AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues
June 20, 2023
for Congress
Patrick Parrish (Advanced Capabilities):
May 21, 2024
Background and Issues for Congress
Luke A. Nicastro
AUKUS Pillar 2 refers to a suite of cooperative activities conducted by the United States, the
AUKUS Pillar 2 refers to a suite of cooperative activities conducted by the United States, the
National Defense FellowAnalyst in U.S. Defense
United Kingdom, and Australia to develop and field “advanced capabilities” under the AUKUS
United Kingdom, and Australia to develop and field “advanced capabilities” under the AUKUS
Infrastructure Policy
security
security
pactpartnership. To date, Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the three . To date, Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the three
governments by
Luke A. Nicastro
means of working groups. Eight
governments by a number of means, including topic-specific working groups. At least eight such groups are currently active such groups are currently active
; six of them address
Analyst in U.S. Defense
: six address technological areastechnological areas
, and the remaining and two address two address
broader functional areas. The functional areas. The
current working current working
Infrastructure Policy
groups are: groups are:
• Undersea capabilities;
• Undersea capabilities;
• Quantum technologies; • Quantum technologies;
• Artificial intelligence and autonomy; • Artificial intelligence and autonomy;
• Advanced cyber; • Advanced cyber;
• Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities; • Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities;
• Electronic warfare; • Electronic warfare;
• Innovation; and • Innovation; and
• Information sharing. • Information sharing.
The activities of these working groups are closely tied to the broader regional and global defense strategies of each of the
The activities of these working groups are closely tied to the broader regional and global defense strategies of each of the
participating governments, and have drawn considerable attention from some Members of Congress and other stakeholders. participating governments, and have drawn considerable attention from some Members of Congress and other stakeholders.
This report describes the origins, role, and implementation of AUKUS Pillar 2, and identifies and analyzes potential issues This report describes the origins, role, and implementation of AUKUS Pillar 2, and identifies and analyzes potential issues
for congressional consideration. Particular for congressional consideration. Particular
questionsissues Congress may face include: Congress may face include:
•
•
How might the current U.S. defense export control regime—theWhether to modify the current laws, regulations, and policies that govern laws, regulations, and policies that govern
the export of defense articles and services—impact the conduct of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities? What options are available should Congress want to improve the speed or ease with which U.S. entities may provide controlled articles or services to British or Australian entities?
• How can Congress exercise effective oversight of the administration and implementation of AUKUS Pillar
2? What criteria, metrics, and considerations might Congress use to assess the progress and efficacy of Pillar 2 activities?the export of U.S.-origin defense
articles and services relevant to AUKUS Pillar 2 activities; and
• How to resource and oversee the executive branch’s conduct of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities.
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Contents
AUKUS Overview Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
AUKUS Overview ................................................ 1
The Role of AUKUS in U.S., British, and Australian Strategy ....................................................... 2
Pillar 2 Working Groups ............. 1
The Role of Congress.................................................................................................................. 3
Undersea Capabilities 1 The Role of the Executive Branch ...................................................................................... 2 Alignment with National Strategies .................................................................................... 3
Pillar 2 Activities ......... 3
Quantum Technologies .............................................................................................................. 4
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
Undersea Capabilities ........................................................................................ 5
Advanced Cyber ................. 5 Quantum Technologies ....................................................................................................... 6
Hypersonic and Counter-Hypersonic Capabilities Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy ........................................................................ 7
Electronic Warfare......... 6 Advanced Cyber ..................................................................................................................... 7
Innovation 7 Hypersonic and Counter-Hypersonic Capabilities .............................................................. 8 Electronic Warfare ..................................................................................................... 8
Information Sharing ......... 9 Innovation ....................................................................................................................... 8.. 10 Information Sharing .......................................................................................................... 10
Issues for Congress .......................................................................................................................... 9 10
U.S. Export Control Laws and Regulations Controls ................................................................................................................ 11 Resourcing and Oversight ............................................................................................... 9
Oversight of AUKUS........ 12
Funding for Pillar 2 Activities ........................................................................................... 12 11
Assessing Progress and Measuring Outcomes .................................................................. 1213
Modifying Technological and Functional Coverage ......................................................... 12
Expanding AUKUS Pillar 2 to Include Additional Countries ........................................... 1213 Including Additional Countries ......................................................................................... 14
Tables
Table A-1. Selected Pillar 2 Provisions in the FY2024 NDAA .................................................... 16
Appendixes Appendix. Relevant NDAA Provisions ......................................................................................... 16
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 1418
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AUKUS Pillar 2 (Advanced Capabilities): Background and Issues for Congress
Background
AUKUS Overview
AUKUS is a security partnership between the governments of the United States, the United AUKUS is a security partnership between the governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia designed to “promote a free and Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia designed to “promote a free and
open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable.”1 Established by a joint announcement in September open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable.”1 Established by a joint announcement in September
2021, AUKUS has organized its trilateral defense activities along two lines of effort, referred to 2021, AUKUS has organized its trilateral defense activities along two lines of effort, referred to
as “pillars.” Pillar 1 aims to provide Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarinesas “pillars.” Pillar 1 aims to provide Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines
.2 , while Pillar 2 is intended to collaboratively develop Pillar 2 is intended to collaboratively develop
advanced defense capabilities across eight technological and functional areas.“advanced capabilities”.2
Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the U.S., British, and Australian governments by
Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the U.S., British, and Australian governments by
means of working groups. Eighta number of means, including working groups (sometimes also referred to as “workstreams”).3 At least eight such groups are currently active: six address particular such groups are currently active: six address particular
technological areas (undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and technological areas (undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and
autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic
warfare), and two address broader warfare), and two address broader
functional areas (innovation and information sharing).4 As of this writing, AUKUS members have announced a number of Pillar 2 accomplishments, including multiple successful test and demonstration events.5
The Role of Congress
Within the legislative branch, a group of Members formed the Congressional AUKUS Working Group in 2022 and a number of committees have held hearings on various AUKUS-related issues in 2022, 2023, and 2024.6 Congress has also passed AUKUS-related provisions as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 (FY2024 NDAA; P.L. 118-31), including provisions that:
• Established new responsibilities and requirements for executive branch
management of U.S. participation in AUKUS;7 functional areas (innovation and information sharing). 3
Given its broad scope, AUKUS has involved a wide array of stakeholders across the U.S. government. Within the executive branch, the National Security Council (NSC) and a number of organizations within the Department of State (including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) and the Department of Defense (including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Navy) have participated in the implementation of AUKUS activities.4 Within the legislative branch, a bipartisan group of Members formed the Congressional AUKUS Working Group in 2022, and a number of committees have held hearings on various AUKUS-related issues in 2022 and 2023.5
1 “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, March 13, 2023. Available at
1 “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, March 13, 2023. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/.
2 For more information on Pillar 1, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
3 See, for instance, remarks made on June 16, 2023 by the British Secretary of State for Defence, available at https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2023-06-07/188182.
4 “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS),” The White House, April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
5 AUKUS members have collaboratively tested robotic vehicles and sensors, for instance, as well as demonstrated new uncrewed undersea capabilities. For more information, refer to the “Pillar 2 Working Groups” section of this report.
6 For more on the Congressional AUKUS Working Group (sometimes referred to as the “AUKUS Caucus”), see “AUKUS Working Group Issues Statement,” Rep. Joe Courtney Press Release, April 6, 2022 at https://courtney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/aukus-working-group-issues-statement-new-details-trilateral-defense. For a recent example of AUKUS-related congressional activity, see “AUKUS Implementation and Challenges to International Security and Arms Control in the 21st Century,” House Foreign Affairs Committee, Hearing, February 14, 2024. Recording available online at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/aukus-implementation-and-challenges-to-international-security-and-arms-control-in-the-21st-century/.
7 Sections 1331, 1332, and 1333 of P.L. 118-31. See Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report for more detail.
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• Provided for the prioritization of Australia and the UK in the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) processes, as well as the pre-clearance of certain items for provision to Australia and the UK through FMS and DCS;8
• Provided for the potential exemption of Australia and the UK from arms export
licensing/other approval requirements;9
• Authorized the sale of up to three Virginia-class submarines to Australia;10 and • Authorized the acceptance of financial contributions from the Australian
government to support non-nuclear AUKUS submarine security activities.11
Congress has also provided funding for AUKUS-related activities, including FY2024 appropriations for Pillar 2-focused Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) programs.12 As of this writing, Congress is also considering legislation that would direct the executive branch to engage with the Japanese government regarding potential participation in Pillar 2 activities (S. 4279).13
The Role of the Executive Branch
Given its broad scope, AUKUS has involved a wide array of stakeholders across the U.S. government. Within the executive branch, the National Security Council and a number of organizations within the Department of State (including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) and the Department of Defense (including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Navy) have participated in the implementation of AUKUS activities.14 As part of its AUKUS efforts, the executive branch has made a series of wide-ranging organizational and procedural changes intended to ensure the partnership’s success, including establishing new offices and modifying the administration of export controls.15 In reference to their broad sweep, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State has characterized these as part of “a massive sea change.”16
8 Sections 1341 and 1342 of P.L. 118-31. See Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report for more detail. 9 Sections 1343, 1344, and 1345 of P.L. 118-31. See Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report for more detail. 10 Section 1352 of P.L. 118-31. 11 Section 1353 of P.L. 118-31. 12 For more information, see discussion in the “Resourcing and Overseeing Pillar 2 Activities” subsection of this report’s “Issues for Congress” section. 13 Senators Mitt Romney (UT), Tim Kaine (VA), Bill Hagerty (TN), and Jim Risch (ID) introduced the Coordinating AUKUS Engagement with Australia Act in May 2024. For more information, see Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, Romney, Kaine, Hagerty Introduce Bill to Increase AUKUS Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” May 8, 2024, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-romney-kaine-hagerty-introduce-bill-to-increase-aukus-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific. Refer also to discussion in this report’s “Issues for Congress” section.
14briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/.
2 The details of Pillar 1—that is, the precise capabilities, mechanisms, and timelines associated with Australia’s acquisition of nuclear submarines—were to be determined through an 18-month consultative process. That process was completed in March 2023, when the participating nations’ heads of government issued another Joint Leaders Statement (also referred to as the “AUKUS Optimal Pathway Announcement”) detailing a phased approach to occur over the next two decades. Under this plan, Australia would purchase between three and five U.S.-built Virginia-class submarines beginning in the early 2030s, while concurrently working with the UK to design and build a new class of nuclear submarines for delivery in the early 2040s. See “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, September 15, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus/.
3 “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS),” The White House, April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
4 For information on the various U.S. government organizations involved in AUKUS implementation, see Jack Detsch For information on the various U.S. government organizations involved in AUKUS implementation, see Jack Detsch
and Robbie Gramer, “Biden’s AUKUS Point Man to Exit,” and Robbie Gramer, “Biden’s AUKUS Point Man to Exit,”
Foreign Policy, March 10, 2023, at , March 10, 2023, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/10/biden-aukus-miller-us-uk-australia-china-france/, and “Rear Admiral Dave https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/10/biden-aukus-miller-us-uk-australia-china-france/, and “Rear Admiral Dave
Goggins to support AUKUS Program,” U.S. Navy, June 17, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Goggins to support AUKUS Program,” U.S. Navy, June 17, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-
Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3066852/rear-admiral-dave-goggins-to-support-aukus-program/. Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3066852/rear-admiral-dave-goggins-to-support-aukus-program/.
5 For more on the Congressional AUKUS Working Group (sometimes referred to as the “AUKUS Caucus”), see “AUKUS Working Group Issues Statement,” Rep. Joe Courtney Press Release, April 6, 2022 at https://courtney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/aukus-working-group-issues-statement-new-details-trilateral-defense. For a recent example of AUKUS-related congressional activity, see “House Foreign Affairs Committee Member Roundtable on AUKUS and Arms Exports Modernization,” April 18, 2023, webcast recording available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hfac-member-roundtable-on-aukus-and-arms-exports-modernization/.
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The Role of AUKUS in U.S., British, and Australian
Strategy
The U.S., British, and Australian governments have 15 For example, the Department of the Navy established the “AUKUS Direct Reporting Program Office and Integration & Acquisition Office” to manage its Pillar 1 activities, and the Department of State created the “AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism” to facilitate AUKUS-related defense transfers. Naval Sea Systems Command, “Team Submarines," https://www.navsea.navy.mil/home/team-subs/; and Department of State, “The AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism,” press release, July 10, 2023, https://www.state.gov/ensuring-swift-and-secure-defense-trade-under-aukus.
16 Matthew Cranston, “US Needs to Step Up Assurances on AUKUS, Admits Kurt Campbell,” Australian Financial (continued...)
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Alignment with National Strategies
The U.S., British, and Australian governments have each identified AUKUS as an important part of identified AUKUS as an important part of
their respective national strategies. The Biden Administration’s 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy their respective national strategies. The Biden Administration’s 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
cites AUKUS efforts under its “Reinforce Deterrence” line of effort, cites AUKUS efforts under its “Reinforce Deterrence” line of effort,
stating thatcharacterizing the partnership the partnership
will supportas contributing to the defense of U.S. interests, deterrence of adversary aggression, the defense of U.S. interests, deterrence of adversary aggression,
andand the promotion of promotion of
regional security.regional security.
617 In addition, the 2024 U.S. National Defense Industrial Strategy states that AUKUS supports DOD’s “economic deterrence” priority.18 The United Kingdom’s “Integrated Review Refresh 2023” asserts that the The United Kingdom’s “Integrated Review Refresh 2023” asserts that the
AUKUS partnership will “allow [the UK and its allies] collectively to balance against coercive AUKUS partnership will “allow [the UK and its allies] collectively to balance against coercive
behaviours and to preserve an open and stable international order.”behaviours and to preserve an open and stable international order.”
719 AUKUS AUKUS
also features prominently features prominently
in Australia’s 2023 “Defense Strategic Review,” primarily as an enabler of essential “enhanced lethality” for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and “asymmetric capability” more generally.8 in Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy, which describes the partnership as “essential to building the Australian Defence Force’s capacity to deliver impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response.”20
Formal DOD and executive branch statements concerning AUKUS
Formal DOD and executive branch statements concerning AUKUS
tend to avoid identifying have generally avoided focusing on particular threats or challengesparticular threats or challenges
of concern, instead referring to more abstract interests and goals., instead referring to more abstract interests and goals.
9 21 However, some analysts argue the pact responds to a perception among its members that the However, some analysts argue the pact responds to a perception among its members that the
intentions and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pose a significant and intentions and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pose a significant and
growing threat to Indo-Pacific security. This perspective has growing threat to Indo-Pacific security. This perspective has
also been articulated by a number of U.S. been articulated by a number of U.S.
policymakers, including policymakers, including
severalsome senior executive branch officials and Members of Congress. Members of Congress.
In April 2024, for instance, Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell referred to the capabilities developed through AUKUS as creating “enormous implications in a variety of scenarios, including in cross-[Taiwan] strait circumstances,” and in March 2023 In March 2023, for instance, House House
Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairman Michael McCaul Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairman Michael McCaul
spoke on the House Floor concerning AUKUSoffered the following characterization of the partnership: :
We are facing a generational challenge from the Chinese Communist Party. We must bring
We are facing a generational challenge from the Chinese Communist Party. We must bring
all tools to bear in our effort to counter Chairman Xi’s attempts to disrupt the global balance all tools to bear in our effort to counter Chairman Xi’s attempts to disrupt the global balance
of power. With AUKUS, our three nations can achieve the shared strategic goal of of power. With AUKUS, our three nations can achieve the shared strategic goal of
defending the Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining our technological and military defending the Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining our technological and military
superiority.superiority.
10
This view—that AUKUS is part of a broader response to the perceived threat from the PRC—appears to be shared by the other AUKUS nations. During the AUKUS Optimal Pathway Announcement, for example, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak explained the need for an increased focus on defense by citing a number of particular challenges, including “China’s
622
Review, March 20, 2024. Available online at https://www.afr.com/world/north-america/us-needs-to-step-up-assurances-on-aukus-admits-kurt-campbell-20240320-p5fdr2.
17 “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, February 2022, p. 15. Available at “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, February 2022, p. 15. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
718 “National Defense Industrial Strategy,” Department of Defense, January 2024, p. 45. Available at https://www.businessdefense.gov/docs/ndis/2023-NDIS.pdf.
19 The 2023 “Integrated Review Refresh” is an update of the The 2023 “Integrated Review Refresh” is an update of the
“Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development, Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development,
and Foreign Policyand Foreign Policy
” issued in 2021. See “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” His Majesty’s Government, March 13, issued in 2021. See “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” His Majesty’s Government, March 13,
2023, p. 40, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-2023, p. 40, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-
more-contested-and-volatile-world. more-contested-and-volatile-world.
8 “Defense Strategic Review,” Australian Government, April 24, 2023, pp. 7 and 72. Available20 Australian Government, “National Defence Strategy,” April 2024, p. 8, available at at
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/https://www.defence.gov.au/about/
reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.
9strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program. AUKUS is also discussed in greater detail on pp. 42 (Pillar 1) and 65 (Pillar 2).
21 See, for example, Secretary Austin’s characterization of AUKUS as a partnership to “strengthen our combined See, for example, Secretary Austin’s characterization of AUKUS as a partnership to “strengthen our combined
military capabilities, boost our defense industrial capacity, enhance our ability to deter aggression, and promote our military capabilities, boost our defense industrial capacity, enhance our ability to deter aggression, and promote our
shared goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” “Statement by Secretary of Defense on AUKUS Optimal Pathway shared goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” “Statement by Secretary of Defense on AUKUS Optimal Pathway
Announcement,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 13, 2023. Available at Announcement,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 13, 2023. Available at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3327747/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3327747/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-
on-aukus-optimal-pathway-a/.
10 “McCaul Speaks on House Floor in Support of Deterring China Through AUKUS Bill,” HFAC Press Release, March 24, 2023. Available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-speaks-on-house-floor-in-support-of-deterring-china-through-aukus-bill/. For another example, see Rep. Mike Rogers’ remarks concerning AUKUS in “House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Indo-Pacific National Security Challenges,” April 18, 2023. Available at https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings/full-committee-hearing-us-military-posture-and-national-security-challenges-indo-pacific.
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growing assertiveness.”11on-aukus-optimal-pathway-a/.
22 Richard Fontaine and Kurt Campbell, “AUKUS: Securing the Indo-Pacific, A Conversation with Kurt Campbell,” (continued...)
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This view—that AUKUS is part of a broader response to the perceived threat from the PRC—appears to be shared by the other AUKUS governments. During the AUKUS Optimal Pathway Announcement, for example, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak explained the need for an increased focus on defense by citing a number of particular challenges, including “China’s growing assertiveness.”23 In 2022, Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison described In 2022, Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison described
AUKUS as a response to, in part, PRC “attempt[s] to reshape our region, and the world, in a way AUKUS as a response to, in part, PRC “attempt[s] to reshape our region, and the world, in a way
more conducive to autocracies than liberal democracies.”more conducive to autocracies than liberal democracies.”
1224
Pillar 2 Working Groups
Activities Given the diversity of technological and functional areas encompassed by AUKUS Pillar 2, each Given the diversity of technological and functional areas encompassed by AUKUS Pillar 2, each
of the eight working groupsworking group may conduct its activities in a different manner may conduct its activities in a different manner
. In addition; additionally, the , the
ongoing and potentially classified nature of many such activities may limit the amount of ongoing and potentially classified nature of many such activities may limit the amount of
information available to the public.information available to the public.
25 To accomplish their goals, To accomplish their goals,
it appears likely that the working groups willthe AUKUS partners may engage in a number of activities that the U.S. DOD refers to as engage in a number of activities that the U.S. DOD refers to as
international
armaments cooperation..
1326 These may include: These may include:
• the exchange of controlled technical information;
• the exchange of controlled technical information;
• the exchange of military, civilian, and industry personnel; • the exchange of military, civilian, and industry personnel;
• cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) • cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E)
projectsactivities; ;
• joint • joint
procurement effortsproduction and procurement; and ; and
• other acquisition partnerships.• other acquisition partnerships.
1427
In contrast to Pillar 1 activities, which may take decades to deliver results, some analysts and
In contrast to Pillar 1 activities, which may take decades to deliver results, some analysts and
policymakers expect AUKUS Pillar 2 to produce more immediate capability improvements.policymakers expect AUKUS Pillar 2 to produce more immediate capability improvements.
15 The following sections discuss each working group’s area in the context of overarching AUKUS objectives.
Undersea Capabilities
Undersea capabilities, in the context of AUKUS, refer to systems and technologies that operate underwater but are not manned submarines. To date, the U.S. Navy (USN) has engaged in a number of high-profile efforts in this area, including RDT&E activities focused on the maturation, procurement, and operation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). The USN has been developing various UUVs for years, and future systems may have considerable variation in size, capability, and role.16 Within the USN, UUVs may have applications for intelligence,
1128 Senior DOD officials have also characterized Pillar 2 work as focusing on technologies that are
Center for a New American Security, April 3, 2024, available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/transcript/aukus-securing-the-indo-pacific-a-conversation-with-kurt-campbell; and “McCaul Speaks on House Floor in Support of Deterring China Through AUKUS Bill,” HFAC Press Release, March 24, 2023, available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-speaks-on-house-floor-in-support-of-deterring-china-through-aukus-bill/.
23 “Transcript: Remarks By President Biden, Prime Minister Albanese, and Prime Minister Sunak on AUKUS,” U.S. “Transcript: Remarks By President Biden, Prime Minister Albanese, and Prime Minister Sunak on AUKUS,” U.S.
Embassy in Canberra, March 14, 2023, at https://au.usembassy.gov/transcript-remarks-by-president-biden-prime-Embassy in Canberra, March 14, 2023, at https://au.usembassy.gov/transcript-remarks-by-president-biden-prime-
minister-albanese-of-australia-and-prime-minister-sunak-of-the-united-kingdom-on-the-aukus-partnership/. minister-albanese-of-australia-and-prime-minister-sunak-of-the-united-kingdom-on-the-aukus-partnership/.
1224 Tyrone Clarke, “Scott Morrison says AUKUS and Quad key to fight back against China’s ‘arc of autocracy’ after Tyrone Clarke, “Scott Morrison says AUKUS and Quad key to fight back against China’s ‘arc of autocracy’ after
missing first week of parliament,” missing first week of parliament,”
Sky News Australia, July 29, 2022, at https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/July 29, 2022, at https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/
politics/scott-morrison-says-aukus-and-quad-key-to-fight-back-against-chinas-arc-of-autocracy-after-missing-first-politics/scott-morrison-says-aukus-and-quad-key-to-fight-back-against-chinas-arc-of-autocracy-after-missing-first-
week-of-parliament/news-story/c798f6c004eaabc5e952118d69d73948week-of-parliament/news-story/c798f6c004eaabc5e952118d69d73948
.
13.
25 A December 2023 DOD press release, for instance, claimed that “many AUKUS-related advanced capability activities remain classified.” Department of Defense, “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/. No classified or controlled information was used in the preparation of this report.
26 For more on international armaments cooperation, see CRS In Focus IF12425, For more on international armaments cooperation, see CRS In Focus IF12425,
Defense Primer: International
Armaments Cooperation. .
1427 Some working groups may also employ other security cooperation mechanisms to transfer defense articles and Some working groups may also employ other security cooperation mechanisms to transfer defense articles and
services between the three countries, including foreign military sales. services between the three countries, including foreign military sales.
1528 See, for instance remarks by former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy William Greenwalt in See, for instance remarks by former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy William Greenwalt in
Joe Gould and Bryant Harris, “Big AUKUS news coming, but Hill and allies see tech sharing snags,” Joe Gould and Bryant Harris, “Big AUKUS news coming, but Hill and allies see tech sharing snags,”
Defense News, ,
March 7, 2023, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/03/07/big-aukus-news-coming-but-hill-and-allies-see-March 7, 2023, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/03/07/big-aukus-news-coming-but-hill-and-allies-see-
tech-sharing-snags/. tech-sharing-snags/.
16 The USN currently manages programs for developing UUVs designated as small (0-45 feet in length), medium (45-190 feet in length), and large (200-300 feet in length) UUVs. See CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface
and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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useful for all three countries and that have particular relevance to the security challenges of the Indo-Pacific.29
Beyond the topics covered by the working groups discussed below, there may be some additional areas in which Pillar 2 work is ongoing or planned. For instance, the AUKUS countries have announced they will “pursue opportunities in Long Range Fires under AUKUS Pillar II in 2024.”30
In addition, the U.S., British, and Australian governments have established a number of initiatives designed to support Pillar 2 efforts as a whole. These include the launch of the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Industry Forum and the AUKUS Defense Investors Network, intended to facilitate coordination between and among defense suppliers, investors, and government organizations across all three nations.31 The AUKUS governments have also announced the commencement of Pillar 2 "innovation challenges,” which “will identify opportunities to harness commercial technologies from all three nations to support advanced capability development under AUKUS.”32
Undersea Capabilities
Undersea capabilities, in the context of AUKUS, refer to systems and technologies that operate underwater but are not manned submarines. To date, the U.S. Navy (USN) has engaged in a number of efforts in this area, including activities focused on the development, procurement, and operation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). UUVs may have applications for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, minesweeping, and other mission sets.33 The other AUKUS nations are also developing and fielding UUV capabilities.34
The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have announced a number of Pillar 2 efforts relating to undersea capabilities. These include the “AUKUS Maritime Autonomy Experimentation and Exercise Series,” which the three governments have described as “a series of integrated trilateral experiments and exercises aimed at enhancing capability development, improving interoperability, and increasing the sophistication and scale of autonomous systems in the maritime domain.”35 The AUKUS governments are also working on the ability to deploy and recover UUVs from manned submarines (sometimes referred to as “launch and recovery”), conducting activities to develop and improve “the ability to launch and recover undersea vehicles
29 Joseph Clark, “AUKUS Partners Focus on Indo-Pacific Security in Shaping Joint Capabilities,” DOD News, April 10, 2024. Available at https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3737569/aukus-partners-focus-on-indo-pacific-security-in-shaping-joint-capabilities/.
30 “AUKUS Defense Ministers' Joint Statement,” Department of Defense, April 8, 2024, available at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3733790/aukus-defense-ministers-joint-statement/.
31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 The USN currently manages programs for developing UUVs designated as small (0-45 feet in length), medium (45-190 feet in length), and large (200-300 feet in length) UUVs. See CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
34 See, for example, “UK Royal Navy Acquires Latest Generation REMUS 100s,” HII Press Release, September 21, 2022 at https://hii.com/news/united-kingdom-royal-navy-acquires-remus-100-unmanned-underwater-vehicle/, and Patrick Tucker, “Australia Got a New Sub Drone Far Faster than the US Navy Could Have, Company Says,” Defense One, April 24, 2024, at https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/04/australia-got-new-sub-drone-far-faster-us-navy-could-have-company-says/.
35 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
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from torpedo tubes on current classes of submarines to deliver effects such as strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.”36 In November 2023, DOD announced that the AUKUS partners had participated in a joint exercise to demonstrate and improve capabilities relating to the protection of underwater infrastructure and the use of autonomous and semi-autonomous undersea systems.37
Quantum Technologies
In the context of defense, quantum technologies are those that use the principles of quantum physics (e.g., superposition, quantum bits, and entanglement) to create, enhance, or support military capabilities.38 Quantum technologies have a variety of potential applications, including the improvement of communication systems, sensor capabilities, and information processing and security.39
As part of the Quantum Technologies working group, the AUKUS nations have established the AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA), an initiative to coordinate U.S., British, and Australian RDT&E efforts concerning quantum technologies. Initial AQuA efforts were expected to focus on developing alternate solutions for position, navigation, and timing (similar to current Global Positioning System capability) through trials and experimentation through 2025.40 Additionally, the AUKUS governments announced in December 2023 that they were “accelerating the development of quantum technologies for positioning, navigation, and timing in military capabilities,” with a particular focus on improving “resilience for our trilateral forces in Global Positioning System-degraded environments and… stealth in the undersea domain.”41
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
Definitions of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy vary. One definition— codified at 15 U.S.C. §9401, and used across the U.S. government—states that:
The term "artificial intelligence" means a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual environments. Artificial intelligence systems use machine and human-based inputs to-
(A) perceive real and virtual environments;
(B) abstract such perceptions into models through analysis in an automated manner; and
(C) use model inference to formulate options for information or action.42
36 Ibid. 37 Department of Defense, “New Uncrewed Undersea Capabilities Strengthen AUKUS Partnership,” press release, November 13, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3586592/new-uncrewed-undersea-capabilities-strengthen-aukus-partnership/.
38 For more information on the defense applications of quantum technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer: Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler.
39 Ibid. 40 The White House, “AUKUS Fact Sheet,”, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
41 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
42 15 U.S.C. §9401(3). This definition is also adopted by Executive Order 14110, "Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence," 88 Federal Register 75191, November 1, 2023.
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Within DOD, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (CDAO) is responsible for a number of AI and autonomy-related functions, including developing DOD strategy for data, analytics, and AI, creating enabling infrastructure and services, scaling certain “digital and AI-enabled solutions,” and deploying AI and related services for crisis response.43 Other recent U.S. government AI efforts with defense implications include Executive Order 14110 of October 30, 2023 (“Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence”).44
The other AUKUS nations have been adopting similarly broad approaches to AI and autonomy: the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD) released a “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy” in June 2022, and the Australian government published “Australia’s AI Action Plan” in June 2021.45
According to the White House, the AUKUS Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group aims to “improv[e] the speed and precision of decision-making processes to maintain a capability edge and defend against AI-enabled threats.”46 In December 2023, the AUKUS governments announced that they were “delivering artificial intelligence algorithms and machine learning to enhance force protection, precision targeting, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” through an effort called Resilient and Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Technologies. 47 The announcement also stated that the U.S., British, and Australian militaries had “demonstrated and will deploy common advanced artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms on multiple systems, including P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft, to process data from each nation's sonobuoys.”48
Advanced Cyber
DOD’s cyber operations are diverse, consisting of military, intelligence, and business activities conducted in or through cyberspace—the information network encompassing the internet, other telecommunications connections, and computer systems.49 Cyber capabilities have become an enduring focus for all three AUKUS nations, especially given the intensification of the threat environment in what DOD refers to as the “cyber domain.”50 The unclassified summary of DOD’s 2023 Cyber Strategy identifies four lines of effort: 1) defend the nation; 2) prepare to fight and
43 Department of Defense, “Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office,” at https://www.ai.mil/. For additional information concerning DOD’s approach to AI, see Department of Defense, 2023 Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy, June 27, 2023, at https://media.defense.gov/2023/nov/02/2003333300/-1/-1/1/dod_data_analytics_ai_adoption_strategy.pdf.
44 For more information, refer to CRS Report R47843, Highlights of the 2023 Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence for Congress, by Laurie Harris and Chris Jaikaran and CRS Insight IN12286, The AI Executive Order and Its Potential Implications for DOD, by Alexandra G. Neenan and Kelley M. Sayler.
45 See “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” UK Ministry of Defence, June 15, 2022, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-artificial-intelligence-strategy, and “Australia’s AI Action Plan,” Australian Government, June 2021, at https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20220816053410/https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/australias-artificial-intelligence-action-plan.
46 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
47 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
48 Ibid. 49 For more information on cyber capabilities and operations, see CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary.
50 A November 2022 Government Accountability Office report found that DOD experienced over 12,000 cyber incidents since 2015. U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Cybersecurity: Enhanced Attention Needed to Ensure Cyber Incidents Are Appropriately Reported and Shared, GAO-23-105084, November 14, 2022, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105084.
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win the nation’s wars; 3) protect the cyber domain with allies and partners; and 4) build enduring advantages in cyberspace.51
The UK and Australia have also developed cybersecurity strategies: the British government released its National Cyber Strategy 2022 in December 2022, and the Australian government released its 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy in November 2023.52
To date, work in the Advanced Cyber area appears to have focused on cybersecurity. According to a joint statement released by the AUKUS defense ministers in December 2023:
Trilaterally, AUKUS partners are engaging on cyber security with critical suppliers to the naval supply chain. We are collaborating with industry partners to deploy some advanced tooling which will uplift the cyber security of our supply chains, while also giving us greater insight into the threats to AUKUS. The AUKUS partners are also working to strengthen cyber capabilities, including protecting critical communication and operations' systems.53
Given the increasing centrality of networked communications to military operations, the scope of the Advanced Cyber working group may encompass many different platforms, systems, and functions.54
Hypersonic and Counter-Hypersonic Capabilities
Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities refer to maneuverable weapons that fly at speeds of Mach 5 or greater, or systems intended to counter such weapons.55 The speed and maneuverability of these missiles, coupled with their low flying altitude, make them more difficult to detect and neutralize than ballistic missiles.56 The U.S. DOD currently manages a number of programs intended to develop conventionally armed hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic defensive capabilities.57 The British and Australian governments also pursued the development of hypersonic capabilities prior to the establishment of the AUKUS pact,
51 Department of Defense, Unclassified Summary of the 2023 Cyber Strategy, September 2023, at https://media.defense.gov/2023/Sep/12/2003299076/-1/-1/1/2023_DOD_Cyber_Strategy_Summary.pdf.
52 National Cyber Strategy 2022, UK Government, December 15, 2022, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-strategy-2022/national-cyber-security-strategy-2022; and 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy, Australian Government, November 22, 2023, available at https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/cyber-security/strategy/2023-2030-australian-cyber-security-strategy.
53 “AUKUS Defense Ministers Meeting Joint Statement,” press release, December 1, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3604511/aukus-defense-ministers-meeting-joint-statement/.
54 See, for instance, Stew Magnuson, “AUKUS Agreement Poses Cybersecurity Risks to Allies,” National Defense, September 29, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/9/29/aukus-agreement-poses-cybersecurity-risk-to-allies.
55 For more information on hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
56 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” press release, March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
57 These include the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, the Air Force’s Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, and DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide. See CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.
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including—in the case of Australia—bilateral hypersonic-focused cooperation with the United States.58
In April 2022, the White House announced that the AUKUS partners would “work together to accelerate development of advanced hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities” under AUKUS Pillar 2.59 Few details about this working group are publicly available; however, some analysts have speculated that Australia’s missile testing infrastructure—including a newly opened “Hypersonic Research Precinct” in Brisbane, Australia—could feature significantly in initial projects.60 Some media outlets have also reported that the UK may seek to buy “a strategic Hypersonic Glide Vehicle via AUKUS.”61 Other reporting has suggested that Australia and the United States may increase the extent of their RDT&E collaboration on hypersonics and look to conduct more joint experimentation.62
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) refers to activities that manipulate and control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)—a range of frequencies for electromagnetic energy—for military purposes. The U.S. DOD, UK MOD, and Australian DOD have each engaged in electronic warfare operations and programs since World War II, and a wide number of organizations in each nation’s defense establishment operate and develop electronic warfare capabilities.63
EW was added to the scope of AUKUS Pillar 2 in April 2022. According to the White House, this working group will aim to “share understanding of tools, techniques, and technology to enable our forces to operate in contested and degraded environments.”64 Opportunities for the EW working group may include electronic protection, electronic attack, and electronic support (i.e., intelligence collection and analysis of the EMS that supports other EW operations), all of which strengthen the ability to operate in a contested EMS environment. These EW opportunities are particularly relevant given that all three AUKUS nations are to operate the U.S. Air Force E-7 Wedgetail, an airborne EW platform.65
58 Bilateral U.S.-Australia hypersonics efforts include the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) and Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) programs. See “Department of Defense Announces New Allied Prototyping Initiative Effort With Australia to Continue Partnership in Developing Air Breathing Hypersonic Vehicles,” DOD press release, November 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2429061/department-of-defense-announces-new-allied-prototyping-initiative-effort-with-a/.
59 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
60 See Mikayla Easley, “AUKUS Partners Aim to Catch China in Hypersonics Race,” National Defense, February 17, 2023, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/17/aukus-partners-aim-to-catch-china-in-hypersonics-race.
61 Tony Osborne, “UK Plans £1 Billion Effort to Secure Hypersonic Weapon Capacity,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2023 at https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/uk-plans-ps1-billion-effort-secure-hypersonic-weapon-capacity.
62 Courtney Albon, “US, Australia Eye Joint Hypersonics Experiments in 2024,” C4ISRNET, December 3, 2023, available at https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/hypersonics/2023/12/03/us-australia-eye-joint-hypersonics-experiments-in-2024/.
63 For more information on electronic warfare, see CRS In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare. 64 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
65 See “E-7A AEW&C,” Boeing, at https://www.boeing.com/defense/e-7-airborne-early-warning-and-control/.
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Innovation
As a functional area of defense collaboration, innovation is more difficult to define than the technological areas identified above. Broadly speaking, defense innovation refers to purposeful changes in the technologies, operations, processes, or organizations employed by governments for military purposes.66
According to the White House, the Innovation working group will seek to “accelerate our respective defense innovation enterprises and learn from one another, including ways to more rapidly integrate commercial technologies to solve warfighting needs.”67 This may include increased collaboration between the U.S. DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Defense Advanced Research and Development Projects Agency (DARPA), and service RDT&E organizations, on the one hand, and analogous British and Australian organizations (e.g., the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratories and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group), on the other.68
Information Sharing
According to the White House, the Information Sharing working group will “will expand and accelerate sharing of sensitive information, including as a first priority enabling workstreams that underpin our work on agreed areas of advanced capabilities [i.e., the other working groups].” The AUKUS nations have a long history of sharing information on defense through a variety of fora such as the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance.69
Issues for Congress Congress may consider options for modifying U.S. export controls and resourcing and overseeing AUKUS Pillar 2 activities. Particular issues include
• whether or not to modify U.S. arms export control laws, regulations, or policies; • how much funding (if any) to appropriate specifically for Pillar 2 activities; • how to assess Pillar 2 progress and measure outcomes; • whether or not to modify the technological and functional scope of Pillar 2
working groups; and
• whether or not to expand participation in Pillar 2 activities beyond the current
AUKUS members.
66 See P.M. Picucci et al., “Categorizing Defense Innovation,” Defense Acquisition University, March 9, 2021, at https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/blog/Categorizing-Defense-Innovation.
67 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
68 For more information on British and Australian programs, see “MOD Innovation,” UK Government, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553429/MOD_SB_Innovation_Initiative_Brochure_v21_web.pdf, and “Defence Innovation,” Australian Government, at https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/strategy/defence-science-and-technology-strategy-2030.
69 In addition to the three AUKUS nations, FVEY includes Canada and New Zealand. Some experts see FVEY as a model—or additional mechanism—for AUKUS information sharing.
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U.S. Export Controls From the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, some analysts, policymakers, and Members of Congress have argued that the U.S. export control regime hampers effective technological and industrial cooperation between the United States, Australia, and the UK.70 According to this view, the array of U.S. laws, regulations, and policies governing defense exports—particularly the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA; codified as 22 U.S.C. §2751 et seq.) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR—may slow or even prevent legitimate transfers of equipment or information necessary to accomplish AUKUS objectives.71 On the other hand, existing export controls may be necessary to protect sensitive U.S. technology and information from potential disclosure to adversaries or malicious actors. Because its aims, activities, and participants are more diffuse than those of Pillar 1, Pillar 2 may be more comprehensively affected by export controls and has tended to feature more centrally in public discourse surrounding this issue.72
As noted, the FY2024 NDAA included a number of provisions addressing AUKUS Pillar 2, including some that modified U.S. export controls (for a detailed list, see Table A-1). Key developments include:
• The creation of new responsibilities and requirements for executive branch
management of U.S. participation in AUKUS;
• The prioritization of Australia and the UK in the FMS and DCS processes, as
well as the pre-clearance of certain items for provision to Australia and the UK;
• The conditional exemption of Australia and the UK from arms export
licensing/other approval requirements.
The conditional exemption of AUKUS members from U.S. arms export licensing/approval requirements depends on a Department of State determination that the defense export control regimes of Australia and the UK are “comparable” to that of the United States. Per the FY2024 NDAA, the deadline to make such a determination was April 19, 2024; however, the State Department was not able to make a positive determination by that date, and reportedly expects to make such a determination by August 17, 2024.73 Some Members and other stakeholders have criticized this deferral: for example, Representative Michael McCaul—the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—described the development as “very unfortunate,” and Senator Jim
70 For examples that predate the enactment of the FY2024 NDAA, see: Background and Issues for Congress
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, minesweeping, and other missions.17 The other AUKUS nations are also developing UUV capabilities: the UK’s Royal Navy (RN) has acquired a number of REMUS 100 small UUVs, and the RAN has initiated developmental partnerships with several defense companies for large and extra-large UUVs.18 The development of UUVs is part of a broader push by various militaries to adopt robotics for naval purposes. For example, in March 2023 congressional testimony, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated that “in the future, you’ll see maybe a third or more of the United States Navy or the Chinese Navy or the Russian Navy, those will be unmanned maritime vessels, unmanned sub vessels, and so on.”19
Through the Undersea Capabilities working group, the USN, RN, and RAN have established the AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS) project, an initiative to jointly develop and field autonomous underwater vehicles. The White House has said that it intends for this initiative to function as “a significant force multiplier for [AUKUS] maritime forces,” and that as of April 2022 it expected to begin initial trials and experimentation in 2023.20 In addition, the FY2024 President’s budget request for DOD included $10 million to develop “mission payloads for UUVs” as part of a $25 million request for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.”21 Although the precise connection to the Undersea Capabilities working group is unclear from publicly available information, the Australian government and U.S. company Anduril Industries have undertaken a partnership to deliver three extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle prototypes to the RAN by 2025.22
Quantum Technologies
In the context of defense policy, quantum technologies are those that use the principles of quantum physics (e.g., superposition, quantum bits, and entanglement) to create or enhance military capabilities.23 Quantum technologies have a variety of potential applications, including the improvement of communication systems, sensor capabilities, and information processing and security.24 One recent quantum-focused initiative in the United States is the 2018 National Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), which created a framework for a whole-of-government
17 For more information on current and potential military applications of UUVs, see Bradley Martin et al., “Advancing Autonomous Systems: An Analysis of Current and Future Technology for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles,” RAND Corporation, 2019, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2751.html.
18 See “UK Royal Navy Acquires Latest Generation REMUS 100s,” HII Press Release, September 21, 2022 at https://hii.com/news/united-kingdom-royal-navy-acquires-remus-100-unmanned-underwater-vehicle/, and Ridzwan Rahmat, “Indo Pacific 2022: Royal Australian Navy breaks cover on Speartooth large unmanned underwater vehicle,” Jane’s, May 11, 2022, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/indo-pacific-2022-royal-australian-navy-breaks-cover-on-speartooth-large-unmanned-underwater-vehicle.
19 “House Armed Services Committee Hearing on FY2024 DOD Budget Request,” March 29, 2023, transcript available through CQ at https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7702490?4.
20 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
21 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 466, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
22 See “Ghost Shark a Stealthy ‘Game-Changer,’” Australian Department of Defence, December 14, 2022, at https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-12-14/ghost-shark-stealthy-game-changer.
23 For more information on defense applications of quantum technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer:
Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler.
24 “NATO Exploring Quantum Technology for Future Challenges,” NATO, October 14, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/articles/nato-exploring-quantum-technology-future-challenges.
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effort “to accelerate quantum research and development for the economic and national security of the United States.” Another recent quantum-focused initiative is the Defense Quantum Information Science and Technology Research and Development Program, established by the FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232) to coordinate research and development efforts for quantum sciences and to provide for interagency collaboration. In a manner similar to U.S. efforts, both the British and Australian governments have undertaken activities to increase cooperation among government and industry to research and develop quantum technologies.25
As part of the Quantum Technologies working group, the AUKUS nations have established the AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA), an initiative to coordinate U.S., British, and Australian RDT&E efforts concerning quantum technologies. Initial AQuA efforts are expected to focus on developing alternate solutions for position, navigation, and timing (similar to current global positioning system [GPS] capability) through trials and experimentation through 2025.26
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
Definitions of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy vary. In a defense context, the terms typically refer to technologies that can perform tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight, in a manner that replicates certain human qualities (e.g., learning from experience).27 AI has extremely diverse defense applications that span many different functional areas. As a result, the U.S. DOD has established a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) to manage the development and implementation of AI strategy and programs across the department.28 As of June 2021, the JAIC had accomplished this in part by managing six AI “mission initiatives” covering different topic areas.29 The other AUKUS nations have been adopting similarly broad approaches to AI and autonomy: the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (MOD) released a “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy” in June 2022, and the Australian government published “Australia’s AI Action Plan” in June 2021.30
According to the White House, the AUKUS Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group will focus on “improving the speed and precision of decision-making processes to maintain a
25 Australia launched the National Quantum Strategy in 2021, and the UK established the National Quantum Technologies Programme in 2013. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Quantum Technologies, RAND Corporation, RAND Alliance Initiative, Santa Monica, CA.
26 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
27 See, for instance, definitions of AI adopted by Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-232, the 2018 DOD AI Strategy, and Section 5002 of the FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283. For more information on AI and autonomy in a military context, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.
28 Summary of the 2018 DOD AI Strategy, https://media.defense.gov/2019/feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/summary-of-dod-ai-strategy.pdf. U.S. Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-Responsible-Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.pdf.
29 These mission initiatives are Health and Business Processes; Joint Logistics; Joint Force Protection; Joint Information Warfare; Academic/Industry Engagement; and Joint Command and Control, Maneuver, and Fires. See “Artificial Intelligence,” Government Accountability Office, March 2022, p. 14, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105834.pdf.
30 See “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” UK Ministry of Defence, June 15, 2022, at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-artificial-intelligence-strategy, and “Australia’s AI Action Plan,” Australian Government, June 2021, at https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20220816053410/https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-publications/australias-artificial-intelligence-action-plan.
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capability edge and defend against AI-enabled threats.”31 In addition, the FY2024 President’s budget request for DOD included $5 million to develop an “Artificial Intelligence Development Hub” as part of the broader request for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.”32 Based on publicly available information, it is unclear to what degree the remit of the Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group may overlap with the development of unmanned systems under the Undersea Capabilities working group.
Advanced Cyber
DOD’s cyber operations are diverse, consisting of military, intelligence, and business activities conducted in or through cyberspace—the information network encompassing the internet, other telecommunications connections, and computer systems.33 Cyber capabilities have become an enduring focus for all three AUKUS nations, especially given the intensification of the threat environment in what DOD refers to as the “cyber domain.”34 DOD’s 2018 Cyber Strategy identifies five “cyberspace objectives”: (1) enable the military to prevail in a contested cyberspace environment, (2) conduct cyber operations to enhance U.S. national advantage, (3) protect critical infrastructure from cyberattack, (4) protect DOD information and systems from cyberattack, and (5) expand cyber cooperation.35 Australia and the UK have outlined strategies focused on increasing cyber resilience to enable both commercial and defense activities. In April 2023, the UK disclosed the existence of a National Cyber Force (NCF), which has advanced defensive and offensive cyber operations capabilities.36
According to the White House, the Advanced Cyber working group will seek to “strengthen cyber capabilities, including protecting critical communications and operations systems.”37 Given the increasing centrality of networked communications to military operations, the scope of the Advanced Cyber working group may encompass many different platforms, systems, and functions. Some analysts have argued that cybersecurity will be a critical enabler of other AUKUS working groups, particularly for information sharing.38 In addition, the FY2024 President’s budget request for DOD included $6 million for “Cyber Capability Development” under the “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives” program element.39
31 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
32 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 409, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
33 For more information on cyber capabilities and operations, see CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace
Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary.
34 A November 2022 Government Accountability Office report found that DOD experienced over 12,000 cyber incidents since 2015; see https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105084.
35 Department of Defense, “Summary: Deparment of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018,” at https://media.defense.gov/2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.
36 Kevin Poireault, “UK Discloses Offensive Cyber Capabilities Principles,” Info Security Magazine, April 5, 2023, https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/uk-offensive-cyber-capabilities/.
37 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
38 See Stew Magnuson, “AUKUS Agreement Poses Cybersecurity Risks to Allies,” National Defense, September 29, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/9/29/aukus-agreement-poses-cybersecurity-risk-to-allies.
39 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 466, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
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Hypersonic and Counter-Hypersonic Capabilities
Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities refer to maneuverable weapons that fly at speeds of Mach 5 or greater, or systems intended to counter such weapons.40 The speed and maneuverability of these missiles, coupled with their low flying altitude, make them more difficult to detect and neutralize than ballistic missiles.41 The U.S. DOD currently manages a number of programs intended to develop conventionally armed hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic defensive capabilities.42 The British and Australian governments also pursued the development of hypersonic capabilities prior to the establishment of the AUKUS pact, including—in the case of Australia—bilateral hypersonic-focused cooperation with the United States.43
In April 2022, the White House announced that the AUKUS partners would “work together to accelerate development of advanced hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities” under AUKUS Pillar 2.44 Few details about this working group are publicly available; however, some analysts have speculated that Australia’s missile testing infrastructure—including a newly opened “Hypersonic Research Precinct” in Brisbane, Australia—could feature significantly in initial projects.45
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) refers to activities that manipulate and control the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)—a range of frequencies for electromagnetic energy—for military purposes. The U.S. DOD, UK MOD, and Australian DOD have each engaged in electronic warfare operations and programs since World War II, and a wide number of organizations in each nation’s defense establishment operate and develop electronic warfare capabilities.46
EW was added to the scope of AUKUS Pillar 2 in April 2022. According to the White House, this working group will aim to “share understanding of tools, techniques, and technology to enable our forces to operate in contested and degraded environments.”47 Opportunities for the EW working group may include electronic protection, electronic attack, and electronic support (i.e.,
40 For more information on hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
41 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” press release, March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/.
42 These include the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, the Air Force’s Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, and DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide. See CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.
43 Bilateral U.S.-Australia hypersonics efforts include the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) and Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) programs. See “Department of Defense Announces New Allied Prototyping Initiative Effort With Australia to Continue Partnership in Developing Air Breathing Hypersonic Vehicles,” DOD press release, November 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2429061/department-of-defense-announces-new-allied-prototyping-initiative-effort-with-a/.
44 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
45 See Mikayla Easley, “AUKUS Partners Aim to Catch China in Hypersonics Race,” National Defense, February 17, 2023, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/17/aukus-partners-aim-to-catch-china-in-hypersonics-race.
46 For more information on electronic warfare, see CRS In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare. 47 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
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intelligence collection and analysis of the EMS that supports other EW operations), all of which strengthen the ability to operate in a contested EMS environment. These EW opportunities are particularly relevant given that all three AUKUS nations are to operate the U.S. Air Force E-7 Wedgetail, an airborne EW platform. 48
Innovation
As a functional area of defense collaboration, innovation is more difficult to define than the technological areas identified above. Broadly speaking, defense innovation refers to purposeful changes in the technologies, operations, processes, or organizations employed by governments for military purposes.49
According to the White House, the Innovation working group will seek to “accelerate our respective defense innovation enterprises and learn from one another, including ways to more rapidly integrate commercial technologies to solve warfighting needs.”50 This may include increased collaboration between the U.S. DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Defense Advanced Research and Development Projects Agency (DARPA), and service RDT&E organizations, on the one hand, and analogous British and Australian organizations (e.g., the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratories and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group), on the other.51 In addition, the President’s FY2024 budget request for DOD included $25 million for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.”52 The new initiative includes proposed funding for efforts in AI, cyber, UUVs, enhanced battlespace awareness, and engineering and architecture studies.53
Information Sharing
According to the White House, the Information Sharing working group will “will expand and accelerate sharing of sensitive information, including as a first priority enabling workstreams that underpin our work on agreed areas of advanced capabilities [i.e., the other working groups].” The AUKUS nations have a long history of sharing information on defense, most notably through the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance.54
48 See “E-7A AEW&C,” Boeing, at https://www.boeing.com/defense/e-7-airborne-early-warning-and-control/. 49 See P.M. Picucci et al., “Categorizing Defense Innovation,” Defense Acquisition University, March 9, 2021, at https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/blog/Categorizing-Defense-Innovation.
50 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
51 For more information on British and Australian programs, see “MOD Innovation,” UK Government, at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553429/MOD_SB_Innovation_Initiative_Brochure_v21_web.pdf, and “Defence Innovation,” Australian Government, at https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/strategy/defence-science-and-technology-strategy-2030.
52 This request includes funding for UUV and AI applications mentioned above. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Research Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide,” March 2023, accessed at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/FY2024_r1.pdf, p.61.
53 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 466, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
54 In addition to the three AUKUS nations, FVEY includes Canada and New Zealand. Some experts see FVEY as a model—or additional mechanism—for AUKUS information sharing.
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According to some analysts, this working group could seek to address barriers to trilateral information sharing, such as export controls, classification more generally, and bureaucratic cultures that prioritize risk aversion when it comes to sharing controlled information.55
Issues for Congress
Congress may consider options for modifying U.S. export controls and exercising oversight of the AUKUS Pillar 2 working groups. Particular issues include:
• whether and how to modify U.S. export control laws and regulations; • options to assess progress and measure outcomes; • whether to modify the technological and functional scope of Pillar 2 working
groups; and
• whether to expand participation in Pillar 2 activities beyond the current AUKUS
members.
Each of these topics is discussed in more detail below.
U.S. Export Control Laws and Regulations
A number of analysts and policymakers—including some Members of Congress—have argued that the current U.S. export control regime may hamper effective technological and industrial cooperation between the AUKUS partners.56 From this point of view, the existing array of U.S. laws, regulations, and policies restricting defense exports may impede AUKUS Pillar 2 efforts by barring or disincentivizing contractors from establishing joint projects, thereby delaying the commencement and execution of work and imposing undue administrative burdens on participating organizations.57
Much of this concern has focused on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set of regulations concerning the export of defense articles and services. Established to implement the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, codified at 22 U.S.C. §§2751 et seq.), ITAR restricts the transfer of controlled defense articles and services (i.e., those that appear on the United States Munitions List, or USML) to non-U.S. persons.58 To comply with ITAR, companies wishing to export controlled articles or services must obtain licenses or other authorization from the U.S. Department of State (DOS). Some analysts contend that this process is overly complex and onerous, arguing that—in combination with the significant legal and financial consequences of violating the ITAR—it can hinder legitimate cooperation efforts.59 Characterizing the issue in an
55 Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Alan Tidwell, “Making AUKUS Work,” RAND Corporation, March 22, 2022, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/making-aukus-work.html.
56 Rachel Oswald, “Lawmakers Seek to Ease Defense Export Controls to UK, Australia,” Rachel Oswald, “Lawmakers Seek to Ease Defense Export Controls to UK, Australia,”
Roll Call, May 23, 2023, , May 23, 2023,
available online at https://rollcall.com/2023/05/23/lawmakers-seek-to-ease-defense-export-controls-to-uk-australia/https://rollcall.com/2023/05/23/lawmakers-seek-to-ease-defense-export-controls-to-uk-australia/
.
57 See, for instance,; and Rajiv Shah, “U.S. Export Rules Need Major Reform if AUKUS is to Succeed,” Rajiv Shah, “U.S. Export Rules Need Major Reform if AUKUS is to Succeed,”
Australian
Strategic Policy Institute: The Strategist, February 16, 2023, , February 16, 2023,
available online at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-export-rules-need-https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-export-rules-need-
major-reform-if-aukus-is-to-succeed/. major-reform-if-aukus-is-to-succeed/.
58 ITAR is available at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-I/subchapter-M. It71 The ITAR implements Section 38 of the implements Section 38 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2778) and authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2778) and authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense
articles and defense services. articles and defense services.
59 See, for instance, Rajiv Shah, “U.S. Export Rules Need Major Reform if AUKUS is to Succeed,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 16, 2023, at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-export-rules-need-major-reform-if-aukus-is-to-succeed/, and Alan Dupont, “Failure Not An Option in this Generational Opportunity,” The Australian, (continued...)
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April 2023 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on AUKUS, Representative Michael McCaul asserted that “ITAR is a big issue, and it’s prohibiting our ability [sic] to make weapons with our closest allies in a very expeditious way.”60
On the other hand, some experts have argued that the current U.S. export control regime does not create significant barriers to AUKUS Pillar 2 activities. A March 2023 Defense News article quoted an anonymous DOS official as saying that the department does “not anticipate any challenges in implementing AUKUS due to U.S. export control regulations, which exist to safeguard U.S. technologies and maintain the U.S. warfighter’s qualitative edge.”61
To address perceived issues with U.S. export controls in the context of AUKUS efforts, several analysts and policymakers have proposed remedies. Some have advocated for the total exemption of AUKUS participants from ITAR, while others have advanced more modest changes to the technology-sharing and export approval processes.62 In addition, some have pointed to precedents in Cold War-era frameworks that allowed the United States to share sensitive nuclear information with the United Kingdom.63
In 2023, the executive branch initiated a number of efforts to align U.S. export control administration with AUKUS goals. In a May 2023 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, DOS’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Assistant Secretary Jessica Lewis described three broad efforts:
First, the AUKUS trade authorization mechanism, known as ATAM, legislative changes and international consultations. The Department of State will implement a novel use of our existing authorities [and pursue an] interim solution, expediting and optimizing technology sharing and defense trade among only the AUKUS partners. Second and simultaneously, the administration plans to consult closely with Congress and propose legislative changes to meet the ambitions of AUKUS…. Under this legislative proposal, AUKUS partners will have many transfers pre-approved and not subject to case by case review. Third, the administration will also be seeking commitments from our AUKUS partners on shared standards for protection of defense, information, and material.64
In 2023, two bills addressing these issues were introduced in the 118th Congress: H.R. 1093 and S. 1471. H.R. 1093 would “direct the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report on implementation of the advanced capabilities pillar of the [AUKUS] trilateral security partnership.” The report would provide information on a number of issues relating to export controls, including
March 18, 2023, at https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/aukus-failure-not-an-option-in-this-generational-opportunity/news-story/00d638abe9b939a56f6f730d00beae49.
60 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on AUKUS and Arms Exports Modernization,” April 18, 2023, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hfac-member-roundtable-on-aukus-and-arms-exports-modernization/.
61 Bryant Harris, “Congress lays Groundwork for AUKUS Export Control Reform,” Defense News, March 22, 2023. 62 For a version of the first position, see James Carouso et al., “ITAR Should End for Australia,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 7, 2022, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/itar-should-end-australia. For a version of the second, see Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner’s comments highlighting a “live evolution of processes around technology sharing” in the context of AUKUS. “Building a More Resilient Indo-Pacific Security Architecture,” DOD, March 2, 2023 at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3318943/building-a-more-resilient-indo-pacific-security-architecture-a-conversation-wit/.
63 See, for example, Rep. Joe Courtney, “Rep. Joe Courtney: To Make AUKUS work, Congress should look to the Past,” Breaking Defense, January 11, 2023, at https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/rep-joe-courtney-to-make-aukus-work-congress-should-look-to-the-past/.
64 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Modernizing U.S. Arms Exports and a Stronger AUKUS,” May 24 2023, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/modernizing-u-s-arms-exports-and-a-stronger-aukus/.
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• wait times, volume, and denials of/modifications to applications for U.S. defense
exports and foreign military sales to the United Kingdom and Australia in calendar years 2021 and 2022;
• ITAR violations involving the United Kingdom and Australia from FY2017 to
FY2022; and
• recommendations to improve existing U.S. export controls and regulations to
implement the AUKUS partnership.
S. 1471 would make a number of changes to the processes and programs enabling AUKUS-related functions, including
• designating the UK and Australia as domestic sources for the purposes of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.);
• exempting defense exports to the UK and Australia from certain licensing
requirements;65
• exempting the UK and Australia from certain arms transfer-related certification
and congressional notification requirements;66
• creating an open general license for defense exports to the UK and Australia; • expediting the release of certain advanced technologies to the UK and Australia
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process;
• requiring reports on AUKUS strategy, implementation, impacts to U.S. military
readiness, and recommended changes to export control regimes; and
• creating an “AUKUS Senior Advisor” position at the DOS and authorizing the
use of existing DOS funds to hire additional personnel to review export license applications.
In addition, DOS has announced it will socialize draft legislative proposals to inform congressional deliberations (pursuant to Assistant Secretary Lewis’ remarks quoted above). Congress may consider these modifications alongside other options, including other reforms to the AECA and direction to DOD and/or DOS to develop administrative options to facilitate trilateral cooperative efforts under AUKUS Pillar 2.
Oversight of AUKUS Pillar 2 Activities
The scale and diversity of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities may present administrative challenges for the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Each technological and functional area is relatively broad, involving an array of different programs, stakeholders, and potential applications.67
65 This could be enacted as an amendment of Section 38(j)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (codified at 22 U.S.C. 2778(j)(1).
66 This could be enacted as an amendment of Section 38(f)(3) of the Arms Export Control Act (codified at 22 U.S.C. 2778(f)(3).
67 To take the Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group as an example, DOD’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center has identified six broad and disparate AI “mission initiatives,” and a 2022 Government Accountability Office found 10 separate AI strategies across DOD. See “Artificial Intelligence: DOD should Improve Strategies, Inventory Process, and Collaboration Guidance,” Government Accountability Office, March 2022, pp. 18-21, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105834.pdf.
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Given the relevance of AUKUS to many congressional priorities, Congress may seek to exercise oversight of DOD, DOS, and other executive agencies’ coordination of the working groups in a number of areas, three of which are discussed below.
Assessing Progress and Measuring Outcomes
Congress may consider ways to assess the progress of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities and to measure their outcomes against strategic and operational objectives. For example, Congress could establish periodic reporting requirements for DOD and DOS that address Pillar 2-specific progress and outcomes. Depending on the alignment of existing executive branch guidance with congressional priorities, Congress may also consider whether to use legislation (or accompanying explanatory statements) to direct DOD, DOS, or other relevant executive organizations to modify processes or programs to better accomplish Pillar 2 objectives.
Modifying Technological and Functional Coverage
As AUKUS activities continue, Congress may consider whether additional technological or functional areas should be included under Pillar 2, either through the creation of new working groups or the assignment of new topics to existing ones. Congress may also assess whether any of the currently identified technological or functional working groups are underperforming or conducting activities that are superfluous to U.S. defense requirements, which may suggest a need to narrow existing scopes. The import of such assessments may grow as the amount of U.S. resources devoted to Pillar 2 activities increases.
Expanding AUKUS Pillar 2 to Include Additional Countries
Congress may also consider whether to direct DOD and DOS to expand AUKUS Pillar 2 to include additional countries, especially New Zealand and Canada (the other two members of the Five Eyes intelligence pact). A number of analysts have argued for the inclusion of New Zealand on strategic grounds, and the country’s Defence Minister has stated that his government has “been offered the opportunity … and would be willing to explore it.”68 Another candidate may be Canada: in May 2023, a Canadian newspaper reported that Canada was seeking to join Pillar 2, and some analysts have argued the country’s addition would strengthen AUKUS efforts relating to critical minerals, AI, cybersecurity, and Arctic-focused domain awareness capabilities.69 Some analysts have also argued for the addition of Japan, given its close security ties to the U.S., technological and industrial capabilities, and geopolitical interests.70
In considering whether it would be in the U.S. interest to expand AUKUS Pillar 2, Congress may weigh the potential benefits, such as new members’ capability and capacity, against the potential
68 “New Zealand may Join AUKUS Pact’s Non-Nuclear Component,” The Guardian, March 27, 2023, at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/new-zealand-may-join-aukus-pacts-non-nuclear-component. For arguments in support of New Zealand membership in Pillar 2, see Reuben Steff, “AUKUS + NZ=Win-Win,” The Lowy Institute, May 1, 2023, at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aukus-nz-win-win.
69 See Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Canada Seeks to Join Non-Nuclear Pillar of AUKUS Alliance,” The Globe and
Mail, May 8, 2023, at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-eyes-entry-into-aukus-alliance-to-help-keep-china-in-check/, and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Canadian Membership in AUKUS: A Time for Action,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9, 2023, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-membership-aukus-time-action.
70 See, for instance, Michael Auslin, “Why Japan Belongs in AUKUS,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2022, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/japan/why-japan-belongs-aukus.
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drawbacks. These latter may include the risk of administrative inefficiencies, negative impacts on U.S. firms (e.g., through increased competition with foreign companies for U.S. defense
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contracts), and geopolitical blowback (i.e., provoking a destabilizing response from regional competitors such as China).
Author Information
Patrick Parrish
Luke A. Nicastro
National Defense Fellow
Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy
Acknowledgments
Bruce Vaughn, former CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs, was the original coordinator of this report. For more information, see CRS Report R46337, Transfer of Defense Articles: U.S. Sale and Export of U.S.-Made Arms to Foreign Entities, coordinated by Christina L. Arabia.
72 For discussion of the export control considerations surrounding Pillar 1, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
73 Lewis Jackson, “U.S. Confident About Meeting New Deadline for UK, Australia AUKUS Exemptions,” Reuters, April 23, 2024, available online at https://www.reuters.com/world/us-confident-about-meeting-new-deadline-uk-australia-aukus-exemptions-2024-04-23/. For more information on this requirement, refer to the entry for Section 1345 of the FY2024 NDAA in Table A-1.
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Risch—the Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—stated that the decision was “deeply misguided and further delays the implementation of AUKUS.”74 On May 1, 2024, the State Department published in the Federal Register a proposed rule that would amend the ITAR to:
include an exemption to the requirement to obtain a license or other approval from the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) prior to any export, reexport, retransfer, or temporary import of defense articles; the performance of defense services; or engagement in brokering activities between or among authorized users within Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.75
According to one State Department official, this rule change “exempts the vast majority of currently licensed defense trade between the United States, the U.K. and Australia.”76
Congress may consider whether to make further changes to the policies, procedures, regulations, or statutes associated with U.S. export controls.
Resourcing and Oversight
Funding for Pillar 2 Activities
The FY2024 President’s budget request included $25 million in DOD Defense-wide Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives,” and the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47) provided $12.5 million for this program.77 P.L. 118-47 also provided a $14.7 million program increase for “AUKUS and coalition warfare” under the Defense Innovation Unit Fielding program.78
The FY2025 President’s budget request includes approximately $79.8 million in Defense-wide Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations for AUKUS under the “International Innovation Initiatives” program.79 According to DOD, this funding would support two Pillar 2-related efforts:
74 Rep. Michael McCaul, “McCaul Statement on Admin Failure to Grant U.K., Australia Critical ITAR Exemption,” April 19, 2024, at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-statement-on-admin-failure-to-grant-u-k-australia-itar-exemption/; and Sen. Jim Risch, “Risch on Administration’s Failure to Certify UK, Australia for ITAR Exemptions,” April 22, 2024, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-on-administrations-failure-to-certify-uk-australia-for-itar-exemptions. For more media coverage of responses to the State Department’s decision, see Colin Clark and Tim Martin, “Is State Dept.’s AUKUS trade certification delay a sign of choppy waters ahead?” Breaking Defense, April 30, 2024, at https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/is-state-dept-s-aukus-trade-certification-delay-a-sign-of-choppy-waters-ahead/.
75 Department of State, “International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Exemption for Defense Trade and Cooperation Among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States,” 89 Federal Register 35028, May 1, 2024.
76 Joe Gould, “G’day, AUKUS Tech-sharing Regs,” Politico Pro Morning Defense, newsletter, May 1, 2024. 77 According to DOD, the AUKUS Innovation Initiative project “provides funding to pursue operationally relevant advanced capability co-development, support integration of multi-national capabilities to act as a force multiplier, and test and evaluate promising solutions found across the AUKUS innovation ecosystem,” and supports AI, UUV, and cyber efforts. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates—Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, March 2023, p. 466, available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf. Submission by Rep. Kay Granger, “Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024,” Explanatory Statement, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 170, part 51 (March 22, 2024), p. H1703.
78 Ibid., p. H1712. 79 This program has the same program element—PE 0603945D8Z—as that used to designate the “AUKUS Innovation (continued...)
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• The development of “a multi-classification level collaborative computing environment to
support efforts under the AUKUS Advanced Capabilities Pillar” ($10 million); and
• The “solicitation, evaluation, merit-based selection, and execution of new projects to get
cutting-edge technological capabilities into the hands of the warfighters,” with planned FY2025 work relating to AI, maritime hypersonic tracking and targeting, and air-launched hypersonic cruise missiles ($69.8 million).80
In addition to AUKUS-specific appropriations, other parts of DOD’s budget may fund U.S. participation in AUKUS Pillar 2 activities. For example, activities conducted under the hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities working group could involve a number of hypersonic-related DOD accounts and program offices that may not be specifically identified in budget documents or elsewhere as AUKUS-related.
Congress may consider whether to make appropriations for Pillar 2 activities, as well as the extent to which its AUKUS priorities may require adjustments to funding levels, both for AUKUS-specific programs and DOD’s broader budget.
Assessing Progress and Measuring Outcomes
Congress may consider ways to assess the progress of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities and to measure their outcomes against strategic and operational objectives. For example, Congress may create or modify reporting requirements for DOD and DOS that address Pillar 2-specific progress and outcomes.81 Depending on the alignment of existing executive branch guidance with congressional priorities, Congress may also consider whether to direct DOD, DOS, or other relevant executive organizations to modify processes or programs to better accomplish Pillar 2 objectives.
Modifying Technological and Functional Coverage
As AUKUS activities continue, Congress may consider whether additional technological or functional areas should be included under Pillar 2, particularly through the creation of new working groups or the assignment of new topics to existing ones (as an example, some analysts have suggested the inclusion of critical minerals as an area for Pillar 2 activities and investments).82 Congress may also assess whether any of the currently identified technological or functional working groups are underperforming or conducting activities that are superfluous to U.S. defense requirements, which may suggest a need to narrow existing scopes. The importance of such assessments may grow as the amount of U.S. resources devoted to Pillar 2 activities increases.
Initiatives” program in the FY2024 budget request. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 Budget Estimates—Justification Book Volume 3 of 5 Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, Defense-Wide, March 2024, pp. 391-395, available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/RDTE_OSD_PB_2025.pdf.
80 Ibid. 81 Congress included a number of Pillar 2-related reporting requirements in the FY2024 NDAA (P.L. 118-31); for details, see Table A-1 in the Appendix to this report.
82 John Coyne, “AUKUS Needs to Focus on Critical Minerals,” Australian Strategy Policy Institute, June 22, 2023, available at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-needs-to-focus-on-critical-minerals/.
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Including Additional Countries
Congress may also consider whether to direct DOD and DOS to expand AUKUS Pillar 2 to include additional countries.
In determining whether this would be in the national interest, Congress may weigh the potential benefits against the potential drawbacks. Supporters of expanding AUKUS have argued that it would strengthen the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific—especially vis-à-vis China—by making additional military, technological, and industrial capabilities available, as well as by strengthening relationships with other regional powers.83 On the other hand, some have claimed that additional members would increase the risk that sensitive U.S. technology or information could fall into adversary hands.84 Others have criticized potential AUKUS expansion as escalatory, suggesting that it could undermine regional stability and provoke a PRC response.85
Several potential additions to Pillar 2 are discussed in brief below.
Japan
In April 2024, the AUKUS governments stated that because of “Japan's strengths and its close bilateral defense partnerships with all three countries, we are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar 2 advanced capability projects.”86 On May 8, 2024, Senators Mitt Romney (UT), Tim Kaine (VA), Bill Hagerty (TN), and Jim Risch (ID) introduced the Coordinating AUKUS Engagement with Australia Act (S. 4279) , which would direct DOD and DOS to directly engage with “the relevant stakeholders in the government of Japan” to understand and identify Japan’s potential to contribute to Pillar 2 activities. This bill would also require DOD and DOS to provide Congress with an assessment and recommendation concerning Japan’s participation in Pillar 2.87
South Korea
In May 2024, South Korea’s Defense Minister stated that he had discussed “the possibility of partnering with AUKUS Pillar 2” with his Australian counterparts at the Australia-Republic of Korea ‘2+2’ Foreign and Defense Ministers’ Meeting.88
83 See, for example, Ashok Sharma, “The AUKUS Expansion: A Step Towards Bolstering Security and Stability in the Indo-Pacific,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, May 2, 2024, at https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-aukus-expansion-a-step-towards-bolstering-security-and-stability-in-the-indo-pacific/.
84 See, for example, William C. Greenwalt, “Japan in AUKUS? Why That’s Premature,” American Enterprise Institute, April 24, 2024, at https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/japan-in-aukus-why-thats-premature/.
85 See, for example, Mike M. Mochizuki and Michael D. Swaine, “A Dangerous Game is Underway in Asia,” The New York Times, April 24, 2024, at https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/24/opinion/china-asia-us-relations.html. See also Maria Siow, “AUKUS Expansion: Japan, South Korea Want In On Pillar 2 – But Trust Is Still a Sticking Point,” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2024, at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3262267/aukus-expansion-japan-south-korea-want-pillar-2-trust-still-sticking-point.
86 “AUKUS Defense Ministers' Joint Statement,” Department of Defense, April 8, 2024, available at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3733790/aukus-defense-ministers-joint-statement/.
87 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Risch, Romney, Kaine, Hagerty Introduce Bill to Increase AUKUS Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” May 8, 2024, at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/rep/release/risch-romney-kaine-hagerty-introduce-bill-to-increase-aukus-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific.
88 Australian Government, “Press Conference-Melbourne,” May 1, 2024, at https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/transcripts/2024-05-01/press-conference-melbourne.
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New Zealand
Some media reports have suggested that New Zealand may be invited to join AUKUS Pillar 2; as of this writing, no public invitation had been extended, but the New Zealand Ministry of Defence has confirmed receiving informational briefings on Pillar 2 activities.89 In remarks on the topic delivered on May 1, 2024, New Zealand’s Foreign Minister said that his government was “a long way from being able to make such a decision.”90
Canada
In April 2024, Canada’s Prime Minister stated that he had held “excellent conversations” on cooperation with AUKUS, and several media reports have suggested that Canada is seeking to join Pillar 2.91
89 Tim Fish, “New Zealand in AUKUS ‘No Guarantee,’ But Discussions Active,” Breaking Defense, March 18, 2024, available athttps://breakingdefense.com/2024/03/new-zealand-in-aukus-no-guarantee-but-discussions-active-defence-minister/ ; and New Zealand Ministry of Defence, “AUKUS Pillar II Briefing Takes Place in Wellington,” February 28, 2024, at https://www.defence.govt.nz/the-latest/story/aukus-pillar-ii-briefing-takes-place-in-wellington. New Zealand is also a Major Non-NATO Ally of the United States, as well as a member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing pact.
90 Tracy Withers, “New Zealand a Long Way from Deciding to Join AUKUS, Peters Says,” Bloomberg, May 1, 2024, at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-01/new-zealand-a-long-way-from-deciding-to-join-aukus-peters-says.
91 Andrew Tillett and Matthew Cranston, “First Japan, now Canada wants in on AUKUS,” Australian Financial Review, April 9, 2024, at https://www.afr.com/politics/federal/first-japan-now-canada-wants-in-on-aukus-20240409-p5fifr. See also Tony Diver, “Canada Could Join AUKUS Defence Pact,” The Telegraph, April 8, 2024, at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/04/08/canada-justin-trudeau/.
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Appendix. Relevant NDAA Provisions
Table A-1. Selected Pillar 2 Provisions in the FY2024 NDAA
Section
Description
1331 (AUKUS partnership Requires the Secretary of State to: oversight and
•
appoint a senior advisor to oversee and coordinate the implementation of the
accountability framework)
AUKUS partnership;
•
establish a task force, led by the senior advisor, that wil : 1) ensure the maintenance of a list of all defense-related transactions that have occurred under AUKUS, 2) establish a framework to monitor companies, individuals, or
entities “that are compromising security of military technology, defense articles, and defense services” exchanged under AUKUS, and 3) establish an AUKUS industry forum;
•
provide a report to the appropriate congressional committees on the work of the senior advisor and task force, the average and median review times for Australian and British FMS-related applications, the volume of Australian and British export license applications denied or approved with provisos, and the number of voluntary disclosures resulting in a violation of the ITAR by Australian or British entities;a and
•
provide an annual report to the appropriate congressional committees on general issues, disclosure policy, and AECA Section 38 violations associated with AUKUS.
1332 (Designation of
Requires the Secretary of Defense to:
senior official for DOD
•
designate a senior civilian official to oversee DOD activities relating to AUKUS;
AUKUS activities)
•
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report containing an implementation plan for DOD AUKUS efforts (including timelines, major milestones, dependencies, industrial base implications, resourcing and personnel requirements, proposals to improve information sharing, processes for protecting intellectual property, and recommended updates to Title 10 authorities); and
•
provide the congressional defense and foreign affairs committees semiannual briefings on DOD activities to implement AUKUS.
1333 (AUKUS reporting
Requires:
requirements)
•
the President to submit to the appropriate congressional committees the text of any “non-binding instrument” related to AUKUS within 30 days of signature or conclusion;b
•
the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to submit biennial reports to the appropriate congressional committees on the AUKUS partnership (to include capability and capacity gaps addressed by AUKUS, an explanation of the total Pil ar 1 cost to the United States, an explanation of how access to the Australian industrial base supports U.S. strategy in Asia, an explanation of the benefits provided by access to Australian naval bases, and progress made on implementing Pil ar 1 and Pil ar 2).
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Section
Description
1341 (Priority for
Requires:
Australia and the UK in
•
the President to establish policies and procedures to expedite consideration and
FMS and DCS)
processing of Australian and British requests for defense articles and services under section 21 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2761) relative to all other requests, excepting only Taiwanese or Ukrainian requests;
•
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to create an “anticipatory release policy” for the transfer of certain Pil ar 1 and Pil ar 2 technologies;c
•
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to jointly review and update relevant policies and implementation guidance related to FMS and DCS.
1342 (Identification and
Requires the President to submit to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and
Pre-Clearance of Items
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on a biennial basis, a report that lists military
for Sale)
platforms, technologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and prioritized for sale and release to Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
1343 (Export Control
Amends Section 38 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778) to add a requirement that, not
Exemptions and
later than 120 days after the enactment of P.L. 118-31, the President determine
Standards)
whether Australia and the United Kingdom have implemented a system of export controls and exemptions comparable to those of the United States. If the President is able to make such a determination, he/she shall “immediately exempt from the licensing or other approval requirements of this section exports and transfers (including reexports, transfers, temporary imports, and brokering activities) of defense articles and defense services between the United States and that country or among the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.” In the event the President is unable to make a determination, he/she must reassess whether the country in question has met the requirements at least once every 120 days.
1344 (Expedited Review
Requires the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, to
of Export Licenses)
initiate a rulemaking to establish an expedited decision-making process for applications to export to Australia, the UK, and Canada commercial, advanced-technology defense articles and services not covered by an ITAR exemption.
1345 (U.S. Munitions List)
Amends Section 38(f)(3) of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2778(f)) by
•
inserting “, the United Kingdom, or Australia,” after “Canada;” and
•
adding a note requiring the Secretary of State to, at least once every three years, review items on the U.S. Munitions List.
Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 118-31. Notes: Provisions that exclusively or primarily relate to Pil ar 1 have been excluded from this table. a. The “appropriate congressional committees” are defined by Sec. 1331 as the House Committees on Foreign
Affairs an Appropriations and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations.
b. The text of a “non-binding instrument” is defined by Sec. 1333 to include “ any annex, appendix, codicil, side
agreement, side letter, or any document of similar purpose or function to the aforementioned, regardless of the title of the document, that is entered into contemporaneously and in conjunction with the non-binding instrument; and any implementing agreement or arrangement, or any document of similar purpose or function to the aforementioned, regardless of the title of the document, that is entered into contemporaneously and in conjunction with the non-binding instrument.”
c. Covered Pil ar 1 technologies include submarine and submarine combat systems technologies; covered Pil ar
2 technologies include hypersonic missiles, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, and other advanced technologies.
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Author Information
Luke A. Nicastro
Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy
Acknowledgments
Lt Col Patrick Parrish, USAF, coauthored the initial version of this report.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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