Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for
Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues
for Congress
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
Pat Towell
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
December 22, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R42133
CRS Report for Congress
Pr
epared for Members and Committees of Congress
Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad
Summary
Within the past two decades, prominent foreign policy organizations and foreign policy experts
have perceived serious deficiencies in the authorities, organizations, and personnel used to
conduct interagency missions that prevent the United States from exercising its power to full
advantage. For the 112th Congress, proposals to address these problems may be of interest for
their perceived potential not only to enhance performance, but also to save money by
streamlining processes, encouraging interagency cooperation, and reducing duplication. These
proposals also provide context for current legislation, including the Interagency Personnel
Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268 and H.R. 2314), the Global Security Contingency Fund contained
in the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, Section 1207, H.R. 1540, as sent by
Congress to the President on December 21, 2011), as well as in the House’s FY2012 Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Section 924, H.R. 2583. The FY2012 NDAA, as sent to the
President, requires the President to submit to Congress a “whole-of-government” implementation
plan (Section 1072, H.R. 1540).
Despite a growing perception during the 1990s that reforms were needed to foster interagency
cooperation in missions abroad, it was not until the terrorist attacks on the United States of
September 11, 2001, during the presidency of George W. Bush, and subsequent U.S. military
interventions that the need became urgent enough to result in significant changes. The earlier first
steps of the Clinton Administration toward interagency reform were in short order embraced and
then expanded by the Bush Administration, which also implemented reforms of its own. The
Barack H. Obama Administration has endorsed these changes and undertaken some of its own.
Three problems with the current interagency cooperation system are most commonly cited. These
are: (1) a government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning
capabilities among civilian agencies; (2) a variety of structural deficiencies in the U.S.
government for conducting missions abroad that lead to a tendency for “stove-piping” responses,
with each agency operating independently and to civilian agencies’ reluctance to divert scarce
resources, including personnel, from their core missions to interagency missions; and (3)
personnel who are not trained for interagency missions and often unfamiliar with the missions,
capabilities, and cultures of other agencies.
This report draws on over three dozen studies with recommendations to improve the current
national security system. The studies surveyed include three prepared by the Project on National
Security Reform, with comprehensive recommendations, four prepared or co-sponsored by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and two by RAND in conjunction with the
American Academy of Diplomats, as well as reports by the Council on Foreign Relations, the
Defense Science Board, the National Defense University, and others. This report draws from
these studies, as well as a few articles, for recommendations to improve strategy-making,
planning, and budgeting; to improve institutional authorities, structures and arrangements; and, to
create interagency personnel policies and mechanisms.
As the breadth and variety of the recommendations indicate, there is no consensus on how to fix
the perceived problems. Nor is there agreement among policymakers on a number of overarching
questions: whether interagency reform is necessary for missions abroad, which proposals are
considered highest priority, whether reforms would save money, and whether reform of
Congressional organization or procedures must accompany other national security reform
measures.
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Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Background...................................................................................................................................... 3
Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11 ................................................................. 4
George W. Bush Administration Initiatives......................................................................... 6
The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform ......................................................... 7
Key Problems and Reform Proposals .............................................................................................. 8
Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation....................................................................... 9
Overview of Reform Proposals ............................................................................................... 11
Improve Strategy-making, Planning, and Budgeting? ...................................................... 12
Improve Civilian Institutional Authorities and Structures for Coordination and
Collaboration?................................................................................................................ 13
Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors?.............................................. 14
Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms?................................................. 14
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 15
Is Interagency Reform Necessary for Missions Abroad? ........................................................ 15
Future Conflict Environment and Missions ...................................................................... 15
Utility of State-building Missions ..................................................................................... 16
To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building
Capabilities? ......................................................................................................................... 17
Implications of a DOD State-Building Role for the U.S. Military.................................... 18
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy................................................................................. 19
Short-term Trade-offs........................................................................................................ 20
Which Proposals Are Highest Priority?................................................................................... 21
Prioritize by System Weaknesses ...................................................................................... 21
Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives.................................. 22
Prioritize by Effect on International Cooperation ............................................................. 22
Prioritize by the Ease and Cost of Implementation........................................................... 23
Can Interagency Reform Produce Cost Savings?.................................................................... 23
Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security Reform
Measures?............................................................................................................................. 24
Create New Select Committees......................................................................................... 24
Create a National Security Appropriations Subcommittee................................................ 25
Modify Current Practices and Procedures......................................................................... 25
Looking Ahead............................................................................................................................... 26
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 26
Acronyms....................................................................................................................................... 31
Preface to Appendices, Including Tables ....................................................................................... 32
Tables
Table 1. Key Proposals for Interagency Reforms of Civilian Structures and Capabilities ............ 29
Table B-1. Proposals To Establish New Positions at the National Security Council Staff ............ 47
Table B-2. Proposals to Establish New NSC Structures................................................................ 48
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Table B-3. Proposals to Assign New Responsibilities to NSC and National Security Staff.......... 48
Table B-4. Proposals for Specific New Strategy Development Processes and Documents........... 50
Table B-5. Proposals to Rationalize or Enhance Strategy Development and Planning ................. 51
Table B-6. Proposals for Integrated Budgets ................................................................................. 55
Table B-7. Proposals to Improve the Budget Process.................................................................... 56
Table C-1. Proposals to Increase the State Department Capacity and Authority to Lead,
Coordinate, and Conduct Interagency Missions ......................................................................... 59
Table C-2. Proposals to Strengthen the State Department Lead and Capacity for
Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R)..................................................................................... 60
Table C-3. Proposals to Diversify S&R Responsibilities Away from the State Department ......... 61
Table C-4. Proposals to Create New S&R Structures.................................................................... 62
Table C-5. Proposals to Establish Interagency Teams or Task Forces........................................... 63
Table C-6. Proposals to Enhance Civilian Input into U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commands (GCCs) and Other DOD Units ................................................................................ 65
Table C-7. Proposals for New Civilian Regional Authorities or Structures................................... 66
Table C-8. Proposals to Review or Augment Civilian Personnel at the State Department
and USAID ................................................................................................................................. 67
Table C-9. Proposals to Augment Personnel and Other Capacity Government-wide for
Interagency Missions.................................................................................................................. 68
Table C-10. Proposals to Increase the Capacity of the Civilian Response Corps.......................... 68
Table D-1. Proposals to Increase Chiefs of Mission (COM) Authority......................................... 71
Table D-2. Proposals to Increase the Capacity of Chiefs of Mission (COMs) .............................. 71
Table D-3. Proposal to Expand COM Authority............................................................................ 72
Table E-1. Proposals to Establish National Security Corps or Cadres........................................... 76
Table E-2. Proposals to Improve the Existing Professional Development Program...................... 76
Table E-3. Proposals to Establish an Interagency Career Track .................................................... 77
Table E-4. Proposals to Establish a Senior-Level Corps or Cadre................................................. 77
Table E-5. Proposals to Link Interagency Education, Training, and Experience to Job
Qualifications, Opportunities, Promotions, and other Rewards ................................................. 78
Table E-6. Proposals for Interagency Education, Training, and Experience for Senior
Leaders........................................................................................................................................ 79
Table E-7. Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Interagency Education and Training .............. 79
Table E-8. Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Interagency Professional Experience
(Rotations) .................................................................................................................................. 80
Table E-9. Proposal to Protect Interagency Personnel................................................................... 80
Table E-10. Proposals to Create New Interagency Education and Training Institutions or
Mandates..................................................................................................................................... 81
Table E-11. Proposals to Enhance Existing Education and Training Programs............................. 82
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Appendixes
Appendix A. Interagency Authorities and Structures..................................................................... 33
Appendix B. Proposals to Improve Strategy-Making, Planning, and Budgeting .......................... 45
Appendix C. Proposals to Enhance Civilian Authority, Institutional Arrangements, and
Resources for Interagency Missions Abroad .............................................................................. 57
Appendix D. Proposals to Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors .................. 69
Appendix E. Proposals to Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms ..................... 73
Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 82
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Introduction
Some U.S. policymakers share widespread concern that the United States cannot conduct “whole
of government” missions and activities abroad efficiently and effectively. For the 112th Congress,
various proposals to reform interagency authorities, organizations, processes, and personnel
dedicated to foreign missions may be of interest, especially as it considers ways to maintain U.S.
power and influence as it reduces expenditures. Proponents argue that reforms to rationalize
interagency collaboration on foreign missions will not only enhance performance, but also save
money by streamlining processes, facilitating cooperation, and reducing duplication. Some
reform proposals are relevant to legislation currently before Congress, in particular the
Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011, which provides for interagency rotations by U.S.
government personnel in national security agencies,1 and the legislative proposal for a Global
Security Contingency Fund, which would provide an integrated State Department-Department of
Defense budget for certain types of security assistance.2 The FY2012 NDAA, as sent to the
President, requires the President to submit to specified Congressional committees within 270 of
enactment “an implementation plan for achieving the “whole-of-government” integration vision
prescribed in the President’s National Security Strategy of May 2010.” (See the section on “The
Obama Administration and Interagency Reform,” below.)
For nearly two decades, policymakers have pondered many questions regarding “interagency”
missions and activities abroad—including stabilization and reconstruction, security assistance,
counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, and counterinsurgency—in a search to improve them.
A primary question is the appropriate division of labor between the Department of Defense
(DOD) and civilian agencies, particularly the State Department, in conducting these missions and
activities. Other questions concern the recommended changes in authorities, processes,
organization, structures, and personnel resources to optimize their use. As policymakers and
analysts contemplate the range of probable near and medium term future threats—particularly the
potential spillover effects of state instability and intrastate conflict, and the growth of terrorist and
organized criminal activity—a consensus has grown that major challenges to U.S. national
security over the next decades will require interagency responses.3 Nonetheless, despite a
1 Identical bills for The Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 were introduced in 2011: S. 1268, introduced by
Senator Lieberman and H.R. 2314, introduced by Representatives Davis and Tierney. S. 1268 was passed by the Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee on October 20, 2011. For details on these bills, see CRS
Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues
for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
2 Identical versions of legislation to create a Global Security Contingency Fund were contained in Section 1204, H.R.
1540, the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as passed by the House on May 26, 2011, and Section
924, H.R. 2583, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2012, as passed by the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on July 21, 2011. A different version was reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 22,
2011, as Section 1207, S. 1253, FY2012 NDAA. Congress passed a third version as Section 1207 of H.R. 1540, the
FY2012 NDAA as sent to the President on December 21, 2011.
3 For instance, the September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), issued just two weeks after the
terrorist attacks on the United States known as 9/11, featured two emergent elements in the U.S. security environment.
These were: (1) increasing challenges and threats emanating from the territories of weak and failing states, and (2) the
diffusion of power and military capabilities to non-state actors. In the September 2002 National Security Strategy, the
George W. Bush Administration emphasized the need to “transform America’s national security institution,” stating
that the “major institutions of American security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. All of
them must be transformed.” By the time the Bush Administration issued its 2006 QDR , the need for interagency
reform had become a central tenant of U.S. thinking about national security. “The Department of Defense cannot meet
today’s complex challenges alone,” that QDR stated. “Success requires unified statecraft: the ability of the U.S.
(continued...)
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growing sense of a need for interagency reform to address multiple systemic problems, there is
little agreement on the solutions.
Congress has played a leading role in some aspects of interagency reform. For instance, the
George W. Bush Administration’s creation in 2004 of the State Department Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was promoted by Senator Richard G.
Lugar and then Senator (now Vice President) Joe Biden.4 Some Members call for additional
Congressional initiatives.
To provide context for the 112th Congress’ continuing consideration of interagency reform, this
report provides perspectives on the questions and issues raised by a broad range of reform
proposals offered by research organizations and selected experts. The focus is on proposals for
civilian institutions and personnel. Although DOD is a key player in the missions and activities
that are the object of proposed reform, its very dominance in many areas underlies calls for
reform to build civilian capacity.5 Thus, this report discusses DOD reforms only to the extent that
they would foster improved interaction with civilians.
This report starts with a brief history of the impetus for interagency reform during the 1990s and
2000s, and a sketch of Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administration measures and initiatives,
followed by a discussion of key problems in the context of the current interagency structure.
(Appendix A provides a fuller discussion of interagency authorities and structures.) The report
then provides a short synopsis of the content of reform proposals recommended or published by
some three dozen foreign policy and defense organizations and experts. (Appendix B, Appendix
C, Appendix D, and Appendix E provide a broader discussion of proposed reforms, with tables
of the proposals.) The report concludes with a discussion of four broad overarching questions: (1)
is interagency reform necessary for missions abroad; (2) which proposals are considered highest
priority; (3) can interagency reform produce cost savings; and (4) must Congressional reform
accompany other national security measures?
(...continued)
Government to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and
partners abroad.” (Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 5; The White
House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p. 29, and Department of
Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 83.) For a summary of the 2010 QDR’s depiction
of future challenges, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications for
National Security Planning, by Stephen Daggett.
4 For more on S/CRS and the development of civilian stabilization capabilities, see CRS Report RL32862,
Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian
Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.
5 This concern is voiced by policymakers and analysts across the political spectrum and by military and DOD leaders as
well. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Admiral Michael Mullen (now retired) reportedly stated in
March 2010: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough [to invest in civilian departments]....U.S.
foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our
overseas commands and not enough on the State Department.” This quote is taken from news reports about his March
3, 2010 Landon Lecture at the University of Kansas; it does not appear in the prepared text and remarks published on
the CJCS website.
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Background6
For nearly two decades, foreign policy analysts have been troubled by the difficulties that U.S.
agencies experience when working together to advance U.S. interests abroad.7 After the demise of
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1989, U.S. policymakers were confronted in the
1990s by new types of missions—the conflicts in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and elsewhere—where
conflict could not be brought to an end by force of arms alone. In these operations, U.S. military
forces were tasked with a variety of state-building responsibilities, such as creating justice
systems, assisting police, and promoting governance, which many believed were more
appropriately performed by civilians. DOD soon realized that it needed assistance from civilian
agencies, but those agencies often lacked the resources to help. Further, the United States’
agency-centric national security system could not provide the strong leadership and appropriate
mechanisms needed to meld military and civilian contributions into effective efforts.
In a first step to address the perceived need to develop coordinated U.S. responses to crises
abroad rather than relying on case by case ad hoc responses, the Clinton Administration issued the
May 1997 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56. This directive, entitled The Clinton
Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations, dealt with interagency
planning, collaboration, and coordination problems by creating new planning and implementing
mechanisms.8 PDD 56’s provisions were not systematically implemented, due to what some
analysts have described as internal bureaucratic resistance, although some of its practices were
incorporated into planning processes for some subsequent operations.9
6 This background section and the following section on S/CRS are drawn in part from a now archived CRS Report
RS22031, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, by Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, and from CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization
and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other
Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.
7 For a conceptual overview of this topic, see CRS Report RL34455, Organizing the U.S. Government for National
Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, by Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell.
8 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision
Directive. May 1997. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm.
9 See Michele A. Poole, “Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations: The Impact of Presidential
Decision Directive 56”, (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001). The Clinton Administration also attempted to
remedy the shortage of one critical nation-building tool—international civilian police forces—through PDD 71, which
sets forth policy guidelines for strengthening foreign criminal justice systems in support of peace operations. (U.S.
Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations. February 24, 2000 http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
pdd/pdd-71-4.htm, hereinafter referred to as PDD-71 White Paper; and U.S. Text: Summary of Presidential Decision
Directive 71, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-71-1.htm.) This too encountered bureaucratic resistance.
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The first widely-distributed call for broad reform of the
In Focus: Interagency
U.S. national security system was issued in February 2001
Problems in Iraq
by the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century,
the so-called “Hart-Rudman” commission. This
The 2003 U.S. military intervention in Iraq
is often cited as a example of a lack of
commission recommended a “significant organizational
interagency coordination at multiple
redesign” of the Executive Branch “to permit the U.S.
levels, starting with the development of
government to integrate more effectively the many diverse
appropriate strategy, planning, and
strands of policy that underpin U.S. national security in a
direction. As described by one author,
new era—not only the traditional agenda of defense,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense
developed its plans, disregarding State
diplomacy and intelligence, but also economic, counter-
Department, USAID, and CIA planning, as
terrorism, combating organized crime, protecting the
well as the advice of some military
environment, fighting pandemic diseases, and promoting
leaders. The National Security Council
human rights worldwide.”11 Soon after, the terrorist attacks
(NSC) ceded the lead to DOD, playing a
on the United States of September 11, 2001 (9/11), put the
subordinate role. Factors cited by
another source for problems in Iraq
problems of interagency cooperation at home and abroad in
include “a perceived lack of direction
bold relief for many policymakers and analysts.
from the president and NSC,
bureaucratic infighting in Washington and
The U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (October
overseas, cultural differences between
2001) and, especially, in Iraq (March 2003) manifested–
agencies, and an inherent aversion in
many civilian agencies to the execution of
some would say magnified—the perceived deficiencies of
long-term planning,” as wel as the
previous interagency missions abroad. These wars heavily
absence of grand strategy to guide
stressed U.S. military forces. They demonstrated that U.S.
operations.10
departments and agencies had difficulty working together
productively, indeed they sometimes worked at cross purposes. Gradually, consensus grew that
the United States needed to foster civilian-led interagency collaboration and cooperation in
missions abroad, and to develop adequate civilian organizational structures, procedures, and
personnel to make that possible.
Perceptions of Interagency Requirements Post 9/11
In the mid-2000s, several studies set forth proposals to reform “the interagency,” as the
interdepartmental formal and informal cooperation system is known, largely in transitions from
conflict and post-conflict settings. Two Defense Science Board (DSB) studies (in 2004 and 2005)
advocated broad changes for “stability” operations—defined to include security, transition,
counterinsurgency, peacemaking and other operations needed to deal with irregular security
challenges.12 The DSB studies focused on reforms to be undertaken by DOD and the U.S.
10 Richard Weitz, “Interagency Problems and Proposals: A Research Review,” in Mismanaging Mayhem: How
Washington Responds to Crisis, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2008), pp. 261-262.
11 Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman, co-chairs, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The United
States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Phase III Report, January 31, 2001, p. 47. Hereinafter cited as
Road Map for National Security.
12 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Defense Science Board 2004
Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities, December 2004 (hereinafter referred to as Transitions); and
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DoD, September 2005 (hereinafter referred to as
Institutionalizing Stability Operations.). The Defense Science Board, established in 1956, is a prestigious standing
committee of about forty members—civilians and retired military—selected for leadership in science and technology,
and its application to military requirements. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb The Board reports directly to the Secretary of
(continued...)
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military to a far greater extent than any previous or subsequent study. Nevertheless, the 2005
study also stated that DOD and the State Department needed to develop “an extraordinarily close
working relationship,” and that both departments needed to augment stabilization and
reconstruction capabilities. Among the changes in DOD the 2005 study advocated were elevating
the profile of stability operations within DOD through the creation of high level posts, and raising
the status of stability operations to “core missions,” i.e., on a par with combat operations.
Over the next few years, a second crop of studies on
TERMINOLOGY
improving missions abroad focused on proposals to
bring greater coherence to a variety of peacetime
The term “stabilization and reconstruction"
activities. Some of those studies advocated that action
(or, S&R) is usual y understood to encompass
be taken to prevent conflict when it initially seemed a
tasks and activities that promote security and
possibility (and not just as a reoccurrence in post-
encourage stable, democratic governance and
economic growth.
conflict situations). They viewed preventive action as
critical to U.S. efforts to contain the spread of
These activities can be undertaken where
terrorism and to combat the threats from growing
there are threats to peace as well as in post-
conflict situations. In the past, many of the
transnational crime. Many saw the early proposals to
“stabilization" activities were loosely labeled
improve the U.S. ability to deal with conflict and its
"peacekeeping."
aftermath as applicable to these “steady state” missions
Reconstruction involves repairing (in some
as well. One 2008 study drew “lessons learned” from
cases creating) the infrastructure necessary to
nearly two decades of stabilization and reconstruction
support long-term economic growth and
(S&R) operations and stated that those lessons “can
development. This infrastructure can be
also have utility for a broader range of U.S.
physical (e.g., roads and schools), or
institutional (e.g., legal and tax systems).
engagements abroad during both military and
nonmilitary activities,” including pre-conflict, conflict,
Many stabilization and reconstruction activities
and post-conflict activities.13
and tasks are often also referred to as "nation-
building” or "state-building."
These studies, spanning a decade, differed in several
“Peacebuilding” encompasses all these
respects, but largely agreed on the need for U.S.
activities.
government reforms. For the most part, their
“Stability Operations” is a military doctrine
recommendations rested on two fundamental premises:
term that also encompasses S&R activities.
(1) the need to empower civilians to lead and conduct
all missions except those in dangerously hostile situations, providing the necessary resources for
them to do so, and (2) the need to replace ad hoc, “stove-piped” systems with improved
mechanisms for developing contingency plans and procedures for joint civil-military operations
and for implementing them. Their recommendations were often based on the judgment that the
greatest threats to U.S. security would emerge in states that were either too weak to police their
territory or lacked the political will or capacity to do so. State-building (a term some argued more
appropriate than nation-building) activities to promote a more stable world by fostering the
development of legitimate, open, and effective governments abroad, was at the center of the
strategy developed to deal with these threats. This belief ran counter to many policymakers’
perceptions during the 1990s that the establishment of new institutions in troubled countries was
an overly expensive, if not futile exercise.
(...continued)
Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics).
13 Robert H. Hunter, principal author, Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best
Practices, RAND and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Report of a Panel of Senior Practitioners, Santa Monica,
CA, 2008, p. xix. Hereinafter referred to as Integrating Instruments of Power.
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George W. Bush Administration Initiatives
Although the Bush Administration scorned the concept of “nation-building” at first, its post 9/11
military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq soon changed its perspective. As the need to foster
security and build credible institutions to govern in these highly fractionalized countries became
evident, the Administration adopted significant initiatives to improve agencies’ ability to carry out
state-building missions more effectively and to foster interagency cooperation.
On the military side, the Bush Administration’s Office of the Secretary of Defense embraced a
number of the DSB recommendations when it issued in November 2005 DOD Directive 3000.05
(DODD 3000.05), Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. By designating stability operations as “a core U.S. military
mission,” this landmark directive moved DOD away from its Cold War focus on combat
operations. It mandated that the armed services’ dedicate the same level of systematic attention to
doctrine, training, education, exercises, and planning capabilities for stability operations as they
did for combat operations. At the same time, the directive clarified that DOD would play a
supporting role to civilian leadership in many state-building situations, but cautioned that U.S.
military personnel must be prepared to perform state-building functions when capable civilians
were lacking.14
On the civilian side, the Bush Administration’s signature initiative was the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative, starting with the creation of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004, and concluding with the on-going
creation of active and stand-by components for a new interagency Civilian Response Corp. In
addition, not only did the Bush Administration set forth its own plan for interagency cooperation
in S&R missions in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44,15 but it also partially put
into force Clinton’s PDD 71.16
Another key Bush Administration initiative was a program to prepare U.S. government personnel
to work together on national security missions. On May 17, 2007, through Executive Order
13434, the Bush Administration provided legal authority for the development of an interagency
National Security Professional Development program. 17 Under guidance provided by the
subsequent National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals issued in July 2007,
14 DOD Directive (DODD) 3000.05 can be read at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3000_05.pdf. (DODD 3000.05
was subsequently reissued as DOD Instruction, 3000.05, September 16, 2009.) For an account of the events leading up
to DODD 3000.05 and its major provisions, see CRS Report RL33557, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:
Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino. One proposal not adopted was the Defense Science Board
(DSB) 2005 recommendation to create a position of Under Secretary for Stability Operations. Instead, there is a
stability operations office under the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC).
15 Office of the President, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, National
Security Presidential Directive 44, December 2005. This directive stated: “it is the policy [of] the United States to
promote the education, training, and experience of current and future professionals in national security positions
(security professionals) in executive departments and agencies.”
16 For background and origins, see CRS Report RL32321, Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations:
Problems and Proposed Solutions, by Nina M. Serafino.
17 Executive Order 13434 stated: “it is the policy [of] the United States to promote the education, training, and
experience of current and future professionals in national security positions (security professionals) in executive
departments and agencies.” For more information on this program and subsequent action on national security personnel
preparation, see CRS Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent
Experience, and Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
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the NSPD program was launched as an effort to promote the integration of resources in national
security mission areas. Its stated purpose was “to attain unity of effort through awareness,
relationships, and experience, and to break down cultural barriers and obstacles to coordination
across jurisdictional and organizational boundaries.” The program, however, did not allocate or
request central resources to accomplish its ends. It left each department and agency to build its
own capacity under the program guidelines. Although agencies took the formal steps to
incorporate proposed changes, absent constant direction and supervision from the White House to
enforce it as a top priority and overcome bureaucratic resistance, the program largely stagnated
during the remaining years of the Bush Administration.
The Obama Administration and Interagency Reform
In his January 25, 2011 State of the Union address, President Barack H. Obama signaled his
intent to make the U.S. government more competent and more efficient through a major
reorganization, stating that his Administration would “develop a proposal to merge, consolidate,
and reorganize the federal government in a way that best serves the goal of a more competitive
America.”18 The Obama Administration initially embraced key Bush Administration civilian
capacity-building initiatives. In the early months of the Obama Administration, Administration
officials signaled their support for civilian S&R capabilities. In her January 2009 confirmation
hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham
Clinton asserted that the State Department needed to secure funding to carry out S&R missions
and to demonstrate competence in conducting them. Then Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
reiterated his support for increasing civilian capabilities, which he first expressed while serving in
that position under former President George W. Bush.19 Subsequently, the Obama Administration
scaled back Bush Administration plans for the Civilian Response Corps and the implementation
of the National Security Professional Development program, perhaps because of the cost or
difficulty of fully implementing them. However, it also announced a number of its own modest
steps in line with the recommendations of the many studies to enhance civilian leadership,
capabilities, collaboration, and coordination, and to reduce ad hoc measures.
In May 2010, the White House set forth a statement of its intent to strengthen national security
through a whole-of-government approach. In its 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama
Administration stated that to foster national security the United States “must update, balance, and
integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the
same.”20 It called for maintaining the military’s superiority in conventional welfare and enhancing
other military capabilities, as well as investing “in diplomacy and development capabilities and
institutions in a way that complements and reinforces our global partners.”21 It outlined three
pages of steps to take to improve defense, diplomacy, development, intelligence, homeland
18 President Obama’s January 25, 2011 State of the Union Speech can be accessed through the White House website at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
19 See, U.S. Department of Defense. Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at Kansas State
University, Manhattan, KA (the “Landon Lecture”), November 26, 2007 http://www.defense.gov/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1199, hereinafter cited as Gates’ Landon Lecture, 2007; U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at the AFRICOM Activation Ceremony, Washington, DC, October 1, 2008
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid= 1281; and U.S. Department of Defense, Speech by Secretary
of Defense Robert M. Gates, delivered at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C, February 24, 2010
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1425.
20 The White House, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 14.
21 Ibid.
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security, economic institutions, strategic communication, and partnerships with the for-profit
private sector and non-profit nongovernmental organizations.
In December 2010, the State Department and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) jointly issued a “Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review or
QDDR (modeled after the statutorily-required DOD Quadrennial Defense Review Report or
QDR),22 assessing U.S. diplomacy and development capabilities and proposing reforms to make
them more efficient and achieve “whole-of-government” cohesion.23 The 2010 QDDR,
undertaken by the Obama Administration without a statutory requirement, embraced a number of
the proposals (or variations of those proposals) for national security reform that have been
advocated over the past decade. These include efforts to integrate national security budgets,
elevate the status of key State Department offices tasked with coordinating interagency efforts,
create new regional structures, enhance the ability of Ambassadors to lead embassies and
influence policy-making, and promote personnel reforms. (These are further discussed in
Appendices B through E, below.)
Key Problems and Reform Proposals
The United States’ system for decision-making and implementing foreign affairs missions and
activities is considered dysfunctional by many analysts. One recent study characterizes the
exercise of foreign relations as “a mob scene” of individual and independent agencies.24 The
problems are perceived across many national security areas, including counterterrorism, failed
states/post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction, democracy promotion, and transnational
issues (crime, health, environment, migration, drugs).
The three most commonly cited factors25 responsible for perceived inefficiency and
ineffectiveness of interagency efforts abroad are:
22 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 2. Hereinafter referred to as QDR.
For a discussion of the QDR, see CRS Report R41250, Quadrennial Defense Review 2010: Overview and Implications
for National Security Planning, by Stephen Daggett. Also see CRS Report RL34505, National Security Strategy:
Legislative Mandates, Execution to Date, and Considerations for Congress, by Catherine Dale.
23 U.S. Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review, Washington, DC, December 15, 2010. Henceforth referred to as QDDR. (For more information
on the QDDR, see CRS Report R41173, Foreign Aid Reform, National Strategy, and the Quadrennial Review, by
Susan B. Epstein.) The QDDR document further points to relations with other agencies, private contractors, and state
and local governments: “More specifically, State will enter into interagency agreements, consistent with existing law,
to draw on the skills, expertise and personnel of other federal agencies before turning to private contractors where State
determines that building in-house government capability or promoting bilateral working relationships furthers our
foreign policy priorities. For certain core functions, State will also establish a presumption to enter into agreements to
draw on other agencies and state and local government, where appropriate, to implement State programs overseas....
State will use private contractors for non-governmental functions when other agencies lack appropriate skills or are
otherwise unwilling or unable to provide the services needed in an effective manner.” Pp. 33-34.
24 Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, Report required by Sec. 1049, National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2009, P.L. 110-181, Arlington, VA, November 2008. Hereinafter cited as PNSR 2008. PNSR
found the mob scene phenomenon “especially [prevalent] in our attempts to manage the numerous so-called ‘soft-
powers’ resident in diverse organizations within the federal government.” p. 517.
25 The Government Accountability Office provides an overview of the issues in National Security: Key Challenges and
Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, GAO-10-822T, June 9, 2010. This document categorizes the
problems somewhat differently than this report. Its categories are: (1) developing and implementing overarching,
integrated strategies to achieve national security objectives; (2) creating collaborative organizations that facilitate
(continued...)
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• Inadequate civilian strategic planning and interagency operational planning
capabilities and processes;26
• Structural weaknesses in the U.S. government system for conducting missions
abroad including (1) department-centric organizations resulting in the tendency
for “stove-piping,” with each agency reporting up and down through its own
chain of command and responsibility for coordination placed on an overburdened
White House; (2) insufficient civilian resources, including personnel,
discouraging domestically-oriented agencies from directing funds and personnel
away from core missions; (3) inadequate mechanisms to foster information
sharing within and among agencies; and (4) insufficient leadership authority,
either de jure or de facto, at the headquarters and field level; and
• Personnel who are not trained for interagency missions, possessing little, if any,
familiarity with the missions, capabilities, and cultures of other departments and
agencies.
Some analysts also cite strong disagreements among key players over the general purposes of and
means to conduct missions as factors impeding successful performance. Improved institutional
arrangements and enhanced leadership may provide the means to reduce such disagreements, or
their worst effect, in some, but not all, missions.
The perceived problems surface and have repercussions at all levels: in the field (U.S. embassies
or interagency operations on-the-ground), at an intermediate (regional) level, at department
headquarters in Washington, D.C., and within the Executive Office of the President, i.e., the
White House. How these problems manifest themselves in interagency missions is briefly
outlined in the section immediately below. The next section provides an overview of proposals to
address these problems, with extended discussion in the appendices.
Manifestations in U.S. Interagency Cooperation
Problems with strategic planning and leadership are most often attributed to deficiencies at the
White House, particularly the National Security Council (NSC).27 The NSC, consisting of the
President, the Vice President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and others, is the ultimate
locus for integrating foreign policy and national security strategy and policy making. Through its
directorates and staff, it at times has been responsible for coordinating or even directing policy
implementation. The term “National Security Council” is sometimes used to encompass the
council itself, as well as NSC directorates and staff. Despite its central role, many analysts
consider NSC staff (currently numbering some 300, including detailees) and procedures
(...continued)
integrated national security approaches; (3) developing a well-trained workforce; (4) sharing and integrating national
security information across agencies; and (5) importance of sustained leadership.
26 Many civilian departments and agencies play a role in the missions and activities covered by this report. More than a
dozen civilian executive branch departments and agencies may be involved in stabilization and reconstruction missions
and other national security activities abroad. As most would expect, these include the Department of State, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency. Others are the Departments of
Justice, Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, Homeland Security, Heath and Human Services, Transportation, and
Treasury, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
27 For more information on the National Security Council (NSC), see Appendix A and CRS Report RL30840, The
National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment, by Richard A. Best Jr.
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inadequate to effectively oversee steady state interagency missions and, almost invariably, prone
to be overwhelmed by crises.
Crises reveal the full range of perceived problems in interagency missions. Strategic planning can
break down. The usual practice calls for the relevant State Department regional bureau to direct
civilian crisis planning and implementation in conjunction with the NSC, which meshes it with
DOD planning if necessary. In the case of disagreements, the NSC may not always be able to play
a mediating function. Usually, ad hoc staff-level interagency task forces are formed to coordinate
the activities of civilian agencies and DOD. Task forces can form at the department level and the
field level. Operations can be complicated by their members lack of interagency experience,
knowledge of other agencies’ contributions, and different cultures. In the field, task forces can be
creative, devising solutions to problems. But task force members can end up at odds when they
refer problems the task force cannot resolve up their individual chains of command.
Structural weaknesses manifest themselves at the department level, where steady state policies,
plans, and programs are developed, and at the field level, where programs are implemented. Both
planning and implementation are theoretically conducted in accordance with the President’s broad
policy guidance as developed through National Security Council (NSC) processes and meetings
of the President’s Cabinet, but agency interests, personalities, the availability of resources, and
other factors affect outcomes.
The panoply of players, each with their own priorities and perspectives, illustrates the difficulties
of developing plans for civilian foreign affairs activities and efforts. This function is usually led
by the State Department and shared (not necessarily equally) by State Department regional and
functional bureaus, by USAID and other agencies where appropriate, and by the Ambassadors at
U.S. embassies. The implementation of field-level efforts and activities is reviewed, approved or
disapproved, and overseen by the State Department regional and functional bureaus, which also
secure funding for them. In other civilian agencies (i.e., the Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
Justice, and Agriculture, among others), headquarters units involved in foreign affairs play a large
role in planning and implementing their activities as their presence abroad is often very limited.
At the headquarters level, collaboration and coordination among civilian agencies varies, but
often may be minimal.
Some analysts perceive a key structural weakness at the field level, where U.S. Ambassadors are
responsible for transforming the President’s broad foreign policy outline into concrete diplomatic
measures and foreign assistance programs. At U.S. embassies (which are the United States’
largest civilian permanent structures abroad), the Ambassador (or other COM) directs and
coordinates foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the embassy “country teams. These teams are
composed of the representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies present in a country. The
degree to which Ambassadors can actually lead and coordinate activities varies greatly according
to the interest and management ability of each individual Ambassador. And, many find that the
Ambassador lacks the necessary authority to compel agency representatives to direct their
activities to fulfill embassy mission, rather than agency, goals.
There are particular structural weaknesses at the regional level. Here, DOD is strong; it plans for
and implements operations and activities through the regional Combatant Commands
(COCOMS), also known as the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). When in combat, the
U.S. military operates under its own statutory authorities. In peacetime, military personnel
carrying out security cooperation and related functions (developed by the GCC and approved by
each country’s COM) are attached to the U.S. embassies under COM authority, although the
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degree to which they view themselves as responsible to the COM rather than the geographic
combatant commander varies greatly, according to some analysts. There is no corresponding
regional entity on the civilian side. Further, civilian input into GCC planning is considered
limited, although some GCCs have attempted over the past decade to incorporate civilian
perspectives into their planning systems.
Some analysts regard the absence of permanent civilian regional structures like the GCCs as a
serious deficiency. The State Department does have regional programs in many areas and a
number of “coordinators” reporting directly to the Secretary of State, who play varying roles in
conducting or coordinating interagency missions. For instance, the State Department Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) encourages and manages interagency regional planning
for counterterrorism activities. But these coordinators do not have the power to compel
interagency cooperation.
Overview of Reform Proposals
Proposals for reforming the structures, procedures, and
In Focus: Bureaucracy
mechanisms for foreign policy and strategy making,
and Reform
planning, and implementation range from all inclusive
The difficulties in fostering interagency
to narrow. In 2008, the House Armed Services
col aboration should not be underestimated.
Committee urged Congress to legislate a new National
According to one expert on interagency
Security Act to reform DOD and the entire spectrum of
cooperation, “Almost nothing about the
bureaucratic ethos makes it hospitable to
interagency operations, and to codify new structures
interagency collaboration. The collaborative
that would “flatten, simplify, and integrate” agencies’
ethos values equality, adaptability, discretion,
related processes.29 The same year, the Congressionally-
and results; the bureaucratic ethos venerates
mandated Project on National Security Reform (PNSR)
hierarchy, stability, obedience, and
also proposed a wholesale overhaul of the National
procedures. Making the transition from an
existing way of doing agency business to a
Security Act of 1947.30 (Subsequently, however, PNSR
new and more col aborative way requires
leaders stated that this proposal did not exclude
actors to withdraw at least temporarily from
incremental change.)
the bureaucratic ethos. They must spurn
something they may have at least respected if
Absent full-scale reform, some analysts find but faint
not cherished.... They must adopt the stance
that purpose should dictate structure rather
possibilities for the success of those interagency
than allow structure to dictate purpose.”28
initiatives undertaken thus far. Stating that the U.S.
government operates with core national security processes and organizations dating to the 1950s,
one author judged that initiatives such as S/CRS “are bound to fail without corresponding
initiatives to transform the foundations of U.S. foreign policy.”31
28 Eugene Bardach, Getting Agencies to Work Together: The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), p. 232.
29 U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Initial Perspectives, committee print, prepared by Panel on Roles
and Missions, 110th Cong., 1st sess., January 2008, H.Prt.110-7 (Washington: GPO, 2008), p. 48.
30 PNSR 2008, Executive Summary, p. i. The NDAA for FY2008, P.L. 110-181, Section 1049, authorized up to $3
million for the study.
31 Scott R. Feil, “The Failure of Incrementalism: Interagency Coordination Challenges and Responses,” in The
Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, ed. Joseph R.
Cerami and Jay W. Boggs (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 286.
Other Bush Administration initiatives Feil cited were National Security Presidential Directive 44, Department of
Defense Directive 3000.05, and then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s “transformational diplomacy.”
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The argument for wholesale reform rests on the interdependence of the entire national security
system, where changes in one area will inevitably affect authorities and practices in another.
Nevertheless, given the conceptual and practical difficulties of legislating and implementing
wholesale reform, many analysts favor an incremental approach, with selected improvements in
key areas.32 Some focus on a particular agency, or certain missions or activities. Others look at
top-level management structures, still others at field level practices.
While there is ample overlap in analyses and recommendations, there is also considerable
diversity. These proposals are catalogued below under four rubrics: (1) improve strategy-making,
planning, and budgeting mechanisms and procedures; (2) correct structural weaknesses by
improving institutional structures, arrangements, and authorities for coordination and
collaboration at the headquarters and regional levels;33 (3) address structural weakness at the field
level by enhancing the authority and capacity of U.S. Ambassadors; and (4) create interagency
personnel policies and mechanisms. Table 1, before the appendices, presents the spectrum of
proposals by author and type. Source citations, and the acronyms identifying them in the tables,
are found in the bibliography.
Improve Strategy-making, Planning, and Budgeting?
A fundamental weakness of the current system perceived by many analysts is a lack of adequate
strategy-making, planning, and budgeting capabilities and procedures. Many have pointed to
these deficiencies as critically undermining the United States’ ability to develop and conduct
coherent and effective foreign policies, missions, and assistance activities. They also can produce
duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in others. Many analysts have cited a need for
systems and procedures to ensure the development of coherent strategy, guide planning, and bring
to bear sufficient leadership and direction. (See the Appendix B text box for the difficulties of
compiling comprehensive information on counterterrorism spending and foreign police and other
law enforcement assistance.)
Possible options offered to address these deficiencies are examined in Appendix B. Some involve
modifying the National Security Council (NSC) and NSC staff roles, responsibilities, or structure.
These include establishing new NSC positions, establishing new NSC structures, or assigning
new responsibilities to the NSC and its national security staff. Others would institute new strategy
development processes and documents, or enhance strategy development and planning. Other
options include integrating budgets, and improving budgeting processes.
32 PNSR’s revised recommendations in September 2009 focused on building blocks to reform that could be taken
without legislation, to accelerate progress towards holistic reform. Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas
into Action, September 2009, p. iii. Hereinafter referred to as PNSR 2009.
33 The terms “collaboration” and ‘coordination” are often used interchangeably. A CRS report discusses and illustrates
the strict meaning of these terms: collaboration applies to agencies working together under voluntary arrangements
while coordination is used when there is a lead official or agency with formal authority to instruct, direct, or order other
members. (See CRS Report R41803, Interagency Collaborative Arrangements and Activities: Types, Rationales,
Considerations , by Frederick M. Kaiser.) This report will adhere to these definitions in the CRS text. The term
“cooperation,” as used here, includes both collaboration and cooperation. Where “coordination” is used in quotes from
or references to the works consulted for this report, the term may not be used in its strict sense.
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Improve Civilian Institutional Authorities and Structures for Coordination
and Collaboration?
The perceived weaknesses of civilian institutions (including insufficient authority and planning
capabilities, ineffective hierarchical arrangements, and a paucity of resources) are viewed as
impeding their ability to conduct and coordinate interagency missions abroad. Proponents of
reforms to address these problems identify two bureaucratic impediments to interagency reform.
One is that agencies prioritize core missions and resist allocating personnel and other resources to
peripheral missions. Another is that personnel respond to the direction and perceptions of those
who evaluate and promote them, rather than to other superiors who are not in their chain of
command. A perceived need to build appropriate structures and to create adequate leadership
authority to overcome these obstacles undergirds many proposals for interagency reform.
Appendix C discusses these proposals.
Because the State Department is responsible for
In Focus: Impediments to
overseeing the conduct of the President’s foreign
Institutional Change
policy, many analysts focus on strengthening its
The difficulties of creating new structures or
capacity to lead, coordinate, and conduct civilian
authorities, or of expanding existing ones, are
missions and activities abroad. Some proposals
illustrated by the bureaucratic opposition
deal specifically with improving the State
encountered by the State Department Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
Department’s ability to lead and conduct S&R
(S/CRS) when it was established in 2004.
missions. Others, however, would reallocate S&R
responsibilities to other agencies.
As described by one author: The “USAID
Administrator ... was unhappy about the creation of
S/CRS because he had devoted considerable
Other institutional arrangements are proposed.
attention to building a conflict management capacity
Some would create new institutions specifically for
in USAID,... The [USAID] Office of Foreign
S&R. On a smaller scale, others advocate
Disaster Assistance ... feared its Disaster Assistance
establishing interagency teams or task forces.
Response Teams (DARTs) would be
commandeered by S/CRS. The [State Department]
Some would enhance civilian input into GCCs and
geographic bureaus ... did not welcome a new
other DOD units, while others would create new
player which might threaten their control over
civilian regional structures.
policy toward a conflicted state. INL [the State
Department Bureau of International Narcotics
Some proposals focus on civilian personnel. Some
Control and Law Enforcement] did not wish S/CRS
to intrude into its operational control of police
urge a review or augmentation of the numbers of
training. PM [the State Department Bureau of
civilian personnel at the State Department and
Political-Military Affairs] tried to reassert its earlier
USAID. Others propose augmenting personnel and
ownership of complex contingency planning and
other capacity government-wide for interagency
claimed a new responsibility for State Department-
missions. Some would increase personnel in the
related aspects of counterinsurgency, a specific type
of conflict response. The NSC ... weighed in to help
Civilian Response Corps.
it move forward. Nevertheless, S/CRS made little
progress in securing interagency agreement on a
formal framework and process to trigger a major
R&S [reconstruction and stabilization] program.”34
34 U.S. Peacefare, pp. 85-86.
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Enhance Authority and/or Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors?
As the leaders of the interagency “country teams,”
In Focus: Authorities vs. Reality
Ambassadors are viewed by many analysts as the key to
Despite the statutes, executive order, and
improving interagency coordination and increasing the
President’s letter providing an Ambassador
effectiveness of interagency missions in the bilateral
with authority to manage personnel and
arena. Some analysts view strong country team
activities in-country, an Ambassador may
encounter many challenges to overseeing and
leadership by an Ambassador as the key reason for what
coordinating activities. Ambassadors must,
they perceive as successful interagency cooperation in
according to one author, “counteract the
recent U.S. assistance efforts in Colombia, Paraguay,
never-ending problem of agency officials back
and the Philippines.36
in Washington eager to direct their overseas
staff, sometimes without filling in the
ambassador.”35
Because of their vital role in interagency cooperation,
there are various proposals to enhance Ambassadors’
Chief of Mission (COM) authority. (See Appendix D.) Some would strengthen their authority
over embassy staff or their control over funding for activities carried out by members of the
embassy team. Others recommend enhancing Ambassadors’ ability to manage the interagency
country teams and carry out other responsibilities. One proposal would expand COM authority to
enable Ambassadors to effectively lead regional or crisis task forces.
Create Interagency Personnel Policies and Mechanisms?
Few U.S. government personnel have the necessary knowledge, skills, and experience to work
together effectively in interagency missions, according to many analysts. There are many
proposals to provide them with interagency education, training, and experience in order to create
a U.S. government-wide “interagency” culture, as discussed in Appendix E. (See the Appendix
E text box for insight into the differences between DOD and Department of State agency
cultures.)
Some proposals call for the formation of a group of national security professionals from all levels
dedicated to interagency operations, some for building-up President Bush’s National Security
Professional Development program, some for developing interagency career paths, and some
creating an interagency cadre of senior managers. Other proposals would overhaul personnel
systems and expectations, linking interagency education, training, and experience to job
qualifications, opportunities, and promotions. At the other end of the scale, more limited
proposals call for expanding the opportunities and incentives for interagency education, training,
and professional experience, and protecting interagency personnel against political currents.
Some proposals call for creating new institutions for interagency education and training, or
enhancing existing ones.
35 Shawn Zeller, “Who’s in Charge Here?,” Foreign Service Journal, December 2007, p. 21. The article quotes
Ambassador Charles A. “Tony” Gillespie Jr., former Ambassador to Chile, Colombia, and Grenada: “It’s awfully easy
for someone back in Washington, in Justice or Agriculture, just to pick up the phone and tell a person to go and do
something.... The challenge is to make sure the voice of the United States is consistent and to make sure that agency
heads understand that they are supposed to let the ambassador know of their programs and give him a chance to weigh
in. Otherwise it’s very easy for someone in Washington to treat the embassy as their own foreign office.” (pp. 21-22)
36 Author’s interview (Serafino), October 2011.
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Issues for Congress
Congress has considerable authority regarding interagency reform. Through its appropriations
power, Congress ultimately controls reforms that require additional resources, such as personnel,
facilities, and additional education and training. Congress also sets through statute the
organization of the top levels of executive branch departments and agencies, conditioning the
executive’s ability to put in place new high-level posts and organizational units. These include
positions at the NSC, and leadership positions, i.e., Assistant Secretary and above, at the civilian
departments, including State, Defense, USAID, and others. Congress also has considerable
influence over other personnel matters, through its power to promote civilian and military officers
and fix other terms of employment. Even where the Executive branch has the authority to make
changes on its own, Congress can stimulate reforms by enacting legislation that would break
bureaucratic resistance, for instance, Congress can mandate new procedures and processes by
requiring strategy and budget documents that deal with these matters. Congress may also
encourage changes indirectly through hearings, briefings, and meetings with executive branch
officials.
While contemplating the utility of specific reforms, Members may also wish to consider a number
of issues. Four addressed below are: whether interagency reform is necessary; to what extent the
U.S. military should be relied upon; how to prioritize proposed reforms, and will interagency
reform produce budget savings?
Is Interagency Reform Necessary for Missions Abroad?
The United States’ long military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided much of the
impetus for interagency reform efforts, but have also raised doubts about the wisdom of the
interagency S&R missions. Perceptions regarding the necessity and desirability of interagency
reform for missions abroad may be tied to a policymaker’s assessment of the future security
environment and the appropriate scope of the U.S. response. The need for overall reform, or even
limited reform in certain areas, may depend on whether one judges that (1) the conflict
environment and state-building demands of the past two decades will continue into the next
several decades; (2) whether there are significant new types of missions that would be made more
effective by improved interagency collaboration, and (3) whether one accepts or questions the
utility of such engagements.
Future Conflict Environment and Missions
Initially, the perception that extensive interagency reform for missions abroad is vital to U.S.
national security was fostered by the belief that weak, unstable states and post-conflict settings
provide fertile breeding grounds for international terrorism. Initial proposals were grounded in the
desire to bring to bear in these situations effective whole-of-government efforts to foster security,
good governance and economic development, to prevent outbreaks of conflict, and to forestall
reoccurrences of conflict in transitions from conflict and post-conflict settings. Some analysts
soon disputed the premise that weak and failed states are per se among the most significant
threats to the United States. They pointed out that terrorists find safe-haven and recruits in
developed countries as well, and identified many factors—demographic, political, religious,
cultural, and geographic—contributing to the spread of terrorism. An emphasis on weak and
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failed states, they argued, can result in fruitless interventions, pointless expenditures, and too little
attention on more tangible threats and areas of greater U.S. interest.37
The 2010 QDR does not discount potential threats from weak states, but discussed them in terms
broader than international terrorism. The changing international environment, it judged, “will
continue to put pressure on the modern state system, likely increasing the frequency and severity
of the challenges associated with chronically fragile states ... [which] are often catalysts for the
growth of radicalism and extremism.... Over the course of the next several decades, conflicts are
at least as likely to result from state weakness as from state strength.” It points out some fragile
states “are nuclear-armed or are critically important to enduring American interests.”
This document argues for the integration of defense, diplomacy, and development (the so-called
“3D”) tools to prevent the rise of threats to U.S. interests and to meet the challenges of “a
complex and uncertain security landscape in which the pace of change continues to accelerate.”38
It points to counterterrorism, building the capacity of foreign security forces, and preventing
conflict as interagency missions that will continue into the foreseeable future. And, it flags a need
for interagency approaches to help “strengthen weak states, including those facing homegrown
insurgencies and transnational terrorist and criminal networks or those weakened by humanitarian
disasters.”39
Utility of State-building Missions
To those policymakers and analysts who would discount the need to deal with numerous or high
visibility situations requiring extensive state-building in the foreseeable future, the need for
interagency reform, especially those aspects of it dealing with increasing civilian capacity and
integrative personnel measures, may seem less than pressing. Similarly, this need would be
discounted by those who are skeptical that the United States can effect significant changes in
other states—weak, failing, or simply seriously flawed—through military or political
interventions aimed at creating viable government institutions.
The effectiveness of past efforts is a subject of debate, with differing views on the criteria for and
the number of successes, draws, and failures, as is the best means to achieve success. There is
considerable skepticism that state-building efforts often result in success. In the words of one
scholar, “barring exceptional circumstances (the war against the Taliban after 9/11), we had best
steer clear of missions that deploy forces (of whatever kind) into countries to remake them
anew.... The success stories (Germany, Japan) are the exceptions and were possible because of
several helpful conditions that will not be replicated elsewhere.”40
37 See Stewart Patrick. Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.” Working Paper No. 73,
Center for Global Development, January 2006, and Justin Logan and Christopher Preble. Failed States and Flawed
Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office. CATO Policy Analysis Paper No. 560, Cato Institute,
January 11, 2006.
38 QDR, p. 5.
39 QDR, p. 20.
40 Rajan Menon, “Low Intensity Conflict in the Emerging Strategic Environment,” as reproduced in U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. Strategic Requirements for Stability Operations and Reconstruction:
Final Report. 2008, pp. 80-81. For a short discussion of the elements contributing to the successful occupations in
Japan and Germany, often not present elsewhere, see CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by
Experiences in Japan and Germany, by Nina M. Serafino.
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On the other hand, some analysts judge that some international post-conflict state-building efforts
have had considerable success. Mozambique and El Salvador are often pointed to as cases where
state-building during and after civil strife promoted durable peace in the early 1990s. While two
countries where the United States intervened militarily in the 1990s—Haiti and Somalia—are still
highly problematic, the Balkans, once aflame with war, is stable despite the persistence of ethnic
tensions. A 2003 RAND study that looked at eight U.N. peacekeeping missions (plus Iraq, where
the U.N. played a role) judged that “seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left
democratic ... substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating
conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy.”41 The long period of
time that it takes conditions in post-conflict countries to stabilize—for instance in Bosnia-
Hercegovina (after the Dayton peace accord of December 1995) and in Kosovo as a separate
entity from Serbia (after the NATO military intervention of 1999) is not surprising to some
analysts in light of assessments that state-building efforts take many years to produce results.42
U.S. and international efforts to improve the possibilities of success for mitigating conflict and
improving state-building operations are demonstrating what some regard as increasing promise.
Continuing research and evaluation by the U.S. and other governments, as well as academia and
think tanks, are advancing a broader understanding of the sources and drivers of conflict. There is
a growing body of academic and government literature on the effectiveness of mechanisms used
to defuse and settle conflicts, as well as sets of state-building best practices to prevent or
ameliorate conflict.43 Some analysts judge that future U.S. state-building efforts—when
conducted on the basis of this knowledge and carried out by trained and experienced personnel
operating under a well-designed interagency framework—may be more successful than in the
past.
To What Extent Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed
State-Building Capabilities?
The use of the U.S. military in non-combat roles, particularly state-building, has a long and
controversial history. During the Cold War years of the 1950s-1980s, the U.S. military focused on
developing combat capabilities for decisive victories in conventional warfare. The inconclusive
41 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, and Keith Crane, et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq,
RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxxvi. The cases examined were the Belgium Congo, Namibia, El Salvador,
Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern Slavonia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq.
42 In an analysis of seven U.S. military interventions with nation-building objectives, RAND authors argue that a
minimum of five years is necessary to produce even initial results. “The record suggest that, while staying long does
not guarantee success, leaving early ensures failure. To date, no effort at enforced democratization has taken hold in
less than five years.” James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, and Keith Crane, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building from
Germany to Iraq, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2003, p. xxiv.
43 Under the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. government has advanced its instruments for
assessing and organizing interagency responses to conflict, in particular the Interagency Conflict Assessment
Framework (ICAF), developed by USAID and S/CRS, and the Interagency Management System (IMS), developed by
S/CRS. These tools have not, however, been used consistently or systematically, according to practitioners. Reflecting
on the ability of the U.S. government and the international community to deal with conflict, S/CRS acting director
Robert Loftis stated that “Ideally, U.S. engagements will improve across time, tempered by testing assumptions,
building knowledge, refuting simplistic models of what causes violence and replacing them with strategies built on real
experience.... We cannot solve these problems alone or for the countries we aim to help. But we can improve our ability
to work at the margins.” Transcript provided to CRS of remarks for delivery at George Mason University, August 10,
2011, p. 7.
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1965-1972 counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, which combined military force with a program
of socioeconomic reform reinforced the notion that combat was the only appropriate mission for
U.S. military forces. However, events of the first two post-Cold War decades—the 1990s “peace
operations,” the problematic post-combat transitions that generated insurgencies in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and the efforts to deter the spread of terrorism after 9/11—gradually convinced defense
policymakers that future military missions would often require political, economic, and social
state-building components.
A current question for U.S. policymakers is to what extent should the U.S. military provide the
personnel to carry out non-combat national security activities, either in conjunction with combat
operations (e.g., counterinsurgency, or post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction), or as a
separate military mission (e. g., counterterrorism)? DOD’s response—up to this point—may be
described as an ambiguous “to whatever extent necessary.”
The DOD February 2010 QDR cites among its six key missions the need to “succeed in
counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations,” and to “build the security capacity
of partner states.”44 DOD, however, does not see the U.S. military as the primary actor in the
many non-combat missions that it performs.45
The 2010 QDR reinforces DODD 3000.05 statements that DOD would often play a supporting
role in such missions and activities. However, the meaning of a “supporting role” may vary
depending on the availability of civilians to carry out those missions. The 2010 QDR argues that
the presence of a “strong and adequately resourced cadre of civilians organized and trained to
operate alongside or in lieu of U.S. military personnel” is “an important investment for the
nation’s security,”46 But it also reaffirms the Directive’s intent to ensure that state-building skills
and abilities are available.47 While DODD 3000.05 acknowledges that civilians are better suited
to state-building tasks in such missions, it also recognizes that civilian agencies cannot operate in
all situations, and perhaps also that they are unlikely to develop these capabilities to the extent
needed, at least for some time to come.48
Implications of a DOD State-Building Role for the U.S. Military
Maintaining state-building capabilities within the U.S. military services is not without cost. DOD
has made a considerable front end investment in developing doctrine, training, and exercises for
these capabilities.49 Further developing and maintaining appropriate skill levels and special
abilities (such as personnel with all needed language capabilities) comes at an additional cost. At
44 QDR, see pp 17, 20, and 26.
45 “As our experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, sustainable outcomes require civilian development and
governance experts who can help build local civilian capacity. Although the U.S. military can and should have the
expertise and capacity to conduct these activities, civilian leadership of humanitarian assistance, development, and
governance is essential.” QDR, p. 69.
46 QDR, p. 69.
47 “The Department will retain capabilities designed to support civilian authorities as needed.” QDR, p. 1.
48 DODD 3000.05. Point 4.3: “Many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian
professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain
order when civilians cannot do so.”
49 For instance, the Army created a Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, http://pksoi.army.mi/, the services
and JCS invested considerable effort in developing multiple doctrine and other manuals for stability operations, and
military training centers developed new training scenarios for stability operations.
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a time when increasing budget constraints and a drawdown of active duty troops over the next
several years seem likely, defense analysts may raise concerns about the possible trade-offs of
maintaining such capabilities. If the price of retaining adequate capabilities requires keeping a
substantially larger number of military personnel, this additional cost may be factored into a
debate over weapons modernization vs. personnel budgets.
Because of these additional costs and the burden that performing such tasks can place on
overstretched military forces, as well as the perception that civilians can often perform these tasks
better, DOD leaders have long pushed for the development of a civilian capacity for state-
building activities. Former Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates repeatedly urged Congress to
fund these capabilities, as have the two recent Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.50
Given these costs, Congress may wish to consider whether DOD should remain the default
capability for planning and conducting state-building activities or whether to expand civilian
capabilities sufficiently to permit DOD to retain only those needed for situations too hostile for
civilians to operate. Policymakers who judge that retaining state-building and other stability
operations capacity in DOD may be the best option for the United States into the foreseeable
future may wish to improve DOD’s ability to carry out such missions. One option might be to
implement the DSB 2005 proposal to create a position for Deputy Under Secretary for Defense
for Policy (Stability Operations) that has never been instituted.51 (Responsibility for stability
operations remains under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity
Conflict, i.e., SO/LIC.) Another would be to ensure that all DODD 3000.05 mandates are fully
implemented.
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
Another area of concern is the possible effect on U.S. foreign policy if state-building activities are
largely conducted by U.S. military or DOD contracted personnel. A prominent concern is the
effect of military dominance on the State Department’s lead role in foreign policy coordination
and implementation. The current high-profile DOD role may not only undermine the current
statutory basis for the conduct of foreign policy, but also empower a department whose culture
and processes are more attuned to accomplishing concrete missions than guiding the flow of
bilateral and international relations with a view to the long-run. In addition, many have
questioned whether U.S. efforts to promote democratization and civilian control of governments
abroad might be undermined by too prominent a military face on the U.S. presence around the
world. A RAND publication predicts adverse consequences in both areas:
50 In its 2004 report, Transitions, the Defense Science Board urged Congress to adopt the legislation proposed by
Senator Richard G. Lugar and then Senator, now Vice President Joe Biden establishing the State Department Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The following year, in a prepared statement for
Congressional testimony in February 2005, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers cited
the creation of S/CRS as an important step and stated that if it were “given appropriate resources, it will synchronize
military and civilian efforts and ensure an integrated national approach is applied to post-combat peacekeeping,
reconstruction and stability operations.” Posture Statement of General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, before the 109th Congress. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 17, 2005, p. 31, as posted at
that time on the Senate Armed Services Committee website.
51 Institutionalizing Stability Operations, p. 24. This option is not included in the tables of proposals because it
concerns DOD organization.
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If nation-building remains a foreign-policy[sic] priority for the United States but the majority
of resources and capabilities for that priority are concentrated in DoD, that organization ...
will become the lead agency for a major component of U.S. foreign policy. Such a
development would weaken the role of the State Department, both at home and abroad. It
would raise concerns about the weakening of civilian control over military policy and
undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts around the world. In short, it would be a fundamental
realignment of how the United States both sees itself and is seen globally.52
The RAND publication also raises concerns that state-building activities are made more difficult
and less effective when the military takes the lead.53 As DOD documents and officials public
comments have repeated, the military is most often rightly the second choice for many state-
building tasks. Although military personnel may become more competent at these tasks, many
question whether military could ever become as competent as civilians, hired for their expertise at
state-building tasks, without dedicating personnel and units specifically to those tasks. That
alternative has been rejected by military in the past, and is not on the agenda for the future.
Short-term Trade-offs
Short-term cost considerations may come into play in decisions regarding the DOD role in state-
building. The relative budget costs between further developing capabilities in DOD and building
new capabilities in civilian agencies may be an issue. As measured against the S&R capabilities
envisioned by the Bush Administration’s Civilian Stabilization Initiative, current capacity falls far
short and is declining still further. As up-front costs are usually higher than sustainment costs, and
much further investment is needed in civilian capacity to bring it up to that initiatives’ goals, use
of the military may be the most cost-effective in the short run. Further, some may argue that
continued development of state-building and other S&R capacity is relatively modest in terms of
the defense budget. Nevertheless, if the United States begins to draw down military forces with
the scale-backs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the anti-nation-building arguments of the 1990s—when a
smaller force was stressed by the additional tasks and the costs of the additional personnel needed
to perform such missions was measured against investments in weapons modernization—may
reemerge. At some point, DOD may find it too costly in terms of over-stressed personnel and
foregone investment to continue to embrace stability missions on a par with combat operations, as
mandated by DODD 3000.05.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, the State Department generally has exercised the lead in state-
building and related activities for the past 60 years, with few exceptions. An increase of
52 Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, and Heather Peterson, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2009, p. 64. (Hereinafter cited as Improving Capacity for S&R.) The quote
continues: Such developments would send a powerful signal worldwide that the United States views stabilization and
reconstruction as defense tasks rather than as components of its broader foreign policy. This would strengthen
perceptions that the United States considers the military its primary instrument of power; it could also make
stabilization, reconstruction, and other development efforts appear subsidiary to military missions. p. 65.
53 “The United States would also face difficulty working with NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and IOs
[international organizations]around the world, which would distrust the military’s leadership of such missions. It would
also make it more difficult during such operations for the U.S. government to coordinate with governments whose
civilians take the lead.... With NGOs and IOs distrustful, other civilian specialists likely questioning the mission, and
State and USAID capacity dwindling as resources flow to DoD, stabilization and reconstruction efforts would be
undertaken without appropriate information and guidance. Moreover, because warfighting will remain the primary
mission of DoD, development tasks would probably be aligned to advance military goals rather than be the objectives
in themselves.” Improving Capacity for S&R, p. 65.
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capabilities and budgets in DOD, even if intended to be only temporary, could translate into a de
facto shift from State Department leadership, with possible implications for the balance of
authority between these two departments in the future.
Which Proposals Are Highest Priority?54
Given that an overarching reform of the national security system appears unlikely, policymakers
and analysts may debate the priority order of specific reform elements, and the possible
implications of the order in which they are adopted. Should reform efforts concentrate on
improving strategy-making, planning, and budgeting capabilities and procedures? Are
effectiveness and improved collaboration or coordination better achieved by creating new
governmental structures or rearranging existing ones, or by focusing on increasing the number of
specially trained or dedicated personnel, particularly civilians? Or would augmenting current
authorities and enhancing the capacity of existing structures and personnel be a more cost-
effective approach? These questions have not been systematically raised. Addressing all possible
questions and exploring the numerous permutations of approaches is beyond the scope of this
report. Nevertheless, in forming their judgments, policymakers may wish to consider the
following possible approaches to prioritizing reform.
Prioritize by System Weaknesses
Policymakers may view priorities through many different lenses. Many may judge priorities
based on their perception of the crucial strengths and weaknesses of the current system. For
instance, those who emphasize the need for coherent strategy-making for crisis operations view
the essential fix as at the White House level, with changes in the structure and functioning of the
NSC, while those concerned with better “steady state” (i.e. a normal peacetime situation) strategy
may look as well to the State Department and the embassy level. Those who believe that
personalities dominate strategy-making processes and implementation regardless of structures
might de-emphasize the need for higher level structural reform, and possibly emphasize the need
for enhancing the capacity, authority, and flexibility of leadership at all levels. Those who see
personnel at operational level as capable of correcting flaws and deficiencies of higher levels
might prioritize reform at the field level, with an emphasis on the development of interagency
personnel.55 An emphasis on interagency professional development may also be preferred by
those who judge that thorough interagency reform will require a generational change best started
by institutionalizing reform from the bottom up. On the whole, specific criteria for prioritizing
reform elements are lacking.
54 The proposals surveyed for this report deal in differing degrees with the specific reform elements, and do not provide
a concrete guide to ascertaining relative utility and priority. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the largest
number of recommendations concerned enhancing interagency training, education, and rotations, and the second largest
concerned modifying NSC responsibilities or structures. Of course, the number of recommendations in each category
would vary according to the sources selected. However, this selection includes many sources that could be expected to
be common to most lists.
55 The 2006 QDR judges the field level as integral to the development and conduct of interagency missions: “Solutions
developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long
experience shows that operators, regardless of parent agency, collaborate closely when faced with common challenges
in the field: they often resolve interagency concerns quickly and seamlessly to achieve team objectives.” p. 85.
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One guide to developing priority criteria may be conclusions drawn from historical case studies.
The editors of one compilation of 11 case studies of interagency missions56 found three recurring
weaknesses that some policymakers may chose to make their priorities: (1) little investment in
human capital;57 (2) the absence of “interagency doctrine;”58 and (3) a lack of appropriate
leadership at the highest levels.59 However, the editors also provide a cautionary note about the
limits of interagency reform. Above all, they asserted, competent leaders are more important than
structures, statutes, and process. “At the highest levels of government, no organizational design,
institutional procedures, or legislative remedy proved adequate to overcome poor leadership and
combative personalities.”
Prioritize and Improve George W. Bush Administration Initiatives
Some policymakers may view support for the efforts begun by the Bush Administration as a
priority. One such effort is the national security professional development program, as discussed
above. Another is the creation of civilian capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction under
S/CRS. A prominent feature of six early reports (between 2003 and 2005) on S&R operations was
a recommendation to develop rapidly deployable civilian forces to undertake state-building
functions, particularly those related to rule of law, even before hostilities had ceased. Many
viewed the development of civilian groups as permitting the earlier withdrawal of military
personnel than would otherwise be possible. The establishment and deployment of such a corps,
now underway, marks a substantial change from past practices. Some policymakers and analysts
may view continued attention to and support for the needs of improving this capability as
desirable, given the resources already devoted to it. However, as mentioned above, to those who
doubt that the utility of state-building endeavors abroad, or are wary of undertaking such efforts
while the United State faces budget difficulties, these programs may not merit priority status.
Prioritize by Effect on International Cooperation
Another approach for prioritizing reforms might be to emphasize those changes that might enable
the U.S. government to more effectively cooperate with other governments, international
56 James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz, “Mismanaging Mayhem: Interagency Operations Past and Future,” in
Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis, ed. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport,
CT: Praeger Security International , 2008), p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as Mismanaging Mayhem. The cases included
the U.S. response to the 1918 influenza pandemic, the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, the energy crisis of the
1970s, three natural disasters, as well as selected aspects of U.S. conduct in four conflicts and in the Cold War.
57 The editors found that throughout its history, the U.S. government “has paid scant attention to recruiting, training,
exercising, and educating people to conduct interagency operations. Thus at crucial moments, success or failure often
turned on the happenstance of whether the right people with the right talents happened to be in the right job. Rather
than investing in human capital before a crisis, Washington plays Russian roulette.” Mismanaging Mayhem, p. 3.
58 The editors pointed to a need for interagency doctrine, i.e., a body of knowledge for guiding joint action. “Good
doctrine does not tell individuals what to think, but it guides them in how to think—particularly how to address
complex, ambiguous, and unanticipated challenges when time and resources are both in short supply.... When ...
[interagency doctrine] was taught and practiced, it made a difference. When not, chaos won.” Mismanaging Mayhem,
p. 3.
59 The section on leadership concluded: “Presidential leadership is particularly crucial to the conduct of interagency
operations.... Likewise, congressional leadership, especially from the chairs of congressional committees, is equally
vital.... In the end, no government reform can replace the responsibility of the people to elect officials who can build
trust and confidence in government; the responsibility of officials to select qualified leaders to run the government; and
the responsibility of elected and appointed leaders to demonstrate courage, character, and competence in the time of
crisis.” Mismanaging Mayhem, pp. 3-4.
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agencies, and non-governmental organizations in conducting activities and missions abroad. For
instance, deficiencies in U.S. planning, insufficient clarity in agency roles, and agencies’
unwillingness to share information and work together on projects can only complicate
interactions with non-U.S. government participants and donors.
Prioritize by the Ease and Cost of Implementation
Finally, some policymakers may view the ease and cost of implementation as the prime ranking
factors. Some would say that Obama Administration initiatives seem to be largely based on such
criteria. As of 2011, its initiatives seem to be the least costly and those that are relatively easy to
implement, reflecting perhaps budget and bureaucratic pressures and a desire for greater certainty
of effect before proceeding. For instance, the decision to cut back implementation of the Bush
Administration’s National Security Professional Development program to one pilot project
focused on homeland security seems a cautious, cost-conscious decision that may also reflect
resistance among departments and agencies focused on foreign affairs. Similarly, the Obama
Administration effort to improve the ability of Ambassadors to better carry out their
responsibilities and influence headquarters level deliberations is relatively low-cost and limited,
given the more extensive proposals to enhance COM authority. The decision to elevate S/CRS
and S/CT functions in the State Department hierarchy may involve significant costs and invoke
bureaucratic resistance, but still may be less costly and more expeditious than other options,
particularly creating a new, independent agency to assume S/CRS functions.
Can Interagency Reform Produce Cost Savings?
There is a widespread expectation that interagency reform would save money in the long run. The
2010 QDDR explained the basis for that belief. Discussing plans to develop interagency
cooperation on counterterrorism, rule of law, strengthening justice, interior, and health ministries
abroad, the QDDR stated: “In the long-term, partnering with and building on the assets of other
agencies will offer net policy gains to the U.S. government and reduce overall program
implementation costs. This is a significant departure from current practice, one that we believe
will save money, improve the U.S. government’s ability to advance American interests, and
strengthen State’s engagement across the interagency.”60
Nevertheless, some analysts believe that the cost effects of interagency reform are difficult to
assess. Many analysts with experience in interagency missions expect that cost savings would
accrue by eliminating the duplication of effort. The savings from duplication of effort would
depend, however, on the size of the mission. Since many interagency missions involve relatively
small numbers of people, cost savings on personnel may not be high.
Various analysts point to other possible ways in which interagency reform may produce savings:
• By facilitating the sharing of information technology, which is often expensive;
• By increasing collaboration and coordination at the planning and budgeting
stages, resulting in an improved allocation of resources, because without a
60 QDDR, p. 34.
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coherent strategy even the most efficient operational interagency processes and
collaboration are often ineffective;61
• By hastening the date when U.S. military forces can be removed from post-
conflict areas and replaced with less-costly civilian personnel.62
There may be additional costs associated with the process of interagency reform. As mentioned
above, some analysts believe that savings will accrue from greater efficiency and effectiveness in
missions if conducted by well-resourced civilian agencies with the resident expertise and
appropriate core mandate. Nevertheless, there undoubtedly will be upfront personnel investment
if the appropriate agency currently lacks the necessary capabilities to perform the mission. Some
may question whether streamlining interagency processes and resources would indeed produce
savings if personnel were not regularly called into action to exercise interagency skills.
Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security
Reform Measures?
Congress’ ability to oversee national security affairs, rationalize national security spending, and
promote interagency reform is hampered by its own organization and procedures, according to
some analysts. Some wonder whether Congress’ current organization, which treats defense and
foreign affairs as separate, rather than interdependent national security functions, contributes to
the perceived imbalance between military and civilian resources. In 2008, a report by RAND and
the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) stated that “the integration of instruments of power
and influence would be greatly facilitated by changes in the way that Congress conducts its
business.”63
Create New Select Committees
The 2008 RAND/AAD report proposed the establishment of two new select committees, “one in
each house, devoted to reviewing the overall integration of instruments of power and influence
and reporting their findings in terms of possible programs and appropriations.” This reform, they
argued, “would help individual committees (and Congress as a whole) make better-informed
decisions about the intersection of elements of power and influence—elements that do not respect
institutional boundaries in Congress any more than those in the executive branch.”64 It would not,
the report stated, impinge directly on the current distribution of Congressional power.
The same year, PNSR recommended that the Senate and House each create select committees
“for interagency national security matters specifically responsible for reviewing and making
recommendations for basic legislation governing interagency coordination and multiagency
61 For instance, the 2006 QDR stated that improved planning guidance to set priorities and clarify national security
roles and responsibilities would “reduce capability gaps and eliminate redundancies.”
62 “We spend so much because we are so inefficient and incapable at home with planning and resourcing and
commanding and on the ground with execution,” according to USIP expert Beth Cole. E-mail correspondence with
Beth Cole, Director of Intergovernmental Relations, United States Institute of Peace, August 29, 2011.
63 Integrating Instruments of Power, p. 22.
64 Integrating Instruments of Power, p. 22. Part of the proposal was for Congress to mandate a “standing requirement
for both the Congressional Research Service and the Government Accountability Office to prepare their own annual
reports on this subject.” p. 20.
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activities.”65 PNSR went further than RAND and AAD, recommending that if these select
committees performed well, the Senate and House “should approve creating permanent select
committees for interagency national security activities with oversight and legislative powers.”66
PNSR’s proposal also called for these committees to “serve as the focal point for executive-
legislative consultations on national security matters.”67 The assignment of such jurisdiction to
new committees, whether temporary or permanent, would have significant implications for the
current distribution of responsibilities in Congress, particularly for the armed services and foreign
affairs committees.
Create a National Security Appropriations Subcommittee
More recently, the Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel
recommended that Congress consider reconvening the Joint Committee on the Organization of
the Congress “to examine the current organization of Congress, including the committee
structure, the structure of national security and homeland defense authorities, appropriations, and
oversight, with the intent of recommending changes to make a more effective body in performing
its role to ‘provide for the common defense.’”68 It proposed that Congress consider the possibility
of establishing, at a minimum, a single national security appropriations subcommittee for the
departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, as well as USAID and the intelligence
community. It also proposed that Congress consider establishing a parallel authorization process
to facilitate coordinating authorization action on these departments and agencies.69
Modify Current Practices and Procedures
An option that would not require any structural changes would be for Congress to conform its
committees dealing with defense and foreign relations to the standard declared in 1950 by then
Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Arthur Vandenberg that “politics stops at the
water’s edge.” Such measures might include maintaining bipartisan staffs that share all tasks and
information on subjects that overlap, holding frequent joint foreign relations and armed services
hearings, and sponsoring joint legislation on national security matters. Some of these measures
are not without precedent.
To facilitate long-term strategy development, Congress may also wish to consider options for
revising budgeting processes. For instance, Congress may consider mandating multi-year budgets
in certain areas. Or, it might require civilian agencies to develop five-year budget plans, as DOD
does for non-contingency operation expenditures, in order to develop consensus with Congress on
65 PNSR 2008, p. 416.
66 PNSR 2008, p. 417. PNSR’s proposed jurisdiction for these select committees encompassed: “all interagency 1)
operations and activities; 2) commands, other organizations, and embassies; 3) funding; 4) personnel policies; and [sic]
5) education and training; and 6) nominees for any Senate-confirmed interagency position that may be established.” p.
522.
67 PNSR 2008, p. 522.
68 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security
Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section
1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061,
P.L. 111-84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010, p. 106. Hereinafter referred to as the QDRIP
Report.
69 QDRIP Report, p. 106.
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long-term foreign policy goals. While such plans would be subject to much greater fluctuations
than DOD weapons systems plans, for example, they still might provide a basis for executive-
legislative discussions on long-term resource allocation that could facilitate strategic planning.
Looking Ahead
The United States’ ability to protect its interests and play a global leadership role may be
significantly affected by the way in which it brings resources to bear on new and continuing
national security challenges. Most immediate are the new state-building needs of transforming
Arab States. Over the longer run, if advanced countries’ economic troubles increase developing
countries’ economic distress, the United States may engage even more in counterterrorism and
conflict prevention. In an era of constrained budgets, Congress may be increasingly interested in
examining the possibilities that interagency reform may improve the use of resources. For
instance, improved strategic planning and “whole-of-government” budgeting may focus resource
allocation more effectively. Organizations and officials may produce better results if given the
authority to harness the necessary resources to accomplish their missions, irrespective of their
agency identification. Better trained and experienced personnel may carry out their duties more
effectively. Finally, as the U.S. military, especially the U.S. Army, reviews its purposes while it
shrinks its forces, the need for rebalancing military and civilian state-building capacity may be
further emphasized.
Bibliography
(Materials listed alphabetically by the acronym or surnames used to identify them in Table 1.)
ACTD 2007—U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy,
Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, 2007.
Brookings/CSIS 2010—Brookings Institution and Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Capacity for Change: Reforming U.S. Assistance Efforts in Poor and Fragile Countries, by Norm
Unger and Margaret L. Taylor, with Frederick Barton, April 2010.
Buchanan/Davis/Wight 2009—Buchanan, Jeffrey, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of
the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52
(1st quarter 2009).
Cerami 2007—Cerami, Joseph R. “What is to be Done? Aligning and Integrating the Interagency
Process in Support and Stability Operations, in The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare:
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles, edited by Joseph R. Cerami and Jay W.
Boggs, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December
2007.
CFR 2005—Council on Foreign Relations, In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict
Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force, Task Force Report No. 55, September 2005.
CFR 2009—Council on Foreign Relations, Enhancing U.S. Preventive Action, Council Special
Report No. 48, October 2009.
Congressional Research Service
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Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad
CGD 2004—Center for Global Development Commission on Weak States and U.S. National
Security. On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, May 2004.
CGD 2007—Center for Global Development. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making
Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role, November 2007.
CSIS/AUSA 2003—Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the U.S.
Army, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
January 2003.
CSIS 2004—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I,
2004.
CSIS 2005—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II,
2005.
CSIS 2007—Center for Strategic and International Studies, Integrating 21st Century Development
and Security Assistance, 2007.
CWC 2011—Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Transforming
Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks, Final Report to Congress, August 2011.
DSB 2004—Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities,
December 2004.
Flournoy/Brimley 2006—Flournoy, Michele A. and Shawn W. Brimley, Strategic Planning for
National Security: A New Project Solarium, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006.
Heritage 2005—Heritage Foundation, Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict
Operations, by James Carafano and Dana Dillon, June 13, 2005.
Heritage 2008—Heritage Foundation, Managing Mayhem: The Future of Interagency, by James
Carafano, March 1, 2008.
Lamb/Marks 2009—Lamb, Christopher J. and Edward Marks,), Chief of Mission Authority as a
Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), October
2009.
NDU 2004—National Defense University, Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction
Operations, 2004.
Pope 2010—Pope, Robert S., Lt. Col., USAF, “U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy
Implementation: A Survey of Current Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement”, (A
Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program, Air University, Maxwell Air Force
Base, AL, April 2010), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/
Pope_10_AFF_Reearch_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf.
PNSR 2008—Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield (Report mandated by
Section 1049, P.L. 110-181, National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009), November 2008.
PNSR 2009—Project on National Security Reform, Turning Ideas Into Action, September 2009.
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PNSR 2010—Project on National Security Reform, The Power of People, 2010.
QDR 2006—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6,
2006.
QDR 2010—U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 1,
2010.
QDDR 2010—U.S. State Department and United States Agency for International Development,
The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Washington, DC, December 2010.
QDRIP 2010—Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, The QDR in Perspective:
Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, The Final Report of the
Quadrennial Defense Review Panel (Report mandated by Section 1031(f) P.L. 109-364, the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY2007, as amended by Section 1061, P.L. 111-
84, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010), 2010.
RAND 2009—RAND, Improving Capacity for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, by
Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Heather Peterson, Sponsored by the Department of Defense, Santa
Monica CA, 2009.
RAND/AAD 2008—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments
of Power and Influence: Lessons Learned and Best Practices, Report of a Panel of Senior
Practitioners, 2008.
RAND/AAD 2006—RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy, Integrating Instruments
of Power and Influence in National Security: Starting the Dialogue, Conference Proceedings,
2006.
Schnake/Berkowitz 2005—Schnake, Kori and Bruce Berkowitz, National Security: A Better
Approach, Hoover Digest, No. 4, 2005.
SFRC 2007—U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Embassies Grapple to Guide
Foreign Aid, 2007.
SIGIR 2010—Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons
to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Arlington, VA, February 2010.
Smith 2010—Dane F. Smith, Jr., Organizing American Peace-Building Operations, Praeger (in
cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Santa Barbara, CA, 2010.
Stimson/AAD 2011—The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy,
Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States though Professional Education
and Training, February 2011.
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (known as the Hart/Rudman Commission),
Phase III Report, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, February 15, 2001.
Williams/Adams 2008—Williams, Cindy and Gordon Adams, Strengthening Statecraft and
Security: Reforming U.S. Planning and Resource Allocation, MIT Security Studies Program,
Occasional Paper, June 2008.
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Table 1. Key Proposals for Interagency Reforms of Civilian Structures and Capabilities
Create or
Improve
Increase
Enhance or
Create a
Modify Interagency Develop
State Dept.
Enhance
Modify
National
the
Procedures
Integrated
Capacity/
Augment
Establish
COM
Interagency Interagency
NSC
for
Budgeting
Authority
Personnel
Interagency Influence, Augment
Create
Education,
Professional
or
Strategy-
Procedures for
for
Reform
Teams or
Capacity
Civilian
Civilian
Training
or Senior
NSC
making/
and
Interagency Interagency S&R
Task
or
Input to
Regional
and
Level Corps
Tasks
Planning
Budgets
Missions
Missions
Structures Forces
Authority COCOMs Structures Rotations
or Cadre
CWC
2011
X
Stimson/AAD
X
X
2011
Brookings/CSIS
X
2010
Lamb//Marks
X
2010
PNSR
2010
X
QDR 2010
X
X
X
QDDR
2010
X
X
X
X
X
X X
QDRIP 2010
X
X
X
X
X
X
Pope
2010
X
SIGIR 2010
X
X
X
X
Smith 2010
X
X
X
X
CFR 2009
X
X
X
PNSR
2009
X
X X X X X X
X X
RAND
2009
X
X
Heritage
2008
X
PNSR 2008
X
X
RAND/AAD
X
X X
X X
2008
CRS-29
Create or
Improve
Increase
Enhance or
Create a
Modify Interagency Develop
State Dept.
Enhance
Modify
National
the
Procedures
Integrated
Capacity/
Augment
Establish
COM
Interagency Interagency
NSC
for
Budgeting
Authority
Personnel
Interagency Influence, Augment
Create
Education,
Professional
or
Strategy-
Procedures for
for
Reform
Teams or
Capacity
Civilian
Civilian
Training
or Senior
NSC
making/
and
Interagency Interagency S&R
Task
or
Input to
Regional
and
Level Corps
Tasks
Planning
Budgets
Missions
Missions
Structures Forces
Authority COCOMs Structures Rotations
or Cadre
Williams/Adams
X
X X X
2008
ACTD 2007
X
X
X
X
X
X
CGD
2007
X
X
Cerami
2007
X
CSIS
2007
X
X
SFRC 2007
X
X
X
Flournoy/Brimley
X
X
2006
RAND/AAD
X
X
2006
QDR
2006
X X
X
CFR 2005
X
X
X
X
CSIS
2005
X
X
X
Heritage
2005
X
Schake/Berkowitz
X
2005
CGD
2004
X
CSIS
2004
X
DSB
2004
X
NDU
2004
X
CSIS/AUSA
2003
X
U.S. CNS 2001
X
X
X
Source: Compiled from the indicated reports by the author.
CRS-30
Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad
Acronyms
•
AAD
American Academy of Diplomacy
•
AUSA
Association of the U.S. Army
•
AFRICOM
U.S. Africa Command
•
CENTCOM
U.S. Central Command
•
CEO
Chief Executive Officer
•
CFR
Council on Foreign Relations
•
COM
Chief of Mission
•
CSIS
Center for Strategic and International Studies
•
CWC
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
•
DCM
Deputy Chief of Mission
•
DFA
Director of Foreign Assistance
•
DOD
Department of Defense
•
DODD
Department of Defense Directive
•
EUCOM
U.S. European Command
•
GCC
Geographic Combatant Command
•
GSCF
Global Security Contingency Fund
•
HASC
House Armed Services Committee
•
JIACG
Joint Interagency Coordination Group
•
JTF
Joint Task Force
•
JIATF
Joint Interagency Task Force
•
NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
•
NSC
National Security Council
•
OMB
Office of Management and Budget
•
PACOM
U.S. Pacific Command
•
PNSR
Project on National Security Reform
•
QDR
Quadrennial Defense Review
•
QDDR
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
•
QDRIP
Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel
•
S/CRS
State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
•
SFRC
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
•
SIGIR
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
•
S&R
Stabilization and Reconstruction
• SOUTHCOM U.S.
Southern
Command
•
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
•
USIP
United States Institute of Peace
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Preface to Appendices, Including Tables
Appendix A provides an overview of U.S. interagency institutions and arrangements. The
subsequent appendices discuss salient reform proposals from 38 sources, with each appendix
addressing one (or a subset of one) of the three problem areas perceived as contributing to the
inability of civilian agencies to effectively plan, organize, and implement missions abroad.
Appendix B deals with proposals to improve strategy-making, planning and budgeting.
Appendix C surveys a broad sweep of proposals to enhance institutional arrangements,
resources, and civilian authority at the headquarters level. Appendix D focuses on enhancing
civilian authority at the field level, i.e., proposals to enhance the authority and capacity of U.S.
ambassadors. Appendix E examines proposals to create or improve interagency personnel
policies and mechanisms.
The appendices exclude discussion and proposals concerning specific field or program level
interagency issues (such as those involving the structure and operation of provincial
reconstruction teams) and proposals to strengthen the capacity of individual agencies and
departments, other than the interagency role of the State Department. They also do not include
proposals that already have been implemented. For instance, the recent creation of the
Consortium for Complex Operations at the National Defense University addresses past proposals
for a better interagency “lessons learned” capability, although some may argue that this capability
would be better placed in the State Department or at USAID. They do not include proposals on
foreign assistance reform, which is covered in a previous CRS report, CRS Report R40102,
Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C. Weed.
They also do not address “whole-of-government” reforms that bear on the success of activities
and missions abroad, for instance, the need to commit adequate resources for a substantial period
of time to achieve stabilization and reconstruction goals in post-conflict settings.
As this report focuses on executive branch interagency reform, the tables do not include proposals
for the reform of Congressional oversight of interagency activities. This topic is covered in a
broad sense in the section “Should Congressional Reform Accompany Other National Security
Reform Measures?” above.
In the tables, the language used for the proposal descriptions is generally an exact quote or a close
paraphrasing of the proposal. Quotation marks are often omitted for clarity. These tables do not
include recommendations that have already been implemented.
This is far from an exhaustive list of all proposals by all individuals or organizations. Proposals
were selected because they represent the types of proposals advanced, because they are issued by
organizations and individuals with a recognized depth of expertise on the issues, or because they
are significantly unique.
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Appendix A. Interagency Authorities and Structures
The National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Staff
Role in Policy Coordination
Established by the National Security Act of 1947,70 the NSC is “the President’s principal forum
for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security
advisors and cabinet officials,” according to the White House website. The NSC also advises and
assists the President on these matters and “serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating
these policies among various government agencies,” according to the website.71 The act
specifically sets forth the NSC’s “whole-of-government” coordination role, stating that the
function of the Council
shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and
other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters
involving the national security.72
The act also provides that the NSC, “for the purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies
and functions of the departments and agencies of the Government relating to the national
security,” shall “consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies
of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the
President in connection therewith..”73 The law does not specifically set “hands-on” coordination
in the implementation phase as an NSC staff function.
The law leaves wide discretion to the President in many areas. In particular, the NSC may
perform “such other functions as the President may direct.”74 NSC supporting units and staff are
structured according to the President’s design. And the President may appoint NSC members in
addition to the statutory members.75
70 This act (P.L. 80-235) has been periodically amended. The act mandates NSC functions, membership, participation
by other officials, and auxiliary committees, and provides authority for a staff. Sections dealing with the NSC are
codified at 50 U.S.C. 402. 50 U.S.C. 402 names the following as NSC members: the President, the Vice President, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy. The statute also provides that other heads of
departments and other officials may serve as members if the President directs; those so named have varied over time.
For the Obama Administration, the “directed” members include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations, the
Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Regular
attendees also include the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory
advisors. See Alan G. Whittaker, Shannon A. Brown, Frederick C. Smith, and Ambassador Elizabeth McKune, The
National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System, Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, National Defense University, Research Report, August 15, 2011 Annual Update, Washington , DC,
2011, pp. 12-13. Hereinafter cited as The National Security Policy Process.
71 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc/.
72 50 U.S.C. 402(a).
73 50 U.S.C. 402(b).
74 50 U.S.C. 402(b)).
75 50 U.S.C. 402(a)(8)).
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Because the law leaves the President great leeway in determining NSC and NSC staff size
(subject to appropriations), functions, and organization, each Administration has used the NSC
differently. Over time, the NSC staff (known as the “national security staff” or NSS) has taken on
among its responsibilities “coordination of the interagency policy process and policy
implementation follow-up,” and “articulation of the President’s policies to other departments....”76
Nevertheless, the staff structure and its role in developing and coordinating policy among
executive branch agencies varies from Administration to Administration, often depending on a
President’s relationships with department heads and the National Security Advisor, as well as a
President’s preferences and the management style of the National Security Advisor.77
The State Department’s Responsibility for Oversight
and Coordination
The Secretary of State “plays the lead role in developing and implementing the President’s
foreign policy,”78 and is entrusted under current statutes with primacy for ensuring the coherence
of foreign assistance in support of that policy. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended
(FAA), provides that the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, “shall be
responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military
assistance, and military education and training programs ... to the end that such programs are
effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best
served thereby.”79 Oversight and direction are not equivalent to coordination, however.
This statutory language does not explicitly charge the Secretary of State or the State Department
with responsibility for coordinating the implementation of U.S. foreign policy and foreign
assistance. Instead, coordination responsibility is vested in the Secretary of State through other
legislation or Presidential orders, or a combination of those. For instance, the State Department,
under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State, has primary responsibility for administering
all development (broadly defined to include economic, political, and social aid) assistance.80 In
1992, Congress adopted legislation stating that “the Secretary of State shall be responsible for
coordinating all assistance provided by the United States Government to support international
efforts to combat illicit narcotics production or trafficking.”81 Through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, entitled Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization, President George W. Bush vested the Secretary of State with
responsibility for coordinating and leading “integrated United States Government efforts,
76 The National Security Policy Process, p. 30.
77 The National Security Policy Process, p. 29. According to this report, the current organization of the NSS dates back
to the George H.W. Bush Administration. “Having served eight years as Vice President and participated regularly in
deliberations of the Reagan Administration, President George H.W. Bush came into office with definite ideas as to how
the national security policy should be organized.... President Bush reorganized the NSC system to include a Principals
Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees, and sought (not always successfully) to
establish a collegial system in which the NSC acted as a broker and coordinator of policy across the Executive Branch.
The basic structural organization of interagency working groups, department deputies, and department principals ... has
been retained by each succeeding presidential administration.” pp. 9-10.
78 http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch.
79 22 U.S.C. 2382; FAA, Section 622(c).
80 22 U.S.C. 2151(b); FAA, Section 101(b).
81 22 U.S.C. 2291(b)(1); FAA, Section 481(b)(1) as amended by the International Narcotics Control Act of 1992, P.L.
102-583, Sec. 4(c).
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involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and
conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.” (The Secretary of State’s relationship to DOD
under this authority seems more limited. Somewhat ambiguously, the next sentence states that the
“Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure
harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of
conflict.”)
The State Department organizational structure includes four coordinating offices of highly
differing scope. One office focuses on foreign assistance to Europe and Eurasia; another on
HIV/AIDS assistance; a third on counterterrorism efforts around the world, usually on a regional
basis; and a fourth on stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities throughout the world. The
last of these was transformed into a bureau in late 2011. The Coordinators, i.e., the heads of the
first three of these offices, are equivalent in rank to an assistant secretary rank, and are confirmed
by the Senate, but they report directly to the Secretary of State rather than through a State
Department bureau. The President will nominate an Assistant Secretary for the new S&R bureau.
This bureau was created in line with Obama Administration plans, outlined in the December 2010
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), to upgrade the Coordinator offices
on counterterrorism and on S&R—in an effort to make them more effective. (See below, the
section on creating new agencies or arrangements.)
Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia
Well before the call for interagency reform in complex contingency operations became
widespread, Congress created two interagency coordinator posts in the State Department, one
responsible for assistance to Eastern Europe and the other for assistance to the former Soviet
Union.82 In 2001, these posts were combined into the State Department Office of the Coordinator
of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. This office oversees the bilateral economic, security,
democracy, and humanitarian assistance provided by all U.S. government agencies to the 18
states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This office reports to the Secretary of State
through the Director of the Foreign Assistance (i.e. “F”) bureau.83
82 One coordinator was in charge of assistance provided under the Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989,
P.L. 101-179), or the SEED Act. The other was in charge of assistance provided under the FREEDOM Support Act
(Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992, P.L. 102-511).
Section 601 of the SEED Act establishes that the “President shall designate, within the Department of State, a SEED
Program coordinator who shall be directly responsible for overseeing and coordinating all programs described in this
Act and all other activities that the United States Government conducts in furtherance of the purposes of this Act.”
Section 102(a) of the FREEDOM Support Act provides that the “President shall designate, within the Department of
State, a coordinator who shall be responsible for (1) designing an overall assistance and economic cooperation strategy
for the independent states of the former Soviet Union; (2) ensuring program and policy coordination among agencies of
the United States Government in carrying out the policies set forth in this Act (including the amendments made by this
Act); (3) pursuing coordination with other countries and international organizations with respect to assistance to
independent states; (4) ensuring that United States assistance programs for the independent states are consistent with
this Act (including the amendments made by this Act); (5) ensuring proper management, implementation, and oversight
by agencies responsible for assistance programs for the independent states; and (6) resolving policy and program
disputes among United States Government agencies with respect to United States assistance for the independent states.”
83 For more information, see CRS Report R40756, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination, by Marian Leonardo
Lawson and Susan B. Epstein.
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Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) was established in 2003 by the United
States Leadership against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25).
Section 102(B)(i) of that act charges the Coordinator with “primary responsibility for oversight
and coordination of all resources and international activities of the United State Government to
combat the HIV/AIDS pandemic....” Responsibilities include coordinating among all relevant
executive branch agencies and non-governmental organizations, and dispersing funds provided
under the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).84
Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT)
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) “coordinates and supports the
development and implementation of all U.S. government policies and programs aimed at
countering terrorism overseas,” according to its website.85 A major S/CT function is to facilitate
and encourage interagency collaboration at the regional level, in particular to stimulate ideas for
multi-country activities and provide a mechanism for integrating interagency programs. (Despite
the use of the term “coordination” on the office’s website, the actual function of the office appears
to be encouraging collaboration, or voluntary cooperation, among agencies.) It also provides
input to DOD counterterrorism activities, such as those conducted under “Section 1206” funding
and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP).86 However, the office does not have
authority to compel other offices and agencies to develop, conduct, or participate in programs,
nor a program budget to leverage or compel others to participate.
Its origins date back to 1972, when the Office for Combatting [sic]Terrorism was established after
the Munich Olympics terrorist attack. (According to the S/CT website, President Richard Nixon
appointed a special committee which proposed that the State Department create an office to
provide day-to-day coordination for counterterrorism activities and to develop U.S. government
policy initiatives and responses.) In 1994, Congress provided a mandate for the Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism and defined the coordinator’s role as being the principal adviser
84 Specifically, 102(B)(ii) reads: “SPECIFIC DUTIES.—The duties of the Coordinator shall specifically include the
following: (I) Ensuring program and policy coordination among the relevant executive branch agencies and
nongovernmental organizations, including auditing, monitoring, and evaluation of all such programs. (II) Ensuring that
each relevant executive branch agency undertakes programs primarily in those areas where the agency has the greatest
expertise, technical capabilities, and potential for success. (III) Avoiding duplication of effort. (IV) Ensuring
coordination of relevant executive branch agency activities in the field. ‘‘(V) Pursuing coordination with other
countries and international organizations. (VI) Resolving policy, program, and funding disputes among the relevant
executive branch agencies. (VII) Directly approving all activities of the United States (including funding) relating to
combatting [sic] HIV/AIDS in each of ... [14 specified countries] and other countries designated by the President,
which other designated countries may include those countries in which the United States is implementing HIV/AIDS
programs as of the date of the enactment of the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003. (VIII) Establishing due diligence criteria for all recipients of funds section and all activities
subject to the coordination and appropriate monitoring, evaluation, and audits carried out by the Coordinator necessary
to assess the measurable outcomes of such activities.” For more information on this act and the Coordinator’s Office,
see http://www.state.gov/s/gac; CRS Report R41802, The Global Challenge of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria,
by Alexandra E. Kendall; and United States Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of
the Inspector General, Review of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, Report Number ISP-I-08-23,
Washington, DC, February 2008.
85 See http://www.state.gov/s/ct/about/index.htm.
86 Section 1206, P.L. 109-163, FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as amended, and Section 1208,
P.L. 108-375, FY2005 NDAA, as amended.
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to the Secretary of State on international counterterrorism matters, and providing “overall
supervision (including policy oversight of resources) of international counterterrorism
activities.”87
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (formerly the Office of the
Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction)88
In mid-2004, the Bush Administration established the State Department Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In December of that year, the office was provided
with a congressional mandate (Section 408 of Division D, P.L. 108-447); in October 2008, its
establishment was codified, along with that of the Civilian Response Corps and Reserve for
which it is responsible (Title XVI, P.L. 110-417). (Civilian Response Corps active and standby
members deploy at the request of regional bureaus and ambassadors to assist with strategic
planning in conflict, post-conflict settings and states at risk of instability.89 The reserve
component has never been formed.) In December 2005, through Presidential Decision Directive
44, the Bush Administration provided that the Secretary of State could delegate responsibilities
for stabilization and reconstruction activities to the S/CRS Coordinator.
In late November 2011, the State Department transferred S/CRS functions to a new bureau for
Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO), as contemplated by the 2010 QDDR. The bureau is
expected to play a greater role than S/CRS in developing policy and planning for missions,
becoming “ the institutional locus for policy and operational solutions for crisis, conflict, and
instability,” according to the CSO website.90 The head of CSO bureau, the Assistant Secretary for
Conflict and Stabilization Operations, will also hold the title of Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization.
Other Agencies’ Roles
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
USAID is the U.S. federal government agency primarily responsible for administering civilian
foreign aid and plays an important role in various interagency activities and missions. An
independent agency, USAID receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of
State. It describes itself as “the principal U.S. agency to extend assistance to countries recovering
87 Section 2301, P.L. 105-277 (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations,
1999), which superseded amended earlier legislation (Section 161(e), P.L. 103-236, Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for FY1994 and FY1995) that formally established the office. For more, see http://www.state.gov/s/ct.
88 For more on S/CRS, see CRS Report RL32862, Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background
and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction
Capabilities, by Nina M. Serafino.
89 The Civilian Response Corps active and standby components have, as of October 7, 2011, a combined total of 792
members. The breakdown by agency for the 160 active members (in bold) and the 632 standby members (in italics) is:
Department of State, 47 and 234; USAID, 36 and 177; Department of Justice, 31 and 75; Department of Agriculture, 7
and 8; Department of Homeland Security, 6 and 33; Department of Commerce, 4 and 60; Department of Health and
Human Services, 2 and 42; Department of Energy, 2; and Department of Transportation, 1. Data provided by S/CRS,
October 14, 2011.
90 Http://www.state.gove/g/cso.
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from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.”91 USAID programs
support economic growth, agriculture, trade, global health, democracy, and conflict prevention
throughout the world. USAID has a headquarters staff based in Washington DC of 2,255, and a
staff overseas of 1,634, supplemented by 4,469 foreign nationals abroad.92 USAID often carries
out its program through contracts or cooperative arrangements with private voluntary
organizations, indigenous organizations, universities, American businesses, international
agencies, other governments, and other U.S. government agencies.
USAID is the lead agency in U.S. disaster relief and other humanitarian assistance. The USAID
Administrator (the agency’s head) leads interagency disaster relief efforts, which often include
DOD and support from the Department of Agriculture.93 The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance’s Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams (generally known as DARTs) are quickly
deployed to a disaster area (after an initial assessment), providing trained specialists to assist U.S.
embassies and USAID missions respond to disasters.
Besides its state-building end economic development activities, USAID has long played a major
role in U.S. state-building and other S&R efforts in conflict and in post-conflict settings from
Vietnam forward. The USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), established in 1994,
modeled itself as a rapid response unit after the DART teams. It has had a key role in S&R
efforts, in the case of Iraq arriving in Baghdad “about the same time as the first U.S. troops.”94
Other Executive Departments and Agencies
Several executive departments have offices or agencies that work abroad and some have foreign
service officers posted abroad whose work contributes to interagency efforts, particularly in
stabilization and reconstruction missions. These include the Departments of Treasury, Agriculture,
Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Transportation.
All but Treasury participate in the Civilian Response Corps (CRC) system under S/CRS.
91 USAID website. http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/.
92 USAID hires personnel through a number of different authorities. The U.S. staff at Washington, DC headquarters
and abroad are direct hires. Foreign nationals are hired abroad as foreign service nationals or third country nationals. In
addition, as of October 11, 2011, USAID had 260 people at Washington headquarters and 515 abroad under personal
services contracts. These numbers do not include a small number of people hired as “experts” or through other
mechanisms.
93 The USAID Administrator serves as the Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance under a
presidential delegation of authority provided by Sec. 493 of P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
The Special Coordinator’s role under that legislation is to “promote maximum effectiveness and coordination in
response to foreign disasters by United States agencies and between the United States and other donors,” as well as to
formulate and update contingency plans for disaster relief. For more on the USAID and other agency roles in disaster
assistance, see CRS Report RL33769, International Crises and Disasters: U.S. Humanitarian Assistance, Budget
Trends, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson.
94 Dane F. Smith Jr., U.S. Peacefare: Organizing Peace-Building Operations (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), p.
141. This book has an extended discussion of OTI, pp. 137-143. Hereinafter cited as U.S. Peacefare. For more
information on OTI, also see CRS Report R40600, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives After 15 Years: Issues for
Congress, by Marian Leonardo Lawson. The USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation provides the
analytic framework for work of OTI and other USAID conflict resolution work.
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U.S. Chiefs of Mission (Ambassadors) and Embassy Country Teams
In normal circumstances, U.S. Ambassadors overseas bear the greatest responsibility for ensuring
the coordination of foreign assistance and foreign policy in the countries to which they are
appointed. Under the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Ambassadors are the president’s personal
representatives abroad. An Ambassador, or other civilian serving as a Chief of Mission (COM),
has the sole authority to oversee U.S. foreign policy in individual countries.95 Some experts judge
that the authority exercised by Chiefs of Mission “provides the President with the clearest and
most forceful cross-departmental executive authority mechanism in use today.”96
Section 622(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, charges the Ambassador, or
other responsible official, with the leadership role in ensuring coordination regarding foreign
assistance programs, including U.S. military assistance, among government representatives in
each country, under procedures prescribed by the President. Section 622(b) states: “The Chief of
the diplomatic mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining
to military assistance are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and that his
[sic] comments shall accompany such recommendations if he so desires.”
The embassy “country teams,” i.e., the group in every embassy comprised of representatives of
all U.S. departments and agencies present in a country, bear much responsibility for turning the
President’s broad foreign policy into concrete diplomatic measures and foreign assistance
programs. The team operates under the direction and authority of the U.S. Ambassador or other
COM. Country teams vary according to embassy size and U.S. interests in a country; some may
include representatives from some 40 U.S. departments and agencies.97 In addition to State
Department personnel, many embassies have personnel from at least the departments of
Agriculture, Defense, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Justice, as well as USAID. Other
departments represented may be Health and Human Services, Interior, Labor, Transportation, and
Treasury. Individual agencies from these departments may also be represented on country teams.
As codified by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465, Section 207, an Ambassador (or
other Chief of Mission) is charged, under the direction of the President, with “full responsibility
for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees”
within the country. This statute also requires that the ambassador (or other COM) “shall keep
fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government
within that country,” and “shall insure that all Government executive branch employees within
that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees
under the command of a United States area military commander) comply with all applicable
directives of the chief of mission.” National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 gives Chiefs
of Mission the authority to determine the size, composition, and mandate of personnel operating
under her/his authority. (Each ambassador, upon assuming his/her post, receives a personal letter
from the President spelling out similar responsibilities.) Nevertheless, the nature of
95 The U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2 (second paragraph) establishes that the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, appoints ambassadors.
96 Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration,
Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Institute for
National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives 2, Washington, DC, December 2010, p. 3. Hereinafter referred to as
Chief of Mission Authority as a Model.
97 See http://www.usdiplomacy.org/state/abroad/countryteam.php, an information sheet entitled “Other Agencies on
Mission’s ‘Country Team,” posted online by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.
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Ambassadorial leadership and the use of country teams as integrative mechanisms varies greatly
from country to country, according to observers. Much depends on the interest, knowledge, and
management ability of the individual Ambassador, as well as his relationship with officials in
Washington.
Mechanisms to Integrate Civilian Perspectives into DOD Missions
and Activities
For nearly a decade, the U.S. military has attempted to incorporate an increasing number of
civilians from other departments and agencies into its structures, by creating either new
interagency groups or new posts for civilian agency representatives. (Note, the State Department
has long assigned senior officials as Political Advisors or POLADs to the Geographic Combatant
Command, or GCC, commanders.) Beginning in 2002, as discussed below, DOD began to reach
out for further civilian input by requiring each GCC to set up a Joint Interagency Coordination
Group that would function as an advisory body to the combatant commander, initially on
counterterrorism issues. In 2004, a USAID Office of Military Affairs was established at USAID
Washington, D.C. headquarters, with liaison personnel sent to each GCC to advise on military
activities with development implications. A more recent step was the creation of multiple civilian
positions within some GCCs. In 2007, the U.S. Africa Command was set up as the model
“interagency” command, with designated civilian billets. The U.S. Southern Command (Latin
America and the Caribbean) and others subsequently increased civilian participation.
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG)
For several years, GCCs have each hosted a JIACG, an advisory body composed of military
personnel from all services and civilian personnel from a variety of agencies, usually numbering
about one dozen. JIACGs were established through a memorandum from the NSC Deputies
Committee in early 2002 instructing Combatant Commanders to implement the JIACGs
concept.98 (At the U.S. European Command, the JIACG was named the Interagency Engagement
Group.) Headed in most cases by a member of the federal Senior Executive Service (SES),99 the
JIACG was designed to facilitate interagency information sharing for the operations and activities
of the combatant commands and to enhance the understanding of civilian agency perceptions and
activities within the commands. The initial focus of the JIACGs was counterterrorism.
JIACG structures and tasks, as well as the use that the combatant commanders make of them,
have evolved over time. Some observers express concern that JIACGs have not always fulfilled
the civilian advisory function originally intended.100 Nevertheless, it seems difficult to generalize
98 According to one source, the instruction stated Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) “will be organized
to provide interagency advice and expertise to combatant commanders and their staffs, coordinate interagency
counterterrorism plans and objectives, and integrate military, interagency, and host-nation efforts.” Ambassador
(retired) Edward Marks, Contractor, Camber Corporation, Joint Interagency Coordinating [sic] Group on
Counterterrorism, United States Pacific Command, p. 7, http://www.ndu.edu/itea/storage/678/
PACOM%20JIACG%20and%20the%20War%20on%20Terror.pdf.
99 Jan Schwarzenberg, “Where are the JIACGs today?,” InterAgency Journal, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2011), p. 25.
Hereinafter referred to as JIACGs Today?
100 Col. Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 37 (Second
Quarter 2005), pp. 10-18, and Gabriel Marcella, ed., Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security, Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, December 2008, pp. 243-248.
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about JIACGs. Some are little used, some are used extensively, and some have been virtually
subsumed under or replaced by other interagency arrangements (see below).101
USAID Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation
In response to increasing concerns about possible conflicts between increasing U.S. military
activities and sound development objectives, USAID established in 2005 an Office of Military
Affairs (OMA) to provide input and oversight to U.S. military activities abroad. In November
2011, OMA was renamed the Office of Civilian-Military Cooperation.
Under this office, senior USAID development officials are assigned to GCCs (see above) and to
Pentagon offices. In addition, military liaison officers from the GCCs and from the Special
Operations Command are assigned to USAID headquarters.
Civilian Posts at the Geographic Combatant Commands
While the JIACGs have operated outside the formal organizational structure of combatant
commands, some GCCs have created new posts within the command’s organizational structure
for civilian personnel from other departments and agencies. This personnel augmentation includes
senior USAID representatives that have been brought in through the USAID Office of Military
Affairs, established in 2005, as well as civilians from other agencies.
Two commands have become the most integrated: the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
covering all of Sub-Saharan Africa, and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), covering
Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean. According to DOD’s June 2011 report to
Congress on the organization of the GCCs,102 AFRICOM had 39 civilian “interagency” personnel
assigned fulltime to its headquarters staff, with at least one from each of the civilian agencies
relevant to its mission, while SOUTHCOM had 29 from 13 agencies. Both commands have also
integrated senior civilian personnel into command leadership by establishing civilian “Deputy to
101 According to JIACGs Today?, the U.S. Pacific Command’s JIACG is “essentially non-existent,” while the U.S.
Northern Command’s JIACG is “a means of communication and coordination in the event of a national disaster.”
However, the U.S. Central Command JIACG is used for “integrating U.S. government activities in an active combat
zone,” and the U.S. Southern Command JIACG is “exploring a completely new paradigm ... analogous to a mega-
embassy where day-to-day operations of many agencies functioning in the region are closely coordinated with each
other.” Jan Schwarzenberg, “Where are the JIACGs today?,” InterAgency Journal, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 2011), p. 24.
According to a recent DOD report to Congress, the U.S. Northern Command/North American Aerospace Defense
Command JIACG has more than 30 full-time interagency representatives, from a variety of domestically-focused
agencies as well as from the Department of State and representatives of the U.S. intelligence community, and, at the
time the report was written, was seeking a dedicated Drug Enforcement Administration representative to assist with
transnational criminal organizations operating in Mexico. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Report on
Organizational Structures of the Headquarters of the Geographic Combatant Commands, Report to Congress Pursuant
to Section 944 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, P.L. 111-383, June 2011, p.
14. Hereinafter referred to as DOD GCC Report.
102 DOD GCC Report, pp. 5, 18. The extent to which these civilian deputy commanders can influence the conduct of
command missions is unclear. In an explanation of the SOUTHCOM civilian deputy commander’s role, the report
states that the position “empowers the incumbent to influence decision making at the Command in a way not possible
for a POLAD. Although the CDC [Civilian Deputy Commander] does not have the authority to make decision affecting
the command’s military operations and personnel, or large resource commitments, he/she can shape strategic planning,
strategic communications, public affairs, politico-military and intelligence analysis, and the use of security assistance
dollars—and better align those missions with those of civilian agencies and country teams. This authority and direction
improve USSOUTHCOM’s ability to engage with and build interagency capacity.” p. 19.
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the Commander” posts occupied by senior State Department foreign service officials, as has the
U.S. European Command (EUCOM).103 EUCOM, which covers 51 countries including Russia
and the countries of greater Europe, has incorporated its Interagency Engagement Group (i.e., its
JIACG) into its command structure as an Interagency Partnering Directorate (currently lead by an
Army civilian). As of the end of FY2011, EUCOM expected to have 13 interagency personnel at
the command. The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), covering 20 states (Egypt, states on the
Arabian peninsula, and in Central and South Asia), has “20 liaison members from other U.S.
Government departments and agencies” working with CENTCOM staff. The report contained no
information on interagency personnel within the staff structure of the U.S. Pacific Command
(PACOM) and NORTHCOM.
Other Interagency Mechanisms
Interagency Task Forces104
Interagency cooperation for missions abroad has largely been accomplished through multi-agency
task forces. Most often these task forces are pulled together in times of crisis or periods of
transition when agency roles are not clear, and constitute the very ad hoc structures that are
criticized as inadequate and dysfunctional. At the field level, these are sometimes referred to as
“hastily formed networks.”105
Established Task Forces
There are long-standing task forces in two mission areas involving the protection of U.S. borders.
Three task forces are organized under three GCCs to coordinate military and civilian
counternarcotics, and in some cases counter-terrorism, efforts.
Following Congress’ 1988 designation of DOD as the lead agency for the detection and
monitoring of aerial and maritime drug trafficking into the United States,106 DOD set up three
task forces to combat drug trafficking. The purpose of the task forces was to coordinate the
support and assistance that DOD provides to civilian law enforcement agencies under other
authorities.107
In 1994, two of the DOD task forces served as the base for the establishment of two interagency
task forces: the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATFS) under SOUTHCOM in Florida
103 In the case of SOUTHCOM and EUCOM, the deputy posts were created by upgrading the political advisor posts;
their titles are Civilian Deputy to the Commander, Foreign Policy Advisor [POLAD]. The AFRICOM title is simply
Deputy for the Commander for Civil-Military Activities.
104 Note that there also are many interagency task forces for domestic operations and activities that are not discussed
here.
105 The Naval Postgraduate School’s Cebrowski Institute has a center for research and advice on hastily formed
networks for disaster and humanitarian crisis response. See http://www.hfncenter.org.
106 NDAA for FY1989, P.L. 100-456, Division A, Sec. 1202(a)(1), codified at 10 U.S.C. 124.
107 DOD counternarcotics assistance may be provided under Section 1004 of the NDAA for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510), as
amended and periodically extended, and Section 1033 of the NDAA for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85), as amended and
periodically extended. DOD may also maintain and operate equipment in support of counternarcotics and counter-
terrorism efforts under 10 U.S.C. 374. For more on this counternarcotics assistance, see CRS Report RL34543,
International Drug Control Policy, by Liana Sun Wyler.
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(often pointed to as a model task force),108 and Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATFWest)
under the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. JIATFS stated function is “to facilitate the
interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and
partners’ national security.”109 JIAFTWest describes its mission as providing support “to law
enforcement for counterdrug and drug-related activities.”110
The third DOD task force, Joint Task Force North (JTFN) under the U.S. Northern Command, is
not formally an interagency task force, but it is located at Fort Bliss, near El Paso, TX, near the
civilian interagency Operation Alliance, a civilian task force of federal, state, and local civilian
law enforcement agencies. JTFN (known as Joint Task Force North until 2004) coordinates
activities along the southwest border and the Gulf of Mexico. It provides support to federal law
enforcement agencies for counternarcotics and homeland security missions.
Task Forces by Another Name
The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have operated in Iraq and Afghanistan may be
considered a type of task force. These teams—which have consisted of 20 to 100 members—were
first formed in Afghanistan in 2002, and then were established in Iraq in 2005. Members were
drawn largely from DOD, the State Department, and USAID. The original concept was for the
PRTs to be mixed civilian-military teams that would operate in Afghanistan’s provinces,
coordinating U.S. government support from civilian agencies to local authorities and providing a
secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction work in areas outside Kabul. PRTs
were stood up first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. Their purpose was to build basic
infrastructure and to provide assistance, advice, and mentoring to provincial and local
government and officials in a wide range of areas, including governance, political and economic
development, rule of law, education and culture, and public health.
Despite numerous problems—among them what many considered an initial disproportionate
representation by DOD, given that civilian agencies at first could not provide the requisite
personnel—the PRTs have persisted in Afghanistan. In Iraq, with the transition to a U.S. State
Department lead for the U.S. presence there, the 15 PRTs were dissolved in FY2011. Their
engagement, stabilization, and liaison functions are conducted through State Department civilian
diplomatic posts , and other functions were turned over to Iraqi provincial and local governments.
In addition, the interagency Civilian Response Corps (CRC) teams, mentioned above, may be
viewed as a form of interagency task force. Although their assignments are still limited, CRC
deployed personnel, often from two or more civilian agencies, work together as teams,
developing data, conducting interviews, and stimulating the thinking of U.S. government
employees in the field about approaches to conflict mitigation and resolution in their countries.
108 Evan Munsing and Christopher J. Lamb, Joint Interagency Task Force—South: The Best Known, Least Understood
Interagency Success, Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Strategic Perspectives, No. 5, Washington, DC, June 2011. Hereinafter cited as Joint Interagency Task
Force-South.
109 As stated on the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South website http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/index.aspx.
110 See the JIATF West (JIATFWest) website, http://www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/staff%20directory/jiatfwest/
jiatfwest.shtml.
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Interagency Informal Arrangements
Interagency collaboration may occur through informal arrangements developed by those
responsible for program planning and implementation. For example, although legislation
establishing the DOD Regional Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) has no provision
for State Department coordination or collaboration, DOD regularly consults with the State
Department on CTFP programming. In Afghanistan, DOD and civilian personnel at the field level
often have devised informal arrangements to better integrate their work.111
111 For examples of informal arrangements in Afghanistan, see CRS Report R40156, War in Afghanistan: Strategy,
Operations, and Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale. On p. 32, she writes: “On the ground, civilian and military
practitioners have frequently crafted innovative arrangements for better integrating their efforts.” She provides details
on a civil-military “Board of Directors” for efforts in Paktia, Paktika, and Khowst provinces.
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Appendix B. Proposals to Improve Strategy-
Making, Planning, and Budgeting
Many foreign policy and interagency reform analyses express concern that successive
Administrations have done at best a fair job in integrating the various elements of foreign policy
making and have not engaged at all in making strategy, i.e., matching resources to policy
decisions and priorities. In 2001, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century
(Hart-Rudman Commission) flatly stated that “Strategic planning is largely absent within the U.S.
government. The planning that does occur is ad hoc and specific to Executive departments and
agencies. No overarching strategic framework guides U.S. national security policymaking or
resource allocation.”112
The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in 2008 described the United States’ “inability
to formulate and implement a coherent strategy” as corroding all governmental processes by
“hindering planning, creating gaps, duplicating efforts, frustrating leaders, and encouraging ad
hoc short cuts.”113 Further, the PNSR historical case studies identified a link between poor
strategy and policy formulation and deficient implementation, with the lack of clarity and unity at
top levels fomenting rivalries and “stove-piping” at lower levels.114 The reasons PNSR cited for
these problems at the leadership level ranged from the behavior of top leaders to insufficient
information flows at the executive level.115
Many other analysts have also cited a need for systems and procedures to ensure the development
of coherent strategy, guide planning, and bring to bear sufficient leadership and direction. In
discussing civil-military operations to quell conflict, from initial intervention to the state-building
phase, two experts pointed to three reasons for improving strategy, planning, and leadership that
would hold true for many U.S. government missions and activities abroad. These are: (1) the
mutual dependence among agencies to carry out complex missions, (2) the contentious policy
issues that can lead to problems in the field if not addressed at the outset, and (3) the shortages of
personnel and other resources that demand their optimal use.116
112 Roadmap for National Security, p. 48.
113 PNSR 2008, p. vii.
114 PNSR 2008, p. 95. PNSR cited the “absence of unity, clarity, and agreement at the top energized cross-agency
jealousies, ignorances [sic], and ‘stove-piping’ at the middle and lower levels charged with implementation....”
115 PNSR 2008, see pp. 153-157. PNSR signaled a lack of candor and trust among general leaders and staff produced
by the custom of “leaking” information to the press as a major obstacle to generating and objectively evaluating
potential strategic courses of action. This, and other factors such as “poor decision support and the tendency toward
consensus building” also “obscure the links between objectives and the alternative activities, programs, and resources
required to achieve them.” (pp. 154-155.) PNSR also found that information “about real-world conditions does not
travel easily between field-level components of institutions and the policymaking levels,” and even less readily
between executive institutions.” (P. 153.)
116 Specifically, these authors argued for “an interagency planning effort well in advance of deployment” citing three
reasons for advance planning that would also hold true for other missions. “First, significant dependences among
various agency efforts in a mission require unified policy direction and a coherent intervention strategy, one that
integrates its political, security-rule-of-law, and economic lines of effort to achieve transformation. Second, contentious
policy issues emerge from the outset that must be addressed to avoid policy gaps and subsequent disconnects on the
ground. Finally, and often most important, a substantial number of international troops, personnel, and resources must
be mobilized in a multinational and multilateral context and sustained, reasonably for at lease five years, to assure that
the desired transformation of power takes hold. The pool of available capabilities, however, is seriously limited. There
(continued...)
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From the Hart-Rudman Commission forward, many organizations and experts have advanced
proposals to enhance or improve strategy-making and planning processes, including reforms at
the NSC (Table B-1, Table B-2, Table B-3), creating specific new strategy development
processes and documents (Table B-4), or making other changes to rationalize or enhance strategy
development and planning (Table B-5). Many have also recommended integrating national
security budgets (Table B-6) and/or improving budget processes (Table B-7).
The Obama Administration has two initiatives in the budgeting area. One is a request that
Congress establish a Global Security Contingency Fund, providing a pool of integrated DOD and
State Department funding for security assistance. Another is a plan for Ambassadors to participate
in budget-making at the country team level. (See the section on integrated budgets, below.) In
addition, State Department, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and
Department of Defense (DOD) planners have recently formed a “3D Planning Group” to improve
their collaboration in planning.117
Modify National Security Council and Staff Roles,
Responsibilities, Processes, or Structures
Proposals for improving strategy-making and planning have centered on the National Security
Council (NSC) processes and NSC staff. Policy and strategy-making for foreign policy and
affairs is the prerogative of the President, normally conducted through the NSC and its staff, with
the participation of DOD, the State Department, and other agencies. Nonetheless, the President
and the NSC staff have been widely viewed for many years as so overwhelmed with the tasks of
conducting day-to-day governance that the NSC cannot direct the processes of making coherent
policy and strategy. Analysts offer differing solutions. Some would create new NSC staff
positions (Table B-1), new NSC staff structures (Table B-2), or assign new responsibilities to the
NSC staff (Table B-3). This might require expanding the size of the NSC staff; alternatively, the
President might delegate these functions to others.
The composition of the NSC itself is largely set by statute, but it is the President’s prerogative to
determine NSC staff structure and size, subject of course to appropriations. Any substantial
changes in staff size, or the creation of new NSC staff units or additional posts elsewhere to
handle delegated functions would, through their budgetary implications, be a matter for
Congressional action. Nevertheless, any codification of size or structure, as mentioned above,
may be considered impinging on a president’s flexibility to structure the White House in
accordance with circumstances and the capacity of available personnel.
(...continued)
is no slack in the system.” Len Hawley and Dennis Skocz, “Advance Political-Military Planning,” in The Quest for
Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation, ed. Jock Covey, Michael J.
Dziedzic, Leonard R. Hawley (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press , 2005), p. 37. This book was
also sponsored by the Association of the United States Army.
117 Diplomacy, development, and defense are the 3Ds. During the Bush Administration, the State Department Office of
Strategic and Performance Planning set up “Project Horizon,” an interagency effort to identify strategic interagency
capabilities that the government might invest in over the next 20 years and to provide a starting point for an interagency
planning process, including the development of a scenario-based toolkit for internal agency and interagency planning.
Participants included senior executives, strategic planners, and subject matter experts from 15 U.S. government
agencies, as well as selected academics and private sector personnel.
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Table B-1. Proposals To Establish New Positions at the
National Security Council Staff
Organization
Proposal
Commission on Wartime
Establish a new, dual-hatted position for a senior official to serve both at Office of
Contracting (CWC) 2011
Management and Budget (OMB) and on the NSC staff to provide oversight and
strategic direction for interagency coordination and cooperation of interagency
contingency operations, including contracting-related matters. This official would also
ensure that each relevant agency has the necessary financial resources and police
oversight to carry out its contingency-related mission, and that agency budgets,
Defense, State, and the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), are complementary rather than duplicative or conflicting. At OMB, this
official would serve as a deputy director, i.e., a presidential appointee confirmed by
the Senate. At the National Security Council (NSC), this official would serve as a
deputy national security adviser and deputy assistant to the President, and would
attend and participate in NSC meetings as the principal advisor to the NSC on
interagency contingency missions, (pp. 144-145)
CSIS 2007
Create a NSC Senior Director for Conflict Prevention and Response to provide a
locus of interagency coordination on these issues in the White House. Ideally, the
Senior Director would occupy the contingency planning role envisioned in
Presidential Decision Directive 56. The Senior Director should be supported in large
part by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Development (S/CRS). (p. 36)
Council on Foreign Relations Establish planning and programming arrangements for preventive action at the White
(CFR) 2009
House level, specifically at the NSC. Create two new NSC directorates, each to
handle different types of preventive action: a Directorate for Development and
Governance to oversee and coordinate foreign assistance planning and programming
across the U.S. government, together with a NSC Interagency Policy Committee
(IPC) co-chaired by the senior director and the deputy administrator for USAID and
a NSC Directorate for Prevention, Stabilization, and Reconstruction (PSR), together
with a PSR IPC co-chaired by the senior director and the coordinate for SCRS. (pp.
22-23)
Center for Global
The President should appoint a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Conflict
Development (CGD) 2007
Prevention and Response to draft and implement an integrated U.S. government
strategy for fragile and war-torn states. (p. 15)
Flournoy/Brimley 2006
Create a NSC Senior Director for Strategic Planning and an Office for Strategic
Planning, both devoted to strategic planning and insulated from day-to-day demands
and crisis management. The senior director would be responsible for coordinating a
Quadrennial National Security Review. (p. 86)
Center for Strategic and
Create a NSC Senior Director to integrate interagency planning for complex
International Studies (CSIS)
contingency operations. Create an office to support this official and to stand up an
2005
Interagency Crisis Planning Team for every stability operation being considered,
providing staff and resources to support three teams simultaneously. (pp. 50-51)
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Table B-2. Proposals to Establish New NSC Structures
Organization
Proposal
Council on Foreign Relations Establish planning and programming arrangements for preventive action at the White
(CFR) 2009
House level, specifically at the NSC. Create two new NSC directorates, each to
handle different types of preventive action: a Directorate for Development and
Governance to oversee and coordinate foreign assistance planning and programming
across the U.S. government, together with a NSC Interagency Policy Committee
(IPC) co-chaired by the senior director and the deputy administrator for USAID and
a NSC Directorate for Prevention, Stabilization, and Reconstruction (PSR), together
with a PSR IPC co-chaired by the senior director and the coordinate for SCRS. (pp.
22-23)
PNSR 2009
Establish a permanent strategy directorate within the National Security Staff., whose
main mission would be to develop medium and long term strategy. (p. 40)
Wil iams/Adams 2008
Establish a permanent interagency group under the NSC and co-chaired by the OMB
to ensure the integration of security assistance programs into the broader national
security strategy, to resolve disagreements between the State Department and DOD,
and provide overarching policy guidance. (Planning, budgeting, and integration would
be left to those departments.) (pp. 72-73)
CGD 2004
Create a NSC Directorate to reflect the high priority assigned to weak and failed
states and charge it with tracking weak and failed states and monitoring U.S.
responses to them. Also create a NSC interagency Policy Coordination Committee
on Weak and Failed States, with responsibility for early warning efforts and for
developing and coordinating comprehensive strategies for country-level engagement.
(pp. 32-22)
National Defense University
Create a National Interagency Contingency Coordinating Group (NICCG) chaired by
(NDU) Center for
the NSC to review lessons learned and develop strategic guidance for planning and
Technology and National
coordinating post-conflict operations. The NICCG would include representatives
Security Policy 2004
from DOD and the departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Commerce and
Agriculture, and would meet on a regular basis, p. 110.
Table B-3. Proposals to Assign New Responsibilities to
NSC and National Security Staff
Organization
Proposal
SIGIR 2010
An NSC-led interagency task force should lead a new S&R doctrine and policy
formulation process to identify the applicable missions, roles, responsibilities, and
operating procedures for all S&R participants. (p. 14)
Project on National Security
Increase the responsibilities of the NSC executive secretary, including managing the
Reform (PNSR) 2009
interagency national security human capital plan and personnel system, and other
innovations proposed by PNSR. Provide statutory authority for the position of
executive secretary of the President’s security council., who would be appointed for a
four year term beginning in the middle of a presidential administration. (pp 401-402,
also see p 451)
Council on Foreign Relations Create a position for an official who would analyze interagency operations, including
(CFR) 2009
real-time assessments of system performance, and report to the director for national
security. (p. x)
RAND 2009
Realign NSC, State, and USAID roles for stabilization and reconstruction. Move some
of the functions of S/CRS, including overall interagency coordination, into the NSC.
(Also, significantly upgrade USAID to become the lead agency for planning and
managing stabilization and reconstruction missions. Leave the State Department and
S/CRS with the tasks of defining detailed strategies and policies.) (pp. 66-68)
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Organization
Proposal
RAND and American
Under an NSC lead, involve relevant U. S. government units and agencies and host
Academy of Diplomacy
nation governments in missions and activities starting from the planning stages. NSC
(AAD) 2008
should also conduct a standing planning process that tries to envision the future. NSC
should operate in tandem with OMB, but without giving OMB veto power over
planning. Planning at this level provides central direction, overall parameters,
interagency reconciliation, allocation of resources, and systemic and continuing
review of results. Lower level planning and review tasks would be handled by
interagency tasks forces. (pp. 16-17)
Wil iams/Adams 2008
Vest NSC and OMB with responsibility for overseeing the planning, funding,
coordination and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction missions. (p. 99)
CFR 2005
Formally task the National Security Advisor and staff with civil-military coordination
and the establishment of overarching policy associated with stabilization and
reconstruction activities. Codify the new role in a new National Security Policy
Directive (pp. 11-12)
Defense Science Board
The President and NSC should provide direction and coordination for Stabilization
(DSB) 2004
and Reconstruction (S&R) operations, as well as for the initiation of planning
processes to resolve issues without the use of military force for countries where U.S.
interests are very important and the risk of U.S. intervention is high. A small,
permanent cadre within the NSC Staff should provide continuity and expertise for
long-term S&R issues. (pp 29-32)
U.S. Commission on
The NSA (National Security Advisor) should coordinate a strategic planning process
National Security 2001
on national security to translate the President’s overall vision into strategic goals and
priorities which would be used as the basis of specific guidance for departments and
agencies on the most important national security policies. (pp. 48-49)
Create New Procedures to Facilitate Strategy-making and Planning
Many proposals to make interagency missions more effective start with or include
recommendations for new or improved government-wide, comprehensive strategy and planning
reviews or documents. (Table B-4) Such annual or periodic reviews and documents would serve
to clarify agency roles and facilitate agency planning and mission integration. The proposals
usually call for modeling the documents after improved versions of the President’s National
Security Strategy Report and the DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Some proposals
explicitly tie the creation of new strategy documents to the development of national security
budgets. There also are a variety of other proposals to rationalize strategy development and
planning capabilities and processes by creating new posts, mechanisms, procedures, or practices
to facilitate coordination and oversight (Table B-5).
In an Obama Administration effort to integrate plans and budgets, Secretary of State Clinton said
that Chiefs of Mission will play a role in integrating country-level strategic plans and budgets. At
a February 2, 2011, meeting of Ambassadors (billed as the first annual Chief of Mission
conference) the Secretary stated, “Each chief of mission will be responsible for overseeing an
integrated country strategy that will bring together all country-level planning processes and
efforts into one single multiyear overarching strategy that encapsulates U.S. policy priorities,
objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools
will be used to achieve them.”118
118 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/155870.htm.
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Table B-4. Proposals for Specific New Strategy Development
Processes and Documents
Organization
Proposal
Quadrennial Defense
Initiate a National Security Strategic Planning Process by establishing a standing
Review Independent
Independent Strategic Review Panel to review the strategic environment over the next 20
Panel Report (QDRIP)
years and provide prioritized, goal and risk assessment recommendations. The ISRP, to be
2010
jointly established by the executive branch and Congress, would also be charged with
reviewing and assessing the existing National Security Strategy and policies: as well as
national security roles, missions, and organizations of the departments and agencies. It
would provide recommendations and input to the National Security Strategic Planning
Process and the national security department and agency planning and review processes.
Using the ISRP assessment of the strategic environment, the NSC would develop a “grand
strategy” for the United States that would be formalized as the National Security Strategy,
signed by the President. The National Security Advisor would then direct reviews of
executive branch national security departments and related assessments. (pp. 101-102)
Smith 2010
As a major part of a new Quadrennial National Security Review, thoroughly review U.S.
peace-building doctrine, mechanisms, and interagency coordination. (p. 211)
PNSR 2009
Perform a National Security Review at the beginning of each presidential term that would
describe the strategic landscape with an analysis of major ongoing or foreseeable
worldwide commitments, the identification and prioritization of current and foreseeable
national security opportunities and threads, and trends that significantly affect national
security, including an assessment of existing capabilities and resources against needs, and
recommendations regarding the missions, activity and budgets across the national security
interagency system, and a review of the scope of national security including possible
changes in roles and responsibilities within the interagency system, and among outside
stakeholders. Use annual reviews to assess the continuing applicability of the PNSR’s basic
assumptions. (pp. 39, 215-216)
Based upon the assessments and priorities of the National Security Review, require the
preparation of national security planning and resource guidance to be issued annual y by
the President to all national security departments and agencies, including guidance
concerning the necessary capabilities to be developed for current and future needs. This
document would be issued jointly by the National Security Staff and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), which among other functions would provide guidance
for the preparation of interagency plans to build required national security capabilities,
linking strategy to resource al ocation. (pp. 40,42, 217-218) (Also see PNSR 2008, pp.
508-509.)
Develop a National Security Strategic Human Capital Plan to align human capital
programs with strategic goals, objectives, and outcomes. (p. 72)
Wil iams/Adams 2008
Institute a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR), jointly conducted by the NSC
and OMB with interagency support and similar to the Department of Defense (DOD)
Quadrennial Defense Review, to establish top-down priorities for national security, link
priorities and resources. Also institute a biennial National Security Planning Guidance
(NSPG) process, jointly conducted by the NSC and OMB with interagency support. The
NSPG would provide guidance on a few cross-cutting policy areas, with one of the first to
be S&R. These documents would provide the basis for an annual NSC/OMB review of
State and Defense program and budget documents. (p.100)
Advisory Committee on
Task the State Department, working closely with the NSC and OMB, with the lead in
Transformational
coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a
Diplomacy (ACTD) 2007
related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. The State Department should also
enhance its regional interagency coordination role and presence by leading the
development of government-wide regional strategic plans and expanding its senior-level
diplomatic visibility. (p. ii)
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Organization
Proposal
QDR 2006
Create National Security Planning Guidance to direct the development of both military
and non-military plans and institutional capabilities. This guidance would set priorities and
clarify national security roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and eliminate
redundancies, and help Federal Departments and Agencies better align their strategy,
budget and planning functions with national objectives. (p. 85)
Flournoy/Brimley 2006
Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR), i.e., an interagency process to
develop a national security strategy that sets national security objectives and priorities,
identifies the capabilities required—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to
implement it, and delineates agency roles and responsibilities. The president should
designate a senior national security official (most likely the National Security Advisor) to
lead the effort, designed to frame key decisions for the President rather than to paper
over differences. The QNSR would produce a classified National Security Planning
Guidance document and the existing unclassified National Security Strategy. (pp. 85-86)
Schake/Berkowitz 2005
Use the President’s National Security Strategy as an instrument to direct the executive
branch department(s?), assigning responsibilities and prioritizing resources, rather than as
a statement of intent and ideals as it is now. (Webpage.)
DSB 2004
The Secretaries of Defense and State should jointly propose a National Security Planning
Directive to assign specific roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies and to
make explicit the NSC’s role in managing national resources for crisis planning. (p. 31)
U.S. Commission on
The NSA (National Security Advisor) should coordinate a strategic planning process on
National Security 2001
national security to translate the President’s overall vision into strategic goals and
priorities which would be used as the basis of specific guidance for departments and
agencies on the most important national security policies. (pp. 48-49)
Table B-5. Proposals to Rationalize or Enhance Strategy Development and Planning
Organization
Proposal
Quadrennial Defense
Expresses DOD support for an improved interagency strategic planning process that
Review Report (QDR)
makes optimal use of all national instruments of statecraft, including a significant
2010
improvement in interagency comprehensive assessments, analysis, planning, and execution
for whole-of-government operations, including systems to monitor and evaluate those
operations in order to advance U.S. national interests. (p. 71)
SIGIR 2010
Al relevant agencies should work together to develop and implement integrated planning
capabilities for S&R operations. (p. 15)
CFR 2009
Better utilize the U.S. government’s considerable early-warning capabilities (including
intelligence collection systems, analysts, and products by among other things, nurturing a
much closer working relationship between the intelligence and policy communities, and
consolidating all instability watch-lists into a single U.S. government watch-list as part of a
general effort to streamline early-warning products and integrate them more formally into
planning and programming. (pp. 21-22)
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Organization
Proposal
PNSR 2009
Focus the National Security Staff on high-level policy formulation and policy guidance. (p.
39)
Establish a permanent strategy directorate within the National Security Staff., whose main
mission would be to develop medium and long term strategy. (p. 40)
Enable the National Security Staff to perform strategic management of end-to-end
national security interagency processes, development of the national security interagency
system, crisis management, and presidential staffing. Improve cross-administration
continuity by staffing the executive secretariat of the national security staff with career
civil servants. (p. 207)
Urge the President to issue an executive order, to be supplemented by derivative
presidential policy and study directives that would establish a coherent, continuing
framework and normative process for the national security system, including defining the
national security interagency system, both with respect to end-to-end management of the
national security interagency system and with respect to the decentralized
implementation by departments, agencies, and interagency teams. (p. 209)
Wil iams/Adams—2008
Establish a single set of security assistance programs conducted under State Department
authorities, with close DOD involvement in shaping programs, since DOD likely will
continue to be the primary implementer. (p. 72)
Advisory Committee on
The State Department should institutionalize its ability to integrate U.S. government
Transformational
instruments of power in support of the NSC and to serve as the lead foreign affairs
Diplomacy (ACTD) 2007
agency within the interagency structure. It should also enhance its regional interagency
coordination role and presence by leading the development of government-wide regional
strategic plans and expanding its senior-level diplomatic visibility. (p. ii)
ACTD 2007
The State Dept. should integrate strategic planning offices and technology infrastructures
of the department and USAID, merge overlapping bureaus and functions, and co-locate
related offices and personnel in Washington, D.C. (pp. i-ii)
CGD 2007
The NSC (and Congress) should mandate closer involvement of the State Department
and USAID (and concurrence by the Secretary of State) in the uses of DOD foreign
assistance funding in order to integrate development and governance expertise in such
DOD activities, particularly in DOD-led counterterrorism and post-conflict initiatives.
(pp. 15-16)
CGD 2007
The Administration should clarify agency roles and responsibilities in carrying out a
strategy for fragile and war-torn states, taking into consideration the permissiveness of
the operating environment in assigning lead roles. (p. 15)
DSB 2004
A small, permanent cadre within the NSC Staff should provide continuity and expertise
for dealing with important countries and regions where there is the potential for U.S.
military involvement. (pp. 29-31)
CSIS/AUSA 2003
Replace the current ad hoc strategy and planning process for addressing post-conflict
reconstruction situations with a standing comprehensive interagency process. (p. 10)
Integrate National Security Budgets or Improve
Budgeting Procedures
Another significant perceived system deficiency is the current practice of budgeting by agency
rather than by mission or goal. Many proposals would integrate agency budgets relevant to
national security, either as a whole or for a specific sector (Table B-6). Others seek to improve
the budgeting process (Table B-7).
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The concept of an integrated national security budget dates back at least to the 2001 U.S.
Commission on National Security. The Commission faulted the budgeting process for its failure
to make clear how the allocation of resources in agency budgets addressed national security
goals, and to systematically consider tradeoffs in the allocation of those resources. It also noted
the problem for Congressional oversight from the absence of a unified budget. “At present,
therefore, neither the Congress nor the American people can assess the relative value of various
national security programs over the full range of Executive Branch activities in this area.”119
Budgeting by agency can lead to duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in others, as well
as incoherent budget information on activities and missions undertaken by multiple agencies.
Preparation of a full scale integrated budget would be a complex undertaking. It would involve
the pragmatic exercise of bringing intellectual rigor to the concepts and programs involved.
Potentially, it could also involve bureaucratic challenges over the appropriate allocation of
missions, programs, and funds.
Perhaps because of the complexity of preparing a fully integrated national security budget, the
Commission on National Security proposed that
the first of them “focus on a few of the nation’s
In Focus: Need for Integrated Budgets
most critical strategic goals, involving only
Current budgeting practices for counterterrorism
some programs in the departmental budgets.”
efforts and for foreign police and law enforcement
assistance programs illustrate the problems of agency-
(The first strategic areas the Commission
based budgets. Several agencies—among them the
proposed for the initial document were
Department of State, USAID, DOD, and the Treasury
homeland security, counterterrorism,
Department—all carry out counterterrorism efforts.
nonproliferation, nuclear threat reduction, and
However, there is no aggregated counterterrorism
science and technology.) Eventually, the
budget. Thus, the U.S. government cannot account for
the total amount of funding it dedicates to
Commission stated, the national security budget
counterterrorism efforts, nor easily identify the extent
“could evolve into a more comprehensive
of duplication or gaps in those efforts.
document.”121 That complexity may also
Similarly, U.S. funding for support to foreign police
explain why subsequent recommendations
forces is difficult to ascertain. Recently, the
called for sector-specific integrated budgets or
Government Accountability Office (GAO) compiled
budget presentations (with proposals limited to
information on funding to train and equip these forces
security assistance, or counterterrorism), or
provided by seven federal agencies for
greater transparency and combined decision-
counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and anticrime
missions. The GAO labeled the amounts reported as
making on State, USAID, and DOD budgets in
“estimates.” Precise figures were not available because
areas of overlap.
“according to agency officials, police training and
equipping is not general y a category the agencies use
Whether an integrated national security budget
to track funding.”120
or integrated sector specific budgets will
increase government efficiency and effectiveness may depend on what is meant by the term
119 Road Map for National Security, p. 48. These problems are a by-product of the U.S. government budgeting system.
Because Congress appropriates funds to individual department/agency budgets and each department or agency budgets
funding for its own activities and operations, there is no authoritative cross-department record of the amounts that the
U.S. government, as a whole, spends for many activities and mission. Further, an individual department or agency
account may fund a wide variety of activities, but do not necessarily disaggregate data by activity. Because of this
budgeting practice, there sometimes is no way to judge agencies’ funding for a specific purpose or activity, and thus the
relative weight of agency contributions to an activity, without a time-consuming review of agency accounts.
120 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Multiple U.S. Agencies Provided Billions of Dollars to Train and Equip
Foreign Police Forces, Letter to Hon. John F. Tierney, April 27, 2011, p. 13.
121 Road Map for National Security, p. 49.
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“integrated.” The budget exercise of providing information on all U.S. national security accounts
in one document may well bring more transparency. Funding could be totaled by mission areas,
providing a comprehensive view of U.S. government spending in vital areas, such as
counterterrorism, that is not now available. This could facilitate oversight. However, to achieve
efficiencies and increase effectiveness by coordinating programs through shared cross-agency
accounts may involve other changes. Reform of strategy and planning structures may be required
to manage “blended” funds. Another drawback mentioned by some analysts are possible
complications for Congress in handling integrated budgets under its current department and
agency-centric committee system.122
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (P.L. 112-25) provides Congress, through the Joint Select
Committee on intelligence, with an opportunity to view the defense and international affairs
budgets as a whole. This legislation consolidates the DOD, State Department, and USAID
budgets, as well as others, under a comprehensive “security” category.123 This type of exercise in
considering overlapping defense and international affairs spending may produce useful insights
for future budget integration.
The Obama Administration has endorsed the idea of establishing a full integrated national
security budget and is taking preliminary steps to achieve that goal. In a May 2010 speech,
Secretary of State Clinton noted that the Administration wanted “to begin to talk about a national
security budget ... [where] you can see the tradeoffs and the savings.” The December 2010
QDDR, as mentioned above, signals the Administration’s intent to advance the discussion. A first
step proposed in the QDDR was the pooled DOD-State Global Security Contingency Fund
(GSCF).124 In December 2011, Congress provided authority for the GSCF in the FY2012
National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1207, H.R. 1540, sent to the President on December
21, 2011).125 Proposed by the State Department as a three-year pilot project, the fund may make
clear the degree to which associated changes are needed.
122 Frank Olivieri, “Blended” Funds Offer Flexibility, Risk for State Department Operations,” Congressional
Quarterly, March 14, 2011, pp. 7, 23.
123 Also included in the security category are the budgets of the Departments of Homeland Security and Veterans
Affairs, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the intelligence community management account. See CRS
Report R41965, The Budget Control Act of 2011, by Bill Heniff Jr., Elizabeth Rybicki, and Shannon M. Mahan.
124 For more information on the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), see CRS Report RS22855, Security
Assistance Reform: “Section 1206” Background and Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino, and CRS Report
RL33647, A Civilian Reserve for Stabilization and Reconstruction Abroad: Summary of a Workshop on U.S. Proposals
and International Experiences and Related Issues for Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
125 The State Department’s FY2012 budget request describes the fund as a means to “streamline the way the U.S.
Government provides assistance for military forces and other security forces....” Forces that could be assisted would be
those “responsible for conducting border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as
well as the government agencies responsible for such forces.” In addition, the fund could be used, according to State’s
request, to provide assistance to foreign justice sector and other rule of law programs, and to other aspects of
stabilization efforts. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Volume 2, Foreign Operations,
Washington, DC, p. 161.
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Table B-6. Proposals for Integrated Budgets
Organization
Proposal
QDR 2010
Cites “the creation of a unified national security budget process” as a goal of current
Administration efforts to reform interagency processes, after joint mission planning, an
Overseas Contingency Operations budget, and pooled funding. (p. 203)
QDRIP 2010
Establish a consolidated budget line for national security that encompasses, at a minimum,
Defense, State, USAID, and the intelligence community. Task OMB and the NSC to develop a
mechanism to track implementation of the various budget that support a comprehensive
approach to national security. (p. ix)
Smith 2010
Develop a national security budget giving careful attention to the sources and accounts used
to fund the range of U.S. government peace-building activities. (pp. 211-212)
PNSR 2009
Develop the capability to produce an integrated national security budget. The President’s
annual budget submission to Congress should provide a single integrated national security
budget display along with integrated budget justification material that reflects how each
department’s and each agency’s budget aligns with underlying security assessments, strategy,
and resource guidance. Develop a core competency within the National Security Staff and
OMB to produce a national security budget and budget justification, including performing
national security mission-based analysis. (p. 219) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 509.)
RAND/AAD 2008
The annual budget submission to Congress should include a separate volume with an
integrated justification for the amounts requested through accounts comprising a national
security budget, including foreign assistance, diplomacy, defense, homeland security, and
intelligence, The OMB should conduct a national security budget review, in which the NSC
should take part. (pp. 22-23)
CSIS 2007
The OMB and NSC should document clearly the connections among USAID, State
Department, and DOD foreign assistance funding, to facilitate funding comparisons across
agencies and sectors and for the creation of new metrics. (p. 35)
CSIS 2007
DOD, State, and USAID should present relevant congressional committees with a joint
counterterrorism security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require Executive
Branch transparency over how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together. (p. 38)
ACTD 2007
The State Dept. should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and OMB, in coordinating
the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a related and
integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. (p. ii)
U.S. Commission on The President should prepare and present to Congress an overall national security budget to
National Security
serve the critical goals that emerge from the NSC strategic planning process. Separately, the
2001
President should continue to submit budgets for the individual national security departments
and agencies for Congressional review and appropriations. (p. ii)
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Table B-7. Proposals to Improve the Budget Process
Organization
Proposal
QDRIP 2010
In addition to establishing a consolidated budget line for national security that encompasses,
at a minimum, Defense, State, USAID, and the intelligence community, task OMB and the
NSC to develop a mechanism to track implementation of the various budgets that support a
comprehensive approach to national security. (p. ix)
SIGIR 202
The NSC and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should work with the relevant
agencies to develop potential S&R budget requirements. (p. 15)
PNSR 2009
Require the preparation of a national security planning and resource guidance document to
be issued annual y by the President to al national security departments and agencies, to be
jointly issued by the National Security Staff and OMB, which among other functions would
provide guidance for the preparation of interagency plans to build required national security
capabilities, linking strategy to resource allocation. (pp. 217-218) (Also see PNSR 2008, pp.
508-509.)
Direct each national security department and agency to prepare a six-year budget projection
derived from National Security Planning and Resource Guidance. Require each department
and agency to submit its annual budget to OMB consistent with the guidance in the National
Security Planning and Resource Guidance. (pp. 40, 219) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 509.)
Develop a core competency within the National Security Staff and OMB to produce a
national security budget and budget justification, including performing national security
mission-based analysis. (p. 219) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 509.)
RAND/AAD 2008
In addition to presenting Congress with an annual integrated justification of national security
accounts, the OMB should conduct a national security budget review, in which the NSC
should take part. (pp. 22-23)
Wil iams/Adams 2008
Budgets for security assistance should be drawn up jointly by State and DOD, with OMB
providing oversight and ensuring integration. Budget requests should reflect the policies and
programs that the NSC permanent interagency group, co-chaired by OMB, develops. (p. 73)
ACTD 2007
The State Dept. should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and OMB, in
coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan and presenting a
related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. (p. ii)
CSIS 2007
The OMB and NSC should document clearly the connections among USAID, State
Department, and DOD foreign assistance funding, to facilitate funding comparisons across
agencies and sectors and for the creation of new metrics. (p. 35)
CSIS 2007
DOD, State, and USAID should present relevant congressional committees with a joint
counterterrorism security assistance budget as part of a broader effort to require Executive
Branch transparency over how State, USAID, and DOD budgets fit together. (p. 38)
CGD 2007
The NSC (and Congress) should mandate closer involvement of the State Department and
USAID (and concurrence by the Secretary of State) in the uses of DOD foreign assistance
funding in order to integrate development and governance expertise in such DOD activities,
particularly in DOD-led counterterrorism and post-conflict initiatives. (p. 16)
Senate Foreign
The Director for Foreign Assistance should break funding decisions into strategic, tactical
Relations Committee
and operational components and find ways to bring appropriate actors into decisions, as
(SFRC) 2007
well as to make clear who the appropriate decisionmaker is at various stages. (p. 4)
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Appendix C. Proposals to Enhance Civilian
Authority, Institutional Arrangements, and
Resources for Interagency Missions Abroad
The predominant role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in missions and activities that some
policymakers and experts (including some DOD and military leaders) argue would be better
placed in civilian hands is often attributed to the weaknesses of civilian institutions and
leadership. The weaknesses cited include inadequate authority, inappropriate structures, and
insufficient civilian resources, especially personnel. Most of the studies surveyed for this report
judged that leaving many of the “nation-building” or “state-building” tasks that DOD has
assumed in military hands is problematic. (See the section, above, entitled “To What Extent
Should the U.S. Military Provide Needed State-Building Capabilities?”) As a result,
improvements to the existing civilian institutions and institutional authorities of the national
security system, particularly the Department of State and its Secretary, have been the mainstay of
many recommendations for interagency reform.
Most often, the Secretary of State leads civilian efforts in missions and activities abroad, but, on
occasion, the President looks elsewhere for a leader. The civilian alternatives to leadership by the
Secretary of State and the State Department for interagency missions have also been viewed by
some as unsatisfactory.
Over the years, Presidents have routinely turned to the appointment of “czars” to head
interagency efforts in a large number of areas of interagency cooperation. Although their offices
offer a venue for interagency operations, the czars themselves often have not possessed the
authority or ability to coordinate interagency operations.126 Further, some Members view “czars”
as lacking accountability to Congress; the 112th Congress expressly denied the Administration
authority to fund such offices. (President Obama rejected the prohibition as an unconstitutional
intrusion on executive branch prerogatives.)127
For certain activities and missions, Presidents may appoint “lead agencies” to coordinate
interagency efforts. But lead agencies, including the Department of State when it plays this role,
are often viewed as ineffective because their mandates to coordinate activities are not
accompanied by the requisite authority and resources. Also, in some cases the lead agency’s
agenda and underlying assumptions may not square with those of other agencies. Thus, civilian
agencies often have no incentive to divert personnel and funding for programs that do not further
their core functions or otherwise serve their interests.128
126 CRS Report R40856, The Debate Over Selected Presidential Assistants and Advisors: Appointment, Accountability,
and Congressional Oversight, by Barbara L. Schwemle et al.
127 White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 1473, April 15, 2011,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/15/statement-president-hr-1473.
128 One study quotes an unnamed senior NSC official: “’lead agency really means sole agency as no one will follow the
lead agency if its directions substantially affect their organizational equities.’” Office of the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction, Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations,
Arlington, VA, February 2010, p. 27. (Hereinafter referred to as Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons.)
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Proposals to enhance civilian authority and institutions are numerous. Many proposals focus on
increasing State Department capacity and authority (Table C-1, Table C-2), others would transfer
some State Department stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) functions elsewhere (Table C-3).
Others would create new institutions or structures for S&R and other missions abroad (Table
C-4), create interagency task forces (Table C-5), enhance civilian regional presence (Table C-6,
Table C-7), and increase civilian interagency personnel capacity (Table C-8,
Table C-9, Table C-10).
Obama Administration interagency reform plans and actions include (1) creating two new
bureaus, one for conflict and stabilization operations and the other for counterterrorism; (2)
establishing regional hubs; (3) better supporting the military Geographic Combatant Commands;
and (4) increasing civilian personnel. These are discussed below. (Plans to enhance Chief of
Mission authority are discussed in Appendix D.)
Enhance State Department Authority and Capacity
The Secretary of State is formally the lead civilian official for developing and implementing
foreign policy and, through a patchwork of statutes and executive orders, has authority for a
variety of ancillary roles. (See Appendix A.) The Secretary’s ability to carry out all her
responsibilities is severely constrained by a lack of appropriate authorities and organizational
structures, adequate numbers of personnel with the appropriate skills, and a sufficient budget,
according to many analysts. There is particular concern that the Department of State does not
possess the capacity to take the lead in three key areas: counterterrorism, security assistance, and
stabilization and reconstruction. In all three areas, Congress has been willing to provide DOD
with authority and resources to carry out missions.
Several of the studies surveyed recommend a wide variety of ways to enhance the State
Department’s ability to lead, coordinate, and conduct interagency missions and activities. These
include a new authorities, new procedures, restructuring, and the cultivation of an “operational”
ethos for interagency missions (Table C-1). The State Department’s ability to lead, coordinate,
and conduct S&R missions is of particular concern, and several recommendations were
specifically targeted at improving S&R capacity (Table C-2).
The Obama Administration has proposed elevating the status and expanding the functions of the
two State Department offices which coordinate interagency efforts: the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), and the Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism (S/CT). As proposed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense and Diplomacy Review
(QDDR), the Obama Administration seeks Congress’ approval to establish and provide resources
for a new Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) Bureau and a new Counterterrorism
Bureau.
On the other hand, some analysts would neither expand nor enhance the State Department’s
stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) role. They view the State Department’s culture, rooted in
its core mission of diplomacy, as an insurmountable barrier that no restructuring, increases in
personnel, or additional budgetary resources could overcome. Because an agency’s core mission
shapes recruitment and promotion selection criteria, some analysts argue that the State
Department will never make effective use of personnel skilled at planning and conducting
operational missions. Some of these analysts also doubt the State Department’s ability to
effectively oversee missions to prevent and manage conflict. Instead, they would build up the
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United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or create a new agency to manage
operational and preventive missions129 (Table C-3).
Table C-1. Proposals to Increase the State Department Capacity and Authority to
Lead, Coordinate, and Conduct Interagency Missions
Organization
Proposal
QDDR 2010
Expand U.S. capacity to engage regionally by establishing regional embassy hubs as bases for
experts in cross-cutting issues such as climate change or conflict resolution. These experts will
“ride the circuit” between posts in the region. (pp. vii, 53)
Establish a Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) bureau (pp. 135-136) and a
Counterterrorism Bureau (p. 45)
Smith 2010
Confirm through presidential executive order that the Secretary of State will continue to carry
the responsibility for leading and coordinating post-conflict reconstruction activities. (p. 213)
PNSR 2009
Develop an integrated approach to the management of global civilian affairs that mirrors the core
strategic management functions of the national security interagency system proposed elsewhere,
including the development of an overarching blueprint for a Next Generation State Department
that includes a new organizational culture that would promote operational skill sets, stronger
department-level oversight functions for budget, comptrol er, and personnel, a management
structure that permits the department to think, anticipate, plan, prepare, and act in an integrated
fashion, multiyear strategic planning and budgeting processes that both facilitate the development
of long-term capabilities and permit flexibility in making tradeoffs in response to new threats,
guidance, or operational requirements, among others. (pp. 212-213)
Williams/Adams
Establish a single set of security assistance programs conducted under State Department
2008
authorities, with close Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in shaping programs, since
DOD likely wil continue to be the primary implementer. (p. 72)
ADTD 2007
The State Department should institutionalize its ability to integrate U.S. government instruments
of power in support of the National Security Council (NSC) and to serve as the lead foreign
affairs agency within the interagency structure. It should take the lead, working closely with the
NSC and the OMB, in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs Strategic Plan
and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. It should enhance its
regional interagency coordination role and presence by leading the development of government-
wide regional strategic plans and expanding its senior-level diplomatic visibility. (p. ii)
The State Dept. should take the lead, working closely with the NSC and the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), in coordinating the periodic development of a Global Affairs
Strategic Plan and presenting a related and integrated annual Global Affairs Budget. The State
Dept. should integrate strategic planning offices and technology infrastructures of the department
and USAID, merge overlapping bureaus and functions, and co-locate related offices and personnel
in Washington, D.C. (p. ii)
SFRC 2007
The President should give the Secretary of State explicit authority to ensure that all foreign aid to
individual countries and regions—including aid from the State Department, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), DOD, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCC), the
President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)—is in the foreign policy interest of the
United States and conforms to the strategic goals determined by the President. (p. 4)
The President should task the Secretary of State to work closely with the Administrator of
USAID to implement the President’s foreign assistance strategy. (p. 4)
129 CRS Report R40102, Foreign Aid Reform: Studies and Recommendations, by Susan B. Epstein and Matthew C.
Weed, and CRS Report R40756, Foreign Aid Reform: Agency Coordination, by Marian Leonardo Lawson and Susan
B. Epstein.
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Organization
Proposal
CFR 2005
Make the State Department the lead agency for all civilian efforts related to S&R, and provide it
with all resources and funding authority needed for executive branch Stabilization and
Reconstruction programs. Establish an Undersecretary of State for Stabilization and
Reconstruction and a Deputy Administrator for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations at
USAID. Make USAID responsible for managing the daily operations in S&R missions and increase
funding and resources accordingly. (pp. 19-25)
Table C-2. Proposals to Strengthen the State Department Lead and Capacity for
Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R)
Organization Proposal
QDDR 2010
Establish a Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) bureau (pp. 135-136) and a
Counterterrorism Bureau (p. 45)
Smith 2010
Building on S/CRS, create a fully integrated State-USAID office, with some staffing from the military
and additional civilian agencies, to exercise the lead for S&R, Consideration should be given to
transferring USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to S/CRS to take over the
conflict prevention function and to integrating the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives into S/CRS
as the foundation of the active component of the Civilian Response Corps. (pp. 215-216, 220)
CFR 2009
Strengthen S/CRS with more resources devoted to preventive planning and crisis preparedness to
fulfill its NSPD-44 mandate. S/CRS should become the prime locus for analyzing prior operations
for “lessons learned” and best practices. Ful y support efforts to build up a Civilian Response Corps
(CRC) for stabilization and reconstruction missions, but at the same time review the overlap
between the CRC and similar USAID expeditionary capabilities to clarify their respective roles and
missions. Consider the utility of standing up a dedicated mediation support unit and a related roster
of regional and functional experts that can be rapidly deployed. (pp. 24-25)
ACTD 2007
Enlarge State Department operational capacity to secure the transition of fragile and failed states in
close coordination with other U.S. government departments and agencies, and in partnership with
other nations and multilateral organizations. Specifically, the State Department should integrate
strategic planning offices and technology infrastructures of the department and the USAID, merge
overlapping bureaus and functions, and co-locate related offices and personnel in Washington, D.C.
The Department should establish senior-level responsibility and interagency authority for
stabilization and reconstruction, and develop fully the its S&R planning and execution capacities in
this area. (pp. i-ii)
CFR 2005
Establish an Under Secretary of State for S&R, and establish a new unit within the State
Department which reports to this Under Secretary. Make the State Department the lead agency
for all civilian efforts related to S&R and provide it with all resources and funding authority needed
for executive branch S&R programs. (p. 22)
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Table C-3. Proposals to Diversify S&R Responsibilities Away
from the State Department
Organization
Proposal
Brookings/CSIS
Divide S/CRS’s functions among the NSC, the State Department Policy Planning Office, and
2010
USAID. Proposes the NSC take on “the design and management of whole-of-government
coordination systems,” a “more robust policy planning office at the State Department,” would
provide the “helpful planning support that S/CRS has provided to regional bureaus on a case-by-
case basis,” and USAID would assume the “operational responsibilities of building and maintaining
the Civilian Response Corps.” (p. 29) USAID might also take on the planning support if a policy
and strategic planning entity were to be established there, according to the proposal. (p. 41)
RAND 2009
Realign NSC, State, and USAID roles for stabilization and reconstruction. Significantly upgrade
USAID to become the lead agency for planning and managing stabilization and reconstruction
missions. Move some of the functions of S/CRS, including overall interagency coordination, into
the NSC. Leave the State Department and S/CRS with the tasks of defining detailed strategies and
policies. (pp. 66-68)
RAND 2009
Issue presidential-level guidance as the source for a coherent and consistent package of
regulations and rules that create an effective S&R new system, clarifying the roles of the State
Department, USAID, and others so that agencies have incentives to make investments in the areas
for which they are responsible. Develop this package in coordination with Congressional guidance
regarding the definition of missions and tasks and the allocation of resources. (p. 74)
Create New Agencies, Arrangements, Authorities
Recently, concerns about the gaps in civilian structures to coordinate interagency missions—both
steady state and extraordinary—have led some to argue for new arrangements at the national,
regional, and field levels. At the national level, some argue for new S&R institutions or
arrangements, independent of existing departments and agencies.
Some have advocated the use of various interagency task forces, informed by the lessons learned
from the various permanent and temporary U.S. government tasks forces, as the means to provide
both much needed capacity, flexibility, and adaptability to respond to emerging situations. Some
argue for improved regional arrangements.
Create New Structures or Arrangements for S&R and Other Overseas Missions
In addition to reforms proposed for the NSC (discussed above), several organizations and experts
have recommended a reorganization of current responsibilities for dealing with fragile states, for
preventing, managing, resolving conflict, or for operational missions abroad in general (Table
C-4). Some proposals would redistribute S&R responsibilities, enhancing the role of USAID or
incorporating its offices into new combined State-USAID units.130 Those who propose enhancing
USAID’s position in S&R structures generally judge its agency focus and culture to be better
suited to the operational nature of S&R missions than those of the State Department. Two would
create an independent S&R agency; one would make it responsible to the Secretary of State
(CSIS 2005), the other to the NSC (Special Inspector General for Iraq, or SIGIR, 2010). SIGIR
130 S&R missions were of greatest concern at the time the initial proposals were made in the mid-2000s. At that time
S&R missions were post-conflict. As discussed earlier, the term now encompasses preventive measures.
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argues that a new agency “would streamline decision-making and eliminate the ‘lead agency’
dilemma” that hinders interagency cooperation.131
Table C-4. Proposals to Create New S&R Structures
Organization
Proposal
CWC 2011
Create a permanent office of inspector general for contingency operations (which includes S&R)
to regularly assess the adequacy of agency planning and readiness for contingencies, and to
exercise audit and investigative authority over all functions and across all participating agencies.
The CWC does not specify where this office should be placed. (p. 147)
Special Inspector
Reassign S/CRS functions to a new, independent entity, the U.S. Office for Contingency
General for Iraq
Operations (USOCO), responsible to the NSC. As proposed in a February 2010 report by the
(SIGIR) 2010
Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the USOCO “would become
the locus for planning, funding, staffing, and managing” stabilization and reconstruction
operations, “replacing the fragmented process that now exists. Importantly, it would provide a
single office whose sole mission is ensuring that the United States is ready to go when the next
contingency occurs; and it would provide someone to hold accountable for failures in planning
and executions.”132 (p. 25)
QDRIP 2010
Create a National Commission on Building the Civil Force of the Future to develop
recommendations and a blueprint for increasing the capability and capacity of civilian
departments and agencies to move promptly overseas and cooperate effectively with military
forces in insecure (pre-conflict and post-conflict) environments. (p. x) Matters to be addressed
include changes in existing statutory authorities to enhance cooperation and integration of roles
and missions; the development of personnel, pay, and other policies and procedures to
promote and support a more mobile, deployable, and flexible civilian workforce and the
development of measures to encourage and facilitate training and exercising civilian elements
with military forces. (pp. 108-109)
Smith 2010
Building on S/CRS, create a fully integrated State-USAID office, with some staffing from the
military and additional civilian agencies, to exercise the lead for S&R, Consideration should be
given to transferring USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation to S/CRS to take
over the conflict prevention function and to integrating the USAID Office of Transition
Initiatives into S/CRS as the foundation of the active component of the Civilian Response Corps.
(pp. 215-216, 220)
RAND 2009
Issue presidential-level guidance as the source for a coherent and consistent package of
regulations and rules that create an effective new system. Develop this package in coordination
with Congressional guidance regarding the definition of missions and tasks and the allocation of
resources. (p. 74)
131 Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, pp. 25, 27. SIGIR quotes an observation of an unnamed senior NSC official: “’lead
agency really means sole agency, as no one will follow the lead agency if its directions substantially affect their
organizational equities.” The report continues: “When a particularly lead agency (State, Defense, or USAID) is put in
charge, departmental bias can cause certain issues to become defined as a military, diplomatic, or assistance challenge,
depending on which agency is in the lead. USOCO [the U.S. Office for Contingency Operations that SIGIR proposes)
would bear none of these institutional prejudices.” p. 27.
132 Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons, p. 25.This quote continues “Currently, there is no single agency that devotes its
entire mission to SROs [stabilization and reconstruction operations]. For State and Defense, they are but a small part of
the departments’ larger missions.” Under this proposal, USOCO would tie DOD capacity and resources to State
Department and USAID expertise “by closely linking its planning and operations with State, Defense, and USAID,
bringing out the best-developed SRO aspects from each, while avoiding the ‘stovepiping’ that tends to limit
departmental action. USOCO would fit between and among State, Defense, and USAID, providing the integrative
‘glue’ that SRO planning and execution currently lack.” (p. 27) The report warns that because the USOCO concept
“impinges upon existing ‘turf,’” it will “draw resistance.” But, the decision on whether to pursue the proposal should be
shaped by a careful analysis of whether the current departmentalized system has the genuine potential to generate an
integrated approach to planning and managing SROs.” (p. 27).
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Organization
Proposal
CSIS 2005
Establish an independent agency for S&R operations reporting directly to the Secretary of State.
Charge it with preparing stability operations and managing a Civilian Stability Operations Corps
and Reserve. Consolidate S/CRS and parts of USAID into this agency. (p. 63)
CFR 2005
Establish an Under Secretary of State for S&R, and establish a new unit within the State
Department which reports to this undersecretary. Make the State Department the lead agency
for all civilian efforts related to S&R and provide it with all resources and funding authority
needed for executive branch S&R programs. (p. 22)
Establish New Interagency Teams or Task Forces?
Proposals to create new agencies or other arrangements that entail new structures may well be
costly, the source of a wide variety of unintended consequences, and subject to bureaucratic
infighting. For those reasons, many may prefer the proposals to improve civilian coordination
efforts through the tool of improved interagency teams (Table C-5). There are a variety of
interagency teams for missions abroad and domestic matters, as noted above (Appendix A), but
information about how they function are notably lacking.133 Some may consider teams yet
another “ad hoc” mechanism, providing a seeming flexibility at the cost of making the structural
and capacity changes needed to create an enduring system for interagency cooperation. Some
may view their prospects for success as subject to the same bureaucratic obstacles—resistance to
sharing responsibilities, personnel, and resources—as the development of other new interagency
structures.
Table C-5. Proposals to Establish Interagency Teams or Task Forces
Organization
Proposal
QDRIP 2010
Establish standing interagency teams with capabilities to plan for and exercise, in an integrated way,
departmental and agency responsibilities in predefined mission scenarios before a crisis occurs. (p. ix)
PNSR 2009
Establish empowered interagency teams to delegate and unify management of national security issues and
missions, starting with a small set of presidential priority-issue teams. Teams would be headed by a
senior executive appointed by the president, who selects members in consultation with the national
security advisor, and operating under a charter developed by the national security advisor and team
leader and approved by the president. The charter would include a statement of the team’s mission and
objectives, authority to direct action, control resources, and otherwise carry out its mandate, and initial
resource levels, to be adjusted as necessary. The team would last until its mission was completed, but
leadership and membership could change. Department and agency heads would be able to appeal team
recommendations and decisions to the president, the National Security Council, or its most senior
subordinate councils, on the basis of unacceptable damage to national interests. (p. 55) (Also see PNSR
2008, p. 514.)
133 One recent National Defense University (NDU) report on JIATFS, long and widely known as the “gold standard”
for an interagency task force, offered two “likely explanations” for the lack of previous work on this unit: one, a
widespread presumption that the organization could not be widely duplicated and the other the “tragedy of the
commons.” “Although it is clearly in everyone’s interest to better understand the relatively few interagency successes
that the national security system has produced, it is not perceived to be in any given department’s or agency’s interest
to conduct or fund such work.” Joint Interagency Task Force-South. p. 82.
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Organization
Proposal
For exceptional situations, create an Interagency Crisis Task Force to handle a crisis in a country or
region that exceeds the capacity of the country team or regional-level team. To be headed by a single
director, the task force would be given a clear mission, clear responsibilities, authority commensurate
with responsibilities, and resources. The director would be supported by an augmented interagency staff
and additional resources from national security departments and agencies. The director would report to
the president through the national security advisor if the mission is large and important enough, or
alternatively to the head of the task force director’s respective department. For crises involving complex
contingencies where a large number of U.S. military forces are present, unless directed otherwise by the
president, the director would be placed in a single integrated chain of command, headed by a civilian
official or military officer depending on the security situation, for all U.S. civilian and military functions
during the operation. (p. 56)
Heritage 2005
Build inter-agency teams within specific geographic regions to plan and implement post-conflict
operations in theater, instead of building a new bureaucracy in Washington, D.C. Include combatant
commands in the interagency staffs. (p. 9)
DSB 2004
To respond to a threat or crisis, the President or NSC should establish a cross-government contingency
planning and integration task force reporting to the NSC to orchestrate planning and provide continued
integration and coordination. The number of task forces to be operating at any one time would likely
range from 2 to 10. (pp. 29-30)
Improve Regional Structures and Capacity?
A variety of proposals have called for improving regional structures and capacity, either by
enhancing the current military Geographic Combatant Commands or by creating new civilian
regional arrangements. Especially since 9/11, many analysts perceive that the threats to the
United States emanating from non-state actors and the spill-over effects of conflict in one country
to its neighbors often demand a regional policy response. Because of its robust military regional
commands but relatively weak civilian regional structures, some analysts question whether the
United States brings the appropriate leaders to the table for decision-making on regional issues
and integrates civilian and military resources to respond effectively.
Enhance the Military Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)
Most reform at the regional level to date has focused on enhancing the GCCs.134 The U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM), created in 2008 as a model for interagency organization as mentioned
above, set the standard for civilian integration into military geographic commands. However,
there has been continued work to improve the model, and about the time that command was
created, RAND and the American Academy of Diplomacy offered further suggestions for
enhancing civilian input into GCCs, as well as other DOD units (Table C-6). Nonetheless, some
analysts are skeptical that combatant commands will be able to attract sufficient personnel from
civilian agencies to operate with the degree of interagency integration originally envisioned for
AFRICOM.
The Obama Administration pledged in the QDDR to support GCCs in a number of ways: making
available senior Ambassador-ranked personnel as civilian deputies in addition to existing Foreign
134 For background on the combatant command system in general and details on the GCCs, see CRS Report R42077,
The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert.
For greater discussion of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S.
Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
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Policy Advisors, providing USAID high-level development advisors where appropriate, and,
“consistent with personnel availability,” detailing mid to senior-level State and USAID personnel
to GCCs.135
Table C-6. Proposals to Enhance Civilian Input into U.S. Geographic Combatant
Commands (GCCs) and Other DOD Units
Organization
Proposal
RAND/AAD 2008
Create a State Department Political Advisor (POLAD) Corps. Members would engage in
frequent classified email exchanges and collective meetings at least twice a year to create a
shared experience and reinforce the POLAD mission. Assign POLADS not just to combatant
commands, but also to subordinate commands wherever that will be useful in promoting State
Department-Combatant Command cooperation. POLADs should be of sufficient rank and
experience to work effectively at senior military levels and be taken seriously. At the senior
commands, they should be individuals who have already held an ambassadorial post. When
political (and development, i.e., USAID) officers are assigned to subordinate commands within
specific countries, they should be under ambassadorial authority. (p. 27)
Where a COCOM is likely to be engaged in operations that could require the assistance of
other government agencies, e.g., USAID, the Departments of Education, Justice, or Health and
Human Services, or the Drug Enforcement Administration, advisors from these agencies,
comparable to a POLAD, should be sent to the command. As with the POLADs, these
individuals would be managed and coordinated under ambassadorial authority. (p. 27)
Create New Civilian Regional Structures
A few analysts advocate creating new civilian regional structures (Table C-7). Some would make
the military commands subordinate to them. While none of the think tank studies surveyed for
this report advanced proposals for civilian regional “command,” one study by an Air Force officer
argues for new State Department-led regional-level interagency organizations.136 Two experts on
interagency organization propose that Chief of Mission authority be expanded to provide
appropriate leadership for civilian-led interagency teams that could be used at the regional level,
as well as elsewhere.
The Obama Administration, in the 2010 QDDR, states its intention to establish “regional hubs” in
some embassies, creating a home base for personnel dedicated to regional programs in cross-
cutting issue areas who will travel to posts throughout the region (Table C-7). This is a key
reform in its plan to improve the State Department and USAID ability “to think and act
regionally.” 137
135 QDDR, p. 54.
136 Robert S. Pope, Lt. Col (USAF), U.S. Interagency Regional Foreign Policy Implementation: A Survey of Current
Practice and an Analysis of Options for Improvement, A Research Report Submitted to the Air Force Fellows Program,
Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/Files/
Pope_10_AFF_Research_Paper_FINAL-2022.pdf. This study found that (1) “only a State-led model can guarantee a
non-military voice and face for U.S. foreign policy at the regional level,” and (2) a State-led organization (which he
would organize as a regional-led “country team” reporting to the Secretary of State) would “best be able to avoid
overburdening the President with regional-led interagency policy disputes.” pp. 171-172.
137 QDDR, p. 53.
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The QDDR states that regional hubs will offer “cost savings over deploying such experts to every
bilateral mission.”138 In a related action, the Administration stated it would improve regional
communication among bilateral posts. It would also create a new State Department “regional
forum” under the State Department Under Secretary for Political Affairs, where representatives
from relevant agencies would “meet regularly to coordinate regional initiatives and proposals.”139
Table C-7. Proposals for New Civilian Regional Authorities or Structures
Organization
Proposal
Lamb/Marks 2011
Expand Chief of Mission (COM) statutory authority to al ow the President to create
interagency Mission Managers, subject to Senate confirmation, to lead interagency teams
responding to a crisis and, in time, to steady-state interagency missions. (See Appendix D
and Table D-3.)
QDDR 2010
Designate a bilateral post in key regions as a “regional hub,” and provide appropriate staffing
to support and coordinate regional initiatives. Staff would consist of Foreign Service
personnel or officials from other agencies. (p. 53)
Pope 2010
Create civilian interagency regional structures to be headed by the State Department.
Create a U.S. Regional Mission (USRM) for each region, to be headed by a Regional Chief of
Mission (RCOM), nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and supported
by robust interagency staff. The RCOM and Deputy RCOM would both be Foreign Service
Officers. The RCOM would have prior experience as an ambassador or a deputy chief of
mission, or as a politically-appointed ambassador. The relevant geographic combatant
command would transfer parts of its staff to the RCOM, including Logistics; Plans, Policy,
and Strategy; and Communications, as well as its Theater Security Cooperation Program,
and its Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). (pp. 174-181)
Buchanan/Davis/Wight Dissolve existing military geographic combatant commands and create in their place civilian-
2009
led interagency organizations (to be called Joint Interagency Commands or JIACOMs), with
regional responsibility for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy, reporting directly to the
President through the NSC. Include representatives from all major Federal Government
agencies, including DOD, as well as assigned joint military forces. Place highly credentialed
civilians as leaders, perhaps with a four-star military deputy. Leaders would possess true
directive authority over all agencies and units below the NSC, including U.S. Ambassadors
and country teams. The NSC would be responsible for integrating policies among these
regional entities and proposing solutions to the President for intractable resource or
mission conflicts. (pp. 92-96)
Review and Augment Civilian Personnel Authority and Capacity
Only a few studies surveyed here have explicitly recommended reviewing or increasing civilian
personnel authorities and capacity. Some recommendations concerned State Department and
USAID personnel (Table C-8), some concerned interagency personnel in general (
Table C-9), and some concerned the interagency civilian response corps (Table C-10).
Nevertheless, the need for an expansion of civilian personnel involved in national security
missions—especially State Department and USAID personnel—has been an implicit part of the
entire interagency reform discussion. For many analysts, a primary goal is for the civilian
agencies to emulate the DOD practice of hiring enough personnel to provide a “float,” i.e.,
138 QDDR, p. 53.
139 QDDR, p. 54.
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sufficient excess capacity to allow personnel to engage periodically in interagency education and
training without creating vacancies at posts.
The Obama Administration’s “Diplomacy 3.0” hiring plan to increase the number of State
Department Foreign Service and Civil Service and USAID personnel is intended to provide such
a float. According to a recent report, for the Foreign Service Officer corps, the State Department’s
goal is a 15% float, equivalent to that of the U.S. military.140
Table C-8. Proposals to Review or Augment Civilian Personnel at the
State Department and USAID
Organization Proposal
Stimson/AAD
Redress the under-investment in diplomacy and the consequent imbalance between defense, on
2011
one side, and diplomacy and development, on the other, by ful y funding Diplomacy 3.0, the
Obama Administration to increase personnel in the State Department and USAID.
Smith 2010
Reexamine the dimensions of the need for a civilian “surge” capacity, including the balance
between additional ful -time positions for State and USAID and a reserve cadre, to meet rapidly
developing additional human resource and skill requirements. (pp. 216-271)
RAND/AAD
Substantially Increase the number of nonmilitary personnel at the State Department and USAID
2008
available for the types of missions conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan and their aftermath. (The
report cal ed for an increase in State Department personnel “even beyond” the 1,100 cal ed for in
the Bush Administration’s FY2009 budget.) (p. 19)
QDR 2006
Expresses DOD support for substantial y increased resources for S/CRS and for the associated
proposal to establish a deployable Civilian Reserve Corps and a Conflict Response Fund.
RAND/AAD
Create positions for military counselors to advise the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. (p. 3)
2006
CFR 2005
Create a new unit in the State Department to further streamline and promote public security and
rule of law programs, consolidating these activities at State and providing an attendant increase in
resources for the department, including international civilian police. (p. 24)
140 The Henry L. Stimson Center and The American Academy of Diplomacy, Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic
Service for the United States through Professional Education and Training, February 2011, pp. 23-24. According to
that report, Diplomacy 3.0 proposed adding 2,700 personnel to the Foreign Service above the FY2008 year-end level
(bringing the number to 14,600, including about 8,800 officers) and increasing the State Department civil service staff
by 13%. USAID in 2008 announced plans to double the number of its foreign service officers by the end of FY2012,
for a total of 2,400.
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Table C-9. Proposals to Augment Personnel and Other Capacity Government-wide
for Interagency Missions
Organization Proposal
QDR 2010
Al ocate additional resources across the government in order to significantly improve
comprehensive assessments, analysis, and planning for interagency operations, as wel as their
execution, monitoring and evaluation. (p. 71)
RAND/AAD
Create cadres of civilian personnel with specialized skills that will not be needed at all times but
2008
that need to be available on an on-call basis, or a “float.” (p. 19)
RAND/AAD
Create positions for military counselors to advise the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. (p. 3)
2006
Table C-10. Proposals to Increase the Capacity of the Civilian Response Corps
Organization Proposal
QDRIP 2010
Review and rewrite authorities to create and expand deployable capabilities of civilian departments,
agencies, and institutions (particularly State, State/USAID, Treasury, Energy, Justice, Homeland
Security, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Transportation.)
CFR 2009
Ful y support efforts to build up a Civilian Response Corps (CRC) for stabilization and
reconstruction missions, but at the same time review the overlap between the CRC and similar
USAID expeditionary capabilities to clarify their respective roles and missions. Consider the utility
of standing up a dedicated mediation support unit and a related roster of regional and functional
experts that can be rapidly deployed. (pp. 24-25)
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Appendix D. Proposals to Enhance Authority and/or
Capacity of U.S. Ambassadors
As the key locus of interagency coordination for steady state operations, the Embassy country
teams under the leadership of an Ambassador (or other official delegated Chief of Mission
authority) are uniquely responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. Given the great disparities
that observers note in ambassadors’ skills and knowledge to manage country teams and oversee
the foreign assistance operations of an embassy, improving Chief of Mission (COM) capacity is
crucial, according to many analysts.
For those who view the “country teams” as the key element in diplomacy and foreign assistance
in most circumstances, enhancing an Ambassador’s authority, capacity, and control over funding
is crucial. Some perceive this step as not only vital, but as an alternative to creating new
structures. Over the years, there have been far fewer proposals to augment the authority and
capacity of U.S. Ambassadors than for other aspects of interagency reform, and all are relatively
recent.
New or improved authority is viewed by some as but one possible step in increasing the capacity
of U.S. Ambassadors to carry out their responsibility for coordinating foreign policy and foreign
assistance (Table D-1). Other possible steps are selecting potential Ambassadors and others in
line for Chief of Mission posts for interagency
experience, expertise, and inclination, and
In Focus: Authority vs. Reality
providing such personnel with adequate training
The authority provided by statutes and hierarchical
in interagency matters (
position can easily be undermined by actual practices.
In the case of COM authority, according to one
Table D-2). Some may wish for progress at
former ambassador, “Solid backing from [the
standardizing the education and training of
Department of] State in a difference of opinion with
another agency’s representatives, for example, cannot
potential ambassadors, and vetting candidates for
be depended upon. Messages from the department
skills at interagency collaboration and
on the subject, often distributed to other agencies,
coordination, before enhancing ambassadors’
sometimes dismiss legitimate concerns in an offhand
authority over interagency resources.
manner. Similarly cables addressed to chiefs of
mission, often prepared by individuals not in the
proximate chain of command, do not always convey
Proposals to increase COM authority over
the impression that the COM’s authorities or views
budgets related to embassy operations and over
are of particular importance If State does not treat
interagency personnel may be resisted by
chief of mission as personal representatives of the
executive branch agencies. Some may question
president, especially in open communications, it
cannot expect others to do so—or respect their
whether attention to interagency reform at the
authority in the interagency process.”141
COM level is sufficient, particularly because
many current problems are not bilateral, but
require regional or global level attention. Table D-3 presents a unique option to expand COM
authority in order to provide COMs with the power to lead, as “mission managers,” interagency
functional or regional teams or task forces.
141 Edward Peck, “Chief-of-Mission Authority: A Powerful but Underused Tool,” Foreign Service Journal, December
2007, p. 32.
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Some analysts are skeptical that new or improved authorities, structures, systems, training, or
selection criteria per se will help an Ambassador overcome the pulls of agency interests and
pressures on a country team if that Ambassador does not have support at appropriate times of
officials in Washington. A key failing of the system, in the opinion of some analysts, can be the
disregard of ambassador’s authority and expertise within the State Department itself, and a lack of
direct support for an ambassador’s position when necessary.
The Obama Administration has announced its plans to strengthen the ability of Ambassadors and
other COMS to perform their role. The State Department/USAID 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy
and Development Review (QDDR) casts Ambassadors as Chief Executive Officers or “CEOs” of
multi-agency missions, not only conducting traditional diplomacy, but also leading and
overseeing civilians from multiple federal agencies in other work.142 The QDDR highlights the
key role of country teams and Ambassadors in the conduct of foreign policy and assistance, and
sets forth ways in which the Obama Administration will try to improve the knowledge and skills
of COMs and their ability to lead country teams. Civilian agencies “possess some of the world’s
leading expertise on issues increasingly central to our diplomacy and development work,”143 the
QDDR states. “The United States benefits when government agencies can combine their expertise
overseas as part of an integrated country strategy,” when “implemented under Chief of Mission
authority, and when those agencies build lasting working relationships with their foreign
counterparts.”144
As discussed in Appendix B, Secretary of State Clinton has announced that Chiefs of Mission are
to play a role in integrating country-level strategic plans and budgets.
142 QDDR, pp. 28-31.
143 QDDR, p. 33.
144 QDDR, p. 33. Addressing Ambassadors in February 2011 at an event that the State Department billed as the “first
Global Chief of Mission Conference,” Secretary of State Clinton repeated the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) analogy.
She told Ambassadors and other COMS that they were positioned “on the front lines of America’s engagement with a
fast-changing world” where they must “claim the ground of being the leaders and coordinators of U.S. Government
presence in every country where you serve.” She also reiterated the QDDR intent to provide educational programs for
Ambassadors to broaden their knowledge of foreign assistance programs and, for non-career Ambassadors, to acquaint
them with the workings of other agencies. Further, she stated that interagency experience will become a priority criteria
“for choosing and training chiefs of mission and deputy chiefs of mission.” To give the ambassadors clout in
integrating “each agency’s priorities ... into a single mission that inspires support and partnership,” the Secretary also
repeated the QDDR intent to give COMs the authority to contribute to a home agency’s evaluation of all personnel at a
post. In addition, to enhance their involvement in decisionmaking in Washington, D.C., the State Department will
include Ambassadors and other COM’s in senior meetings at the department via teleconference facilities.
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Table D-1. Proposals to Increase Chiefs of Mission (COM) Authority
Organization Proposal
PNSR 2009
Proposes new language for the President’s letter to Chiefs of Mission (COMs) to reinforce the de
jure authority of 22 USC 3927 and to establish procedures to ensure that country teams are in fact
true interagency teams rather than a col ection of individuals pursuing independent departmental/
agency agendas. A presidential letter reinforcing the COM authorities also should be provided to
each cabinet and interagency head. (p. 211) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 518.)
Proposes that each ambassador or other COM have control over the assignment, evaluation, and
rewards for any official assigned to an embassy or mission staff. (p. 211) (Also see PNSR 2008, p.
518.)
ACTD 2007
State Department should analyze and strengthen ambassadors’ formal authority over al executive
branch resources allocated to each country. (p ii) In addition to coordinating USG resources and
programs through the country team, Ambassadors should be granted discretionary funding, like the
DOD Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), to address emerging needs. (p. 43)
SFRC 2007
Ambassadors, as the President’s representatives overseas, should take personal responsibility in
their countries of assignment for the implementation of the President’s foreign aid strategy. (p. 6)
Table D-2. Proposals to Increase the Capacity of Chiefs of Mission (COMs)
Organization Proposal
Stimson/AAD
For non-career State Department officials, the Foreign Service Institute should develop a brief
2011
familiarization course on the structure and procedures of the Department, the interagency process,
and Washington power relationships, and personnel-related responsibilities and the role of the
country team for those going abroad.
QDDR 2010
The State Department and USAID will provide training programs to improve COM performance,
with USAID providing orientation to broaden the understanding of COMS with development
agendas in their portfolios regarding development and assistance priorities and processes. Non-
career Ambassadors will be given extensive orientation to inform them of basic processes of not
just the State Department, but other agencies as well. New processes, including more regular
evaluation reviews, will be developed to ensure COM and Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) skills
and incentives and performance to manage missions effectively, including the interests of other
agencies at their posts. (p. 30)
QDDR 2010
The State Department “will expand evaluation tools” to better assess the past performance of
COMs and DCMs and the ability of candidates for DCM to work with or manage interagency
missions, The Department will also consider feedback from other agencies when promoting officers
to the Senior Foreign Service, selecting DCMs, and recommending officers for presidential
appointment as COM. Ongoing feedback on the performance of COMs will also be requested of
other agencies. (p. 30)
QDDR 2010
COM’s should be included more effectively in interagency in decision-making in Washington, D.C.
To that end, COMs “will be invited to participate via secure telecommunications in Deputies
Committee Meetings in Washington at the discretion of the National Security Staff” and the State
Department will try to obtain secure video conference capabilities for all priority embassies. (p. 29)
PNSR 2009
Proposes direct mandatory training in team dynamics, including conflict resolution for the
ambassador and each member of an embassy country team or mission staff. (p. 211) (Also see
PNSR 2008, p. 518.)
SFRC 2007
Provide training for Ambassadors and prospective DCMs that includes a full spectrum of foreign
assistance functions undertaken by the U.S. government and the ambassador’s role in overseeing
them. (pp. 5-6)
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Table D-3. Proposal to Expand COM Authority
Organization Proposal
Lamb/Marks
Proposes Congress broaden and strengthen the COM statutory authority to allow the President to
2010
create interagency “Mission Managers” who, subject to Senate confirmation, would act as the
President’s direct representative in heading interagency teams to respond to a particular crisis and
who would be empowered to direct departments and agencies actions and contributions to their
assigned missions. Eventually this model would be applied to “steady state” interagency missions,
and to regional affairs. (p. 18)
The authors of the proposal in Table D-3 predict that implementing it would be bureaucratically
contentious, but would “facilitate clear roles and missions,” empower good leaders “to be more
consistently effective,” and provide those charged with “weighty responsibilities” with
“commensurate authority.”145 Such an expanded COM authority could provide the President with
an additional tool to use for interagency national security missions abroad. It could be used to
address the gap, noted in Appendix C, in civilian regional authority. It could also provide an
alternative to appointing “czars” or lead agencies. Some might argue that it could replace the need
for revising structures and augmenting capabilities at the NSC, as it might alleviate burdens there,
or at State Department or other civilian agencies. Nevertheless, as the authors note, it might be
subject to bureaucratic pressures. Other analysts might argue that the proposal only adds a new
layer of “adhockery” to the national security system.
145 Chief of Mission Authority as a Model. pp. 22-23.
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Appendix E. Proposals to Create Interagency
Personnel Policies and Mechanisms
The current interagency personnel system has few incentives, but many disincentives for U.S.
civilian personnel to behave in ways that are conducive to interagency collaboration and
coordination. Some civilian personnel may seek interagency missions as important and interesting
work, attracted by the challenges of working under difficult conditions where innovation is
required. Nevertheless, agencies do not encourage personnel to engage in interagency missions,
according to many sources. Agencies generally feel that they are short on personnel for their core
missions and generally do not wish to spare many people for interagency activities. Some
analysts point to the difficulties that State Department Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization
and Reconstruction (S/CRS) and the Geographic Combatant Commands have had in attracting
civilian personnel from other agencies as a result of that disinclination. In addition, according to
some analysts, agencies do not structure their personnel evaluation and promotion systems to
provide credit for interagency work. Systems may penalize those who seek interagency
operations because they have not advanced steadily up the agency’s career ladder.
Compounding the problem of agency
In Focus: Agency Cultures
disincentives are the cultural problems that can
The differences between the DOD and State
unnecessarily complicate interagency work.
Department cultures are explored in a paper written
The great differences between the military and
jointly by an Army Lt. Colonel and a Foreign Service
civilian cultures are often noted, but there are
Officer, where “Defense is from Mars, State is from
Venus.” Mars is “a hierarchical and bureaucratic
also significant differences among civilian
institution,” while Venus is “an individualistic, but
agencies’ cultures, e.g., the perception of a fast-
bureaucratic institution” with “a hierarchical structure
response operational culture within USAID
on paper, but ... little respect for hierarchy.” The world
compared to a slower, reflective State
of Martians “is painted black and white—not gray,”
Department culture based upon its reporting
while that of Venutians “is painted gray—very little is in
black or white.” “Martians like to plan—they hate
and diplomacy functions—thus making certain
surprises, and abhor disorder.” They make decisions
agencies more suitable than others for some
through “a formal, linear, sequential problem solving
tasks. Others believe that the cultures can
process” that leads to the selection of a plan. But
change over time, given the appropriate training
Venutians ‘believe in intuition and psychology. Planning
is anathema to most” of them. “They generally prefer a
and incentives for interagency missions.
more fluid approach” that responds to events rather
Meantime, some consider efforts to assist with
than the selection of one plan. Martians value
helping personnel engaged in interagency
uniformity and teamwork, while Venutians
missions to understand the cultures of other
“intellectually believe in the importance of teamwork,
agencies an important interim step.
but in practice, find it a difficult model to use.”146
Proposals for personnel reform are intended not only to provide incentives for interagency work,
but establish the shared knowledge, skills, vision and trust that some analysts argue is necessary
for effective interagency performance.147 Many analysts consider the 1986 “Goldwater-Nichols”
Act a model for the type of fundamental reforms needed to create a productive interagency
environment. In October 1986, recognizing that the inability of the four U.S. armed forces to
146 Rickey L. Rife and Rosemary Hansen, “Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus”, (Senior Service College Fellow
Research Project, U.S. Army War College , 1998), pp. 4-6.
147 Zeb B. Bradford, Jr. and Frederic J. Brown, America’s Army: A Model for Interagency Effectiveness (Westport, CT:
Praeger Security International, 2008), p. p. 107.
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work together effectively was jeopardizing military operations, Congress passed the bipartisan
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-433).148 Among
other reforms, this act created more powerful incentives for officers to broaden their experience
by seeking formal education and assignments in an inter-service environment with the objective
of creating a “joint” culture.
Key among the Goldwater-Nichols’ changes were a requirement for joint education and
training,149 safeguards to protect officers with “joint” experience to ensure they would be treated
on a par with those without such experience, and a joint service requirement for promotion to
general or flag officer rank.150 These reforms set the basis for inter-service cooperation and the
evolution of “joint” military rather than service-specific loyalties and a “joint” culture.
Some argue that Congress should provide similar legislation for civilian personnel, linking
interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications and rewards (Table E-5,
Table E-6), as well as mandating and providing funds for additional education and training
(Table E-7) and interagency rotations (Table E-8). Congress might also provide for increases in
personnel to allow civilian agencies to create such opportunities while, like the military,
maintaining full strength for core missions (Table E-4). (A key difference between military and
civilian personnel systems is the DOD excess capacity of about 10% more personnel than needed
for day-to-day operations, known as the “float,” to accommodate regular periods of education and
training, among other service-related needs.) Congress could similarly mandate changes in
training and education systems by establishing new schools or providing funds for increased
interagency coursework at others (Table E-10, Table E-11). Others propose that Congress
establish a national interagency professional corps, cadres, career track (Table E-1) or senior
executive service corps or cadre (Table E-4 ), and protect interagency personnel during political
transitions (Table E-9).
In the area of interagency personnel reform, the Obama Administration is slowly advancing the
Bush Administration’s National Security Professional Development program, which seeks to
expand interagency education, training, and rotations. (Discussed below in the section on
establishing a national security interagency corps, cadre, career track, or executive service, and
referred to in Table E-2.)
Legislation currently before Congress, the Interagency Personnel Rotation Act of 2011 (S. 1268
and H.R. 2314), would expand opportunities for interagency experience.
148 The bill was introduced October 24, 1985 in the House by Representative Bill Nichols (D-AL) and a similar
measure was introduced April 1986 in the Senate by Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ). A history of the process leading
to the bill’s passage is recounted in James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies
the Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002).
149 More specifically, the Goldwater-Nichols Act required the creation of a professional development system for “joint
specialty offices” that included joint education requirements and joint duty assignments.
150 Congress subsequently mandated in related legislation a requirement that candidates for general or flag officer rank
have earned a “joint specialty” designation and have served a full tour of duty in a joint assignment.
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Establish a National Interagency Professional Corps, Cadre,
Career Track, or Executive Service
The most far-reaching recommended changes to the current personnel system involve proposals
to establish a national security corps or cadre (Table E-1). A special corps or cadre, proponents
argue, would foster the development of a group of federal employees whose loyalties are not
principally to an agency or department, as has been the case until now, but to the other people and
entities devoted to interagency missions. Although proponents believe that these proposals hold
great promise for transforming the United States’ ability to perform interagency missions, they
may also be the most costly, involving the creation of new units and management structures.
Depending on how the corps or cadre was structured and manned, these proposals may meet
bureaucratic impediments.
Some proposals would continue efforts to build an interagency cadre based on the existing
National Security Professional Development program (Table E-2). This program was established
in 2007 by the Bush Administration under Executive Order 13434. It called for each agency with
a national security function to create a program of interagency education, training and rotations
for its personnel. The program soon stagnated. In its 2010 report, the Project on National Security
Reform (PNSR) cited several reasons for that stagnation: (1) sporadic leadership to improve
human capital systems, (2) a lack of authority to direct an overall program, (3) unclear roles and
responsibilities, (4) no common lexicon and poor communication among programs, (5) no direct
funding source, (6) no defined metrics for system evaluation, and (7) a lack of coordinated
congressional oversight.151 Some skeptics judge such agency-centric efforts unlikely to surmount
numerous resource allocation and cultural issues.
Early in his term, President Obama directed the NSC’s National Security Staff to “reinvigorate”
the National Security Professional Development program. Since then, nineteen executive
departments have participated in NSC-led efforts to define and draft a guiding strategy.152 The
long run goal, according to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR),
is to form a cadre of interagency professionals. As of 2011, the Obama Administration has
launched a second iteration of this professional development program. This iteration is focusing
on a single pilot program to enhance interagency cooperation in Emergency Management, leaving
aside for the moment efforts to further develop interagency professionals for other national
security matters. (Further information on Obama Administration activities can be found in CRS
Report RL34565, National Security Professionals and Interagency Reform: Proposals, Recent
Experience, and Issues for Congress, by Catherine Dale, pp. 17-21.)
Related proposals call for the development of a special interagency career track within individual
agencies and departments (Table E-3). Although participating personnel would remain with their
agency or department, they would be considered “interagency” personnel available to be tasked
for interagency missions. Advocates argue that as specially trained and experienced personnel,
attuned to the capabilities and cultures of other agencies and the requirements of interagency
missions, individuals in this career track would be effective in such missions at carrying out their
roles, coordinating their activities with others, and representing their agencies. On the other hand,
without the provision of an excess capacity “float,” such a career track may well encounter
151 PNSR 2011, p.
152 QDDR, pp. 175-176.
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bureaucratic resistance, as funding personnel in that track might divert agency funding from core
missions. In addition, such “interagency” personnel may be perceived as secondary citizens
within their home agencies, which still are dominated by people devoted to the core functions.
A third set of proposals regards the creation of a senior executive interagency leadership cadre of
personnel versed in the requirements of interagency missions (Table E-4). Again, the
effectiveness of members of this cadre may depend not only on their interagency experience and
expertise, but also their ability to maintain close relationships with their home bureaus and
departments when deployed.
These proposals may all require new institutional arrangements. If personnel were to be grouped
in new units formed outside existing agencies, they would require new budgets. Even if
incorporated into existing agencies, the ability of such personnel to perform their tasks may well
benefit from the establishment of separate budget lines, so that funds do not have to be squeezed
from core functions to accomplish interagency missions.
Table E-1. Proposals to Establish National Security Corps or Cadres
Organization Proposal
QDDR 2010
As staffing numbers increase, the State Department will expand the number of interagency detail
assignments in order to build over time a cadre of personnel expert in the mechanisms and
objective of other agencies. The State Department will work with other agencies to expand the
number of detail assignments to State. (pp. 34-35)
PNSR 2009
Create a National Security Professional Corps and create a separate cadre of national security
executives to lead interagency teams. The Corps would be an integral and separate government
entity; its members would not be attached to any government department. Also form a Cadre of
National Security Executives, whose members are selected for their leadership ability, expertise in
statecraft, and skills in their departmental specialty. They would be available for appointments by
the President to lead interagency teams. (p. 229) (Also see PNSR 2008, p. 511.)
Table E-2. Proposals to Improve the Existing Professional Development Program
Organization Proposal
QDR 2010
Ful y implement the national security professional program in order to improve cross-agency
training, education, and professional experience opportunities. (p. 71)
PNSR 2010
Create, over 5 to 7 years, an Integrated National Security Professional system to develop and
manage a cadre of professionals highly capable of working effectively across agency and
governmental boundaries on complex day-to-day and crisis challenges, building on the current
Executive Order 13434 program and on existing systems. Central management would be in the
hands of a new congressional y created independent board, whose chief officer is nominated by
President and confirmed by the Senate, and who reports to the President. (pp iii-v) (Also see PNSR
2008, p. 511.)
PNSR 2008
Strengthen the National Security Education and Training Consortium (NSETC) system established
by Executive Order 13434 in order to provide a common curriculum for al national security
professional and practical training for junior and middle-management personnel as wel as a
leadership program for selected individuals. (pp. 409-410)
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Table E-3. Proposals to Establish an Interagency Career Track
Organization Proposal
SFRC 2007
Create career paths that include ambassadorships for USAID professional staff and consider USAID
personnel for more ambassadorships. This is particularly appropriate in countries where the major
U.S. mission is economic development. Provide training for ambassadors and prospective Deputy
Chiefs of Mission (DCMs), particularly for those with no interagency government experience, that
includes the ful spectrum of foreign assistance functions undertaken by the U.S. Government and
the ambassador’s role in overseeing them. (pp. 5-6)
CSIS 2005
Develop a National Security Career Path that would give career professionals incentives to seek
out interagency experience, education, and training, but would leave control over the employees,
including promotions, to their home agencies. Congress should approve a 10% personnel float for
key civilian agencies to enable interagency education, training, and rotations. Related to this, create
a “pool” of interagency duty assignments across the government. (pp. 40-41)
Table E-4. Proposals to Establish a Senior-Level Corps or Cadre
Organization
Proposal
PNSR 2009
Form a Cadre of National Security Executives, whose members are selected for their
leadership ability, expertise in statecraft, and skills in their departmental specialty. They would
be available for appointments by the President to lead interagency teams. (p. 229) (Also see
PNSR 2008, p. 511.)
QDR 2006
Expresses support for the establishment of an interagency cadre of senior military and civilian
professionals able to integrate and orchestrate the contributions of individual government
agencies on behalf of larger national security interests. (p. 79)
U.S. Commission on Establish a National Security Service Corps (NSSC) of executive branch senior departmental
National Security
managers who would rotate among departments and receive special professional education in
2001
order to broaden their experience and develop leaders skilled at producing integrative
solutions to national security policy problems. Participating departments would include
Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security. (pp. xvi, 101)
Link Interagency Education, Training, and Experience to Job
Qualifications, Opportunities, and Promotion.
Proposals to link interagency education, training, and experience to job qualifications,
opportunities, and promotions (Table E-5, and for senior leaders specifically Table E-6) would
be the most akin to the changes in the military personnel system mandated by the Goldwater-
Nichols Act. As a result of changes initiated in 1986 under this act, soldiers, sailors, and airman
remain in and retain their loyalties to their service, but enjoy opportunities for inter-service
education and experience. Further, inter-service education and experience is required for their
promotion to senior levels. These “joint” inter-service opportunities are widely viewed as
contributing to continuing improvements in military missions.
Nevertheless, for civilian personnel, the proposals are not always accompanied by the types of
structural changes that also were legislated by Goldwater-Nichols, i.e., the development of the
inter-service Combatant Commands that plan, organize, and conduct all military activities and
operations aside from service-specific personnel training and education. Also, given that analysts
view the development of a joint service culture as still a work in progress, some may question
whether such education, training, and experience opportunities are sufficient to create cohesive
interagency units. Still, these practices may break down misconceptions and prejudices and help
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individuals understand the capabilities and operating cultures of other agencies, facilitating
interagency relations at the field level, where analysts say many problems are worked out, even if
they are not likely to create new loyalties and overcome “stove-piping.”
Table E-5. Proposals to Link Interagency Education, Training, and Experience to Job
Qualifications, Opportunities, Promotions, and other Rewards
Organization
Proposal
QDDR 2010
Make successful engagement within the interagency an integral part of an individual’s career
development and promotion. Encourage, and to the extent possible, expect personnel to
undertake short-term detail assignments in other agencies. (pp. 34-35)
QDRIP 2010
Create a system of incentives for Executive branch personnel to work in designated “whole
of government” assignments. (p. viii)
PNSR - 2009
Develop an integrated approach to the management of global civilian affairs that include a new
overarching personnel system of systems that would permit the continuation of specialized
personnel systems but would require a common professional education program and formal
interagency requirements. (p. 213)
Require individuals appointed to serve in high-level national security positions to complete a
structured orientation on the policy and operations of the national security interagency
system. (p. 230)
Use promotion requirements to create incentives for service in interagency assignments. (p.
219)
Heritage 2008
Have Congress establish broad guidelines and exercise oversight of national security
interagency accreditation and assignments, mandating the creation of boards that set
educational requirements and accredit institutions needed to teach national security and
homeland security, screen and approve individuals to attend schools, and fill interagency
assignments, and certify leaders as interagency-qualified leaders. (pp. 7-8). (In the congress,
establish committees in the House and Senate with narrow jurisdictions over key education,
assignment, and accreditation interagency programs. (p. 8)
RAND/AAD 2008
Have Congress consider legislation to establish incentives for interagency service. Even
without legislation, agencies should provide tangible incentives and rewards to officers taking
part in interagency service and in deployed expeditionary activities and promotion boards
should take into account such service. Congress should legislate to protect experts with
interagency experience from “reshuffling during political transitions.” (pp 3, 22)
Cerami 2007
Create a civilian agency training and education culture, including a formal leadership
development process to explicitly link synchronized and progressive professional education,
training, assignments, and promotions within a system providing opportunities to interact in
diverse agency and international contexts. Among the ancillary needs cited are a formal
interagency knowledge management process and the definition and development of an
interagency professional ethic. Expand the Office of Personnel Management’s leader
development and education efforts. (pp. 562-563)
Link interagency subject matter expertise and experience to promotion and other incentives,
including advanced civil schooling opportunities. (p. 565)
CSIS 2004 and 2005
Link interagency rotational assignments to “increased upward mobility” for those who
participate. Provide accelerated promotion consideration for mid-level career civil servants
participating in interagency rotations. (pp 40-41)
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Table E-6. Proposals for Interagency Education, Training, and Experience for Senior
Leaders
Organization
Proposal
PNSR 2009
Require individuals appointed to serve in high-level national security positions to complete a
structured orientation on the policy and operations of the national security interagency system.
(p. 230)
PNSR 2008
Require that candidates to Senior Executive Service, military flag ranks, and similar ranks
elsewhere in government complete at least one joint or interagency rotation assignment of
significant duration outside their home agency. (p. 408)
Require that an individual nominated for a Senate-confirmed national security position complete
a three-week course on the national security system, leadership, and values. (p. 408)
CSIS 2004 and 2005
Make promotion to the Senior Foreign Service or the Senior Executive Service for national
security related positions contingent on completing an interagency rotation. (pp 40-41)
Expand Opportunities, Requirements, and Incentives for
Interagency Education, Training and Professional Experience
Over the years, many analysts have viewed enhancing interagency education and training (Table
E-7) and rotations (Table E-8), as basic steps to more effective interagency missions. Some also
find a need to protect interagency personnel during political transitions (Table E-9).
Table E-7. Proposals to Expand Opportunities for
Interagency Education and Training
Organization
Proposal
QDRIP 2010
Create a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop and provide a common
professional national security education curriculum. (p. viii)
SIGIR 2010
Integrate and increase funding for Stabilization and Reconstruction (S&R) training programs.
(p. 17)
PNSR 2009
Strengthen education and training programs for interagency personnel by creating a
comprehensive, professional education and training program with an interdisciplinary
curriculum and giving high priority to preparing civilian personnel for leadership positions in
the national security system, among other actions. (p. 230) (
Require training in team dynamics, including conflict resolution, for the ambassador and each
staff member of an embassy or other diplomatic mission. (p. 211)
PNSR 2008
Strengthen the National Security Education and Training Consortium (NSETC) system
established by Executive Order 13434 in order to provide a common curriculum for al
national security professional and practical training for junior and middle-management
personnel as wel as a leadership program for selected individuals. (pp. 409-410)
RAND/AAD 2008
Resources should be made available for Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and their
counterparts in other agencies with actual or potential national security responsibilities to
have mid-career opportunities analogous to those now available to military officers, who
typically spend up to one-third of their careers in formal education. (p. 20)
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SFRC 2007
Provide training for al FSOs, including ambassadors and DCMs, to prepare them for effective
interaction with the military. (pp. 5-6)
RAND/AAD 2006
Adopt legislation to groom junior government officials for leadership positions in interagency
activity. (Includes officials from the State Department and other civilian agencies, as well as
the U.S. military. Provide mid-career educational opportunities (like those for military
officers) to State Department FSOs and their counterparts at other agencies with actual or
potential national security responsibilities. (p. 3, pp. 20-21)
Table E-8. Proposals to Expand Opportunities for Interagency
Professional Experience (Rotations)
Organization
Proposal
QDDR 2010
Increase rotational assignments to other agencies and from other agencies to State and
USAID. As noted throughout the QDDR, our training must focus more on how to engage
and coordinate other agencies as well as ensure their representatives are effectively
integrated into a Mission’s Country Team. To foster these skills, we will increase rotational
assignments to and where possible from other agencies at al levels in both State and USAID.
(p. 174.)
QDRIP 2010
Establish authority for an interagency assignment exchange program for national security
officials. (Under the same authority, create a consortium of existing U.S. government schools
to develop and provide a common professional national security education curriculum. (p.
viii)
Table E-9. Proposal to Protect Interagency Personnel
Organization
Proposal
RAND/AAD 2006
Adopt legislation to insulate experts with interagency experience from reshuffling during
political transitions. Adopt legislation to groom junior government officials for leadership
positions in interagency activity. (Includes officials from the State Department and other
civilian agencies, as we; as the U.S. military. Provide mid-career educational opportunities (like
those for military officers) to State Department FSOs and their counterparts at other
agencies with actual or potential national security responsibilities. (p. 3, pp. 20-21)
Enhance Existing or Create New Education and
Training Institutions
A few organizations have championed the idea of creating entirely new education and training
institutions (Table E-10). Others have argued for incorporating new courses and curricula into
existing institutions (Table E-11). Several U.S. government or government-funded institutions
have inaugurated or increased interagency coursework; these include the Foreign Service Institute
(FSI) and the National Defense University (NDU), as well as the Naval Post Graduate School,
and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).153 Some analysts judge these offerings still
153 In addition to its pre-deployment training courses, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) currently offers a course in
“Interagency Effectiveness, Strategies, and Best Practices,” and interagency policy seminars for senior leaders, a course
on “Foundations of Interagency Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations” directed at Civilian Reserve Corps
members but open to others, and two distance learning courses, “Introduction to Agency Culture,” and “Reconstruction
and Stabilization Introduction.” NDU and its affiliated institutions also are offering during the FY2011-FY2012
academic year a number of courses on interagency missions and S&R operations for students there, with class sizes
limited to 13-18 members. Among them, these institutions offers “Leadership in the InterAgency Process” “Working
the Three D’s: Afghanistan/Pakistan and Whole of Government Assistance,” “Rebuilding Weak and Failed States:
Afghanistan and Beyond,” “Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding,” “The Civil War: Reassessing War, Stabilization,
(continued...)
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insufficient and urge continued work on expanding the curriculum at all institutions. Some would
also try to tap into coursework at state and private educational institutions and consider whether
such institutions might be encouraged to offer comprehensive coursework to meet the full range
of interagency practitioner needs.
Table E-10. Proposals to Create New Interagency Education and
Training Institutions or Mandates
Organization
Proposal
QDRIP 2010
Establish authority for a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop and
provide a common professional national security education curriculum. (Under the same
new authority, establish an interagency assignment exchange program for national security
officials, see above.) (p. vii )
Smith 2010
Explore the possibility of giving the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) the mandate to
take over much of the function of training in the peace-building field. In assuming such a role,
USIP should col aborate closely with the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS), the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), and the National Defense University
(NDU). (p. 221)
PNSR 2008
Create a National Security University with interagency leadership to develop and administer
an interagency curriculum. If enhancing the current national security education and training
(NSETC) system does not provide sufficient quality personnel. (p. 410)
RAND/AAD 2008
As soon as possible, a National Security Col ege should be added to NDU. (p. 20)
Modernization of education in national security affairs might include the establishment of a
National Security Academy at an educational level parallel to that of the U.S. military service
academies. (p. 20)
CSIS 2004 and 2005
Create a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations. (pp. 64-65) in 2005
CSIS/AUSA 2003
Establish a U.S. Training Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations. (pp. 18-19)
(...continued)
and Reconstruction,” “Responding to State Failure and Instability,” “Seizing the Sword: The Challenge of U.S.
Civilian-Military Relations,” and U.S. Civilian-Military Relations Today,” as well as courses specific to Afghanistan
and Vietnam. These and other institutions also offer courses on dealing with conflict.
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Table E-11. Proposals to Enhance Existing Education and Training Programs
Organization Proposal
QDRIP 2010
Create a consortium of existing U.S. government schools to develop a common national
security curriculum.
PNSR 2009
Strengthen education and training programs for interagency personnel by creating a
comprehensive, professional education and training program with an interdisciplinary
curriculum and giving high priority to preparing civilian personnel for leadership positions in
the national security system, among other actions. (p. 230)
Heritage 2008
Use existing institutions in Washington, D.C. as a base for building programs to provide
interagency education, and create an education, assignment, and accreditation program for
interagency professionals. (p. 7)
RAND/AAD 2008
Until a National Security College is added to the NDU complex, NDU should recruit faculty
and students from different elements and disciplines in the U.S. government, significantly
expand the student body, and develop appropriate interdisciplinary courses. Special emphasis
needs to be placed on training military officers in relevant civilian skills and responsibilities,
especially those applicable in situations when it is not possible to separate military and civilian
functions. At the same time, FSI should increase the number of officers among its students
from DOD and other agencies. (p. 20)
Modernization of education in national security affairs might include the establishment of a
National Security Academy at an educational level parallel to that of the four service
academies. (p. 20)
CFR 2005
DOD and the State Department should jointly support an interagency, integrated training
program(s) at the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training
Center. (p. 12)
CSIS/AUSA 2003
Increase funding for the best of existing U.S. post-conflict reconstruction education and
training programs, including programs offered by the NDU, the Naval Post-Graduate Schools,
and USIP. (p. 19)
Author Contact Information
Nina M. Serafino
Pat Towell
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Specialist in U.S. Defense Policy and Budget
nserafino@crs.loc.gov, 7-7667
ptowell@crs.loc.gov, 7-2122
Catherine Dale
Specialist in International Security
cdale@crs.loc.gov, 7-8983
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