Expanded Access and Right to Try: Access to Investigational Drugs

Expanded Access and Right to Try: Access to
March 16, 2021
Investigational Drugs
Agata Bodie
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates the safety and effectiveness of
Analyst in Health Policy
drugs and biological products under its authorities in the Federal Food, Drug and

Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and Public Health Service Act (PHSA). In general, a
manufacturer may not sel a drug or biologic in the United States until FDA has

reviewed and approved its marketing application (i.e., a new drug application [NDA] or
biologics license application [BLA]).
The primary route for an individual to obtain an investigational (i.e., unapproved) drug is to enroll in a clinical
trial testing that new drug. However, an individual may be excluded from the clinical trial because its enrollment
is limited to patients with particular characteristics (e.g., in a particular stage of a disease, with or without certain
other conditions, or in a specified age range), or because the trial has reached its target enrollment number. In
certain circumstances, FDA may al ow an individual to obtain an investigational drug outside of a clinical trial
through its expanded access procedures. Another option, the pathway created by the Trickett Wendler, Frank
Mongiel o, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bel ina Right to Try Act of 2017 (“Right to Try Act,” P.L. 115-176),
does not require FDA permission.
Right to Try Act
The Right to Try Act became federal law on May 30, 2018. Prior to its passage, 40 states had enacted related
legislation. The goal of these legislative efforts was to al ow individuals with imminently life-threatening diseases
or conditions to seek access to investigational drugs directly from the manufacturer without the step of procuring
permission from FDA. Another goal—held by the Goldwater Institute, which led the initiative toward state bil s,
and some of the legislative proponents—was focused more on the process: to eliminate government’s role in an
individual’s choice.
The Right to Try Act offers eligible individuals and their physicians a pathway other than FDA’s expanded access
procedures to obtain investigational drugs. It defines an eligible patient as one who (1) has been diagnosed with a
life-threatening disease or condition, (2) has exhausted approved treatment options and is unable to participate in
a clinical trial involving the eligible investigational drug (as certified by a physician who meets specified criteria),
and (3) has given written informed consent regarding the drug to the treating physician.
It defines an eligible investigational drug as an investigational drug (1) for which a Phase 1 clinical trial has been
completed, (2) that FDA has not approved or licensed for sale in the United States for any use, (3) that is the
subject of an NDA or BLA pending FDA decision or is the subject of an active investigational new drug
application and is being studied in a clinical trial that is intended to support the drug’s effectiveness, and (4) for
which the manufacturer has not discontinued active development or production and for which the FDA has not
placed on clinical hold.
The Right to Try Act also has provisions that limit how the Secretary of Health and Human Services (through the
FDA) can use data regarding clinical outcomes of patients who get these drugs through this pathway; require a
drug’s sponsor or manufacturer to report annual y to FDA on use of the pathway; and require FDA to post certain
annual summaries. Final y, the Right to Try Act states that the sponsor or manufacturer has “no liability” for
actions under these provisions. The no-liability provision applies also to a prescriber, dispenser, or “other
individual entity” unless there is “reckless or wil ful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort.”
Before the Right to Try Act was enacted, observers discussed several obstacles to access to investigational drugs
through FDA’s expanded access procedures. These included some that were FDA-related: the reportedly difficult
process to request FDA permission, concern about FDA use of adverse event data, and the role of FDA as
gatekeeper. Some related to why a manufacturer might decline to provide an investigational drug: limited
available supply, liability, limited staff and facility resources, and concerns about use of outcomes data. The Right
to Try Act directly eliminates some of these concerns, addresses some others, and leaves others unaddressed.
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Opponents of the law have expressed concern about the erosion of protections for patients who may be exposed to
drugs that are unsafe or ineffective. For example, in taking FDA out of the equation, the Right to Try Act limits
the agency’s ability to make suggestions to the protocols under which investigational drugs are provided,
potential y compromising patient safety.
Congressional Considerations
While the Right to Try Act aimed to remove certain perceived obstacles to obtaining investigational drugs,
unknowns remain regarding its impact on patients, drug manufacturers, and FDA. These unknowns include (1)
whether more patients have received investigational drugs than prior to the law ’s enactment, (2) whether
manufacturers are granting more requests for investigational drugs under the Right to Try Act pathway than
previously under expanded access, and (3) FDA’s role in implementing certain Right to Try Act requirements
when the purpose of the law was to remove FDA from the situation. Congress may consider whether the law has
had the effect its sponsors intended or whether legislative changes are necessary.

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Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
FDA Regulation of Investigational Drugs ........................................................................... 2
Expanded Access and Obstacles ........................................................................................ 4
FDA Requirements .................................................................................................... 4
Obstacles to Access.................................................................................................... 5
FDA-Related Issues .............................................................................................. 6
Manufacturer-Related Issues .................................................................................. 9
The Right to Try Act...................................................................................................... 10
Provisions in the Right to Try Act .............................................................................. 11
Discussion of Selected Provisions in the Right to Try Act .............................................. 12
Eligible Patients ................................................................................................. 12
Informed Consent............................................................................................... 13
Data to FDA ...................................................................................................... 13
Disclosure ......................................................................................................... 14
Financial Cost to Patient...................................................................................... 14
Liability Protections ........................................................................................... 15
Concluding Comments................................................................................................... 15

Figures
Figure 1. Standard Drug Development Path......................................................................... 3

Tables
Table 1. Access to Investigational Drugs ............................................................................. 4

Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 16


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Introduction
The Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiel o, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bel ina Right to Try Act of
2017 (“Right to Try Act,” P.L. 115-176) became federal law on May 30, 2018. Prior to its
passage, 40 states had enacted related legislation. The law’s goal was to al ow individuals with
imminently life-threatening diseases or conditions to seek access to investigational drugs without
the step of procuring permission from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Another goal—
held by the Goldwater Institute, which led the initiative toward state bil s, and some of the
legislative proponents—was focused more on the process: to eliminate government’s role in an
individual’s choice.1
The effort to publicize the issue and press for a federal solution involved highlighting the
poignant situations of individuals who sought access. For example, in March 2014, mil ions of
Americans heard about the plight of a seven-year-old boy with cancer. He was battling an
infection following a bone marrow transplant that no antibiotic had been able to treat.2 His
physicians thought an experimental antiviral drug might help. Because FDA had not yet approved
that experimental drug, it was not available in pharmacies. FDA did have the authority to permit
the use of an unapproved drug in certain circumstances—a process referred to as expanded
access
. For FDA to grant that permission, however, the manufacturer must have agreed to provide
the drug. The manufacturer, which was stil testing the drug, declined. Other stories often pointed
toward FDA as an obstacle.
During this time, certain groups—for example, the Goldwater Institute—encouraged Congress to
act on right-to-try legislation (i.e., legislation that would al ow patients to access investigational
drugs without FDA permission). The institute framed the issue as one of individual freedom and
circulated model legislation.3 After 33 states4 enacted legislation reflecting the Goldwater
Institute-provided model bil , in January 2017, some Members of Congress introduced a bil to try
to address the issue. The Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiel o, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew
Bel ina Right to Try Act of 2017—named for several individuals facing amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis (ALS, Lou Gehrig’s disease) or Duchenne muscular dystrophy—sought to remove what
proponents saw as FDA obstacles to patient access. On May 30, 2018, President Trump signed
the bil into law (P.L. 115-176).
This report discusses

1 Goldwater Institute, “President T rump Signs Right to T ry Act into Law,” May 30, 2018,
https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/president -trump-signs-right -to-try-act-into-law/. T he Goldwater Institute’s website
describes itself as “a leading free-market public policy research and litigation organization that is dedicated to
empowering all Americans to live freer, happier lives … the Institute focuses on advancing the principles of limited
government, economic freedom, and individual liberty ” (Goldwater Institute, https://goldwaterinstitute.org/about/).
2 Steve Usdin, “Josh Hardy chronicles: How Chimerix, FDA grappled with providing compassionate access to Josh
Hardy,” BioCentury, March 31, 2014, https://www.biocentury.com/biocentury/regulation/2014-03-31/how-chimerix-
fda-grappled-providing-compassionate-access-josh-hardy; Kim Painter, “ Drug company changes course, gives drug to
sick boy,” USA Today, March 12, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/11/chimerix-josh-hardy-
drug/6308891/; and David Kroll, “ Josh Hardy Going Home After Getting Chimerix Anti-Viral Drug,” Forbes, July 17,
2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2014/07/17/josh-hardy-going-home-after-getting-chimerix-anti-viral-
drug/.
3 Goldwater Institute, “Right to T ry Model Legislation,” https://goldwaterinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/
cms_page_media/2016/1/5/GoldwaterInstituteRighttoTryModel.pdf.
4 Starlee Coleman, “Ohio becomes 33rd state to adopt right to try law for terminally ill,” Goldwater Institute, January 5,
2017, https://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/ohio-33rd-state-to-adopt-right-to-try-law-terminally-ill/.
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 how FDA regulates investigational drugs;
 FDA’s expanded access procedures and the perceived obstacles to individuals
accessing experimental drugs through this mechanism;
 a summary of the provisions in the Right to Try Act and how they are meant to
address those obstacles; and
 selected provisions in the Right to Try Act and what questions remain
unresolved.
FDA Regulation of Investigational Drugs
The FDA regulates the safety and effectiveness of drugs and biological products (“biologics”)
under its authorities in the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) and Public Health
Service Act (PHSA).5 In general, a manufacturer may not sel a drug or biologic in the United
States until FDA has reviewed and approved its marketing application (i.e., a new drug
application [NDA] or biologics license application [BLA]). That application for a new drug or
biologic must include data from clinical trials as evidence of the product’s safety and
effectiveness for its stated purpose(s).6
After laboratory and animal studies have identified a potential drug or biologic, the sponsor of the
clinical trial, usual y its manufacturer, may submit an investigational new drug (IND) application
to FDA for permission to begin testing the drug in humans.7 An IND must include information
about the proposed study design, chemistry and manufacturing of the drug, and the investigator’s
qualifications, among other information.8 The investigator also must provide assurance that an
Institutional Review Board (IRB) wil provide initial and continuous review and approval of each
of the studies in the clinical investigation to ensure that participants are aware of the drug’s
investigative status and that any risk of harm wil be necessary, explained, and minimized.9
Sponsors of clinical trials also must comply with FDA regulations governing protection of human
subjects (e.g., informed consent),10 adverse event reporting,11 and charging for investigational
new drugs,12 among other requirements.
FDA has 30 days to review an IND, after which a sponsor may begin clinical testing if the agency
has not objected and imposed a clinical hold.13 In reviewing an IND, FDA’s primary objective is
to assure the safety and rights of human subjects, and with respect to Phase 2 and 3 trials

5 Whereas the FFDCA (§505) authorizes FDA to approve and regulate drugs, the Public Health Service Act (PHSA
§351) authorizes FDA to license biological products (e.g., monoclonal antibodies, vaccines). Most FDA procedures
regarding drugs also apply to the agency’s regulation of biological products.
6 FFDCA §505(b) [21 U.S.C. §355(b)], PHSA §351(a) [42 U.S.C. §262(a)], 21 C.F.R. §314.50, §601.2. For an
overview of the general process of drug approval in t he United States, see CRS Report R41983, How FDA Approves
Drugs and Regulates Their Safety and Effectiveness
. See, also, FDA, “ How Drugs are Developed and Approved,”
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/default.htm.
7 FFDCA §505(i) [21 U.S.C. §355(i)], PHSA §351(a)(3) [42 U.S.C. §262(a)(3)], 21 C.F.R. Part 312.
8 21 C.F.R. §312.23.
9 21 C.F.R. §312.23(a)(1)(iv) and 21 C.F.R. Part 56.
10 21 C.F.R. Part 50.
11 21 C.F.R. §312.32.
12 21 C.F.R. §312.8.
13 21 C.F.R. §312.20(c).
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specifical y, to ensure that the quality of the scientific investigations and evaluations is adequate
to permit an evaluation of the drug’s safety and effectiveness.14
Once the IND application is approved, the sponsor may then start the first of three major phases
of clinical—human—trials. (Figure 1 illustrates the general path of a pharmaceutical product.)
Researchers first test in a smal number of human volunteers the safety they had previously
demonstrated in animals. These trials, cal ed Phase 1 clinical trials, attempt “to determine dosing,
document how a drug is metabolized and excreted, and identify acute side effects.”15 If a sponsor
considers the product stil worthy of investment based on the results of a Phase 1 trial, it
continues with Phase 2 and Phase 3 trials. Those trials look for evidence of the product’s
effectiveness—how wel it works for individuals with the particular characteristic, condition, or
disease of interest.16 Phase 2 is a first attempt at assessing effectiveness and its experience helps
to plan the subsequent Phase 3 clinical trial, which the sponsor designs to be large enough to
statistical y test for meaningful differences attributable to the drug.
Figure 1. Standard Drug Development Path

Source: Created by CRS.
Notes: The figure does not show the elements of the path to scale.
BLA = biologics license application. DOD = Department of Defense. FDA = Food and Drug Administration.
IND = investigational new drug application. NDA = new drug application. NIH = National Institutes of Health.
The primary route for an individual to obtain an investigational drug is to enroll in a clinical trial
testing that new drug. However, an individual may be excluded from the clinical trial because its
enrollment is limited to patients with particular characteristics (e.g., in a particular stage of a
disease, with or without certain other conditions, or in a specified age range), or because the trial
has reached its target enrollment number. In certain circumstances, FDA may al ow an individual
to obtain an investigational drug outside of a clinical trial through its expanded access procedures.
Another option, the pathway created by the Right to Try Act, does not require permission from
FDA. Table 1 summarizes selected differences in criteria for access to investigational drugs
through participation in clinical trials, expanded access, and right to try. 17

14 21 C.F.R. §312.22(a).
15 FDA, “Inside Clinical T rials: T esting Medical Product s in People,” http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/
consumers/ucm143531.htm.
16 21 C.F.R. §312.21(b) & (c).
17 Under certain emergency circumstances, FDA may issue an emergency use authorization (EUA) to allow the use of
an unapproved medical product or the unapproved use of an approved product. T he EUA mechanism is beyond the
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Table 1. Access to Investigational Drugs
Clinical Trials, Expanded Access, and Right to Try

Clinical Trials
Expanded Access
Right to Try
Who is eligible?
Individual who meets the
Individual must have a
Individual must have a
trial’s requirements for
serious or immediately life-
serious or life-threatening
inclusion and exclusion
threatening disease or
disease or condition, be
condition, be unable to
unable to participate in a
participate in a clinical
clinical trial, and have
trial, and have no
exhausted approved
comparable therapeutic
treatment options
options
When can patients
May enrol in Phase 1, 2,
During or after Phase 1, 2, After Phase 1 trials have
gain access?
or 3 trials
or 3 trials
been completed
Who must provide
FDA, IRB, and drug
FDA, IRB, and drug
Drug manufacturer
permission?
manufacturer
manufacturer
Is informed consent
Yes, in accord with 21
Yes, in accord with 21
Yes, but not defined and
from the individual
C.F.R. Part 50 “Protection
C.F.R. Part 50
exempt from 21 C.F.R.
required?
of Human Subjects”
Part 50
Source: FFDCA §§561 & 561B, 21 C.F.R. §312.305, FDA, “Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for
Treatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for Industry, June 2016, updated October 2017,
https://www.fda.gov/media/85675/download.
Expanded Access and Obstacles
FDA Requirements
The primary purpose of expanded access is to provide investigational drugs as treatment for
patients who lack therapeutic alternatives. This is in contrast to clinical trials, which are designed
primarily to generate evidence of safety and effectiveness to support approval of an NDA or
BLA.18
Through FDA’s expanded access procedure, a person, acting through a licensed physician, may
request access to an investigational drug—through either a new IND or a revised protocol to an
existing IND—if19
 a licensed physician determines (1) the patient has “no comparable or satisfactory
alternative therapy available to diagnose, monitor, or treat” the serious disease or
condition; and (2) “the probable risk to the person from the investigational drug

scope of this report but is discussed in other CRS products. See, for example, CRS In Focus IF10745, Em ergency Use
Authorization and FDA’s Related Authorities
.
18 FDA, “Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for T reatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for
Industry, June 2016, updated October 2017, pp. 2 -3, https://www.fda.gov/media/85675/download.
19 FFDCA §561(b) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb(b)]. See, also, FDA, “Expanded Access: Information for Patients,”
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealt hFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm20041768.htm. In
addition to the individual IND or protocol, regulations describe other categories of expanded use of investigational
drugs: intermediate-size patient populations, with one IND or protocol that con solidates several individual access
requests, and treatment IND or treatment protocol for “widespread treatment use” when a drug is farther along the
clinical trial and marketing application process. See FFDCA §561(c) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb(c)]; and 21 C.F.R.
§§312.305, 312.310, 312.315, and 312.320.
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or investigational device is not greater than the probable risk from the disease or
condition”;
 the Secretary (FDA, by delegation of authority) determines (1) “that there is
sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use of the
investigational drug” for this person; and (2) “that provision of the
investigational drug ... wil not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or
completion of clinical investigations to support marketing approval”; and
 the sponsor of the investigational drug, or clinical investigator, submits to FDA a
clinical protocol consistent with the requirements of FFDCA Section 505(i) and
related regulations.
FDA makes most expanded access IND and protocol decisions on an individual-case basis.
Consistent with the IND process under which the expanded access mechanism fal s, it considers
the requesting physician as the investigator. The investigator must comply with informed consent
and IRB review of the expanded use.20 The sponsor of the IND must make required safety reports
to FDA.21 FDA may permit a sponsor to charge a patient for the investigational drug, but “only
[for] the direct costs of making its investigational drug available”22 (i.e., not for development
costs or profit).
Expanded access could apply outside of the clinical trial arena in these situations:
(1) use in situations when a drug has been withdrawn for safety reasons, but there exists a
patient population for whom the benefits of the withdrawn drug continue to outweigh the
risks; (2) use of a similar, but unapproved drug (e.g., foreign-approved drug product) to
provide treatment during a drug shortage of the approved drug; (3) use of an approved drug
where availability is limited by a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) for
diagnostic, monitoring, or treatment purposes, by patients who cannot obtain the drug
under the REMS; or (4) use for other reasons.23
Obstacles to Access
The widespread use of expanded access is limited by an important factor: whether the
manufacturer agrees to provide the drug, which—because it is not FDA-approved—cannot be
obtained otherwise. FDA does not have the authority to compel a manufacturer to participate. In
addition, some manufacturers have expressed concern regarding how FDA would use adverse
event data from expanded access when reviewing drug applications. Many highly publicized
accounts of specific individuals’ struggles with life-threatening conditions and efforts by activists
influenced public debate over access. Examples of public attitudes included news accounts of
specific individuals’ struggles with life-threatening conditions. Some found the process of asking
FDA for a treatment IND too cumbersome. Others questioned FDA’s right to act as a gatekeeper

20 21 C.F.R. §312.305(c)(4).
21 21 C.F.R. §312.305(c)(5).
22 21 C.F.R. §312.8 and FDA, “Guidance for Industry: Charging for Investigational Drugs Under an IND—Questions
and Answers,” Center for Drug Evaluation and Research and Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, June 2016,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/guidances/ucm351264.pdf.
23 FDA, “Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for T reatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for
Industry, June 2016, updated October 2017, p. 3, https://www.fda.gov/media/85675/download.
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at al .24 Some pointed to manufacturers’ refusal to provide their experimental drugs.25 Most
critics, therefore, see solutions as within the control of FDA or pharmaceutical companies. This
section lays out key perceived obstacles and issues—both FDA- and manufacturer-related—with
respect to expanded access prior to the enactment of the Right to Try Act.
FDA-Related Issues
Difficult Process to Request FDA Permission
In February 2015, FDA issued draft guidance (finalized in June 2016 and updated in October
2017) on individual patient expanded access applications, acknowledging difficulties with
requesting permission for access to investigational drugs from the agency.26 FDA developed a
new form that a physician could use when requesting expanded access for an individual patient. It
reduced the amount of information required from the physician by al owing reference (with the
sponsor’s permission) to the information the sponsor had already submitted to FDA in its IND.27
In October 2017, FDA modified its expanded access IRB review policy to al ow one IRB member
to concur with the treatment use rather than the full IRB.28 This policy change was made pursuant
to a statutory directive that FDA streamline IRB review of individual patient expanded access
requests.29 A September 2019 report published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
found that the IRB update was helpful for physicians and patients, for example, by reducing the
amount of time for patients to obtain access to investigational drugs.30
In instances where a patient needs emergency treatment with the investigational product before a
physician can submit a written request, FDA can authorize expanded access for an individual
patient by phone or email, and the physician or sponsor must agree to submit an IND or protocol

24 T he Abigail Alliance, formed by the father of a young woman with cancer who had unsuccessfully attempted to get
an investigational drug, subsequently went to court, claimed “ as a fundamental aspect of constitutional due process, the
right to choose to take medication of unknown benefit and risk that might potentially be lifesaving” (Linda Greenhouse,
“Justices Won’t Hear Appeal on Drugs for T erminally Ill,” New York Times, January 15, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/washington/15appeal.html?_r=0). T he U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit 2007 opinion found “that there is no Const itutional right to access to experimental drugs for
terminally ill patients”; in 2008, the Supreme Court declined to consider an appeal (FDA, “Court Decisions, Fiscal
Year 2008,” http://www.fda.gov/downloads/iceci/enforcementactions/enforcementstory/ucm129820.pdf).
25 Jonathan J. Darrow, Ameet Sarpatwari, Jerry Avorn, M.D., and Aaron S. Kesselheim, “Practical, Legal, and Ethical
Issues in Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs,” New England Journal of Medicine, January 2015, vol. 372, pp.
279-286.
26 FDA, “Individual Patient Expanded Access Applications: Form FDA 3926,” Guidance for Industry, June 2016,
Updated October 2017, p. 4, https://www.fda.gov/media/91160/download.
27 FDA estimated that it would take a physician about 45 minutes to complete the proposed new form rather than the 8
hours estimated for the original form (or 16 hours when the r equest was for emergency access) (80 FR 7318). FDA,
“Guidance for Industry: Individual Patient Expanded Access Applications: Form FDA 3926.”
28 FDA, “Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on new efforts to strengthen FDA’s expanded
access program,” November 8, 2018, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-
commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-efforts-strengthen-fdas-expanded-access-program. FDA, “ Expanded Access to
Investigational Drugs for T reatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for Industry, p. 6.
29 P.L. 115-52, §610(b).
30 GAO, “Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some
Patients,” GAO-19-630, September 2019, pp. 18-19, https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/701243.pdf.
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within 15 working days.31 In such emergency circumstances, treatment with the investigational
drug may begin prior to IRB approval, but the IRB must be notified within five working days.32
Coincident with discussions preceding passage of the Right to Try Act, FDA had commissioned
an independent report on its expanded access program. Citing that report,33 in November 2018,
then-FDA Commissioner Gottlieb announced several actions to improve its program.34 These
included an enhanced webpage to help applicants navigate the application process and
establishing an agency-wide Expanded Access Coordinating Committee. In July 2019, FDA
launched the Oncology Center of Excel ence Project Facilitate, which provides a single point of
contact through which FDA oncology staff help physicians through the process of submitting an
expanded access request for an individual patient with cancer.35 According to a 2019 GAO report,
officials from one drug manufacturer indicated that Project Facilitate may help reduce the burden
on oncologists seeking expanded access to investigational drugs for their patients. However, other
officials from the same manufacturer “raised concerns about the potential for FDA to
intentional y or unintentional y pressure companies to make their investigational drugs available
to patients, should FDA have increased involvement with drug manufacturers as part of the pilot
program.”36
Use of Adverse Event Data from Expanded Access
In October 2017, FDA updated its guidance to address how the agency reviews adverse event data
in the expanded access context. In the guidance, FDA explains that reviewers are aware of the
context in which adverse event data are generated—for example, that patients who receive a drug
through expanded access may have a more advanced stage of the disease than those enrolled in a
clinical trial—and evaluate adverse events in that context. The guidance further states that “FDA
is not aware of instances in which adverse event information from expanded access has prevented
FDA from approving a drug.”37 However, FDA officials have indicated to GAO that “efficacy and
safety data from the expanded access program have been used to support drug approvals in
several instances.”38 Further, expanded access use may al ow for the detection of rare adverse
events or may contribute to information about use of the drug in certain populations that are not
exposed to the drug in clinical trials.39 While some drug manufacturers have indicated that they

31 21 C.F.R. §312.310(d). FDA “For Physicians: How to Request Single Patient Expanded Access (“Compassionate
Use”),” https://www.fda.gov/drugs/investigational-new-drug-ind-application/physicians-how-request-single-patient-
expanded-access-compassionate-use.
32 FDA, “Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for T reatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for
Industry, p. 5.
33 FDA, “Expanded Access Program Report,” May 2018, https://www.fda.gov/media/119971/download.
34 FDA, “Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on new efforts to strengthen FDA’s expanded
access program,” November 8, 2018, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-
commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-efforts-strengthen-fdas-expanded-access-program.
35 FDA, “Project Facilitate,” https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/oncology-center-excellence/project-facilitate. GAO,
“Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some Patients,”
pp. 18-19.
36 GAO, “Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some
Patients,” p. 19.
37 FDA, “Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for T reatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for
Industry, p. 18.
38 GAO, “Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some
Patients,” p. 22.
39 FDA, “Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for T reatment Use—Questions and Answers,” Guidance for
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view FDA’s updated guidance as an improvement, others maintained that they stil had
significant concerns about adverse event data from expanded access use negatively affecting
development of their investigational new drugs.40
FDA as Gatekeeper
FDA action is not the final obstacle to access, as the manufacturer stil needs to agree to provide
their product. Between FY2010 through FY2020, FDA received 16,380 expanded access requests
and granted 16,258 (99.3%) of them.41
Leading up to passage of the Right to Try Act, in August 2014, a USA Today editorial had cal ed
the FDA procedures that patients must follow for compassionate use access “bureaucratic
absurdity,” “daunting,” and “fatal y flawed.” Echoing much of the criticism that FDA had
received regarding the issue, it cal ed for one measure that would “cut out the FDA, which now
has final say.”42 The solution the editorial proposed involved what proponents term “right to try”
laws. By spring 2018, 40 states had passed right to try laws in the absence of federal legislation.43
The laws varied on the detail required in informed consent and liability issues of the manufacturer
and the patient’s estate.44 However, several experts had suggested that this state law approach is
unlikely to directly increase patient access.45 Before passage of the federal Right to Try Act,
analysts raised questions about how federal law (the FFDCA), which required FDA approval of
such arrangements, might preempt this type of state law.46 After the enactment of the federal
Right to Try Act, some legal analysts had predicted that the issue of federal preemption of state
laws would “likely be determined on a case-by-case basis.”47

Industry, p. 18.
40 GAO, “Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some
Patients,” pp. 21-22.
41 Reports for 2010 through 2020 are at FDA, “Expanded Access INDs and Protocols,” https://www.fda.gov/drugs/ind-
activity/expanded-access-inds-and-protocols.
42 T he Editorial Board, “FDA vs. right to try: Our view,” USA Today, August 17, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2014/08/17/ebola-drugs-terminally-ill-right -to-try-editorials-debates/14206039/.
43 National Conference of State Legislatures, “‘Right to T ry’ Experimental Prescription Medicines State Laws and
Legislation for 2014-2017,” March 7, 2018, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-legislation-related-to-
biologic-medications-and-substitution-of-biosimilars.aspx#Right_to_Try.
44 For example: House Bill 14-1281, State of Colorado, Sixty-ninth General Assembly, http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/
clics2014a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont/CE8AAA4FAF92567487257C6F005C8D97?Open&file=1281_enr.pdf; House Bill No.
891, Enrolled, Louisiana, https://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/Vie wDocument.aspx?d=902583; Conference Committee
Substitute No. 2 for Senate Substitute for House Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1685, T ruly Agreed T o and
Finally Passed, Missouri, 97th General Assembly, 2014, http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills141/billpdf/truly/
HB1685T .PDF; Public Act Numbers 345 and 346 of 2014, State of Michigan, 97 th Legislature,
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(gb2onn55vxkuylrvqmn3axrp))/mileg.aspx?page=PublicActs.
45 Arthur Caplan, “Bioethicist: ‘Right to T ry’ Law More Cruel T han Compassionate,” NBC NEWS, May 18, 2014,
http://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/bioethicist -right-try-law-more-cruel-compassionate-n108686; and David
Kroll, “T he False Hope Of Colorado‘s ‘Right T o T ry’ Investigational Drug Law,” Forbes, May 19, 2014,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2014/05/19/the-false-hope-of-colorados-right-to-try-act/.
46 See, generally, Elizabeth Richardson, “Health Policy Brief: Right -to-T ry Laws,” Health Affairs, March 5, 2015,
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=135.
47 Phoebe Mounts, Kathleen Sanzo, and Jacqueline Berman, “A Closer Look At New Federal ‘Right T o T ry’ Law,”
Law 360, June 1, 2018, https://www.law360.com/articles/1048871/a-closer-look-at-new-federal-right-to-try-law.
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Manufacturer-Related Issues
The manufacturer faces a complex decision in determining whether or not to give its experimental
drug to a patient who requests it. In making a decision in each case, the manufacturer considers
available supply of the drug, liability, safety, and whether adverse event or outcome data wil
affect FDA’s consideration of a new drug application in the future.
Available Supply
If a manufacturer has only a tiny amount of an experimental drug, that paucity may limit
distribution, no matter what the manufacturer would like to do.48 Sponsors of early clinical
research make smal amounts of experimental products for use in smal Phase 1 safety trials, and
progressively more for Phase 2 and 3 trials. Although one or two additional patients may not
cause supply problems, a manufacturer does not know how many expanded access requests it wil
receive. Investment in building up to large-scale production usual y comes only after reasonable
assurance that the product wil get FDA approval. For a company to redirect its current
manufacturing capacity involves financial, logistic, and public relations decisions.
Liability
In discussing expanded access, some manufacturers have raised liability concerns if patients
report injury from the investigational products.49 Whether these concerns become il ustrated by
court cases and how any issues may be resolved in future laws are beyond the scope of this
discussion.50
Limited Staff and Facility Resources
Any energy put into setting up and maintaining an expanded access program could take away
from a company’s focus on completing clinical trials, preparing an NDA, and launching a product
into the market. While this delay would have bottom-line implications, one CEO, in denying
expanded access, portrayed the decision as an equity issue, saying, “We held firm to the ethical
standard that, were the drug to be made available, it had to be on an equitable basis, and we
couldn’t do anything to slow down approval that wil help the hundreds or thousands of
[individuals].” Pointing to ways granting expanded access might divert them from research tasks
and postpone approval, he said, “Who are we to make this decision?”51

48 GAO, “Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some
Patients,” p. 25.
49 For example, see Sam Adriance, “Fighting for the ‘Right T o T ry’ Unapproved Drugs: Law as Persuasion,” Yale Law
Journal Forum
, vol. 124, December 4, 2014, http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/right -to-try-unapproved-drugs;
Darshak Sanghavi, Meaghan George, and Sara Bencic, “Individual Patient Expanded Access: Developing Principles
For A Structural And Regulatory Framework,” Health Affairs Blog, July 31, 2014, http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/
07/31/individual-patient -expanded-access-developing-principles-for-a-structural-and-regulatory-framework/; and
Elizabeth Richardson, “Health Policy Brief: Right -to-T ry Laws,” Health Affairs, March 5, 2015,
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=135.
50 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10115, Federal “Right-to-Try” Legislation: Legal Considerations.
51 Steve Usdin, “Josh Hardy chronicles: How Chimerix, FDA grappled with providing comp assionate access to Josh
Hardy,” BioCentury, March 31, 2014, https://www.biocentury.com/biocentury/regulation/2014-03-31/how-chimerix-
fda-grappled-providing-compassionate-access-josh-hardy.
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Data for Assessing Safety and Effectiveness
By distributing the drug outside a carefully designed clinical trial, it may be difficult, if not
impossible, to collect the data that would validly assess safety and effectiveness. Clinical trials
are structured to assess the safety of a drug as wel as its effectiveness. The trial design may
exclude subjects who are so il from either the disease or condition for which the drug is being
tested or another disease or condition. This al ows, among other reasons, the analysis of adverse
events in the context of the drug and disease of interest. The patients who would seek a drug
under a right to try pathway are likely to be very il and likely to experience serious health events.
Those events could be a result of the drug or those events could be unrelated. They would present
difficulties both scientific and public relations-wise to the manufacturer. A manufacturer may
avoid those risks by choosing to not provide a drug outside a clinical trial.
As mentioned, FDA has indicated that it is not aware of any instances in which safety and
effectiveness data obtained from expanded access have prevented approval of a drug, but there
are instances in which such data have been used to support approval (see the section “Use of
Adverse Event Data from Expanded Access”).
Disclosure
It is unclear how many people request and are denied expanded access to experimental drugs by
manufacturers. This lack of information makes devising solutions to manufacturer-based
obstacles difficult. Although FDA reports the number of requests it receives, manufacturers do
not (nor does FDA require them to do so). The number of individuals who approach
manufacturers is unknown.
In December 2016, the 21st Century Cures Act amended the FFDCA to require a manufacturer or
distributor of an investigational drug intended for a serious disease or condition to make its
policies on evaluating and responding to compassionate use requests publicly available.52
However, the law does not require manufacturers to disclose how many requests they receive,
grant, or deny.
A 2019 GAO study surveyed 29 drug manufacturers regarding their policies for individual patient
access to investigational drugs.53 Of those surveyed, 23 reported using their websites to
communicate whether they considered individual requests for access to investigational drugs
outside of clinical trials; the remaining 6 were in the process of developing this content for their
websites. Of those 23 manufacturers, 19 stated they were wil ing to consider requests, while 4
stated they were not. Of the 19 drug manufacturers wil ing to consider requests, 13 indicated that
they require the relevant regulatory authority to review requests, of which 6 specified that they
require FDA to review requests for access in the United States.
The Right to Try Act
On January 24, 2017, Senator Johnson introduced S. 204, the Trickett Wendler Right to Try Act
of 2017, and the bil had 43 cosponsors at that time. On August 3, 2017, the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions discharged the bil by unanimous consent. The same day,

52 FFDCA §561A [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0], as added by P.L. 114-255, §3032.
53 GAO, “Investigational Drugs: FDA and Drug Manufacturers Have Ongoing Efforts to Facilitate Access for Some
Patients,” pp. 24-26.
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the Senate passed S. 204, the Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiel o, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew
Bel ina Right to Try Act (P.L. 115-176) with a substantial amendment also by unanimous consent.
On March 13, 2018, Representative Fitzpatrick introduced a related bil , H.R. 5247, the Trickett
Wendler, Frank Mongiel o, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bel ina Right to Try Act of 2018, and
the bil had 40 cosponsors at that time. On March 21, the House passed the bil (voting 267-149).
The House accepted the Senate bil on May 22, 2018 (voting 250-169), and President Trump
signed it into law on May 30, 2018.
This section of the report first summarizes the provisions in the Right to Try Act. It then discusses
how those provisions address some of the obstacles described in the previous section.
Provisions in the Right to Try Act
The Right to Try Act added FFDCA Section 561B, Investigational Drugs for Use by Eligible
Patients. It has a separate paragraph that is not linked to an FFDCA section to limit the liability to
al entities involved in providing an eligible drug to an eligible patient. It concludes with a “Sense
of the Senate” section.
FFDCA Section 561B has several provisions that mirror many steps in FDA’s expanded access
program. A major difference is that the new section is designed to exist wholly outside the
jurisdiction and participation of FDA. These provisions
 define an eligible patient as one who (1) has been diagnosed with a life-
threatening disease or condition, (2) has exhausted approved treatment options
and is unable to participate in a clinical trial involving the eligible investigational
drug (as certified by a physician who meets specified criteria), and (3) has given
written informed consent regarding the drug to the treating physician;54
 define an eligible investigational drug as an investigational drug (1) for which a
Phase 1 clinical trial has been completed, (2) that FDA has not approved or
licensed for sale in the United States for any use, (3) that is the subject of an
NDA or BLA pending FDA decision or is the subject of an active IND and is
being studied in a clinical trial that is intended to form the primary basis of the
drug’s effectiveness, and (4) for which the manufacturer has not discontinued
active development or production and which the FDA has not placed on clinical
hold;55 and
 exempt use under this section from parts of the FFDCA and FDA regulations
regarding misbranding, certain labeling and directions for use, drug approval,
investigational new drug regulations, protection of human subjects, and IRBs.56
FFDCA Section 561B includes provisions that address use of clinical outcomes and reporting of
certain information to FDA. These provisions
 prohibit the Secretary (FDA) from using clinical outcome data related to use
under this section “to delay or adversely affect the review or approval of such
drug” unless the FDA determines its use is “critical to determining [its] safety,” at
which time the FDA must provide written notice to the sponsor to include a

54 FFDCA §561B(a)(1) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(a)(1)].
55 FFDCA §561B(a)(2) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(a)(2)].
56 FFDCA §561B(b) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(b)].
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public health justification, or unless the sponsor requests use of such clinical
outcome data;57
 require the sponsor to submit an annual summary to FDA to include “the number
of doses supplied, the number of patients treated, the uses for which the drug was
made available, and any known serious adverse events”;58 and
 require FDA to post an annual summary on its website to include the number of
drugs for which (1) FDA determined the need to use clinical outcomes in the
review or approval of an investigational drug, (2) the sponsor requested that
clinical outcomes be used, and (3) the clinical outcomes were not used.59
The act has an uncodified section titled “No Liability,” which does not correspond to the FDA’s
expanded access program. The provision states that, related to use of a drug under the new
FFDCA Section 561B,
 “no liability in a cause of action shal lie against ... a sponsor or manufacturer; or
... a prescriber, dispenser, or other individual entity ... unless the relevant conduct
constitutes reckless or wil ful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort
under any applicable State law”; and
 no liability, also, for a “determination not to provide access to an eligible
investigational drug.”60
Discussion of Selected Provisions in the Right to Try Act
Eligible Patients
The Right to Try Act defines eligibility, in part, as a person diagnosed with a “life threatening
disease or condition.” That definition differs from many of the state-passed laws, as wel as from
what FDA preferred: that the definition make clear patients were eligible only if they faced a
“terminal il ness.”61 FDA Commissioner Gottlieb noted that “[many] chronic conditions are life-
threatening, but medical and behavioral interventions make them manageable.”62 Examples of
such diseases or conditions are diabetes and heart disease.
Speaking in support of right to try bil s, supporters told of people facing death who, with no
alternatives remaining, would be wil ing to risk an experimental drug that might even hasten their
death.63 By not limiting eligibility to those at the end of options, the Right to Try Act could al ow
people with chronic conditions to take extreme risks rather than live a normal lifespan with
treatments now available. Because of the broad eligibility, manufacturers could see a significant

57 FFDCA §561B(c) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(c)].
58 FFDCA §561B(d)(1) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(d)(1)].
59 FFDCA §561B(d)(2) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(d)(2)].
60 P.L. 115-176, §2(b).
61 Statement of Scott Gottlieb, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, before the Subcommittee on Health,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, October 3, 2017, https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/T estimony/ucm578634.htm.
62 Statement of Scott Gottlieb, M.D., Commissioner of Food and Drugs, before the Subcommittee on Health,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, October 3, 2017, https://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/T estimony/ucm578634.htm.
63 For example, Rep. Barton during House floor debate on S. 204, Congressional Record, May 22, 2018, p. H4359,
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/05/22/CREC-2018-05-22-pt1-PgH4355.pdf.
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increase in requests. If Congress revisits the Right to Try Act, Members might consider the
definition and clarify what they want for patients and manufacturers.
Informed Consent
The Right to Try Act makes it mandatory that before eligible patients receive an investigational
drug, they give the treating doctor their informed consent in writing—but it does not define
“informed consent.”64 Other right to try bil s, including the House-passed H.R. 5247 (115th
Congress), included more specific direction for consent, such as criteria already laid out in 21
CFR Part 50.65 The Right to Try Act neither provides nor requires the development of such
criteria. It thus may weaken patient protections that FDA’s expanded access program provides.
The Right to Try Act also eliminates the requirement that an IRB review the investigational use of
a drug.66
If Congress decides to revisit the Right to Try Act, it may seek to create a more explicit informed
consent requirement and some outside oversight to reduce the risk to patients either by wel -
meaning but less knowledgeable physicians or by unscrupulous actors some opponents of the law
anticipate.67
Data to FDA
Clinical Outcomes
It sometimes takes thousands of patients to establish an accurate evaluation of a drug’s safety and
effectiveness. Researchers exclude from the clinical trial patients who—for reasons other than the
drug’s effectiveness—may not show evident benefit from the drug. Those are the patients who
would get access through the Right to Try Act pathway.
The Right to Try Act prohibits FDA from using clinical outcome data related to use under this
section “to delay or adversely affect the review or approval of such drug.”68 This might make a
sponsor more likely to approve the use of its investigational drug under this pathway. The Right
to Try Act, however, includes two exceptions. It al ows FDA to use those data if the agency
determines their use is “critical to determining [the drug’s] safety” or if the sponsor requests use
of such outcomes.69 If drug sponsors find that this remains an obstacle to their permitting access
to investigational drugs, Congress could work with them, FDA, and patient advocacy groups to
devise another approach.

64 FFDCA §561B(a)(1)(C) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(a)(1)(C)].
65 21 C.F.R. 312.305(c)(4); Rep. Walden, during House debate on S. 204, May 22, 2018, pp. H4357-4358,
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/05/22/CREC-2018-05-22-pt1-PgH4355.pdf; and Letter to Speaker Ryan and
Minority Leader Pelosi, dated May 21, 2018, from 104 advocacy groups, including the American Cancer Society
Cancer Action Network, the American Lung Association, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation, and the Leukemia &
Lymphoma Society, as entered into the record by Rep. Castor during House debate on S. 204, May 22, 2018, p. H4358,
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/05/22/CREC-2018-05-22-pt1-PgH4355.pdf.
66 FFDCA §561B(b) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(b)].
67 Rep. Pallone, during House floor debate on S. 204, Congressional Record, May 22, 2018, p. H4360,
https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/05/22/CREC-2018-05-22-pt1-PgH4355.pdf.
68 FFDCA §561B(c)(1) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(c)(1)].
69 FFDCA §561B(c)(1)(A) & (B) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(c)(1)(A)&(B)].
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Adverse Events
The Right to Try Act requires the manufacturer to report once a year to FDA, including an
account of al serious adverse events that occurred in the preceding 12 months.70 It does not
require immediate reporting of adverse events.71 This is less than what FDA requires of sponsors
of approved drugs and investigational drugs provided in clinical trials or under expanded access.
Al must periodical y inform FDA of such events—and immediately if the event is “serious and
unexpected.”72 An adverse event may not be clearly attributable to a drug. A clustering of such
reports, though, could signal FDA that this might be something worth exploring.
If Congress were to reconsider the Right to Try Act, it could explore with stakeholders—FDA,
drug sponsors, and physicians and patients who use this pathway—ways to make data available to
advance the goal of developing safe and effective drugs while protecting the legitimate business
interests of manufacturers and the access of seriously il individuals to try risky drugs.
Disclosure
The Right to Try Act requires the manufacturer or sponsor to submit an annual summary to FDA
to include “the number of doses supplied, the number of patients treated, the uses for which the
drug was made available, and any known serious adverse events.”73 FDA has issued a proposed
rule to implement this annual reporting requirement, which wil not become effective until FDA
promulgates a final rule and establishes a deadline for such reports.74 The Right to Try Act also
requires FDA to post an annual summary on its website to include the number of drugs for which
(1) the agency has determined the need to use clinical outcomes in the review or approval of an
investigational drug, (2) the sponsor requested that clinical outcomes be used, and (3) the clinical
outcomes were not used.75
Congress may choose to revisit these reporting requirements, to require the manufacturer or
sponsor to provide more information to FDA, to require FDA to make public additional
information, or both.
Financial Cost to Patient
FDA’s expanded use process permits a sponsor to charge a patient for the investigational drug,
but only to recover the direct costs of making the drug available, as defined under 21 C.F.R.
312.8(d).76 This includes costs to manufacture the drug in the quantity needed or costs to acquire
the drug from another source (e.g., shipping, handling, storage).77 The sponsor cannot charge for
development costs or to make a profit. The Right to Try Act extends this requirement to drugs that

70 FFDCA §561B(d)(1) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(d)(1)].
71 Letter to Speaker Ryan and Minority Leader Pelosi, dated May 21, 2018, from 104 advocacy groups, including the
American Cancer Society Cancer Action Network, the American Lung Association, the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation,
and the Leukemia & Lymphoma Societ y, as entered into the record by Rep. Castor during House debate on S. 204,
May 22, 2018, p. H4358, https://www.congress.gov/crec/2018/05/22/CREC-2018-05-22-pt1-PgH4355.pdf.
72 21 C.F.R. §314.80(c)(1)(i), 21 C.F.R. §312.32(c)(1).
73 FFDCA §561B(d)(1) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(d)(1)].
74 FDA, “Annual Summary Reporting Requirements Under the Right to T ry Act,” 85 Federal Register 44803, July 24,
2020.
75 FFDCA §561B(d)(2) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(d)(2)].
76 21 C.F.R. §312.8(d)(1).
77 FDA, “Guidance for Industry: Charging for Investigational Drugs Under an IND—Questions and Answers,” p. 6.
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sponsors may provide under this pathway.78 However, it does not require insurers to pay for the
drug—or pay for doctor office visits or hospital stays associated with its use or potential adverse
outcomes—and these costs may therefore fal on the patient. Congress may consider examining
the effect of the Right to Try Act on costs incurred by patients.
Liability Protections
Manufacturers may see liability costs as an obstacle to providing an investigational drug to
patients. The no-liability provision in the Right to Try Act seems to remove that obstacle,
although it may leave the patient with limited legal recourse. In the past, Congress has sometimes
tried to protect both recipients and the manufacturer from harm (e.g., the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 and the Smal pox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003). In
those cases, where Congress felt the public health benefit to the larger group outweighed the
smal er risk to some, the federal government accepted responsibility for compensating injured
patients and indemnifying manufacturers from lawsuits.79 That has not been the motivating force
behind the Right to Try Act. Discussions of earlier versions of liability protections raised
concerns that they might not fully protect the manufacturer.80 As patients use drugs under the
Right to Try Act pathway, it is possible that they wil test such protections in the courts. This is
yet another issue that Congress might pursue.
Concluding Comments
Several questions remain regarding the impact of the Right to Try Act on patients, drug
manufacturers, and FDA.
First: Will more patients get investigational drugs? The Right to Try Act
requires manufacturers or sponsors to report each year on the number of doses
supplied and patients treated as a result of the law, as wel as what the drugs were
used for and any known serious adverse events.81 Over time—and perhaps with
requesting other data—Congress could determine whether the law has had the
effect its sponsors intended.
Second: Has the law removed the obstacles to access to investigational
drugs? While the Right to Try Act achieves proponents’ objective of removing
the FDA application step in a patient’s quest for an investigational drug, it does
not address other obstacles—such as a limited drug supply or limits on staff and
facility resources—that could lead a manufacturer to refuse access to its drugs.
Further, it is not clear whether it sufficiently deals with the obstacles it does
address—use of clinical outcomes data and liability protection. While the
reporting required by the Right to Try Act was not designed to answer those
questions, Congress could ask GAO to evaluate the law’s impact on
manufacturers’ wil ingness to provide investigational drugs under this pathway.

78 FFDCA §561B(b) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(b)].
79 T he National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-660) established the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program. T he Smallpox Emergency Personnel Protection Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-20) established the
Smallpox Vaccine Injury Compensation Program .
80 Bexis, “Federal Right to T ry Legislation—Is It Any Better?” Drug & Device Law, September 5, 2017,
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/09/federal-right-to-try-legislation.
81 FFDCA §561B(d)(1) [21 U.S.C. §360bbb-0a(d)(1)].
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Third: How will this affect FDA? One news article referred to the Right to Try
Act’s “bizarre twist,” as FDA must determine its role in implementing a law
whose function is to remove FDA from the situation.82 Writing in opposition to
the bil , four former FDA commissioners warned that it would “create a
dangerous precedent that would erode protections for vulnerable patients.”83 That
is something Congress may choose to address.
The Right to Try Act concludes with a “Sense of the Senate” section that appears to acknowledge
that this legislation offers minimal opportunity to patients. It is explicit in asserting that the new
law “wil not, and cannot, create a cure or effective therapy where none exists.” The legislation, it
says, “only expands the scope of individual liberty and agency among patients.” The drafters
realistical y end that phrase with “in limited circumstances.”

Author Information

Agata Bodie

Analyst in Health Policy


Acknowledgments
Susan Thaul, retired CRS Specialist in Drug Safety and Effectiveness, was the author of a previous version
of this report.

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82 For almost a decade, the Goldwater Institute has been working toward the goal it achieved with the signing of the
Right to T ry Act. It says that “people have a fundamental right to try to save their own lives without applying to the
federal government for permission.” (Goldwater Institute quoted in Erin Mershon, “ Drug makers have to post policies
for patients seeking experimental medicines. Not all do.” Stat+, April 5, 2018, https://www.statnews.com/2018/04/05/
drug-makers-compassionate-use-policies/.)
83 Laurie McGinley, “ Former FDA commissioners say right -to-try bills could endanger ‘vulnerable patients,’”
Washington Post, March 18, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/03/18/former-fda-
commissioners-say-right -to-try-bills-could-endanger-vulnerable-patients/?utm_term=.3fe265fa04eb.
Congressional Research Service
R45414 · VERSION 4 · UPDATED
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