even a proper invocation of the Fifth Amendment does not necessarily mean that a committee
will be unable to obtain the testimony or documents that it seeks. Under federal statute, when a
witness asserts the privilege, the full house or the committee conducting the investigation may
seek a court order that (1) directs the witness to testify and (2) grants the witness immunity
against the use of his or her testimony, or other evidence derived from this testimony, in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.331 To preserve the witness’s Fifth Amendment rights, neither the
immunized testimony that the witness gives nor evidence derived therefrom may be used against
him or her in a subsequent criminal prosecution, except one for perjury or contempt relating to his
or her testimony.332 However, the witness may be convicted of the crime (the “transaction”) on
the basis of other evidence.333
An application for a judicial immunity order must be approved by a majority of the House or
Senate or by a two-thirds vote of the full committee seeking the order.334 The Attorney General
must be notified at least 10 days prior to the request for the order and can request a delay of 20
days in issuing the order.335 Although the order to testify may be issued before the witness’s
appearance,336 it does not become legally effective until the witness has been asked a question,
has invoked privilege, and has been presented with the court order.337 The court’s role in issuing
the order has been viewed as ministerial, and thus, if the procedural requirements under the

327 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 45 (2000).
328 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
329 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); see also Joint Comm. on Cong. Operations, 94th Cong., LEADING
CASES ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATORY POWER 63 (Comm. Print 1976).
330 Emspak, 349 U.S. at 195. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). It remains undetermined whether
the rule of “testimonial subject matter waiver” applies to claims of privilege in congressional hearings. That doctrine
provides that if a witness provides testimony on a particular subject matter, he or she has waived the privilege against
self-incrimination as it relates to that subject only. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958); Mitchell v. United
States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999). But see Presser v. United States, 284 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (suggesting that the Brown
rule applies in congressional proceedings).
331 18 U.S.C. §§6002, 6005.
332 Id. §6002(3).
333 The constitutionality of granting a witness only-use immunity, rather than transactional immunity, was upheld in
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
334 18 U.S.C. §6005(a).
335 The DOJ may waive the notice requirement. Application of the Senate Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, 655
F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
336 Id. at 1237.
337 See In re McElreath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc).
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immunity statute have been met, the court may not refuse to issue the order or impose conditions
on the grant of immunity.338
Fifth Amendment Due Process Rights
A witness or participant in a congressional investigation need not be accorded the same
procedural rights and protections that are commonly seen in adjudicative proceedings. While the
procedural protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause may apply to congressional
proceedings in some limited manner, the precise “process” that is “due” to participants depends
on the nature of the proceeding.339 A congressional investigation, whether conducted for
legislative or oversight purposes, is not a judicial or adjudicative proceeding but is instead an
“inquest” or fact-finding proceeding. As the Supreme Court has noted, “when a general fact-
finding investigation is being conducted, it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial
procedures be used.”340 The D.C. Circuit, for example, has explicitly stated that “the
distinguishing factors” between a legislative investigation and a criminal proceeding “cause”
congressional investigations “to be outside the guarantees of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment….”341
The Due Process Clause has been interpreted to establish a pertinency or relevancy requirement
in contempt of Congress prosecutions. The Supreme Court has held that to punish a witness for
failure to comply with a congressional subpoena, the relationship of the question posed to the
matter under inquiry “must be brought home to the witness at the time the questions are put to
him.”342 “Unless the subject matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the
duty of the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of pertinency, to state for
the record the subject under inquiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded
questions are pertinent thereto.”343 Additionally, in a contempt proceeding, to satisfy both the
requirement of due process as well as the statutory requirement that a refusal to answer be
“willful,” a witness should be informed of the committee’s ruling on any objections raised or
privileges asserted.344
Common-Law Privileges
Congress has generally drawn an important distinction between those privileges that derive from
the Constitution and those that arise from the common law.345 Whereas committees must
recognize and accept properly asserted constitutional privileges during an investigation, it has
generally been the congressional view that investigative committees are not bound by court-

338 Application of the U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C.
1973). In non-binding dicta, however, the court referred to the legislative history of the statutory procedure. That
history, in the court’s view, suggested that although a court lacks power to review the advisability of granting
immunity, it may consider the jurisdiction of Congress and the committee over the subject area and the relevance of the
information that is sought to the committee’s inquiry. See id. at 1278-79.
339 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (concluding that the concept of Due Process is “flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”).
340 Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
341 United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
342 Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961). As the court explained in that case, there is also a separate
statutory requirement of pertinency.
343 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957).
344 Deutch, 367 U.S. at 467-68.
345 See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST: THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 227-28 (1974).
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created common-law privileges.346 Although in practice committees at times choose to recognize
common-law privileges,347 the House especially has treated the decision as a discretionary one to
be made by the committee by “weighing the legislative need for disclosure against any possible
resulting injury.”348 The underlying rationale for this position has been that Congress’s exercise of
its constitutionally based investigative powers cannot be impeded by court-created, common-law
limitations and that each chamber’s exclusive power to determine the rules of its own proceedings
includes the authority to establish investigative and hearing procedures that govern the treatment
of certain privileges within those proceedings.349
The Supreme Court recently made a statement that may be in some tension with this
congressional practice. In nonbinding dicta, the Court stated in the 2020 case of Trump v. Mazars
that, in addition to retaining their constitutional rights, recipients of a committee subpoena “have
long been understood to retain common law and constitutional privileges with respect to certain
materials….”350 The import of this passage is unclear. A few observers have interpreted it to
indicate that the Court may view common-law privileges as applicable in a congressional
proceeding.351 That may be so, but the Court did not go so far as to state that common-law
privileges can be used to shield information from Congress. Nor is it clear how a non-
constitutional, common-law privilege could be a legal constraint upon Congress’s exercise of its
implied Article I powers.352 Instead, the passage only suggests that witnesses have been

346 See, e.g., H. REP. NO 116-125 at 31 (2019) (concluding that “common law privileges … are not valid reasons to
withhold documents subject to a valid subpoena from Congress, which derives its investigative authority from the
Constitution.) Id. (citing Letter from Chairman Jason Chaffetz. et al., Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
to Huban Gowadia, Acting Administrator, Transportation Security Administration (May 2, 2017)) (“The House of
Representatives derives its authority from the United States Constitution and is bound only by the privileges derived
therefrom … neither the Committee nor the United States House of Representatives recognizes purported non-
disclosure privileges associated with the common law….”); S REP. NO 105-167 at 586 (1998) (“There is no binding
authority that the Senate and its committees are legally required to recognize common-law privileges such as the
attorney-client or work-product privilege. As a separate and equal branch of government, Congress is constitutionally
authorized to establish its own rules of procedure, so long as they do not contravene the express provisions of the
Constitution. Both the attorney-client and work-product privileges are common-law privileges established by the
courts; they have no constitutional standing (although attorney-client privilege is implicated in some of the
Constitution’s provisions). The Senate is under no obligation to recognize the attorney-client and work-product
privileges.”); H. REP. NO. 105-792 (1998) (“The historic position of the House of Representatives is that committees of
Congress are not bound to recognize any non-Constitutional privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege.”)
347 For example, in rejecting a 1955 bill that would have made common-law privileges applicable in committee
investigations, the Senate stated, “With few exceptions, it has been committee practice to observe the testimonial
privileges of witnesses with respect to communications between clergyman and parishioner, doctor and patient, lawyer
and client, and husband and wife.” S. REP. NO. 84-2, at 27-28 (1955).
348 See H. Comm. on Nat. Resources, Rule IV (“Claims of common-law privileges made by witnesses in hearings, or by
interviewees or deponents in investigations or inquiries, are applicable only at the discretion of the Chair, subject to
appeal to the Committee.”); H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Tech., Rule III (“Claims of common-law privileges
made by witnesses in hearings, or by interviewees or deponents in investigations or inquiries, are applicable only at the
discretion of the Chair, subject to appeal to the Committee.”); 1 International Uranium Control: Hearing Before the
Oversight and Investigations Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Comm., 95th Cong. 60 (1977).
349 U.S. CONST. art. 1, §5, cl. 2.
350 Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2032 (2020) (emphasis added).
351 See, e.g., Robert Kelner and Perrin Cooke, The Supreme Court’s Mazars Decision Contains a Significant
Suggestion That Congress May Be Bound by the Attorney-Client Privilege in Congressional Investigations, INSIDE
POLITICAL LAW (July 9, 2020), https://www.insidepoliticallaw.com/2020/07/09/the-supreme-courts-mazars-decision-
contains-a-significant-suggestion-that-congress-may-be-bound-by-the-attorney-client-privilege-in-congressional-
investigations/.
352 U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
… shall be the supreme Law of the Land”).
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“understood” to “retain” certain common-law privileges. This may have been a reference to what
could be described as an informal understanding—arising from House and Senate practice—that
committees at times choose to recognize and accept common-law privileges, especially the
attorney-client privilege. To the extent, however, that the Court was suggesting the existence of a
legal obligation, it would appear that neither the House nor the Senate has historically
“understood” common-law privileges to limit the power of inquiry.353
Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, which protects confidential communications made with an attorney
to obtain legal advice or assistance, is one of the oldest common-law exceptions to the normal
principle of full disclosure in the judicial process.354 In practice, the exercise of committee
discretion in accepting a claim of attorney-client privilege has turned on a “weighing [of] the
legislative need for disclosure against any possible resulting injury”355 to the witness.356 On a
case-by-case basis, a committee can consider, among other factors:
 the strength of a claimant’s assertion in light of the pertinence of the
documents or information sought to the subject of the investigation,
 the practical unavailability of the documents or information from any other
source,
 the possible unavailability of the privilege to the claimant if it had been
raised in a judicial forum, and
 the committee’s assessment of the cooperation of the witness in the matter.357
A valid claim of attorney-client privilege is likely to receive substantial weight by the committee.
Doubt as to the validity of the asserted claim, however, may diminish the force of such a claim.358

353 In the historical example referenced by the Court for support of the proposition that witnesses are understood to
retain certain common-law privileges in congressional investigations, the committee chair stated in the course of
considering an attorney-client claim that “[i]t is well-established by congressional precedent and practice that
acceptance of a claim of attorney-client privilege rests in the sole and sound discretion of Congress, and cannot be
asserted as a matter of right.” See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 106 (2004). See also Michael
D. Bopp and Delisa Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges for Witnesses in Congressional Investigations, 35
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 897, 905 (2012) (noting that “common law privileges are not constitutionally protected and
thus do not apply to Congress”).
354 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951
F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991). See also United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The essential
elements of the claim of attorney-client privilege are as follows: (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”).
355 International Uranium Control, supra note 324, at 60.
356 Committees may also consider their statutory duty to engage in continuous oversight of the application,
administration, and execution of laws that fall within their jurisdiction. See 2 U.S.C. §190d (“[E]ach standing
committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the
application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the
jurisdiction of that committee.”).
357 For a recent discussion of the House’s approach to the attorney-client privilege, see David Rapallo, House Rules:
Congress and the Attorney-Client Privilege, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2023)https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2476.
358 See, e.g., H. REP. NO. 105-792 (FRANKLIN L. HANEY), at 11-15 (1988); H. REP. NO. 104-598 (JOHN M. QUINN, DAVID
WATKINS, AND MATTHEW MOORE), at 40-54 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-191 (WILLIAM H. KENNEDY III), at 9-19 (1995); H.
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Other Common-Law Testimonial Privileges
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize testimonial privileges for witnesses in judicial
proceedings so that they need not reveal confidential communications between doctor and patient,
husband and wife, or clergyman and parishioner.359 Congressional committees have not viewed
themselves as legally required to allow a witness to decline to testify on the basis of these and
similar testimonial privileges.360 And as previously noted, the various rules of procedure that are
generally applicable to judicial proceedings, such as the right to cross-examine and call other
witnesses, need not be accorded to a witness in a congressional hearing.361
Executive Privilege
Various executive privileges are sometimes invoked as a reason not to comply with congressional
requests for information. The foundation for these privileges is not always clear, as some derive
from the Constitution, others from the common law, and still others from a combination of
both.362
There is not a single “executive privilege.” Instead, there exists a suite of distinct privileges, each
possessing a different—though sometimes overlapping—scope.363 The political branches, in
support of their often competing interests and priorities, have adopted somewhat divergent views
on these different component privileges. Whereas Congress has generally interpreted executive
privilege narrowly, limiting its application to the types of presidential, national security, and
diplomatic communications referenced by the Supreme Court in the seminal decision of United
States v. Nixon,364 the executive branch has historically viewed executive privilege more broadly,
providing protections to a number of different categories of documents and communications that
implicate executive branch confidentiality interests.365 Under the executive branch’s
interpretation, these privileges include:

REP. NO. 99-462 (RALPH AND JOSEPH BERNSTEIN), at 13-14 (1986); International Uranium Control, note 324, at 54-60.
359 FED. R. EVID. 501.
360 See generally ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE: MEMORANDA OPINIONS OF THE AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMM. 98th Cong.
(Comm. Print 1983).
361 United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citing Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960)).
362 See infra notes 349-57 and accompanying text.
363 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that “executive officials have claimed a variety of
privileges to resist disclosure of information”). See also John E. Bies, Primer on Executive Privilege and the Executive
Branch Approach to Congressional Oversight, LAWFARE (June 16, 2017) ( “[A] review of executive branch practice
identifies a number of categories of information that the executive branch, at least, believes may be protected by an
invocation of the privilege.”).
364 See H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., REP. ON PRESIDENT BUSH’S ASSERTION OF
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE SUBPOENA TO ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHAEL B. MUKASEY 8
(Comm. Print 2008) (“The Attorney General’s argument that the subpoena implicates the ‘law enforcement
component’ of executive privilege is equally flawed. There is no basis to support the proposition that a law
enforcement privilege, particularly one applied to closed investigations, can shield from congressional scrutiny
information that is important for addressing congressional oversight concerns. The Attorney General did not cite a
single judicial decision recognizing this alleged privilege.”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-728, at 16 n. 43 (1998) (“As the D.C.
Circuit has recently held, the doctrine of executive privilege which arises from the constitutional separation of powers
applies only to decisionmaking of the President. Since the subject of the Committee’s subpoena is not one that does (or
legally could) involve Presidential decisionmaking, no constitutional privilege could be invoked here.”) (citations
omitted).
365 See Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive
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 the state secrets privilege, which protects certain military, diplomatic, and
national security information;366
 the presidential communications privilege, which generally protects
confidential communications between the President and his advisors that
relate to presidential decisionmaking, as well as a certain subset of
communications not involving the President but nonetheless made for
purposes of advising the President;367
 the deliberative process privilege, which protects predecisional and
deliberative communications within executive branch agencies;368 and
 the law enforcement privilege, which protects the contents of open (and
sometimes closed) law enforcement files, including communications related
to investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking.369
The executive branch has tended to consolidate these various privileges into one “executive
privilege,” particularly when responding to congressional investigative requests.370 Congressional
committees, on the other hand, have typically distinguished between the different individual
privileges.371
There are various reasons the executive privileges may appropriately be treated as distinct. They
protect different types of communications and appear to arise from different sources of law (e.g.,
the Constitution, judicial common law, or history and practice) with some more firmly established
in judicial precedent than others. As a result, the privileges apply with different strengths and are
balanced against judicial or congressional needs in different ways. For example, when faced with
a dispute over compelled disclosure, courts have “traditionally shown the utmost deference” to
presidential claims of a need to protect military or diplomatic secrets.372 The President’s more
generalized interest in the confidentiality of his other communications (the presidential
communications privilege), though also arising implicitly from the Constitution, has not been
“extended this high degree of deference”373 and may be overcome by Congress when access is
“demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s function.”374 The other

Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 116 (May 30, 1984) (“The scope of executive privilege includes several related areas in
which confidentiality within the Executive Branch is necessary for the effective execution of the laws.”).
366 See Congressional Requests for Confidential Executive Branch Information, 13 Op. O.L.C. 153, 154 (June 19,
1989).
367 See Assertion of Executive Privilege Regarding White House Counsel’s Office Documents, 20 Op. O.L.C. 2 (May
23, 1996).
368 See Assertion of Executive Privilege Over Documents Generated in Response to Congressional Investigation into
Operation Fast and Furious, 2012 OLC LEXIS 4 (June 29, 2012).
369 See Protective Assertion of Executive Privilege Over Unredacted Mueller Report and Related Investigative Files, 43
Op. O.L.C. 374 (Nov. 30, 1982).
370 See 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, supra note 340, at 116 (reasoning that “[t]he scope of executive privilege includes several
related areas”); 13 Op. O.L.C. 153, supra note 341, at 154 (reasoning that “the executive branch’s interest in keeping
the information confidential” is “usually discussed in terms of “‘executive privilege’”).
371 See supra note 339.
372 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
373 Id. at 711.
374 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Although
it appears that former Presidents may assert the presidential communications privilege over communications made
while in office, that claim appears to be weakened when the sitting President does not concur with the former
President’s privilege claim. See Trump v. Thompson, No. 21-5254, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 36315, at *6 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 9, 2021), application for stay of mandate and injunction pending review denied, No. 21A272, 2022 U.S. LEXIS
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privileges have been given less weight and must be assessed differently in the face of an exercise
of Congress’s investigative powers. For example, when compared to the presidential
communications privilege, the deliberative process privilege is more easily overcome by
Congress and “disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct
occurred.”375 The legal source of the deliberative process privilege also appears to be different
from the presidential communications privilege, as the former arises “primarily” from the
common law376 but may have a “constitutional dimension,”377 whereas the latter is “inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers.”378 Least potent are those executive privileges that arise purely
from historical practice or reflect the judicial common law. These have generally been viewed, at
least by Congress, as legally insufficient to justify non-compliance with a congressional
subpoena.379
Of the various executive privileges, the deliberative process privilege is most frequently
implicated in congressional oversight investigations because it gives protection to the very
decisionmaking process that Congress is often intent on understanding.380 The purpose underlying
the privilege is to protect the “‘quality of agency decisions’ by allowing government officials
freedom to debate alternative approaches in private.”381 But the deliberative process privilege
applies only to those documents and communications that are predecisional, meaning they are
created prior to the agency reaching its final decision, and deliberative, meaning they relate to the
thought process of executive officials and are not purely factual.382 The privilege does not protect
entire documents. Rather, the executive branch must disclose non-privileged factual information
that can be reasonably segregated from privileged information in the requested documents. And

589 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2022) (stating that the appellate court’s discussion of “President Trump’s status as a former President
must [] be regarded as nonbinding dicta”); Nixon v. GSA, 433 U.S. 425, 448, 451 (1999) (concluding that “a former
President is in less need of” the privilege “than an incumbent” and that the “expectation of the confidentiality of
executive communications [is]... subject to erosion over time after an administration leaves office”).
375 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 746.
376 In In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit determined that “the deliberative process privilege is primarily a common law
privilege” but that “[s]ome aspects of the privilege, for example the protection accorded the mental processes of agency
officials, have roots in the constitutional separation of powers.” 121 F.3d at 745, 737 n.4. Later, in Committee on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, a district court “determined that there is an important constitutional dimension to
the deliberative process aspect of the executive privilege, and that the privilege could be properly invoked in response
to a legislative demand.” See 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2016).
377 The scope and source of the law enforcement privilege is unclear, particularly when asserted in the context of
congressional investigations where committees have voiced consistent objections to its use. The executive branch
asserts that the law enforcement privilege is constitutionally based, deriving from both the President’s responsibility to
“faithfully execute the law” under Article II and constitutionally rooted individual trial and privacy rights. See
Congressional Subpoenas of Department of Justice Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252 (Oct. 17, 1984). Committees,
on the other hand, have previously viewed the executive branch’s position on the confidentiality of law enforcement
information as a nondisclosure “policy” rather than a constitutionally based privilege. See H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., REP. ON PRESIDENT BUSH’S ASSERTION OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN RESPONSE TO THE
COMMITTEE SUBPOENA TO ATTORNEY GENERAL MICHAEL B. MUKASEY 8 (Comm. Print 2008).
378 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708.
379 See supra notes 341-50 and accompanying text.
380 Given its broad scope, the deliberative-process privilege is “the most frequent form of executive privilege raised.” In
re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d at 737.
381 Id. at 737 (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975)).
382 See Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, No. 18-5280, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 40001, at *5-6 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 21, 2020) (“The privilege covers information that is both ‘predecisional’ and ‘deliberative.’ Documents are
predecisional if they were ‘generated before the adoption of an agency policy,’ and deliberative if they ‘reflect[] the
give-and-take of the consultative process.’”) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
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like the other executive privileges,383 the deliberative process privilege is overcome by an
adequate showing of need.384
The relatively few judicial opinions that have addressed executive privilege disputes between
Congress and the executive branch suggest that a reviewing court’s view of the legislative
purpose and interests underlying a committee investigation plays a significant role in a court’s
willingness to enforce a subpoena.385 That purpose is articulated by the investigating committee,
but its weight may be colored by various outside factors, including actions of the President. For
example, in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, a case
involving a subpoena issued by a Senate committee for President Nixon’s White House tapes, the
D.C. Circuit held that the committee’s need for the tapes was insufficient to overcome the
President’s claim of executive privilege.386 In reaching that decision, the court took a dim view of
the committee’s asserted oversight and legislative fact-finding purposes. The court characterized
the committee’s need for the tapes to conduct oversight of the Nixon Administration as “merely
cumulative” given that many of the tapes had already been obtained by the House in its ongoing
impeachment investigation.387 The committee’s legislative fact-finding purpose fared no better
and was similarly undercut by the fact that President Nixon had publicly released transcripts of
the tapes. Those transcripts, the court reasoned, were a suitable substitute for the tapes since the
“most precise evidence” is not necessary for Congress to make “legislative judgments” that
“normally depend more on... political acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past
events.... ”388
The D.C. Circuit recently took a different view of the legislative interests underlying the House
investigation into the January 6, 2021, attempt to violently disrupt the congressional certification
of the 2020 presidential election.389 In Trump v. Thompson, the court heard a claim brought by
former President Donald Trump seeking to block the National Archives from disclosing his
presidential records to the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol on the grounds that the records were protected by the presidential
communications privilege.390 Notably, President Biden had explicitly determined that an assertion
of executive privilege was, in light of the “unique and extraordinary circumstances,” not
warranted.391

383 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 (holding that the presidential communications privilege is not “absolute” or
“unqualified”); Senate Select, 498 F.2d at 731.
384 See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 112(D.D.C. 2016) (finding that a
congressional committees need for deliberative materials outweighed the executive branch’s interest in confidentiality).
385 See Trump v. Thompson, No. 21-5254, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 36315, at *47 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 9, 2021), application
for stay of mandate and injunction pending review denied, No. 21A272, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 589 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2022);
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 112 (D.D.C. 2016); Senate Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that “[w]e must ... consider the
nature of [the Committe’s] need when we are called upon” to order the President to “disclose to the Committee records
of conversations between himself and his principal aides”).
386 Senate Select, 498 F.3d at 733.
387 Id. at 732.
388 Id.
389 Thompson, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 36315.
390 Id. at *24, n.6 (“The only privilege at issue in this appeal is the constitutionally based presidential communications
privilege.”).
391 Id. at *4.
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The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Thompson began by reaffirming that “[i]n cases concerning a claim
of executive privilege, the bottom-line question has been whether a sufficient showing of need for
disclosure has been made so that the claim of presidential privilege ‘must yield.’”392 In assessing
whether the committee had shown such a need, the court noted that President Biden’s decision
not to assert executive privilege “substantially ‘detracts from the weight of’ former President
Trump’s contrary privilege contention.”393 But rather than adopt a specific standard to govern
disputes between congressional committees and a former President, the court instead held that
“[u]nder any of the tests advocated by former President Trump, the profound interests in
disclosure advanced by President Biden and the January 6th Committee far exceed his generalized
concerns for Executive Branch confidentiality.”394
In both Thompson and Senate Select Committee, the D.C. Circuit characterized the circumstances
of the applicable congressional investigation as unusual, possibly in an effort to limit each
opinion’s impact on future interbranch disputes over executive privilege.395 But Thompson
contrasts with Senate Select in two key ways. First, in Thompson, the actions of the sitting
President strengthened rather than weakened Congress’s interests in disclosure.396 And second, in
stark comparison to Senate Select Committee, the court in Thompson took a robust view of the
House’s interests in obtaining the requested information. The committee’s investigation was
“vital” and served a “uniquely weighty interest.”397 “The very essence of the Article I power is
legislating,” the court reasoned, “and so there would seem to be few, if any, more imperative
interests squarely within Congress’s wheelhouse than ensuring the safe and uninterrupted conduct
of its constitutionally assigned business.”398 As a result, the court reasoned that under any
applicable standard, even one reserved for executive privilege claims made by a sitting President,
the former President’s interests in confidentiality must succumb to the committee’s heightened
interest in access.
Former President Trump immediately asked the Supreme Court to stay the circuit court decision
and block the National Archives from transferring the records to the committee. That appeal was
denied, thereby effectively affirming the D.C. Circuit ruling.399 But in a brief order, the Supreme
Court clarified that because the D.C. Circuit had “concluded that President Trump’s claims would
have failed even if he were the incumbent ... Any discussion of ... President Trump’s status as a
former President must therefore be regarded as nonbinding dicta.”400 Nevertheless, the D.C.
Circuit’s holding that even a sitting President’s interest in confidentiality would succumb to the
committee’s unique and substantial interest in disclosure remains unaltered and stands as a

392 Id. at *45.
393 Id. at *53 (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 439.)
394 Id. at *46 (emphasis added). These tests included those established in Trump v Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2035-36
(2020) (congressional subpoena for personal presidential records), Senate Select, 498 F.2d at 731 (congressional
subpoena for official records of sitting president) and U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974) (judicial subpoena to
sitting president).
395 Id. at 46 (noting a “rare and formidable alignment of factors”); Senate Select, 498 F.2d at 733 (noting the “peculiar
circumstances of this case”).
396 Thompson, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 36315, at *47-52.
397 Id. at *47, 53.
398 Id. at 54.
399 Trump v. Thompson, No. 21A272, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 589 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2022) (denying application for stay of
mandate).
400 Id.
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reminder of the principle that the presidential communications privilege is not absolute and can
be overcome by Congress.
Statutory Limits on Congressional Access to Information
In rare circumstances, Congress has chosen to enact laws that limit its own ability to access
specific types of information. One example of such self-limiting action is 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f),
under which the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Committee on Finance, and
the Joint Committee on Taxation are permitted access to individuals’ tax returns.401 For any other
committee to receive such information, the House or Senate must pass a resolution402 specifying
the purpose for which the information is to be furnished and that the requested information cannot
be reasonably obtained from any other source.403 The information is to be provided only when the
requesting committee is sitting in closed executive session.404
Other commonly cited statutory restrictions on oversight are Title 50, Sections 3091-3093, of the
U.S. Code, which relate to foreign intelligence activities. Section 3091 governs congressional
oversight of “intelligence activities”405 generally. It requires that the President ensure that
congressional intelligence committees are “fully and currently informed” of intelligence
activities406 and “promptly” notified of illegal intelligence activities.407 Section 3092 governs
oversight of intelligence activities that are not covert actions, and Section 3093 governs oversight
of covert actions. Each section imposes a duty on the Director of National Intelligence and the
heads of other entities involved in intelligence activities to
with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information
relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive
matters … keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
all intelligence activities, other than a covert action.… which are the responsibility of, are
engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of
the United States Government.408
Self-imposed limits on congressional oversight powers raise the question of whether statutes that
generally prohibit public disclosure of information also restrict congressional access. Federal
courts have held that the executive branch and private parties may not withhold documents from

401 26 U.S.C. §6103(f)(1). Returns are to be submitted to the requesting committee in a manner that protects the privacy
of the individual. In the event that information identifying (either directly or indirectly) any tax filer is requested, it may
be furnished to the committee only “when sitting in closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents
in writing to such disclosure.” Id.
402 In the case of other joint or special committees, a concurrent resolution is required. Id.
403 Id. §6103(f)(3).
404 Id.
405 Intelligence activities is defined to include “covert actions” and “financial intelligence activities” but is not further
defined in law. 50 U.S.C. §3091(f). Covert action is also defined in statute. 50 U.S.C. §3093(e). Intelligence activities
is defined by Executive Order 12333, as amended, as “all activities that agencies within the Intelligence Community
are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order.” Executive Order 12333, “United States Intelligence Activities,” 46
Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981). Additionally, detailed definitions of intelligence activities and intelligence-related
activities are contained in the Senate resolution establishing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
rule establishing the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. See S.Res. 400, 94th Cong., §14(a); House
Rule X(11).
406 This requirement includes reporting on “significant anticipated intelligence activity as required by this subchapter.”
50 U.S.C. §3091(a).
407 50 U.S.C. §3091(a).
408 50 U.S.C. §§3092(a), 3093(b).
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Congress based on a law that restricts public disclosure, because the release of information to a
congressional requestor is not considered to be a disclosure to the general public.409 In addition,
many confidentiality statutes contain explicit exceptions for disclosure to Congress.410
From time to time the President and other executive branch entities, as well as private parties,
have argued that certain statutes of general applicability prevent the disclosure of confidential or
sensitive information to congressional committees. For example, a frequently cited statute to
justify nondisclosure is the Trade Secrets Act, a criminal provision that generally prohibits the
disclosure of trade secrets and other confidential business information by a federal officer or
employee “unless otherwise authorized by law.”411 A review of the Trade Secrets Act’s legislative
history, however, provides no indication that it was ever intended to apply to Congress, its
employees, or any legislative branch agency or its employees.412
In instances in which the target of a congressional inquiry attempts to withhold information based
on a general nondisclosure statute that is silent with respect to congressional disclosure, the
committee may have to take additional steps to access the information. Potential solutions include
negotiations with the target; accommodations in the form of accepted redactions or other means
of providing the information; or a “friendly subpoena,” which may provide the targeted entity or
individual with the necessary legal cover to assist the committee with its inquiry. Each of these
and many other prospective solutions can be employed at the committee’s discretion.
Classified Material
How Are Materials Classified?
The standards for classifying and declassifying information are contained in Executive Order
13526.413 These standards provide that the President, Vice President, agency heads, and any other
officials designated by the President may classify information upon a determination that its
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to damage national security.414 Such
information must be owned by, produced by, or under the control of the federal government and
must concern one of the areas delineated by the executive order.415

409 See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 970, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Exxon Corp. v.
F.T.C., 589 F.2d 582, 585-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ashland Oil Co., Inc. v. F.T.C., 548 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
410 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §552a(b)(9); 6 U.S.C. §673.
411 18 U.S.C. §1905.
412 See CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1144-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the legislative history
of the Trade Secrets Act).
413 Executive Order 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010).
414 Id. §1.3. The unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is presumed to damage national security.
Id. §1.1(b).
415 Id. §1.4. The areas are as follows: military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign government information;
intelligence activities, intelligence sources/methods; cryptology; foreign relations or foreign activities of the United
States, including confidential sources; scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
federal programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or capabilities of national security
systems; or weapons of mass destruction. Id. In addition, when classified information that is incorporated, paraphrased,
restated, or generated in a new form, that new form must be classified at the same level as the original. Id. §§2.1-2.2.
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Information is classified at one of three levels based on the amount of danger that its unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national security.416 Information is classified
as:
 “top secret” if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to
cause “exceptionally grave damage” to national security,
 “secret” if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause
“serious damage” to national security, and
 “confidential” if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to
cause “damage” to national security.
Significantly, for each level, the original classifying officer must identify or describe the specific
danger potentially presented by the information’s disclosure.417 The officer who originally
classifies the information establishes a date for declassification based upon the expected duration
of the information’s sensitivity. If the officer cannot set an earlier declassification date, then the
information must be marked for declassification after 10 or 25 years, depending on the sensitivity
of the information.418 The deadline for declassification can be extended if the threat to national
security still exists.419
Who Can Access Classified Materials?
Access to classified information is generally limited to those who:
 demonstrate their eligibility to the relevant agency head (for example,
through a security clearance);
 sign a nondisclosure agreement; and
 have a need to know the information, which is satisfied upon “a
determination within the executive branch … that a prospective recipient
requires access to specific classified information in order to perform or assist
in a lawful and authorized governmental function.”420
The information being accessed may not be removed from the controlling agency’s premises
without permission.421 Each agency is required to establish systems for controlling the
distribution of classified information.422
The executive order does not contain any instructions regarding disclosures to Congress or its
committees of jurisdiction. “Members of Congress, as constitutionally elected officers, do not
receive security clearances as such, but are instead presumed to be trustworthy,” thereby fulfilling
the first requirement to access classified materials.423 Members of Congress still face the “need to

416 Id. §1.2.
417 Id. Classifying authorities are specifically prohibited from classifying information for reasons other than protecting
national security, such as to conceal violations of law or avoid embarrassment. Id. §1.7(a).
418 Id. §1.5.
419 Id. §1.5(c).
420 Id. §§4.1, 6.1(dd). The need-to-know requirement can be waived for former Presidents and Vice Presidents,
historical researchers, and former policymaking officials who were appointed by the President or Vice President. Id.
§4.4.
421 Id. §4.1.
422 Id. §4.2.
423 Access to Classified Information, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 402, 406 (1996).
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know” requirement. A Member could assert that he or she fulfills this requirement based on the
constitutional duties and responsibilities of his or her office. The executive branch may disagree
with this interpretation and has previously stated that it retains the final authority to determine if a
Member has a need to know.424 Congressional aides, support staff, and other legislative branch
employees do not automatically have access to classified information and, therefore, must go
through the necessary security clearance process prior to being permitted to review such
information.425
The executive order’s silence with respect to disclosure to Congress, combined with the absence
of any other law restricting congressional access to classified material,426 suggests that mere
classification likely cannot be used as a legal basis to withhold information from Congress.
Notwithstanding classification itself, practical and political concerns with respect to controlled
access, secure storage, and public disclosure may provide persuasive rationales for withholding or
limiting congressional access. Committees and subcommittees have wide discretion to negotiate
with a presidential Administration regarding these issues. For example, an investigating
committee or subcommittee could choose to review documents at an executive branch secure
facility; permit redactions of certain information; limit the ability of Members or staff to review
certain material; or opt to hold nonpublic meetings, briefings, and hearings where classified
information will be discussed. None of these measures is legally required, but all are within the
investigating entity’s discretion and may assist in facilitating the disclosure of materials sought
during the investigation.
Controlled Unclassified Information
Committees conducting investigations and oversight of executive branch agencies may require
access to information and documents that are “sensitive” but do not rise to the level of being
classified. This general category of “controlled unclassified information” (CUI)427 can present
access issues for congressional committees. The fact that information is CUI does not alone
provide a basis for withholding it from duly authorized jurisdictional committees of Congress.428
However, there may be political and policy reasons why an agency’s classification of information
as CUI should be afforded due deference.
CUI material can take numerous forms.429 Some categories are statutorily authorized, while
others are creations of the agency that authored or is holding the requested information. All such
classifications fall under the oversight of the National Archives and Records Administration as

424 See id.
425 See CRS Report R43216, Security Clearance Process: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by Michelle D.
Christensen, at 5.
426 See 50 U.S.C. §3163 (exempting Members of Congress from requirements for accessing classified information).
427 Executive Order 13556, 75 Fed. Reg. 68675 (Nov. 4, 2010).
428 See 32 C.F.R. §2002.16(a)(7) (providing that “[a]gencies need not enter a written agreement when they share CUI
with … Congress, including any committee, subcommittee, joint committee, joint subcommittee, or office thereof”).
429 CUI is defined as
information the Government creates or possesses, or that an entity creates or possesses for or on
behalf of the Government, that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy requires or permits an
agency to handle using safeguarding or dissemination controls. However, CUI does not include
classified information … or information a non-executive branch entity possesses and maintains in
its own systems that did not come from, or was not created or possessed by or for, an executive
branch agency or an entity acting for an agency.
Id. §2002.4(h).
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executive agent for the CUI Program,430 which maintains a registry of CUI categories.431 The
executive order does not supersede statutorily created protections.432
One example of a statutorily authorized CUI category is found in the statute creating the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The statute requires the TSA director to “prescribe
regulations prohibiting the disclosure of information obtained or developed in carrying out
security … if [he or she] decides that disclosing the information would—(A) be an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy; (B) reveal a trade secret or privileged or confidential commercial or
financial information; or (C) be detrimental to the security of transportation.433
The statute also expressly states that the general authority provided to withhold information from
the public “does not authorize information to be withheld from a committee of Congress
authorized to have the information.”434 Pursuant to this statute, TSA promulgated regulations
defining sensitive security information (SSI)—defined generally as “information obtained or
developed in the conduct of security activities”—and restrictions on its disclosure.435 In addition,
the SSI regulations appear to insulate congressional committees and their staffs from any
sanctions or penalty from the receipt and disclosure of SSI. The definition of covered persons—
those subject to the SSI regulations—does not appear to include Members of Congress,
committees, or congressional staff.436 Moreover, the regulations specifically state, as directed by
the statute, that “[n]othing in this part precludes TSA or the Coast Guard from disclosing SSI to a
committee of Congress authorized to have the information.”437
Many agencies have developed their own CUI protection regimes in accordance with federal
regulation438 that may be cited in response to congressional requests. Agencies are encouraged to
enter into written agreements or arrangements when disseminating CUI outside the executive
branch.439 However, agencies may provide CUI to Congress without a formal agreement.440
Individual Member Authority to Conduct Oversight and
Investigations
Individual members of a legislative body may conduct investigatory oversight on their own
initiative. However, absent the support of the body or a committee, such an investigation will

430 Executive Order 13556 §2(c).
431 The list is available at National Archives, Controlled Unclassified Information, CUI Categories,
https://www.archives.gov/cui/registry/category-list.
432 Executive Order 13556 §6(a).
433 49 U.S.C. §114(r)(1).
434 Id. §114(r)(2).
435 49 C.F.R. §1520.5.
436 See id. §1520.7 (providing 13 specific categories of “covered persons”).
437 Id. §1520.15(c).
438 32 C.F.R. Part 2002.
439 Id. §2002.2(c). Agreement or arrangement is defined as “any vehicle that sets out specific CUI handling
requirements for contractors and other information-sharing partners when the arrangement with the other party involves
CUI [including] contracts, grants, licenses, certificates, memoranda of agreement/arrangement or understanding, and
information-sharing agreements or arrangements.”
440 Id. §2002.16(a)(7)(i).
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generally not be supported by the same compulsory legal authorities that are available during
committee investigations, including the power to issue subpoenas.441
Senate rules provide substantially more effective means for individual minority party Members to
engage in “self-help” to support oversight objectives than afforded their House counterparts.
Senate rules emphasize the rights and prerogatives of individual Senators and, therefore, minority
groups of Senators.442 The most important of these rules are those that effectively allow unlimited
debate on a bill or amendment unless a supermajority votes to invoke cloture.443 Senators can use
their right to filibuster, or simply the threat of filibuster, to delay or prevent the Senate from
reaching a vote on legislative business. Other Senate rules can also directly or indirectly aid the
minority in gaining investigatory rights. For example, the right of extended debate also applies in
committee and, unlike on the floor, the cloture rule may not be invoked in committee. Each
Senate committee decides for itself how it will control debate, and therefore a Member may have
opportunities to threaten or cause delay in committee. Also, Senate Rule XXVI prohibits the
reporting of any measure or matter from a committee unless a majority of the committee is
present, another point of possible tactical leverage. Even beyond the potent power to delay,
Senators can promote their goals by taking advantage of other parliamentary rights and
opportunities that are provided by the Senate’s formal procedures and customary practices, such
as are afforded by the processes dealing with floor recognition and the amending process.
5 U.S.C. § 2954: The “Rule of Seven” Statute
Another potential tool for minority or small group participation in oversight is 5 U.S.C. § 2954,
commonly known as the “rule of seven.”444 Under the statute, seven members of the House
Oversight and Reform Committee or five members of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs can request information from executive agencies on matters
within their committee jurisdictions, which the agencies “shall” provide.445 While the statute
confers a right of access upon this group of Members, it is not clear whether the Members—in the
case of an agency refusal—can enforce their request in the courts. A recent D.C. Circuit decision
has recognized that Members who invoke § 2954 have standing to enforce their right,446 but
whether they also possess the necessary cause of action for a court to entertain an enforcement
lawsuit remains the subject of litigation.447

441 When authorized by chamber and committee rules, an individual committee chair may exercise the subpoena power.
See House Rule XI(2)(m). Minority members are accorded some rights under the rules. For example, in the House of
Representatives, whenever a hearing is conducted on any measure or matter, the minority may, upon the written request
of a majority of the minority Members to the chair before the completion of the hearing, call witnesses selected by the
minority and presumably request documents. House Rule XI 2(j)(1); see also House Banking Committee Rule IV(4).
442 See CRS Report RL30360, Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, by Valerie Heitshusen and Richard S. Beth.
443 Senate Rule XXII.
444 5 U.S.C. §2954 provides: “An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on [Oversight and] Government
[Reform] of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request of the Committee on
Government Operations of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it
relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.”
445 The text of the statute refers to the House Committee on Government Operations, a predecessor to the House
Committee on Oversight and Reform, and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, a predecessor to the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
446 Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2020). A federal district court in California previously came to an
opposing conclusion on the standing question. See Waxman v. Thompson, Case No. CV 04-3467 MMM, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 102688, at *29 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2006).
447 Maloney, 984 F.3d at 70 (“This decision resolves only the standing question decided by the district court. To the
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Specialized Investigations
Oversight at times occurs through specialized, temporary investigations of a specific event or
development. These can be dramatic, high-profile endeavors focusing on scandals, alleged abuses
of authority, suspected illegal conduct, or other unethical behavior. The stakes are high, possibly
even leading to the end of individual careers of high-ranking executive officials. Congressional
investigations can induce resignations, firings, and impeachment proceedings and question major
policy actions of the President, as occurred in the Senate Watergate Committee investigation into
the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s, the Church and Pike select committees’ inquiries in
the mid-1970s into intelligence agency abuses, the 1981 and 1982 House and Senate select
committee inquiries into the ABSCAM scandal, the 1987 Iran-Contra investigation during the
Reagan Administration, the multiple investigations of scandals and alleged misconduct during the
Clinton Administration, the joint intelligence committee investigation into the September 11
attacks, the Hurricane Katrina probe in 2005 during the George W. Bush Administration, the
Benghazi panel established in 2014 and again in 2015 during the Obama Administration,
investigations into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election during the Trump
Administration, and a select committee inquiry by the House into the attack on the U.S. Capitol
Building on January 6, 2021. On these investigations and others, interest in Congress, the
executive, and the public is frequently intense and impassioned.
Prominent Select Investigative Committees
Senate Watergate Committee (1973-74), S.Res. 60, 93rd Congress, 1st session.
“To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which
il egal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any persons, acting individually or in combination with
others, in the presidential election of 1972, or any campaign, canvass, or other activity related to it.”
House Select Committee on the Iran-Contra Affair (1987), H.Res. 12, 100th Congress, 1st session.
“The select committee is authorized and directed to conduct a ful and complete investigation and study, and to
make such findings and recommendations to the House as the select committee deems appropriate, regarding the
sale or transfer of arms, technology, or intelligence to Iran or Iraq; the diversion of funds realized in connection
with such sales and otherwise, to the anti-government forces in Nicaragua; the violation of any law, agreement,
promise, or understanding regarding the reporting to and informing of Congress; operational activities and the
conduct of foreign and national security policy by the staff of the National Security Council; authorization and
supervision or lack thereof of such matters by the President and other White House personnel; the role of
individuals and entities outside the government; other inquiries regarding such matters, by the Attorney General,
White House, intel igence community, and Departments of Defense, Justice, and State; and the impact of such
matters on public and international confidence in the United States Government.”
Although the circumstances that give rise to one or another committee investigation can vary
significantly, the investigations themselves tend to share some common attributes, including these
five:
1. Investigative hearings may be televised or webcast and often result in extensive
news media coverage.
2. Such investigations may be undertaken by different organizational arrangements.
These include temporary select committees, standing committees and their
subcommittees, specially created subcommittees, or specially commissioned task
forces within existing standing committees.

extent the GSA’s argument or the district court’s reasoning implicate the existence of a cause of action, the appropriate
exercise of equitable discretion, or the merits of the Requesters’ claims, those issues remain to be resolved by the
district court in the first instance.”).
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3. Specially created investigative committees usually have a short life span (e.g., six
months, one year, or at the longest until the end of a Congress, at which point the
panel would have to be reauthorized for the inquiry to continue).
4. The investigative panel often has to employ additional and special staff—
including investigators, attorneys, auditors, and researchers—because of the
added workload and need for specialized expertise in conducting such
investigations and in the subject matter involved. Such staff can be hired under
contract from the private sector, transferred from existing congressional offices
or committees, transferred from the congressional support agencies, or loaned
(“detailed”) by executive agencies, including the FBI. The staff would require
appropriate security clearances if the inquiry looked into matters of national
security.
5. Such special panels have often been vested with investigative authorities not
ordinarily available to standing committees. Staff deposition authority is the most
commonly provided authority, but given the particular circumstances, special
panels have also been vested with the authority to obtain tax information, seek
international assistance in information-gathering efforts abroad, and participate in
judicial proceedings related to the investigation (for instance, to enforce a
committee-issued subpoena). The specific authorities granted to some of the most
prominent investigations undertaken in recent decades are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1. Special Investigative Authorities Explicitly Provided to Selected
Investigating Committees
International
Tax
Authority to
Staff
Information-
Information
Participate in
Authorizing
Deposition
Gathering
Access
Judicial
Investigation
Resolution(s)
Authority
Authority
Authority
Proceedings
Senate
S.Res. 60, 93rd Cong.
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Watergate
(1973)
Investigation
S.Res. 194, 93rd Cong.
(1973)
S.Res. 327, 93rd Cong.
(1974)
President
H.Res. 803, 93rd Cong.
Yes
Yes
No
No
Nixon
(1974)
Impeachment
Church
S.Res. 21, 94th Cong.
Yes
Yes
No
No
Committee
(1975)
S.Res. 377, 94th Cong.
(1976)
House Select
H.Res. 1540, 94th Cong.
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Committee
(1976)
on
H.Res. 222, 95th Cong.
Assassinations (1977)
H.Res. 433, 95th Cong.
(1977)
Koreagate
H.Res. 252, 95th Cong.
No
Yes
No
Yes
(1977)
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International
Tax
Authority to
Staff
Information-
Information
Participate in
Authorizing
Deposition
Gathering
Access
Judicial
Investigation
Resolution(s)
Authority
Authority
Authority
Proceedings
2012
H.Res. 567, 113th Cong.
Yes
No
No
No
Terrorist
(2014)
Attack in
H.Res. 5, 114th Cong.
Benghazi
(2015)
President
H.Res. 660, 116th Cong.
Yes
No
No
No
Trump
(2019)
Impeachment
Attack on the
H.Res. 503, 117th Cong.
Yes
No
No
No
U.S. Capitol
(2021)
Source: Congressional Research Service.
Note: More comprehensive compilations of authorities and rules of Senate and House special investigatory
committees can be found in Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Authority and Rules of Senate Special
Investigatory Committees and Other Senate Entities, 1973-97, S.Doc. 105-16, 105th Cong., 1st sess. (1998); and U.S.
Congress, House Committee on Rules, Subcommittee on the Legislative Process, Guidelines for the Establishment
of Select Committees, 98th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983).
Selected Oversight Techniques
Some oversight techniques—such as conducting hearings with agency officials, receiving reports
on agency activities and performance, and scrutinizing budget requests—are relatively
straightforward. There are several techniques for which explanation or elaboration may prove
helpful for a better understanding of their utility.
Identifying Relevant Committee Jurisdiction
A basic step in conducting oversight involves identifying the committee(s) with jurisdiction over
the policy matter or programs of interest. The committee jurisdictional statements in House Rule
X and Senate Rule XXV specify the subjects that fall within each committee’s jurisdiction. In
general, the rules do not address specific departments, agencies, programs, or laws but are stated
in broad subject terms. Therefore, multiple committees may exercise some jurisdiction—
especially in regard to oversight—over the same departments and agencies or over different
elements of the same agency activities. While the House and Senate Parliamentarians are the sole
definitive arbiters of committee jurisdiction, CRS can also assist with the identification of the
relevant committee(s) of jurisdiction for proposed oversight activities.448
Orientation and Periodic Review Hearings with Agencies
Oversight hearings (or even “pre-hearings”) may be held for the purposes of briefing Members
and staff on the organization, operations, and programs of an agency and determining how an
agency intends to implement any newly enacted legislation. Hearings can also be used as a way to
obtain information on the administration, effectiveness, and economy of agency operations and
programs.

448 On House rules governing committee jurisdiction and referral, see CRS Report R46251, Committee Jurisdiction and
Referral in the House, by Mark J. Oleszek. Jurisdiction and referral in the Senate is the subject of CRS Report R46815,
Committee Jurisdiction and Referral in the Senate, by Mark J. Oleszek.
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Agency officials can be noticeably influenced by the knowledge and expectation that they will be
called before a congressional committee regularly to account for the activities of their agencies.
Such hearings benefit the committee by, for example:
 helping committee members keep up to date on important administrative
developments;
 serving as a forum for exchanging and communicating views on pertinent
problems and other relevant matters;
 providing background information that could assist members in making
sound legislative and fiscal judgments;
 identifying program areas within each committee’s jurisdiction that may be
vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement; and
 determining whether new laws are needed or whether changes in the
administration of existing laws will be sufficient to resolve problems.
The ability of committee members during oversight hearings to focus on meaningful issues and
ask penetrating questions will typically be enhanced if staff have accumulated, organized, and
evaluated relevant data, information, and analyses about administrative performance.
A prime objective of the “continuous watchfulness” mandate (Section 136) of the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 is to encourage committees to take an active and ongoing role in
administrative review and not wait for public revelations of agency and program inadequacies
before conducting oversight. As Section 136 states in part: “each standing committee of the
Senate and House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by
the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the
jurisdiction of such committee.”
Committee personnel may be assigned to maintain active liaison with appropriate agencies and
record their pertinent findings routinely. Information compiled in this fashion will typically be
useful for both routine oversight hearings and oversight hearings that may be called unexpectedly,
perhaps following a public outcry on a particular issue in which the opportunity to conduct an
extensive background study is limited.
It can be important for a committee to direct specific questions to agency witnesses in advance of
a hearing so that witnesses will be on notice regarding the kinds of questions the committee wants
answered. This allows witnesses to be more responsive to the committee’s questions and may
limit their ability to provide rambling or evasive statements.
Casework
Casework is a congressional activity that typically occurs in Members’ personal offices and
includes the response or services provided to constituents who request assistance on a wide
variety of matters. These could include problems with various federal agencies and departments
that could signal a need for further oversight. Casework inquiries can be simple and include
requests for assistance in applying for Social Security, veterans’, educational, or other benefits.
More complex inquiries might involve tracking misdirected benefits payments or efforts to
obtain, or seek relief from, a federal administrative decision.449

449 CRS provides a variety of resources to assist congressional offices with casework. These include CRS Report
RL33209, Casework in a Congressional Office: Background, Rules, Laws, and Resources, by R. Eric Petersen and
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Casework inquiries and the efforts of congressional constituent services staff to respond can
provide important insights into executive agency activities. Together, constituent inquiries and
agency responses may afford Members an early warning about whether an agency or program is
functioning as Congress intended and which programs or policies might warrant additional
institutional oversight or further legislative consideration.450
Performance Audits by Inspectors General and GAO
Performance auditing of executive departments is among the most frequently undertaken
techniques of legislative oversight. A performance audit is intended to help Congress (and other
oversight entities) hold executive officers accountable for their use of public funds with a primary
aim to facilitate improvement of various government programs and operations.451 According to
GAO, performance audits aim to accomplish four key objectives:
1. Program effectiveness and results. Determine whether a program or
activity is achieving its legislative, regulatory, or organizational goals and
objectives, as well as whether resources are being used efficiently,
effectively, and economically to achieve program results.
2. Internal control. Determine whether an internal control system for a
program or activity provides reasonable assurance of achieving efficient and
effective operations, reliability of reporting, and compliance with applicable
laws and regulations.
3. Compliance. Determine whether a program or activity complies with criteria
established by laws, regulations, contracts, grant agreements, or other
requirements.
4. Prospective analysis. Identify projected trends and impact of a program or
activity and possible policy alternatives to address them.452
Performance audits may be undertaken by independent auditors (e.g., GAO or inspectors general)
or internal auditors (e.g., agency audit teams or agency-hired consultants). Internal auditors often
work under the direction of their affiliated agencies, and their reports may be designed to meet

Sarah J. Eckman; CRS In Focus IF10503, Constituent Services: Overview and Resources, by Sarah J. Eckman; and
“Casework and Other Constituent Services,” available to congressional offices at https://www.crs.gov/resources/
casework.
450 Larry P. Ortiz et al., “Legislative Casework: When Policy and Practice Intersect,” Journal of Sociology and Social
Welfare, vol. 31 (June 2004), pp. 49-52; Representative Lee H. Hamilton, “Casework,” Congressional Record, vol.
142, (July 24, 1996), pp. 19015-19016; and John R. Johannes, “Casework as a Technique of U.S. Congressional
Oversight of the Executive,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 4 (August 1979), pp. 325-351.
451 GAO’s Government Auditing Standards—also known as the Yellow Book—identifies three types of engagements
that audit agencies may conduct: (1) financial audits, (2) attestation engagements and reviews of financial statements,
and (3) performance audits. See GAO, Government Auditing Standards, 2018 Revision Technical Update April 2021,
GAO-21-368G, pp. 7-14, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-368g.
452 GAO issues government auditing standards—commonly referred to as generally accepted government auditing
standards—as part of the Yellow Book. The Yellow Book includes performance audit standards and objectives.
According to GAO, the four listed categories of performance audit objectives are not mutually exclusive and can be
pursued simultaneously within a single audit engagement. For more information on performance audit objectives and
standards, see GAO, Government Auditing Standards, 2018 Revision Technical Update April 2021, pp. 10-14 and 154-
193.
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the needs of executive officials. Regardless, internal audit reports might be useful in conducting
legislative oversight.453
GAO and other audit entities may consider several questions when assessing government
programs and operations, such as the following:
 How successful is the program in accomplishing the intended results? Could
program objectives be achieved at less cost?
 Has agency management clearly defined and promulgated the objectives and
goals of the program or activity?
 Have performance standards been developed?
 Are program objectives sufficiently clear to permit agency management to
accomplish effectively the desired program results? Are the objectives of the
component parts of the program consistent with overall program objectives?
 Are program costs reasonably commensurate with the benefits achieved?
 Have alternative programs or approaches been examined, or should they be
examined to determine whether objectives can be achieved more
economically?
 Were all studies, such as cost-benefit studies, appropriate for analyzing costs
and benefits of alternative approaches?
 Is the program producing benefits or detriments that were not contemplated
by Congress when it authorized the program?
 Is the information furnished to Congress by the agency adequate and
sufficiently accurate to permit Congress to monitor program achievements
effectively?
 Does top management have the essential and reliable information necessary
for exercising supervision and control and for ascertaining directions or
trends?
 Does management have internal review or audit facilities adequate for
monitoring program operations, identifying program and management
problems and weaknesses, and insuring fiscal integrity?
Monitoring the Federal Register
The Federal Register, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/, is published Monday through
Friday (except official holidays) by the Office of the Federal Register in the National Archives
and Records Administration. It provides a uniform system for making available to the public
regulations and legal notices issued by federal agencies and the President. These include
presidential proclamations and executive orders, federal agency documents having general
applicability and legal effect, documents required to be published by acts of Congress, and other
federal agency documents of public interest. Final regulations are codified by subject in the Code
of Federal Regulations.
Documents are typically on file for public inspection in the Office of the Federal Register for at
least one day before they are published unless the issuing agency requests earlier filing. The list
of documents on file for public inspection can be accessed at https://www.federalregister.gov/

453 Agencies sometimes consider internal audit reports as predecisional and thus not suitable for release to Congress or
the public.
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public-inspection. Regular scrutiny of the Federal Register by committees and staff may help
them to identify proposed rules and regulations in their areas of jurisdiction that merit
congressional review as to need and likely effect.
Monitoring the Unified Agenda
The Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions is a government-wide
publication of rulemaking actions that agencies expect to take in the coming six to 12 months.
The Unified Agenda, which is generally published twice each year, lists upcoming regulatory
actions (i.e., new proposed and final regulations) and deregulatory actions (i.e., reductions in or
elimination of current regulations). The Unified Agenda provides Congress transparency into
federal agencies’ upcoming rulemaking activities—which can be particularly useful given that
most regulatory activities are not made public until they are published in the Federal Register.
The Unified Agenda is available on the website www.Reginfo.gov,454 which is published by the
General Services Administration’s Regulatory Information Service Center. Separate from the
Unified Agenda, Reginfo.gov also has information about Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) review of regulations under Executive Order 12866 and information collection requests
under the Paperwork Reduction Act.455
Special Studies and Investigations by Staff, Support Agencies, and
Others
Staff investigations. The staffs of committees and individual members play a vital role in the
legislative process. Committee staffs, through field investigations or on-site visits, for example,
can help a committee develop its own independent evaluation of the effectiveness of laws.
Support agencies. The legislative support agencies can directly or indirectly assist committees
and members in conducting investigations and reviewing agency performance.456 GAO is the
agency most involved in investigations, audits, and program evaluations. It has a large,
professional investigative staff and produces numerous reports useful in oversight.
Outside contractors, consultants, and detailees. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970
authorized House and Senate committees to contract with individual consultants or organizations
to assist them in their work. Committees may also use federal employees detailed from executive
or legislative branch agencies.457 The use of contractors, consultants, and detailees is subject to
limitations and approvals established in House and Senate rules, guidelines established by the
Committee on House Administration or the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and
rules of individual committees.458
Investigative commissions. Congress has periodically established independent commissions to
conduct studies or to investigate an event, activity, or government function. Commissions are

454 Specifically at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain.
455 For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12118, The Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
Actions: An Overview, by Maeve P. Carey
456 See “Oversight Information Sources and Consultant Services” below (discussing the capabilities of CRS, GAO, and
CBO).
457 2 U.S.C. §4301(i).
458 Ibid.
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typically made up of outside experts and tasked with issuing reports to Congress (or to Congress
and the President) that contain the commission’s findings and recommendations.459
The 9/11 Commission
Congress established the National Commission on Terrorists Attacks Upon the United States (commonly known
as the 9/11 Commission) in November 2002 (P.L. 107-306; 6 U.S.C. §101 note) to “examine and report upon the
facts and causes relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.” The commission, which operated until
August 2004, conducted an extensive and widely watched investigation, including a dozen public hearings, that
culminated in the publication of “The 9/11 Commission Report.” The work of the commission helped bring to
light a variety of information about how the attack was planned and perpetrated, identified factors that kept the
government from stopping the attack, and made recommendations intended to prevent future successful attacks.
In addition to providing what many consider to be a definitive report on the attacks, the 9/11 Commission also
made recommendations that became the basis for the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).
Sources: The Government Publishing Office maintains an archived version of the 9/11 Commission’s website
including the reports, hearing materials, and other information at https://www.9-11commission.gov/.
Communicating with the Media
Public awareness of a problem can contribute to oversight. Public and media attention to an issue
may be considered a separate form of oversight or a complement to other oversight techniques.
Official resources are available to assist Members in interacting with the media and scheduling
press conferences and with the broadcasting of official proceedings. Additionally, nearly all
Members maintain one or more social media accounts and use their institutional websites to help
communicate with constituents and publicize issues.460
Press Gallery Offices
The staff of the House and Senate press galleries provide services for journalists and Members of
Congress. The press galleries can assist Members or staff with the distribution of press releases,
facilitate Member communications with journalists, and help arrange location reservations or
other logistics for press conferences or interviews.461
Within each chamber, separate gallery offices exist for the daily press, periodical press, and
radio/TV press. A single office, serving both chambers, exists for the press photographers’ gallery.
The websites for each gallery are provided in Table 2.
Table 2. Press Gallery Names and Websites
Gallery Name
Website
House Press Gallery
https://pressgallery.house.gov
Senate Press Gallery
https://www.dailypress.senate.gov
Press Photographers’ Gallery
https://www.pressphotographers.senate.gov/

459 For additional information on advisory commissions, see CRS Report R40076, Congressional Commissions:
Overview and Considerations for Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
460 For more information, see CRS Report R45337, Social Media Adoption by Members of Congress: Trends and
Congressional Considerations, by Jacob R. Straus.
461 For additional information on the congressional press galleries, see CRS Report R44816, Congressional News
Media and the House and Senate Press Galleries, by Sarah J. Eckman.
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Gallery Name
Website
House Radio and Television Gallery
http://radiotv.house.gov
Senate Radio and Television Gallery
https://www.radiotv.senate.gov
House Periodical Press Gallery
https://periodical.house.gov
Senate Periodical Press Gallery
http://www.periodicalpress.senate.gov
Source: U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Printing, Official Congressional Directory, 116th Congress.
Resolutions of Inquiry
The House of Representatives can call upon the executive branch for factual information through
resolutions of inquiry (House Rule XIII, clause 7).462 This is a simple resolution considered in and
approved by only the House. Resolutions of inquiry are addressed to either the President or heads
of Cabinet-level agencies to supply specific factual information to the chamber. The resolutions
usually “request” the President or “direct” administrative heads to supply such information. In
calling upon the President for information, especially about foreign affairs, the House often adds
the qualifying language—“if not incompatible with the public interest.” Resolutions of inquiry do
not impose a legally enforceable duty to respond on executive branch officials.463
Such resolutions are one way for Congress to ask for facts, documents, or specific information.
These devices are not to request an opinion or require an investigation (see box below).
Resolutions of inquiry can trigger other congressional methods of obtaining information, such as
through supplemental hearings or the regular legislative process.
Resolutions of Inquiry in Practice
The first resolution of inquiry was approved on March 24, 1796, when the House sought documents in
connection with the Jay Treaty negotiations:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to lay before this House a copy
of the instructions to the minister of the United States, who negotiated the treaty with the
King of Great Britain … together with the correspondence and other documents relative to
the said treaty; excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiation may render
improper to be delivered (Journal of the House of Representatives, 4th Cong., 1st sess., March 24,
1796, p. 480).
A modern illustration occurred on March 1, 1995, when the House adopted H.Res. 80, as amended (104th
Congress, 1st session). The resolution sought information about the Mexican peso crisis at the time and an
Administration plan to use up to $20 bil ion in resources from the Exchange Stabilization Fund to help stabilize the
Mexican currency and financial system. The resolution read: “Resolved, That the President, is hereby requested to
provide the House of Representatives (consistent with the rules of the House), not later than 14 days after the
adoption of this resolution, the fol owing documents in the possession of the executive branch, if not inconsistent
with the public interest.” The House request then specified the matters that the documents were to cover: the
condition of the Mexican economy, consultations between the government of Mexico on the one hand and the
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and/or the International Monetary Fund on the other, market policies and tax
policies of the Mexican government, and repayment agreements between Mexico and the United States, among
other things.

462 For a more detailed discussion of Resolutions of Inquiry see CRS Report R40879, Resolutions of Inquiry: An
Analysis of Their Use in the House, 1947-2017, by Christopher M. Davis.
463CRS Report R40879, Resolutions of Inquiry: An Analysis of Their Use in the House, 1947-2017, by Christopher M.
Davis.
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If all the committees of referral do not report a resolution of inquiry within 14 legislative days
after its introduction, any Representative can move to discharge the panels and bring the
resolution to the floor for consideration. Action by the committees to report the resolution within
the 14 days, however, effectively sidetracks House floor action on the resolution. For this reason,
House committees virtually always mark up and report resolutions of inquiry referred to them,
even when they do not support the goals of the legislation. By reporting the resolution within the
specified 14-day window, a committee of referral retains control over the measure and prevents
supporters of the resolution from going to the floor and making the privileged motion to
discharge.
Limitations and Riders on Appropriations
Congress generally uses a two-step legislative procedure: authorization of programs in bills
reported by legislative committees followed by the funding of those programs in bills reported by
the Committees on Appropriations. Congressional rules generally encourage these two steps to be
distinct and sequential. Authorizations should not be in general appropriation bills or
appropriations in authorization measures. However, there are various exceptions to the general
principle that Congress should not make policy through the appropriations process. One
exception is the practice of permitting “limitations” in an appropriations bill. So-called riders
(language extraneous to the subject of the bill) are also sometimes added to control agency
actions.
Limitations
Although House rules forbid in any general appropriations bill a provision “changing existing
law,” certain “limitations” may be admitted. “Just as the House under its rules may decline to
appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so it may by limitation prohibit the use of the money
for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder of it.”464 Limitations can be an
effective device in oversight by strengthening Congress’s ability to exercise control over federal
spending and to reduce expenditures that Congress believes to be unnecessary or undesirable.
Under House Rule XXI, no provision changing existing law can be reported in any general
appropriation bill “except germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of
amounts of money covered by the bill” (the so-called Holman rule, rarely used in modern
practice).
An Appropriations Limitation
The Hyde Amendment: Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-93, 133 Stat. 2412, Title II,
§202(2019): “None of the funds appropriated by this title shall be available to pay for an abortion, except where
the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or in the case of rape or incest:
Provided, That should this prohibition be declared unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, this
section shall be nul and void.”
Rule XXI was amended in 1983 in an effort to restrict the number of limitations on appropriations
bills. The rule was changed again in 1995 by granting the majority leader a central role in
determining consideration of limitation amendments. The procedures for limitation in the House
are set forth in the House Manual, Sections 1044(b) and 1053-1062.

464 Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H.DOC. NO. 115-177, 115th Cong., 2nd
sess. § 1053 (2019).
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Riders
Unlike limitations, legislative “riders” are extraneous to the subject matter of the bill to which
they are added. Riders appear in both authorization bills and appropriations bills. In the latter
case, such provisions would be subject to a point of order in the House on the grounds that they
are attempts to place legislation in an appropriations bill, although in almost every case, the
procedure used to consider the legislation may restrict Members’ ability to lodge a point of order.
In the Senate, Rule XVI prohibits the addition to general appropriations bills of amendments that
are legislative or non-germane. Both chambers have procedures to waive these prohibitions.
An Appropriations Rider
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, P.L. 109-295 §550, 120 Stat. 1388
(2006): “(a) No later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security
shall issue interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for security of chemical facilities
and requiring vulnerability assessments and the development and implementation of site security plans for
chemical facilities: Provided, That such regulations shall apply to chemical facilities that, in the discretion of the
Secretary, present high levels of security risk: Provided further, That such regulations shall permit each such
facility, in developing and implementing site security plans, to select layered security measures that, in
combination, appropriately address the vulnerability assessment and the risk-based performance standards for
security for the facility: Provided further, That the Secretary may not disapprove a site security plan submitted
under this section based on the presence or absence of a particular security measure, but the Secretary may
disapprove a site security plan if the plan fails to satisfy the risk-based performance standards established by this
section: Provided further, That the Secretary may approve alternative security programs established by private
sector entities, Federal, State, or local authorities, or other applicable laws if the Secretary determines that the
requirements of such programs meet the requirements of this section and the interim regulations: Provided
further, That the Secretary shall review and approve each vulnerability assessment and site security plan required
under this section: Provided further, That the Secretary shall not apply regulations issued pursuant to this section
to facilities regulated pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-295, as amended;
Public Water Systems, as defined by section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, P.L. 93-523, as amended;
Treatment Works as defined in section 212 of the Federal Water Pol ution Control Act, Public Law 92-500, as
amended; any facility owned or operated by the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy, or any
facility subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.”
Legislative Veto and Advance Notice
Many acts of Congress have delegated authority to the executive branch on the condition that
proposed executive actions be submitted to Congress for review and possible disapproval before
they can be put into effect. This way of ensuring continuing oversight of policy areas follows two
paths: the legislative veto and advance notification.
Legislative Veto
Beginning in 1932,465 Congress delegated authority to the executive branch with the condition
that proposed executive actions would be first submitted to Congress and subjected to disapproval
by a committee, a single house, or both houses. Over the years, other types of legislative veto
were added, allowing Congress to control executive branch actions without having to enact a law.
In 1983, the Supreme Court, in INS v. Chadha, ruled that the legislative veto was unconstitutional
on the grounds that all exercises of legislative power that affect the rights, duties, and relations of
persons outside the legislative branch must satisfy the constitutional requirements of

465 Legislative Appropriations Act, 1933, 47 Stat. 382, 414.
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bicameralism and presentment of a bill or resolution to the President for his signature or veto.466
Despite this ruling, Congress has continued to enact proscribed legislative vetoes, and it has also
relied on informal arrangements to provide comparable controls.467
Statutory Legislative Vetoes
Congress responded to Chadha by converting some of the one-house and two-house legislative
vetoes to joint resolutions of approval or disapproval, thus satisfying the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. However, Congress continues to rely on legislative vetoes. Since
the Chadha decision, hundreds of legislative vetoes have been enacted into public law, usually in
appropriations acts. These legislative vetoes are exercised by the Appropriations Committees.
Typically, funds may not be used or an executive action may not begin until the Appropriations
Committees have approved—or, at least, not disapproved—the planned action, often within a
specified time limit.
A Sample Statutory Legislative Veto Provision
Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, 114 Stat. 1356A-2
(2000): For the appropriation account “Transportation Administrative Service Center,” no assessments may be
levied against any program, budget activity, subactivity or project funded by this statute “unless notice of such
assessments and the basis therefore are presented to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and
are approved by such Committees.”
Informal Legislative Vetoes
Unlike a formal legislative veto, where the arrangement is spelled out in the law, the informal
legislative veto occurs where an executive official pledges not to proceed with an activity until
Congress or certain committees agree to it. An example of this appeared during the 101st
Congress. In the “bipartisan accord” on funding the Contras in Nicaragua, the Administration
pledged that no funds would be obligated beyond November 30, 1989, unless affirmed by letter
from the relevant authorization and appropriations committees and the bipartisan leadership of
Congress.468
Advance Notification or Report-and-Wait
Statutory provisions may stipulate that before a particular activity can be undertaken by the
executive branch or funds obligated, Congress must first be advised or informed, ordinarily
through a full written statement, of what is being proposed. These statutory provisions usually
provide for a period of time during which the executive branch must defer action, giving
Congress an opportunity to pass legislation prohibiting the pending action or using political
pressure to cause executive officials to retract or modify the proposed action. The Supreme Court
has upheld this type of “report-and-wait” provision, noting: “The value of the reservation of the
power to examine proposed rules, laws and regulations before they become effective is well
understood by Congress. It is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the
delegation squares with the Congressional purpose.”469

466 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
467 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, “Reassessing the Legislative Veto: The Statutory President, Foreign Affairs, and
Congressional Workarounds,” Journal of Legal Analysis, vol. 13, no. 1 (2021), pp. 439-501.
468 See Bernard Weinraub, “Bush and Congress Sign Policy Accord on Aid to Contras,” New York Times, March 25,
1986, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/25/world/bush-and-congress-sign-policy-accord-on-aid-to-contras.html.
469 Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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A Report-and-Wait Provision
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, P.L. 114-17 §135(b): “During the 30-calendar day period
fol owing transmittal by the President of an agreement pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives shall, as
appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and otherwise obtain information in order to ful y review such agreement
… and during the period for congressional review provided in paragraph (1), including any additional period as
applicable under the exception provided in paragraph (2), the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide
relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of
law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a).”
Independent Counsel
The statutory provisions for the appointment of an independent counsel (formerly called “special
prosecutor”) were originally enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978470 and were
reauthorized on several occasions before expiring in 1999.
The mechanisms of the independent counsel law were triggered by the receipt of information by
the Attorney General that alleged a violation of any federal criminal law (other than certain
misdemeanors or “infractions”) by a person covered by the act. The law automatically covered
certain high-level federal officials—including the President, Vice President, and heads of
departments. In addition, the Attorney General had discretion to seek an independent counsel for
any person for whom there may exist a personal, financial, or political conflict of interest for DOJ
personnel to investigate, and the Attorney General could seek an independent counsel for any
Member of Congress when the Attorney General deemed it to be in the “public interest.” 471
There was no specific term of appointment for independent counsels. They could serve for as
long as it took to complete their duties concerning the specific matter within their defined and
limited jurisdictions. Once a matter was completed, the independent counsel filed a final report.
The Supreme Court upheld the procedures for appointing and removing the independent counsel
in Morrison v. Olson.472
The conduct of an independent counsel was subject to congressional oversight, and an
independent counsel was required to cooperate with that oversight.473 In addition, the independent
counsel was required to report to the House of Representatives any “substantial and credible”
information that may constitute grounds for any impeachment.474
The independent counsel statute expired in 1992, partly because of criticism directed at Lawrence
Walsh’s investigation of Iran-Contra. The statute was reauthorized in 1994, but objections to the
investigations conducted by Kenneth Starr into Whitewater, Monica Lewinsky, and other matters
put Congress under pressure to let the statute lapse on June 30, 1999.
Unless Congress in the future reauthorizes the independent counsel, the only available option for
an independent counsel is to have the Attorney General invoke existing authority to appoint a
special prosecutor to investigate a particular matter. Current DOJ regulations provide for the

470 These provisions were codified at 28 U.S.C. §§591-599.
471 For additional information, see CRS Report R44857, Special Counsel Investigations: History, Authority,
Appointment and Removal, by Jared P. Cole.
472 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
473 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(1).
474 28 U.S.C. § 595(c).
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appointment of outside, temporary special counsels to conduct investigations and possible
prosecutions of certain sensitive matters or matters that may raise a conflict for the DOJ.475 Such
special counsels would have substantially less independence than the statutory independent
counsel, including removal for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or
for other good cause, including violation of Department policies.”
These special counsel rules have been invoked in at least two recent and high-profile cases. First,
in May 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed former FBI director Robert
Mueller as special counsel to investigate the Russian government’s efforts to “influence the 2016
election and related matters.”476 Then, in October 2020, Attorney General Bill Barr appointed
John Durham, then-U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut, to investigate “intelligence and
law-enforcement activities surrounding the 2016 presidential election.”477
Reporting, Testimony, Notice, and Consultation, Requirements
Congressional oversight of the executive branch is dependent to a large degree upon information
supplied by agencies. Congress has developed a number of tools—including reporting and notice
requirements, statutory testimony requirements, and consultation requirements—to help ensure
Congress and the public are aware of executive branch activities.478 The bulk of this information
arrives on Capitol Hill in the thousands of written reports that are prepared by agencies and
received by Congress on an annual basis.479
Concerns about unnecessary, duplicative, and wasteful reports have prompted efforts to
reexamine these requirements.480 One such initiative, in part stimulated by recommendations from
the Vice President’s National Performance Review and from the GAO, resulted in the Federal
Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995. In 2010, Congress established a statutory process
that allows executive agencies and the President to more systematically propose the elimination
or modification of reporting requirements.481
Reporting Requirements
Reporting requirements affect executive and administrative agencies and officers, including the
President, independent boards and commissions, and federally chartered corporations (as well as
the judiciary). These statutory provisions vary in terms of the specificity, detail, and type of

475 28 C.F.R. Part 600.
476 Office of Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian
Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
appointment-special-counsel.
477 Office of Attorney General, Order No. 4878-2020, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Matters Related
to the Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out of the 2016 Presidential Campaigns (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1370931/download.
478 See Congress Evolving in the Face of Complexity: Legislative Efforts to Embed Transparency, Participation, and
Representation in Agency Operations, by Clinton T. Brass and Wendy Ginsberg, in CRS Committee Print CP10000,
The Evolving Congress: A Committee Print Prepared for the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,
coordinated by Walter J. Oleszek, Michael L. Koempel, and Robert Jay Dilger.
479 A 2020 CRS study identified 3,359 reporting requirements enacted during the 115th Congress. CRS Report R46357,
Congressionally Mandated Reports: Overview and Considerations for Congress, by William T. Egar (archived).
480 For discussion, see the 2013 CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual
Process Under the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), by Clinton T. Brass.
481CRS Report R42490, Reexamination of Agency Reporting Requirements: Annual Process Under the GPRA
Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA), by Clinton T. Brass.
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information that Congress demands.482 Reports may be required at periodic intervals, such as
semiannually or at the end of a fiscal year, or submitted only if or when a specific event, activity,
or set of conditions exists.483 The reports may also call upon one or more agencies, commissions,
or officers to:
 study and provide recommendations about a particular problem or concern;
 alert Congress or particular committees and subcommittees about a proposed
or planned activity or operation;
 provide information about specific ongoing or just-completed operations,
projects, or programs; or
 summarize an agency’s activities for the year or the prior six months.
Examples of Reporting Requirements in Law
Early Requirement in the 1789 Treasury Department Act:
“That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury … to make report, and give information to either
branch of the legislature, in person or in writing (as he may be required), respecting all matters referred to him by
the Senate or House of Representatives, or which shall appertain to his office” (1 Stat. 65-66 (1789)).
Reporting on support for air carriers in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act:
“(a) REPORT.—Not later than November 1, 2020, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives and
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs of the Senate a report on the financial assistance provided to air carriers and contractors under this
subtitle, including a description of any financial assistance provided.
(b) UPDATE.—Not later than the last day of the 1-year period fol owing the date of enactment of this Act, the
Secretary shall update and submit to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate the report described in
subsection (a).” (134 Stat. 501 (2020)).
Testimony Requirements
Congress has established statutory requirements for certain executive branch officials to appear
and provide testimony before identified committees.484 At least two such provisions date to
1976,485 and many testimony requirements have been enacted since 2007, particularly in
legislation responding to the financial crisis.486 Recently, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security (CARES) Act included requirements that the Secretary of the Treasury and

482 For more information, see CRS Report R46661, Strategies for Identifying Reporting Requirements and Submitted
Reporting to Congress, by Kathleen E. Marchsteiner.
483 See CRS Report R46862, How Are Reporting Requirements Submitted to Congress?, by Kathleen E. Marchsteiner.
484 CRS is aware of approximately 25 such requirements under current law. See CRS Report R47288, Statutory
Testimony Requirements: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ben Wilhelm.
485 Title 7, Section 228(c), of the U.S. Code requires the Secretary of Agriculture to testify annually on the department’s
budget before the Agriculture Committees, and Title 39, Section 2401(e), requires the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)—the
specific official is not identified—to appear annually before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform regarding the agency’s annual budget.
486 For example, Title 12, Section 5496(a), requires the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to appear
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce on a semiannual basis.
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the chair of the Federal Reserve Board testify on a quarterly basis before the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Financial Services.487
Notice and Prior Consultation
Congress sometimes includes provisions in law or language in committee reports that requires or
directs agencies to consult with Congress or other stakeholders before taking certain actions.
These requirements can inform Congress and the public about agencies’ plans and activities. In
addition, the provisions may create opportunities for Congress and nonfederal stakeholders to
influence an agency’s decisionmaking in areas such as reallocation of budgetary resources
through reprogramming,488 notice-and-comment rulemaking,489 and establishment of goals.490
A Sample Prior Consultation Provision
A provision in the conference committee report on the 1978 Ethics in Government Act il ustrates this
development: “The conferees expect the Attorney General to consult with the Judiciary Committees of both
Houses of Congress before substantially expanding the scope of authority or mandate of the Public Integrity
Section of the Criminal Division” (emphasis added).
Statutory Oversight Enablers
Congress has passed a number of laws designed to provide additional information to Congress
(and the public) on the operations of the executive branch. These laws also add controls that may
reduce the demands on Congress’s time by shifting responsibility for some routine monitoring to
professionals in the executive branch.
Many such laws include reporting requirements or other provisions that involve public
participation. Some illustrative examples are included below, along with citations to when they
were originally enacted.491
Direct Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Authority
A number of laws directly augment and safeguard Congress’s authority, mandate, and resources
to conduct oversight and legislative investigations. Pertinent statutes affect congressional
proceedings, such as obstruction (18 U.S.C. §1505), false statements by witnesses (18 U.S.C.
§1001(c)(2)), and contempt procedures (2 U.S.C. §§192, 194). Some other relevant laws are
discussed below.
 1912 anti-gag legislation and whistleblower protection laws for federal
employees:
 The Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912 (5 U.S.C. §7211) countered executive
orders issued by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft
that prohibited civil service employees from communicating directly with

487 P.L. 116-136, §4026.
488 CRS Report R43098, Transfer and Reprogramming of Appropriations: An Overview of Authorities, Limitations, and
Procedures, by Michelle D. Christensen.
489 CRS Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey.
490 CRS Report R42379, Changes to the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA): Overview of the New
Framework of Products and Processes, by Clinton T. Brass.
491 Many of the laws were codified in the U.S. Code, sometimes in one place and other times across a number of
locations, and subsequently amended.
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Congress. It also guaranteed that “the right of any persons employed in the
civil service … to petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish
information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member
thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.”
 The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-12, 5 U.S.C. ch. 12)
makes it a prohibited personnel practice for an agency employee to take any
action against an employee that is in retaliation for disclosure of information
that the employee believes relates to violation of law, rule, or regulation or
evidences gross mismanagement, waste, fraud, or abuse of authority (5
U.S.C. §2302(b)(8)). The prohibition is explicitly intended to protect
disclosures to Congress: “This subsection shall not be construed to authorize
the withholding of information from Congress or the taking of any personnel
action against an employee who discloses information to Congress.”
 The Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act (P.L. 105-272)
establishes special procedures for personnel in the Intelligence Community to
transmit urgent concerns involving classified information to inspectors
general and the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.
 Section 713 of Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L.
116-260), prohibits the payment of the salary of any officer or employee of
the federal government who prohibits, prevents, attempts, or threatens to
prohibit or prevent any other federal officer or employee from having direct
oral or written communication or contact with any Member, committee, or
subcommittee. This prohibition applies irrespective of whether such
communication was initiated by such officer or employee or in response to
the request or inquiry of such Member, committee, or subcommittee. Further,
any punishment or threat of punishment because of any contact or
communication by an officer or employee with a Member, committee, or
subcommittee is prohibited under the provisions of this act.
 Section 743 of Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L.
116-260), prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for use in
implementing or enforcing agreements in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of
the government or any other nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement if such
policy, form, or agreement does not contain a provision that states that the
restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or
otherwise alter the employee obligation, rights, and liabilities created by:
 Executive Order 12958;492 the Lloyd-La Follette Act (5 U.S.C. §7211);
the Military Whistleblower Act (10 U.S.C. §1034);
 the Whistleblower Protection Act (5 U.S.C. §2303(b)(8));
 the Intelligence Identities Protection Act (50 U.S.C. §§421 et seq.);
 and U.S. Code Title 18, Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 and Title
50, Section 783(b).
 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-13)

492 Executive Order 12958 was promulgated by President Bill Clinton on April 20, 1995, and established the
classification system for national security information.
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 Established GAO (which was then named the General Accounting Office) as
“independent of the executive departments and under the control and
direction of the Comptroller General of the United States.”
 Granted authority to the Comptroller General to “investigate, at the seat of
government or elsewhere, all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement,
and application of public funds.”
 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-601):
 Mandated House and Senate committees to exercise “continuous
watchfulness” of the administration of laws and programs under their
jurisdiction.
 Authorized, for the first time in history, permanent professional and clerical
staff for committees.
 Authorized and directed the Comptroller General to make administrative
management analyses of each executive branch agency.
 Established the Legislative Reference Service, renamed the Congressional
Research Service by the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (see below), as
a separate department in the Library of Congress. It called upon the service
“to advise and assist any committee of either House or joint committee in the
analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of any legislative proposal … and
otherwise to assist in furnishing a basis for the proper determination of
measures before the committee.”
 Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-577):
 Required that House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over grants-
in-aid conduct studies of the programs under which grants-in-aid are made.
 Provided that studies of these programs are to determine whether (1) their
purposes have been met, (2) their objectives could be carried on without
further assistance, (3) they are adequate to meet needs, and (4) any changes
in programs or procedures should be made.
 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-510):
 Revised and rephrased in more explicit language the oversight function of
House and Senate standing committees: “each standing committee shall
review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and
execution of those laws or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within
the jurisdiction of that committee.”
 Required most House and Senate committees to issue biennial oversight
reports.
 Strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities and other authorities
and duties of the GAO.
 Re-designated the Legislative Reference Service as the Congressional
Research Service, strengthening its policy analysis role and expanding its
other responsibilities to Congress.
 Recommended that House and Senate committees ascertain whether
programs within their jurisdictions could be appropriated for annually.
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 Required most House and Senate committees to include in their committee
reports on legislation five-year cost estimates for carrying out the proposed
programs.
 Increased by two the number of permanent staff for each standing committee,
including provisions for minority party hiring, and provided for hiring of
consultants by standing committees.
 Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-463):
 Directed House and Senate committees to make continuing reviews of the
activities of each advisory committee under their jurisdictions.
 The studies are to determine whether (1) such committee should be abolished
or merged with any other advisory committee, (2) its responsibility should be
revised, and (3) it performs a necessary function not already being
performed.493
 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344):
 Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight. Permitted
committees to appraise and evaluate programs themselves “or by contract, or
(to) require a Government agency to do so and furnish a report thereon to the
Congress.”
 Directed the Comptroller General to “review and evaluate the results of
Government programs and activities” on his or her own initiative or at the
request of either House or any standing or joint committee and to assist
committees in analyzing and assessing program reviews or evaluation
studies. Authorized GAO to establish an Office of Program Review and
Evaluation to carry out these responsibilities.
 Strengthened GAO’s role in acquiring fiscal, budgetary, and program-related
information.
 Established House and Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO). The CBO director is authorized to “secure
information, data, estimates, and statistics directly from the various
departments, agencies, and establishments” of the government.
 Required any House or Senate legislative committee report on a public bill or
resolution to include an analysis (prepared by CBO) providing an estimate
and comparison of costs that would be incurred in carrying out the bill during
the next and following four fiscal years in which it would be effective.
 Public Debt Limit Increase of 2010 (P.L. 111-139):
 Required the Comptroller General to conduct routine investigations to
identify programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives with duplicative goals
and activities within departments and government-wide and report annually
to Congress on the findings, including the cost of such duplication.
 GAO Access and Oversight Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-3):
 Authorized GAO to obtain federal agency records, including through civil
actions, required to discharge GAO’s audit, evaluation, and investigative
duties.

493 86 Stat. 771 (1972).
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 Provided that no provision of the Social Security Act shall be construed to
limit, amend, or supersede GAO’s authority to obtain information or inspect
records about an agency’s duties, powers, activities, organization, or
financial transactions.
 Required agency statements on actions taken or planned in response to GAO
recommendations to be submitted to the congressional committees with
jurisdiction over the pertinent agency program or activity.
Indirect Expansions of Congress’s Oversight Capabilities
Separate from expanding Congress’s own authority and resources directly, Congress has
strengthened its oversight capabilities indirectly by establishing ongoing processes and
institutions through which other actors may track developments and identify issues that merit
Congress’s attention. Some scholars have characterized this as “fire alarm” oversight.494 From
this perspective, it is possible that
the bureaucracy might not pursue Congress’s goals. But citizens and interest groups can be
counted on to sound an alarm in most cases in which the bureaucracy has arguably violated
Congress’s goals. Then Congress can intervene to rectify the violation. Congress has not
necessarily relinquished legislative responsibility to anyone else. It has just found a more
efficient way to legislate.495
Congress has done this, for instance, by establishing study commissions to review and evaluate
programs, policies, and operations of the government. In addition, Congress has created various
mechanisms, structures, and procedures within the executive branch that improve the ability of
the public and interested stakeholders to monitor activities of the President and executive
agencies and, at the same time, provide additional information and oversight-related analyses to
Congress. In some cases, Congress has created oversight processes within the executive branch in
which actors in agencies are statutorily required to exercise oversight over certain activities and
make information known to Congress and the public. These statutory provisions include, but are
not limited to, the following:496
 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990, as Amended (P.L. 101-576, 31
U.S.C. §§901 et seq.):
 Created two new posts within OMB along with a new position of chief
financial officer in each of the larger executive agencies, including all
Cabinet departments.
 Provided for improvements in agency systems of accounting, financial
management, and internal controls to ensure reliable financial information
and to deter fraud as well as the waste and abuse of government resources.
 Required production of complete, reliable, timely, and consistent financial
information for use by both the executive branch and Congress in the
financing, management, and evaluation of federal programs.

494 See McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. 175.
495 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked,” p. [?].
496 Many of these statutes are discussed in CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, by
Clinton T. Brass et al. (available to congressional clients upon request). For an analysis of themes that cut across these
statutes, see CRS Report RL32388, General Management Laws: Major Themes and Management Policy Options, by
Clinton T. Brass. See also Brass and Ginsberg, “Congress Evolving in the Face of Complexity.”
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 Required most executive branch entities to submit audited financial
statements annually.
 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) (P.L. 103-62), as
Amended by the GPRA Modernization Act (GPRAMA) (P.L. 111-352, 31
U.S.C. §1101 note)
 Requires agencies to create strategic plans that specify general goals and
objectives for agencies based on the basic missions and underlying statutory
or other authority of an agency. These plans, initially required in 1997, are to
be developed in consultation with relevant congressional offices and with
information from “stakeholders” and then submitted to Congress. Agencies
may update plans if circumstances change.
 Directs agencies, based on their strategic plans, to set annual performance
goals and to measure the results of their programs in achieving these goals.
The annual plans outlining these goals are also available to Congress.
 Requires each agency to issue yearly follow-up reports assessing the
implementation of its annual plan. These are required to be submitted after
the end of the fiscal year.
 Requires the executive branch to develop a federal government performance
plan and priority goals under the direction of OMB. These are to include
“outcome-oriented goals covering a limited number of crosscutting policy
areas; and goals for management improvements needed across the Federal
Government.”
 Congressional Review Act (P.L. 104-121)
 Established a special set of parliamentary procedures by which Congress can
consider legislation to disapprove federal rules and regulations.497 Congress
has legislative authority over federal regulations, which agencies issue
pursuant to statutory delegations of authority. The act provided tools
allowing Congress to expedite that legislative authority.
 Required any agency promulgating a covered rule to report to each house of
Congress and the Comptroller General containing specific information about
the rule before it can go into effect.
 Established that rules designated by OMB as “major” may normally not go
into effect until at least 60 days after submission, while non-major rules may
become effective “as otherwise allowed in law,” usually 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register.
 Subjected all covered rules to fast-track disapproval by passage of a joint
resolution, even if they have already gone into effect, for a period of at least
60 days. Upon enactment of such a joint resolution, no new rule that is
“substantially the same” as the disapproved rule may be issued unless it is
specifically authorized by a law enacted subsequent to the disapproval of the
original rule.
 Established that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission” under the
act shall be subject to judicial review.

497 For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report R43992, The Congressional Review Act (CRA): Frequently Asked
Questions, by Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis; and CRS In Focus IF10023, The Congressional Review Act
(CRA), by Maeve P. Carey and Christopher M. Davis.
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 Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-13, 44 U.S.C. ch. 35)
 Authorized OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to
develop and administer uniform information policies to ensure the
availability and accuracy of agency data collection and provided for
congressional oversight including the requirement for Senate confirmation of
OIRA’s administrator.
 Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982 (P.L. 97-255)
 Strengthened internal management and financial controls, accounting
systems, and financial reports. The law required the internal accounting
systems to be consistent with standards prescribed by the Comptroller
General, including a requirement that all assets be safeguarded against waste,
fraud, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation.498
 Provided for ongoing evaluations of the internal control and accounting
systems that protect federal programs against waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.
 Mandated that the head of each agency report annually to the President and
Congress on the condition of these systems and on agency actions to correct
any material weakness that the reports identify.
 FMFIA is also related to the CFO Act (P.L. 101-576), which calls upon the
director of OMB to submit a financial management status report to
appropriate congressional committees.499 Part of this report is to be a
summary of reports on internal accounting and administrative control
systems as required by FMFIA.
 Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106, 40 U.S.C. §§11101 et seq.)
 Changed how agencies invest in information technology by giving more
responsibility to individual agencies and revoking the primary role that the
General Services Administration (GSA) had played previously.
 Established the position of chief information officer in federal agencies to
provide relevant advice to agency heads.
 Federal Advisory Committee Act (P.L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C. Appendix)500
 Established the first requirements for the management and oversight of
federal advisory committees to ensure impartial and relevant expertise. As
required by the act, GSA administers and provides management guidelines
for advisory committees.
 GSA maintains a specialized, federal government, interagency, information-
sharing database that collects data on federal advisory committee activities
government-wide and is publicly available on the web at
http://www.facadatabase.gov.

498 For an expanded introduction to federal financial management, see CRS In Focus IF11610, Federal Financial and
Budgetary Reporting: A Primer, by Dominick A. Fiorentino; and CRS In Focus IF11620, The Office of Federal
Financial Management: An Overview, by Dominick A. Fiorentino.
499 See CRS Insight IN11495, The Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990: 30th Anniversary and Potential Issues
for Congress, by Dominick A. Fiorentino and Clinton T. Brass.
500 For more information, see CRS Report R44253, Federal Advisory Committees: An Introduction and Overview, by
Meghan M. Stuessy.
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 Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act (FFATA), as Amended
by the Digital Accountability and Transparency (DATA) Act (P.L. 109-282,
31 U.S.C. §6101 note)
 Under FFATA, OMB established USAspending.gov a searchable, free, and
public website that enables anyone to go online to find information about
most federal grants, loans, and contracts.501
 Subsequently, Congress significantly amended FFATA with passage of the
DATA Act (P.L. 113-101). The amended version of FFATA directed the
Secretary of the Treasury and director of OMB to establish government-wide
financial data standards and required online reporting of extensive data on
budget execution.
Statutory Offices of Inspector General
Congress created statutory inspectors general (IGs) to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within
designated federal departments and agencies.502 To execute their missions, offices of inspector
general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations, among other duties. By law, OIGs
are nonpartisan, independent offices, and 75 statutory OIGs currently exist in more than 70
federal entities, including departments, agencies, boards, commissions, and government-
sponsored enterprises in both the legislative and executive branches.503 While IGs are organized
within agencies, they have explicit duties to report directly to Congress on their work and
frequently conduct audits and investigations requested by Members or committees or required by
statute.
Inspector General Act of 1978
The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (IG Act)504 governs the majority of IGs. The IG
Act originally created OIGs in 12 “federal establishments” and provided the blueprint for IG
authorities and responsibilities.505 The IG Act has been substantially amended three times since its
enactment, as described below.
4. The Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988 (P.L. 100-504) expanded the
number of OIGs in federal establishments and created a new set of IGs in
“designated federal entities” (DFEs). The act also established separate

501 Two federal government websites resulted from the enactment of FFATA. USAspending.gov, at
http://www.usaspending.gov/, includes spending data for contracts, grants, direct payments, insurance, and
loans/guarantees. The FFATA Search Portal, at http://www.ffata.org/ffata/, contains information about contracts and
grants.
502 For more information on statutory IGs, see CRS Report R45450, Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal
Government: A Primer, by Ben Wilhelm.
503 Three other IG posts are recognized in public law: for the Departments of the Air Force (10 U.S.C. §8020), Army
(10 U.S.C. §3020), and Navy (10 U.S.C. §5020). This report does not examine these offices because they have a
significantly different history, set of authorities, operational structure, and degree of independence compared to other
statutory IGs.
504 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act).
505 P.L. 95-452. Two IGs whose origins pre-dated the IG Act served as models: in 1976, in the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare—now Health and Human Services (P.L. 94-505)—and in 1977, in the then-new Department of
Energy (P.L. 95-91). The IG Act establishes OIGs in many federal agencies and defines the IG as the head of each of
these offices. The act assigns to the IG specific duties and authorities, including the authority “to select, appoint, and
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for carrying out the functions, powers, and duties of the
Office.” See 5 U.S.C. Appendix (IG Act) §6(a)(7).
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appropriations accounts for IGs in federal establishments and added to the annual
reporting obligations of all IGs and agency heads.
5. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-409) established a new
Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE);
established salary, bonus, and award provisions; added budget protections for
OIGs; required OIG websites to include all completed audits and reports; and
amended IG removal requirements and reporting obligations.
6. The Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-317) aimed to
enhance IGs’ access to agency records; vested CIGIE with new coordination
responsibilities regarding audits and investigations that span multiple IG
jurisdictions; amended the membership and investigatory procedures of CIGIE’s
Integrity Committee; and required IGs to submit documents containing
recommendations for corrective action to affiliated agency heads, congressional
committees of jurisdiction, and others upon request.
Purpose and Role
Pursuant to the IG Act, the principal purposes of IGs include:
 conducting and supervising audits and investigations related to agency
programs and operations;
 providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies for
activities designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and
the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs and
operations; and
 keeping the agency head and Congress fully and currently informed about
problems and deficiencies relating to such programs and the necessity for and
progress of corrective action.506
To carry out their purposes, the IG Act grants covered IGs broad authority to:
 conduct audits and investigations;
 access directly the records and information related to agency programs and
operations;
 request assistance from other federal, state, and local government agencies;
 subpoena information and documents and administer oaths when conducting
interviews;
 hire staff and manage their own resources;
 receive and respond to complaints from agency employees, whose identities
are to be protected;
 appoint Whistleblower Protection Coordinators to educate staff on options
and protections for whistleblowers;507 and

506 IG Act, §2. IGs not covered by the IG Act generally have similar or identical purposes, although some IG missions
may vary. For more information see CRS Report R45450, Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A
Primer, by Ben Wilhelm.
507 IG Act, §3(d)(1)(C).
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 implement the cash incentive award program in their agencies for employee
disclosures of waste, fraud, and abuse.508
Notwithstanding these authorities, IGs are not authorized to take corrective action themselves.
Moreover, the IG Act prohibits the transfer of “program operating responsibilities” to an IG.509
Types and Categories
Currently, 74 statutory IGs exist in the federal government.510 Of these IGs, the IG Act authorized
64, and individual statutes outside the IG Act govern the remaining 10. Statutory IGs may be
grouped into four different types based on authorizing statute, appointment method, affiliated
federal entity and the branch of government in which it is located, oversight jurisdiction, and
oversight duration.511 These types are Establishment IGs, who are nominated by the President and
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate; Designated Federal Entity IGs, who are
appointed by agency leaders; Special IGs, who are appointed to conduct oversight of a particular
topic; and other permanent IGs whose authority comes from statutes other than the IG Act.512
Authorities and Responsibilities
As mentioned previously, the IG Act vests establishment IGs and DFE IGs with many authorities
and responsibilities to carry out their respective missions. Several of these authorities and
responsibilities are described in more detail below.513
Oversight Jurisdiction
Typically, the jurisdiction of an IG includes only the programs, operations, and activities of a
single affiliated entity and its components. In some cases, one IG operates for multiple federal
entities.514 For example, the IG of the Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve System was
given jurisdiction over the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which the Dodd-Frank Wall

508 5 U.S.C. §4512. IGs operating under their own statutory authorities may have similar or identical authorities to those
covered by the IG Act, although some IGs may have additional authorities or be prohibited from exercising the
authorities listed in this report.
509 IG Act, §§8G(b), 9(a)(2). One rationale for this proscription is that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for IGs to
audit or investigate programs and operations impartially and objectively if they were directly involved in carrying them
out.
510 Some now-defunct statutory IGs have been abolished or transferred either when their parent agencies met the same
fate or when superseded by another OIG. For example, the OIG in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI)—which operated under the full discretionary authority of the DNI (P.L. 108-458)—was supplanted by the IG of
the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-259, §405) established the new
Intelligence Community IG post with substantially broader authority, jurisdiction, and independence than the previous
IG.
511 IGs can be grouped in a variety of ways based on several criteria. IGs could be categorized into types other than
those listed here based on a different set of criteria.
512 See CRS Report R45450, Statutory Inspectors General in the Federal Government: A Primer, by Ben Wilhelm.
513 In general, the authorities and responsibilities of IGs operating outside of the IG Act are beyond the scope of this
report and can differ from those governed by the act. In certain cases, such differences are significant. In addition,
unique statutory authorities and responsibilities for some IGs covered by the IG Act are also out of scope. Many IGs
covered by the IG Act have been provided additional, unique responsibilities and powers on a selective basis.
514 IG Act, §§2, 8G(g)(1), 12(2). For more information on IG oversight jurisdiction, see CRS Report R43814, Federal
Inspectors General: History, Characteristics, and Recent Congressional Actions, by Michael Greene and Ben Wilhelm.
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Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act515 established as an “independent bureau” in the
Federal Reserve System. In other cases, multiple IGs operate for a single federal entity. For
example, two statutory IGs operate for the Department of the Treasury—one IG to oversee
department-wide programs and operations and one IG (U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration) to oversee the programs and operations of the Internal Revenue Service.
Reporting Requirements
IGs have various reporting obligations to Congress, the Attorney General, agency head(s), and the
public. One such obligation is to report suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and
expeditiously to the Attorney General.516 IGs are also required to report semiannually about their
activities, findings, and recommendations to the agency heads, who must submit the IGs’ reports
to Congress, unaltered, within 30 days.517 These semiannual reports are to be made available to
the public within 60 days of their submission to Congress.518 IGs are also to report “particularly
serious or flagrant problems” immediately to the agency heads, who must submit the IG reports to
Congress within seven days.519 The majority of statutory IGs have also elected to participate in
Oversight.gov, a central repository for OIG reports that was established in 2017.520
Finding Inspector General Materials Online
The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) manages two webpages that provide a
variety of information on the activities of IG offices and the operations of the IG community.

Oversight.gov includes a searchable database of published IG reports going back to at least 2015 for most
IG offices. In addition, Oversight.gov includes additional information on the IG community, including
recommendation tracking, analytics related to IG productivity, and regular updates on IG vacancies.

IGNet.gov includes information on IG community activities. Among other things, IGNet.gov includes general
information on the IG Act and IG community; a number of manuals, guides, and standards for investigations
and audits; and a directory of contact information, including websites, for all IG offices.
Independence
Under the IG Act, IGs are to be selected without regard to political affiliation and solely on the
basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial and management
analysis, law, public administration, or investigations.521 IGs have broad authorities and

515 P.L. 111-203, §§1011, 1081(1)-(2).
516 IG Act, §4(d).
517 IG Act, §5(a), (b). The agency head may include additional comments when the IG submits the semiannual report to
Congress.
518 IG Act, §5(c).
519 IG Act, §5(d). This is commonly referred to as the “Seven Day Letter.” More broadly, IGs are to keep the agency
head and Congress “fully and currently informed” by means of the required reports and “otherwise.” See IG Act,
§4(a)(5). Again, the agency head may not alter the IG’s report but may attach additional comments.
520 Establishment of, and participation in, Oversight.gov is not statutorily required. A list of participating OIGs is
available at CIGIE, “About Oversight.gov,” https://oversight.gov/about. For more information on Oversight.gov, see
CRS Insight IN10752, Inspector General Community Launches Oversight.gov to Increase Accessibility to Reports, by
Ben Wilhelm.
521 IG Act, §§3(a), 8G(c).
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protections to support and reinforce their independence, such as the authority to hire their own
staff and access all records related to the programs and operations of their affiliated entities.522
IGs also determine the priorities and projects for their offices without outside direction in most
cases. An IG may decide to conduct a review requested by the agency head, the President,
Congress, agency employees, or others. They are not obligated to do so, however, unless required
by law.523 IGs serve under the “general supervision” of the agency head, reporting exclusively to
the head or to the officer next in rank if such authority is delegated.524 Additionally all
establishment and DFE IGs formulate their own budget estimates, which are provided to
Congress as part of the President’s budget,525 and establishment IGs receive their appropriations
in separate budget accounts from the agencies in which they operate.526
Appointment and Removal Methods
Appointment and removal procedures vary among statutory IGs. Establishment IGs are appointed
and removable by the President. When exercising removal authority, the President must
communicate the reasons to Congress in writing 30 days prior to the scheduled removal date.527 A
DFE IG, by contrast, is appointed and can be removed by the agency head, who must also notify
Congress in writing 30 days in advance when exercising the removal authority.528 In cases where
a board or commission is considered the DFE head, removal of a DFE IG requires the written
concurrence of a two-thirds majority of the board or commission members.529 The U.S. Postal
Service (USPS) IG is the only IG that can be removed only “for cause,” and then only by the
written concurrence of at least seven of the nine presidentially appointed governors of USPS.530
Presidential Removal of IGs
The President has been authorized to remove presidentially appointed IGs since the creation of the IG system in
1978 (IG Act, P.L. 95-452). Prior to 2008, there were no statutory conditions on the President’s exercise of this
authority. The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-409) required the President to provide notice to

522 For more information on IG authorities, see IG Act, §§4, 6.
523 The heads of eight agencies—the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and the Treasury plus the
USPS, Federal Reserve Board, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the DNI—are explicitly authorized to
prevent or halt the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation or issuing a subpoena, and
then only for certain reasons: to preserve national security interests or to protect ongoing criminal investigations,
among a few others. See IG Act, §§8, 8D(a), 8E(a), 8G(f), 8G(g)(3), 8G(f)(3)(A),8I(a); 50 U.S.C. §§3033(f)(1),
3517(b)(3). In addition, the Secretary of Energy may prevent the Department of Energy IG from accessing certain
information related to the department’s nuclear activities. See IG Act, §8N. When exercising this power, the governing
statute generally provides for congressional notification of the exercise of such authority.
524 IG Act, §§3(a), 8G(d).
525 IG Act, §§6(g), 8G(g)(1).
526 31 U.S.C. §1105(a)(25).
527 IG Act, §3(a)-(b). This advance notice allows the IG, Congress, or other interested parties to examine, and possibly
object to, the planned removal.
528 IG Act, §8G(c) and (e). Differences arise over who is considered the “head of the agency” in a DFE. The agency
head may be (1) an individual serving as the administrator or director or as spelled out in law (e.g., the Archivist of the
United States in the National Archives and Records Administration); (2) the chairperson of a board or commission, a
full board, or council as specified in law (e.g., the National Council on the Arts in the National Endowment for the
Arts); or (3) a certain supermajority of a governing board. See IG Act, §§8G(f)(1)-(2) and (4)). For USPS, for instance,
the USPS governors appoint the IG.
529 IG Act, §8G(e)(1).
530 39 U.S.C. §202(e)(3).
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Congress 30 days prior to the removal of an IG. While this provision gives Congress early notice and an
opportunity to respond to the removal of an IG, it does not create any special mechanism for Congress to
overturn the President’s decision. While IG removal has been an issue in the past (for instance in 2009 when
President Obama removed the IG for the Corporation for National and Community Service, Gerald Walpin), it
received renewed attention in spring 2020 when President Trump removed the IGs for the Intelligence
Community and Department of State and replaced the acting IGs for the Departments of Defense and
Transportation with other officials.
Sources: CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10476, Presidential Removal of IGs Under the Inspector General Act, by Todd Garvey;
and CRS In Focus IF11546, Removal of Inspectors General: Rules, Practice, and Considerations for Congress, by Ben
Wilhelm.
Coordination and Oversight
Coordination among the IGs and oversight of their actions exists through several channels,
including interagency bodies created by public law or administrative directive:531
 CIGIE. CIGIE is the primary coordinating body for statutory IGs.532 Among
other things, CIGIE is intended to aid in coordination among IGs and
maintain programs and resources to train and professionalize OIG
personnel.533 CIGIE includes all statutory IGs along with other relevant
officers, such as a representative of the FBI and the special counsel of the
Office of Special Counsel.534 The CIGIE chair is an IG chosen from within
its ranks, while the executive chair is the OMB deputy director of
management.535
 CIGIE Integrity Committee. The CIGIE Integrity Committee—the sole
statutory committee of the council—plays a lead role in addressing
allegations of IG wrongdoing. The committee receives, reviews, and refers
for investigation alleged misconduct by the IG or OIG according to processes
and procedures detailed in the IG Act.536 The committee is composed of six
members—four IGs on the full council, the FBI representative on the
council, and the director of the Office of Government Ethics. The committee
chairperson is elected to a two-year term by the members of the
committee.537
 Other coordinative bodies. Other interagency mechanisms have been
created by law or administrative directive to assist coordination among IGs.
For example, Congress established a lead IG for overseas contingency
operations—a formal role assigned to one of three IGs (Department of
Defense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International
Development) to coordinate comprehensive oversight of program and

531 For more information of oversight of IGs, see CRS In Focus IF11869, An Introduction to Oversight of Offices of
Inspector General, by Ben Wilhelm.
532 IG Act, §11.
533 IG Act, §11(c)(E).
534 IG Act, §11(b)(1).
535 IG Act, §11(b)(2).
536 IG Act, §11(d).
537 IG Act, §11(d)(2).
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operations in support of covered overseas contingency operations.538 Further,
Congress established a Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight
to facilitate information sharing among them and develop ways to improve
financial oversight.539 Organizations have also been administratively created
to help coordinate IG activities and capabilities for selected policy issues,
such as the Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the Disaster
Assistance Working Group.540
The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC)
Section 15010 of the CARES Act (P.L. 116-136) created the PRAC. The members of the PRAC are IGs working in
agencies that are playing significant roles in the federal government’s pandemic response. Congress tasked the
PRAC with three duties related to the federal response to the COVID-19 pandemic: promoting transparency,
conducting oversight, and supporting oversight being conducted by IGs across the federal government. The
PRAC’s primary function, the coordination of oversight activities related to the pandemic, reflects Congress’s view
of the complexity, scope, and importance of the federal response to COVID-19 and the value of having a single
source for information on that response.
Source: CRS Insight IN11343, The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee: Organization and Duties, by Ben
Wilhelm.
Oversight Information Sources and
Consultant Services
Congress calls upon a variety of sources for information and analysis to support its oversight
activities. Legislative support agencies—CRS, CBO, and GAO—provide most of this assistance.
In addition, various support offices established in the House and Senate may have a role in
oversight through the legal, legislative, administrative, financial, and ceremonial functions they
perform. Two of these—the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel—are
highlighted below. A range of outside interest groups and research organizations also provide rich
sources of information.
Congressional Research Service
CRS541 is the public policy research arm of Congress. Originally established as the Legislative
Reference Service in 1914, CRS was renamed and given expanded research and analytic duties
with the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970.542
CRS analysts, attorneys, and information specialists provide nonpartisan, confidential analysis on
current and emerging issues of national policy. CRS works exclusively for Congress, providing

538 P.L. 112-239, §848; codified at IG Act, §8L.
539 P.L. 111-203, §989E; codified at IG Act, §11 note.
540 For more information on the Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency, see Department of Defense OIG,
“Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency,” http://www.dodig.mil/Resources/DCIE/; and Defense Council on
Integrity and Efficiency, Charter, January 16, 2003, https://media.defense.gov/2003/Jan/16/2001711908/-1/-1/1/
DCIE%20Charter%20-%20Final.pdf. For more information on the Disaster Assistance Working Group, see CIGIE,
“Mission: Disaster Assistance Working Group,” https://www.ignet.gov/content/disaster-assistance-working-group.
541 Published reports, seminars and training, and other resources and services provided by CRS are available at
https://www.crs.gov/.
542 P.L. 63-127, ch. 141, July 16, 1914; P.L. 79-601, ch. 753, Title II, §203, August 2, 1946, 60 Stat. 836; P.L. 91-510,
Title III, §321(a), October 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1181; 2 U.S.C. §166.
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the legislature with an independent source of information and assisting Congress in its ability to
oversee the executive branch in a system characterized by separation of powers.
In addition to serving the committees and party leaders of the House and Senate, CRS responds to
requests for assistance from all Members of both houses regardless of their party, length of
service, or political philosophy. CRS also assists congressional staff in district and state offices.
CRS supports the House and Senate at all stages of the legislative process. Individual Members or
their staffs may request help from CRS, for example, in learning about issues; developing ideas
for legislation; providing technical assistance during hearings and markups; evaluating and
comparing legislative proposals made by the President, their colleagues, or private organizations;
understanding the effects of House and Senate rules on the legislative process; and clarifying the
legal effects a bill may have. CRS also assists Members and staff to plan and execute oversight.
CRS support for congressional oversight activities take many forms. It includes confidential
consultations in-person and by phone, video, and email. Other examples include analytical reports
and memoranda; customized training/briefings for offices; classes, seminars, and podcasts;
database searches; and other research products and services. Its analysts also deliver expert
testimony before congressional committees.
Although CRS does not draft bills, resolutions, and amendments, CRS staff may support the staff
of Members and committees consulting with the professional drafting staff within each chamber’s
Office of the Legislative Counsel as they translate the Member’s policy decisions into formal
legislative language. CRS is also prohibited from preparing products of a partisan nature or
advocating bills or policies and researching individual Members or living former Members of
Congress (other than holders of, or nominees to, federal appointive office). It also cannot
undertake casework or provide translation services, provide personal legal or medical advice,
undertake personal or academic research, provide clerical assistance, or conduct audits or field
investigations.
In all of their work, CRS staff are governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness,
authoritativeness, objectivity, and nonpartisanship. CRS makes no legislative or other policy
recommendations to Congress. Its responsibility is to ensure that Members of the House and
Senate have available the best possible information and analysis on which to base the policy
decisions the American people have elected them to make.
The Librarian of Congress appoints the director of CRS “after consultation with the Joint
Committee on the Library.”543
Pursuant to the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act, CRS launched a website to provide
public access to CRS reports (https://crsreports.congress.gov/).544 The confidentiality of
congressional requests or responses (such as confidential memoranda) remains unchanged, and
only the Members of Congress who received these confidential communications may release
them.
Congressional Budget Office
Since its founding in 1974,545 CBO has provided an objective, impartial, and nonpartisan source
of budgetary and economic information to support the congressional budget process in the House

543 2 U.S.C. §166.
544 P.L. 115-141; March 23, 2018; 2 U.S.C. §166a.
545 P.L. 93-344, July 12, 1974; 2 U.S.C. §§601-603.
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and Senate. Economists and policy analysts at CBO generate a variety of products in support of
Congress and the budget process, including dozens of reports and hundreds of cost estimates each
year.
CBO provides formal cost estimates of virtually every bill reported by congressional committees
in addition to preliminary, informal estimates of legislative proposals at various stages of the
legislative process. Additionally, CBO regularly prepares reports on the economic and budget
outlook, analysis of the President’s budget proposals, scorekeeping reports, assessments of
unfunded mandates, and products and testimony related to other budgetary matters.546
CBO does not make policy recommendations, and its reports and cost estimates contain
information regarding the agency’s assumptions and methodologies. All of CBO’s products, apart
from informal cost estimates for legislation being developed privately by Members of Congress
or their staffs, are available to Congress and the public on CBO’s website.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate jointly
appoint the CBO director after considering recommendations from the two budget committees.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 specifies that CBO’s director
is to be chosen without regard to political affiliation.
Government Accountability Office
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly known as the General Accounting
Office, was established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 as an independent auditor of
government agencies547 and has statutory authority to gather information from and investigate
agencies.548 The GAO’s mission is to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and ensure the accountability of the federal
government.
GAO issues hundreds of reports, testimony statements, and legal opinions each year.549 GAO’s
reports typically support congressional oversight through focusing on:
 auditing agency operations to determine whether federal funds are being
spent efficiently and effectively;
 identifying opportunities to address duplication, fragmentation, overlap,
waste, or inefficiencies in the use of public funds;
 reporting on how well government programs and policies are meeting their
objectives;
 performing policy analyses and outlining options for congressional
consideration; and
 investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities.
GAO’s objective is to produce high-quality reports, testimonies, briefings, and other products and
services that are objective, fact-based, nonpartisan, non-ideological, fair, and balanced. The
agency operates under strict professional standards, including Government Auditing Standards
and a quality assurance framework. GAO’s products include oral briefings, testimony, and written
reports. All non-classified reports are made available to the public through posting on GAO’s

546 For a more detailed description of CBO products, see CBO, “Products,” https://www.cbo.gov/about/products.
547 P.L. 67-13, June 10, 1921; 31 U.S.C. §702. Renamed by P.L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811.
548 31 U.S.C. §716.
549 GAO publications are available at https://www.gao.gov.
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website. Report recommendations that remain to be addressed, including those that are a priority,
are included in GAO’s Recommendations Database (https://www.gao.gov/recommendations).
GAO prepares most of its reports in response to congressional requests or requirements in statute
or committee or conference reports. It undertakes a small percentage of reviews under the
Comptroller General’s authority.
GAO’s Watchdog website,550 available on the House and Senate intranet, provides information on
how to request GAO reports, GAO’s policies for accepting and prioritizing mandates and requests
(contained in its Congressional Protocols551) and information about ongoing reviews, among
other things. GAO encourages Members and staff to consult with its staff when considering a
request or mandate for a report.
In addition to its audits and evaluations, GAO offers a number of other services, including
performing forensic audits and investigations of waste, fraud, and abuse; providing various legal
services; prescribing accounting principles and standards for the executive branch; providing
other services to help the audit and evaluation community improve and keep abreast of current
developments; occasionally detailing staff to work for congressional committees for up to one
year on request of committee leadership; and providing testimony from the Comptroller General
on high-level issues and the role of government.
GAO is led by the Comptroller General of the United States, who is appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of candidates selected by a bipartisan,
bicameral congressional commission. The Comptroller General is appointed to a 15-year term
and may not be reappointed. GAO’s staff are located in Washington, DC, and in field offices in
Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Dayton, Denver, Huntsville, Los Angeles, Norfolk, Oakland,
and Seattle.
Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel
Since their establishment, the Offices of Senate Legal Counsel and House General Counsel have
developed parallel yet distinctly unique and independent roles as institutional legal “voices” of
the two bodies they represent. Both offices perform functions important to committee oversight,
including representing the committees of their respective chambers in certain judicial
proceedings.
Senate Legal Counsel
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel provides legal assistance and representation to Senators,
committees, officers, and employees of the Senate on matters pertaining to their official duties. It
was established “to serve the institution of Congress rather than the partisan interests of one party
or another”552 in the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.553
Statutory duties of the office include defensive legal representation of the Senate, its committees,
members, officers, and employees;554 representation in legal proceedings to aid investigations by

550 http://watchdog.gao.gov/.
551 GAO’s Congressional Protocols can be accessed at https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-767G.
552 S. Rept. 95-170, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. (1978) at 84.
553 P.L. 95-520, §§701 et seq., 92 Stat. 1824, 1875 (1978), codified principally in 2 U.S.C. §§288 et seq.
554 2 U.S.C. §288c. For further discussion, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and
Practice, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., S.Doc. 101-28 (Washington: GPO, 1992), pp. 1236-1247, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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Senate committees;555 representation of the Senate itself in litigation in cases in which the Senate
is a party and also as amicus curiae when the Senate has an institutional interest;556 providing
legal advice and assistance to Senators;557 and performing such other duties consistent with the
nonpartisan purposes and limitations of Title VII of the Ethics Act as the Senate may direct.558
Critical to committee oversight, the Senate legal counsel may represent committees in
proceedings to obtain evidence for Senate investigations. Specifically, the office may represent a
Senate committee or subcommittee in a civil action to enforce a subpoena.559 Additionally, a
committee may direct the Senate legal counsel to represent it or any of its subcommittees in an
application for an immunity order.560
The office also has a number of advisory functions. Principal among these are the responsibility
of advising members, committees, and officers of the Senate with respect to subpoenas or
requests for the withdrawal of Senate documents and the responsibility of advising committees
about their promulgation and implementation of rules and procedures for congressional
investigations. The office also provides advice about legal questions that arise during the course
of investigations.561
In addition, the counsel’s office provides information and advice to Senators, officers, and
employees on a wide range of legal and administrative matters relating to Senate business. Unlike
the House practice, the Senate legal counsel plays no formal role in the review and issuance of
subpoenas. However, committees may wish to consult with the office regarding the form and
substance of proposed subpoenas prior to their issuance by committees.
The office is led by the Senate legal counsel and deputy counsel, who are appointed by the
President pro tempore of the Senate from among recommendations submitted by the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate without regard for political affiliation.562
House General Counsel
The House Office of General Counsel, authorized under House Rule II, clause 8, serves the role
of counsel for the institution. The office provides legal assistance and representation to Members,
committees, officers, and employees of the House of Representatives, without regard to political
affiliation, on matters pertaining to their official duties.
The work of the office typically includes providing legal advice and assistance to House
committees in the preparation and service of subpoenas; representing Members, committees,
officers, and employees of the House in judicial proceedings; providing legal advice and
assistance to Members; and providing legal guidance regarding requests from executive branch
agencies.

pkg/GPO-RIDDICK-1992/pdf/GPO-RIDDICK-1992-127.pdf.
555 2 U.S.C. §288d.
556 2 U.S.C. §288e.
557 2 U.S.C. §288g.
558 2 U.S.C. §288g(c). For examples of activities conducted by the Office of Senate Legal Counsel under this authority,
see Riddick’s Senate Procedure, pp. 1245-1246.
559 The procedure for directing the Senate legal counsel to bring a civil action to enforce a subpoena is detailed in
statute. See 2 U.S.C. §§288d; 28 U.S.C. §1365.
560 2 U.S.C. §§288b(d)(2), 288f.
561 2 U.S.C. §288g(a)(5)-(6).
562 2 U.S.C. §288(a)(2).
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Committees often work closely with the Office of General Counsel in drafting subpoenas; dealing
with various asserted constitutional, statutory, and common law privileges; responding to
executive agencies and officials that resist congressional oversight; and navigating the statutory
process for obtaining a contempt citation with respect to a recalcitrant witness.
The office represents the interests of House committees in judicial proceedings. The office
represents committees in federal court on applications for immunity orders pursuant to Title 18,
Section 6005, of the U.S. Code; appears as amicus curiae in cases affecting House committee
investigations; defends against attempts to obtain direct or indirect judicial interference with
congressional subpoenas or other investigatory authority; represents committees seeking to
prevent compelled disclosure of nonpublic information relating to their investigatory or other
legislative activities; and appears in court on behalf of committees seeking judicial assistance in
obtaining access to documents or information, such as documents that are under seal or materials
that may be protected by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Speaker appoints the general counsel, deputy general counsel, and other attorneys of the
office. The office functions “pursuant to the direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group,” which consists of the majority and minority leaderships.563
Office of Management and Budget
OMB came into existence under its current name in 1970. Its predecessor agency, the Bureau of
the Budget, was established in 1921. Initially created as a unit in the Treasury Department, the
agency has been a part of the Executive Office of the President since 1939.
Capabilities
OMB, though created by Congress, functions in many ways as the President’s agent for the
management and implementation of policy, including the federal budget.564 In practice, OMB’s
major responsibilities include:
 assisting the President in the preparation of budget proposals and
development of a fiscal program;
 supervising and controlling the administration of the budget in the executive
branch, including transmittal to Congress of proposals for deferrals and
rescissions;
 keeping the President informed about agencies’ activities (proposed, initiated,
and completed) in order to coordinate efforts, expend appropriations
economically, and minimize unnecessary overlap and duplication;
 administering the process of review of draft proposed and final agency rules
established by Executive Order 12866;
 administering the process of review and approval of collections of
information by federal agencies and reducing the burden of agency
information collection on the public under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995;

563 House Rule II, clause 8 (117th Congress).
564 For more detailed information on OMB, see CRS Report RS21665, Office of Management and Budget (OMB): An
Overview, coordinated by Taylor N. Riccard.
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 overseeing (1) the manner in which agencies disseminate information to the
public (including electronic dissemination); (2) how agencies collect,
maintain, and use statistics; (3) how agencies’ archives are maintained; (4)
how agencies develop systems for ensuring privacy, confidentiality, security,
and the sharing of information collected by the government; and (5) how the
government acquires and uses information technology, pursuant to the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,565 the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996,566 and
other legislation;
 studying and promoting better governmental management, including making
recommendations to agencies regarding their administrative organization and
operations;
 clearing and coordinating agencies’ draft testimony and legislative proposals
and making recommendations about presidential action on legislation;
 assisting in the preparation, consideration, and clearance of executive orders
and proclamations;
 planning and developing information systems that provide the President with
agency and program performance data;
 establishing and overseeing implementation of financial management
policies and requirements for the federal government;
 assisting in development of regulatory reform proposals and programs for
paperwork reduction and the implementation of these initiatives;
 improving the economy and efficiency of the federal procurement process by
providing overall direction for procurement policies, regulations, procedures,
and forms.
Limitations
OMB is inevitably drawn into institutional and partisan struggles between the President and
Congress. Difficulties with Congress notwithstanding, OMB is a central coordinator and overseer
for executive agencies and can be a rich potential source of information for investigative and
oversight committees. In addition, Congress may through legislation assign duties to OMB in
order to establish oversight mechanisms and advance congressional oversight objectives.
Legislative Coordination and Clearance, Circular A-19, and OMB
Federal agencies, while organizationally part of the executive branch and subject to the President’s program,
communicate with and rely upon Congress to enact legislation and provide appropriations. An example of this
institutional tension among federal agencies, Congress, and the presidential Administration is found in the
legislative coordination and clearance procedures described in OMB’s Circular No. A-19.
Circular No. A-19 prescribes the process for agency recommendations on proposed, pending, and enrol ed
legislation. To create a singular Administration voice, OMB’s legislative coordination and clearance process
centralizes the development of the Administration’s position on legislation and communicates that position to
Congress and the agencies. This allows for consideration of various issues, including the effect of the
Administration’s position on agencies, existing laws, and future policy goals. This process is fol owed in the
creation of Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs), draft legislation, agency testimony, and agency reports.
Through the process, OMB and White House officials decide which agency views shall be accepted and which shall
be discarded in forming the Administration’s view on a matter at hand. As a practical matter, not all agency

565 P.L. 104-13, 44 U.S.C. ch. 35.
566 P.L. 104-106, 40 U.S.C. §§11101 et seq.
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positions wil be included. These deliberations are typically not visible to Congress. However, in practice, agencies
may reach out to Members of Congress or committee staff about the agency’s policy preferences.
Sources: OMB, “1. Purpose,” in Circular No. A-19, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a019/#purpose; and
CRS Report R44539, Statements of Administration Policy, by Meghan M. Stuessy.
Budget Information
The 1974 Budget Act, as amended, provides Congress with significant resources on budgetary
information. Extensive budgetary materials are also available from the executive branch. Some of
the major sources of budgetary information are available on and off Capitol Hill. They include (1)
the President and executive agencies (under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the
President presents an annual budget to Congress); (2) CBO; (3) the House and Senate Budget
Committees; (4) the House and Senate Appropriations Committees; and (5) the House and Senate
legislative committees. In addition, CRS and GAO prepare reports that address the budget and
related issues.
Discretionary spending, the component of the budget that the Appropriations Committees control
through the annual appropriations process, accounts for about one-third of federal spending.
Other House and Senate committees, particularly the House Committee on Ways and Means and
the Senate Committee on Finance, oversee more than $2 trillion in spending through
reauthorizations, direct spending measures, and reconciliation legislation. In addition, the latter
two committees oversee a diverse set of programs—including tax collection, tax expenditures,
and some user fees—through the revenue process. The oversight activities of all of these
committees is enhanced through the use of the diverse range of budgetary information that is
available to them.
Executive Branch Budget Products
Budget of the United States Government contains the Budget Message of the President and
information on the President’s budget proposals by budget function.
Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government contains analyses that are
designed to highlight specified subject areas or provide other significant presentations of budget
data that place the budget in perspective. This volume includes economic and accounting
analyses, information on federal receipts and collections, analyses of federal spending,
information on federal borrowing and debt, baseline or current services estimates, and other
technical presentations. The Analytical Perspectives volume also contains supplemental material
with several detailed tables—including tables showing the budget by agency and account and by
function, subfunction, and program—that are available on the internet and as a CD-ROM in the
printed document.
Historical Tables provides data on budget receipts, outlays, surpluses or deficits, federal debt,
and federal employment over an extended time period, generally from 1940 or earlier to the
present. To the extent feasible, the data have been adjusted to provide consistency with the budget
and to provide comparability over time.
Appendix, Budget of the United States Government contains detailed information on the
various appropriations and funds that constitute the budget. The Appendix contains financial
information on individual programs and appropriation accounts. It includes for each agency the
proposed text of appropriations language, budget schedules for each account, legislative
proposals, explanations of the work to be performed and the funds needed, and proposed general
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provisions applicable to the appropriations of entire agencies or groups of agencies. Information
is also provided on certain activities whose transactions are not part of the budget totals.
Several other points about the President’s budget are worth noting. The President’s budgetary
communications to Congress continue after submission of the budget (typically in early February)
and usually include a series of budget amendments and supplemental appropriations, the Mid-
Session Review, SAPs on legislation, and even revised budgets on occasion. Most of these
additional communications are issued as House documents and are available on the web from the
Government Publishing Office or the OMB home page (in the case of SAPs). The initial budget
products often do not provide sufficient information on the President’s budgetary
recommendations to enable committees to begin developing legislation. Further budgetary
information is provided in the agencies’ “justification” materials (see below) and the later
submission of legislative proposals. Finally, many executive agency documents (such as agency
budget submissions to OMB) are often not made available to Congress.
Agency Budget Justifications are typically detailed documents that agencies submit to the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees each year to support their budget requests.
Generally, agency budget justifications consist of descriptions of each agency’s programs and
activities and their purposes.567 Agencies may also include explanations of the proposed changes
in appropriations and activities for the next fiscal year, often concentrating on the increase or
decrease in spending from the previous fiscal year. The format and content of budget
justifications differ from agency to agency and may reflect the influence of agencies and their
component organizations, House and Senate appropriators, and OMB. Many participants in the
annual appropriations process also refer to these documents as “congressional budget
justifications,” or “CBJs.”
Congressional Budget Justification Transparency Act of 2021
In 2021, Congress passed legislation to newly define agency budget justifications by statute and require their
posting online (P.L. 117-40). Prior to the enactment of this law, statutory provisions that establish key aspects of
the executive budget process in Title 31 of the U.S. Code were relatively silent on the topic of agency budget
justifications submitted to Congress. In practice, this silence left considerable discretion in the creation of these
documents. OMB’s Circular No. A-11 provides guidance to agencies requiring them to consult with appropriators
before submitting their budget justifications. Typically, the written justifications vary in form and content with each
agency and appropriations subcommittee, reflecting the ongoing relationship between them. An agency's budget
justification usually contains a detailed description of its programs and activities and their purposes, as well as an
explanation of the proposed changes in appropriations and program activities for the next fiscal year.
Among other things, P.L. 117-40 newly defined in statute that agency “‘budget justification materials’ [are] the
annual budget justification materials of a Federal agency, or a component of a Federal agency, that are submitted,
in conjunction with” the President’s annual submission. Prospectively, these materials are required to be posted
on USAspending.gov subject to OMB-developed data standards. In addition, the materials are required to be
posted as “open Government data assets” (i.e., machine-readable and other attributes specified by Title 44,
Section 3502, of the U.S. Code, relating to federal information policy). Separately, the President’s budget
submission is also required to include a “tabular list” of the justifications.
Looking ahead, it remains to be seen what the implications of the legislation may be. The enactment of the
Congressional Budget Justification Transparency Act of 2021 may be characterized as “fire alarm” oversight. This
legislation promotes greater transparency in the appropriations process and provides interested parties with more
opportunities to gather information and sound an alarm to Congress if additional oversight may be necessary. At
times, Congress and OMB may compete or cooperate for influence over the decisionmaking of agencies. For
example, House and Senate appropriators and OMB both have a role in the formulation of agencies’ budget
justifications. OMB has used increased transparency in the past in an attempt to exercise influence over agencies.
It is unclear if transparency associated with this legislation could affect power relationships among agencies,
Congress, and OMB.

567 See CRS Report RS20268, Agency Justification of the President’s Budget, by Michelle D. Christensen.
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Sources: OMB, Circular No. A-11: Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, August 2021, §22.6;
CRS Report RS20268, Agency Justification of the President’s Budget, by Michelle D. Christensen; and CRS Report
RS21665, Office of Management and Budget (OMB): An Overview, coordinated by Taylor N. Riccard.
Some Other Sources of Useful Budgetary Information
Appropriations Committees. The subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees hold extensive hearings on the fiscal year appropriations requests of federal
departments and agencies. Each federal department or agency submits justification material to the
Committees on Appropriations. Their submissions can run from several hundred pages to over
2,000 pages. The Appropriations subcommittees typically print this material with the hearing
record of the federal officials concerning these requests.
Budget Committees. The House and Senate Budget Committees, in preparing to report the
annual concurrent budget resolution, conduct hearings on overall federal budget policy. These
hearings and other fiscal analyses made by these panels address various aspects of federal
programs and funding levels that can be useful sources of information.
Other committees. To assist the Budget Committees in developing the concurrent budget
resolution, other committees are required to prepare “views and estimates” of programs in their
jurisdiction. Committee views and estimates, usually packaged together and issued as a
committee print, may also be a useful source of detailed budget data.
Internal agency studies and budget reviews. These agency studies and reviews are often
conducted in support of budget formulation and can yield useful information about individual
programs. The budgeting documents, evaluations, and priority rankings of individual agency
programs can provide insights into executive branch views of the importance of individual
programs.
Nonfederal Information Resources
Committees and Members can acquire useful information about executive branch programs and
performance from nonfederal stakeholders. These stakeholders may bring expertise to
congressional deliberations, and they may be categorized in many ways. Illustrative examples of
these stakeholders and their potential contribution to congressional oversight are described below.
State and local governments may offer valuable information to congressional overseers on the
efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness of federal programs and policies, including potential
implementation challenges and unintended consequences. State and local governments administer
many federal programs, policies, and funds—such as those related to health care (e.g., Medicaid),
workforce development, education, and disaster management—and often audit or evaluate their
effectiveness. Some state and local programs have also served as models for similar programs at
the federal level.
Think tanks and good government organizations are research entities that periodically conduct
studies of public policy issues that may inform Members and committees on how well federal
agencies and programs are working. Examples of think tanks include the Brookings Institution,
the RAND Corporation, and the Heritage Foundation. Examples of good government
organizations include the National Academy of Public Administration, the Partnership for Public
Service, and the Project on Government Oversight (POGO). Think tanks and good government
organizations may operate under various legal authorities (e.g., 501(c)(3) status with the Internal
Revenue Service), and their political ideologies and policy issues of focus can vary widely. Some
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organizations, such as POGO, focus explicitly on improving government and congressional
oversight.
Media organizations are a frequent source of information that might be useful to Members and
committees conducting oversight. Media organizations provide both general coverage that they
believe will be of interest to the general public as well as specialized reporting on topics that
might provide a more detailed view into particular policy areas. Additionally, in recent years there
has been increased interest in nonprofit investigative journalism by organizations such as
ProPublica, which tend to produce more deeply reporting on matters with public policy impacts
that may be of particular interest to Congress. Regardless of their focus, journalists may develop
sources and publicize information that can useful to Congress and would not otherwise come to
the body’s attention.
Interest groups might provide unique perspectives on the impact of legislation to Members and
committees, including potential unintended consequences on specific populations. In general,
interest groups are organizations that represent individuals or entities who share common views
on a specific public policy issue, such as civil rights, education, or health. An interest group often
takes a particular position on a policy issue and advocates for adoption of laws and policies that
align with that position. Such advocacy can include attempts to directly influence public policy,
including lobbying Members and congressional committees.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), broadly speaking, are entities that are independent of
government involvement or control. The acronym NGO can encompass a broad range of entities,
such as international organizations or domestic nonprofit organizations. Similar to think tanks,
NGOs can vary in terms of their purpose, legal authorities, policy areas of focus, and political or
religious affiliations. NGOs may be active in different aspects of social, political, scientific,
environmental, and humanitarian policymaking. NGOs might provide valuable assistance to
congressional overseers in navigating a broad range of policy issues. According to the
Department of State, NGOs “often develop and address new approaches to social and economic
problems that governments cannot address alone.”568
Private sector companies might assist Members and committees in overseeing the
implementation of agency programs and policies, including by identifying potential application of
private sector expertise and practices to government programs and services. Companies that are
regulated may also have feedback on the effectiveness of the regulation and how related
implementation could be improved. Companies may also market themselves to federal agencies,
seeking brand recognition and contracts. In addition to providing consultative services to
agencies, private sector companies may publish insights and perspectives on certain federal
policy issues, such as shared services, information technology, and cybersecurity.
Members of the general public can provide useful feedback on how well federal programs and
services are working. Such feedback can assist Members and committees in obtaining policy-
relevant information about program performance and in evaluating the problems individuals
might be having with federal administrators and agencies. A variety of methods might be
employed to solicit the views of those who receive federal programs and services, including
investigations and hearings, field and on-site meetings, and surveys.

568 U.S. Department of State, “Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in the United States,” January 20, 2017,
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/fs/2017/266904.htm.
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Appendix A. Illustrative Subpoena

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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. In complying with this Subpoena, you are required to produce all responsive documents that
are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you or your past or present agents,
employees, and representatives acting on your behalf. You are also required to produce
documents that you have a legal right to obtain, documents that you have a right to copy or
have access to, and documents that you have placed in the temporary possession, custody, or
control of any third party. No records, documents, data or information called for by this request
shall be destroyed, modified, removed or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.
2. In the event that any entity, organization or individual denoted in this subpoena has been, or is
also known by any other name than that herein denoted, the subpoena shall be read to also
include them under that alternative identification.
3. Each document produced shall be produced in a form that renders the document susceptible of
copying.
4. Documents produced in response to this subpoena shall be produced together with copies of
file labels, dividers or identifying markers with which they were associated when this subpoena
was served. Also identify to which paragraph from the subpoena that such documents are
responsive.
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5. It shall not be a basis for refusal to produce documents that any other person or entity also
possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same document.
6. If any of the subpoenaed information is available in machine-readable form (such as punch
cards, paper or magnetic tapes, drums, disks, or core storage), state the form in which it is
available and provide sufficient detail to allow the information to be copied to a readable
format. If the information requested is stored in a computer, indicate whether you have an
existing program that will print the records in a readable form.
7. If the subpoena cannot be complied with in full, it shall be complied with to the extent
possible, which shall include an explanation of why full compliance is not possible.
8. In the event that a document is withheld on the basis of privilege, provide the following
information concerning any such document: (a) the privilege asserted; (b) the type of
document; (c) the general subject matter; (d) the date, author and addressee; and (e) the
relationship of the author and addressee to each other.
9. If any document responsive to this subpoena was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody,
or control, identify the document (stating its date, author, subject and recipients) and explain
the circumstances by which the document ceased to be in your possession, or control.
10. If a date set forth in this subpoena referring to a communication, meeting, or other event is
inaccurate, but the actual date is known to you or is otherwise apparent from the context of the
request, you should produce all documents which would be responsive as if the date were
correct.
11. Other than subpoena questions directed at the activities of specified entities or persons, to the
extent that information contained in documents sought by this subpoena may require
production of donor lists, or information otherwise enabling the re-creation of donor lists,
such identifying information may be redacted.
12. The time period covered by this subpoena is included in the attached Schedule A.
13. This request is continuing in nature. Any record, document, compilation of data or
information, not produced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date,
shall be produced immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.
14. All documents shall be Bates stamped sequentially and produced sequentially.
15. Two sets of documents shall be delivered, one set for the Majority Staff and one set for the
Minority Staff. When documents are produced to the Subcommittee, production sets shall be
delivered to the Majority Staff in Room B346 Rayburn House Office Building and the
Minority Staff in Room 2101 Rayburn House Office Building.
GENERAL DEFINITIONS
1. The term “document” means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever,
regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy, including, but not limited to, the
following: memoranda, reports, expense reports, books, manuals, instructions, financial
reports, working papers, records notes, letters, notices, confirmations, telegrams, receipts,
appraisals, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, prospectuses, interoffice and intra office
communications, electronic mail (E-mail), contracts, cables, notations of any type of
conversation, telephone call, meeting or other communication, bulletins, printed matter,
computer printouts, teletypes, invoices, transcripts, diaries, analyses, returns, summaries,
minutes, bills, accounts, estimates, projections, comparisons, messages, correspondence, press
releases, circulars, financial statements, reviews, opinions, offers, studies and investigations,
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questionnaires and surveys, and work sheets (and all drafts, preliminary versions, alterations,
modifications, revisions, changes, and amendments of any of the foregoing, as well as any
attachments or appendices thereto), and graphic or oral records or representations of any kind
(including without limitation, photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotape,
recordings and motion pictures), and electronic, mechanical, and electric records or
representations of any kind (including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, and
recordings) and other written, printed, typed, or other graphic or recorded matter of any kind or
nature, however produced or reproduced, and whether preserved in writing, film, tape, disc, or
videotape. A documents bearing any notation not a part of the original text is to be considered a
separate document. A draft or non-identical copy is a separate document within the meaning of
this term.
2. The term “communication” means each manner or means of disclosure or exchange of
information, regardless of means utilized, whether oral, electronic, by document or otherwise,
and whether face to face, in a meeting, by telephone, mail, telexes, discussions, releases,
personal delivery, or otherwise.
3. The terms “and” and “or” shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively or disjunctively
to bring within the scope of this subpoena any information which might otherwise be construed
to be outside its scope. The singular includes plural number, and vice versa. The masculine
includes the feminine and neuter genders.
4. The term “White House” refers to the Executive Office of the President and all of its units
including, without limitation, the Office of Administration, the White House Office, the Office
of the Vice President, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management
and Budget, the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Public Liaison, the Office of
Correspondence, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Political Affairs, the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for White House Operations, the Domestic Policy Council,
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, the Office
of Legislative Affairs, Media Affairs, the National Economic Council, the Office of Policy
Development, the Office of Political Affairs, the Office of Presidential Personnel, the Office of
the Press Secretary, the Office of Scheduling and Advance, the Council of Economic Advisors,
the Council on Environmental Quality, the Executive Residence, the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, the Office of National Drug
Control, and the Office of Policy Development.
March 10, 1998
Custodian of Documents
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
25 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
SCHEDULE A
1. All organizational charts and personnel rosters for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(“Teamsters” or “IBT”), including the DRIVE PAC, in effect during calendar years 1991
through 1997.
2. All IBT operating, finance, and administrative manuals in effect during calendar years 1991
through 1997, including, but not limited to those that set forth (1) operating policies, practices,
and procedures; (2) internal financial practices and reporting requirements; and (3)
authorization, approval, and review responsibilities.
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3. All annual audit reports of the IBT for the years 1991 through 1996 performed by the auditing
firm of Grant Thornton.
4. All IBT annual reports to its membership and the public for years 1991 through 1997, including
copies of IBT annual audited financial statements certified to by independent public
accountants.
5. All books and records showing receipts and expenditures, assets and liabilities, profits and
losses, and all other records used for recording the financial affairs of the IBT including,
journals (or other books of original entry) and ledgers including cash receipts journals, cash
disbursements journals, revenue journals, general journals, subledgers, and workpapers
reflecting accounting entries.
6. All Federal Income Tax returns filed by the IBT for years 1991 through 1997.
7. All minutes of the General Board, Executive Board, Executive Council, and all Standing
Committees, including any internal ethics committees formed to investigate misconduct and
corruption, and all handouts and reports prepared and produced at each Committee meeting.
8. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, any contribution,
donation, expenditure, outlay, in-kind assistance, transfer, loan, or grant (from DRIVE, DRIVE
E&L fund, or IBT general treasury) to any of the following entities/organizations:
a. Citizen Action
b. Campaign for a Responsible Congress
c. Project Vote
d. National Council of Senior Citizens
e. Vote Now ‘96
f. AFL-CIO
g. AFSCME
h. Democratic National Committee
i. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (“DSCC”)
j. Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (“DCCC”)
k. State Democratic Parties
1. Clinton-Gore ‘96
m. SEIU
9. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about any of the following
individuals/entities:
a. Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union
b. Teamsters for a Democratic Union
c. Concerned Teamsters 2000
d. Martin Davis
e. Michael Ansara
f. Jere Nash
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g. Share Group
h. November Group
i. Terrence McAuliffe
j. Charles Blitz
k. New Party
1. James P. Hoffa Campaign
m. Delancy Printing
n. Axis Enterprises
o. Barbara Arnold
p. Peter McGourty
q. Charles McDonald
r. Theodore Kheel
10. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information on about, communications
between the Teamsters and the White House regarding any of the following issues:
a. United Parcel Service Strike
b. Diamond Walnut Company Strike
c. Pony Express Company organizing efforts
d. Davis Bacon Act
e. NAFTA Border Crossings
f. Ron Carey reelection campaign
g. IBT support to 1996 federal election campaigns.
i. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, communications
between the Teamsters and the Federal Election Commission.
12. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, communications
between the Teamsters and the Democratic National Committee, DSCC, or DCCC.
13. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, communications
between the Teamsters and the Clinton-Gore ‘96 Campaign Committee.
14. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, policies and
procedures in effect during 1996 regarding the approval of expenditures from the IBT general
treasury, DRIVE E&L fund, and DRIVE PAC.
15. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the retention by the
IBT of the law firm Covington & Burling and/or Charles Ruff.
16. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about work for the IBT
performed by the firm Palladino & Sutherland and/or Jack Palladino.
17. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about work for the IBT
performed by Ace Investigations and/or Guerrieri, Edmund, and James.
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18. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about IBT involvement in
the 1995-1996 Oregon Senate race (Ron Wyden vs. Gordon Smith).
19. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, Ron Carey’s
campaign for reelection as general president of the Teamsters.
20. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about organization, planning,
and operation of the 1996 IBT Convention.
21. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the following:
a. Trish Hoppey
b. John Latz
c. any individual with the last name of “Golovner”.
d. Convention Management Group.
22. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the Household Finance
Corporation.
23. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, any “affinity credit
card” program or other credit card program sponsored by or participated in by the IBT.
24. A list of all bank accounts held by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters including the
name of the bank, account number, and bank address.
25. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, payments made by the
IBT to any official or employee of the Independent Review Board.
26. Unless otherwise indicated, the time period covered by this subpoena is between January
1991 and December 1997.
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Appendix B. Example Congressional Oversight
Letter

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Appendix C. Examples of White House Response to
Congressional Requests
THE WHITE HOUSE
November 4, 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Request for Information
The policy of this administration is to comply with Congressional Requests for information to the
fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.
While this Administration, like its predecessors, has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of
some communications, executive privilege will be asserted only in the most compelling
circumstances, and only after careful review demonstrates that assertion of the privilege is
necessary. Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the executive branch has
minimized the need for invoking executive privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should
continue as the primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches. To ensure that every
reasonable accommodation is made to the needs of Congress, executive privilege shall not be
invoked without specific Presidential authorization.
The Supreme Court has held that the Executive Branch may occasionally find it necessary and
proper to preserve the confidentiality of national security secrets, deliberative communications
that form a part of the decision-making process, or other information important to the discharge
of the Executive Branch’s constitutional responsibilities. Legitimate and appropriate claims of
privilege should not thoughtlessly be waived. However, to ensure that this Administration acts
responsibly and consistently in the exercise of its duties, with due regard for the responsibilities
and prerogatives of Congress, the following procedures shall be followed whenever
Congressional requests for information raise concerns regarding the confidentiality of the
information sought:
1. Congressional requests for information shall be complied with as promptly and as fully as
possible, unless it is determined that compliance raises a substantial question of executive
privilege. A “substantial question of executive privilege” exists if disclosure of the information
requested might significantly impair the national security (including the conduct of foreign
relations), the deliberative processes of the Executive Branch or other aspects of the
performance of the Executive Branch’s constitutional duties.
2. If the head of an executive department or agency (“Department Head”) believes, after
consultation with department counsel, that compliance with a Congressional request for
information raises a substantial question of executive privilege, he shall promptly notify and
consult with the Attorney General through the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of
Legal Counsel, and shall also promptly notify and consult with the Counsel to the President. If
the information requested of a department or agency derives in whole or in part or from
information received from another department or agency, the latter entity shall also be
consulted as to whether disclosure of the information raises a substantial question of executive
privilege.
3. Every effort shall be made to comply with the Congressional request in a manner consistent
with the legitimate needs of the Executive Branch. The Department Head, the Attorney
“General and the Counsel to the President may, in the exercise of their discretion in the
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circumstances, determine that executive privilege shall not be invoked and release the
requested information.
4. If the Department Head, the Attorney General or the Counsel to the President believes, after
consultation, that the circumstances justify invocation of executive privilege, the issue shall be
presented to the President by the Counsel to the President, who will advise the Department
Head and the Attorney General of the President’s decision.
5. Pending a final Presidential decision on the matter, the Department Head shall request the
Congressional body to hold its request for the information in abeyance. The Department Head
shall expressly indicate that the purpose of this request is to protect the privilege pending a
Presidential decision, claim of privilege.
6. If the President decides to invoke executive privilege, the Department Head shall advise the
requesting Congressional body that the claim of executive privilege is being made with the
specific approval of the President.
Any questions concerning these procedures or related matters should be addressed to the Attorney
General, through the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, and to the
Counsel to the President.
Ronald Reagan
THE WHITE HOUSE
September 28, 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY GENERAL
COUNSELS
FROM: LLOYD N. CUTLER, SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Congressional Requests to Departments and Agencies for Documents Protected
by Executive Privilege
The policy of this Administration is to comply with congressional requests for information to the
fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the Executive Branch.
While this Administration, like its predecessors, has an obligation to protect the confidentiality of
core communications, executive privilege will be asserted only after careful review demonstrates
that assertion of the privilege is necessary to protect Executive Branch prerogatives.
The doctrine of executive privilege protects the confidentiality of deliberations within the White
House, including its policy councils, as well as communications between the White House and
executive departments and agencies. Executive privilege applies to written and oral
communications between and among the White House, its policy councils and Executive Branch
agencies, as well as to documents that describe or prepares for such communications (e.g.
“talking points”). This has been the view expressed by all recent White House Counsels. In
circumstances involving communications relating to investigations of personal wrongdoing by
government officials, it is our practice not to assert executive privilege, either, in judicial
proceedings or in congressional investigations and hearings. Executive privilege must always be
weighed against other competing governmental interests, including the judicial need to obtain
relevant evidence, especially in criminal proceedings, and the congressional need to make factual
findings for legislative and oversight purposes.
In the last resort, this balancing is usually conducted by the courts. However, when executive
privilege is asserted against a congressional request for documents, the courts usually decline to
intervene until after the other two branches have exhausted the possibility of working out a
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satisfactory accommodation. It is our policy to work out such an accommodation whenever we
can, without unduly interfering with the President’s need to conduct frank exchange of views
with his principal advisors.
Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the Executive Branch have minimized
the need for invoking executive privilege.
Executive privilege belongs to the President, not individual departments or agencies. It is
essential that all requests to departments and agencies for information of the type described above
be referred to the White House Counsel before any information is furnished. Departments and
agencies receiving such request should therefore follow the procedures set forth below, designed
to ensure that this Administration acts responsibly and consistently with respect to executive
privilege issues, with due regard for the responsibilities and prerogatives of Congress:
First, any document created in the White House, including a White House policy council, or
in a department or agency, that contains the deliberations of, or advice to or from, the White
House, should be presumptively treated as protected by executive privilege. This is so
regardless of the document’s location at the time of the request or whether it originated in the
White House or in a department or agency.
Second, a department or agency receiving a request for any such document should promptly
notify the White House Counsel’s Office, and direct any inquiries regarding such a document
to the White House Counsel’s Office.
Third, the White House Counsel’s Office, working together with the department or agency
(and, where appropriate, the DOJ), will discuss the request with appropriate congressional
representatives to determine whether a mutually satisfactory recommendation is available.
Fourth, if efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory accommodation are unsuccessful, and if
release of the document would pass a substantial question of executive privilege, the Counsel
to the President will consult with the DOJ and other affected agencies to determine whether
to recommend that the President invoke the privilege.
We believe this policy will facilitate the resolution of issues relating to disclosures to Congress
and maximize the opportunity for reaching mutually satisfactory accommodations with Congress.
We will of course try to cooperate with reasonable congressional requests for information in ways
that preserve the President’s ability to exchange frank advice with his immediate staff and the
heads of the executive departments and agencies.
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Author Information

Ben Wilhelm, Coordinator
Sarah J. Eckman
Analyst in Government Organization and
Analyst in American National Government
Management

Todd Garvey, Coordinator
Mark J. Oleszek
Legislative Attorney
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

Christopher M. Davis, Coordinator
R. Eric Petersen
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process
Specialist in American National Government

Walter J. Oleszek
Jacob R. Straus
Senior Specialist in American National Government Specialist on the Congress

Clinton T. Brass
Meghan M. Stuessy
Specialist in Government Organization and
Analyst in Government Organization and
Management
Management

Ida A. Brudnick
Taylor N. Riccard
Specialist on the Congress
Analyst in Government Organization and

Management

Maeve P. Carey

Specialist in Government Organization and
Management

Acknowledgments
Over time, authors of this report have included current and former CRS attorneys and analysts Alissa M.
Dolan, William T. Egar, Louis Fisher, Kathryn A. Francis, Rick Greenwood, L. Elaine Halchin, T. J.
Halstead, Frederick M. Kaiser, Mort Rosenberg, Wendy Ginsberg, and Todd B. Tatelman.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
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