AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress

June 20, 2023 – May 21, 2024 R47599

AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities):
May 21, 2024
Background and Issues for Congress
Luke A. Nicastro
AUKUS Pillar 2 refers to a suite of cooperative activities conducted by the United States, the
Analyst in U.S. Defense
United Kingdom, and Australia to develop and field “advanced capabilities” under the AUKUS
Infrastructure Policy
security partnership. To date, Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the three

governments by a number of means, including topic-specific working groups. At least eight such
groups are currently active: six address technological areas and two address functional areas. The

current working groups are:
• Undersea capabilities;
• Quantum technologies;
• Artificial intelligence and autonomy;
• Advanced cyber;
• Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities;
• Electronic warfare;
• Innovation; and
• Information sharing.
The activities of these working groups are closely tied to the broader regional and global defense strategies of each of the
participating governments, and have drawn considerable attention from some Members of Congress and other stakeholders.
This report describes the origins, role, and implementation of AUKUS Pillar 2, and identifies and analyzes potential issues
for congressional consideration. Particular issues Congress may face include:
• Whether to modify the current laws, regulations, and policies that govern the export of U.S.-origin defense
articles and services relevant to AUKUS Pillar 2 activities; and
• How to resource and oversee the executive branch’s conduct of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities.

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AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress

Background
AUKUS Overview
AUKUS is a security partnership between the governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia designed to “promote a free and
open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable.”1 Established by a joint announcement in September
2021, AUKUS has organized its trilateral defense activities along two lines of effort, referred to
as “pillars.” Pillar 1 aims to provide Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines,
while Pillar 2 is intended to collaboratively develop “advanced capabilities”.2
Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the U.S., British, and Australian governments by
a number of means, including working groups (sometimes also referred to as “workstreams”).3 At
least eight such groups are currently active: six address particular technological areas (undersea
capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber,
hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare), and two address broader
functional areas (innovation and information sharing).4 As of this writing, AUKUS members have
announced a number of Pillar 2 accomplishments, including multiple successful test and
demonstration events.5
The Role of Congress
Within the legislative branch, a group of Members formed the Congressional AUKUS Working
Group in 2022 and a number of committees have held hearings on various AUKUS-related issues
in 2022, 2023, and 2024.6 Congress has also passed AUKUS-related provisions as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024 NDAA; P.L. 118-31),
including provisions that:
• Established new responsibilities and requirements for executive branch
management of U.S. participation in AUKUS;7

1 “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, March 13, 2023. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/.
2 For more information on Pillar 1, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS
Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 See, for instance, remarks made on June 16, 2023 by the British Secretary of State for Defence, available at
https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-06-07/188182.
4 “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS),” The White
House, April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-
implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
5 AUKUS members have collaboratively tested robotic vehicles and sensors, for instance, as well as demonstrated new
uncrewed undersea capabilities. For more information, refer to the “Pillar 2 Working Groups” section of this report.
6 For more on the Congressional AUKUS Working Group (sometimes referred to as the “AUKUS Caucus”), see
“AUKUS Working Group Issues Statement,” Rep. Joe Courtney Press Release, April 6, 2022 at
https://courtney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/aukus-working-group-issues-statement-new-details-trilateral-
defense. For a recent example of AUKUS-related congressional activity, see “AUKUS Implementation and Challenges
to International Security and Arms Control in the 21st Century,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing, February
14, 2024. Recording available online at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/aukus-implementation-and-challenges-
to-international-security-and-arms-control-in-the-21st-century/.
7 Sections 1331, 1332, and 1333 of P.L. 118-31. See Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report for more detail.
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AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress

• Provided for the prioritization of Australia and the UK in the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) processes, as well as the pre-
clearance of certain items for provision to Australia and the UK through FMS
and DCS;8
• Provided for the potential exemption of Australia and the UK from arms export
licensing/other approval requirements;9
• Authorized the sale of up to three Virginia-class submarines to Australia;10 and
• Authorized the acceptance of financial contributions from the Australian
government to support non-nuclear AUKUS submarine security activities.11
Congress has also provided funding for AUKUS-related activities, including FY2024
appropriations for Pillar 2-focused Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
programs.12 As of this writing, Congress is also considering legislation that would direct the
executive branch to engage with the Japanese government regarding potential participation in
Pillar 2 activities (S. 4279).13
The Role of the Executive Branch
Given its broad scope, AUKUS has involved a wide array of stakeholders across the U.S.
government. Within the executive branch, the National Security Council and a number of
organizations within the Department of State (including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs)
and the Department of Defense (including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of Navy) have participated in the implementation of AUKUS activities.14 As part of
its AUKUS efforts, the executive branch has made a series of wide-ranging organizational and
procedural changes intended to ensure the partnership’s success, including establishing new
offices and modifying the administration of export controls.15 In reference to their broad sweep,
the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State has characterized these as part of “a massive sea change.”16

8 Sections 1341 and 1342 of P.L. 118-31. See Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report for more detail.
9 Sections 1343, 1344, and 1345 of P.L. 118-31. See Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report for more detail.
10 Section 1352 of P.L. 118-31.
11 Section 1353 of P.L. 118-31.
12 For more information, see discussion in the “Resourcing and Overseeing Pillar 2 Activities” subsection of this
report’s “Issues for Congress” section.
13 Senators Mitt Romney (UT), Tim Kaine (VA), Bill Hagerty (TN), and Jim Risch (ID) introduced the Coordinating
AUKUS Engagement with Australia Act in May 2024. For more information, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
“Risch, Romney, Kaine, Hagerty Introduce Bill to Increase AUKUS Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” May 8, 2024, at
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-romney-kaine-hagerty-introduce-bill-to-increase-aukus-
cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific. Refer also to discussion in this report’s “Issues for Congress” section.
14 For information on the various U.S. government organizations involved in AUKUS implementation, see Jack Detsch
and Robbie Gramer, “Biden’s AUKUS Point Man to Exit,” Foreign Policy, March 10, 2023, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/10/biden-aukus-miller-us-uk-australia-china-france/, and “Rear Admiral Dave
Goggins to support AUKUS Program,” U.S. Navy, June 17, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-
Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3066852/rear-admiral-dave-goggins-to-support-aukus-program/.
15 For example, the Department of the Navy established the “AUKUS Direct Reporting Program Office and Integration
& Acquisition Office” to manage its Pillar 1 activities, and the Department of State created the “AUKUS Trade
Authorization Mechanism” to facilitate AUKUS-related defense transfers. Naval Sea Systems Command, “Team
Submarines," https://www.navsea.navy.mil/home/team-subs/; and Department of State, “The AUKUS Trade
Authorization Mechanism,” press release, July 10, 2023, https://www.state.gov/ensuring-swift-and-secure-defense-
trade-under-aukus.
16 Matthew Cranston, “US Needs to Step Up Assurances on AUKUS, Admits Kurt Campbell,” Australian Financial
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Alignment with National Strategies
The U.S., British, and Australian governments have each identified AUKUS as an important part
of their respective national strategies. The Biden Administration’s 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific
Strategy cites AUKUS efforts under its “Reinforce Deterrence” line of effort, characterizing the
partnership as contributing to the defense of U.S. interests, deterrence of adversary aggression,
and the promotion of regional security.17 In addition, the 2024 U.S. National Defense Industrial
Strategy states that AUKUS supports DOD’s “economic deterrence” priority.18 The United
Kingdom’s “Integrated Review Refresh 2023” asserts that the AUKUS partnership will “allow
[the UK and its allies] collectively to balance against coercive behaviours and to preserve an open
and stable international order.”19 AUKUS also features prominently in Australia’s 2024 National
Defence Strategy, which describes the partnership as “essential to building the Australian Defence
Force’s capacity to deliver impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate
response.”20
Formal DOD and executive branch statements concerning AUKUS have generally avoided
focusing on particular threats or challenges, instead referring to more abstract interests and
goals.21 However, some analysts argue the pact responds to a perception among its members that
the intentions and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pose a significant and
growing threat to Indo-Pacific security. This perspective has also been articulated by a number of
U.S. policymakers, including some senior executive branch officials and Members of Congress.
In April 2024, for instance, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell referred to the capabilities
developed through AUKUS as creating “enormous implications in a variety of scenarios,
including in cross-[Taiwan] strait circumstances,” and in March 2023 House Foreign Affairs
Committee (HFAC) Chairman Michael McCaul offered the following characterization of the
partnership:
We are facing a generational challenge from the Chinese Communist Party. We must bring
all tools to bear in our effort to counter Chairman Xi’s attempts to disrupt the global balance
of power. With AUKUS, our three nations can achieve the shared strategic goal of
defending the Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining our technological and military
superiority.22

Review, March 20, 2024. Available online at https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/us-needs-to-step-up-assurances-
on-aukus-admits-kurt-campbell-20240320-p5fdr2.
17 “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, February 2022, p. 15. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
18 “National Defense Industrial Strategy,” Department of Defense, January 2024, p. 45. Available at
https://www.businessdefense.gov/docs/ndis/2023-NDIS.pdf.
19 The 2023 “Integrated Review Refresh” is an update of the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development,
and Foreign Policy issued in 2021. See “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” His Majesty’s Government, March 13,
2023, p. 40, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-
more-contested-and-volatile-world.
20 Australian Government, “National Defence Strategy,” April 2024, p. 8, available at
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-
program. AUKUS is also discussed in greater detail on pp. 42 (Pillar 1) and 65 (Pillar 2).
21 See, for example, Secretary Austin’s characterization of AUKUS as a partnership to “strengthen our combined
military capabilities, boost our defense industrial capacity, enhance our ability to deter aggression, and promote our
shared goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” “Statement by Secretary of Defense on AUKUS Optimal Pathway
Announcement,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 13, 2023. Available at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/
Release/Article/3327747/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-aukus-optimal-pathway-a/.
22 Richard Fontaine and Kurt Campbell, “AUKUS: Securing the Indo-Pacific, A Conversation with Kurt Campbell,”
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This view—that AUKUS is part of a broader response to the perceived threat from the PRC—
appears to be shared by the other AUKUS governments. During the AUKUS Optimal Pathway
Announcement, for example, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak explained the need for an
increased focus on defense by citing a number of particular challenges, including “China’s
growing assertiveness.”23 In 2022, Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison described
AUKUS as a response to, in part, PRC “attempt[s] to reshape our region, and the world, in a way
more conducive to autocracies than liberal democracies.”24
Pillar 2 Activities
Given the diversity of technological and functional areas encompassed by AUKUS Pillar 2, each
working group may conduct its activities in a different manner; additionally, the ongoing and
potentially classified nature of many such activities may limit the amount of information
available to the public.25 To accomplish their goals, the AUKUS partners may engage in a number
of activities that the U.S. DOD refers to as international armaments cooperation.26 These may
include:
• the exchange of controlled technical information;
• the exchange of military, civilian, and industry personnel;
• cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) activities;
• joint production and procurement; and
• other acquisition partnerships.27
In contrast to Pillar 1 activities, which may take decades to deliver results, some analysts and
policymakers expect AUKUS Pillar 2 to produce more immediate capability improvements.28
Senior DOD officials have also characterized Pillar 2 work as focusing on technologies that are

Center for a New American Security, April 3, 2024, available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/transcript/aukus-
securing-the-indo-pacific-a-conversation-with-kurt-campbell; and “McCaul Speaks on House Floor in Support of
Deterring China Through AUKUS Bill,” HFAC Press Release, March 24, 2023, available at
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-speaks-on-house-floor-in-support-of-deterring-china-through-
aukus-bill/.
23 “Transcript: Remarks By President Biden, Prime Minister Albanese, and Prime Minister Sunak on AUKUS,” U.S.
Embassy in Canberra, March 14, 2023, at https://au.usembassy.gov/transcript-remarks-by-president-biden-prime-
minister-albanese-of-australia-and-prime-minister-sunak-of-the-united-kingdom-on-the-aukus-partnership/.
24 Tyrone Clarke, “Scott Morrison says AUKUS and Quad key to fight back against China’s ‘arc of autocracy’ after
missing first week of parliament,” Sky News Australia, July 29, 2022, at https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/
politics/scott-morrison-says-aukus-and-quad-key-to-fight-back-against-chinas-arc-of-autocracy-after-missing-first-
week-of-parliament/news-story/c798f6c004eaabc5e952118d69d73948.
25 A December 2023 DOD press release, for instance, claimed that “many AUKUS-related advanced capability
activities remain classified.” Department of Defense, “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press
release, December 1, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-
ministers-meeting-joint-statement/. No classified or controlled information was used in the preparation of this report.
26 For more on international armaments cooperation, see CRS In Focus IF12425, Defense Primer: International
Armaments Cooperation.
27 Some working groups may also employ other security cooperation mechanisms to transfer defense articles and
services between the three countries, including foreign military sales.
28 See, for instance remarks by former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy William Greenwalt in
Joe Gould and Bryant Harris, “Big AUKUS news coming, but Hill and allies see tech sharing snags,” Defense News,
March 7, 2023, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/03/07/big-aukus-news-coming-but-hill-and-allies-see-
tech-sharing-snags/.
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useful for all three countries and that have particular relevance to the security challenges of the
Indo-Pacific.29
Beyond the topics covered by the working groups discussed below, there may be some additional
areas in which Pillar 2 work is ongoing or planned. For instance, the AUKUS countries have
announced they will “pursue opportunities in Long Range Fires under AUKUS Pillar II in
2024.”30
In addition, the U.S., British, and Australian governments have established a number of initiatives
designed to support Pillar 2 efforts as a whole. These include the launch of the AUKUS Advanced
Capabilities Industry Forum and the AUKUS Defense Investors Network, intended to facilitate
coordination between and among defense suppliers, investors, and government organizations
across all three nations.31 The AUKUS governments have also announced the commencement of
Pillar 2 "innovation challenges,” which “will identify opportunities to harness commercial
technologies from all three nations to support advanced capability development under
AUKUS.”32
Undersea Capabilities
Undersea capabilities, in the context of AUKUS, refer to systems and technologies that operate
underwater but are not manned submarines. To date, the U.S. Navy (USN) has engaged in a
number of efforts in this area, including activities focused on the development, procurement, and
operation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). UUVs may have applications for
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface
warfare, minesweeping, and other mission sets.33 The other AUKUS nations are also developing
and fielding UUV capabilities.34
The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have announced a number of Pillar 2 efforts
relating to undersea capabilities. These include the “AUKUS Maritime Autonomy
Experimentation and Exercise Series,” which the three governments have described as “a series
of integrated trilateral experiments and exercises aimed at enhancing capability development,
improving interoperability, and increasing the sophistication and scale of autonomous systems in
the maritime domain.”35 The AUKUS governments are also working on the ability to deploy and
recover UUVs from manned submarines (sometimes referred to as “launch and recovery”),
conducting activities to develop and improve “the ability to launch and recover undersea vehicles

29 Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” DOD News, April
10, 2024. Available at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-
indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/.
30 “AUKUS Defense Ministers' Joint Statement,” Department of Defense, April 8, 2024, available at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3733790/aukus-defense-ministers-joint-statement/.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 The USN currently manages programs for developing UUVs designated as small (0-45 feet in length), medium (45-
190 feet in length), and large (200-300 feet in length) UUVs. See CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface
and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
34 See, for example, “UK Royal Navy Acquires Latest Generation REMUS 100s,” HII Press Release, September 21,
2022 at https://hii.com/news/united-kingdom-royal-navy-acquires-remus-100-unmanned-underwater-vehicle/, and
Patrick Tucker, “Australia Got a New Sub Drone Far Faster than the US Navy Could Have, Company Says,” Defense
One, April 24, 2024, at https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/04/australia-got-new-sub-drone-far-faster-us-
navy-could-have-company-says/.
35 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
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from torpedo tubes on current classes of submarines to deliver effects such as strike and
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.”36 In November 2023, DOD announced that the
AUKUS partners had participated in a joint exercise to demonstrate and improve capabilities
relating to the protection of underwater infrastructure and the use of autonomous and semi-
autonomous undersea systems.37
Quantum Technologies
In the context of defense, quantum technologies are those that use the principles of quantum
physics (e.g., superposition, quantum bits, and entanglement) to create, enhance, or support
military capabilities.38 Quantum technologies have a variety of potential applications, including
the improvement of communication systems, sensor capabilities, and information processing and
security.39
As part of the Quantum Technologies working group, the AUKUS nations have established the
AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA), an initiative to coordinate U.S., British, and Australian
RDT&E efforts concerning quantum technologies. Initial AQuA efforts were expected to focus on
developing alternate solutions for position, navigation, and timing (similar to current Global
Positioning System capability) through trials and experimentation through 2025.40 Additionally,
the AUKUS governments announced in December 2023 that they were “accelerating the
development of quantum technologies for positioning, navigation, and timing in military
capabilities,” with a particular focus on improving “resilience for our trilateral forces in Global
Positioning System-degraded environments and… stealth in the undersea domain.”41
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
Definitions of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy vary. One definition— codified at 15
U.S.C. §9401, and used across the U.S. government—states that:
The term "artificial intelligence" means a machine-based system that can, for a given set
of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing
real or virtual environments. Artificial intelligence systems use machine and human-based
inputs to-
(A) perceive real and virtual environments;
(B) abstract such perceptions into models through analysis in an automated manner; and
(C) use model inference to formulate options for information or action.42

36 Ibid.
37 Department of Defense, “New Uncrewed Undersea Capabilities Strengthen AUKUS Partnership,” press release,
November 13, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3586592/new-uncrewed-undersea-
capabilities-strengthen-aukus-partnership/.
38 For more information on the defense applications of quantum technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense
Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler.
39 Ibid.
40 The White House, “AUKUS Fact Sheet,”, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
41 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
42 15 U.S.C. §9401(3). This definition is also adopted by Executive Order 14110, "Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy
Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence," 88 Federal Register 75191, November 1, 2023.
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Within DOD, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) is responsible for a
number of AI and autonomy-related functions, including developing DOD strategy for data,
analytics, and AI, creating enabling infrastructure and services, scaling certain “digital and AI-
enabled solutions,” and deploying AI and related services for crisis response.43 Other recent U.S.
government AI efforts with defense implications include Executive Order 14110 of October 30,
2023 (“Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence”).44
The other AUKUS nations have been adopting similarly broad approaches to AI and autonomy:
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD) released a “Defence Artificial Intelligence
Strategy” in June 2022, and the Australian government published “Australia’s AI Action Plan” in
June 2021.45
According to the White House, the AUKUS Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group
aims to “improv[e] the speed and precision of decision-making processes to maintain a capability
edge and defend against AI-enabled threats.”46 In December 2023, the AUKUS governments
announced that they were “delivering artificial intelligence algorithms and machine learning to
enhance force protection, precision targeting, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance”
through an effort called Resilient and Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Technologies. 47 The
announcement also stated that the U.S., British, and Australian militaries had “demonstrated and
will deploy common advanced artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms on multiple systems,
including P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to process data from each nation's sonobuoys.”48
Advanced Cyber
DOD’s cyber operations are diverse, consisting of military, intelligence, and business activities
conducted in or through cyberspace—the information network encompassing the internet, other
telecommunications connections, and computer systems.49 Cyber capabilities have become an
enduring focus for all three AUKUS nations, especially given the intensification of the threat
environment in what DOD refers to as the “cyber domain.”50 The unclassified summary of DOD’s
2023 Cyber Strategy identifies four lines of effort: 1) defend the nation; 2) prepare to fight and

43 Department of Defense, “Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office,” at https://www.ai.mil/. For additional
information concerning DOD’s approach to AI, see Department of Defense, 2023 Data, Analytics, and Artificial
Intelligence Adoption Strategy, June 27, 2023, at https://media.defense.gov/2023/nov/02/2003333300/-1/-
1/1/dod_data_analytics_ai_adoption_strategy.pdf.
44 For more information, refer to CRS Report R47843, Highlights of the 2023 Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence
for Congress, by Laurie Harris and Chris Jaikaran and CRS Insight IN12286, The AI Executive Order and Its Potential
Implications for DOD, by Alexandra G. Neenan and Kelley M. Sayler.
45 See “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” UK Ministry of Defence, June 15, 2022, at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/defence-artificial-intelligence-strategy, and “Australia’s AI Action Plan,” Australian
Government, June 2021, at https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20220816053410/https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-
publications/australias-artificial-intelligence-action-plan.
46 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
47 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
48 Ibid.
49 For more information on cyber capabilities and operations, see CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace
Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary.
50 A November 2022 Government Accountability Office report found that DOD experienced over 12,000 cyber
incidents since 2015. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to
Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 14, 2022,
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105084.
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win the nation’s wars; 3) protect the cyber domain with allies and partners; and 4) build enduring
advantages in cyberspace.51
The UK and Australia have also developed cybersecurity strategies: the British government
released its National Cyber Strategy 2022 in December 2022, and the Australian government
released its 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy in November 2023.52
To date, work in the Advanced Cyber area appears to have focused on cybersecurity. According to
a joint statement released by the AUKUS defense ministers in December 2023:
Trilaterally, AUKUS partners are engaging on cyber security with critical suppliers to the
naval supply chain. We are collaborating with industry partners to deploy some advanced
tooling which will uplift the cyber security of our supply chains, while also giving us
greater insight into the threats to AUKUS. The AUKUS partners are also working to
strengthen cyber capabilities, including protecting critical communication and operations'
systems.53
Given the increasing centrality of networked communications to military operations, the scope of
the Advanced Cyber working group may encompass many different platforms, systems, and
functions.54
Hypersonic and Counter-Hypersonic Capabilities
Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities refer to maneuverable weapons that fly at speeds
of Mach 5 or greater, or systems intended to counter such weapons.55 The speed and
maneuverability of these missiles, coupled with their low flying altitude, make them more
difficult to detect and neutralize than ballistic missiles.56 The U.S. DOD currently manages a
number of programs intended to develop conventionally armed hypersonic weapons and counter-
hypersonic defensive capabilities.57 The British and Australian governments also pursued the
development of hypersonic capabilities prior to the establishment of the AUKUS pact,

51 Department of Defense, Unclassified Summary of the 2023 Cyber Strategy, September 2023, at
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/12/2003299076/-1/-1/1/2023_DOD_Cyber_Strategy_Summary.pdf.
52 National Cyber Strategy 2022, UK Government, December 15, 2022, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-strategy-2022/national-cyber-security-strategy-2022; and
2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy, Australian Government, November 22, 2023, available at
https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-
strategy.
53 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
54 See, for instance, Stew Magnuson, “AUKUS Agreement Poses Cybersecurity Risks to Allies,” National Defense,
September 29, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/9/29/aukus-agreement-poses-
cybersecurity-risk-to-allies.
55 For more information on hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
56 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” press release, March 2, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-
hypersonics/.
57 These include the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, the Air Force’s Air-Launched Rapid Response
Weapon, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, and DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide. See CRS Report R45811,
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.
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including—in the case of Australia—bilateral hypersonic-focused cooperation with the United
States.58
In April 2022, the White House announced that the AUKUS partners would “work together to
accelerate development of advanced hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities” under
AUKUS Pillar 2.59 Few details about this working group are publicly available; however, some
analysts have speculated that Australia’s missile testing infrastructure—including a newly opened
“Hypersonic Research Precinct” in Brisbane, Australia—could feature significantly in initial
projects.60 Some media outlets have also reported that the UK may seek to buy “a strategic
Hypersonic Glide Vehicle via AUKUS.”61 Other reporting has suggested that Australia and the
United States may increase the extent of their RDT&E collaboration on hypersonics and look to
conduct more joint experimentation.62
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) refers to activities that manipulate and control the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS)—a range of frequencies for electromagnetic energy—for military purposes. The
U.S. DOD, UK MOD, and Australian DOD have each engaged in electronic warfare operations
and programs since World War II, and a wide number of organizations in each nation’s defense
establishment operate and develop electronic warfare capabilities.63
EW was added to the scope of AUKUS Pillar 2 in April 2022. According to the White House, this
working group will aim to “share understanding of tools, techniques, and technology to enable
our forces to operate in contested and degraded environments.”64 Opportunities for the EW
working group may include electronic protection, electronic attack, and electronic support (i.e.,
intelligence collection and analysis of the EMS that supports other EW operations), all of which
strengthen the ability to operate in a contested EMS environment. These EW opportunities are
particularly relevant given that all three AUKUS nations are to operate the U.S. Air Force E-7
Wedgetail, an airborne EW platform.65

58 Bilateral U.S.-Australia hypersonics efforts include the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment
(SCIFiRE) and Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) programs. See “Department of
Defense Announces New Allied Prototyping Initiative Effort With Australia to Continue Partnership in Developing Air
Breathing Hypersonic Vehicles,” DOD press release, November 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/
Release/Article/2429061/department-of-defense-announces-new-allied-prototyping-initiative-effort-with-a/.
59 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
60 See Mikayla Easley, “AUKUS Partners Aim to Catch China in Hypersonics Race,” National Defense, February 17,
2023, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/17/aukus-partners-aim-to-catch-china-in-
hypersonics-race.
61 Tony Osborne, “UK Plans £1 Billion Effort to Secure Hypersonic Weapon Capacity,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2023
at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/uk-plans-ps1-billion-effort-secure-hypersonic-
weapon-capacity.
62 Courtney Albon, “US, Australia Eye Joint Hypersonics Experiments in 2024,” C4ISRNET, December 3, 2023,
available at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/hypersonics/2023/12/03/us-australia-eye-joint-hypersonics-
experiments-in-2024/.
63 For more information on electronic warfare, see CRS In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare.
64 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
65 See “E-7A AEW&C,” Boeing, at https://www.boeing.com/defense/e-7-airborne-early-warning-and-control/.
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Innovation
As a functional area of defense collaboration, innovation is more difficult to define than the
technological areas identified above. Broadly speaking, defense innovation refers to purposeful
changes in the technologies, operations, processes, or organizations employed by governments for
military purposes.66
According to the White House, the Innovation working group will seek to “accelerate our
respective defense innovation enterprises and learn from one another, including ways to more
rapidly integrate commercial technologies to solve warfighting needs.”67 This may include
increased collaboration between the U.S. DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Defense
Advanced Research and Development Projects Agency (DARPA), and service RDT&E
organizations, on the one hand, and analogous British and Australian organizations (e.g., the UK’s
Defence Science and Technology Laboratories and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology
Group), on the other.68
Information Sharing
According to the White House, the Information Sharing working group will “will expand and
accelerate sharing of sensitive information, including as a first priority enabling workstreams that
underpin our work on agreed areas of advanced capabilities [i.e., the other working groups].” The
AUKUS nations have a long history of sharing information on defense through a variety of fora
such as the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance.69
Issues for Congress
Congress may consider options for modifying U.S. export controls and resourcing and overseeing
AUKUS Pillar 2 activities. Particular issues include
• whether or not to modify U.S. arms export control laws, regulations, or policies;
• how much funding (if any) to appropriate specifically for Pillar 2 activities;
• how to assess Pillar 2 progress and measure outcomes;
• whether or not to modify the technological and functional scope of Pillar 2
working groups; and
• whether or not to expand participation in Pillar 2 activities beyond the current
AUKUS members.

66 See P.M. Picucci et al., “Categorizing Defense Innovation,” Defense Acquisition University, March 9, 2021, at
https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/blog/Categorizing-Defense-Innovation.
67 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
68 For more information on British and Australian programs, see “MOD Innovation,” UK Government, at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553429/
MOD_SB_Innovation_Initiative_Brochure_v21_web.pdf, and “Defence Innovation,” Australian Government, at
https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/strategy/defence-science-and-technology-strategy-2030.
69 In addition to the three AUKUS nations, FVEY includes Canada and New Zealand. Some experts see FVEY as a
model—or additional mechanism—for AUKUS information sharing.
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U.S. Export Controls
From the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, some analysts, policymakers, and Members
of Congress have argued that the U.S. export control regime hampers effective technological and
industrial cooperation between the United States, Australia, and the UK.70 According to this view,
the array of U.S. laws, regulations, and policies governing defense exports—particularly the
provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA; codified as 22 U.S.C. §2751 et seq.) and the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR—may slow or even prevent legitimate
transfers of equipment or information necessary to accomplish AUKUS objectives.71 On the other
hand, existing export controls may be necessary to protect sensitive U.S. technology and
information from potential disclosure to adversaries or malicious actors. Because its aims,
activities, and participants are more diffuse than those of Pillar 1, Pillar 2 may be more
comprehensively affected by export controls and has tended to feature more centrally in public
discourse surrounding this issue.72
As noted, the FY2024 NDAA included a number of provisions addressing AUKUS Pillar 2,
including some that modified U.S. export controls (for a detailed list, see Table A-1). Key
developments include:
• The creation of new responsibilities and requirements for executive branch
management of U.S. participation in AUKUS;
• The prioritization of Australia and the UK in the FMS and DCS processes, as
well as the pre-clearance of certain items for provision to Australia and the UK;
• The conditional exemption of Australia and the UK from arms export
licensing/other approval requirements.
The conditional exemption of AUKUS members from U.S. arms export
licensing/approval requirements depends on a Department of State determination that the
defense export control regimes of Australia and the UK are “comparable” to that of the
United States. Per the FY2024 NDAA, the deadline to make such a determination was
April 19, 2024; however, the State Department was not able to make a positive
determination by that date, and reportedly expects to make such a determination by
August 17, 2024.73 Some Members and other stakeholders have criticized this deferral:
for example, Representative Michael McCaul—the Chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee—described the development as “very unfortunate,” and Senator Jim

70 For examples that predate the enactment of the FY2024 NDAA, see Rachel Oswald, “Lawmakers Seek to Ease
Defense Export Controls to UK, Australia,” Roll Call, May 23, 2023, available online at https://rollcall.com/2023/05/
23/lawmakers-seek-to-ease-defense-export-controls-to-uk-australia/; and Rajiv Shah, “U.S. Export Rules Need Major
Reform if AUKUS is to Succeed,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute: The Strategist, February 16, 2023, available
online at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-export-rules-need-major-reform-if-aukus-is-to-succeed/.
71 The ITAR implements Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2778) and authorizes the President to
control the export and import of defense articles and defense services. For more information, see CRS Report R46337,
Transfer of Defense Articles: U.S. Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities, coordinated by Christina L.
Arabia.
72 For discussion of the export control considerations surrounding Pillar 1, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-
Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
73 Lewis Jackson, “U.S. Confident About Meeting New Deadline for UK, Australia AUKUS Exemptions,” Reuters,
April 23, 2024, available online at https://www.reuters.com/world/us-confident-about-meeting-new-deadline-uk-
australia-aukus-exemptions-2024-04-23/. For more information on this requirement, refer to the entry for Section 1345
of the FY2024 NDAA in Table A-1.
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Risch—the Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—stated that the
decision was “deeply misguided and further delays the implementation of AUKUS.”74
On May 1, 2024, the State Department published in the Federal Register a proposed rule
that would amend the ITAR to:
include an exemption to the requirement to obtain a license or other approval from the State
Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) prior to any export, reexport,
retransfer, or temporary import of defense articles; the performance of defense services; or
engagement in brokering activities between or among authorized users within Australia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.75
According to one State Department official, this rule change “exempts the vast majority of
currently licensed defense trade between the United States, the U.K. and Australia.”76
Congress may consider whether to make further changes to the policies, procedures, regulations,
or statutes associated with U.S. export controls.
Resourcing and Oversight
Funding for Pillar 2 Activities
The FY2024 President’s budget request included $25 million in DOD Defense-wide Research,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations for “AUKUS Innovation
Initiatives,” and the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47) provided $12.5
million for this program.77 P.L. 118-47 also provided a $14.7 million program increase for
“AUKUS and coalition warfare” under the Defense Innovation Unit Fielding program.78
The FY2025 President’s budget request includes approximately $79.8 million in Defense-wide
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations for AUKUS under the
“International Innovation Initiatives” program.79 According to DOD, this funding would support
two Pillar 2-related efforts:

74 Rep. Michael McCaul, “McCaul Statement on Admin Failure to Grant U.K., Australia Critical ITAR Exemption,”
April 19, 2024, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-statement-on-admin-failure-to-grant-u-k-
australia-itar-exemption/; and Sen. Jim Risch, “Risch on Administration’s Failure to Certify UK, Australia for ITAR
Exemptions,” April 22, 2024, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-on-administrations-failure-to-
certify-uk-australia-for-itar-exemptions. For more media coverage of responses to the State Department’s decision, see
Colin Clark and Tim Martin, “Is State Dept.’s AUKUS trade certification delay a sign of choppy waters ahead?”
Breaking Defense, April 30, 2024, at https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/is-state-dept-s-aukus-trade-certification-
delay-a-sign-of-choppy-waters-ahead/.
75 Department of State, “International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Exemption for Defense Trade and Cooperation
Among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” 89 Federal Register 35028, May 1, 2024.
76 Joe Gould, “G’day, AUKUS Tech-sharing Regs,” Politico Pro Morning Defense, newsletter, May 1, 2024.
77 According to DOD, the AUKUS Innovation Initiative project “provides funding to pursue operationally relevant
advanced capability co-development, support integration of multi-national capabilities to act as a force multiplier, and
test and evaluate promising solutions found across the AUKUS innovation ecosystem,” and supports AI, UUV, and
cyber efforts. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates—Justification
Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, March 2023, p. 466, available at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OS
D_PB2024.pdf. Submission by Rep. Kay Granger, “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,” Explanatory
Statement, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 170, part 51 (March 22, 2024), p. H1703.
78 Ibid., p. H1712.
79 This program has the same program element—PE 0603945D8Z—as that used to designate the “AUKUS Innovation
(continued...)
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• The development of “a multi-classification level collaborative computing environment to
support efforts under the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Pillar” ($10 million); and
• The “solicitation, evaluation, merit-based selection, and execution of new projects to get
cutting-edge technological capabilities into the hands of the warfighters,” with planned
FY2025 work relating to AI, maritime hypersonic tracking and targeting, and air-
launched hypersonic cruise missiles ($69.8 million).80
In addition to AUKUS-specific appropriations, other parts of DOD’s budget may fund U.S.
participation in AUKUS Pillar 2 activities. For example, activities conducted under the
hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities working group could involve a number of
hypersonic-related DOD accounts and program offices that may not be specifically identified in
budget documents or elsewhere as AUKUS-related.
Congress may consider whether to make appropriations for Pillar 2 activities, as well as the extent
to which its AUKUS priorities may require adjustments to funding levels, both for AUKUS-
specific programs and DOD’s broader budget.
Assessing Progress and Measuring Outcomes
Congress may consider ways to assess the progress of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities and to measure
their outcomes against strategic and operational objectives. For example, Congress may create or
modify reporting requirements for DOD and DOS that address Pillar 2-specific progress and
outcomes.81 Depending on the alignment of existing executive branch guidance with
congressional priorities, Congress may also consider whether to direct DOD, DOS, or other
relevant executive organizations to modify processes or programs to better accomplish Pillar 2
objectives.
Modifying Technological and Functional Coverage
As AUKUS activities continue, Congress may consider whether additional technological or
functional areas should be included under Pillar 2, particularly through the creation of new
working groups or the assignment of new topics to existing ones (as an example, some analysts
have suggested the inclusion of critical minerals as an area for Pillar 2 activities and
investments).82 Congress may also assess whether any of the currently identified technological or
functional working groups are underperforming or conducting activities that are superfluous to
U.S. defense requirements, which may suggest a need to narrow existing scopes. The importance
of such assessments may grow as the amount of U.S. resources devoted to Pillar 2 activities
increases.

Initiatives” program in the FY2024 budget request. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY)
2025 Budget Estimates—Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide,
March 2024, pp. 391-395, available at
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/R
DTE_OSD_PB_2025.pdf.
80 Ibid.
81 Congress included a number of Pillar 2-related reporting requirements in the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31); for
details, see Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report.
82 John Coyne, “AUKUS Needs to Focus on Critical Minerals,” Australian Strategy Policy Institute, June 22, 2023,
available at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-needs-to-focus-on-critical-minerals/.
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Including Additional Countries
Congress may also consider whether to direct DOD and DOS to expand AUKUS Pillar 2 to
include additional countries.
In determining whether this would be in the national interest, Congress may weigh the potential
benefits against the potential drawbacks. Supporters of expanding AUKUS have argued that it
would strengthen the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific—especially vis-à-vis China—by making
additional military, technological, and industrial capabilities available, as well as by strengthening
relationships with other regional powers.83 On the other hand, some have claimed that additional
members would increase the risk that sensitive U.S. technology or information could fall into
adversary hands.84 Others have criticized potential AUKUS expansion as escalatory, suggesting
that it could undermine regional stability and provoke a PRC response.85
Several potential additions to Pillar 2 are discussed in brief below.
Japan
In April 2024, the AUKUS governments stated that because of “Japan's strengths and its close
bilateral defense partnerships with all three countries, we are considering cooperation with Japan
on AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced capability projects.”86 On May 8, 2024, Senators Mitt Romney
(UT), Tim Kaine (VA), Bill Hagerty (TN), and Jim Risch (ID) introduced the Coordinating
AUKUS Engagement with Australia Act (S. 4279) , which would direct DOD and DOS to
directly engage with “the relevant stakeholders in the government of Japan” to understand and
identify Japan’s potential to contribute to Pillar 2 activities. This bill would also require DOD and
DOS to provide Congress with an assessment and recommendation concerning Japan’s
participation in Pillar 2.87
South Korea
In May 2024, South Korea’s Defense Minister stated that he had discussed “the possibility of
partnering with AUKUS Pillar 2” with his Australian counterparts at the Australia-Republic of
Korea ‘2+2’ Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting.88

83 See, for example, Ashok Sharma, “The AUKUS Expansion: A Step Towards Bolstering Security and Stability in the
Indo-Pacific,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, May 2, 2024, at
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-aukus-expansion-a-step-towards-bolstering-security-and-
stability-in-the-indo-pacific/.
84 See, for example, William C. Greenwalt, “Japan in AUKUS? Why That’s Premature,” American Enterprise Institute,
April 24, 2024, at https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/japan-in-aukus-why-thats-premature/.
85 See, for example, Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael D. Swaine, “A Dangerous Game is Underway in Asia,” The New
York Times, April 24, 2024, at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/opinion/china-asia-us-relations.html. See also
Maria Siow, “AUKUS Expansion: Japan, South Korea Want In On Pillar 2 – But Trust Is Still a Sticking Point,” South
China Morning Post, May 11, 2024, at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3262267/aukus-expansion-
japan-south-korea-want-pillar-2-trust-still-sticking-point.
86 “AUKUS Defense Ministers' Joint Statement,” Department of Defense, April 8, 2024, available at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3733790/aukus-defense-ministers-joint-statement/.
87 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, Romney, Kaine, Hagerty Introduce Bill to Increase AUKUS
Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” May 8, 2024, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-romney-
kaine-hagerty-introduce-bill-to-increase-aukus-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific.
88 Australian Government, “Press Conference-Melbourne,” May 1, 2024, at
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2024-05-01/press-conference-melbourne.
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New Zealand
Some media reports have suggested that New Zealand may be invited to join AUKUS Pillar 2; as
of this writing, no public invitation had been extended, but the New Zealand Ministry of Defence
has confirmed receiving informational briefings on Pillar 2 activities.89 In remarks on the topic
delivered on May 1, 2024, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister said that his government was “a long
way from being able to make such a decision.”90
Canada
In April 2024, Canada’s Prime Minister stated that he had held “excellent conversations” on
cooperation with AUKUS, and several media reports have suggested that Canada is seeking to
join Pillar 2.91

89 Tim Fish, “New Zealand in AUKUS ‘No Guarantee,’ But Discussions Active,” Breaking Defense, March 18, 2024,
available athttps://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/new-zealand-in-aukus-no-guarantee-but-discussions-active-defence-
minister/ ; and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, “AUKUS Pillar II Briefing Takes Place in Wellington,” February 28,
2024, at https://www.defence.govt.nz/the-latest/story/aukus-pillar-ii-briefing-takes-place-in-wellington. New Zealand is
also a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States, as well as a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact.
90 Tracy Withers, “New Zealand a Long Way from Deciding to Join AUKUS, Peters Says,” Bloomberg, May 1, 2024,
at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-01/new-zealand-a-long-way-from-deciding-to-join-aukus-peters-
says.
91 Andrew Tillett and Matthew Cranston, “First Japan, now Canada wants in on AUKUS,” Australian Financial
Review, April 9, 2024, at https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/first-japan-now-canada-wants-in-on-aukus-20240409-
p5fifr. See also Tony Diver, “Canada Could Join AUKUS Defence Pact,” The Telegraph, April 8, 2024, at
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/08/canada-justin-trudeau/.
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Appendix. Relevant NDAA Provisions
Table A-1. Selected Pillar 2 Provisions in the FY2024 NDAA
Section
Description
1331 (AUKUS partnership Requires the Secretary of State to:
oversight and
•
appoint a senior advisor to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the
accountability framework)
AUKUS partnership;
•
establish a task force, led by the senior advisor, that wil : 1) ensure the
maintenance of a list of all defense-related transactions that have occurred
under AUKUS, 2) establish a framework to monitor companies, individuals, or
entities “that are compromising security of military technology, defense articles,
and defense services” exchanged under AUKUS, and 3) establish an AUKUS
industry forum;
•
provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the work of
the senior advisor and task force, the average and median review times for
Australian and British FMS-related applications, the volume of Australian and
British export license applications denied or approved with provisos, and the
number of voluntary disclosures resulting in a violation of the ITAR by
Australian or British entities;a and
•
provide an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees on
general issues, disclosure policy, and AECA Section 38 violations associated with
AUKUS.
1332 (Designation of
Requires the Secretary of Defense to:
senior official for DOD
•
designate a senior civilian official to oversee DOD activities relating to AUKUS;
AUKUS activities)
•
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an
implementation plan for DOD AUKUS efforts (including timelines, major
milestones, dependencies, industrial base implications, resourcing and personnel
requirements, proposals to improve information sharing, processes for
protecting intellectual property, and recommended updates to Title 10
authorities); and
•
provide the congressional defense and foreign affairs committees semiannual
briefings on DOD activities to implement AUKUS.
1333 (AUKUS reporting
Requires:
requirements)
•
the President to submit to the appropriate congressional committees the text of
any “non-binding instrument” related to AUKUS within 30 days of signature or
conclusion;b
•
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to submit
biennial reports to the appropriate congressional committees on the AUKUS
partnership (to include capability and capacity gaps addressed by AUKUS, an
explanation of the total Pil ar 1 cost to the United States, an explanation of how
access to the Australian industrial base supports U.S. strategy in Asia, an
explanation of the benefits provided by access to Australian naval bases, and
progress made on implementing Pil ar 1 and Pil ar 2).
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Section
Description
1341 (Priority for
Requires:
Australia and the UK in
•
the President to establish policies and procedures to expedite consideration and
FMS and DCS)
processing of Australian and British requests for defense articles and services
under section 21 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2761) relative to all other requests,
excepting only Taiwanese or Ukrainian requests;
•
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to create
an “anticipatory release policy” for the transfer of certain Pil ar 1 and Pil ar 2
technologies;c
•
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to jointly review and update
relevant policies and implementation guidance related to FMS and DCS.
1342 (Identification and
Requires the President to submit to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and
Pre-Clearance of Items
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on a biennial basis, a report that lists military
for Sale)
platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and prioritized for sale
and release to Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
1343 (Export Control
Amends Section 38 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778) to add a requirement that, not
Exemptions and
later than 120 days after the enactment of P.L. 118-31, the President determine
Standards)
whether Australia and the United Kingdom have implemented a system of export
controls and exemptions comparable to those of the United States. If the President is
able to make such a determination, he/she shall “immediately exempt from the
licensing or other approval requirements of this section exports and transfers
(including reexports, transfers, temporary imports, and brokering activities) of
defense articles and defense services between the United States and that country or
among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.” In the event the
President is unable to make a determination, he/she must reassess whether the
country in question has met the requirements at least once every 120 days.
1344 (Expedited Review
Requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to
of Export Licenses)
initiate a rulemaking to establish an expedited decision-making process for
applications to export to Australia, the UK, and Canada commercial, advanced-
technology defense articles and services not covered by an ITAR exemption.
1345 (U.S. Munitions List)
Amends Section 38(f)(3) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)) by
•
inserting “, the United Kingdom, or Australia,” after “Canada;” and
•
adding a note requiring the Secretary of State to, at least once every three
years, review items on the U.S. Munitions List.
Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 118-31.
Notes: Provisions that exclusively or primarily relate to Pil ar 1 have been excluded from this table.
a. The “appropriate congressional committees” are defined by Sec. 1331 as the House Committees on Foreign
Affairs an Appropriations and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations.
b. The text of a “non-binding instrument” is defined by Sec. 1333 to include “ any annex, appendix, codicil, side
agreement, side letter, or any document of similar purpose or function to the aforementioned, regardless of
the title of the document, that is entered into contemporaneously and in conjunction with the non-binding
instrument; and any implementing agreement or arrangement, or any document of similar purpose or
function to the aforementioned, regardless of the title of the document, that is entered into
contemporaneously and in conjunction with the non-binding instrument.”
c. Covered Pil ar 1 technologies include submarine and submarine combat systems technologies; covered Pil ar
2 technologies include hypersonic missiles, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies,
undersea capabilities, and other advanced technologies.

Congressional Research Service

17

AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress

Author Information

Luke A. Nicastro

Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy

Acknowledgments
Lt Col Patrick Parrish, USAF, coauthored the initial version of this report.

Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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