AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues
June 20, 2023
for Congress
Patrick Parrish
AUKUS Pillar 2 refers to a suite of cooperative activities conducted by the United States, the
National Defense Fellow
United Kingdom, and Australia to develop and field “advanced capabilities” under the AUKUS

security pact. To date, Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the three governments by
Luke A. Nicastro
means of working groups. Eight such groups are currently active; six of them address
Analyst in U.S. Defense
technological areas, and the remaining two address broader functional areas. The current working
Infrastructure Policy
groups are:

• Undersea capabilities;

• Quantum technologies;
• Artificial intelligence and autonomy;
• Advanced cyber;
• Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities;
• Electronic warfare;
• Innovation; and
• Information sharing.
The activities of these working groups are closely tied to the broader regional and global defense strategies of each of the
participating governments, and have drawn considerable attention from some Members of Congress and other stakeholders.
This report describes the origins, role, and implementation of AUKUS Pillar 2, and identifies and analyzes potential issues
for congressional consideration. Particular questions Congress may face include:
• How might the current U.S. defense export control regime—the laws, regulations, and policies that govern
the export of defense articles and services—impact the conduct of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities? What options
are available should Congress want to improve the speed or ease with which U.S. entities may provide
controlled articles or services to British or Australian entities?
• How can Congress exercise effective oversight of the administration and implementation of AUKUS Pillar
2? What criteria, metrics, and considerations might Congress use to assess the progress and efficacy of
Pillar 2 activities?

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AUKUS Pillar 2: Background and Issues for Congress

AUKUS Overview
AUKUS is a security partnership between the governments of the United States, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Australia designed to “promote a free and
open Indo-Pacific that is secure and stable.”1 Established by a joint announcement in September
2021, AUKUS has organized its trilateral defense activities along two lines of effort, referred to
as “pillars.” Pillar 1 aims to provide Australia with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines.2
Pillar 2 is intended to collaboratively develop advanced defense capabilities across eight
technological and functional areas.
Pillar 2 activities have been coordinated among the U.S., British, and Australian governments by
means of working groups. Eight such groups are currently active: six address particular
technological areas (undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and
autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic
warfare), and two address broader functional areas (innovation and information sharing). 3
Given its broad scope, AUKUS has involved a wide array of stakeholders across the U.S.
government. Within the executive branch, the National Security Council (NSC) and a number of
organizations within the Department of State (including the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs)
and the Department of Defense (including the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Department of Navy) have participated in the implementation of AUKUS activities.4 Within the
legislative branch, a bipartisan group of Members formed the Congressional AUKUS Working
Group in 2022, and a number of committees have held hearings on various AUKUS-related issues
in 2022 and 2023.5

1 “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, March 13, 2023. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/03/13/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus-2/.
2 The details of Pillar 1—that is, the precise capabilities, mechanisms, and timelines associated with Australia’s
acquisition of nuclear submarines—were to be determined through an 18-month consultative process. That process was
completed in March 2023, when the participating nations’ heads of government issued another Joint Leaders Statement
(also referred to as the “AUKUS Optimal Pathway Announcement”) detailing a phased approach to occur over the next
two decades. Under this plan, Australia would purchase between three and five U.S.-built Virginia-class submarines
beginning in the early 2030s, while concurrently working with the UK to design and build a new class of nuclear
submarines for delivery in the early 2040s. See “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” The White House, September
15, 2021, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-
aukus/.
3 “Fact Sheet: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS),” The White
House, April 5, 2022, at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-
implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
4 For information on the various U.S. government organizations involved in AUKUS implementation, see Jack Detsch
and Robbie Gramer, “Biden’s AUKUS Point Man to Exit,” Foreign Policy, March 10, 2023, at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/10/biden-aukus-miller-us-uk-australia-china-france/, and “Rear Admiral Dave
Goggins to support AUKUS Program,” U.S. Navy, June 17, 2022, at https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-
Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3066852/rear-admiral-dave-goggins-to-support-aukus-program/.
5 For more on the Congressional AUKUS Working Group (sometimes referred to as the “AUKUS Caucus”), see
“AUKUS Working Group Issues Statement,” Rep. Joe Courtney Press Release, April 6, 2022 at
https://courtney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/aukus-working-group-issues-statement-new-details-trilateral-
defense. For a recent example of AUKUS-related congressional activity, see “House Foreign Affairs Committee
Member Roundtable on AUKUS and Arms Exports Modernization,” April 18, 2023, webcast recording available at
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hfac-member-roundtable-on-aukus-and-arms-exports-modernization/.
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The Role of AUKUS in U.S., British, and Australian
Strategy
The U.S., British, and Australian governments have identified AUKUS as an important part of
their respective national strategies. The Biden Administration’s 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy
cites AUKUS efforts under its “Reinforce Deterrence” line of effort, stating that the partnership
will support the defense of U.S. interests, deterrence of adversary aggression, and promotion of
regional security.6 The United Kingdom’s “Integrated Review Refresh 2023” asserts that the
AUKUS partnership will “allow [the UK and its allies] collectively to balance against coercive
behaviours and to preserve an open and stable international order.”7 AUKUS features prominently
in Australia’s 2023 “Defense Strategic Review,” primarily as an enabler of essential “enhanced
lethality” for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and “asymmetric capability” more generally.8
Formal DOD and executive branch statements concerning AUKUS tend to avoid identifying
particular threats or challenges of concern, instead referring to more abstract interests and goals.9
However, some analysts argue the pact responds to a perception among its members that the
intentions and capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pose a significant and
growing threat to Indo-Pacific security. This perspective has been articulated by a number of U.S.
policymakers, including several Members of Congress. In March 2023, for instance, House
Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Chairman Michael McCaul spoke on the House Floor
concerning AUKUS:
We are facing a generational challenge from the Chinese Communist Party. We must bring
all tools to bear in our effort to counter Chairman Xi’s attempts to disrupt the global balance
of power. With AUKUS, our three nations can achieve the shared strategic goal of
defending the Indo-Pacific region, while maintaining our technological and military
superiority.10
This view—that AUKUS is part of a broader response to the perceived threat from the PRC—
appears to be shared by the other AUKUS nations. During the AUKUS Optimal Pathway
Announcement, for example, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak explained the need for an
increased focus on defense by citing a number of particular challenges, including “China’s

6 “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” The White House, February 2022, p. 15. Available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
7 The 2023 “Integrated Review Refresh” is an update of the “Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development,
and Foreign Policy” issued in 2021. See “Integrated Review Refresh 2023,” His Majesty’s Government, March 13,
2023, p. 40, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/integrated-review-refresh-2023-responding-to-a-
more-contested-and-volatile-world.
8 “Defense Strategic Review,” Australian Government, April 24, 2023, pp. 7 and 72. Available at
https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.
9 See, for example, Secretary Austin’s characterization of AUKUS as a partnership to “strengthen our combined
military capabilities, boost our defense industrial capacity, enhance our ability to deter aggression, and promote our
shared goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” “Statement by Secretary of Defense on AUKUS Optimal Pathway
Announcement,” U.S. Department of Defense, March 13, 2023. Available at
https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3327747/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-
on-aukus-optimal-pathway-a/.
10 “McCaul Speaks on House Floor in Support of Deterring China Through AUKUS Bill,” HFAC Press Release, March
24, 2023. Available at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/mccaul-speaks-on-house-floor-in-support-of-
deterring-china-through-aukus-bill/. For another example, see Rep. Mike Rogers’ remarks concerning AUKUS in
“House Armed Services Committee Hearing on Indo-Pacific National Security Challenges,” April 18, 2023. Available
at https://armedservices.house.gov/hearings/full-committee-hearing-us-military-posture-and-national-security-
challenges-indo-pacific.
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growing assertiveness.”11 In 2022, Australia’s then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison described
AUKUS as a response to, in part, PRC “attempt[s] to reshape our region, and the world, in a way
more conducive to autocracies than liberal democracies.”12
Pillar 2 Working Groups
Given the diversity of technological and functional areas encompassed by AUKUS Pillar 2, each
of the eight working groups may conduct its activities in a different manner. In addition, the
ongoing and potentially classified nature of many such activities may limit the amount of
information available to the public. To accomplish their goals, it appears likely that the working
groups will engage in a number of activities that the U.S. DOD refers to as international
armaments cooperation.13 These may include:
• the exchange of controlled technical information;
• the exchange of military, civilian, and industry personnel;
• cooperative research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) projects;
• joint procurement efforts; and
• other acquisition partnerships.14
In contrast to Pillar 1 activities, which may take decades to deliver results, some analysts and
policymakers expect AUKUS Pillar 2 to produce more immediate capability improvements.15 The
following sections discuss each working group’s area in the context of overarching AUKUS
objectives.
Undersea Capabilities
Undersea capabilities, in the context of AUKUS, refer to systems and technologies that operate
underwater but are not manned submarines. To date, the U.S. Navy (USN) has engaged in a
number of high-profile efforts in this area, including RDT&E activities focused on the
maturation, procurement, and operation of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). The USN has
been developing various UUVs for years, and future systems may have considerable variation in
size, capability, and role.16 Within the USN, UUVs may have applications for intelligence,

11 “Transcript: Remarks By President Biden, Prime Minister Albanese, and Prime Minister Sunak on AUKUS,” U.S.
Embassy in Canberra, March 14, 2023, at https://au.usembassy.gov/transcript-remarks-by-president-biden-prime-
minister-albanese-of-australia-and-prime-minister-sunak-of-the-united-kingdom-on-the-aukus-partnership/.
12 Tyrone Clarke, “Scott Morrison says AUKUS and Quad key to fight back against China’s ‘arc of autocracy’ after
missing first week of parliament,” Sky News Australia, July 29, 2022, at https://www.skynews.com.au/australia-news/
politics/scott-morrison-says-aukus-and-quad-key-to-fight-back-against-chinas-arc-of-autocracy-after-missing-first-
week-of-parliament/news-story/c798f6c004eaabc5e952118d69d73948 .
13 For more on international armaments cooperation, see CRS In Focus IF12425, Defense Primer: International
Armaments Cooperation.
14 Some working groups may also employ other security cooperation mechanisms to transfer defense articles and
services between the three countries, including foreign military sales.
15 See, for instance remarks by former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy William Greenwalt in
Joe Gould and Bryant Harris, “Big AUKUS news coming, but Hill and allies see tech sharing snags,” Defense News,
March 7, 2023, at https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2023/03/07/big-aukus-news-coming-but-hill-and-allies-see-
tech-sharing-snags/.
16 The USN currently manages programs for developing UUVs designated as small (0-45 feet in length), medium (45-
190 feet in length), and large (200-300 feet in length) UUVs. See CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface
and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare,
minesweeping, and other missions.17 The other AUKUS nations are also developing UUV
capabilities: the UK’s Royal Navy (RN) has acquired a number of REMUS 100 small UUVs, and
the RAN has initiated developmental partnerships with several defense companies for large and
extra-large UUVs.18 The development of UUVs is part of a broader push by various militaries to
adopt robotics for naval purposes. For example, in March 2023 congressional testimony,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley stated that “in the future, you’ll see
maybe a third or more of the United States Navy or the Chinese Navy or the Russian Navy, those
will be unmanned maritime vessels, unmanned sub vessels, and so on.”19
Through the Undersea Capabilities working group, the USN, RN, and RAN have established the
AUKUS Undersea Robotics Autonomous Systems (AURAS) project, an initiative to jointly
develop and field autonomous underwater vehicles. The White House has said that it intends for
this initiative to function as “a significant force multiplier for [AUKUS] maritime forces,” and
that as of April 2022 it expected to begin initial trials and experimentation in 2023.20 In addition,
the FY2024 President’s budget request for DOD included $10 million to develop “mission
payloads for UUVs” as part of a $25 million request for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.”21
Although the precise connection to the Undersea Capabilities working group is unclear from
publicly available information, the Australian government and U.S. company Anduril Industries
have undertaken a partnership to deliver three extra-large autonomous undersea vehicle
prototypes to the RAN by 2025.22
Quantum Technologies
In the context of defense policy, quantum technologies are those that use the principles of
quantum physics (e.g., superposition, quantum bits, and entanglement) to create or enhance
military capabilities.23 Quantum technologies have a variety of potential applications, including
the improvement of communication systems, sensor capabilities, and information processing and
security.24 One recent quantum-focused initiative in the United States is the 2018 National
Quantum Initiative Act (P.L. 115-368), which created a framework for a whole-of-government

17 For more information on current and potential military applications of UUVs, see Bradley Martin et al., “Advancing
Autonomous Systems: An Analysis of Current and Future Technology for Unmanned Maritime Vehicles,” RAND
Corporation, 2019, at https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2751.html.
18 See “UK Royal Navy Acquires Latest Generation REMUS 100s,” HII Press Release, September 21, 2022 at
https://hii.com/news/united-kingdom-royal-navy-acquires-remus-100-unmanned-underwater-vehicle/, and Ridzwan
Rahmat, “Indo Pacific 2022: Royal Australian Navy breaks cover on Speartooth large unmanned underwater vehicle,”
Jane’s, May 11, 2022, at https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/indo-pacific-2022-royal-australian-navy-
breaks-cover-on-speartooth-large-unmanned-underwater-vehicle.
19 “House Armed Services Committee Hearing on FY2024 DOD Budget Request,” March 29, 2023, transcript available
through CQ at https://plus.cq.com/doc/congressionaltranscripts-7702490?4.
20 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
21 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,”
Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 466, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
22 See “Ghost Shark a Stealthy ‘Game-Changer,’” Australian Department of Defence, December 14, 2022, at
https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/news/2022-12-14/ghost-shark-stealthy-game-changer.
23 For more information on defense applications of quantum technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11836, Defense Primer:
Quantum Technology, by Kelley M. Sayler.
24 “NATO Exploring Quantum Technology for Future Challenges,” NATO, October 14, 2022, https://www.act.nato.int/
articles/nato-exploring-quantum-technology-future-challenges.
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effort “to accelerate quantum research and development for the economic and national security of
the United States.” Another recent quantum-focused initiative is the Defense Quantum
Information Science and Technology Research and Development Program, established by the
FY2019 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232) to
coordinate research and development efforts for quantum sciences and to provide for interagency
collaboration. In a manner similar to U.S. efforts, both the British and Australian governments
have undertaken activities to increase cooperation among government and industry to research
and develop quantum technologies.25
As part of the Quantum Technologies working group, the AUKUS nations have established the
AUKUS Quantum Arrangement (AQuA), an initiative to coordinate U.S., British, and Australian
RDT&E efforts concerning quantum technologies. Initial AQuA efforts are expected to focus on
developing alternate solutions for position, navigation, and timing (similar to current global
positioning system [GPS] capability) through trials and experimentation through 2025.26
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy
Definitions of artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy vary. In a defense context, the terms
typically refer to technologies that can perform tasks under varying and unpredictable
circumstances without significant human oversight, in a manner that replicates certain human
qualities (e.g., learning from experience).27 AI has extremely diverse defense applications that
span many different functional areas. As a result, the U.S. DOD has established a Joint Artificial
Intelligence Center (JAIC) to manage the development and implementation of AI strategy and
programs across the department.28 As of June 2021, the JAIC had accomplished this in part by
managing six AI “mission initiatives” covering different topic areas.29 The other AUKUS nations
have been adopting similarly broad approaches to AI and autonomy: the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence (MOD) released a “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy” in June 2022,
and the Australian government published “Australia’s AI Action Plan” in June 2021.30
According to the White House, the AUKUS Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group
will focus on “improving the speed and precision of decision-making processes to maintain a

25 Australia launched the National Quantum Strategy in 2021, and the UK established the National Quantum
Technologies Programme in 2013. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Quantum Technologies, RAND Corporation, RAND
Alliance Initiative, Santa Monica, CA.
26 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
27 See, for instance, definitions of AI adopted by Section 238 of the FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-232, the 2018 DOD AI
Strategy, and Section 5002 of the FY2021 NDAA, P.L. 116-283. For more information on AI and autonomy in a
military context, see CRS Report R45178, Artificial Intelligence and National Security, by Kelley M. Sayler.
28 Summary of the 2018 DOD AI Strategy, https://media.defense.gov/2019/feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/summary-of-
dod-ai-strategy.pdf. U.S. Department of Defense Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation
Pathway, 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/22/2003022604/-1/-1/0/Department-of-Defense-Responsible-
Artificial-Intelligence-Strategy-and-Implementation-Pathway.pdf.
29 These mission initiatives are Health and Business Processes; Joint Logistics; Joint Force Protection; Joint
Information Warfare; Academic/Industry Engagement; and Joint Command and Control, Maneuver, and Fires. See
“Artificial Intelligence,” Government Accountability Office, March 2022, p. 14, at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-
105834.pdf.
30 See “Defence Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” UK Ministry of Defence, June 15, 2022, at https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/defence-artificial-intelligence-strategy, and “Australia’s AI Action Plan,” Australian
Government, June 2021, at https://webarchive.nla.gov.au/awa/20220816053410/https://www.industry.gov.au/data-and-
publications/australias-artificial-intelligence-action-plan.
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capability edge and defend against AI-enabled threats.”31 In addition, the FY2024 President’s
budget request for DOD included $5 million to develop an “Artificial Intelligence Development
Hub” as part of the broader request for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.”32 Based on publicly
available information, it is unclear to what degree the remit of the Artificial Intelligence and
Autonomy working group may overlap with the development of unmanned systems under the
Undersea Capabilities working group.
Advanced Cyber
DOD’s cyber operations are diverse, consisting of military, intelligence, and business activities
conducted in or through cyberspace—the information network encompassing the internet, other
telecommunications connections, and computer systems.33 Cyber capabilities have become an
enduring focus for all three AUKUS nations, especially given the intensification of the threat
environment in what DOD refers to as the “cyber domain.”34 DOD’s 2018 Cyber Strategy
identifies five “cyberspace objectives”: (1) enable the military to prevail in a contested
cyberspace environment, (2) conduct cyber operations to enhance U.S. national advantage, (3)
protect critical infrastructure from cyberattack, (4) protect DOD information and systems from
cyberattack, and (5) expand cyber cooperation.35 Australia and the UK have outlined strategies
focused on increasing cyber resilience to enable both commercial and defense activities. In April
2023, the UK disclosed the existence of a National Cyber Force (NCF), which has advanced
defensive and offensive cyber operations capabilities.36
According to the White House, the Advanced Cyber working group will seek to “strengthen cyber
capabilities, including protecting critical communications and operations systems.”37 Given the
increasing centrality of networked communications to military operations, the scope of the
Advanced Cyber working group may encompass many different platforms, systems, and
functions. Some analysts have argued that cybersecurity will be a critical enabler of other
AUKUS working groups, particularly for information sharing.38 In addition, the FY2024
President’s budget request for DOD included $6 million for “Cyber Capability Development”
under the “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives” program element.39

31 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
32 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,”
Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 409, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
33 For more information on cyber capabilities and operations, see CRS In Focus IF10537, Defense Primer: Cyberspace
Operations, by Catherine A. Theohary.
34 A November 2022 Government Accountability Office report found that DOD experienced over 12,000 cyber
incidents since 2015; see https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105084.
35 Department of Defense, “Summary: Deparment of Defense Cyber Strategy 2018,” at https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF.
36 Kevin Poireault, “UK Discloses Offensive Cyber Capabilities Principles,” Info Security Magazine, April 5, 2023,
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/uk-offensive-cyber-capabilities/.
37 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
38 See Stew Magnuson, “AUKUS Agreement Poses Cybersecurity Risks to Allies,” National Defense, September 29,
2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/9/29/aukus-agreement-poses-cybersecurity-risk-to-allies.
39 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,”
Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 466, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
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Hypersonic and Counter-Hypersonic Capabilities
Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities refer to maneuverable weapons that fly at speeds
of Mach 5 or greater, or systems intended to counter such weapons.40 The speed and
maneuverability of these missiles, coupled with their low flying altitude, make them more
difficult to detect and neutralize than ballistic missiles.41 The U.S. DOD currently manages a
number of programs intended to develop conventionally armed hypersonic weapons and counter-
hypersonic defensive capabilities.42 The British and Australian governments also pursued the
development of hypersonic capabilities prior to the establishment of the AUKUS pact,
including—in the case of Australia—bilateral hypersonic-focused cooperation with the United
States.43
In April 2022, the White House announced that the AUKUS partners would “work together to
accelerate development of advanced hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities” under
AUKUS Pillar 2.44 Few details about this working group are publicly available; however, some
analysts have speculated that Australia’s missile testing infrastructure—including a newly opened
“Hypersonic Research Precinct” in Brisbane, Australia—could feature significantly in initial
projects.45
Electronic Warfare
Electronic warfare (EW) refers to activities that manipulate and control the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS)—a range of frequencies for electromagnetic energy—for military purposes. The
U.S. DOD, UK MOD, and Australian DOD have each engaged in electronic warfare operations
and programs since World War II, and a wide number of organizations in each nation’s defense
establishment operate and develop electronic warfare capabilities.46
EW was added to the scope of AUKUS Pillar 2 in April 2022. According to the White House, this
working group will aim to “share understanding of tools, techniques, and technology to enable
our forces to operate in contested and degraded environments.”47 Opportunities for the EW
working group may include electronic protection, electronic attack, and electronic support (i.e.,

40 For more information on hypersonic weapons, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler.
41 Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” press release, March 2, 2020,
https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-
hypersonics/.
42 These include the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, the Air Force’s Air-Launched Rapid Response
Weapon, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon, and DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide. See CRS Report R45811,
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.
43 Bilateral U.S.-Australia hypersonics efforts include the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment
(SCIFiRE) and Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) programs. See “Department of
Defense Announces New Allied Prototyping Initiative Effort With Australia to Continue Partnership in Developing Air
Breathing Hypersonic Vehicles,” DOD press release, November 30, 2020, at https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/
Release/Article/2429061/department-of-defense-announces-new-allied-prototyping-initiative-effort-with-a/.
44 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
45 See Mikayla Easley, “AUKUS Partners Aim to Catch China in Hypersonics Race,” National Defense, February 17,
2023, at https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/2/17/aukus-partners-aim-to-catch-china-in-
hypersonics-race.
46 For more information on electronic warfare, see CRS In Focus IF11118, Defense Primer: Electronic Warfare.
47 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
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intelligence collection and analysis of the EMS that supports other EW operations), all of which
strengthen the ability to operate in a contested EMS environment. These EW opportunities are
particularly relevant given that all three AUKUS nations are to operate the U.S. Air Force E-7
Wedgetail, an airborne EW platform. 48
Innovation
As a functional area of defense collaboration, innovation is more difficult to define than the
technological areas identified above. Broadly speaking, defense innovation refers to purposeful
changes in the technologies, operations, processes, or organizations employed by governments for
military purposes.49
According to the White House, the Innovation working group will seek to “accelerate our
respective defense innovation enterprises and learn from one another, including ways to more
rapidly integrate commercial technologies to solve warfighting needs.”50 This may include
increased collaboration between the U.S. DOD’s Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), Defense
Advanced Research and Development Projects Agency (DARPA), and service RDT&E
organizations, on the one hand, and analogous British and Australian organizations (e.g., the UK’s
Defence Science and Technology Laboratories and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology
Group), on the other.51 In addition, the President’s FY2024 budget request for DOD included $25
million for “AUKUS Innovation Initiatives.”52 The new initiative includes proposed funding for
efforts in AI, cyber, UUVs, enhanced battlespace awareness, and engineering and architecture
studies.53
Information Sharing
According to the White House, the Information Sharing working group will “will expand and
accelerate sharing of sensitive information, including as a first priority enabling workstreams that
underpin our work on agreed areas of advanced capabilities [i.e., the other working groups].” The
AUKUS nations have a long history of sharing information on defense, most notably through the
Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance.54

48 See “E-7A AEW&C,” Boeing, at https://www.boeing.com/defense/e-7-airborne-early-warning-and-control/.
49 See P.M. Picucci et al., “Categorizing Defense Innovation,” Defense Acquisition University, March 9, 2021, at
https://www.dau.edu/library/defense-atl/blog/Categorizing-Defense-Innovation.
50 See “AUKUS Fact Sheet,” The White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/.
51 For more information on British and Australian programs, see “MOD Innovation,” UK Government, at
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553429/
MOD_SB_Innovation_Initiative_Brochure_v21_web.pdf, and “Defence Innovation,” Australian Government, at
https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/strategy/defence-science-and-technology-strategy-2030.
52 This request includes funding for UUV and AI applications mentioned above. See Office of the Secretary of Defense,
“Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Budget Estimates, Research Development, Test & Evaluation,
Defense-Wide,” March 2023, accessed at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2024/
FY2024_r1.pdf, p.61.
53 See “Department of Defense FY 2024 Budget Estimates, Defense-Wide RDT&E Justification Book Volume 3 of 5,”
Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 2023, p. 466, at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/
defbudget/fy2024/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT_and_E/OSD_PB2024.pdf.
54 In addition to the three AUKUS nations, FVEY includes Canada and New Zealand. Some experts see FVEY as a
model—or additional mechanism—for AUKUS information sharing.
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According to some analysts, this working group could seek to address barriers to trilateral
information sharing, such as export controls, classification more generally, and bureaucratic
cultures that prioritize risk aversion when it comes to sharing controlled information.55
Issues for Congress
Congress may consider options for modifying U.S. export controls and exercising oversight of the
AUKUS Pillar 2 working groups. Particular issues include:
• whether and how to modify U.S. export control laws and regulations;
• options to assess progress and measure outcomes;
• whether to modify the technological and functional scope of Pillar 2 working
groups; and
• whether to expand participation in Pillar 2 activities beyond the current AUKUS
members.
Each of these topics is discussed in more detail below.
U.S. Export Control Laws and Regulations
A number of analysts and policymakers—including some Members of Congress—have argued
that the current U.S. export control regime may hamper effective technological and industrial
cooperation between the AUKUS partners.56 From this point of view, the existing array of U.S.
laws, regulations, and policies restricting defense exports may impede AUKUS Pillar 2 efforts by
barring or disincentivizing contractors from establishing joint projects, thereby delaying the
commencement and execution of work and imposing undue administrative burdens on
participating organizations.57
Much of this concern has focused on the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), a set
of regulations concerning the export of defense articles and services. Established to implement
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, codified at 22 U.S.C. §§2751 et seq.), ITAR restricts the
transfer of controlled defense articles and services (i.e., those that appear on the United States
Munitions List, or USML) to non-U.S. persons.58 To comply with ITAR, companies wishing to
export controlled articles or services must obtain licenses or other authorization from the U.S.
Department of State (DOS). Some analysts contend that this process is overly complex and
onerous, arguing that—in combination with the significant legal and financial consequences of
violating the ITAR—it can hinder legitimate cooperation efforts.59 Characterizing the issue in an

55 Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Alan Tidwell, “Making AUKUS Work,” RAND Corporation, March 22, 2022,
https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/making-aukus-work.html.
56 Rachel Oswald, “Lawmakers Seek to Ease Defense Export Controls to UK, Australia,” Roll Call, May 23, 2023,
https://rollcall.com/2023/05/23/lawmakers-seek-to-ease-defense-export-controls-to-uk-australia/.
57 See, for instance, Rajiv Shah, “U.S. Export Rules Need Major Reform if AUKUS is to Succeed,” Australian
Strategic Policy Institute: The Strategist, February 16, 2023, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-export-rules-need-
major-reform-if-aukus-is-to-succeed/.
58 ITAR is available at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-22/chapter-I/subchapter-M. It implements Section 38 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2778) and authorizes the President to control the export and import of defense
articles and defense services.
59 See, for instance, Rajiv Shah, “U.S. Export Rules Need Major Reform if AUKUS is to Succeed,” Australian
Strategic Policy Institute, February 16, 2023, at https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-export-rules-need-major-reform-if-
aukus-is-to-succeed/, and Alan Dupont, “Failure Not An Option in this Generational Opportunity,” The Australian,
(continued...)
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April 2023 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on AUKUS, Representative Michael
McCaul asserted that “ITAR is a big issue, and it’s prohibiting our ability [sic] to make weapons
with our closest allies in a very expeditious way.”60
On the other hand, some experts have argued that the current U.S. export control regime does not
create significant barriers to AUKUS Pillar 2 activities. A March 2023 Defense News article
quoted an anonymous DOS official as saying that the department does “not anticipate any
challenges in implementing AUKUS due to U.S. export control regulations, which exist to
safeguard U.S. technologies and maintain the U.S. warfighter’s qualitative edge.”61
To address perceived issues with U.S. export controls in the context of AUKUS efforts, several
analysts and policymakers have proposed remedies. Some have advocated for the total exemption
of AUKUS participants from ITAR, while others have advanced more modest changes to the
technology-sharing and export approval processes.62 In addition, some have pointed to precedents
in Cold War-era frameworks that allowed the United States to share sensitive nuclear information
with the United Kingdom.63
In 2023, the executive branch initiated a number of efforts to align U.S. export control
administration with AUKUS goals. In a May 2023 House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing,
DOS’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Assistant Secretary Jessica Lewis described three
broad efforts:
First, the AUKUS trade authorization mechanism, known as ATAM, legislative changes
and international consultations. The Department of State will implement a novel use of our
existing authorities [and pursue an] interim solution, expediting and optimizing technology
sharing and defense trade among only the AUKUS partners. Second and simultaneously,
the administration plans to consult closely with Congress and propose legislative changes
to meet the ambitions of AUKUS…. Under this legislative proposal, AUKUS partners will
have many transfers pre-approved and not subject to case by case review. Third, the
administration will also be seeking commitments from our AUKUS partners on shared
standards for protection of defense, information, and material.64
In 2023, two bills addressing these issues were introduced in the 118th Congress: H.R. 1093 and
S. 1471. H.R. 1093 would “direct the Secretary of State to submit to Congress a report on
implementation of the advanced capabilities pillar of the [AUKUS] trilateral security
partnership.” The report would provide information on a number of issues relating to export
controls, including

March 18, 2023, at https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/aukus-failure-not-an-option-in-this-generational-
opportunity/news-story/00d638abe9b939a56f6f730d00beae49.
60 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on AUKUS and Arms Exports Modernization,” April 18, 2023,
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/hfac-member-roundtable-on-aukus-and-arms-exports-modernization/.
61 Bryant Harris, “Congress lays Groundwork for AUKUS Export Control Reform,” Defense News, March 22, 2023.
62 For a version of the first position, see James Carouso et al., “ITAR Should End for Australia,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, December 7, 2022, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/itar-should-end-australia. For a version
of the second, see Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner’s comments highlighting
a “live evolution of processes around technology sharing” in the context of AUKUS. “Building a More Resilient Indo-
Pacific Security Architecture,” DOD, March 2, 2023 at https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/
3318943/building-a-more-resilient-indo-pacific-security-architecture-a-conversation-wit/.
63 See, for example, Rep. Joe Courtney, “Rep. Joe Courtney: To Make AUKUS work, Congress should look to the
Past,” Breaking Defense, January 11, 2023, at https://breakingdefense.com/2023/01/rep-joe-courtney-to-make-aukus-
work-congress-should-look-to-the-past/.
64 “House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Modernizing U.S. Arms Exports and a Stronger AUKUS,” May 24
2023, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/modernizing-u-s-arms-exports-and-a-stronger-aukus/.
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• wait times, volume, and denials of/modifications to applications for U.S. defense
exports and foreign military sales to the United Kingdom and Australia in
calendar years 2021 and 2022;
• ITAR violations involving the United Kingdom and Australia from FY2017 to
FY2022; and
• recommendations to improve existing U.S. export controls and regulations to
implement the AUKUS partnership.
S. 1471 would make a number of changes to the processes and programs enabling AUKUS-
related functions, including
• designating the UK and Australia as domestic sources for the purposes of the
Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774, 50 U.S.C. §§4501 et seq.);
• exempting defense exports to the UK and Australia from certain licensing
requirements;65
• exempting the UK and Australia from certain arms transfer-related certification
and congressional notification requirements;66
• creating an open general license for defense exports to the UK and Australia;
• expediting the release of certain advanced technologies to the UK and Australia
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process;
• requiring reports on AUKUS strategy, implementation, impacts to U.S. military
readiness, and recommended changes to export control regimes; and
• creating an “AUKUS Senior Advisor” position at the DOS and authorizing the
use of existing DOS funds to hire additional personnel to review export license
applications.
In addition, DOS has announced it will socialize draft legislative proposals to inform
congressional deliberations (pursuant to Assistant Secretary Lewis’ remarks quoted above).
Congress may consider these modifications alongside other options, including other reforms to
the AECA and direction to DOD and/or DOS to develop administrative options to facilitate
trilateral cooperative efforts under AUKUS Pillar 2.
Oversight of AUKUS Pillar 2 Activities
The scale and diversity of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities may present administrative challenges for
the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Each technological and
functional area is relatively broad, involving an array of different programs, stakeholders, and
potential applications.67

65 This could be enacted as an amendment of Section 38(j)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act (codified at 22 U.S.C.
2778(j)(1).
66 This could be enacted as an amendment of Section 38(f)(3) of the Arms Export Control Act (codified at 22 U.S.C.
2778(f)(3).
67 To take the Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy working group as an example, DOD’s Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center has identified six broad and disparate AI “mission initiatives,” and a 2022 Government Accountability Office
found 10 separate AI strategies across DOD. See “Artificial Intelligence: DOD should Improve Strategies, Inventory
Process, and Collaboration Guidance,” Government Accountability Office, March 2022, pp. 18-21, at
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105834.pdf.
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Given the relevance of AUKUS to many congressional priorities, Congress may seek to exercise
oversight of DOD, DOS, and other executive agencies’ coordination of the working groups in a
number of areas, three of which are discussed below.
Assessing Progress and Measuring Outcomes
Congress may consider ways to assess the progress of AUKUS Pillar 2 activities and to measure
their outcomes against strategic and operational objectives. For example, Congress could
establish periodic reporting requirements for DOD and DOS that address Pillar 2-specific
progress and outcomes. Depending on the alignment of existing executive branch guidance with
congressional priorities, Congress may also consider whether to use legislation (or accompanying
explanatory statements) to direct DOD, DOS, or other relevant executive organizations to modify
processes or programs to better accomplish Pillar 2 objectives.
Modifying Technological and Functional Coverage
As AUKUS activities continue, Congress may consider whether additional technological or
functional areas should be included under Pillar 2, either through the creation of new working
groups or the assignment of new topics to existing ones. Congress may also assess whether any of
the currently identified technological or functional working groups are underperforming or
conducting activities that are superfluous to U.S. defense requirements, which may suggest a need
to narrow existing scopes. The import of such assessments may grow as the amount of U.S.
resources devoted to Pillar 2 activities increases.
Expanding AUKUS Pillar 2 to Include Additional Countries
Congress may also consider whether to direct DOD and DOS to expand AUKUS Pillar 2 to
include additional countries, especially New Zealand and Canada (the other two members of the
Five Eyes intelligence pact). A number of analysts have argued for the inclusion of New Zealand
on strategic grounds, and the country’s Defence Minister has stated that his government has “been
offered the opportunity … and would be willing to explore it.”68 Another candidate may be
Canada: in May 2023, a Canadian newspaper reported that Canada was seeking to join Pillar 2,
and some analysts have argued the country’s addition would strengthen AUKUS efforts relating
to critical minerals, AI, cybersecurity, and Arctic-focused domain awareness capabilities.69 Some
analysts have also argued for the addition of Japan, given its close security ties to the U.S.,
technological and industrial capabilities, and geopolitical interests.70
In considering whether it would be in the U.S. interest to expand AUKUS Pillar 2, Congress may
weigh the potential benefits, such as new members’ capability and capacity, against the potential

68 “New Zealand may Join AUKUS Pact’s Non-Nuclear Component,” The Guardian, March 27, 2023, at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/28/new-zealand-may-join-aukus-pacts-non-nuclear-component. For
arguments in support of New Zealand membership in Pillar 2, see Reuben Steff, “AUKUS + NZ=Win-Win,” The
Lowy Institute, May 1, 2023, at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/aukus-nz-win-win.
69 See Robert Fife and Steven Chase, “Canada Seeks to Join Non-Nuclear Pillar of AUKUS Alliance,” The Globe and
Mail, May 8, 2023, at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-canada-eyes-entry-into-aukus-alliance-to-help-
keep-china-in-check/, and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, “Canadian Membership in AUKUS: A Time for Action,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9, 2023, at https://www.csis.org/analysis/canadian-membership-
aukus-time-action.
70 See, for instance, Michael Auslin, “Why Japan Belongs in AUKUS,” Foreign Affairs, October 28, 2022, at
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/japan/why-japan-belongs-aukus.
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drawbacks. These latter may include the risk of administrative inefficiencies, negative impacts on
U.S. firms (e.g., through increased competition with foreign companies for U.S. defense
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contracts), and geopolitical blowback (i.e., provoking a destabilizing response from regional
competitors such as China).

Author Information

Patrick Parrish
Luke A. Nicastro
National Defense Fellow
Analyst in U.S. Defense Infrastructure Policy

Acknowledgments
Bruce Vaughn, former CRS Specialist in Asian Affairs, was the original coordinator of this report.

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