Contents

• Introduction
• Background
• Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11
• George W. Bush Administration Initiatives
• The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform
• Key Problems and Reform Proposals
• Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation
• Overview of Reform Proposals
• Improve Strategy-making, Planning, and Budgeting?
• Improve Civilian Institutional Authorities and Structures for Coordination and Collaboration?
• Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors?
• Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms?
• Issues for Congress
• Is Interagency Reform Necessary for Missions Abroad?
• Future Conflict Environment and Missions
• Utility of State-building Missions
• To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building Capabilities?
• Implications of a DOD State-Building Role for the U.S. Military
• Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
• Short-term Trade-offs
• Which Proposals Are Highest Priority?
• Prioritize by System Weaknesses
• Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives
• Prioritize by Effect on International Cooperation
• Prioritize by the Ease and Cost of Implementation
• Can Interagency Reform Produce Cost Savings?
• Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security Reform Measures?
• Create New Select Committees
• Create a National Security Appropriations Subcommittee
• Modify Current Practices and Procedures
• Looking Ahead
• Bibliography
• Acronyms
• Preface to Appendices, Including Tables

Summary

Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full advantage. For the 112^th Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These proposals also provide context for current and recent legislation, including the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314) and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011 (H.R. 3660), as well as the new Global Security Contingency Fund contained in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81, signed into law December 31, 2011). The FY2012 NDAA requires the President to submit to Congress a "whole-of-government" implementation plan.

Despite a growing perception during the 1990s that reforms were needed to foster interagency cooperation in missions abroad, it was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, during the presidency of George W. Bush, and subsequent U.S. military interventions that the need became urgent enough to result in significant changes. The earlier first steps of the Clinton Administration toward interagency reform were in short order embraced and then expanded by the Bush Administration, which also implemented reforms of its own. The Barack H. Obama Administration has endorsed these changes and undertaken some of its own.

Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These are (1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies; (2) a variety of structural deficiencies in the U.S. government for conducting missions abroad that lead to a tendency for "stove-piping" responses, with each agency operating independently, and to civilian agencies' reluctance to divert scarce resources, including personnel, from their core missions to interagency missions; and (3) personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.

This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting; to improve institutional authorities, structures, and arrangements; and to create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms.

As the breadth and variety of the recommendations indicate, there is no consensus on how to fix the perceived problems. Nor is there agreement among policymakers on a number of overarching questions: whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of congressional organization or procedures must accompany other national security reform measures.

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Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress

Introduction

Some U.S. policymakers share widespread concern that the United States cannot conduct "whole of government" missions and activities abroad efficiently and effectively. For the 112^th Congress, various proposals to reform interagency authorities, organizations, processes, and personnel dedicated to foreign missions may be of interest, especially as it considers ways to maintain U.S. power and influence as it reduces expenditures. Proponents argue that reforms to rationalize interagency collaboration on foreign missions will not only enhance performance, but also save money by streamlining processes, facilitating cooperation, and reducing duplication. Some reform proposals are relevant to legislation currently before Congress, in particular the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, which provides for interagency rotations by U.S. government personnel in national security agencies,¹ and the Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011,² as well as the recently approved Global Security Contingency Fund, providing an integrated State Department-Department of Defense budget for certain types of security assistance.³ The FY2012 NDAA (P.L. 112-81) requires the President to submit to specified congressional committees within 270 days of enactment "an implementation plan for achieving the 'whole-of-government' integration vision prescribed in the President's National Security Strategy of May 2010." (See the section on "The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform," below.)

For nearly two decades, policymakers have pondered many questions regarding "interagency" missions and activities abroad—including stabilization and reconstruction, security assistance, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency—in a search to improve them. A primary question is the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies, particularly the State Department, in conducting these missions and activities. Other questions concern the recommended changes in authorities, processes, organization, structures, and personnel resources to optimize their use. As policymakers and analysts contemplate the range of probable near- and medium-term future threats—particularly the potential spillover effects of state instability and intrastate conflict, and the growth of terrorist and organized criminal activity—a consensus has grown that major challenges to U.S. national security over the next decades will require interagency responses.⁴ Nonetheless, despite a growing sense of a need for interagency reform to address multiple systemic problems, there is little agreement on the solutions.

Congress has played a leading role in some aspects of interagency reform. For instance, the George W. Bush Administration's creation in 2004 of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was promoted by Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator (now Vice President) Joe Biden.⁵ Some Members call for additional congressional initiatives.

To provide context for the 112^th Congress's continuing consideration of interagency reform, this report provides perspectives on the questions and issues raised by a broad range of reform proposals offered by research organizations and selected experts. The focus is on proposals for civilian institutions and personnel. Although DOD is a key player in the missions and activities that are the object of proposed reform, its very dominance in many areas underlies calls for reform to build civilian capacity.⁶ Thus, this report discusses DOD reforms only to the extent that they would foster improved interaction with civilians.

This report starts with a brief history of the impetus for interagency reform during the 1990s and 2000s, and a sketch of Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administration measures and initiatives, followed by a discussion of key problems in the context of the current interagency structure. (Appendix A provides a fuller discussion of interagency authorities and structures.) The report then provides a short synopsis of the content of reform proposals recommended or published by some three dozen foreign policy and defense organizations and experts. (Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, and Appendix E provide a broader discussion of proposed reforms, with tables of the proposals.) The report concludes with a discussion of four broad overarching questions: (1) is interagency reform necessary for missions abroad; (2) which proposals are considered highest priority; (3) can interagency reform produce cost savings; and (4) must congressional reform accompany other national security measures?

Background⁷

For nearly two decades, foreign policy analysts have been troubled by the difficulties that U.S. agencies experience when working together to advance U.S. interests abroad.⁸ After the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989, U.S. policymakers were confronted in the 1990s by new types of missions—the conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere—where conflict could not be brought to an end by force of arms alone. In these operations, U.S. military forces were tasked with a variety of state-building responsibilities, such as creating justice systems, assisting police, and promoting governance, which many believed were more appropriately performed by civilians. DOD soon realized that it needed assistance from civilian agencies, but those agencies often lacked the resources to help. Further, the United States' agency-centric national security system could not provide the strong leadership and appropriate mechanisms needed to meld military and civilian contributions into effective efforts.

In a first step to address the perceived need to develop coordinated U.S. responses to crises abroad rather than relying on case by case ad hoc responses, the Clinton Administration issued the May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. This directive, entitled The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, dealt with interagency planning, collaboration, and coordination problems by creating new planning and implementing mechanisms.⁹ PDD 56's provisions were not systematically implemented, due to what some analysts have described as internal bureaucratic resistance, although some of its practices were incorporated into planning processes for some subsequent operations.¹⁰

The first widely distributed call for broad reform of the U.S. national security system was issued in February 2001 by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century, the so-called "Hart-Rudman" commission. This commission recommended a "significant organizational redesign" of the executive branch "to permit the U.S. government to integrate more effectively the many diverse strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a new era—not only the traditional agenda of defense, diplomacy and intelligence, but also economic, counter-terrorism, combating organized crime, protecting the environment, fighting pandemic diseases, and promoting human rights worldwide."¹² Soon after, the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), put the problems of interagency cooperation at home and abroad in bold relief for many policymakers and analysts.

The U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (October 2001) and, especially, in Iraq (March 2003) manifested—some would say magnified—the perceived deficiencies of previous interagency missions abroad. These wars heavily stressed U.S. military forces. They demonstrated that U.S. departments and agencies had difficulty working together productively; indeed they sometimes worked at cross purposes. Gradually, consensus grew that the United States needed to foster civilian-led interagency collaboration and cooperation in missions abroad, and to develop adequate civilian organizational structures, procedures, and personnel to make that possible.

Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11

In the mid-2000s, several studies set forth proposals to reform "the interagency," as the interdepartmental formal and informal cooperation system is known, largely in transitions from conflict and post-conflict settings. Two Defense Science Board (DSB) studies (in 2004 and 2005) advocated broad changes for "stability" operations—defined to include security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking, and other operations needed to deal with irregular security challenges.¹³ The DSB studies focused on reforms to be undertaken by DOD and the U.S. military to a far greater extent than any previous or subsequent study. Nevertheless, the 2005 study also stated that DOD and the State Department needed to develop "an extraordinarily close working relationship," and that both departments needed to augment stabilization and reconstruction capabilities. Among the changes in DOD the 2005 study advocated were elevating the profile of stability operations within DOD through the creation of high level posts, and raising the status of stability operations to "core missions," that is, on a par with combat operations.

Over the next few years, a second crop of studies on improving missions abroad focused on proposals to bring greater coherence to a variety of peacetime activities. Some of those studies advocated that action be taken to prevent conflict when it initially seemed a possibility (and not just as a reoccurrence in post-conflict situations). They viewed preventive action as critical to U.S. efforts to contain the spread of terrorism and to combat the threats from growing transnational crime. Many saw the early proposals to improve the U.S. ability to deal with conflict and its aftermath as applicable to these "steady state" missions as well. One 2008 study drew "lessons learned" from nearly two decades of stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations and stated that those lessons "can also have utility for a broader range of U.S. engagements abroad during both military and nonmilitary activities," including pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict activities.¹⁴

These studies, spanning a decade, differed in several respects, but largely agreed on the need for U.S. government reforms. For the most part, their recommendations rested on two fundamental premises: (1) the need to empower civilians to lead and conduct all missions except those in dangerously hostile situations, providing the necessary resources for them to do so, and (2) the need to replace ad hoc, "stove-piped" systems with improved mechanisms for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations and for implementing them. Their recommendations were often based on the judgment that the greatest threats to U.S. security would emerge in states that were either too weak to police their territory or lacked the political will or capacity to do so. State-building (a term some argued more appropriate than nation-building) activities to promote a more stable world by fostering the development of legitimate, open, and effective governments abroad, was at the center of the strategy developed to deal with these threats. This belief ran counter to many policymakers' perceptions during the 1990s that the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries was an overly expensive, if not futile exercise.

George W. Bush Administration Initiatives

Although the Bush Administration scorned the concept of "nation-building" at first, its post 9/11 military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq soon changed its perspective. As the need to foster security and build credible institutions to govern in these highly fractionalized countries became evident, the Administration adopted significant initiatives to improve agencies' ability to carry out state-building missions more effectively and to foster interagency cooperation.

On the military side, the Bush Administration's Office of the Secretary of Defense embraced a number of the DSB recommendations when it issued in November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05), Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. By designating stability operations as "a core U.S. military mission," this landmark directive moved DOD away from its Cold War focus on combat operations. It mandated that the armed services' dedicate the same level of systematic attention to doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning capabilities for stability operations as they did for combat operations. At the same time, the directive clarified that DOD would play a supporting role to civilian leadership in many state-building situations, but cautioned that U.S. military personnel must be prepared to perform state-building functions when capable civilians were lacking.¹⁵

On the civilian side, the Bush Administration's signature initiative was the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, starting with the creation of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004, and concluding with the on-going creation of active and stand-by components for a new interagency Civilian Response Corp. In addition, not only did the Bush Administration set forth its own plan for interagency cooperation in S&R missions in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44,¹⁶ but it also partially put into force Clinton's PDD 71.¹⁷

Another key Bush Administration initiative was a program to prepare U.S. government personnel to work together on national security missions. On May 17, 2007, through Executive Order 13434, the Bush Administration provided legal authority for the development of an interagency National Security Professional Development program.¹⁸ Under guidance provided by the subsequent National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals issued in July 2007, the NSPD program was launched as an effort to promote the integration of resources in national security mission areas. Its stated purpose was "to attain unity of effort through awareness, relationships, and experience, and to break down cultural barriers and obstacles to coordination across jurisdictional and organizational boundaries." The program, however, did not allocate or request central resources to accomplish its ends. It left each department and agency to build its own capacity under the program guidelines. Although agencies took the formal steps to incorporate proposed changes, absent constant direction and supervision from the White House to enforce it as a top priority and overcome bureaucratic resistance, the program largely stagnated during the remaining years of the Bush Administration.

The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform

In his January 25, 2011, State of the Union address, President Barack H. Obama signaled his intent to make the U.S. government more competent and more efficient through a major reorganization, stating that his Administration would "develop a proposal to merge, consolidate, and reorganize the federal government in a way that best serves the goal of a more competitive America."¹⁹ The Obama Administration initially embraced key Bush Administration civilian capacity-building initiatives. In the early months of the Obama Administration, Administration officials signaled their support for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton asserted that the State Department needed to secure funding to carry out S&R missions and to demonstrate competence in conducting them. Then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates reiterated his support for increasing civilian capabilities, which he first expressed while serving in that position under former President George W. Bush.²⁰ Subsequently, the Obama Administration scaled back Bush Administration plans for the Civilian Response Corps and the implementation of the National Security Professional Development program, perhaps because of the cost or difficulty of fully implementing them. However, it also announced a number of its own modest steps in line with the recommendations of the many studies to enhance civilian leadership, capabilities, collaboration, and coordination, and to reduce ad hoc measures.

In May 2010, the White House set forth a statement of its intent to strengthen national security through a whole-of-government approach. In its 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama Administration stated that to foster national security the United States "must update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same."²¹ It called for maintaining the military's superiority in conventional welfare and enhancing other military capabilities, as well as investing "in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners."²² It outlined three pages of steps to take to improve defense, diplomacy, development, intelligence, homeland security, economic institutions, strategic communication, and partnerships with the for-profit private sector and non-profit nongovernmental organizations.

In December 2010, the State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly issued a "Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review" or QDDR (modeled after the statutorily required DOD Quadrennial Defense Review Report or QDR),²³ assessing U.S. diplomacy and development capabilities and proposing reforms to make them more efficient and achieve "whole-of-government" cohesion.²⁴ The 2010 QDDR, undertaken by the Obama Administration without a statutory requirement, embraced a number of the proposals (or variations of those proposals) for national security reform that have been advocated over the past decade. These include efforts to integrate national security budgets, elevate the status of key State Department offices tasked with coordinating interagency efforts, create new regional structures, enhance the ability of Ambassadors to lead embassies and influence policy-making, and promote personnel reforms. (These are further discussed in Appendices B through E, below.)

Key Problems and Reform Proposals

The United States' system for decision-making and implementing foreign affairs missions and activities is considered dysfunctional by many analysts. One recent study characterizes the exercise of foreign relations as "a mob scene" of individual and independent agencies.²⁵ The problems are perceived across many national security areas, including counterterrorism, failed states/post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, democracy promotion, and transnational issues (crime, health, environment, migration, drugs).

The three most commonly cited factors²⁶ responsible for perceived inefficiency and ineffectiveness of interagency efforts abroad are:

• Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities and processes;²⁷
• Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions abroad including (1) department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency for "stove-piping," with each agency reporting up and down through its own chain of command and responsibility for coordination placed on an overburdened White House; (2) insufficient civilian resources, including personnel, discouraging domestically oriented agencies from directing funds and personnel away from core missions; (3) inadequate mechanisms to foster information sharing within and among agencies; and (4) insufficient leadership authority, either de jure or de facto, at the headquarters and field level; and
• Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions, possessing little, if any, familiarity with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other departments and agencies.

Some analysts also cite strong disagreements among key players over the general purposes of and means to conduct missions as factors impeding successful performance. Improved institutional arrangements and enhanced leadership may provide the means to reduce such disagreements, or their worst effect, in some, but not all, missions.

The perceived problems surface and have repercussions at all levels: in the field (U.S. embassies or interagency operations on-the-ground), at an intermediate (regional) level, at department headquarters in Washington, DC, and within the Executive Office of the President, that is, the White House. How these problems manifest themselves in interagency missions is briefly outlined in the section immediately below. The next section provides an overview of proposals to address these problems, with extended discussion in the appendices.

Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation

Problems with strategic planning and leadership are most often attributed to deficiencies at the White House, particularly the National Security Council (NSC).²⁸ The NSC, consisting of the President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and others, is the ultimate locus for integrating foreign policy and national security strategy and policy making. Through its directorates and staff, it at times has been responsible for coordinating or even directing policy implementation. The term "National Security Council" is sometimes used to encompass the council itself, as well as NSC directorates and staff. Despite its central role, many analysts consider NSC staff (currently numbering some 300, including detailees) and procedures inadequate to effectively oversee steady state interagency missions and, almost invariably, prone to be overwhelmed by crises.

Crises reveal the full range of perceived problems in interagency missions. Strategic planning can break down. The usual practice calls for the relevant State Department regional bureau to direct civilian crisis planning and implementation in conjunction with the NSC, which meshes it with DOD planning if necessary. In the case of disagreements, the NSC may not always be able to play a mediating function. Usually, ad hoc staff-level interagency task forces are formed to coordinate the activities of civilian agencies and DOD. Task forces can form at the department level and the field level. Operations can be complicated by their members' lack of interagency experience and knowledge of other agencies' contributions and different cultures. In the field, task forces can be creative, devising solutions to problems. But task force members can end up at odds when they refer problems the task force cannot resolve up their individual chains of command.

Structural weaknesses manifest themselves at the department level, where steady state policies, plans, and programs are developed, and at the field level, where programs are implemented. Both planning and implementation are theoretically conducted in accordance with the President's broad policy guidance as developed through National Security Council (NSC) processes and meetings of the President's Cabinet, but agency interests, personalities, the availability of resources, and other factors affect outcomes.

The panoply of players, each with their own priorities and perspectives, illustrates the difficulties of developing plans for civilian foreign affairs activities and efforts. This function is usually led by the State Department and shared (not necessarily equally) by State Department regional and functional bureaus, by USAID and other agencies where appropriate, and by the Ambassadors at U.S. embassies. The implementation of field-level efforts and activities is reviewed, approved or disapproved, and overseen by the State Department regional and functional bureaus, which also secure funding for them. In other civilian agencies (i.e., the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Justice, and Agriculture, among others), headquarters units involved in foreign affairs play a large role in planning and implementing their activities as their presence abroad is often very limited. At the headquarters level, collaboration and coordination among civilian agencies varies, but often may be minimal.

Some analysts perceive a key structural weakness at the field level, where U.S. Ambassadors are responsible for transforming the President's broad foreign policy outline into concrete diplomatic measures and foreign assistance programs. At U.S. embassies (which are the United States' largest civilian permanent structures abroad), the Ambassador or other Chief of Mission (COM) directs and coordinates foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the embassy "country teams." These teams are composed of the representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in a country. The degree to which Ambassadors can actually lead and coordinate activities varies greatly according to the interest and management ability of each individual Ambassador. And, many find that the Ambassador lacks the necessary authority to compel agency representatives to direct their activities to fulfill embassy mission, rather than agency, goals.

There are particular structural weaknesses at the regional level. Here, DOD is strong; it plans for and implements operations and activities through the regional Combatant Commands (COCOMS), also known as the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). When in combat, the U.S. military operates under its own statutory authorities. In peacetime, military personnel carrying out security cooperation and related functions (developed by the GCC and approved by each country's COM) are attached to the U.S. embassies under COM authority, although the degree to which they view themselves as responsible to the COM rather than the geographic combatant commander varies greatly, according to some analysts. There is no corresponding regional entity on the civilian side. Further, civilian input into GCC planning is considered limited, although some GCCs have attempted over the past decade to incorporate civilian perspectives into their planning systems.

Some analysts regard the absence of permanent civilian regional structures like the GCCs as a serious deficiency. The State Department does have regional programs in many areas and a number of "coordinators" reporting directly to the Secretary of State, who play varying roles in conducting or coordinating interagency missions. For instance, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) encourages and manages interagency regional planning for counterterrorism activities. But these coordinators do not have the power to compel interagency cooperation.

Overview of Reform Proposals

Proposals for reforming the structures, procedures, and mechanisms for foreign policy and strategy making, planning, and implementation range from all inclusive to narrow. In 2008, the House Armed Services Committee urged Congress to legislate a new National Security Act to reform DOD and the entire spectrum of interagency operations, and to codify new structures that would "flatten, simplify, and integrate" agencies' related processes.³⁰ The same year, the congressionally mandated Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) also proposed a wholesale overhaul of the National Security Act of 1947.³¹ (Subsequently, however, PNSR leaders stated that this proposal did not exclude incremental change.)

Absent full-scale reform, some analysts find but faint possibilities for the success of those interagency initiatives undertaken thus far. Stating that the U.S. government operates with core national security processes and organizations dating to the 1950s, one author judged that initiatives such as S/CRS "are bound to fail without corresponding initiatives to transform the foundations of U.S. foreign policy."³²

The argument for wholesale reform rests on the interdependence of the entire national security system, where changes in one area will inevitably affect authorities and practices in another. Nevertheless, given the conceptual and practical difficulties of legislating and implementing wholesale reform, many analysts favor an incremental approach, with selected improvements in key areas.³³ Some focus on a particular agency, or certain missions or activities. Others look at top-level management structures, still others at field level practices.

While there is ample overlap in analyses and recommendations, there is also considerable diversity. These proposals are catalogued below under four rubrics: (1) improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting mechanisms and procedures; (2) correct structural weaknesses by improving institutional structures, arrangements, and authorities for coordination and collaboration at the headquarters and regional levels;³⁴ (3) address structural weakness at the field level by enhancing the authority and capacity of U.S. Ambassadors; and (4) create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms. Table 1, before the appendices, presents the spectrum of proposals by author and type. Source citations, and the acronyms identifying them in the tables, are found in the bibliography.

Improve Strategy-making, Planning, and Budgeting?

A fundamental weakness of the current system perceived by many analysts is a lack of adequate strategy-making, planning, and budgeting capabilities and procedures. Many have pointed to these deficiencies as critically undermining the United States' ability to develop and conduct coherent and effective foreign policies, missions, and assistance activities. They also can produce duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in others. Many analysts have cited a need for systems and procedures to ensure the development of coherent strategy, guide planning, and bring to bear sufficient leadership and direction. (See the Appendix B text box for the difficulties of compiling comprehensive information on counterterrorism spending and foreign police and other law enforcement assistance.)

Possible options offered to address these deficiencies are examined in Appendix B. Some involve modifying the National Security Council (NSC) and NSC staff roles, responsibilities, or structure. These include establishing new NSC positions, establishing new NSC structures, or assigning new responsibilities to the NSC and its national security staff. Others would institute new strategy development processes and documents, or enhance strategy development and planning. Other options include integrating budgets, and improving budgeting processes.

Improve Civilian Institutional Authorities and Structures for Coordination and Collaboration?

The perceived weaknesses of civilian institutions (including insufficient authority and planning capabilities, ineffective hierarchical arrangements, and a paucity of resources) are viewed as impeding their ability to conduct and coordinate interagency missions abroad. Proponents of reforms to address these problems identify two bureaucratic impediments to interagency reform. One is that agencies prioritize core missions and resist allocating personnel and other resources to peripheral missions. Another is that personnel respond to the direction and perceptions of those who evaluate and promote them, rather than to other superiors who are not in their chain of command. A perceived need to build appropriate structures and to create adequate leadership authority to overcome these obstacles undergirds many proposals for interagency reform. Appendix C discusses these proposals.

Because the State Department is responsible for overseeing the conduct of the President's foreign policy, many analysts focus on strengthening its capacity to lead, coordinate, and conduct civilian missions and activities abroad. Some proposals deal specifically with improving the State Department's ability to lead and conduct S&R missions. Others, however, would reallocate S&R responsibilities to other agencies.

Other institutional arrangements are proposed. Some would create new institutions specifically for S&R. On a smaller scale, others advocate establishing interagency teams or task forces. Some would enhance civilian input into GCCs and other DOD units, while others would create new civilian regional structures.

Some proposals focus on civilian personnel. Some urge a review or augmentation of the numbers of civilian personnel at the State Department and USAID. Others propose augmenting personnel and other capacity government-wide for interagency missions. Some would increase personnel in the Civilian Response Corps.

Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors?

As the leaders of the interagency "country teams," Ambassadors are viewed by many analysts as the key to improving interagency coordination and increasing the effectiveness of interagency missions in the bilateral arena. Some analysts view strong country team leadership by an Ambassador as the key reason for what they perceive as successful interagency cooperation in recent U.S. assistance efforts in Colombia, Paraguay, and the Philippines.³⁷

Because of their vital role in interagency cooperation, there are various proposals to enhance Ambassadors' authority. (See Appendix D.) Some would strengthen their authority over embassy staff or their control over funding for activities carried out by members of the embassy team. Others recommend enhancing Ambassadors' ability to manage the interagency country teams and carry out other responsibilities. One proposal would expand COM authority to enable Ambassadors to effectively lead regional or crisis task forces.

Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms?

Few U.S. government personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to work together effectively in interagency missions, according to many analysts. There are many proposals to provide them with interagency education, training, and experience in order to create a U.S. government-wide "interagency" culture, as discussed in Appendix E. (See the Appendix E text box for insight into the differences between DOD and Department of State agency cultures.)

Some proposals call for the formation of a group of national security professionals from all levels dedicated to interagency operations, some for building up President Bush's National Security Professional Development program, some for developing interagency career paths, and some for creating an interagency cadre of senior managers. Other proposals would overhaul personnel systems and expectations, linking interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications, opportunities, and promotions. At the other end of the scale, more limited proposals call for expanding the opportunities and incentives for interagency education, training, and professional experience, and protecting interagency personnel against political currents. Some proposals call for creating new institutions for interagency education and training, or enhancing existing ones.

Issues for Congress

Congress has considerable authority regarding interagency reform. Through its appropriations power, Congress ultimately controls reforms that require additional resources, such as personnel, facilities, and additional education and training. Congress also sets through statute the organization of the top levels of executive branch departments and agencies, conditioning the executive's ability to put in place new high-level posts and organizational units. These include positions at the NSC, and leadership positions (i.e., Assistant Secretary and above) at the civilian departments, including State, Defense, USAID, and others. Congress also has considerable influence over other personnel matters, through its power to promote civilian and military officers and fix other terms of employment. Even where the executive branch has the authority to make changes on its own, Congress can stimulate reforms by enacting legislation that would break bureaucratic resistance; for instance, Congress can mandate new procedures and processes by requiring strategy and budget documents that deal with these matters. Congress may also encourage changes indirectly through hearings, briefings, and meetings with executive branch officials.

While contemplating the utility of specific reforms, Members may also wish to consider a number of issues. Four addressed below are whether interagency reform is necessary; to what extent the U.S. military should be relied upon; how to prioritize proposed reforms; and whether interagency reform will produce budget savings?

Is Interagency Reform Necessary for Missions Abroad?

The United States' long military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has provided much of the impetus for interagency reform efforts, but has also raised doubts about the wisdom of the interagency S&R missions. Perceptions regarding the necessity and desirability of interagency reform for missions abroad may be tied to a policymaker's assessment of the future security environment and the appropriate scope of the U.S. response. The need for overall reform, or even limited reform in certain areas, may depend on whether one judges that (1) the conflict environment and state-building demands of the past two decades will continue into the next several decades; (2) whether there are significant new types of missions that would be made more effective by improved interagency collaboration; and (3) whether one accepts or questions the utility of such engagements.

Future Conflict Environment and Missions

Initially, the perception that extensive interagency reform for missions abroad is vital to U.S. national security was fostered by the belief that weak, unstable states and post-conflict settings provide fertile breeding grounds for international terrorism. Initial proposals were grounded in the desire to bring to bear in these situations effective whole-of-government efforts to foster security, good governance, and economic development; to prevent outbreaks of conflict; and to forestall reoccurrences of conflict in transitions from conflict and post-conflict settings. Some analysts soon disputed the premise that weak and failed states are per se among the most significant threats to the United States. They pointed out that terrorists find safe-haven and recruits in developed countries as well, and identified many factors—demographic, political, religious, cultural, and geographic—contributing to the spread of terrorism. An emphasis on weak and failed states, they argued, can result in fruitless interventions, pointless expenditures, and too little attention on more tangible threats and areas of greater U.S. interest.³⁸

The 2010 QDR does not discount potential threats from weak states, but discussed them in terms broader than international terrorism. The changing international environment, it judged, "will continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states ... [which] are often catalysts for the growth of radicalism and extremism.... Over the course of the next several decades, conflicts are at least as likely to result from state weakness as from state strength." It points out some fragile states "are nuclear-armed or are critically important to enduring American interests."

This document argues for the integration of defense, diplomacy, and development (the so-called "3D") tools to prevent the rise of threats to U.S. interests and to meet the challenges of "a complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate."³⁹ It points to counterterrorism, building the capacity of foreign security forces, and preventing conflict as interagency missions that will continue into the foreseeable future. And, it flags a need for interagency approaches to help "strengthen weak states, including those facing homegrown insurgencies and transnational terrorist and criminal networks or those weakened by humanitarian disasters."⁴⁰

Utility of State-building Missions

To those policymakers and analysts who would discount the need to deal with numerous or high visibility situations requiring extensive state-building in the foreseeable future, the need for interagency reform, especially those aspects of it dealing with increasing civilian capacity and integrative personnel measures, may seem less than pressing. Similarly, this need would be discounted by those who are skeptical that the United States can effect significant changes in other states—weak, failing, or simply seriously flawed—through military or political interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions.

The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria for and the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success. There is considerable skepticism that state-building efforts often result in success. In the words of one scholar, "barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11), we had best steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake them anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere."⁴¹

On the other hand, some analysts judge that some international post-conflict state-building efforts have had considerable success. Mozambique and El Salvador are often pointed to as cases where state-building during and after civil strife promoted durable peace in the early 1990s. While two countries where the United States intervened militarily in the 1990s—Haiti and Somalia—are still highly problematic, the Balkans, once aflame with war, is stable despite the persistence of ethnic tensions. A 2003 RAND study that looked at eight U.N. peacekeeping missions (plus Iraq, where the U.N. played a role) judged that "seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic ... substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy."⁴² The long period of time that it takes conditions in post-conflict countries to stabilize—for instance in Bosnia-Hercegovina (after the Dayton peace accord of December 1995) and in Kosovo as a separate entity from Serbia (after the NATO military intervention of 1999) is not surprising to some analysts in light of assessments that state-building efforts take many years to produce results.⁴³

U.S. and international efforts to improve the possibilities of success for mitigating conflict and improving state-building operations are demonstrating what some regard as increasing promise. Continuing research and evaluation by the U.S. and other governments, as well as academia and think tanks, are advancing a broader understanding of the sources and drivers of conflict. There is a growing body of academic and government literature on the effectiveness of mechanisms used to defuse and settle conflicts, as well as sets of state-building best practices to prevent or ameliorate conflict.⁴⁴ Some analysts judge that future U.S. state-building efforts—when conducted on the basis of this knowledge and carried out by trained and experienced personnel operating under a well-designed interagency framework—may be more successful than in the past.

To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building Capabilities?

The use of the U.S. military in non-combat roles, particularly state-building, has a long and controversial history. During the Cold War years of the 1950s-1980s, the U.S. military focused on developing combat capabilities for decisive victories in conventional warfare. The inconclusive 1965-1972 counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, which combined military force with a program of socioeconomic reform, reinforced the notion that combat was the only appropriate mission for U.S. military forces. However, events of the first two post-Cold War decades—the 1990s "peace operations," the problematic post-combat transitions that generated insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the efforts to deter the spread of terrorism after 9/11—gradually convinced defense policymakers that future military missions would often require political, economic, and social state-building components.

A current question for U.S. policymakers is to what extent should the U.S. military provide the personnel to carry out non-combat national security activities, either in conjunction with combat operations (e.g., counterinsurgency, or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction), or as a separate military mission (e.g., counterterrorism)? DOD's response—up to this point—may be described as an ambiguous "to whatever extent necessary."

The DOD February 2010 QDR cites among its six key missions the need to "succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations," and to "build the security capacity of partner states."⁴⁵ DOD, however, does not see the U.S. military as the primary actor in the many non-combat missions that it performs.⁴⁶

The 2010 QDR reinforces DODD 3000.05 statements that DOD would often play a supporting role in such missions and activities. However, the meaning of a "supporting role" may vary depending on the availability of civilians to carry out those missions. The 2010 QDR argues that the presence of a "strong and adequately resourced cadre of civilians organized and trained to operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. military personnel" is "an important investment for the nation's security,"⁴⁷ but it also reaffirms the Directive's intent to ensure that state-building skills and abilities are available.⁴⁸ While DODD 3000.05 acknowledges that civilians are better suited to state-building tasks in such missions, it also recognizes that civilian agencies cannot operate in all situations, and perhaps also that they are unlikely to develop these capabilities to the extent needed, at least for some time to come.⁴⁹

Implications of a DOD State-Building Role for the U.S. Military

Maintaining state-building capabilities within the U.S. military services is not without cost. DOD has made a considerable front end investment in developing doctrine, training, and exercises for these capabilities.⁵⁰ Further developing and maintaining appropriate skill levels and special abilities (such as personnel with all needed language capabilities) comes at an additional cost. At a time when increasing budget constraints and a drawdown of active duty troops over the next several years seem likely, defense analysts may raise concerns about the possible trade-offs of maintaining such capabilities. If the price of retaining adequate capabilities requires keeping a substantially larger number of military personnel, this additional cost may be factored into a debate over weapons modernization vs. personnel budgets.

Because of these additional costs and the burden that performing such tasks can place on overstretched military forces, as well as the perception that civilians can often perform these tasks better, DOD leaders have long pushed for the development of a civilian capacity for state-building activities. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates repeatedly urged Congress to fund these capabilities, as have the two recent Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵¹

Given these costs, Congress may wish to consider whether DOD should remain the default capability for planning and conducting state-building activities or whether to expand civilian capabilities sufficiently to permit DOD to retain only those needed for situations too hostile for civilians to operate. Policymakers who judge that retaining state-building and other stability operations capacity in DOD may be the best option for the United States into the foreseeable future may wish to improve DOD's ability to carry out such missions. One option might be to implement the DSB 2005 proposal to create a position for Deputy Under Secretary for Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) that has never been instituted.⁵² (Responsibility for stability operations remains under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict, i.e., SO/LIC.) Another would be to ensure that all DODD 3000.05 mandates are fully implemented.

Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy

Another area of concern is the possible effect on U.S. foreign policy if state-building activities are largely conducted by U.S. military or DOD contracted personnel. A prominent concern is the effect of military dominance on the State Department's lead role in foreign policy coordination and implementation. The current high-profile DOD role may not only undermine the current statutory basis for the conduct of foreign policy, but also empower a department whose culture and processes are more attuned to accomplishing concrete missions than guiding the flow of bilateral and international relations with a view to the long run. In addition, many have questioned whether U.S. efforts to promote democratization and civilian control of governments abroad might be undermined by too prominent a military face on the U.S. presence around the world. A RAND publication predicts adverse consequences in both areas:

If nation-building remains a foreign-policy[sic] priority for the United States but the majority of resources and capabilities for that priority are concentrated in DoD, that organization ... will become the lead agency for a major component of U.S. foreign policy. Such a development would weaken the role of the State Department, both at home and abroad. It would raise concerns about the weakening of civilian control over military policy and undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts around the world. In short, it would be a fundamental realignment of how the United States both sees itself and is seen globally.⁵³

The RAND publication also raises concerns that state-building activities are made more difficult and less effective when the military takes the lead.⁵⁴ As DOD documents and officials public comments have repeated, the military is most often rightly the second choice for many state-building tasks. Although military personnel may become more competent at these tasks, many question whether the military could ever become as competent as civilians, hired for their expertise at state-building tasks, without dedicating personnel and units specifically to those tasks. That alternative has been rejected by the military in the past, and is not on the agenda for the future.

Short-term Trade-offs

Short-term cost considerations may come into play in decisions regarding the DOD role in state-building. The relative budget costs between further developing capabilities in DOD and building new capabilities in civilian agencies may be an issue. As measured against the S&R capabilities envisioned by the Bush Administration's Civilian Stabilization Initiative, current capacity falls far short and is declining still further. As up-front costs are usually higher than sustainment costs, and much further investment is needed in civilian capacity to bring it up to that initiatives' goals, use of the military may be the most cost-effective in the short run. Further, some may argue that continued development of state-building and other S&R capacity is relatively modest in terms of the defense budget. Nevertheless, if the United States begins to draw down military forces with the scale-backs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the anti-nation-building arguments of the 1990s—when a smaller force was stressed by the additional tasks and the costs of the additional personnel needed to perform such missions was measured against investments in weapons modernization—may reemerge. At some point, DOD may find it too costly in terms of over-stressed personnel and foregone investment to continue to embrace stability missions on a par with combat operations, as mandated by DODD 3000.05.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, the State Department generally has exercised the lead in state-building and related activities for the past 60 years, with few exceptions. An increase of capabilities and budgets in DOD, even if intended to be only temporary, could translate into a de facto shift from State Department leadership, with possible implications for the balance of authority between these two departments in the future.

Which Proposals Are Highest Priority?⁵⁵

Given that an overarching reform of the national security system appears unlikely, policymakers and analysts may debate the priority order of specific reform elements, and the possible implications of the order in which they are adopted. Should reform efforts concentrate on improving strategy-making, planning, and budgeting capabilities and procedures? Are effectiveness and improved collaboration or coordination better achieved by creating new governmental structures or rearranging existing ones, or by focusing on increasing the number of specially trained or dedicated personnel, particularly civilians? Or would augmenting current authorities and enhancing the capacity of existing structures and personnel be a more cost-effective approach? These questions have not been systematically raised. Addressing all possible questions and exploring the numerous permutations of approaches is beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, in forming their judgments, policymakers may wish to consider the following possible approaches to prioritizing reform.

Prioritize by System Weaknesses

Policymakers may view priorities through many different lenses. Many may judge priorities based on their perception of the crucial strengths and weaknesses of the current system. For instance, those who emphasize the need for coherent strategy-making for crisis operations view the essential fix as at the White House level, with changes in the structure and functioning of the NSC, while those concerned with better "steady state" (i.e., a normal peacetime situation) strategy may look as well to the State Department and the embassy level. Those who believe that personalities dominate strategy-making processes and implementation regardless of structures might de-emphasize the need for higher level structural reform, and possibly emphasize the need for enhancing the capacity, authority, and flexibility of leadership at all levels. Those who see personnel at operational level as capable of correcting flaws and deficiencies of higher levels might prioritize reform at the field level, with an emphasis on the development of interagency personnel.⁵⁶ An emphasis on interagency professional development may also be preferred by those who judge that thorough interagency reform will require a generational change best started by institutionalizing reform from the bottom up. On the whole, specific criteria for prioritizing reform elements are lacking.

One guide to developing priority criteria may be conclusions drawn from historical case studies. The editors of one compilation of 11 case studies of interagency missions⁵⁷ found three recurring weaknesses that some policymakers may chose to make their priorities: (1) little investment in human capital;⁵⁸ (2) the absence of "interagency doctrine;"⁵⁹ and (3) a lack of appropriate leadership at the highest levels.⁶⁰ However, the editors also provide a cautionary note about the limits of interagency reform. Above all, they asserted, competent leaders are more important than structures, statutes, and process. "At the highest levels of government, no organizational design, institutional procedures, or legislative remedy proved adequate to overcome poor leadership and combative personalities."

Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives

Some policymakers may view support for the efforts begun by the Bush Administration as a priority. One such effort is the national security professional development program, as discussed above. Another is the creation of civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction under S/CRS. A prominent feature of six early reports (between 2003 and 2005) on S&R operations was a recommendation to develop rapidly deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many viewed the development of civilian groups as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible. The establishment and deployment of such a corps, now underway, marks a substantial change from past practices. Some policymakers and analysts may view continued attention to and support for the needs of improving this capability as desirable, given the resources already devoted to it. However, as mentioned above, to those who doubt the utility of state-building endeavors abroad, or are wary of undertaking such efforts while the United State faces budget difficulties, these programs may not merit priority status.

Prioritize by Effect on International Cooperation

Another approach for prioritizing reforms might be to emphasize those changes that might enable the U.S. government to more effectively cooperate with other governments, international agencies, and non-governmental organizations in conducting activities and missions abroad. For instance, deficiencies in U.S. planning, insufficient clarity in agency roles, and agencies' unwillingness to share information and work together on projects can only complicate interactions with non-U.S. government participants and donors.

Prioritize by the Ease and Cost of Implementation

Finally, some policymakers may view the ease and cost of implementation as the prime ranking factors. Some would say that Obama Administration initiatives seem to be largely based on such criteria. As of 2011, its initiatives seem to be the least costly and those that are relatively easy to implement, reflecting perhaps budget and bureaucratic pressures and a desire for greater certainty of effect before proceeding. For instance, the decision to cut back implementation of the Bush Administration's National Security Professional Development program to one pilot project focused on homeland security seems a cautious, cost-conscious decision that may also reflect resistance among departments and agencies focused on foreign affairs. Similarly, the Obama Administration effort to improve the ability of Ambassadors to better carry out their responsibilities and influence headquarters level deliberations is relatively low-cost and limited, given the more extensive proposals to enhance COM authority. The decision to elevate S/CRS and S/CT functions in the State Department hierarchy may involve significant costs and invoke bureaucratic resistance, but still may be less costly and more expeditious than other options, particularly creating a new, independent agency to assume S/CRS functions.

Can Interagency Reform Produce Cost Savings?

There is a widespread expectation that interagency reform would save money in the long run. The 2010 QDDR explained the basis for that belief. Discussing plans to develop interagency cooperation on counterterrorism, rule of law, strengthening justice, interior, and health ministries abroad, the QDDR stated: "In the long-term, partnering with and building on the assets of other agencies will offer net policy gains to the U.S. government and reduce overall program implementation costs. This is a significant departure from current practice, one that we believe will save money, improve the U.S. government's ability to advance American interests, and strengthen State's engagement across the interagency."⁶¹

Nevertheless, some analysts believe that the cost effects of interagency reform are difficult to assess. Many analysts with experience in interagency missions expect that cost savings would accrue by eliminating the duplication of effort. The savings from duplication of effort would depend, however, on the size of the mission. Since many interagency missions involve relatively small numbers of people, cost savings on personnel may not be high.

Various analysts point to other possible ways in which interagency reform may produce savings:

• By facilitating the sharing of information technology, which is often expensive;
• By increasing collaboration and coordination at the planning and budgeting stages, resulting in an improved allocation of resources, because without a coherent strategy even the most efficient operational interagency processes and collaboration are often ineffective;⁶²
• By hastening the date when U.S. military forces can be removed from post-conflict areas and replaced with less-costly civilian personnel.⁶³

There may be additional costs associated with the process of interagency reform. As mentioned above, some analysts believe that savings will accrue from greater efficiency and effectiveness in missions if conducted by well-resourced civilian agencies with the resident expertise and appropriate core mandate. Nevertheless, there undoubtedly will be upfront personnel investment if the appropriate agency currently lacks the necessary capabilities to perform the mission. Some may question whether streamlining interagency processes and resources would indeed produce savings if personnel were not regularly called into action to exercise interagency skills.

Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security Reform Measures?

Congress's ability to oversee national security affairs, rationalize national security spending, and promote interagency reform is hampered by its own organization and procedures, according to some analysts. Some wonder whether Congress's current organization, which treats defense and foreign affairs as separate, rather than interdependent national security functions, contributes to the perceived imbalance between military and civilian resources. In 2008, a report by RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) stated that "the integration of instruments of power and influence would be greatly facilitated by changes in the way that Congress conducts its business."⁶⁴

Create New Select Committees

The 2008 RAND/AAD report proposed the establishment of two new select committees, "one in each house, devoted to reviewing the overall integration of instruments of power and influence and reporting their findings in terms of possible programs and appropriations." This reform, they argued, "would help individual committees (and Congress as a whole) make better-informed decisions about the intersection of elements of power and influence—elements that do not respect institutional boundaries in Congress any more than those in the executive branch."⁶⁵ It would not, the report stated, impinge directly on the current distribution of congressional power.

The same year, PNSR recommended that the Senate and House each create select committees "for interagency national security matters specifically responsible for reviewing and making recommendations for basic legislation governing interagency coordination and multiagency activities."⁶⁶ PNSR went further than RAND and AAD, recommending that if these select committees performed well, the Senate and House "should approve creating permanent select committees for interagency national security activities with oversight and legislative powers."⁶⁷ PNSR's proposal also called for these committees to "serve as the focal point for executive-legislative consultations on national security matters."⁶⁸ The assignment of such jurisdiction to new committees, whether temporary or permanent, would have significant implications for the current distribution of responsibilities in Congress, particularly for the armed services and foreign affairs committees.

Create a National Security Appropriations Subcommittee

More recently, the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel recommended that Congress consider reconvening the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress "to examine the current organization of Congress, including the committee structure, the structure of national security and homeland defense authorities, appropriations, and oversight, with the intent of recommending changes to make a more effective body in performing its role to 'provide for the common defense.'"⁶⁹ It proposed that Congress consider the possibility of establishing, at a minimum, a single national security appropriations subcommittee for the departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, as well as USAID and the intelligence community. It also proposed that Congress consider establishing a parallel authorization process to facilitate coordinating authorization action on these departments and agencies.⁷⁰

Modify Current Practices and Procedures

An option that would not require any structural changes would be for Congress to conform its committees dealing with defense and foreign relations to the standard declared in 1950 by then Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur Vandenberg that "politics stops at the water's edge." Such measures might include maintaining bipartisan staffs that share all tasks and information on subjects that overlap, holding frequent joint foreign relations and armed services hearings, and sponsoring joint legislation on national security matters. Some of these measures are not without precedent.

To facilitate long-term strategy development, Congress may also wish to consider options for revising budgeting processes. For instance, Congress may consider mandating multi-year budgets in certain areas. Or, it might require civilian agencies to develop five-year budget plans, as DOD does for non-contingency operation expenditures, in order to develop consensus with Congress on long-term foreign policy goals. While such plans would be subject to much greater fluctuations than DOD weapons systems plans, for example, they still might provide a basis for executive-legislative discussions on long-term resource allocation that could facilitate strategic planning.

Looking Ahead

The United States' ability to protect its interests and play a global leadership role may be significantly affected by the way in which it brings resources to bear on new and continuing national security challenges. Most immediate are the new state-building needs of transforming Arab states. Over the longer run, if advanced countries' economic troubles increase developing countries' economic distress, the United States may engage even more in counterterrorism and conflict prevention. In an era of constrained budgets, Congress may be increasingly interested in examining the possibilities that interagency reform may improve the use of resources. For instance, improved strategic planning and "whole-of-government" budgeting may focus resource allocation more effectively. Organizations and officials may produce better results if given the authority to harness the necessary resources to accomplish their missions, irrespective of their agency identification. Better trained and experienced personnel may carry out their duties more effectively. Finally, as the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Army, reviews its purposes while it shrinks its forces, the need for rebalancing military and civilian state-building capacity may be further emphasized.

Bibliography

(Materials listed alphabetically by the acronym or surnames used to identify them in Table 1.)

ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.

Brookings/CSIS 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies. Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.

Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, "Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (1^st quarter 2009).

Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. "What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 2007.

CFR 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.

CFR 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 48, October 2009.

CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.

CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role, November 2007.

CSIS/AUSA 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S. Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003.

CSIS 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I, 2004.

CSIS 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II, 2005.

CSIS 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21^st Century Development and Security Assistance, 2007.

CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.

DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004.

Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2^nd quarter, 2006.

Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.

Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James Carafano, March 1, 2008.

Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October 2009.

NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 2004.

Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, "U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement", (A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.

PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.

PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.

PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.

QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006.

QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1, 2010.

QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.

QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21^st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.

RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa Monica CA, 2009.

RAND/AAD 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, 2008.

RAND/AAD 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings, 2006.

Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.

SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide Foreign Aid, 2007.

SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.

Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.

Stimson/AAD 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21^st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education and Training, February 2011.

U.S. Commission on National Security/21^st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission), Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.

Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program, Occasional Paper, June 2008.

Acronyms

Preface to Appendices, Including Tables

Appendix A provides an overview of U.S. interagency institutions and arrangements. The subsequent appendices discuss salient reform proposals from 38 sources, with each appendix addressing one (or a subset of one) of the three problem areas perceived as contributing to the inability of civilian agencies to effectively plan, organize, and implement missions abroad. Appendix B deals with proposals to improve strategy-making, planning, and budgeting. Appendix C surveys a broad sweep of proposals to enhance institutional arrangements, resources, and civilian authority at the headquarters level. Appendix D focuses on enhancing civilian authority at the field level, that is, proposals to enhance the authority and capacity of U.S. Ambassadors. Appendix E examines proposals to create or improve interagency personnel policies and mechanisms.

The appendices exclude discussion and proposals concerning specific field or program level interagency issues (such as those involving the structure and operation of provincial reconstruction teams) and proposals to strengthen the capacity of individual agencies and departments, other than the interagency role of the State Department. They also do not include proposals that already have been implemented. For instance, the recent creation of the Consortium for Complex Operations at the National Defense University addresses past proposals for a better interagency "lessons learned" capability, although some may argue that this capability would be better placed in the State Department or at USAID. They do not include proposals on foreign assistance reform, which is covered in a previous CRS report, CRS Report R40102, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. They also do not address "whole-of-government" reforms that bear on the success of activities and missions abroad, for instance, the need to commit adequate resources for a substantial period of time to achieve stabilization and reconstruction goals in post-conflict settings.

As this report focuses on executive branch interagency reform, the tables do not include proposals for the reform of congressional oversight of interagency activities. This topic is covered in a broad sense in the section "Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security Reform Measures?" above.

In the tables, the language used for the proposal descriptions is generally an exact quote or a close paraphrasing of the proposal. Quotation marks are often omitted for clarity. These tables do not include recommendations that have already been implemented.

This is far from an exhaustive list of all proposals by all individuals or organizations. Proposals were selected because they represent the types of proposals advanced, because they are issued by organizations and individuals with a recognized depth of expertise on the issues, or because they are significantly unique.

Appendix A. Interagency Authorities and Structures

The National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Staff Role in Policy Coordination

Established by the National Security Act of 1947,⁷¹ the NSC is "the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials," according to the White House website. The NSC also advises and assists the President on these matters and "serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies," according to the website.⁷² The act specifically sets forth the NSC's "whole-of-government" coordination role, stating that the function of the Council

shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.⁷³

The act also provides that the NSC, "for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national security," shall "consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith."⁷⁴ The law does not specifically set "hands-on" coordination in the implementation phase as an NSC staff function.

The law leaves wide discretion to the President in many areas. In particular, the NSC may perform "such other functions as the President may direct."⁷⁵ NSC supporting units and staff are structured according to the President's design. And the President may appoint NSC members in addition to the statutory members.⁷⁶

Because the law leaves the President great leeway in determining NSC and NSC staff size (subject to appropriations), functions, and organization, each Administration has used the NSC differently. Over time, the NSC staff (known as the "national security staff" or NSS) has taken on among its responsibilities "coordination of the interagency policy process and policy implementation follow-up," and "articulation of the President's policies to other departments."⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the staff structure and its role in developing and coordinating policy among executive branch agencies varies from Administration to Administration, often depending on a President's relationships with department heads and the National Security Advisor, as well as a President's preferences and the management style of the National Security Advisor.⁷⁸

The State Department's Responsibility for Oversight and Coordination

The Secretary of State "plays the lead role in developing and implementing the President's foreign policy,"⁷⁹ and is entrusted under current statutes with primacy for ensuring the coherence of foreign assistance in support of that policy. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), provides that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, "shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education and training programs ... to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby."⁸⁰ Oversight and direction are not equivalent to coordination, however.

This statutory language does not explicitly charge the Secretary of State or the State Department with responsibility for coordinating the implementation of U.S. foreign policy and foreign assistance. Instead, coordination responsibility is vested in the Secretary of State through other legislation or presidential orders, or a combination of those. For instance, the State Department, under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State, has primary responsibility for administering all development (broadly defined to include economic, political, and social aid) assistance.⁸¹ In 1992, Congress adopted legislation stating that "the Secretary of State shall be responsible for coordinating all assistance provided by the United States Government to support international efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or trafficking."⁸² Through National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, entitled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, President George W. Bush vested the Secretary of State with responsibility for coordinating and leading "integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities." (The Secretary of State's relationship to DOD under this authority seems more limited. Somewhat ambiguously, the next sentence states that the "Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.")

The State Department organizational structure includes four coordinating offices of highly differing scope. One office focuses on foreign assistance to Europe and Eurasia; another on HIV/AIDS assistance; a third on counterterrorism efforts around the world, usually on a regional basis; and a fourth on stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities throughout the world. The last of these was transformed into a bureau in late 2011. The Coordinators, that is, the heads of the first three of these offices, are equivalent in rank to an assistant secretary rank, and are confirmed by the Senate, but they report directly to the Secretary of State rather than through a State Department bureau. The President will nominate an Assistant Secretary for the new S&R bureau. This bureau was created in line with Obama Administration plans, outlined in the December 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), to upgrade the Coordinator offices on counterterrorism and on S&R—in an effort to make them more effective. (See below, the section on creating new agencies or arrangements.)

Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia

Well before the call for interagency reform in complex contingency operations became widespread, Congress created two interagency coordinator posts in the State Department, one responsible for assistance to Eastern Europe and the other for assistance to the former Soviet Union.⁸³ In 2001, these posts were combined into the State Department Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. This office oversees the bilateral economic, security, democracy, and humanitarian assistance provided by all U.S. government agencies to the 18 states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This office reports to the Secretary of State through the Director of the Foreign Assistance (i.e., "F") bureau.⁸⁴

Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator

The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) was established in 2003 by the United States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25). Section 102(B)(i) of that act charges the Coordinator with "primary responsibility for oversight and coordination of all resources and international activities of the United State Government to combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic." Responsibilities include coordinating among all relevant executive branch agencies and non-governmental organizations, and dispersing funds provided under the U.S. President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).⁸⁵

Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) "coordinates and supports the development and implementation of all U.S. government policies and programs aimed at countering terrorism overseas," according to its website.⁸⁶ A major S/CT function is to facilitate and encourage interagency collaboration at the regional level, in particular to stimulate ideas for multi-country activities and provide a mechanism for integrating interagency programs. (Despite the use of the term "coordination" on the office's website, the actual function of the office appears to be encouraging collaboration, or voluntary cooperation, among agencies.) It also provides input to DOD counterterrorism activities, such as those conducted under "Section 1206" funding and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).⁸⁷ However, the office does not have authority to compel other offices and agencies to develop, conduct, or participate in programs, nor a program budget to leverage or compel others to participate.

Its origins date back to 1972, when the Office for Combatting [sic]Terrorism was established after the Munich Olympics terrorist attack. (According to the S/CT website, President Richard Nixon appointed a special committee which proposed that the State Department create an office to provide day-to-day coordination for counterterrorism activities and to develop U.S. government policy initiatives and responses.) In 1994, Congress provided a mandate for the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and defined the coordinator's role as being the principal adviser to the Secretary of State on international counterterrorism matters, and providing "overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources) of international counterterrorism activities."⁸⁸

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (formerly the Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction)⁸⁹

In mid-2004, the Bush Administration established the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In December of that year, the office was provided with a congressional mandate (Section 408 of Division D, P.L. 108-447); in October 2008, its establishment was codified, along with that of the Civilian Response Corps and Reserve for which it is responsible (Title XVI, P.L. 110-417). (Civilian Response Corps active and standby members deploy at the request of regional bureaus and ambassadors to assist with strategic planning in conflict, post-conflict settings and states at risk of instability.⁹⁰ The reserve component has never been formed.) In December 2005, through Presidential Decision Directive 44, the Bush Administration provided that the Secretary of State could delegate responsibilities for stabilization and reconstruction activities to the S/CRS Coordinator.

In late November 2011, the State Department transferred S/CRS functions to a new bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), as contemplated by the 2010 QDDR. The bureau is expected to play a greater role than S/CRS in developing policy and planning for missions, becoming " the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and instability," according to the CSO website.⁹¹ The head of CSO bureau, the Assistant Secretary for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, will also hold the title of Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Other Agencies' Roles

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID is the U.S. federal government agency primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and plays an important role in various interagency activities and missions. An independent agency, USAID receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. It describes itself as "the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms."⁹² USAID programs support economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, and conflict prevention throughout the world. USAID has a headquarters staff based in Washington, DC, of 2,255, and a staff overseas of 1,634, supplemented by 4,469 foreign nationals abroad.⁹³ USAID often carries out its program through contracts or cooperative arrangements with private voluntary organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international agencies, other governments, and other U.S. government agencies.

USAID is the lead agency in U.S. disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance. The USAID Administrator (the agency's head) leads interagency disaster relief efforts, which often include DOD and support from the Department of Agriculture.⁹⁴ The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams (generally known as DARTs) are quickly deployed to a disaster area (after an initial assessment), providing trained specialists to assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions respond to disasters.

Besides its state-building and economic development activities, USAID has long played a major role in U.S. state-building and other S&R efforts in conflict and in post-conflict settings from Vietnam forward. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), established in 1994, modeled itself as a rapid response unit after the DART teams. It has had a key role in S&R efforts, in the case of Iraq arriving in Baghdad "about the same time as the first U.S. troops."⁹⁵

Other Executive Departments and Agencies

Several executive departments have offices or agencies that work abroad and some have foreign service officers posted abroad whose work contributes to interagency efforts, particularly in stabilization and reconstruction missions. These include the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Transportation. All but Treasury participate in the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) system under S/CRS.

U.S. Chiefs of Mission (Ambassadors) and Embassy Country Teams

In normal circumstances, U.S. Ambassadors overseas bear the greatest responsibility for ensuring the coordination of foreign assistance and foreign policy in the countries to which they are appointed. Under the U.S. Constitution, the President appoints Ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate. An Ambassador serves as the President's personal representative abroad. In addition, an Ambassador, or other civilian serving as a Chief of Mission (COM), has the sole authority to oversee U.S. foreign policy in individual countries.⁹⁶ Some experts judge that the authority exercised by Chiefs of Mission "provides the President with the clearest and most forceful cross-departmental executive authority mechanism in use today."⁹⁷

Section 622(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, charges the Ambassador, or other responsible official, with the leadership role in ensuring coordination regarding foreign assistance programs, including U.S. military assistance, among government representatives in each country, under procedures prescribed by the President. Section 622(b) states: "The Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and that his [sic] comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires."

The embassy "country teams," that is, the group in every embassy comprised of representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in a country, bear much responsibility for turning the President's broad foreign policy into concrete diplomatic measures and foreign assistance programs. The team operates under the direction and authority of the U.S. Ambassador or other COM. Country teams vary according to embassy size and U.S. interests in a country; some may include representatives from some 40 U.S. departments and agencies.⁹⁸ In addition to State Department personnel, many embassies have personnel from at least the departments of Agriculture, Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as USAID. Other departments represented may be Health and Human Services, Interior, Labor, Transportation, and Treasury. Individual agencies from these departments may also be represented on country teams.

As codified by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465, §207) an Ambassador (or other Chief of Mission) is charged, under the direction of the President, with "full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees" within the country. This statute also requires that the Ambassador (or other COM) "shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country," and "shall insure that all Government executive branch employees within that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander) comply with all applicable directives of the chief of mission." National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 gives Chiefs of Mission the authority to determine the size, composition, and mandate of personnel operating under her/his authority. (Each Ambassador, upon assuming his/her post, receives a personal letter from the President spelling out similar responsibilities.) Nevertheless, the nature of Ambassadorial leadership and the use of country teams as integrative mechanisms varies greatly from country to country, according to observers. Much depends on the interest, knowledge, and management ability of the individual Ambassador, as well as his relationship with officials in Washington.

Mechanisms to Integrate Civilian Perspectives into DOD Missions and Activities

For nearly a decade, the U.S. military has attempted to incorporate an increasing number of civilians from other departments and agencies into its structures, by creating either new interagency groups or new posts for civilian agency representatives. (Note, the State Department has long assigned senior officials as Political Advisors or POLADs to the Geographic Combatant Command, or GCC, commanders.) Beginning in 2002, as discussed below, DOD began to reach out for further civilian input by requiring each GCC to set up a Joint Interagency Coordination Group that would function as an advisory body to the combatant commander, initially on counterterrorism issues. In 2004, a USAID Office of Military Affairs was established at USAID Washington, DC, headquarters, with liaison personnel sent to each GCC to advise on military activities with development implications. A more recent step was the creation of multiple civilian positions within some GCCs. In 2007, the U.S. Africa Command was set up as the model "interagency" command, with designated civilian billets. The U.S. Southern Command (Latin America and the Caribbean) and others subsequently increased civilian participation.

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG)

For several years, GCCs have each hosted a JIACG, an advisory body composed of military personnel from all services and civilian personnel from a variety of agencies, usually numbering about one dozen. JIACGs were established through a memorandum from the NSC Deputies Committee in early 2002 instructing Combatant Commanders to implement the JIACGs concept.⁹⁹ (At the U.S. European Command, the JIACG was named the Interagency Engagement Group.) Headed in most cases by a member of the federal Senior Executive Service (SES),¹⁰⁰ the JIACG was designed to facilitate interagency information sharing for the operations and activities of the combatant commands and to enhance the understanding of civilian agency perceptions and activities within the commands. The initial focus of the JIACGs was counterterrorism.

JIACG structures and tasks, as well as the use that the combatant commanders make of them, have evolved over time. Some observers express concern that JIACGs have not always fulfilled the civilian advisory function originally intended.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, it seems difficult to generalize about JIACGs. Some are little used, some are used extensively, and some have been virtually subsumed under or replaced by other interagency arrangements (see below).¹⁰²

USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation

In response to increasing concerns about possible conflicts between increasing U.S. military activities and sound development objectives, USAID established in 2005 an Office of Military Affairs (OMA) to provide input and oversight to U.S. military activities abroad. In November 2011, OMA was renamed the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation.

Under this office, senior USAID development officials are assigned to GCCs (see above) and to Pentagon offices. In addition, military liaison officers from the GCCs and from the Special Operations Command are assigned to USAID headquarters.

Civilian Posts at the Geographic Combatant Commands

While the JIACGs have operated outside the formal organizational structure of combatant commands, some GCCs have created new posts within the command's organizational structure for civilian personnel from other departments and agencies. This personnel augmentation includes senior USAID representatives that have been brought in through the USAID Office of Military Affairs, established in 2005, as well as civilians from other agencies.

Two commands have become the most integrated: the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) covering all of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), covering Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean. According to DOD's June 2011 report to Congress on the organization of the GCCs,¹⁰³ AFRICOM had 39 civilian "interagency" personnel assigned fulltime to its headquarters staff, with at least one from each of the civilian agencies relevant to its mission, while SOUTHCOM had 29 from 13 agencies. Both commands have also integrated senior civilian personnel into command leadership by establishing civilian "Deputy to the Commander" posts occupied by senior State Department foreign service officials, as has the U.S. European Command (EUCOM).¹⁰⁴ EUCOM, which covers 51 countries including Russia and the countries of greater Europe, has incorporated its Interagency Engagement Group (i.e., its JIACG) into its command structure as an Interagency Partnering Directorate (currently lead by an Army civilian). As of the end of FY2011, EUCOM expected to have 13 interagency personnel at the command. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), covering 20 states (Egypt, states on the Arabian peninsula, and in Central and South Asia), has "20 liaison members from other U.S. Government departments and agencies" working with CENTCOM staff. The report contained no information on interagency personnel within the staff structure of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and NORTHCOM.

Other Interagency Mechanisms

Interagency Task Forces¹⁰⁵

Interagency cooperation for missions abroad has largely been accomplished through multi-agency task forces. Most often these task forces are pulled together in times of crisis or periods of transition when agency roles are not clear, and constitute the very ad hoc structures that are criticized as inadequate and dysfunctional. At the field level, these are sometimes referred to as "hastily formed networks."¹⁰⁶

Established Task Forces

There are long-standing task forces in two mission areas involving the protection of U.S. borders. Three task forces are organized under three GCCs to coordinate military and civilian counternarcotics, and in some cases counter-terrorism, efforts.

Following Congress's 1988 designation of DOD as the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime drug trafficking into the United States,¹⁰⁷ DOD set up three task forces to combat drug trafficking. The purpose of the task forces was to coordinate the support and assistance that DOD provides to civilian law enforcement agencies under other authorities.¹⁰⁸

In 1994, two of the DOD task forces served as the base for the establishment of two interagency task forces: the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS) under SOUTHCOM in Florida (often pointed to as a model task force),¹⁰⁹ and Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATFWest) under the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. JIATFS stated function is "to facilitate the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partners' national security."¹¹⁰ JIAFTWest describes its mission as providing support "to law enforcement for counterdrug and drug-related activities."¹¹¹

The third DOD task force, Joint Task Force North (JTFN) under the U.S. Northern Command, is not formally an interagency task force, but it is located at Fort Bliss, near El Paso, TX, near the civilian interagency Operation Alliance, a civilian task force of federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies. JTFN (known as Joint Task Force North until 2004) coordinates activities along the southwest border and the Gulf of Mexico. It provides support to federal law enforcement agencies for counternarcotics and homeland security missions.

Task Forces by Another Name

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan may be considered a type of task force. These teams—which have consisted of 20 to 100 members—were first formed in Afghanistan in 2002, and then were established in Iraq in 2005. Members were drawn largely from DOD, the State Department, and USAID. The original concept was for the PRTs to be mixed civilian-military teams that would operate in Afghanistan's provinces, coordinating U.S. government support from civilian agencies to local authorities and providing a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. PRTs were stood up first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Their purpose was to build basic infrastructure and to provide assistance, advice, and mentoring to provincial and local government and officials in a wide range of areas, including governance, political and economic development, rule of law, education and culture, and public health.

Despite numerous problems—among them what many considered an initial disproportionate representation by DOD, given that civilian agencies at first could not provide the requisite personnel—the PRTs have persisted in Afghanistan. In Iraq, with the transition to a U.S. State Department lead for the U.S. presence there, the 15 PRTs were dissolved in FY2011. Their engagement, stabilization, and liaison functions are conducted through State Department civilian diplomatic posts , and other functions were turned over to Iraqi provincial and local governments.

In addition, the interagency Civilian Response Corps (CRC) teams, mentioned above, may be viewed as a form of interagency task force. Although their assignments are still limited, CRC deployed personnel, often from two or more civilian agencies, work together as teams, developing data, conducting interviews, and stimulating the thinking of U.S. government employees in the field about approaches to conflict mitigation and resolution in their countries.

Interagency Informal Arrangements

Interagency collaboration may occur through informal arrangements developed by those responsible for program planning and implementation. For example, although legislation establishing the DOD Regional Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) has no provision for State Department coordination or collaboration, DOD regularly consults with the State Department on CTFP programming. In Afghanistan, DOD and civilian personnel at the field level often have devised informal arrangements to better integrate their work.¹¹²

Appendix B. Proposals to Improve Strategy-Making, Planning, and Budgeting

Many foreign policy and interagency reform analyses express concern that successive Administrations have done at best a fair job in integrating the various elements of foreign policy making and have not engaged at all in making strategy, that is, matching resources to policy decisions and priorities. In 2001, the United States Commission on National Security/21^st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) flatly stated that "Strategic planning is largely absent within the U.S. government. The planning that does occur is ad hoc and specific to Executive departments and agencies. No overarching strategic framework guides U.S. national security policymaking or resource allocation."¹¹³

The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in 2008 described the United States' "inability to formulate and implement a coherent strategy" as corroding all governmental processes by "hindering planning, creating gaps, duplicating efforts, frustrating leaders, and encouraging ad hoc short cuts."¹¹⁴ Further, the PNSR historical case studies identified a link between poor strategy and policy formulation and deficient implementation, with the lack of clarity and unity at top levels fomenting rivalries and "stove-piping" at lower levels.¹¹⁵ The reasons PNSR cited for these problems at the leadership level ranged from the behavior of top leaders to insufficient information flows at the executive level.¹¹⁶

Many other analysts have also cited a need for systems and procedures to ensure the development of coherent strategy, guide planning, and bring to bear sufficient leadership and direction. In discussing civil-military operations to quell conflict, from initial intervention to the state-building phase, two experts pointed to three reasons for improving strategy, planning, and leadership that would hold true for many U.S. government missions and activities abroad. These are (1) the mutual dependence among agencies to carry out complex missions, (2) the contentious policy issues that can lead to problems in the field if not addressed at the outset, and (3) the shortages of personnel and other resources that demand their optimal use.¹¹⁷

From the Hart-Rudman Commission forward, many organizations and experts have advanced proposals to enhance or improve strategy-making and planning processes, including reforms at the NSC (Table B-1, Table B-2, Table B-3), creating specific new strategy development processes and documents (Table B-4), or making other changes to rationalize or enhance strategy development and planning (Table B-5). Many have also recommended integrating national security budgets (Table B-6) and/or improving budget processes (Table B-7).

The Obama Administration has two initiatives in the budgeting area. One is a request that Congress establish a Global Security Contingency Fund, providing a pool of integrated DOD and State Department funding for security assistance. Another is a plan for Ambassadors to participate in budget-making at the country team level. (See the section on integrated budgets, below.) In addition, State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) planners have recently formed a "3D Planning Group" to improve their collaboration in planning.¹¹⁸

Modify National Security Council and Staff Roles, Responsibilities, Processes, or Structures

Proposals for improving strategy-making and planning have centered on the National Security Council (NSC) processes and NSC staff. Policy and strategy-making for foreign policy and affairs is the prerogative of the President, normally conducted through the NSC and its staff, with the participation of DOD, the State Department, and other agencies. Nonetheless, the President and the NSC staff have been widely viewed for many years as so overwhelmed with the tasks of conducting day-to-day governance that the NSC cannot direct the processes of making coherent policy and strategy. Analysts offer differing solutions. Some would create new NSC staff positions (Table B-1), new NSC staff structures (Table B-2), or assign new responsibilities to the NSC staff (Table B-3). This might require expanding the size of the NSC staff; alternatively, the President might delegate these functions to others.

The composition of the NSC itself is largely set by statute, but it is the President's prerogative to determine NSC staff structure and size, subject of course to appropriations. Any substantial changes in staff size, or the creation of new NSC staff units or additional posts elsewhere to handle delegated functions would, through their budgetary implications, be a matter for congressional action. Nevertheless, any codification of size or structure, as mentioned above, may be considered impinging on a President's flexibility to structure the White House in accordance with circumstances and the capacity of available personnel.

Create New Procedures to Facilitate Strategy-making and Planning

Many proposals to make interagency missions more effective start with or include recommendations for new or improved government-wide, comprehensive strategy and planning reviews or documents. (Table B-4) Such annual or periodic reviews and documents would serve to clarify agency roles and facilitate agency planning and mission integration. The proposals usually call for modeling the documents after improved versions of the President's National Security Strategy Report and the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Some proposals explicitly tie the creation of new strategy documents to the development of national security budgets. There also are a variety of other proposals to rationalize strategy development and planning capabilities and processes by creating new posts, mechanisms, procedures, or practices to facilitate coordination and oversight (Table B-5).

In an Obama Administration effort to integrate plans and budgets, Secretary of State Clinton said that Chiefs of Mission will play a role in integrating country-level strategic plans and budgets. At a February 2, 2011, meeting of Ambassadors (billed as the first annual Chief of Mission conference) the Secretary stated, "Each chief of mission will be responsible for overseeing an integrated country strategy that will bring together all country-level planning processes and efforts into one single multiyear overarching strategy that encapsulates U.S. policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them."¹¹⁹

Integrate National Security Budgets or Improve Budgeting Procedures

Another significant perceived system deficiency is the current practice of budgeting by agency rather than by mission or goal. Many proposals would integrate agency budgets relevant to national security, either as a whole or for a specific sector (Table B-6). Others seek to improve the budgeting process (Table B-7).

The concept of an integrated national security budget dates back at least to the 2001 U.S. Commission on National Security. The Commission faulted the budgeting process for its failure to make clear how the allocation of resources in agency budgets addressed national security goals, and to systematically consider tradeoffs in the allocation of those resources. It also noted the problem for congressional oversight from the absence of a unified budget. "At present, therefore, neither the Congress nor the American people can assess the relative value of various national security programs over the full range of Executive Branch activities in this area."¹²⁰ Budgeting by agency can lead to duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in others, as well as incoherent budget information on activities and missions undertaken by multiple agencies.

Preparation of a full scale integrated budget would be a complex undertaking. It would involve the pragmatic exercise of bringing intellectual rigor to the concepts and programs involved. Potentially, it could also involve bureaucratic challenges over the appropriate allocation of missions, programs, and funds.

Perhaps because of the complexity of preparing a fully integrated national security budget, the Commission on National Security proposed that the first of them "focus on a few of the nation's most critical strategic goals, involving only some programs in the departmental budgets." (The first strategic areas the Commission proposed for the initial document were homeland security, counterterrorism, nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, and science and technology.) Eventually, the Commission stated, the national security budget "could evolve into a more comprehensive document."¹²² That complexity may also explain why subsequent recommendations called for sector-specific integrated budgets or budget presentations (with proposals limited to security assistance, or counterterrorism), or greater transparency and combined decision-making on State, USAID, and DOD budgets in areas of overlap.

Whether an integrated national security budget or integrated sector specific budgets will increase government efficiency and effectiveness may depend on what is meant by the term "integrated." The budget exercise of providing information on all U.S. national security accounts in one document may well bring more transparency. Funding could be totaled by mission areas, providing a comprehensive view of U.S. government spending in vital areas, such as counterterrorism, that is not now available. This could facilitate oversight. However, to achieve efficiencies and increase effectiveness by coordinating programs through shared cross-agency accounts may involve other changes. Reform of strategy and planning structures may be required to manage "blended" funds. Another drawback mentioned by some analysts are possible complications for Congress in handling integrated budgets under its current department and agency-centric committee system.¹²³

The Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) provides Congress, through the Joint Select Committee on intelligence, with an opportunity to view the defense and international affairs budgets as a whole. This legislation consolidates the DOD, State Department, and USAID budgets, as well as others, under a comprehensive "security" category.¹²⁴ This type of exercise in considering overlapping defense and international affairs spending may produce useful insights for future budget integration.

The Obama Administration has endorsed the idea of establishing a full integrated national security budget and is taking preliminary steps to achieve that goal. In a May 2010 speech, Secretary of State Clinton noted that the Administration wanted "to begin to talk about a national security budget ... [where] you can see the tradeoffs and the savings." The December 2010 QDDR, as mentioned above, signals the Administration's intent to advance the discussion. A first step proposed in the QDDR was the pooled DOD-State Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF).¹²⁵ In December 2011, Congress provided authority for the GSCF in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207, H.R. 1540, P.L. 112-81, signed into law December 31, 2011).¹²⁶ Proposed by the State Department as a three-year pilot project, the fund may make clear the degree to which associated changes are needed.

Appendix C. Proposals to Enhance Civilian Authority, Institutional Arrangements, and Resources for Interagency Missions Abroad

The predominant role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in missions and activities that some policymakers and experts (including some DOD and military leaders) argue would be better placed in civilian hands is often attributed to the weaknesses of civilian institutions and leadership. The weaknesses cited include inadequate authority, inappropriate structures, and insufficient civilian resources, especially personnel. Most of the studies surveyed for this report judged that leaving many of the "nation-building" or "state-building" tasks that DOD has assumed in military hands is problematic. (See the section, above, entitled "To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building Capabilities?") As a result, improvements to the existing civilian institutions and institutional authorities of the national security system, particularly the Department of State and its Secretary, have been the mainstay of many recommendations for interagency reform.

Most often, the Secretary of State leads civilian efforts in missions and activities abroad, but, on occasion, the President looks elsewhere for a leader. The civilian alternatives to leadership by the Secretary of State and the State Department for interagency missions have also been viewed by some as unsatisfactory.

Over the years, Presidents have routinely turned to the appointment of "czars" to head interagency efforts in a large number of areas of interagency cooperation. Although their offices offer a venue for interagency operations, the czars themselves often have not possessed the authority or ability to coordinate interagency operations.¹²⁷ Further, some Members view "czars" as lacking accountability to Congress; the 112^th Congress expressly denied the Administration authority to fund such offices. (President Obama rejected the prohibition as an unconstitutional intrusion on executive branch prerogatives.)¹²⁸

For certain activities and missions, Presidents may appoint "lead agencies" to coordinate interagency efforts. But lead agencies, including the Department of State when it plays this role, are often viewed as ineffective because their mandates to coordinate activities are not accompanied by the requisite authority and resources. Also, in some cases the lead agency's agenda and underlying assumptions may not square with those of other agencies. Thus, civilian agencies often have no incentive to divert personnel and funding for programs that do not further their core functions or otherwise serve their interests.¹²⁹

Proposals to enhance civilian authority and institutions are numerous. Many proposals focus on increasing State Department capacity and authority (Table C-1, Table C-2); others would transfer some State Department stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) functions elsewhere (Table C-3). Others would create new institutions or structures for S&R and other missions abroad (Table C-4), create interagency task forces (Table C-5), enhance civilian regional presence (Table C-6, Table C-7), and increase civilian interagency personnel capacity (Table C-8, Table C-9, Table C-10).

Obama Administration interagency reform plans and actions include (1) creating two new bureaus, one for conflict and stabilization operations and the other for counterterrorism; (2) establishing regional hubs; (3) better supporting the military Geographic Combatant Commands; and (4) increasing civilian personnel. These are discussed below. (Plans to enhance Chief of Mission authority are discussed in Appendix D.)

Enhance State Department Authority and Capacity

The Secretary of State is formally the lead civilian official for developing and implementing foreign policy and, through a patchwork of statutes and executive orders, has authority for a variety of ancillary roles. (See Appendix A.) The Secretary's ability to carry out all her responsibilities is severely constrained by a lack of appropriate authorities and organizational structures, adequate numbers of personnel with the appropriate skills, and a sufficient budget, according to many analysts. There is particular concern that the Department of State does not possess the capacity to take the lead in three key areas: counterterrorism, security assistance, and stabilization and reconstruction. In all three areas, Congress has been willing to provide DOD with authority and resources to carry out missions.

Several of the studies surveyed recommend a wide variety of ways to enhance the State Department's ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct interagency missions and activities. These include a new authorities, new procedures, restructuring, and the cultivation of an "operational" ethos for interagency missions (Table C-1). The State Department's ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct S&R missions is of particular concern, and several recommendations were specifically targeted at improving S&R capacity (Table C-2).

In 2011, the Obama Administration elevated the status and expanded the functions of two State Department offices coordinating interagency efforts: the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT). As proposed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense and Diplomacy Review (QDDR) and implemented after consultation with Congress, the Obama Administration created a new Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Bureau (incorporating S/CRS) and a new Counterterrorism Bureau.

On the other hand, some analysts would neither expand nor enhance the State Department's stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) role. They view the State Department's culture, rooted in its core mission of diplomacy, as an insurmountable barrier that no restructuring, increases in personnel, or additional budgetary resources could overcome. Because an agency's core mission shapes recruitment and promotion selection criteria, some analysts argue that the State Department will never make effective use of personnel skilled at planning and conducting operational missions. Some of these analysts also doubt the State Department's ability to effectively oversee missions to prevent and manage conflict. Instead, they would build up the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or create a new agency to manage operational and preventive missions¹³⁰ (Table C-3).

Create New Agencies, Arrangements, Authorities

Recently, concerns about the gaps in civilian structures to coordinate interagency missions—both steady state and extraordinary—have led some to argue for new arrangements at the national, regional, and field levels. At the national level, some argue for new S&R institutions or arrangements, independent of existing departments and agencies.

Some have advocated the use of various interagency task forces, informed by the lessons learned from the various permanent and temporary U.S. government tasks forces, as the means to provide both much needed capacity, flexibility, and adaptability to respond to emerging situations. Some argue for improved regional arrangements.

Create New Structures or Arrangements for S&R and Other Overseas Missions

In addition to reforms proposed for the NSC (discussed above), several organizations and experts have recommended a reorganization of current responsibilities for dealing with fragile states, for preventing, managing, resolving conflict, or for operational missions abroad in general (Table C-4). Some proposals would redistribute S&R responsibilities, enhancing the role of USAID or incorporating its offices into new combined State-USAID units.¹³¹ Those who propose enhancing USAID's position in S&R structures generally judge its agency focus and culture to be better suited to the operational nature of S&R missions than those of the State Department. Two would create an independent S&R agency; one would make it responsible to the Secretary of State (CSIS 2005), the other to the NSC (Special Inspector General for Iraq, or SIGIR, 2010). SIGIR argues that a new agency "would streamline decision-making and eliminate the 'lead agency' dilemma" that hinders interagency cooperation.¹³² The Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011(H.R. 3660, introduced December 14, 2011) would create a new independent entity, the United States Office for Contingency Operations, reporting to the Department of State and DOD. H.R. 3660 proposes that the functions, personnel, and assets of S/CRS, and the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, as well certain other S&R functions, personnel, and assets of State, USAID, DOD, and other agencies, be transferred to this new office.

Establish New Interagency Teams or Task Forces?

Proposals to create new agencies or other arrangements that entail new structures may well be costly, the source of a wide variety of unintended consequences, and subject to bureaucratic infighting. For those reasons, many may prefer the proposals to improve civilian coordination efforts through the tool of improved interagency teams (Table C-5). There are a variety of interagency teams for missions abroad and domestic matters, as noted above (Appendix A), but information about how they function are notably lacking.¹³⁴ Some may consider teams yet another "ad hoc" mechanism, providing a seeming flexibility at the cost of making the structural and capacity changes needed to create an enduring system for interagency cooperation. Some may view their prospects for success as subject to the same bureaucratic obstacles—resistance to sharing responsibilities, personnel, and resources—as the development of other new interagency structures.

Improve Regional Structures and Capacity?

A variety of proposals have called for improving regional structures and capacity, either by enhancing the current military Geographic Combatant Commands or by creating new civilian regional arrangements. Especially since 9/11, many analysts perceive that the threats to the United States emanating from non-state actors and the spill-over effects of conflict in one country to its neighbors often demand a regional policy response. Because of its robust military regional commands but relatively weak civilian regional structures, some analysts question whether the United States brings the appropriate leaders to the table for decision-making on regional issues and integrates civilian and military resources to respond effectively.

Enhance the Military Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)

Most reform at the regional level to date has focused on enhancing the GCCs.¹³⁵ The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), created in 2008 as a model for interagency organization as mentioned above, set the standard for civilian integration into military geographic commands. However, there has been continued work to improve the model, and about the time that command was created, RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy offered further suggestions for enhancing civilian input into GCCs, as well as other DOD units (Table C-6). Nonetheless, some analysts are skeptical that combatant commands will be able to attract sufficient personnel from civilian agencies to operate with the degree of interagency integration originally envisioned for AFRICOM.

The Obama Administration pledged in the QDDR to support GCCs in a number of ways: making available senior Ambassador-ranked personnel as civilian deputies in addition to existing Foreign Policy Advisors, providing USAID high-level development advisors where appropriate, and, "consistent with personnel availability," detailing mid to senior-level State and USAID personnel to GCCs.¹³⁶

Create New Civilian Regional Structures

A few analysts advocate creating new civilian regional structures (Table C-7). Some would make the military commands subordinate to them. While none of the think tank studies surveyed for this report advanced proposals for civilian regional "command," one study by an Air Force officer argues for new State Department-led regional-level interagency organizations.¹³⁷ Two experts on interagency organization propose that Chief of Mission authority be expanded to provide appropriate leadership for civilian-led interagency teams that could be used at the regional level, as well as elsewhere.

The Obama Administration, in the 2010 QDDR, states its intention to establish "regional hubs" in some embassies, creating a home base for personnel dedicated to regional programs in cross-cutting issue areas who will travel to posts throughout the region (Table C-7). This is a key reform in its plan to improve the State Department and USAID ability "to think and act regionally."¹³⁸

The QDDR states that regional hubs will offer "cost savings over deploying such experts to every bilateral mission."¹³⁹ In a related action, the Administration stated it would improve regional communication among bilateral posts. It would also create a new State Department "regional forum" under the State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs, where representatives from relevant agencies would "meet regularly to coordinate regional initiatives and proposals."¹⁴⁰

Review and Augment Civilian Personnel Authority and Capacity

Only a few studies surveyed here have explicitly recommended reviewing or increasing civilian personnel authorities and capacity. Some recommendations concerned State Department and USAID personnel (Table C-8), some concerned interagency personnel in general (Table C-9), and some concerned the interagency civilian response corps (Table C-10). Nevertheless, the need for an expansion of civilian personnel involved in national security missions—especially State Department and USAID personnel—has been an implicit part of the entire interagency reform discussion. For many analysts, a primary goal is for the civilian agencies to emulate the DOD practice of hiring enough personnel to provide a "float," that is, sufficient excess capacity to allow personnel to engage periodically in interagency education and training without creating vacancies at posts.

The Obama Administration's "Diplomacy 3.0" hiring plan to increase the number of State Department Foreign Service and Civil Service and USAID personnel is intended to provide such a float. According to a recent report, for the Foreign Service Officer corps, the State Department's goal is a 15% float, equivalent to that of the U.S. military.¹⁴¹

Appendix D. Proposals to Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors

As the key locus of interagency coordination for steady state operations, the Embassy country teams under the leadership of an Ambassador (or other official delegated Chief of Mission authority) are uniquely responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. Given the great disparities that observers note in ambassadors' skills and knowledge to manage country teams and oversee the foreign assistance operations of an embassy, improving Chief of Mission (COM) capacity is crucial, according to many analysts.

For those who view the "country teams" as the key element in diplomacy and foreign assistance in most circumstances, enhancing an Ambassador's authority, capacity, and control over funding is crucial. Some perceive this step as not only vital, but as an alternative to creating new structures. Over the years, there have been far fewer proposals to augment the authority and capacity of U.S. Ambassadors than for other aspects of interagency reform, and all are relatively recent.

New or improved authority is viewed by some as but one possible step in increasing the capacity of U.S. Ambassadors to carry out their responsibility for coordinating foreign policy and foreign assistance (Table D-1). Other possible steps are selecting potential Ambassadors and others in line for Chief of Mission posts for interagency experience, expertise, and inclination, and providing such personnel with adequate training in interagency matters (Table D-2). Some may wish for progress at standardizing the education and training of potential ambassadors, and vetting candidates for skills at interagency collaboration and coordination, before enhancing ambassadors' authority over interagency resources.

Proposals to increase COM authority over budgets related to embassy operations and over interagency personnel may be resisted by executive branch agencies. Some may question whether attention to interagency reform at the COM level is sufficient, particularly because many current problems are not bilateral, but require regional or global level attention. Table D-3 presents a unique option to expand COM authority in order to provide COMs with the power to lead, as "mission managers," interagency functional or regional teams or task forces.

Some analysts are skeptical that new or improved authorities, structures, systems, training, or selection criteria per se will help an Ambassador overcome the pulls of agency interests and pressures on a country team if that Ambassador does not have support at appropriate times of officials in Washington. A key failing of the system, in the opinion of some analysts, can be the disregard of Ambassadors' authority and expertise within the State Department itself, and a lack of direct support for an Ambassador's position when necessary.

The Obama Administration has announced its plans to strengthen the ability of Ambassadors and other COMS to perform their role. The State Department/USAID 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) casts Ambassadors as Chief Executive Officers or "CEOs" of multi-agency missions, not only conducting traditional diplomacy, but also leading and overseeing civilians from multiple federal agencies in other work.¹⁴³ The QDDR highlights the key role of country teams and Ambassadors in the conduct of foreign policy and assistance, and sets forth ways in which the Obama Administration will try to improve the knowledge and skills of COMs and their ability to lead country teams. Civilian agencies "possess some of the world's leading expertise on issues increasingly central to our diplomacy and development work,"¹⁴⁴ the QDDR states. "The United States benefits when government agencies can combine their expertise overseas as part of an integrated country strategy," when "implemented under Chief of Mission authority, and when those agencies build lasting working relationships with their foreign counterparts."¹⁴⁵

As discussed in Appendix B, Secretary of State Clinton has announced that Chiefs of Mission are to play a role in integrating country-level strategic plans and budgets.

The authors of the proposal in Table D-3 predict that implementing it would be bureaucratically contentious, but would "facilitate clear roles and missions," empower good leaders "to be more consistently effective," and provide those charged with "weighty responsibilities" with "commensurate authority."¹⁴⁶ Such an expanded COM authority could provide the President with an additional tool to use for interagency national security missions abroad. It could be used to address the gap, noted in Appendix C, in civilian regional authority. It could also provide an alternative to appointing "czars" or lead agencies. Some might argue that it could replace the need for revising structures and augmenting capabilities at the NSC, as it might alleviate burdens there, or at State Department or other civilian agencies. Nevertheless, as the authors note, it might be subject to bureaucratic pressures. Other analysts might argue that the proposal only adds a new layer of "adhockery" to the national security system.

Appendix E. Proposals to Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms

The current interagency personnel system has few incentives, but many disincentives for U.S. civilian personnel to behave in ways that are conducive to interagency collaboration and coordination. Some civilian personnel may seek interagency missions as important and interesting work, attracted by the challenges of working under difficult conditions where innovation is required. Nevertheless, agencies do not encourage personnel to engage in interagency missions, according to many sources. Agencies generally feel that they are short on personnel for their core missions and generally do not wish to spare many people for interagency activities. Some analysts point to the difficulties that State Department Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) and the Geographic Combatant Commands have had in attracting civilian personnel from other agencies as a result of that disinclination. In addition, according to some analysts, agencies do not structure their personnel evaluation and promotion systems to provide credit for interagency work. Systems may penalize those who seek interagency operations because they have not advanced steadily up the agency's career ladder.

Compounding the problem of agency disincentives are the cultural problems that can unnecessarily complicate interagency work. The great differences between the military and civilian cultures are often noted, but there are also significant differences among civilian agencies' cultures, for example, the perception of a fast-response operational culture within USAID compared to a slower, reflective State Department culture based upon its reporting and diplomacy functions—thus making certain agencies more suitable than others for some tasks. Others believe that the cultures can change over time, given the appropriate training and incentives for interagency missions. Meantime, some consider efforts to assist with helping personnel engaged in interagency missions to understand the cultures of other agencies an important interim step.

Proposals for personnel reform are intended not only to provide incentives for interagency work, but establish the shared knowledge, skills, vision, and trust that some analysts argue is necessary for effective interagency performance.¹⁴⁸ Many analysts consider the 1986 "Goldwater-Nichols" Act a model for the type of fundamental reforms needed to create a productive interagency environment. In October 1986, recognizing that the inability of the four U.S. Armed Forces to work together effectively was jeopardizing military operations, Congress passed the bipartisan Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433).¹⁴⁹ Among other reforms, this act created more powerful incentives for officers to broaden their experience by seeking formal education and assignments in an inter-service environment with the objective of creating a "joint" culture.

Key among the Goldwater-Nichols changes were a requirement for joint education and training,¹⁵⁰ safeguards to protect officers with "joint" experience to ensure they would be treated on a par with those without such experience, and a joint service requirement for promotion to general or flag officer rank.¹⁵¹ These reforms set the basis for inter-service cooperation and the evolution of "joint" military rather than service-specific loyalties and a "joint" culture.

Some argue that Congress should provide similar legislation for civilian personnel, linking interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications and rewards (Table E-5, Table E-6), as well as mandating and providing funds for additional education and training (Table E-7) and interagency rotations (Table E-8). Congress might also provide for increases in personnel to allow civilian agencies to create such opportunities while, like the military, maintaining full strength for core missions (Table E-4). (A key difference between military and civilian personnel systems is the DOD excess capacity of about 10% more personnel than needed for day-to-day operations, known as the "float," to accommodate regular periods of education and training, among other service-related needs.) Congress could similarly mandate changes in training and education systems by establishing new schools or providing funds for increased interagency coursework at others (Table E-10, Table E-11). Others propose that Congress establish a national interagency professional corps, cadres, career track (Table E-1) or senior executive service corps or cadre (Table E-4 ), and protect interagency personnel during political transitions (Table E-9).

In the area of interagency personnel reform, the Obama Administration is slowly advancing the Bush Administration's National Security Professional Development program, which seeks to expand interagency education, training, and rotations. (Discussed below in the section on establishing a national security interagency corps, cadre, career track, or executive service, and referred to in Table E-2.)

Legislation currently before Congress, the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314), would expand opportunities for interagency experience.

Establish a National Interagency Professional Corps, Cadre, Career Track, or Executive Service

The most far-reaching recommended changes to the current personnel system involve proposals to establish a national security corps or cadre (Table E-1). A special corps or cadre, proponents argue, would foster the development of a group of federal employees whose loyalties are not principally to an agency or department, as has been the case until now, but to the other people and entities devoted to interagency missions. Although proponents believe that these proposals hold great promise for transforming the United States' ability to perform interagency missions, they may also be the most costly, involving the creation of new units and management structures. Depending on how the corps or cadre was structured and manned, these proposals may meet bureaucratic impediments.

Some proposals would continue efforts to build an interagency cadre based on the existing National Security Professional Development program (Table E-2). This program was established in 2007 by the Bush Administration under Executive Order 13434. It called for each agency with a national security function to create a program of interagency education, training, and rotations for its personnel. The program soon stagnated. In its 2010 report, the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) cited several reasons for that stagnation: (1) sporadic leadership to improve human capital systems, (2) a lack of authority to direct an overall program, (3) unclear roles and responsibilities, (4) no common lexicon and poor communication among programs, (5) no direct funding source, (6) no defined metrics for system evaluation, and (7) a lack of coordinated congressional oversight.¹⁵² Some skeptics judge such agency-centric efforts unlikely to surmount numerous resource allocation and cultural issues.

Early in his term, President Obama directed the NSC's National Security Staff to "reinvigorate" the National Security Professional Development program. Since then, 19 executive departments have participated in NSC-led efforts to define and draft a guiding strategy.¹⁵³ The long-run goal, according to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), is to form a cadre of interagency professionals. As of 2011, the Obama Administration has launched a second iteration of this professional development program. This iteration is focusing on a single pilot program to enhance interagency cooperation in Emergency Management, leaving aside for the moment efforts to further develop interagency professionals for other national security matters. (Further information on Obama Administration activities can be found in CRS Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], pp. 17-21.)

Related proposals call for the development of a special interagency career track within individual agencies and departments (Table E-3). Although participating personnel would remain with their agency or department, they would be considered "interagency" personnel available to be tasked for interagency missions. Advocates argue that as specially trained and experienced personnel, attuned to the capabilities and cultures of other agencies and the requirements of interagency missions, individuals in this career track would be effective in such missions at carrying out their roles, coordinating their activities with others, and representing their agencies. On the other hand, without the provision of an excess capacity "float," such a career track may well encounter bureaucratic resistance, as funding personnel in that track might divert agency funding from core missions. In addition, such "interagency" personnel may be perceived as secondary citizens within their home agencies, which still are dominated by people devoted to the core functions.

A third set of proposals regards the creation of a senior executive interagency leadership cadre of personnel versed in the requirements of interagency missions (Table E-4). Again, the effectiveness of members of this cadre may depend not only on their interagency experience and expertise, but also their ability to maintain close relationships with their home bureaus and departments when deployed.

These proposals may all require new institutional arrangements. If personnel were to be grouped in new units formed outside existing agencies, they would require new budgets. Even if incorporated into existing agencies, the ability of such personnel to perform their tasks may well benefit from the establishment of separate budget lines, so that funds do not have to be squeezed from core functions to accomplish interagency missions.

Link Interagency Education, Training, and Experience to Job Qualifications, Opportunities, and Promotion.

Proposals to link interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications, opportunities, and promotions (Table E-5, and for senior leaders specifically Table E-6) would be the most akin to the changes in the military personnel system mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. As a result of changes initiated in 1986 under this act, soldiers, sailors, and airman remain in and retain their loyalties to their service, but enjoy opportunities for inter-service education and experience. Further, inter-service education and experience is required for their promotion to senior levels. These "joint" inter-service opportunities are widely viewed as contributing to continuing improvements in military missions.

Nevertheless, for civilian personnel, the proposals are not always accompanied by the types of structural changes that also were legislated by Goldwater-Nichols, that is, the development of the inter-service Combatant Commands that plan, organize, and conduct all military activities and operations aside from service-specific personnel training and education. Also, given that analysts view the development of a joint service culture as still a work in progress, some may question whether such education, training, and experience opportunities are sufficient to create cohesive interagency units. Still, these practices may break down misconceptions and prejudices and help individuals understand the capabilities and operating cultures of other agencies, facilitating interagency relations at the field level, where analysts say many problems are worked out, even if they are not likely to create new loyalties and overcome "stove-piping."

Expand Opportunities, Requirements, and Incentives for Interagency Education, Training and Professional Experience

Over the years, many analysts have viewed enhancing interagency education and training (Table E-7) and rotations (Table E-8), as basic steps to more effective interagency missions. Some also find a need to protect interagency personnel during political transitions (Table E-9).

Enhance Existing or Create New Education and Training Institutions

A few organizations have championed the idea of creating entirely new education and training institutions (Table E-10). Others have argued for incorporating new courses and curricula into existing institutions (Table E-11). Several U.S. government or government-funded institutions have inaugurated or increased interagency coursework; these include the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and the National Defense University (NDU), as well as the Naval Post Graduate School, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).¹⁵⁴ Some analysts judge these offerings still insufficient and urge continued work on expanding the curriculum at all institutions. Some would also try to tap into coursework at state and private educational institutions and consider whether such institutions might be encouraged to offer comprehensive coursework to meet the full range of interagency practitioner needs.

Footnotes

1.	Identical bills for The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 were introduced in 2011: S. 1268, introduced by Senator Lieberman and H.R. 2314, introduced by Representatives Davis and Tierney. S. 1268 was passed by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on October 20, 2011. For details on these bills, see CRS Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
2.	The Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act of 2011, H.R. 3660, introduced December 14, 2011, would transfer specified stabilization and reconstruction functions, personnel, and assets of the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and other agencies to a new, independent entity, the United States Office for Contingency Operations, which would report to the State Department and DOD.
3.	Identical versions of legislation to create a Global Security Contingency Fund were contained in Section 1204, H.R. 1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as passed by the House on May 26, 2011, and Section 924, H.R. 2583, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2012, as passed by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on July 21, 2011. A different version was reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 22, 2011, as Section 1207, S. 1253, FY2012 NDAA. Congress passed a third version as Section 1207 of H.R. 1540, the FY2012 NDAA, which was signed into law on December 31, 2011 (P.L. 112-81).
4.	For instance, the September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), issued just two weeks after the terrorist attacks on the United States known as 9/11, featured two emergent elements in the U.S. security environment. These were: (1) increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states, and (2) the diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. In the September 2002 National Security Strategy, the George W. Bush Administration emphasized the need to "transform America's national security institution," stating that the "major institutions of American security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of them must be transformed." By the time the Bush Administration issued its 2006 QDR , the need for interagency reform had become a central tenant of U.S. thinking about national security. "The Department of Defense cannot meet today's complex challenges alone," that QDR stated. "Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad." (Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 5; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 29, and Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 83.) For a summary of the 2010 QDR's depiction of future challenges, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning, by [author name scrubbed].
5.	For more on S/CRS and the development of civilian stabilization capabilities, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by [author name scrubbed].
6.	This concern is voiced by policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum and by military and DOD leaders as well. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Michael Mullen (now retired) reportedly stated in March 2010: "My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren't moving fast enough [to invest in civilian departments]....U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our overseas commands and not enough on the State Department." This quote is taken from news reports about his March 3, 2010 Landon Lecture at the University of Kansas; it does not appear in the prepared text and remarks published on the CJCS website.
7.	This background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn in part from a now archived CRS Report RS22031, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and from CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by [author name scrubbed].
8.	For a conceptual overview of this topic, see CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
9.	The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive. May 1997. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
10.	See Michele A. Poole, "Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations: The Impact of Presidential Decision Directive 56", (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001). The Clinton Administration also attempted to remedy the shortage of one critical nation-building tool—international civilian police forces—through PDD 71, which sets forth policy guidelines for strengthening foreign criminal justice systems in support of peace operations. (U.S. Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24, 2000 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-4.htm, hereinafter referred to as PDD-71 White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 71, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm.) This too encountered bureaucratic resistance.
11.	Richard Weitz, "Interagency Problems and Proposals: A Research Review," in Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), pp. 261-262.
12.	Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, co-chairs, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report, January 31, 2001, p. 47. Hereinafter cited as Road Map for National Security.
13.	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, December 2004 (hereinafter referred to as Transitions); and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD, September 2005 (hereinafter referred to as Institutionalizing Stability Operations.). The Defense Science Board, established in 1956, is a prestigious standing committee of about forty members—civilians and retired military—selected for leadership in science and technology, and its application to military requirements. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb The Board reports directly to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
14.	Robert H. Hunter, principal author, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, RAND and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. xix. Hereinafter referred to as Integrating Instruments of Power.
15.	DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05 can be read at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf. (DODD 3000.05 was subsequently reissued as DOD Instruction, 3000.05, September 16, 2009.) For an account of the events leading up to DODD 3000.05 and its major provisions, see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by [author name scrubbed]. One proposal not adopted was the Defense Science Board (DSB) 2005 recommendation to create a position of Under Secretary for Stability Operations. Instead, there is a stability operations office under the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC).
16.	Office of the President, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National Security Presidential Directive 44, December 2005. This directive stated: "it is the policy [of] the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies."
17.	For background and origins, see CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions, by [author name scrubbed].
18.	Executive Order 13434 stated: "it is the policy [of] the United States to promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive departments and agencies." For more information on this program and subsequent action on national security personnel preparation, see CRS Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
19.	President Obama's January 25, 2011 State of the Union Speech can be accessed through the White House website at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
20.	See, U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at Kansas State University, Manhattan, KA (the "Landon Lecture"), November 26, 2007 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1199, hereinafter cited as Gates' Landon Lecture, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at the AFRICOM Activation Ceremony, Washington, DC, October 1, 2008 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid= 1281; and U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C, February 24, 2010 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425.
21.	The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 14.
22.	Ibid.
23.	Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 2. Hereinafter referred to as QDR. For a discussion of the QDR, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for National Security Planning, by [author name scrubbed]. Also see CRS Report RL34505, National Security Strategy: Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
24.	U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 15, 2010. Henceforth referred to as QDDR. (For more information on the QDDR, see CRS Report R41173, Foreign Aid Reform, National Strategy, and the Quadrennial Review, by [author name scrubbed].) The QDDR document further points to relations with other agencies, private contractors, and state and local governments: "More specifically, State will enter into interagency agreements, consistent with existing law, to draw on the skills, expertise and personnel of other federal agencies before turning to private contractors where State determines that building in-house government capability or promoting bilateral working relationships furthers our foreign policy priorities. For certain core functions, State will also establish a presumption to enter into agreements to draw on other agencies and state and local government, where appropriate, to implement State programs overseas.... State will use private contractors for non-governmental functions when other agencies lack appropriate skills or are otherwise unwilling or unable to provide the services needed in an effective manner." Pp. 33-34.
25.	Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, Report required by Section 1049, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, P.L. 110-181, Arlington, VA, November 2008. Hereinafter cited as PNSR 2008. PNSR found the mob scene phenomenon "especially [prevalent] in our attempts to manage the numerous so-called 'soft-powers' resident in diverse organizations within the federal government." p. 517.
26.	The Government Accountability Office provides an overview of the issues in National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, GAO-10-822T, June 9, 2010. This document categorizes the problems somewhat differently than this report. Its categories are: (1) developing and implementing overarching, integrated strategies to achieve national security objectives; (2) creating collaborative organizations that facilitate integrated national security approaches; (3) developing a well-trained workforce; (4) sharing and integrating national security information across agencies; and (5) importance of sustained leadership.
27.	Many civilian departments and agencies play a role in the missions and activities covered by this report. More than a dozen civilian executive branch departments and agencies may be involved in stabilization and reconstruction missions and other national security activities abroad. As most would expect, these include the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency. Others are the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Heath and Human Services, Transportation, and Treasury, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
28.	For more information on the National Security Council (NSC), see Appendix A and CRS Report RL30840, The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, by [author name scrubbed]
29.	Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 232.
30.	U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Initial Perspectives, committee print, prepared by Panel on Roles and Missions, 110th Cong., 1st sess., January 2008, H.Prt.110-7 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 48.
31.	PNSR 2008, Executive Summary, p. i. The NDAA for FY2008, P.L. 110-181, Section 1049, authorized up to $3 million for the study.
32.	Scott R. Feil, "The Failure of Incrementalism: Interagency Coordination Challenges and Responses," in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, ed. Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 286. Other Bush Administration initiatives Feil cited were National Security Presidential Directive 44, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, and then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's "transformational diplomacy."
33.	PNSR's revised recommendations in September 2009 focused on building blocks to reform that could be taken without legislation, to accelerate progress towards holistic reform. Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas into Action, September 2009, p. iii. Hereinafter referred to as PNSR 2009.
34.	The terms "collaboration" and 'coordination" are often used interchangeably. A CRS report discusses and illustrates the strict meaning of these terms: collaboration applies to agencies working together under voluntary arrangements while coordination is used when there is a lead official or agency with formal authority to instruct, direct, or order other members. (See CRS Report R41803, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales, Considerations , by [author name scrubbed].) This report will adhere to these definitions in the CRS text. The term "cooperation," as used here, includes both collaboration and cooperation. Where "coordination" is used in quotes from or references to the works consulted for this report, the term may not be used in its strict sense.
35.	U.S. Peacefare, pp. 85-86.
36.	Shawn Zeller, "Who's in Charge Here?," Foreign Service Journal, December 2007, p. 21. The article quotes Ambassador Charles A. "Tony" Gillespie Jr., former Ambassador to Chile, Colombia, and Grenada: "It's awfully easy for someone back in Washington, in Justice or Agriculture, just to pick up the phone and tell a person to go and do something.... The challenge is to make sure the voice of the United States is consistent and to make sure that agency heads understand that they are supposed to let the ambassador know of their programs and give him a chance to weigh in. Otherwise it's very easy for someone in Washington to treat the embassy as their own foreign office." (pp. 21-22)
37.	Author's interview (Serafino), October 2011.
38.	See Stewart Patrick. Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of "Spillovers." Working Paper No. 73, Center for Global Development, January 2006, and Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006.
39.	QDR, p. 5.
40.	QDR, p. 20.
41.	Rajan Menon, "Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment," as reproduced in U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction: Final Report. 2008, pp. 80-81. For a short discussion of the elements contributing to the successful occupations in Japan and Germany, often not present elsewhere, see CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in Japan and Germany, by [author name scrubbed].
42.	James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, and Keith Crane, et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxxvi. The cases examined were the Belgium Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq.
43.	In an analysis of seven U.S. military interventions with nation-building objectives, RAND authors argue that a minimum of five years is necessary to produce even initial results. "The record suggest that, while staying long does not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in less than five years." James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, and Keith Crane, et al., America's Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxiv.
44.	Under the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. government has advanced its instruments for assessing and organizing interagency responses to conflict, in particular the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), developed by USAID and S/CRS, and the Interagency Management System (IMS), developed by S/CRS. These tools have not, however, been used consistently or systematically, according to practitioners. Reflecting on the ability of the U.S. government and the international community to deal with conflict, S/CRS acting director Robert Loftis stated that "Ideally, U.S. engagements will improve across time, tempered by testing assumptions, building knowledge, refuting simplistic models of what causes violence and replacing them with strategies built on real experience.... We cannot solve these problems alone or for the countries we aim to help. But we can improve our ability to work at the margins." Transcript provided to CRS of remarks for delivery at George Mason University, August 10, 2011, p. 7.
45.	QDR, see pp 17, 20, and 26.
46.	"As our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, sustainable outcomes require civilian development and governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. Although the U.S. military can and should have the expertise and capacity to conduct these activities, civilian leadership of humanitarian assistance, development, and governance is essential." QDR, p. 69.
47.	QDR, p. 69.
48.	"The Department will retain capabilities designed to support civilian authorities as needed." QDR, p. 1.
49.	DODD 3000.05. Point 4.3: "Many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so."
50.	For instance, the Army created a Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, http://pksoi.army.mi/, the services and JCS invested considerable effort in developing multiple doctrine and other manuals for stability operations, and military training centers developed new training scenarios for stability operations.
51.	In its 2004 report, Transitions, the Defense Science Board urged Congress to adopt the legislation proposed by Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator, now Vice President Joe Biden establishing the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The following year, in a prepared statement for congressional testimony in February 2005, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers cited the creation of S/CRS as an important step and stated that if it were "given appropriate resources, it will synchronize military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping, reconstruction and stability operations." Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted at that time on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.
52.	Institutionalizing Stability Operations, p. 24. This option is not included in the tables of proposals because it concerns DOD organization.
53.	Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2009, p. 64. (Hereinafter cited as Improving Capacity for S&R.) The quote continues: Such developments would send a powerful signal worldwide that the United States views stabilization and reconstruction as defense tasks rather than as components of its broader foreign policy. This would strengthen perceptions that the United States considers the military its primary instrument of power; it could also make stabilization, reconstruction, and other development efforts appear subsidiary to military missions. p. 65.
54.	"The United States would also face difficulty working with NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and IOs [international organizations]around the world, which would distrust the military's leadership of such missions. It would also make it more difficult during such operations for the U.S. government to coordinate with governments whose civilians take the lead.... With NGOs and IOs distrustful, other civilian specialists likely questioning the mission, and State and USAID capacity dwindling as resources flow to DoD, stabilization and reconstruction efforts would be undertaken without appropriate information and guidance. Moreover, because warfighting will remain the primary mission of DoD, development tasks would probably be aligned to advance military goals rather than be the objectives in themselves." Improving Capacity for S&R, p. 65.
55.	The proposals surveyed for this report deal in differing degrees with the specific reform elements, and do not provide a concrete guide to ascertaining relative utility and priority. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the largest number of recommendations concerned enhancing interagency training, education, and rotations, and the second largest concerned modifying NSC responsibilities or structures. Of course, the number of recommendations in each category would vary according to the sources selected. However, this selection includes many sources that could be expected to be common to most lists.
56.	The 2006 QDR judges the field level as integral to the development and conduct of interagency missions: "Solutions developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with common challenges in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and seamlessly to achieve team objectives." p. 85.
57.	James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, "Mismanaging Mayhem: Interagency Operations Past and Future," in Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International , 2008), p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as Mismanaging Mayhem. The cases included the U.S. response to the 1918 influenza pandemic, the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the energy crisis of the 1970s, three natural disasters, as well as selected aspects of U.S. conduct in four conflicts and in the Cold War.
58.	The editors found that throughout its history, the U.S. government "has paid scant attention to recruiting, training, exercising, and educating people to conduct interagency operations. Thus at crucial moments, success or failure often turned on the happenstance of whether the right people with the right talents happened to be in the right job. Rather than investing in human capital before a crisis, Washington plays Russian roulette." Mismanaging Mayhem, p. 3.
59.	The editors pointed to a need for interagency doctrine, i.e., a body of knowledge for guiding joint action. "Good doctrine does not tell individuals what to think, but it guides them in how to think—particularly how to address complex, ambiguous, and unanticipated challenges when time and resources are both in short supply.... When ... [interagency doctrine] was taught and practiced, it made a difference. When not, chaos won." Mismanaging Mayhem, p. 3.
60.	The section on leadership concluded: "Presidential leadership is particularly crucial to the conduct of interagency operations.... Likewise, congressional leadership, especially from the chairs of congressional committees, is equally vital.... In the end, no government reform can replace the responsibility of the people to elect officials who can build trust and confidence in government; the responsibility of officials to select qualified leaders to run the government; and the responsibility of elected and appointed leaders to demonstrate courage, character, and competence in the time of crisis." Mismanaging Mayhem, pp. 3-4.
61.	QDDR, p. 34.
62.	For instance, the 2006 QDR stated that improved planning guidance to set priorities and clarify national security roles and responsibilities would "reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies."
63.	"We spend so much because we are so inefficient and incapable at home with planning and resourcing and commanding and on the ground with execution," according to USIP expert Beth Cole. E-mail correspondence with Beth Cole, Director of Intergovernmental Relations, United States Institute of Peace, August 29, 2011.
64.	Integrating Instruments of Power, p. 22.
65.	Integrating Instruments of Power, p. 22. Part of the proposal was for Congress to mandate a "standing requirement for both the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office to prepare their own annual reports on this subject." p. 20.
66.	PNSR 2008, p. 416.
67.	PNSR 2008, p. 417. PNSR's proposed jurisdiction for these select committees encompassed: "all interagency 1) operations and activities; 2) commands, other organizations, and embassies; 3) funding; 4) personnel policies; and [sic] 5) education and training; and 6) nominees for any Senate-confirmed interagency position that may be established." p. 522.
68.	PNSR 2008, p. 522.
69.	Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010, p. 106. Hereinafter referred to as the QDRIP Report.
70.	QDRIP Report, p. 106.
71.	This act (P.L. 80-235) has been periodically amended. The act mandates NSC functions, membership, participation by other officials, and auxiliary committees, and provides authority for a staff. Sections dealing with the NSC are codified at 50 U.S.C. 402. 50 U.S.C. 402 names the following as NSC members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy. The statute also provides that other heads of departments and other officials may serve as members if the President directs; those so named have varied over time. For the Obama Administration, the "directed" members include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Regular attendees also include the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisors. See Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Research Report, August 15, 2011 Annual Update, Washington , DC, 2011, pp. 12-13. Hereinafter cited as The National Security Policy Process.
72.	See http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/.
73.	50 U.S.C. 402(a).
74.	50 U.S.C. 402(b).
75.	50 U.S.C. 402(b)).
76.	50 U.S.C. 402(a)(8)).
77.	The National Security Policy Process, p. 30.
78.	The National Security Policy Process, p. 29. According to this report, the current organization of the NSS dates back to the George H.W. Bush Administration. "Having served eight years as Vice President and participated regularly in deliberations of the Reagan Administration, President George H.W. Bush came into office with definite ideas as to how the national security policy should be organized.... President Bush reorganized the NSC system to include a Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees, and sought (not always successfully) to establish a collegial system in which the NSC acted as a broker and coordinator of policy across the Executive Branch. The basic structural organization of interagency working groups, department deputies, and department principals ... has been retained by each succeeding presidential administration." pp. 9-10.
79.	http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch.
80.	22 U.S.C. 2382; FAA, Section 622(c).
81.	22 U.S.C. 2151(b); FAA, Section 101(b).
82.	22 U.S.C. 2291(b)(1); FAA, Section 481(b)(1) as amended by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992, P.L. 102-583, Section 4(c).
83.	One coordinator was in charge of assistance provided under the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989, P.L. 101-179), or the SEED Act. The other was in charge of assistance provided under the FREEDOM Support Act (Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, P.L. 102-511). Section 601 of the SEED Act establishes that the "President shall designate, within the Department of State, a SEED Program coordinator who shall be directly responsible for overseeing and coordinating all programs described in this Act and all other activities that the United States Government conducts in furtherance of the purposes of this Act." Section 102(a) of the FREEDOM Support Act provides that the "President shall designate, within the Department of State, a coordinator who shall be responsible for (1) designing an overall assistance and economic cooperation strategy for the independent states of the former Soviet Union; (2) ensuring program and policy coordination among agencies of the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in this Act (including the amendments made by this Act); (3) pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations with respect to assistance to independent states; (4) ensuring that United States assistance programs for the independent states are consistent with this Act (including the amendments made by this Act); (5) ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight by agencies responsible for assistance programs for the independent states; and (6) resolving policy and program disputes among United States Government agencies with respect to United States assistance for the independent states."
84.	For more information, see CRS Report R40756, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination, by Marian Leonardo Lawson and [author name scrubbed].
85.	Specifically, 102(B)(ii) reads: "SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The duties of the Coordinator shall specifically include the following: (I) Ensuring program and policy coordination among the relevant executive branch agencies and nongovernmental organizations, including auditing, monitoring, and evaluation of all such programs. (II) Ensuring that each relevant executive branch agency undertakes programs primarily in those areas where the agency has the greatest expertise, technical capabilities, and potential for success. (III) Avoiding duplication of effort. (IV) Ensuring coordination of relevant executive branch agency activities in the field. ''(V) Pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations. (VI) Resolving policy, program, and funding disputes among the relevant executive branch agencies. (VII) Directly approving all activities of the United States (including funding) relating to combatting [sic] HIV/AIDS in each of ... [14 specified countries] and other countries designated by the President, which other designated countries may include those countries in which the United States is implementing HIV/AIDS programs as of the date of the enactment of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. (VIII) Establishing due diligence criteria for all recipients of funds section and all activities subject to the coordination and appropriate monitoring, evaluation, and audits carried out by the Coordinator necessary to assess the measurable outcomes of such activities." For more information on this act and the Coordinator's Office, see http://www.state.gov/s/gac; CRS Report R41802, The Global Challenge of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, by [author name scrubbed]; and United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, Report Number ISP-I-08-23, Washington, DC, February 2008.
86.	See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/index.htm.
87.	Section 1206, P.L. 109-163, FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as amended, and Section 1208, P.L. 108-375, FY2005 NDAA, as amended.
88.	Section 2301, P.L. 105-277 (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations, 1999), which superseded amended earlier legislation (Section 161(e), P.L. 103-236, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994 and FY1995) that formally established the office. For more, see http://www.state.gov/s/ct.
89.	For more on S/CRS, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by [author name scrubbed].
90.	The Civilian Response Corps active and standby components have, as of October 7, 2011, a combined total of 792 members. The breakdown by agency for the 160 active members (in bold) and the 632 standby members (in italics) is: Department of State, 47 and 234; USAID, 36 and 177; Department of Justice, 31 and 75; Department of Agriculture, 7 and 8; Department of Homeland Security, 6 and 33; Department of Commerce, 4 and 60; Department of Health and Human Services, 2 and 42; Department of Energy, 2; and Department of Transportation, 1. Data provided by S/CRS, October 14, 2011.
91.	Http://www.state.gove/g/cso.
92.	USAID website. http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/.
93.	USAID hires personnel through a number of different authorities. The U.S. staff at Washington, DC headquarters and abroad are direct hires. Foreign nationals are hired abroad as foreign service nationals or third country nationals. In addition, as of October 11, 2011, USAID had 260 people at Washington headquarters and 515 abroad under personal services contracts. These numbers do not include a small number of people hired as "experts" or through other mechanisms.
94.	The USAID Administrator serves as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under a presidential delegation of authority provided by Section 493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The Special Coordinator's role under that legislation is to "promote maximum effectiveness and coordination in response to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors," as well as to formulate and update contingency plans for disaster relief. For more on the USAID and other agency roles in disaster assistance, see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
95.	Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing Peace-Building Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), p. 141. This book has an extended discussion of OTI, pp. 137-143. Hereinafter cited as U.S. Peacefare. For more information on OTI, also see CRS Report R40600, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives After 15 Years: Issues for Congress, by Marian Leonardo Lawson. The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation provides the analytic framework for work of OTI and other USAID conflict resolution work.
96.	The U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2 (second paragraph) establishes that the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints ambassadors.
97.	Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives 2, Washington, DC, December 2010, p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as Chief of Mission Authority as a Model.
98.	See http://www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php, an information sheet entitled "Other Agencies on Mission's 'Country Team," posted online by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
99.	According to one source, the instruction stated Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) "will be organized to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts." Ambassador (retired) Edward Marks, Contractor, Camber Corporation, Joint Interagency Coordinating [sic] Group on Counterterrorism, United States Pacific Command, p. 7, http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/678/PACOM%20JIACG%20and%20the%20War%20on%20Terror.pdf.
100.	Jan Schwarzenberg, "Where are the JIACGs today?," InterAgency Journal, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2011), p. 25. Hereinafter referred to as JIACGs Today?
101.	Col. Matthew F. Bogdanos, "Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 37 (Second Quarter 2005), pp. 10-18, and Gabriel Marcella, ed., Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2008, pp. 243-248.
102.	According to JIACGs Today?, the U.S. Pacific Command's JIACG is "essentially non-existent," while the U.S. Northern Command's JIACG is "a means of communication and coordination in the event of a national disaster." However, the U.S. Central Command JIACG is used for "integrating U.S. government activities in an active combat zone," and the U.S. Southern Command JIACG is "exploring a completely new paradigm ... analogous to a mega-embassy where day-to-day operations of many agencies functioning in the region are closely coordinated with each other." Jan Schwarzenberg, "Where are the JIACGs today?," InterAgency Journal, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2011), p. 24. According to a recent DOD report to Congress, the U.S. Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense Command JIACG has more than 30 full-time interagency representatives, from a variety of domestically focused agencies as well as from the Department of State and representatives of the U.S. intelligence community, and, at the time the report was written, was seeking a dedicated Drug Enforcement Administration representative to assist with transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report on Organizational Structures of the Headquarters of the Geographic Combatant Commands, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 944 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383, June 2011, p. 14. Hereinafter referred to as DOD GCC Report.
103.	DOD GCC Report, pp. 5, 18. The extent to which these civilian deputy commanders can influence the conduct of command missions is unclear. In an explanation of the SOUTHCOM civilian deputy commander's role, the report states that the position "empowers the incumbent to influence decision making at the Command in a way not possible for a POLAD. Although the CDC [Civilian Deputy Commander] does not have the authority to make decision affecting the command's military operations and personnel, or large resource commitments, he/she can shape strategic planning, strategic communications, public affairs, politico-military and intelligence analysis, and the use of security assistance dollars—and better align those missions with those of civilian agencies and country teams. This authority and direction improve USSOUTHCOM's ability to engage with and build interagency capacity." p. 19.
104.	In the case of SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, the deputy posts were created by upgrading the political advisor posts; their titles are Civilian Deputy to the Commander, Foreign Policy Advisor [POLAD]. The AFRICOM title is simply Deputy for the Commander for Civil-Military Activities.
105.	Note that there also are many interagency task forces for domestic operations and activities that are not discussed here.
106.	The Naval Postgraduate School's Cebrowski Institute has a center for research and advice on hastily formed networks for disaster and humanitarian crisis response. See http://www.hfncenter.org.
107.	NDAA for FY1989, P.L. 100-456, Division A, Section 1202(a)(1), codified at 10 U.S.C. 124.
108.	DOD counternarcotics assistance may be provided under Section 1004 of the NDAA for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510), as amended and periodically extended, and Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended and periodically extended. DOD may also maintain and operate equipment in support of counternarcotics and counter-terrorism efforts under 10 U.S.C. 374. For more on this counternarcotics assistance, see CRS Report RL34543, International Drug Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
109.	Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force—South: The Best Known, Least Understood Interagency Success, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Perspectives, No. 5, Washington, DC, June 2011. Hereinafter cited as Joint Interagency Task Force-South.
110.	As stated on the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South website http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx.
111.	See the JIATF West (JIATFWest) website, http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/staff%20directory/jiatfwest/jiatfwest.shtml.
112.	For examples of informal arrangements in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. On p. 32, she writes: "On the ground, civilian and military practitioners have frequently crafted innovative arrangements for better integrating their efforts." She provides details on a civil-military "Board of Directors" for efforts in Paktia, Paktika, and Khowst provinces.
113.	Roadmap for National Security, p. 48.
114.	PNSR 2008, p. vii.
115.	PNSR 2008, p. 95. PNSR cited the "absence of unity, clarity, and agreement at the top energized cross-agency jealousies, ignorances [sic], and 'stove-piping' at the middle and lower levels charged with implementation...."
116.	PNSR 2008, see pp. 153-157. PNSR signaled a lack of candor and trust among general leaders and staff produced by the custom of "leaking" information to the press as a major obstacle to generating and objectively evaluating potential strategic courses of action. This, and other factors such as "poor decision support and the tendency toward consensus building" also "obscure the links between objectives and the alternative activities, programs, and resources required to achieve them." (pp. 154-155.) PNSR also found that information "about real-world conditions does not travel easily between field-level components of institutions and the policymaking levels," and even less readily between executive institutions." (P. 153.)
117.	Specifically, these authors argued for "an interagency planning effort well in advance of deployment" citing three reasons for advance planning that would also hold true for other missions. "First, significant dependences among various agency efforts in a mission require unified policy direction and a coherent intervention strategy, one that integrates its political, security-rule-of-law, and economic lines of effort to achieve transformation. Second, contentious policy issues emerge from the outset that must be addressed to avoid policy gaps and subsequent disconnects on the ground. Finally, and often most important, a substantial number of international troops, personnel, and resources must be mobilized in a multinational and multilateral context and sustained, reasonably for at lease five years, to assure that the desired transformation of power takes hold. The pool of available capabilities, however, is seriously limited. There is no slack in the system." Len Hawley and Dennis Skocz, "Advance Political-Military Planning," in The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, Leonard R. Hawley (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press , 2005), p. 37. This book was also sponsored by the Association of the United States Army.
118.	Diplomacy, development, and defense are the 3Ds. During the Bush Administration, the State Department Office of Strategic and Performance Planning set up "Project Horizon," an interagency effort to identify strategic interagency capabilities that the government might invest in over the next 20 years and to provide a starting point for an interagency planning process, including the development of a scenario-based toolkit for internal agency and interagency planning. Participants included senior executives, strategic planners, and subject matter experts from 15 U.S. government agencies, as well as selected academics and private sector personnel.
119.	http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/155870.htm.
120.	Road Map for National Security, p. 48. These problems are a by-product of the U.S. government budgeting system. Because Congress appropriates funds to individual department/agency budgets and each department or agency budgets funding for its own activities and operations, there is no authoritative cross-department record of the amounts that the U.S. government, as a whole, spends for many activities and mission. Further, an individual department or agency account may fund a wide variety of activities, but do not necessarily disaggregate data by activity. Because of this budgeting practice, there sometimes is no way to judge agencies' funding for a specific purpose or activity, and thus the relative weight of agency contributions to an activity, without a time-consuming review of agency accounts.
121.	U.S. Government Accountability Office, Multiple U.S. Agencies Provided Billions of Dollars to Train and Equip Foreign Police Forces, Letter to Hon. John F. Tierney, April 27, 2011, p. 13.
122.	Road Map for National Security, p. 49.
123.	Frank Olivieri, "Blended" Funds Offer Flexibility, Risk for State Department Operations," Congressional Quarterly, March 14, 2011, pp. 7, 23.
124.	Also included in the security category are the budgets of the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans Affairs, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the intelligence community management account. See CRS Report R41965, The Budget Control Act of 2011, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed].
125.	For more information on the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), see CRS Report RS22855, Security Assistance Reform: "Section 1206" Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33647, A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed].
126.	The State Department's FY2012 budget request describes the fund as a means to "streamline the way the U.S. Government provides assistance for military forces and other security forces...." Forces that could be assisted would be those "responsible for conducting border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces." In addition, the fund could be used, according to State's request, to provide assistance to foreign justice sector and other rule of law programs, and to other aspects of stabilization efforts. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, Foreign Operations, Washington, DC, p. 161.
127.	CRS Report R40856, The Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, by [author name scrubbed] et al.
128.	White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 1473, April 15, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/15/statement-president-hr-1473.
129.	One study quotes an unnamed senior NSC official: "'lead agency really means sole agency as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.'" Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010, p. 27. (Hereinafter referred to as Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons.)
130.	CRS Report R40102, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report R40756, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination, by Marian Leonardo Lawson and [author name scrubbed].
131.	S&R missions were of greatest concern at the time the initial proposals were made in the mid-2000s. At that time S&R missions were post-conflict. As discussed earlier, the term now encompasses preventive measures.
132.	Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons, pp. 25, 27. SIGIR quotes an observation of an unnamed senior NSC official: "'lead agency really means sole agency, as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities." The report continues: "When a particularly lead agency (State, Defense, or USAID) is put in charge, departmental bias can cause certain issues to become defined as a military, diplomatic, or assistance challenge, depending on which agency is in the lead. USOCO [the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations that SIGIR proposes) would bear none of these institutional prejudices." p. 27.
133.	Applying Iraq's Hard Lessons, p. 25.This quote continues "Currently, there is no single agency that devotes its entire mission to SROs [stabilization and reconstruction operations]. For State and Defense, they are but a small part of the departments' larger missions." Under this proposal, USOCO would tie DOD capacity and resources to State Department and USAID expertise "by closely linking its planning and operations with State, Defense, and USAID, bringing out the best-developed SRO aspects from each, while avoiding the 'stovepiping' that tends to limit departmental action. USOCO would fit between and among State, Defense, and USAID, providing the integrative 'glue' that SRO planning and execution currently lack." (p. 27) The report warns that because the USOCO concept "impinges upon existing 'turf,'" it will "draw resistance." But, the decision on whether to pursue the proposal should be shaped by a careful analysis of whether the current departmentalized system has the genuine potential to generate an integrated approach to planning and managing SROs." (p. 27).
134.	One recent National Defense University (NDU) report on JIATFS, long and widely known as the "gold standard" for an interagency task force, offered two "likely explanations" for the lack of previous work on this unit: one, a widespread presumption that the organization could not be widely duplicated and the other the "tragedy of the commons." "Although it is clearly in everyone's interest to better understand the relatively few interagency successes that the national security system has produced, it is not perceived to be in any given department's or agency's interest to conduct or fund such work." Joint Interagency Task Force-South. p. 82.
135.	For background on the combatant command system in general and details on the GCCs, see CRS Report R42077, The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]. For greater discussion of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
136.	QDDR, p. 54.
137.	Robert S. Pope, Lt. Col (USAF), U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement, A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/Pope_10_AFF_Research_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf. This study found that (1) "only a State-led model can guarantee a non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy at the regional level," and (2) a State-led organization (which he would organize as a regional-led "country team" reporting to the Secretary of State) would "best be able to avoid overburdening the President with regional-led interagency policy disputes." pp. 171-172.
138.	QDDR, p. 53.
139.	QDDR, p. 53.
140.	QDDR, p. 54.
141.	The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States through Professional Education and Training, February 2011, pp. 23-24. According to that report, Diplomacy 3.0 proposed adding 2,700 personnel to the Foreign Service above the FY2008 year-end level (bringing the number to 14,600, including about 8,800 officers) and increasing the State Department civil service staff by 13%. USAID in 2008 announced plans to double the number of its foreign service officers by the end of FY2012, for a total of 2,400.
142.	Edward Peck, "Chief-of-Mission Authority: A Powerful but Underused Tool," Foreign Service Journal, December 2007, p. 32.
143.	QDDR, pp. 28-31.
144.	QDDR, p. 33.
145.	QDDR, p. 33. Addressing Ambassadors in February 2011 at an event that the State Department billed as the "first Global Chief of Mission Conference," Secretary of State Clinton repeated the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) analogy. She told Ambassadors and other COMS that they were positioned "on the front lines of America's engagement with a fast-changing world" where they must "claim the ground of being the leaders and coordinators of U.S. Government presence in every country where you serve." She also reiterated the QDDR intent to provide educational programs for Ambassadors to broaden their knowledge of foreign assistance programs and, for non-career Ambassadors, to acquaint them with the workings of other agencies. Further, she stated that interagency experience will become a priority criteria "for choosing and training chiefs of mission and deputy chiefs of mission." To give the ambassadors clout in integrating "each agency's priorities ... into a single mission that inspires support and partnership," the Secretary also repeated the QDDR intent to give COMs the authority to contribute to a home agency's evaluation of all personnel at a post. In addition, to enhance their involvement in decisionmaking in Washington, DC, the State Department will include Ambassadors and other COM's in senior meetings at the department via teleconference facilities.
146.	Chief of Mission Authority as a Model. pp. 22-23.
147.	Rickey L. Rife and Rosemary Hansen, "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus", (Senior Service College Fellow Research Project, U.S. Army War College , 1998), pp. 4-6.
148.	Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, America's Army: A Model for Interagency Effectiveness (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. p. 107.
149.	The bill was introduced October 24, 1985 in the House by Representative Bill Nichols (D-AL) and a similar measure was introduced April 1986 in the Senate by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). A history of the process leading to the bill's passage is recounted in James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002).
150.	More specifically, the Goldwater-Nichols Act required the creation of a professional development system for "joint specialty offices" that included joint education requirements and joint duty assignments.
151.	Congress subsequently mandated in related legislation a requirement that candidates for general or flag officer rank have earned a "joint specialty" designation and have served a full tour of duty in a joint assignment.
152.	PNSR 2011, p.
153.	QDDR, pp. 175-176.
154.	In addition to its pre-deployment training courses, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) currently offers a course in "Interagency Effectiveness, Strategies, and Best Practices," and interagency policy seminars for senior leaders, a course on "Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations" directed at Civilian Reserve Corps members but open to others, and two distance learning courses, "Introduction to Agency Culture," and "Reconstruction and Stabilization Introduction." NDU and its affiliated institutions also are offering during the FY2011-FY2012 academic year a number of courses on interagency missions and S&R operations for students there, with class sizes limited to 13-18 members. Among them, these institutions offers "Leadership in the InterAgency Process" "Working the Three D's: Afghanistan/Pakistan and Whole of Government Assistance," "Rebuilding Weak and Failed States: Afghanistan and Beyond," "Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding," "The Civil War: Reassessing War, Stabilization, and Reconstruction," "Responding to State Failure and Instability," "Seizing the Sword: The Challenge of U.S. Civilian-Military Relations," and U.S. Civilian-Military Relations Today," as well as courses specific to Afghanistan and Vietnam. These and other institutions also offer courses on dealing with conflict.