The POWER Initiative: Energy Transition as Economic Development
The POWER Initiative: Energy Transition as
September 8, 2022
Economic Development
Julie M. Lawhorn
With the decline of the U.S. coal industry, managing the economic effects of energy transition
Analyst in Economic
has become a priority for the federal government. The Partnerships for Opportunity and
Development Policy
Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative, and the broader POWER Plus Plan
of which it was a part, represent the U.S. government’s efforts to ease the economic effects of
energy transition in coal industry-dependent communities in the United States, and especially in
Appalachia. Launched in 2015 by the Obama Administration as a multi-agency effort utilizing
various existing programs, the POWER Plus plan received partial backing through appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016
(FY2016) to the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Economic Development Administration, and for abandoned mine
land reclamation.
While certain proposed provisions of POWER Plus were never enacted or funded, other elements of the POWER Initiative
have continued under the Trump and Biden Administrations. Continuing programs include the Assistance to Coal
Communities program (now part of the Assistance to Energy Communities initiative) within the Economic Development
Administration, the POWER Initiative under the Appalachian Regional Commission (the only program to retain the original
branding), and a funding program for abandoned mine land reclamation. Of these efforts, the Appalachian Regional
Commission’s POWER Initiative is the largest of the initiative’s economic development programs, having funded over $319
million in projects since it was first launched. The Appalachian Regional Commission’s POWER Initiative is regionally
targeted to declining coal communities in Appalachia, unlike the Economic Development Administration’s Assistance to
Coal Communities (now the Assistance to Energy Communities) program, which has a national scope. To date, the initiative
has reportedly leveraged approximately $1.5 billion of private investment into the Appalachian regional economy. This
report provides background on the origins, development, and activities of the POWER Initiative.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The POWER+ Plan ................................................................................................................... 2
The POWER Initiative .............................................................................................................. 3
POWER Elements in the Current Administration ........................................................................... 4
The EDA Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC) Program .................................................... 4
Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER) Reclamation Program ................ 5
The ARC’s POWER Initiative......................................................................................................... 7
About the ARC .......................................................................................................................... 8
Scope and Activities .................................................................................................................. 9
Funding History ....................................................................................................................... 11
Policy Considerations .................................................................................................................... 12
Concluding Notes .......................................................................................................................... 14
Figures
Figure 1. Map of the Appalachian Regional Commission ............................................................... 8
Figure 2. Distribution of ARC POWER Initiative Projects, 2016-2022 (to date) .......................... 11
Tables
Table 1. POWER+ Plan, FY2015 Roll Out ..................................................................................... 3
Table 2. ACC Program Funding, FY2015-FY2022 ......................................................................... 5
Table 3. AMLER Reclamation Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022 .................................................. 7
Table 4. ARC POWER Initiative Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022 and FY2023 Request .......... 12
Table 5. ARC POWER Initiative Grant Awards, FY2016-FY2022 .............................................. 12
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 16
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Introduction
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has forecast U.S. coal production to decline
through 2050, with the sharpest reduction to occur by the mid-2020s.1 Consequently, the coal
industry’s decline has contributed to economic distress in coal-dependent communities, including
increased unemployment and poverty rates.2
In response, the Obama Administration launched the Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Plus Plan, which addressed the coal sector’s decline
through funding for (1) economic stabilization, (2) social welfare efforts, and (3) environmental
efforts. The economic elements were organized within the POWER Initiative, a multi-agency
federal initiative to provide economic development funding and technical assistance to address
economic distress caused by the effects of energy transition principally in coal communities.
Although the initiative began as a multi-agency effort as part of the POWER Plus Plan, the
POWER Initiative currently operates as a funded program administered by the Appalachian
Regional Commission (ARC) in its 423-county service area.
This report considers the background of the POWER Initiative and the broader effort of which it
was originally a part, the POWER Plus Plan. It broadly surveys the state of POWER elements in
the current administration, including elements of the initiative in the Economic Development
Administration (EDA), the ARC, and funded efforts for abandoned mine land reclamation. The
Appalachian Regional Commission’s POWER Initiative program is the largest of these, and the
only program to retain the POWER Initiative branding. This report considers its scope and
activities as well as its funding history.
The POWER Initiative is supported by Congress as reflected by consistent annual appropriations.
The POWER Initiative may also be of interest to Congress as an economic development program
that actively facilitates and eases the repercussions of energy transition in affected communities in
Appalachia. More broadly, in light of the projected continued decline of the coal industry, as well
as proposals to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from hydrocarbon combustion,
congressional interest in programs to address economic dislocations as a result of energy
transition is likely to accelerate.
Background
The POWER Initiative was launched in 2015 as a multi-agency federal effort to provide grant
funding and technical assistance to address economic and labor dislocations caused by the effects
of energy transition—principally in coal communities around the United States.3 The POWER
Initiative was a precursor to a broader effort known as the POWER Plus Plan (dubbed POWER+
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2022: With Projections to 2050, March 3, 2022,
Total Coal Production, reference case, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=1-AEO2022®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2022&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=~ref2022-d011222a.6-1-AEO2022&ctype=linechart&
sourcekey=0 and https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/electricity/sub-topic-02.php.
2 Eric Bowen et al., An Overview of the Coal Economy in Appalachia, Appalachian Regional Commission, January
2018, https://www.arc.gov/assets/research_reports/CIE1-OverviewofCoalEconomyinAppalachia.pdf.
3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-workforce-
and-economic-revitaliz.
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by the Obama Administration).4 This latter plan was launched using preexisting funds, and was
intended to develop an array of grant programs across multiple agencies to facilitate energy
transition and ameliorate the negative effects of that transition. Most legislative elements of the
POWER+ Plan were carried out under existing authorities rather than new legislation. Certain
features continue to be active—particularly elements of the POWER Initiative within the ARC
and the EDA.
The POWER+ Plan
The POWER+ Plan was organized to address three areas of concern:
1. economic diversification and adjustment for affected coal communities;
2. social welfare for coal mineworkers and their families, and the accelerated clean-
up of hazardous coal abandoned mine lands; and
3. tax incentives to support the technological development and deployment of
carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration technologies.5
The POWER+ Plan was proposed in the FY2016 President’s Budget as a multi-agency approach
to energy transition.6 As proposed, the POWER+ Plan involved the participation of the
Department of Labor (DOL), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), the Small Business
Administration (SBA), the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Corporation for National and Community
Service, and the Department of the Interior (DOI). The FY2016 President’s Budget requested
approximately $56 million in POWER+ Plan grant funds: (1) $20 million for the DOL; (2) $25
million for the ARC; (3) $6 million for the EDA; and (4) $5 million for the EPA. In addition, a
portion of USDA rural development funds—$12 million in grants and $85 million in loans—were
aligned to POWER+ Plan priorities. Also, the plan sought $1 billion for abandoned mine land
reclamation and an additional $2 billion for carbon capture and sequestration technology
investments.7
4 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Resources for Communities through POWER Initiative,” press release, October 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
workforce-and-economic.
5 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Investing in Coal Communities, Workers, and Technology: The
POWER+ Plan, The President’s Budget: Fact Sheets on Key Issues Fiscal Year 2016, February 2, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact_sheets/investing-in-coal-
communities-workers-and-technology-the-power-plan.pdf.
6 The POWER+ Plan involved a number of existing programs and initiatives administered by the participating
agencies, and did not have an appropriations line item unto itself. An OMB fact sheet describes the specific funding
measures proposed in the new budget among the participating agencies: OMB, Investing in Coal Communities,
Workers, and Technology: The POWER+ Plan, The President’s Budget: Fact Sheets on Key Issues, Fiscal Year 2016,
February 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact_sheets/
investing-in-coal-communities-workers-and-technology-the-power-plan.pdf.. These funding requests were reflected in
the FY2016 White House budget proposal: OMB, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget of the U.S. Government: Appendix,
February 2, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2016-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2016-APP.pdf. See also
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Resources for Communities through POWER Initiative,” press release, October 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
workforce-and-economic.
7 OMB, Investing in Coal Communities, Workers, and Technology: The POWER+ Plan, The President’s Budget: Fact
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The POWER Initiative
The Obama Administration described the POWER Initiative as a “down payment” on the
POWER+ Plan, and focused on the Plan’s economic development elements using existing
funding sources (Table 1).8 Those existing funding sources (or “Targeted Funds” in Table 1) refer
to funds that were set aside by the respective federal executive agency in support of the POWER+
Plan in FY2015. These funding amounts are only those funds made available initially, and do not
account for additional appropriations or set-asides made available as the program progressed. The
EDA was initially designated as the lead agency for the POWER Initiative, with significant
funding elements from the ARC, SBA, and DOL. While led by the EDA, POWER Initiative
grants were determined by the individual awarding agency. Grants were divided into two funding
streams: (1) planning grants; and (2) implementation grants.
The POWER Initiative was announced in March 2015, with the first tranche of grants awarded in
October 2016.9 With the exception of certain parts of the POWER Initiative and funding for
reclaiming abandoned mine land (AML), broad elements of the POWER+ Plan were not enacted
by Congress. Since the end of the Obama Administration, the ARC is the only federal agency
with a POWER Initiative-designated program.
Table 1. POWER+ Plan, FY2015 Roll Out
as announced in March 2015
Agency
Program / Activity
Targeted Funds
Department of Commerce,
Assistance to Coal Communities,
$15 mil ion
Economic Development
Economic Adjustment Assistance,
Administration
and Partnership Planning
Department of Labor, Employment
Dislocated Worker National
$10-20 mil ion
and Training Administration
Emergency Grants
Small Business Administration
Regional Innovation Clusters and
$3 mil ion
Growth Accelerators
Appalachian Regional Commission
Technical Assistance and
$0.5 mil ion
Demonstration Projects
Source: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and
Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-
workforce-and-economic-revitaliz.
Notes: The EPA, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, the Corporation for National and
Community Service, and the Department of Interior were also noted as participating agencies, but did not
initial y contribute funding. Targeted funds refers to funds that were set aside by the respective federal agency in
support of the POWER+ Plan in FY2015. These funding amounts are only those funds made available initially, and
do not account for additional appropriations or set-asides made available as the program progressed.
Sheets on Key Issues, Fiscal Year 2016, February 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact_sheets/investing-in-coal-communities-workers-and-technology-the-power-plan.pdf.
8 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-workforce-
and-economic-revitaliz.
9 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Resources for Communities through POWER Initiative,” press release, October 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
workforce-and-economic.
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POWER Elements in the Current Administration
As of FY2022, the POWER Initiative exists solely as a funded program of the ARC, and is no
longer a multi-agency initiative. However, certain other elements originally included in the
POWER+ Plan and the POWER Initiative continue to receive appropriations and continue to be
active, but they are not designated as such. These elements are discussed below.
The EDA Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC) Program10
The EDA continues to receive appropriations for its Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC)
program. The ACC program was a grant-making element launched as a part of the EDA’s role in
the POWER Initiative.
In FY2022, $41.5 million was designated for the ACC program as part of appropriations to the
EDA.11 The FY2022 appropriations represented the eighth consecutive fiscal year of funding for
the ACC program, and reflected 315% growth from approximately $10 million appropriated in
FY2015. (See CRS Report R46991, Economic Development Administration: An Overview of
Programs and Appropriations (FY2011-FY2022), by Julie M. Lawhorn.12
While the ACC program is an active outgrowth of the POWER Initiative and POWER+ Plan, it is
no longer associated with the POWER Initiative and instead is identified as a separate program
drawing on Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) funds.13 Because it draws on EAA funding,
10 Following the initial implementation of the ACC program, EDA continued to allocate funding to coal-impacted
communities. In FY2021, EDA allocated 10% ($300 million) of the $3 billion appropriation from the American Rescue
Plan Act (ARPA, P.L. 117-2) to coal-impacted communities through the Coal Communities Commitment (CCC). The
set-asides were made to the Build Back Better Regional Challenge (BBBRC) and Economic Adjustment Assistance
Challenge (EAAC). The Initial Report to the President on Empowering Workers Through Revitalizing Energy
Communities (April 2021), developed by President Biden’s Interagency Working Group (IWG), also recommended
focused federal investments for coal-impacted communities. According to EDA, the CCC builds on this report. See
EDA, “Coal Communities Commitment,” https://eda.gov/arpa/coal-communities/. The IWG’s report is available
at https://netl.doe.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/Initial%20Report%20on%20Energy%20Communities_Apr2021.pdf.
11 See the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103, and the accompanying explanatory statement, printed
in the March 9, 2022, Congressional Record (pp. H1772-H1773), https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2022/03/09/168/
42/CREC-2022-03-09-bk3.pdf.
12 The Trump Administration’s FY2017 Budget sought to eliminate the ACC program. See U.S. Department of
Commerce, Economic Development Administration: Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Budget Request, February 9,
2016, pp. 36-38, http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/budget/FY17CBJ/
EDA%20FY%202017%20Congressional%20Submission%202-8-16%20OMB%20cleared%20508%20Compliant.pdf.
Subsequent Trump Administration Budget requests proposed eliminating the EDA entirely, including the ACC
program. For FY2018, the Trump Administration requested $30 million in funding for the EDA to enable the “orderly
closeout” of the agency: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2018: Appendix, May 23, 2017, pp. 181-
183, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2018-APP.pdf. In FY2019, the EDA
was also proposed for termination, and approximately $15 million was requested to enable its closeout: OMB, Budget
of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2019: Appendix, February 12, 2018, pp. 182-183, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/BUDGET-2019-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2019-APP.pdf. In the Trump Administration’s budget request for
FY2020, $30 million was requested for the EDA’s closeout: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2020:
Appendix, March 18, 2019, pp. 178-180, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2020-APP/pdf/BUDGET-
2020-APP.pdf. In the Trump Administration’s budget request for FY2021, $32 million was requested for the EDA’s
closeout; see OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2021: Appendix, February 10, 2020, pp. 191-192,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2021-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2021-APP.pdf. For a summary of EDA
appropriations, see CRS Report R46991, Economic Development Administration: An Overview of Programs and
Appropriations (FY2011-FY2022), by Julie M. Lawhorn.
13 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
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ACC investments may only be used for projects located in, or substantially benefiting, a
community or region that meets EDA distress criteria.
EDA economic distress is defined as
“An unemployment rate that is, for the most recent 24-month period for which
data are available, at least one percentage point greater than the national average
unemployment rate;
Per capita income that is, for the most recent period for which data are available,
80 percent or less of the national average per capita income; or
A Special Need, as determined by EDA.”14
Table 2. ACC Program Funding, FY2015-FY2022
in millions ($)
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Funding for
$10.0
$15.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$33.5
$41.5
ACC
program
Source: Compiled by CRS from Department of Commerce budget justification documents.
Notes: The ACC program was not identified as a specific appropriations line item until the FY2017 Department
of Commerce budget justification, which sought to terminate its funding. However, that same document included
past funding amounts for ACC in FY2015 and FY2016, which were included as set-asides within the EAA
program. In FY2018-FY2021, funding for the ACC program was not requested as the Trump Administration
proposed terminating the EDA and its programs.
Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER)
Reclamation Program
One objective of the POWER+ Plan was funding for the social welfare of miners and for cleanup
and reclamation of former mine and other coal-related “brownfield” sites. While certain
legislative proposals for these purposes were never enacted,15 Congress has approved annual
funding since FY2016 for economic development grants to states for Abandoned Mine Land
reclamation activities. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE)
within the Department of the Interior is the federal office responsible for administering
Abandoned Mine Land reclamation activities in coordination with eligible states and tribes.16
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-workforce-
and-economic-revitaliz.
14 13 C.F.R. §301.3. See also Economic Development Administration, Applying for EDA Investments: Eligibility
Requirements and Criteria, https://www.eda.gov/archives/2016/how-to-apply/files/Eligibility-Requirements-and-
Criteria.pdf. For additional information about area eligibility and measures of economic distress in EDA programs, see
CRS In Focus IF12074, Areas of Economic Distress for EDA Activities and Programs, by Julie M. Lawhorn, Areas of
Economic Distress for EDA Activities and Programs, by Julie M. Lawhorn.
15 See, for example, The Miners Protection Act, first introduced in 2015 as S. 1714. Versions of this bill, with the same
scope and effect, have been reintroduced in the years since. For example, in the 116th Congress, the Revitalizing the
Economy of Coal Communities by Leveraging Local Activities and Investing More (RECLAIM) Act of 2016, H.R.
4456, was introduced but was not enacted.
16 Funding launched in FY2016 was notable for providing grants for economic development purposes. Previously,
grants had been made available to eligible states and tribes to address the hazards and environmental degradation posed
by abandoned mine sites under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 (P.L. 95-87). For
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Initially, OSMRE referred to this program as the “AML Pilot Program.” Later, the program was
renamed as the Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER) Program.
The FY2016 appropriation of $90 million directed funds to be divided equally among the three
Appalachian states with the greatest amount of unfunded AML needs (P.L. 114-13).17 The $105
million appropriated for FY2017 set aside $75 million to be divided this way, with the balance of
that amount being available more broadly to other eligible AML reclamation applicants (P.L. 115-
31).18 FY2018 appropriations of $115 million set aside $75 million for the three states
demonstrating the greatest unmet need (P.L. 115-141).19
For FY2019, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2019, Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), appropriated
$115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian states with the
greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian states with the
“subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 million for federally recognized Indian
Tribes.20
For FY2020, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2020, Division D of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94),
appropriated $115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian
states with the greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian
states with the “subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 million for federally
recognized Indian Tribes with AML programs.21
For FY2021, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2021, Division G of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), appropriated
$115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian states with the
greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian states with the
“subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 million for federally recognized Indian
tribes.22
For FY2022, the President’s budget requested $165 million for the AMLER program, a proposed
increase of $50 million from the prior year appropriation.23 For FY2022, the Department of the
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2022, Division G of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103) appropriated $122.5 million, which was
subdivided further: $79.9 million for the three Appalachian states with the greatest amount of
unfunded needs; $32 million for the next three Appalachian states with the “subsequent greatest
more information on the AML economic development program, see Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement, Report on Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Economic Development Pilot Program (AML Pilot
Program) for FY 2016–FY2018, April 19, 2019, https://www.osmre.gov/programs/AML/
2016_2018_Annual_Report_AML_Economic_Development_Pilot_Program.pdf. See also Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement, Reclaiming Abandoned Mine Lands, https://www.osmre.gov/programs/aml.shtm.
17 To clarify the effective date of certain provisions of the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, and for other
purposes, P.L. 114-13.
18 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 115-31.
19 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, P.L. 115-141.
20 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, P.L. 116-6.
21 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94.
22 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260.
23 Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Budget Justifications and Performance Information, Fiscal
Year 2022, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/fy2022-osmre-budget-justification.pdf.
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amount of unfunded needs”; and $10.7 million for federally recognized Indian tribes.24 The
appropriation was $42.5 million less than requested, but increased the AMLER program by 6.5%
from the previous year.
Table 3. AMLER Reclamation Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022
in millions ($)
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Total for AMLER
$90.0
$105.0
$115.0
$115.0
$115.0
$115.0
$122.5
reclamation
Total amount for the
$90.0
$75.0
$75.0
$75.0
$75.0
$75.0
$79.9
top three Appalachian
states with the greatest
amount of unfunded
needsa,b
Total amount for the
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$31.9
next three Appalachian
states with the greatest
amount of unfunded
needsa,b
Total amount for the
$10.0
$10.0
$10.0
$10.0
$10.7
three tribes with
Abandoned Mine Land
Programs: Navajo
Nation, Hopi Tribe, and
Crow Tribeb
Sources: Data compiled and tabulated by CRS. For FY2016, the $90 mil ion was reported in the explanatory
statement accompanying P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Congressional Record,
December 17, 2015, Book III, p. H10217). Each of the fol owing fiscal year appropriations were reported in
respective enacted bil s: P.L. 115-31; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 116-94; P.L. 116-260; and P.L. 117-103.
Notes: Beginning in FY2017, Congress provided tiers of funding not reserved for the three Appalachian states
with the greatest amount of unfunded AML needs. For example, in FY2018 Congress appropriated $75 mil ion
for the three Appalachian states with the greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 mil ion for the next three
Appalachian states with the “subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 mil ion for grants to
federally recognized Indian Tribes. Subsequent appropriations laws specified a similar approach to al ocating
funding among the eligible states and tribes.
a. OSMRE periodically updates funding estimates for sites in the Abandoned Mine Land Inventory System
(AMLIS) inventory. The unfunded reclamation needs a state reports may vary from year to year. Thus, a
state’s grant amount may change depending on their relative reporting of unfunded reclamation needs.
b. Each state or tribe eligible for an AMLER grant received one-third of the total grant amount for that year.
The ARC’s POWER Initiative
The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is the only federal agency that continues to
receive regular appropriated funding for energy transition activities under the POWER Initiative
24 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103.
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designation.25 While the POWER Initiative was launched as a multi-agency effort, only the ARC
chose to designate its contributions as the POWER Initiative.
About the ARC
The ARC was established in 1965 to address economic distress in the Appalachian region (40
U.S.C. §14101-14704).26 The ARC’s jurisdiction spans 423 counties in Alabama, Georgia,
Kentucky, Ohio, New York, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Map of the Appalachian Regional Commission
ARC service area, by designations of county distress, FY2022
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from the Appalachian Regional Commission and Esri Data and Maps 2019.
Note: West Virginia is the only state with all counties within the ARC’s jurisdiction.
The ARC is a federal-state partnership, with administrative costs shared equally by the federal
government and member states, while economic development activities are federally funded
25 It should be noted that while the ARC is generally classified as an independent federal agency, the federal regional
commissions and authorities are unique in that although they are federally chartered organizations and draw on federal
appropriations for their operations and activities, they are generally understood to be partnerships between the
constituent states and the federal government. The vast majority of their staff and leadership are not federal employees.
For more information, see CRS Report R45997, Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Structural Features
and Function, by Julie M. Lawhorn.
26 Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, as amended, P.L. 89-4.
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through appropriations. Thirteen state governors and a federal co-chair oversee the ARC. The
federal co-chair is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.27
Scope and Activities
The ARC’s POWER Initiative program prioritizes federal resources to projects and activities in
coal communities that exhibit elements that
produce multiple economic development outcomes (e.g., promoting regional
economic growth; job creation; and/or employment opportunities for displaced
workers);
are specifically identified under state, local, or regional economic development
plans; and
have been collaboratively designed by state, local, and regional stakeholders.28
For FY2022, the ARC will fund two classes of grants as part of the POWER Initiative: (1)
implementation grants, with awards of up to $1.5 million (with the exception for broadband
deployment projects, which can have awards of up to $2.5 million),29 and (2) planning grants,
with awards of up to $50,000. For FY2022, $65 million in grant funding was made available for
the POWER Initiative (see Table 4), of which one-third was reserved for broadband projects.30
POWER investments are subject to the ARC’s grant match requirements, which are linked to the
Commission’s economic distress hierarchy.31 Those economic distress designations are, in
descending order of distress
distressed (80% funding allowance, 20% grant match);32
at-risk (70%);
27 For more information about the ARC and the other federal regional commissions and authorities, see CRS Report
R45997, Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Structural Features and Function, by Julie M. Lawhorn. See
also, in summarized form, CRS In Focus IF11140, Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Overview of
Structure and Activities, by Julie M. Lawhorn.
28 Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic
Revitalization (POWER) Initiative: Federal Fiscal Year 2022—Request for Proposals (RFP) for Project Grants,
February 22, 2022, https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
29 According to the FY2022 POWER RFP, to qualify for the broadband deployment funding, at least 65% of the
broadband project’s budget “must be directed to the physical deployment of broadband infrastructure.” If more than
35% of proposed funds are directed to activities not directly associated with deployment of broadband infrastructure,
then applicants may apply for funding under the guidelines for implementation projects and will not qualify for
broadband deployment funding. See ARC, POWER, FY2022 RFP for Project Grants, February 22, 2022, p. 3,
https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
30 ARC, POWER, FY2022 RFP for Project Grants, February 22, 2022, p. 3, https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
31 ARC, County Economic Status and Distressed Areas in Appalachia, https://www.arc.gov/classifying-economic-
distress-in-appalachian-counties/.
32 The ARC uses an index-based classification system to compare each county within its jurisdiction with national
averages based on: (1) three-year average unemployment rates; (2) per capita market income; and (3) poverty rates.
These factors are calculated into a composite index value for each county, which are ranked and sorted into designated
distress levels. Each distress level corresponds to a given county’s ranking relative to that of the U.S. as a whole. These
designations are defined as, in descending order: distressed counties, or those with values in the “worst” 10% of U.S.
counties; at-risk, which rank between worst 10% and 25%; transitional, which rank between worst 25% and best 25%;
competitive, which rank between “best” 25% and best 10%; and attainment, or those which rank in the best 10%.
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transitional (50%);
competitive (30%); and
attainment (0% funding allowance).
Special allowances at the discretion of the commission may reduce or discharge matches, and
match requirements may be met with other federal funds when allowed. Designations of county-
level distress in the ARC’s service area are represented in Figure 1.
POWER investments are also aligned to the ARC’s strategic plan. The current strategic plan,
adopted in October 2021, prioritizes five investment goals:
1. entrepreneurial and business development;
2. workforce development;
3. infrastructure development;
4. natural and cultural assets; and
5. leadership and community capacity.33
Given its programmatic breadth, POWER investments may link to any one of these investment
goals. POWER investment determinations are made according to annual objectives outlined in
the request for proposals, as well as broader investment priorities, which are building a
competitive workforce; fostering entrepreneurial activities; developing industry clusters in
communities; and broadband.34 responding to substance abuse
According to the ARC,35 over $319 million in investments have been made since 2015 through
395 projects in 358 counties across the ARC’s service area, leveraging an estimated $1.5 billion
of private investment. Figure 2 is a representation of the ARC’s POWER Initiative projects
tallied by state (for 2016-2022 (to date)).
33 ARC, Appalachia Envisioned: A New Era of Opportunity, ARC Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022–2026,
https://www.arc.gov/strategicplan/.
34 ARC, POWER, FY2022 RFP for Project Grants, February 22, 2022, pp. 2-3, https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
35 ARC, ARC’s Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,
accessed July 28, 2022, https://www.arc.gov/arcs-power-initiative/.
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Figure 2. Distribution of ARC POWER Initiative Projects, 2016-2022 (to date)
by state (and one additional category)
Source: Data retrieved from ARC website (https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/POWER-Award-
Summaries-by-State-as-of-May-2022.pdf) on September 6, 2022.
Notes: Special Regional Projects are those projects that are undertaken to provide regional benefits, and may
include col aboration with organizations outside of the ARC’s service area. Data reflect the number of awards
announced by ARC as of May 2022.
Funding History
While the POWER Initiative does not receive appropriations separate from that of the ARC as a
whole, congressional intent is signaled in House Appropriations Committee reports, which
specify amounts to be reserved for the POWER Initiative. In committee report language, it is
generally described as activities “in support of the POWER+ Plan” or “in support of the POWER
Initiative.”36
Table 4 shows appropriations set aside for the POWER Initiative from FY2016 to FY2022 and
the FY2023 requested amounts, as well as the amounts of annual and supplemental appropriations
for ARC as a whole.
36 See, for example: U.S. Congress, House Appropriations, Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, 2019, Report to
accompany H.R. 5895, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., 2019, H.Rept. 115-697 (Washington: GPO, 2019), p. 159; and the
explanatory statement accompanying the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-244), printed in the September 10, 2018, Congressional Record
(p. H8038), vol. 164, no. 150, https://www.congress.gov/115/crec/2018/09/10/CREC-2018-09-10-pt1-PgH7946-2.pdf.
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Table 4. ARC POWER Initiative Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022
and FY2023 Request
in millions ($)
FY2023
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Request
Appropriations
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$55
$65
$72
reserved for
POWER
Appropriations
$146
$152
$155
$165
$175
$180
$395
$235
for the ARC as
a whole
Sources: Data compiled and tabulated by CRS from data provided by ARC and from committee reports
associated with the fol owing annual appropriations bil s: P.L. 114-113 (FY2016); P.L. 115-31 (FY2017); P.L. 115-
141 (FY2018); P.L. 115-244 (FY2019); P.L. 116-94 (FY2020); P.L. 116-260 (FY2021); and P.L. 117-103 (FY2022).
The FY2022 amount includes $195 mil ion provided through annual appropriations (P.L. 117-103) and $200
mil ion from Division J, Title III of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA, P.L. 117-58). The IIJA
provided $200 mil ion for the ARC in each fiscal year from FY2022 through FY2026. The amount requested for
FY2023 is from ARC FY2023 Performance Budget Justification (see https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/
03/FINAL-FY2023-ARC-Budget-Justification-Congressional.pdf).
To date, the ARC received approximately $1.2 billion in requests for POWER Initiative grant
funding from FY2016 to FY2022 (Table 5). This suggests that there was unmet demand for the
POWER Initiative in the Appalachian region alone (the ARC’s service area, as depicted in
Figure 1).
Table 5. ARC POWER Initiative Grant Awards, FY2016-FY2022
FY2016-
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022a
# Applications
216
231
140
174
188
167
Amount of
$280 mil ion
$329 mil ion
$120 mil ion
$164 mil ion
$173 mil ion
$153 mil ion
Funding
Requested by
Applicants
Awarded Funds
$91 mil ion
$49 mil ion
$47 mil ion
$45 mil ion
$57 mil ion
$77 mil ion
Source: Data provided by the ARC and tabulated by CRS.
Notes: For FY2016 and FY2017, funding was combined into a single pot and awarded accordingly. In FY2021,
the Commission voted to recommend 26 projects totaling $28,440,625 from the FY2021cycle for funding in
FY2022.
a. The FY2022 “Awarded Funds” amount reflects the amount of funding announced as of August 18, 2022.
Policy Considerations
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that coal production overall will continue
to decline as a consequence of falling market demand.37 In particular, the EIA forecasts coal to
37 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2022: With Projections to 2050, March 3, 2022.
Total Coal Production, reference case, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=1-AEO2022®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2022&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=~ref2022-d011222a.6-1-AEO2022&ctype=linechart&
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account for 6% less generating capacity at the end of 2022 than at the end of 2021.38 By 2050,
coal is projected to decline to 10% of U.S. electricity generation, nuclear is projected to account
for 12%, renewables (i.e., wind, solar) 36%, hydropower 5%, and natural gas 34%, according to
EIA projections.39
Coal’s decline is a function of market forces, particularly its higher cost relative to natural gas
and renewable energy options.40 In the future, under current policies, coal’s cost disadvantage is
expected to continue, and could be accelerated if policies are adopted to reduce GHG emissions
that contribute to climate change.41 Even with federal incentives to invest in carbon capture,
utilization, and storage as a means to mitigate fossil fuel-related emissions, coal may still not be
competitive in many situations. As a result of falling demand, noncompetitive coal producers and
their communities are expected to face continued economic dislocation.
Should it wish to broaden or intensify federal efforts to address energy transition in local
communities, Congress may have several options. In the past, Congress has demonstrated
bipartisan interest in the federal government providing assistance to populations adversely
affected by the ongoing energy transitions. It has done so through its appropriations for the
ARC’s POWER Initiative, the EDA’s ACC program, and the AMLER investments.42 In
combination with evidence of unmet demand for federal assistance, as measured by unfunded
requests to the ARC (Table 5), Congress may consider reviewing the balance among needs,
appropriations, and effectiveness of past efforts.
Congress could conduct a review of the POWER Initiative and the efficacy of its performance
and resources. This potential review suggests some particular considerations:
Geography: While the ACC is available for the nation as a whole, the ARC’s
POWER Initiative is restricted to the ARC’s service area in the Appalachian
region. Congress may consider expanding the POWER Initiative to be available
more broadly across the nation, or in a more targeted fashion as demonstrated by
the ARC’s program. Alternatively, funding could be made available nationwide
to any eligible coal community, such as through other federal regional
commissions and authorities and/or EDA regions.
Funding: Projections of U.S. coal production (cited earlier) suggest that the
ongoing transition in U.S. energy systems may lead to further localized economic
distress without the development of new regional opportunities. Congress may
consider the level of funding for POWER Initiative programs in the context of
those economic needs. Funding levels could be tied to the overall scale of the
challenge, allocated to areas with the greatest need, and made in consideration of
sourcekey=0.
38 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Will Account for 85% of U.S. Electric Generating Capacity
Retirements in 2022, January 11, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=50838.
39 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2022: With Projections to 2050, March 3, 2022.
Total Coal Production, reference case, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=1-AEO2022®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2022&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=~ref2022-d011222a.6-1-AEO2022&ctype=linechart&
sourcekey=0 and https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/electricity/sub-topic-02.php.
40 Howard Gruenspecht, The U.S. Coal Sector: Recent and Continuing Challenges, Brookings Institution, January
2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-u-s-coal-sector/.
41 See, for example, Ed Crooks, “U.S. Coal Output Forecasted to Fall Despite Trump Revival Efforts,” Financial
Times, January 26, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/5c31c480-2036-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65.
42 See, for example: U.S. Congress, House Natural Resources, Energy and Mineral Resources, Climate Change:
Preparing for the Energy Transition, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 12, 2019, House Event 108873.
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data-driven evaluations of the program effectiveness. In assessing scale,
Congress may consider macroeconomic factors as well as social and
environmental policy objectives.
Energy Type: Congress may also consider expanding the POWER Initiative
and/or related programs beyond the coal industry to other energy industries or
regions perceived to be in decline.43 For example, since FY2020, Congress has
directed the EDA to allocate economic adjustment assistance funding to support
transition efforts in nuclear closure communities. Congress may consider policies
to support economically distressed communities impacted by other changes in the
fossil fuel industry as well. Congress may also consider other public policy goals,
such as reducing GHGs, to assist in promoting renewable energy types and
carbon capture technologies.
Should Congress consider such efforts, the ARC’s POWER Initiative program could serve as a
potential model to be scaled or replicated as needed. In addition, other models have also been
proposed in bills introduced in the 116th and 117th Congresses that would assist coal communities
in transition.44
Concluding Notes
Although the POWER+ Plan was not enacted in its entirety, some of its legacy programs continue
to receive annual appropriations and remain active. The persistence of such programs suggests
support among many policymakers for federal efforts to rectify, or at least attenuate, economic
distress as a consequence of energy transition. In addition, were Congress to pursue policy efforts
reflective of broadening concern for climate issues,45 a POWER Initiative-type program could be
developed to also facilitate energy transition from fossil fuel-based energy sources to a mix of
renewables and other alternatives.
Although the POWER+ Plan did not continue beyond the Obama administration, several
constituent programs have continued to receive congressional backing, and applicant volume—at
least in the case of the ARC’s POWER Initiative—may suggest further demand for additional
federal resources in addressing energy and economic transition issues. More broadly, these
mechanisms could also be purposed to facilitate federal resources for other related issues, such as
related to ecological/environmental resilience and adaptation.
The POWER Initiative, as originally conceived or in its current form as a program of the ARC,
has not been evaluated by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) or other research
organization for its effectiveness as either a mechanism for alleviating community economic
distress caused by the declining coal industry, or economic development more broadly. One
43 See Martha T. Moore, Nuclear Plant Closures Bring Economic Pain to Cities and Towns, Pew Trusts, September 5,
2018, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/09/05/nuclear-plant-closures-bring-
economic-pain-to-cities-and-towns.
44 For example, in the 166th Congress, H.R. 315 included provisions “To amend the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 to authorize partnerships between States and nongovernmental entities for the purpose of
reclaiming and restoring land and water resources adversely affected by coal mining activities before August 3, 1977,
and for other purposes”; H.R. 4142, “To rebuild the Nation’s infrastructure, provide a consumer rebate to the American
people, assist coal country, reduce harmful pollution, and for other purposes.” In the 117th Congress, H.R. 5376
included provisions to provide assistance to assistance to energy and industrial transition communities, including coal,
oil and gas, and nuclear transition communities.
45 See H.Res. 112.
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recent GAO report mentioned the Assistance to Coal Communities program, but did not seek to
analyze its activities or efficacy.46 Similarly, older GAO reports exist that feature the Abandoned
Mine Land Reclamation program (prior to its current configuration),47 and the Appalachian
Regional Commission,48 but may be of limited relevance when evaluating current programming,
including more recent activities such as the POWER Initiative. Meanwhile, a number of
anecdotal and media reports appear to tout the POWER Initiative’s success and viability.49 The
ARC, for its part, reports that the POWER Initiative has “invested over $319 million in over 395
projects touching 358 counties across Appalachia.” According to the ARC, those investments are
“projected to create or retain more than 36,600 jobs, and leverage more than $1.5 billion in
additional private investment.”50
ARC completed three evaluations of the POWER Initiative. The FY2019 evaluation (Year 1)
focused on early impacts, challenges, opportunities, and technical assistance needs associated
with the implementation grants funded in or prior to FY2018.51 The FY2020 evaluation (Year 2)
covered additional topics such as projects designed to address the impacts of substance use
disorder (SUD); community capacity in counties in which multiple POWER projects have been
implemented; and multistate projects. The FY2020 evaluation also evaluated early results of
closed POWER projects.52 The FY2021 evaluation (Year 3) reported on indicators of change from
the individual, business, and community levels.53 The evaluations highlight the varying scales of
implementation and the range of activities supported by POWER Initiative awards (e.g.,
infrastructure, planning, broadband, workforce development, substance use disorder, or a
combination of activities). Additionally, the evaluations note that POWER projects may have a
range of timelines for implementation, which impacts the evaluators’ ability to uniformly measure
outcomes. An FY2022 evaluation is in development.
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Economic Adjustment Assistance: Federal Programs Intended to Help
Beneficiaries Adjust to Economic Disruption, GAO-19-85R, March 5, 2019, pp. 13-14, https://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-19-85R.
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement: Abandoned Mine Land Program, GAO-09-208R, November 26, 2008, https://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-09-208R.
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Economic Development: Limited Information Exists on the Impact of
Assistance Provided by Three Agencies, RCED-96-103, April 3, 1996, https://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-96-103.
49 See, for example: Brittany Patterson, Portal 31: How A Closed Mine Opened New Prospects For One Coal Town,
WFPL.org, November 11, 2019, https://wfpl.org/portal-31-how-a-closed-mine-opened-new-prospects-for-one-coal-
town/; and “A $1.5M Shot in the Arm for Workforce Development,” Independent Herald, November 12, 2019,
https://www.ihoneida.com/2019/11/12/shot-arm-workforce-development/.
50 ARC, POWER Award Summaries by State as of May 2022, accessed September 6, 2022, https://www.arc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/POWER-Award-Summaries-by-State-as-of-May-2022.pdf, and ARC, ARC’s POWER
Initiative, https://www.arc.gov/arcs-power-initiative/.
51 ARC, Chamberlin and Dunn, Success Factors, Challenges, and Early Impacts of the POWER Initiative: An
Implementation Evaluation, October 2019, https://www.arc.gov/report/success-factors-challenges-and-early-impacts-
of-the-power-initiative-an-implementation-evaluation/.
52 ARC, Chamberlin and Dunn, POWER Initiative Evaluation: Factors and Results of Project Implementation,
September 2020, https://www.arc.gov/report/power-initiative-evaluation-factors-and-results-of-project-implementation/
.
53 ARC, Chamberlin and Dunn, POWER Initiative Evaluation: The POWER of Change Stories of Results for
Individuals, Businesses, and Communities, September 2021,
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Author Information
Julie M. Lawhorn
Analyst in Economic Development Policy
Acknowledgments
This report was originally written by former CRS Analyst Michael Cecire. Congressional clients seeking
more information and analysis on the material covered in this report should contact the current author.
Lance N. Larson, Analyst in Environmental Policy, provided substantive edits and assistance in updating
the report.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and
under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in
its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or
material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to
copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
R46015 · VERSION 10 · UPDATED
16
September 8, 2022
Economic Development
Julie M. Lawhorn
With the decline of the U.S. coal industry, managing the economic effects of energy transition
Analyst in Economic
has become a priority for the federal government. The Partnerships for Opportunity and
Development Policy
Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative, and the broader POWER Plus Plan
of which it was a part, represent the U.S. government’s efforts to ease the economic effects of
energy transition in coal industry-dependent communities in the United States, and especially in
Appalachia. Launched in 2015 by the Obama Administration as a multi-agency effort utilizing
various existing programs, the POWER Plus plan received partial backing through appropriations for Fiscal Year 2016
(FY2016) to the Appalachian Regional Commission, the Economic Development Administration, and for abandoned mine
land reclamation.
While certain proposed provisions of POWER Plus were never enacted or funded, other elements of the POWER Initiative
have continued under the Trump and Biden Administrations. Continuing programs include the Assistance to Coal
Communities program (now part of the Assistance to Energy Communities initiative) within the Economic Development
Administration, the POWER Initiative under the Appalachian Regional Commission (the only program to retain the original
branding), and a funding program for abandoned mine land reclamation. Of these efforts, the Appalachian Regional
Commission’s POWER Initiative is the largest of the initiative’s economic development programs, having funded over $319
million in projects since it was first launched. The Appalachian Regional Commission’s POWER Initiative is regionally
targeted to declining coal communities in Appalachia, unlike the Economic Development Administration’s Assistance to
Coal Communities (now the Assistance to Energy Communities) program, which has a national scope. To date, the initiative
has reportedly leveraged approximately $1.5 billion of private investment into the Appalachian regional economy. This
report provides background on the origins, development, and activities of the POWER Initiative.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 1
The POWER+ Plan ................................................................................................................... 2
The POWER Initiative .............................................................................................................. 3
POWER Elements in the Current Administration ........................................................................... 4
The EDA Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC) Program .................................................... 4
Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER) Reclamation Program ................ 5
The ARC’s POWER Initiative......................................................................................................... 7
About the ARC .......................................................................................................................... 8
Scope and Activities .................................................................................................................. 9
Funding History ....................................................................................................................... 11
Policy Considerations .................................................................................................................... 12
Concluding Notes .......................................................................................................................... 14
Figures
Figure 1. Map of the Appalachian Regional Commission ............................................................... 8
Figure 2. Distribution of ARC POWER Initiative Projects, 2016-2022 (to date) .......................... 11
Tables
Table 1. POWER+ Plan, FY2015 Roll Out ..................................................................................... 3
Table 2. ACC Program Funding, FY2015-FY2022 ......................................................................... 5
Table 3. AMLER Reclamation Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022 .................................................. 7
Table 4. ARC POWER Initiative Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022 and FY2023 Request .......... 12
Table 5. ARC POWER Initiative Grant Awards, FY2016-FY2022 .............................................. 12
Contacts
Author Information ........................................................................................................................ 16
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The POWER Initiative: Energy Transition as Economic Development
Introduction
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has forecast U.S. coal production to decline
through 2050, with the sharpest reduction to occur by the mid-2020s.1 Consequently, the coal
industry’s decline has contributed to economic distress in coal-dependent communities, including
increased unemployment and poverty rates.2
In response, the Obama Administration launched the Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Plus Plan, which addressed the coal sector’s decline
through funding for (1) economic stabilization, (2) social welfare efforts, and (3) environmental
efforts. The economic elements were organized within the POWER Initiative, a multi-agency
federal initiative to provide economic development funding and technical assistance to address
economic distress caused by the effects of energy transition principally in coal communities.
Although the initiative began as a multi-agency effort as part of the POWER Plus Plan, the
POWER Initiative currently operates as a funded program administered by the Appalachian
Regional Commission (ARC) in its 423-county service area.
This report considers the background of the POWER Initiative and the broader effort of which it
was originally a part, the POWER Plus Plan. It broadly surveys the state of POWER elements in
the current administration, including elements of the initiative in the Economic Development
Administration (EDA), the ARC, and funded efforts for abandoned mine land reclamation. The
Appalachian Regional Commission’s POWER Initiative program is the largest of these, and the
only program to retain the POWER Initiative branding. This report considers its scope and
activities as well as its funding history.
The POWER Initiative is supported by Congress as reflected by consistent annual appropriations.
The POWER Initiative may also be of interest to Congress as an economic development program
that actively facilitates and eases the repercussions of energy transition in affected communities in
Appalachia. More broadly, in light of the projected continued decline of the coal industry, as well
as proposals to address greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from hydrocarbon combustion,
congressional interest in programs to address economic dislocations as a result of energy
transition is likely to accelerate.
Background
The POWER Initiative was launched in 2015 as a multi-agency federal effort to provide grant
funding and technical assistance to address economic and labor dislocations caused by the effects
of energy transition—principally in coal communities around the United States.3 The POWER
Initiative was a precursor to a broader effort known as the POWER Plus Plan (dubbed POWER+
1 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2022: With Projections to 2050, March 3, 2022,
Total Coal Production, reference case, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=1-AEO2022®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2022&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=~ref2022-d011222a.6-1-AEO2022&ctype=linechart&
sourcekey=0 and https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/electricity/sub-topic-02.php.
2 Eric Bowen et al., An Overview of the Coal Economy in Appalachia, Appalachian Regional Commission, January
2018, https://www.arc.gov/assets/research_reports/CIE1-OverviewofCoalEconomyinAppalachia.pdf.
3 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-workforce-
and-economic-revitaliz.
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by the Obama Administration).4 This latter plan was launched using preexisting funds, and was
intended to develop an array of grant programs across multiple agencies to facilitate energy
transition and ameliorate the negative effects of that transition. Most legislative elements of the
POWER+ Plan were carried out under existing authorities rather than new legislation. Certain
features continue to be active—particularly elements of the POWER Initiative within the ARC
and the EDA.
The POWER+ Plan
The POWER+ Plan was organized to address three areas of concern:
1. economic diversification and adjustment for affected coal communities;
2. social welfare for coal mineworkers and their families, and the accelerated clean-
up of hazardous coal abandoned mine lands; and
3. tax incentives to support the technological development and deployment of
carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration technologies.5
The POWER+ Plan was proposed in the FY2016 President’s Budget as a multi-agency approach
to energy transition.6 As proposed, the POWER+ Plan involved the participation of the
Department of Labor (DOL), the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), the Small Business
Administration (SBA), the Economic Development Administration (EDA), the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Corporation for National and Community
Service, and the Department of the Interior (DOI). The FY2016 President’s Budget requested
approximately $56 million in POWER+ Plan grant funds: (1) $20 million for the DOL; (2) $25
million for the ARC; (3) $6 million for the EDA; and (4) $5 million for the EPA. In addition, a
portion of USDA rural development funds—$12 million in grants and $85 million in loans—were
aligned to POWER+ Plan priorities. Also, the plan sought $1 billion for abandoned mine land
reclamation and an additional $2 billion for carbon capture and sequestration technology
investments.7
4 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Resources for Communities through POWER Initiative,” press release, October 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
workforce-and-economic.
5 U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Investing in Coal Communities, Workers, and Technology: The
POWER+ Plan, The President’s Budget: Fact Sheets on Key Issues Fiscal Year 2016, February 2, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact_sheets/investing-in-coal-
communities-workers-and-technology-the-power-plan.pdf.
6 The POWER+ Plan involved a number of existing programs and initiatives administered by the participating
agencies, and did not have an appropriations line item unto itself. An OMB fact sheet describes the specific funding
measures proposed in the new budget among the participating agencies: OMB, Investing in Coal Communities,
Workers, and Technology: The POWER+ Plan, The President’s Budget: Fact Sheets on Key Issues, Fiscal Year 2016,
February 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact_sheets/
investing-in-coal-communities-workers-and-technology-the-power-plan.pdf.. These funding requests were reflected in
the FY2016 White House budget proposal: OMB, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget of the U.S. Government: Appendix,
February 2, 2015, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2016-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2016-APP.pdf. See also
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Resources for Communities through POWER Initiative,” press release, October 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
workforce-and-economic.
7 OMB, Investing in Coal Communities, Workers, and Technology: The POWER+ Plan, The President’s Budget: Fact
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The POWER Initiative
The Obama Administration described the POWER Initiative as a “down payment” on the
POWER+ Plan, and focused on the Plan’s economic development elements using existing
funding sources (Table 1).8 Those existing funding sources (or “Targeted Funds” in Table 1) refer
to funds that were set aside by the respective federal executive agency in support of the POWER+
Plan in FY2015. These funding amounts are only those funds made available initially, and do not
account for additional appropriations or set-asides made available as the program progressed. The
EDA was initially designated as the lead agency for the POWER Initiative, with significant
funding elements from the ARC, SBA, and DOL. While led by the EDA, POWER Initiative
grants were determined by the individual awarding agency. Grants were divided into two funding
streams: (1) planning grants; and (2) implementation grants.
The POWER Initiative was announced in March 2015, with the first tranche of grants awarded in
October 2016.9 With the exception of certain parts of the POWER Initiative and funding for
reclaiming abandoned mine land (AML), broad elements of the POWER+ Plan were not enacted
by Congress. Since the end of the Obama Administration, the ARC is the only federal agency
with a POWER Initiative-designated program.
Table 1. POWER+ Plan, FY2015 Roll Out
as announced in March 2015
Agency
Program / Activity
Targeted Funds
Department of Commerce,
Assistance to Coal Communities,
$15 mil ion
Economic Development
Economic Adjustment Assistance,
Administration
and Partnership Planning
Department of Labor, Employment
Dislocated Worker National
$10-20 mil ion
and Training Administration
Emergency Grants
Small Business Administration
Regional Innovation Clusters and
$3 mil ion
Growth Accelerators
Appalachian Regional Commission
Technical Assistance and
$0.5 mil ion
Demonstration Projects
Source: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and
Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-
workforce-and-economic-revitaliz.
Notes: The EPA, USDA, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, the Corporation for National and
Community Service, and the Department of Interior were also noted as participating agencies, but did not
initial y contribute funding. Targeted funds refers to funds that were set aside by the respective federal agency in
support of the POWER+ Plan in FY2015. These funding amounts are only those funds made available initially, and
do not account for additional appropriations or set-asides made available as the program progressed.
Sheets on Key Issues, Fiscal Year 2016, February 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/budget/fy2016/assets/fact_sheets/investing-in-coal-communities-workers-and-technology-the-power-plan.pdf.
8 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-workforce-
and-economic-revitaliz.
9 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New Workforce and
Economic Revitalization Resources for Communities through POWER Initiative,” press release, October 2015,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/15/fact-sheet-administration-announces-new-
workforce-and-economic.
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POWER Elements in the Current Administration
As of FY2022, the POWER Initiative exists solely as a funded program of the ARC, and is no
longer a multi-agency initiative. However, certain other elements originally included in the
POWER+ Plan and the POWER Initiative continue to receive appropriations and continue to be
active, but they are not designated as such. These elements are discussed below.
The EDA Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC) Program10
The EDA continues to receive appropriations for its Assistance to Coal Communities (ACC)
program. The ACC program was a grant-making element launched as a part of the EDA’s role in
the POWER Initiative.
In FY2022, $41.5 million was designated for the ACC program as part of appropriations to the
EDA.11 The FY2022 appropriations represented the eighth consecutive fiscal year of funding for
the ACC program, and reflected 315% growth from approximately $10 million appropriated in
FY2015. (See CRS Report R46991, Economic Development Administration: An Overview of
Programs and Appropriations (FY2011-FY2022), by Julie M. Lawhorn.12
While the ACC program is an active outgrowth of the POWER Initiative and POWER+ Plan, it is
no longer associated with the POWER Initiative and instead is identified as a separate program
drawing on Economic Adjustment Assistance (EAA) funds.13 Because it draws on EAA funding,
10 Following the initial implementation of the ACC program, EDA continued to allocate funding to coal-impacted
communities. In FY2021, EDA allocated 10% ($300 million) of the $3 billion appropriation from the American Rescue
Plan Act (ARPA, P.L. 117-2) to coal-impacted communities through the Coal Communities Commitment (CCC). The
set-asides were made to the Build Back Better Regional Challenge (BBBRC) and Economic Adjustment Assistance
Challenge (EAAC). The Initial Report to the President on Empowering Workers Through Revitalizing Energy
Communities (April 2021), developed by President Biden’s Interagency Working Group (IWG), also recommended
focused federal investments for coal-impacted communities. According to EDA, the CCC builds on this report. See
EDA, “Coal Communities Commitment,” https://eda.gov/arpa/coal-communities/. The IWG’s report is available
at https://netl.doe.gov/sites/default/files/2021-04/Initial%20Report%20on%20Energy%20Communities_Apr2021.pdf.
11 See the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103, and the accompanying explanatory statement, printed
in the March 9, 2022, Congressional Record (pp. H1772-H1773), https://www.congress.gov/117/crec/2022/03/09/168/
42/CREC-2022-03-09-bk3.pdf.
12 The Trump Administration’s FY2017 Budget sought to eliminate the ACC program. See U.S. Department of
Commerce, Economic Development Administration: Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Budget Request, February 9,
2016, pp. 36-38, http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/budget/FY17CBJ/
EDA%20FY%202017%20Congressional%20Submission%202-8-16%20OMB%20cleared%20508%20Compliant.pdf.
Subsequent Trump Administration Budget requests proposed eliminating the EDA entirely, including the ACC
program. For FY2018, the Trump Administration requested $30 million in funding for the EDA to enable the “orderly
closeout” of the agency: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2018: Appendix, May 23, 2017, pp. 181-
183, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2018-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2018-APP.pdf. In FY2019, the EDA
was also proposed for termination, and approximately $15 million was requested to enable its closeout: OMB, Budget
of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2019: Appendix, February 12, 2018, pp. 182-183, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/BUDGET-2019-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2019-APP.pdf. In the Trump Administration’s budget request for
FY2020, $30 million was requested for the EDA’s closeout: OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2020:
Appendix, March 18, 2019, pp. 178-180, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2020-APP/pdf/BUDGET-
2020-APP.pdf. In the Trump Administration’s budget request for FY2021, $32 million was requested for the EDA’s
closeout; see OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2021: Appendix, February 10, 2020, pp. 191-192,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2021-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2021-APP.pdf. For a summary of EDA
appropriations, see CRS Report R46991, Economic Development Administration: An Overview of Programs and
Appropriations (FY2011-FY2022), by Julie M. Lawhorn.
13 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: The Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce
and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,” press release, March 27, 2015,
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ACC investments may only be used for projects located in, or substantially benefiting, a
community or region that meets EDA distress criteria.
EDA economic distress is defined as
“An unemployment rate that is, for the most recent 24-month period for which
data are available, at least one percentage point greater than the national average
unemployment rate;
Per capita income that is, for the most recent period for which data are available,
80 percent or less of the national average per capita income; or
A Special Need, as determined by EDA.”14
Table 2. ACC Program Funding, FY2015-FY2022
in millions ($)
FY2015
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Funding for
$10.0
$15.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$33.5
$41.5
ACC
program
Source: Compiled by CRS from Department of Commerce budget justification documents.
Notes: The ACC program was not identified as a specific appropriations line item until the FY2017 Department
of Commerce budget justification, which sought to terminate its funding. However, that same document included
past funding amounts for ACC in FY2015 and FY2016, which were included as set-asides within the EAA
program. In FY2018-FY2021, funding for the ACC program was not requested as the Trump Administration
proposed terminating the EDA and its programs.
Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER)
Reclamation Program
One objective of the POWER+ Plan was funding for the social welfare of miners and for cleanup
and reclamation of former mine and other coal-related “brownfield” sites. While certain
legislative proposals for these purposes were never enacted,15 Congress has approved annual
funding since FY2016 for economic development grants to states for Abandoned Mine Land
reclamation activities. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE)
within the Department of the Interior is the federal office responsible for administering
Abandoned Mine Land reclamation activities in coordination with eligible states and tribes.16
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/27/fact-sheet-partnerships-opportunity-and-workforce-
and-economic-revitaliz.
14 13 C.F.R. §301.3. See also Economic Development Administration, Applying for EDA Investments: Eligibility
Requirements and Criteria, https://www.eda.gov/archives/2016/how-to-apply/files/Eligibility-Requirements-and-
Criteria.pdf. For additional information about area eligibility and measures of economic distress in EDA programs, see
CRS In Focus IF12074, Areas of Economic Distress for EDA Activities and Programs, by Julie M. Lawhorn, Areas of
Economic Distress for EDA Activities and Programs, by Julie M. Lawhorn.
15 See, for example, The Miners Protection Act, first introduced in 2015 as S. 1714. Versions of this bill, with the same
scope and effect, have been reintroduced in the years since. For example, in the 116th Congress, the Revitalizing the
Economy of Coal Communities by Leveraging Local Activities and Investing More (RECLAIM) Act of 2016, H.R.
4456, was introduced but was not enacted.
16 Funding launched in FY2016 was notable for providing grants for economic development purposes. Previously,
grants had been made available to eligible states and tribes to address the hazards and environmental degradation posed
by abandoned mine sites under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 (P.L. 95-87). For
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Initially, OSMRE referred to this program as the “AML Pilot Program.” Later, the program was
renamed as the Abandoned Mine Land Economic Revitalization (AMLER) Program.
The FY2016 appropriation of $90 million directed funds to be divided equally among the three
Appalachian states with the greatest amount of unfunded AML needs (P.L. 114-13).17 The $105
million appropriated for FY2017 set aside $75 million to be divided this way, with the balance of
that amount being available more broadly to other eligible AML reclamation applicants (P.L. 115-
31).18 FY2018 appropriations of $115 million set aside $75 million for the three states
demonstrating the greatest unmet need (P.L. 115-141).19
For FY2019, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2019, Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6), appropriated
$115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian states with the
greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian states with the
“subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 million for federally recognized Indian
Tribes.20
For FY2020, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2020, Division D of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (P.L. 116-94),
appropriated $115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian
states with the greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian
states with the “subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 million for federally
recognized Indian Tribes with AML programs.21
For FY2021, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2021, Division G of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260), appropriated
$115 million, which was subdivided further: $75 million for the three Appalachian states with the
greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 million for the next three Appalachian states with the
“subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 million for federally recognized Indian
tribes.22
For FY2022, the President’s budget requested $165 million for the AMLER program, a proposed
increase of $50 million from the prior year appropriation.23 For FY2022, the Department of the
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2022, Division G of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103) appropriated $122.5 million, which was
subdivided further: $79.9 million for the three Appalachian states with the greatest amount of
unfunded needs; $32 million for the next three Appalachian states with the “subsequent greatest
more information on the AML economic development program, see Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement, Report on Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Economic Development Pilot Program (AML Pilot
Program) for FY 2016–FY2018, April 19, 2019, https://www.osmre.gov/programs/AML/
2016_2018_Annual_Report_AML_Economic_Development_Pilot_Program.pdf. See also Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement, Reclaiming Abandoned Mine Lands, https://www.osmre.gov/programs/aml.shtm.
17 To clarify the effective date of certain provisions of the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, and for other
purposes, P.L. 114-13.
18 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, P.L. 115-31.
19 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, P.L. 115-141.
20 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019, P.L. 116-6.
21 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, P.L. 116-94.
22 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, P.L. 116-260.
23 Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, Budget Justifications and Performance Information, Fiscal
Year 2022, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/fy2022-osmre-budget-justification.pdf.
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amount of unfunded needs”; and $10.7 million for federally recognized Indian tribes.24 The
appropriation was $42.5 million less than requested, but increased the AMLER program by 6.5%
from the previous year.
Table 3. AMLER Reclamation Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022
in millions ($)
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Total for AMLER
$90.0
$105.0
$115.0
$115.0
$115.0
$115.0
$122.5
reclamation
Total amount for the
$90.0
$75.0
$75.0
$75.0
$75.0
$75.0
$79.9
top three Appalachian
states with the greatest
amount of unfunded
needsa,b
Total amount for the
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$30.0
$31.9
next three Appalachian
states with the greatest
amount of unfunded
needsa,b
Total amount for the
$10.0
$10.0
$10.0
$10.0
$10.7
three tribes with
Abandoned Mine Land
Programs: Navajo
Nation, Hopi Tribe, and
Crow Tribeb
Sources: Data compiled and tabulated by CRS. For FY2016, the $90 mil ion was reported in the explanatory
statement accompanying P.L. 114-113, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Congressional Record,
December 17, 2015, Book III, p. H10217). Each of the fol owing fiscal year appropriations were reported in
respective enacted bil s: P.L. 115-31; P.L. 115-141; P.L. 116-6; P.L. 116-94; P.L. 116-260; and P.L. 117-103.
Notes: Beginning in FY2017, Congress provided tiers of funding not reserved for the three Appalachian states
with the greatest amount of unfunded AML needs. For example, in FY2018 Congress appropriated $75 mil ion
for the three Appalachian states with the greatest amount of unfunded needs; $30 mil ion for the next three
Appalachian states with the “subsequent greatest amount of unfunded needs”; and $10 mil ion for grants to
federally recognized Indian Tribes. Subsequent appropriations laws specified a similar approach to al ocating
funding among the eligible states and tribes.
a. OSMRE periodically updates funding estimates for sites in the Abandoned Mine Land Inventory System
(AMLIS) inventory. The unfunded reclamation needs a state reports may vary from year to year. Thus, a
state’s grant amount may change depending on their relative reporting of unfunded reclamation needs.
b. Each state or tribe eligible for an AMLER grant received one-third of the total grant amount for that year.
The ARC’s POWER Initiative
The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) is the only federal agency that continues to
receive regular appropriated funding for energy transition activities under the POWER Initiative
24 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022, P.L. 117-103.
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designation.25 While the POWER Initiative was launched as a multi-agency effort, only the ARC
chose to designate its contributions as the POWER Initiative.
About the ARC
The ARC was established in 1965 to address economic distress in the Appalachian region (40
U.S.C. §14101-14704).26 The ARC’s jurisdiction spans 423 counties in Alabama, Georgia,
Kentucky, Ohio, New York, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Map of the Appalachian Regional Commission
ARC service area, by designations of county distress, FY2022
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from the Appalachian Regional Commission and Esri Data and Maps 2019.
Note: West Virginia is the only state with all counties within the ARC’s jurisdiction.
The ARC is a federal-state partnership, with administrative costs shared equally by the federal
government and member states, while economic development activities are federally funded
25 It should be noted that while the ARC is generally classified as an independent federal agency, the federal regional
commissions and authorities are unique in that although they are federally chartered organizations and draw on federal
appropriations for their operations and activities, they are generally understood to be partnerships between the
constituent states and the federal government. The vast majority of their staff and leadership are not federal employees.
For more information, see CRS Report R45997, Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Structural Features
and Function, by Julie M. Lawhorn.
26 Appalachian Regional Development Act of 1965, as amended, P.L. 89-4.
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through appropriations. Thirteen state governors and a federal co-chair oversee the ARC. The
federal co-chair is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.27
Scope and Activities
The ARC’s POWER Initiative program prioritizes federal resources to projects and activities in
coal communities that exhibit elements that
produce multiple economic development outcomes (e.g., promoting regional
economic growth; job creation; and/or employment opportunities for displaced
workers);
are specifically identified under state, local, or regional economic development
plans; and
have been collaboratively designed by state, local, and regional stakeholders.28
For FY2022, the ARC will fund two classes of grants as part of the POWER Initiative: (1)
implementation grants, with awards of up to $1.5 million (with the exception for broadband
deployment projects, which can have awards of up to $2.5 million),29 and (2) planning grants,
with awards of up to $50,000. For FY2022, $65 million in grant funding was made available for
the POWER Initiative (see Table 4), of which one-third was reserved for broadband projects.30
POWER investments are subject to the ARC’s grant match requirements, which are linked to the
Commission’s economic distress hierarchy.31 Those economic distress designations are, in
descending order of distress
distressed (80% funding allowance, 20% grant match);32
at-risk (70%);
27 For more information about the ARC and the other federal regional commissions and authorities, see CRS Report
R45997, Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Structural Features and Function, by Julie M. Lawhorn. See
also, in summarized form, CRS In Focus IF11140, Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Overview of
Structure and Activities, by Julie M. Lawhorn.
28 Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic
Revitalization (POWER) Initiative: Federal Fiscal Year 2022—Request for Proposals (RFP) for Project Grants,
February 22, 2022, https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
29 According to the FY2022 POWER RFP, to qualify for the broadband deployment funding, at least 65% of the
broadband project’s budget “must be directed to the physical deployment of broadband infrastructure.” If more than
35% of proposed funds are directed to activities not directly associated with deployment of broadband infrastructure,
then applicants may apply for funding under the guidelines for implementation projects and will not qualify for
broadband deployment funding. See ARC, POWER, FY2022 RFP for Project Grants, February 22, 2022, p. 3,
https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
30 ARC, POWER, FY2022 RFP for Project Grants, February 22, 2022, p. 3, https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/
2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
31 ARC, County Economic Status and Distressed Areas in Appalachia, https://www.arc.gov/classifying-economic-
distress-in-appalachian-counties/.
32 The ARC uses an index-based classification system to compare each county within its jurisdiction with national
averages based on: (1) three-year average unemployment rates; (2) per capita market income; and (3) poverty rates.
These factors are calculated into a composite index value for each county, which are ranked and sorted into designated
distress levels. Each distress level corresponds to a given county’s ranking relative to that of the U.S. as a whole. These
designations are defined as, in descending order: distressed counties, or those with values in the “worst” 10% of U.S.
counties; at-risk, which rank between worst 10% and 25%; transitional, which rank between worst 25% and best 25%;
competitive, which rank between “best” 25% and best 10%; and attainment, or those which rank in the best 10%.
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transitional (50%);
competitive (30%); and
attainment (0% funding allowance).
Special allowances at the discretion of the commission may reduce or discharge matches, and
match requirements may be met with other federal funds when allowed. Designations of county-
level distress in the ARC’s service area are represented in Figure 1.
POWER investments are also aligned to the ARC’s strategic plan. The current strategic plan,
adopted in October 2021, prioritizes five investment goals:
1. entrepreneurial and business development;
2. workforce development;
3. infrastructure development;
4. natural and cultural assets; and
5. leadership and community capacity.33
Given its programmatic breadth, POWER investments may link to any one of these investment
goals. POWER investment determinations are made according to annual objectives outlined in
the request for proposals, as well as broader investment priorities, which are building a
competitive workforce; fostering entrepreneurial activities; developing industry clusters in
communities; and broadband.34 responding to substance abuse
According to the ARC,35 over $319 million in investments have been made since 2015 through
395 projects in 358 counties across the ARC’s service area, leveraging an estimated $1.5 billion
of private investment. Figure 2 is a representation of the ARC’s POWER Initiative projects
tallied by state (for 2016-2022 (to date)).
33 ARC, Appalachia Envisioned: A New Era of Opportunity, ARC Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2022–2026,
https://www.arc.gov/strategicplan/.
34 ARC, POWER, FY2022 RFP for Project Grants, February 22, 2022, pp. 2-3, https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/02/POWER-2022-RFP.pdf.
35 ARC, ARC’s Partnerships for Opportunity and Workforce and Economic Revitalization (POWER) Initiative,
accessed July 28, 2022, https://www.arc.gov/arcs-power-initiative/.
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Figure 2. Distribution of ARC POWER Initiative Projects, 2016-2022 (to date)
by state (and one additional category)
Source: Data retrieved from ARC website (https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/POWER-Award-
Summaries-by-State-as-of-May-2022.pdf) on September 6, 2022.
Notes: Special Regional Projects are those projects that are undertaken to provide regional benefits, and may
include col aboration with organizations outside of the ARC’s service area. Data reflect the number of awards
announced by ARC as of May 2022.
Funding History
While the POWER Initiative does not receive appropriations separate from that of the ARC as a
whole, congressional intent is signaled in House Appropriations Committee reports, which
specify amounts to be reserved for the POWER Initiative. In committee report language, it is
generally described as activities “in support of the POWER+ Plan” or “in support of the POWER
Initiative.”36
Table 4 shows appropriations set aside for the POWER Initiative from FY2016 to FY2022 and
the FY2023 requested amounts, as well as the amounts of annual and supplemental appropriations
for ARC as a whole.
36 See, for example: U.S. Congress, House Appropriations, Energy and Water Appropriations Bill, 2019, Report to
accompany H.R. 5895, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., 2019, H.Rept. 115-697 (Washington: GPO, 2019), p. 159; and the
explanatory statement accompanying the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and
Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-244), printed in the September 10, 2018, Congressional Record
(p. H8038), vol. 164, no. 150, https://www.congress.gov/115/crec/2018/09/10/CREC-2018-09-10-pt1-PgH7946-2.pdf.
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Table 4. ARC POWER Initiative Appropriations, FY2016-FY2022
and FY2023 Request
in millions ($)
FY2023
FY2016
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022
Request
Appropriations
$50
$50
$50
$50
$50
$55
$65
$72
reserved for
POWER
Appropriations
$146
$152
$155
$165
$175
$180
$395
$235
for the ARC as
a whole
Sources: Data compiled and tabulated by CRS from data provided by ARC and from committee reports
associated with the fol owing annual appropriations bil s: P.L. 114-113 (FY2016); P.L. 115-31 (FY2017); P.L. 115-
141 (FY2018); P.L. 115-244 (FY2019); P.L. 116-94 (FY2020); P.L. 116-260 (FY2021); and P.L. 117-103 (FY2022).
The FY2022 amount includes $195 mil ion provided through annual appropriations (P.L. 117-103) and $200
mil ion from Division J, Title III of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA, P.L. 117-58). The IIJA
provided $200 mil ion for the ARC in each fiscal year from FY2022 through FY2026. The amount requested for
FY2023 is from ARC FY2023 Performance Budget Justification (see https://www.arc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/
03/FINAL-FY2023-ARC-Budget-Justification-Congressional.pdf).
To date, the ARC received approximately $1.2 billion in requests for POWER Initiative grant
funding from FY2016 to FY2022 (Table 5). This suggests that there was unmet demand for the
POWER Initiative in the Appalachian region alone (the ARC’s service area, as depicted in
Figure 1).
Table 5. ARC POWER Initiative Grant Awards, FY2016-FY2022
FY2016-
FY2017
FY2018
FY2019
FY2020
FY2021
FY2022a
# Applications
216
231
140
174
188
167
Amount of
$280 mil ion
$329 mil ion
$120 mil ion
$164 mil ion
$173 mil ion
$153 mil ion
Funding
Requested by
Applicants
Awarded Funds
$91 mil ion
$49 mil ion
$47 mil ion
$45 mil ion
$57 mil ion
$77 mil ion
Source: Data provided by the ARC and tabulated by CRS.
Notes: For FY2016 and FY2017, funding was combined into a single pot and awarded accordingly. In FY2021,
the Commission voted to recommend 26 projects totaling $28,440,625 from the FY2021cycle for funding in
FY2022.
a. The FY2022 “Awarded Funds” amount reflects the amount of funding announced as of August 18, 2022.
Policy Considerations
The Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that coal production overall will continue
to decline as a consequence of falling market demand.37 In particular, the EIA forecasts coal to
37 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2022: With Projections to 2050, March 3, 2022.
Total Coal Production, reference case, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=1-AEO2022®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2022&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=~ref2022-d011222a.6-1-AEO2022&ctype=linechart&
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account for 6% less generating capacity at the end of 2022 than at the end of 2021.38 By 2050,
coal is projected to decline to 10% of U.S. electricity generation, nuclear is projected to account
for 12%, renewables (i.e., wind, solar) 36%, hydropower 5%, and natural gas 34%, according to
EIA projections.39
Coal’s decline is a function of market forces, particularly its higher cost relative to natural gas
and renewable energy options.40 In the future, under current policies, coal’s cost disadvantage is
expected to continue, and could be accelerated if policies are adopted to reduce GHG emissions
that contribute to climate change.41 Even with federal incentives to invest in carbon capture,
utilization, and storage as a means to mitigate fossil fuel-related emissions, coal may still not be
competitive in many situations. As a result of falling demand, noncompetitive coal producers and
their communities are expected to face continued economic dislocation.
Should it wish to broaden or intensify federal efforts to address energy transition in local
communities, Congress may have several options. In the past, Congress has demonstrated
bipartisan interest in the federal government providing assistance to populations adversely
affected by the ongoing energy transitions. It has done so through its appropriations for the
ARC’s POWER Initiative, the EDA’s ACC program, and the AMLER investments.42 In
combination with evidence of unmet demand for federal assistance, as measured by unfunded
requests to the ARC (Table 5), Congress may consider reviewing the balance among needs,
appropriations, and effectiveness of past efforts.
Congress could conduct a review of the POWER Initiative and the efficacy of its performance
and resources. This potential review suggests some particular considerations:
Geography: While the ACC is available for the nation as a whole, the ARC’s
POWER Initiative is restricted to the ARC’s service area in the Appalachian
region. Congress may consider expanding the POWER Initiative to be available
more broadly across the nation, or in a more targeted fashion as demonstrated by
the ARC’s program. Alternatively, funding could be made available nationwide
to any eligible coal community, such as through other federal regional
commissions and authorities and/or EDA regions.
Funding: Projections of U.S. coal production (cited earlier) suggest that the
ongoing transition in U.S. energy systems may lead to further localized economic
distress without the development of new regional opportunities. Congress may
consider the level of funding for POWER Initiative programs in the context of
those economic needs. Funding levels could be tied to the overall scale of the
challenge, allocated to areas with the greatest need, and made in consideration of
sourcekey=0.
38 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Coal Will Account for 85% of U.S. Electric Generating Capacity
Retirements in 2022, January 11, 2022, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=50838.
39 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2022: With Projections to 2050, March 3, 2022.
Total Coal Production, reference case, https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/data/browser/#/?id=1-AEO2022®ion=0-
0&cases=ref2022&start=2020&end=2050&f=A&linechart=~ref2022-d011222a.6-1-AEO2022&ctype=linechart&
sourcekey=0 and https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/electricity/sub-topic-02.php.
40 Howard Gruenspecht, The U.S. Coal Sector: Recent and Continuing Challenges, Brookings Institution, January
2019, https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-u-s-coal-sector/.
41 See, for example, Ed Crooks, “U.S. Coal Output Forecasted to Fall Despite Trump Revival Efforts,” Financial
Times, January 26, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/5c31c480-2036-11e9-b126-46fc3ad87c65.
42 See, for example: U.S. Congress, House Natural Resources, Energy and Mineral Resources, Climate Change:
Preparing for the Energy Transition, 116th Cong., 1st sess., February 12, 2019, House Event 108873.
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data-driven evaluations of the program effectiveness. In assessing scale,
Congress may consider macroeconomic factors as well as social and
environmental policy objectives.
Energy Type: Congress may also consider expanding the POWER Initiative
and/or related programs beyond the coal industry to other energy industries or
regions perceived to be in decline.43 For example, since FY2020, Congress has
directed the EDA to allocate economic adjustment assistance funding to support
transition efforts in nuclear closure communities. Congress may consider policies
to support economically distressed communities impacted by other changes in the
fossil fuel industry as well. Congress may also consider other public policy goals,
such as reducing GHGs, to assist in promoting renewable energy types and
carbon capture technologies.
Should Congress consider such efforts, the ARC’s POWER Initiative program could serve as a
potential model to be scaled or replicated as needed. In addition, other models have also been
proposed in bills introduced in the 116th and 117th Congresses that would assist coal communities
in transition.44
Concluding Notes
Although the POWER+ Plan was not enacted in its entirety, some of its legacy programs continue
to receive annual appropriations and remain active. The persistence of such programs suggests
support among many policymakers for federal efforts to rectify, or at least attenuate, economic
distress as a consequence of energy transition. In addition, were Congress to pursue policy efforts
reflective of broadening concern for climate issues,45 a POWER Initiative-type program could be
developed to also facilitate energy transition from fossil fuel-based energy sources to a mix of
renewables and other alternatives.
Although the POWER+ Plan did not continue beyond the Obama administration, several
constituent programs have continued to receive congressional backing, and applicant volume—at
least in the case of the ARC’s POWER Initiative—may suggest further demand for additional
federal resources in addressing energy and economic transition issues. More broadly, these
mechanisms could also be purposed to facilitate federal resources for other related issues, such as
related to ecological/environmental resilience and adaptation.
The POWER Initiative, as originally conceived or in its current form as a program of the ARC,
has not been evaluated by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) or other research
organization for its effectiveness as either a mechanism for alleviating community economic
distress caused by the declining coal industry, or economic development more broadly. One
43 See Martha T. Moore, Nuclear Plant Closures Bring Economic Pain to Cities and Towns, Pew Trusts, September 5,
2018, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/09/05/nuclear-plant-closures-bring-
economic-pain-to-cities-and-towns.
44 For example, in the 166th Congress, H.R. 315 included provisions “To amend the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 to authorize partnerships between States and nongovernmental entities for the purpose of
reclaiming and restoring land and water resources adversely affected by coal mining activities before August 3, 1977,
and for other purposes”; H.R. 4142, “To rebuild the Nation’s infrastructure, provide a consumer rebate to the American
people, assist coal country, reduce harmful pollution, and for other purposes.” In the 117th Congress, H.R. 5376
included provisions to provide assistance to assistance to energy and industrial transition communities, including coal,
oil and gas, and nuclear transition communities.
45 See H.Res. 112.
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recent GAO report mentioned the Assistance to Coal Communities program, but did not seek to
analyze its activities or efficacy.46 Similarly, older GAO reports exist that feature the Abandoned
Mine Land Reclamation program (prior to its current configuration),47 and the Appalachian
Regional Commission,48 but may be of limited relevance when evaluating current programming,
including more recent activities such as the POWER Initiative. Meanwhile, a number of
anecdotal and media reports appear to tout the POWER Initiative’s success and viability.49 The
ARC, for its part, reports that the POWER Initiative has “invested over $319 million in over 395
projects touching 358 counties across Appalachia.” According to the ARC, those investments are
“projected to create or retain more than 36,600 jobs, and leverage more than $1.5 billion in
additional private investment.”50
ARC completed three evaluations of the POWER Initiative. The FY2019 evaluation (Year 1)
focused on early impacts, challenges, opportunities, and technical assistance needs associated
with the implementation grants funded in or prior to FY2018.51 The FY2020 evaluation (Year 2)
covered additional topics such as projects designed to address the impacts of substance use
disorder (SUD); community capacity in counties in which multiple POWER projects have been
implemented; and multistate projects. The FY2020 evaluation also evaluated early results of
closed POWER projects.52 The FY2021 evaluation (Year 3) reported on indicators of change from
the individual, business, and community levels.53 The evaluations highlight the varying scales of
implementation and the range of activities supported by POWER Initiative awards (e.g.,
infrastructure, planning, broadband, workforce development, substance use disorder, or a
combination of activities). Additionally, the evaluations note that POWER projects may have a
range of timelines for implementation, which impacts the evaluators’ ability to uniformly measure
outcomes. An FY2022 evaluation is in development.
46 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Economic Adjustment Assistance: Federal Programs Intended to Help
Beneficiaries Adjust to Economic Disruption, GAO-19-85R, March 5, 2019, pp. 13-14, https://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-19-85R.
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement: Abandoned Mine Land Program, GAO-09-208R, November 26, 2008, https://www.gao.gov/products/
GAO-09-208R.
48 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Economic Development: Limited Information Exists on the Impact of
Assistance Provided by Three Agencies, RCED-96-103, April 3, 1996, https://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-96-103.
49 See, for example: Brittany Patterson, Portal 31: How A Closed Mine Opened New Prospects For One Coal Town,
WFPL.org, November 11, 2019, https://wfpl.org/portal-31-how-a-closed-mine-opened-new-prospects-for-one-coal-
town/; and “A $1.5M Shot in the Arm for Workforce Development,” Independent Herald, November 12, 2019,
https://www.ihoneida.com/2019/11/12/shot-arm-workforce-development/.
50 ARC, POWER Award Summaries by State as of May 2022, accessed September 6, 2022, https://www.arc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/POWER-Award-Summaries-by-State-as-of-May-2022.pdf, and ARC, ARC’s POWER
Initiative, https://www.arc.gov/arcs-power-initiative/.
51 ARC, Chamberlin and Dunn, Success Factors, Challenges, and Early Impacts of the POWER Initiative: An
Implementation Evaluation, October 2019, https://www.arc.gov/report/success-factors-challenges-and-early-impacts-
of-the-power-initiative-an-implementation-evaluation/.
52 ARC, Chamberlin and Dunn, POWER Initiative Evaluation: Factors and Results of Project Implementation,
September 2020, https://www.arc.gov/report/power-initiative-evaluation-factors-and-results-of-project-implementation/
.
53 ARC, Chamberlin and Dunn, POWER Initiative Evaluation: The POWER of Change Stories of Results for
Individuals, Businesses, and Communities, September 2021,
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Author Information
Julie M. Lawhorn
Analyst in Economic Development Policy
Acknowledgments
This report was originally written by former CRS Analyst Michael Cecire. Congressional clients seeking
more information and analysis on the material covered in this report should contact the current author.
Lance N. Larson, Analyst in Environmental Policy, provided substantive edits and assistance in updating
the report.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan
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under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other
than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in
connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not
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