Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Eighteen years have passed since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program assisting low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF. Female-headed families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such families account for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons, single female-headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report details trends in income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children.

CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data shows that there has been a dramatic transformation with regard to welfare, work, and poverty status of single mothers. The period has seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over the period; more mothers are working and fewer are relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their children.

In the years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, and in the years since, the nation’s income safety net has been transformed into one supporting work. Cash-welfare work requirements, the end of cash welfare as an open-ended entitlement by limiting the duration that individuals may receive federally funded benefits, and expanded earnings and family income supplements administered through the federal income tax system have helped to change the dynamics between work and welfare. The transformed system has helped to both reduce single mothers’ reliance on traditional cash welfare and reduce poverty among their children.

Poverty under the official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows that since 2000, which marked a historical low, the poverty rate among single mothers increased in step with two recessions. By 2010, the official poverty rate for single mothers had reached a post-2000 high, and remained at that level through 2012, before falling somewhat in 2013. In 2013, the official poverty level was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels, despite two recessions since 1996.

Using a more comprehensive income definition than that used by the official poverty measure indicates that the increase in poverty among single mothers and their children over the past 13 years has been substantially mitigated by Food Stamp/SNAP benefits and work-related refundable tax credits—benefits not captured by the “official” poverty measure. Use of an expanded income poverty measure that includes these benefits highlights effects of congressional action that helped reduce child poverty amidst, and subsequent to, the most severe recession since the Great Depression.

The role of work-conditioned benefits, and the provision of traditional cash welfare, will likely continue to garner attention, in part contingent on the nature and pace of economic recovery, and federal and state budget pressures.

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of FemaleHeaded Families with Children: 1987-2013 (name redacted) Specialist in Social Policy November 21, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov R41917 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Summary Eighteen years have passed since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program assisting low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF. Female-headed families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such families account for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons, single female-headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report details trends in income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children. CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data shows that there has been a dramatic transformation with regard to welfare, work, and poverty status of single mothers. The period has seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over the period; more mothers are working and fewer are relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their children. In the years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, and in the years since, the nation’s income safety net has been transformed into one supporting work. Cash-welfare work requirements, the end of cash welfare as an open-ended entitlement by limiting the duration that individuals may receive federally funded benefits, and expanded earnings and family income supplements administered through the federal income tax system have helped to change the dynamics between work and welfare. The transformed system has helped to both reduce single mothers’ reliance on traditional cash welfare and reduce poverty among their children. Poverty under the official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows that since 2000, which marked a historical low, the poverty rate among single mothers increased in step with two recessions. By 2010, the official poverty rate for single mothers had reached a post-2000 high, and remained at that level through 2012, before falling somewhat in 2013. In 2013, the official poverty level was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels, despite two recessions since 1996. Using a more comprehensive income definition than that used by the official poverty measure indicates that the increase in poverty among single mothers and their children over the past 13 years has been substantially mitigated by Food Stamp/SNAP benefits and work-related refundable tax credits—benefits not captured by the “official” poverty measure. Use of an expanded income poverty measure that includes these benefits highlights effects of congressional action that helped reduce child poverty amidst, and subsequent to, the most severe recession since the Great Depression. The role of work-conditioned benefits, and the provision of traditional cash welfare, will likely continue to garner attention, in part contingent on the nature and pace of economic recovery, and federal and state budget pressures. Congressional Research Service Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Contents Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1 A Road Map ..................................................................................................................................... 2 Female-Headed Families with Children—A Policy Concern .......................................................... 3 Policy Landscape on the Eve of 1996 Welfare Reform ................................................................... 6 Welfare Dependency as a Political Theme ................................................................................ 7 EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay” .................................................................................. 8 TANF and Other Policies in the Post-AFDC Era ............................................................................ 9 Other Federal and State Policies that Encourage Work ........................................................... 10 Child Support Enforcement ..................................................................................................... 11 Policies Addressing Marriage and Childbearing ..................................................................... 12 Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions ................................................................... 12 Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits ..................................................................................... 13 Unemployment Insurance Benefits ......................................................................................... 14 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits .......................... 15 Other Social Policies ............................................................................................................... 15 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children ............................ 16 Number of Families Headed by Single Mothers ..................................................................... 19 Incidence of Poverty by Mothers’ Marital Status .................................................................... 20 Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt among Single Mothers ..................................................... 21 Work, Poverty, and Cash Welfare Receipt of Single Mothers ................................................. 22 Single Mothers’ Employment ........................................................................................................ 23 Unemployment Rates Across the Business Cycle ................................................................... 25 Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status ...................................................................... 26 Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families with Children .......... 28 Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) .......................................................................................... 28 Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ...................................................................................... 29 Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits.................................................................................. 30 Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefits .......................... 30 Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) ...................................................................................... 31 Anti-Poverty Effects of Cash Income, Taxes, and Transfers on Poverty—Female-Headed Families with Children ............................................................................................................... 31 Addition of Income from Sources Not Included in the “Official” U.S. Poverty Measure ................................................................................................................................ 34 Effect of Earnings and Other Non-welfare Cash Income on Poverty...................................... 34 Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty .......................................................................................... 35 The Invisible Safety Net—Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure .................................................................. 35 Effect of Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits on Poverty............................................................. 35 Net Effect of the EITC on Poverty .................................................................................... 36 Effect of the ACTC on Poverty ......................................................................................... 37 Effect of Federal Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments and Making Work Pay Tax Credits on Poverty ............................................................................................ 37 Effect of Unrelated Household Members’ Income on Poverty ......................................... 37 Congressional Research Service Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Comparison of the Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Poverty, by Single Mothers’ Work Status ........................................................................................................... 37 Single Mothers Who Worked During the Year—Figure 14 .............................................. 38 Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15 .................................... 42 Trend in Poverty among Children in Female-Headed Families under Selected Income Measures ..................................................................................................................................... 43 Discussion/Conclusion................................................................................................................... 44 The Invisible Safety-Net—Benefits not Officially Counted Toward Poverty Reduction ................................................................................................................ 45 Transformation of Income Safety-Net Programs Toward Work-Conditioned Support ........... 45 Cash Welfare’s Residual Safety-Net Role ............................................................................... 47 Living Arrangements as an Alternative to Welfare ........................................................... 47 Illness or Disability Among Nonworking Single Mothers ................................................ 49 The Work-Based Income Safety Net in Times of Recession and Recovery ............................ 53 Single Mothers’ Attachment to the Work-Based Safety Net ............................................. 53 The Work-Based “Safety Net” and the Role of Traditional Welfare ................................. 54 Figures Figure 1. Children’s Poverty Status by Family Living Arrangement, 2013..................................... 4 Figure 2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, 1960 to 1994 .................................................................................................................... 5 Figure 3. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013 ................................................................................................ 17 Figure 4. Poverty Rate of Children Under Age 18 in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present), 1960 to 2013.................................................................................................... 18 Figure 5. Number of Single-Mother Families, by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 ............ 20 Figure 6. Poverty Rates by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 ............................................... 21 Figure 7. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2013................................ 22 Figure 8. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 .................... 23 Figure 9. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2014 ........................................................................................................ 24 Figure 10. Unemployment Rate of Women Maintaining Families, January 1987 through October 2014 .............................................................................................................................. 25 Figure 11. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2013 .......... 27 Figure 12. Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families with Children, 1987 to 2013 ....................................................................................................... 29 Figure 13. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 ................................................................ 33 Figure 14. Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year: Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 40 Congressional Research Service Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 15. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year: Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................................ 41 Figure 16. Poverty Among Children in Female-Headed Families Under Alternative Measures, 1987 to 2013 ........................................................................................... 44 Figure 17. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status............ 49 Figure 18. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year, by Self-Reported Reason for Not Working .......................................................................................................................... 50 Figure 19. Nonworking Single Mothers with Self-Reported “Illness or Disability” as the Primary Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare Recipiency Status ..................................... 52 Figure 20. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment,1987 to 2013 ............................................................ 54 Figure B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts (Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2013 .................................................................................. 63 Tables Table B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Versus Administrative Caseload Counts, Annual Monthly Average, 1987 to 2013 ................................................................................................. 64 Table C-1. Children’s Family Living Arrangements and Poverty Status, 1987 to 2013 ................ 66 Table C-2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013 ................................................................................................ 74 Table C-3. Poverty Among Related Children Under Age 18, All Children and Children in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present) 1960 to 2013 ............................................... 76 Table C-4. Mothers with Related Children Under Age 18, by Poverty and Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 78 Table C-5. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2013 ............................. 80 Table C-6. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 ................. 81 Table C-7. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2014 ............................................................................................. 82 Table C-8. Monthly Unemployment Rate of Women Who Maintain Families, January 1987 to October 2014 ................................................................................................................. 83 Table C-9. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2013.......... 84 Table C-10. Receipt of Selected Benefits by Female-Headed Families with Children, All Families and “Earnings Poor” Families, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................... 85 Table C-11. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, All Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013.............................................................. 88 Table C-12. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year, 1987 to 2013 ........................................................................................................................................ 90 Table C-13. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Did Not Work at Any Time During the Year, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 92 Congressional Research Service Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-14. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 94 Table C-15. Single Mothers’ Work Status During the Year and Self-Reported Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA SSI) Receipt, 1987 to 2013 ....................... 99 Table C-16. Poverty Status of Children in Female-Headed Families Under Selected Income Measures, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................... 107 Table C-17. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2013 ....................................................... 109 Appendixes Appendix A. From Mothers’ Pensions to TANF—A Brief History ............................................... 56 Appendix B. Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on the CPS ............................................................. 63 Appendix C. Support Tables .......................................................................................................... 66 Contacts Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 111 Congressional Research Service Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Introduction Eighteen years have passed since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program assisting low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF. Female-headed families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such families account for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons, single female-headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report details trends in income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of the 1996 welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children. Since at least the first White House Conference on Children in 1909 (Conference on the Care of Dependent Children), and the subsequent creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912, the federal government has been concerned with the social conditions of children. The conference was an impetus for states’ enactment of state or locally financed mothers’ pensions (also referred to as widows’ pensions and/or mothers’ aid), which provided minimal cash support to mothers made destitute, usually due to a husband’s death. Mothers’ aid was intended to help keep the mother at home to care for her children, as an alternative to institutionalization or adoption. As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program introduced federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent children, basically as a supplement to states’ mothers’ pension programs. Federal involvement in attempting to address the problem of child poverty associated with the loss of parental support grew over the next 61 years, at which point the AFDC program, formerly named ADC, was repealed and replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Two dominant, often conflicting, themes have pervaded public discourse and policy responses to providing public assistance to poor families with children. One has been to help improve the economic and social well-being of children who, through no fault of their own, live in poor circumstances. The other has been reducing welfare dependency. A persistent challenge has been how public policy and programs can address the first theme of reducing child poverty without undermining the second by encouraging welfare dependency. A major goal of social policy, at least since passage of the 1967 Social Security Act welfare amendments, has been to reduce welfare dependency and, as a consequence, child poverty, by encouraging work. This report focuses on the results of efforts to attain these goals, focusing on female-headed families with children. CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data1 presented in this report shows a dramatic transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period. The period 1 Most data presented in this report are based on CRS analysis of 27 years of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS/ASEC). The CPS/ASEC is the principal source for annual income, poverty, and health insurance coverage estimates issued by the Census Bureau. The annual survey is a supplement to the monthly CPS conducted for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) used in deriving monthly labor force statistics, such as the national unemployment rate. Estimates from the annual supplement, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 1 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 examined encompasses a fundamental transformation in the provision of income support through cash welfare to a system promoting and supplementing work. The period has been marked by three recessions, one in the pre-welfare reform era (1990-1991), and two after (2001; 2007-2009); the latter was so severe that it has come to be identified by many as “The Great Recession.”2 Policy interventions to both stimulate the economy and protect those most vulnerable in response to the most recent recession are examined in the context of their effects on families headed by single mothers. The 27-year period examined provides for a range of insights about social programs’ and policies’ effects, under varying economic conditions, on families headed by single mothers—a group at considerable risk of poverty.3 A Road Map The body of the report begins with a brief discussion as to why female-headed families with children are a focus of policy concern. Most directly, children living in such families are many times more likely to be poor than children in married-couple families. Moreover, the families in which they reside have been especially likely to depend on public assistance (i.e., welfare) for at least part of their financial support. The dual goals of reducing child poverty and breaking the bonds of welfare dependency have proven to be an enduring, and often vexing, policy challenge. The report briefly describes the policy landscape prior to 1996 welfare reform and policy changes that have occurred since— especially those that were undertaken in response to the recent recession. A brief, 100-year historical perspective as to how past policy efforts attempted to address the dual problems of child poverty and welfare dependency is presented in Appendix A. The report then turns to an empirical analysis of trends in single mothers’ work, welfare, and poverty status over the 27-year period from 1987 to 2013. Trends in the incidence of poverty and cash welfare receipt and work among single mothers are presented, as are trends in cash welfare receipt (ADC, AFDC, and TANF) and other selected benefits. Particular attention is paid to the role of selected income sources on poverty reduction among single-mother families, overall and by whether or not mothers worked during the year. Some sources of income are not included in the “official” U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income. The analysis shows that the inclusion of other income sources not included in the official measure, such as Food Stamp or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits and refundable federal income tax credits, has a significant effect on poverty reduction among single mothers and their children. The inclusion of such benefits yields a very different picture as to the apparent trend in poverty, especially when viewed in the context of the most recent recession. (...continued) conducted in February through April, represent characteristics at the time of the survey, and income, poverty, and health insurance status in the previous year. The analysis is limited to survey data collected from 1988 through 2014 (the most recent available), representing income and poverty status from 1987 through 2013. The CPS/ASEC analysis in this report is limited to the past 27 years due to relative consistency in design and content of the CPS/ASEC over the period. 2 See, for example, Catherine Rampell, “‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology,” New York Times (internet edition), March 11, 2009, available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/. 3 Single fathers and their children have received comparatively little study, nor have they emerged as a matter of policy concern, as have single mothers and their children. Congressional Research Service 2 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 A final section of the report offers a concluding discussion. It highlights the transformation from income safety net to work-conditioned support, and cash welfare’s resulting residual safety net role. It assesses the effectiveness of income safety net programs in reducing poverty among female-headed families, especially in the context of the recent recession and selected congressional action. The report contains three appendixes. Appendix A provides a brief history of the AFDC program—the precursor to TANF. Appendix B examines under-reporting of cash welfare on the CPS/ASEC relative to administrative benchmarks. Appendix C provides data underlying the figures presented in the body of the report. Female-Headed Families with Children— A Policy Concern Two dominant, often conflicting, themes have pervaded public discourse and policy responses to providing public assistance to poor families with children. One has been to help improve the economic and social well-being of children who, through no fault of their own, live in poor circumstances. The other has been to reduce welfare dependency and to promote parental responsibility and family self-sufficiency. A persistent challenge has been how public policy and programs can address the first theme of reducing child poverty without undermining the second by encouraging welfare dependency. Children living in families headed by single mothers with no spouse present are especially at risk of being poor. In 2013, under the official U.S. poverty measure,4 about one-fifth of all children were poor (19.8%), but among children living in single-mother families, well over two-fifths (44.1%) were poor, compared to about one in ten children (9.5%) living in married-couple families (See Figure 1).5 In 2013, one in four children (25.6%) lived in female-headed families, but children in such families accounted for well over half (57.0%) of all poor children (see bottom panel of Figure 1). About one in eight children (12.9%) live in families headed by single mothers who have never been married; about half of all such children were poor in 2013 (52.6%), and they accounted for about one third (34.3%) of all poor children. 4 The official U.S. statistical poverty measure is based on families’ annual pre-tax income relative to family poverty income thresholds, which vary by family size and composition. For example, in 2013, a family consisting of a single mother with one child was considered poor if its annual pre-tax cash income was less than $16,057, and if she had two children, she and her children would be considered poor if her family income was below $18,769. In turn, a married couple with one child would be considered poor if the family’s income was less than $18,751, and if they had two children, if its income was less than $23,707. 5 The definition of “children” used here represents dependent children under the age of 18 who are related to another family member by birth or adoption. It excludes children who are unrelated to other household members, and excludes persons under the age of 18 who, themselves, have a dependent child residing with them. Congressional Research Service 3 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 1. Children’s Poverty Status by Family Living Arrangement, 2013 Share of Children by Family Living Arrangements All Children Poor Children Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Table C-1 for supporting data. Congressional Research Service 4 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 2 shows the number of recipients (total, children, and adults) and cases (families, and child-only cases) receiving cash assistance under AFDC (ADC, prior to 1962) from 1960 to 1994, the eve of the 1996 welfare reform debate. The AFDC caseload was comprised almost entirely of women with no husband present and their children. Figure 2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, 1960 to 1994 (Annual monthly average, in millions) Millions 15 Recipients 14 13 12 11 10 Children 9 8 7 6 5 Cases Adults 4 3 2 1 0 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Year Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA). See Table C-2 for supporting data. Note: Includes enrollment in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The surge in recipients and cases over the course of the 1960s reflects a variety of factors, including the baby boom generation entering adulthood; an increase in the number and share of children living in female-headed families with a high likelihood of being poor; a rediscovery of poverty in the United States and resultant efforts to address its causes and consequences; and outreach efforts by government and organizations to aid the poor by helping to ensure that they were treated fairly and received benefits to which they were entitled. Additionally, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, U.S. Supreme Court rulings overturned a number of state practices that had denied providing assistance to entitled individuals. Thus, AFDC caseload growth over the period reflected both a growth in the number of persons legally entitled to receive benefits and also an increasing likelihood that legally entitled individuals would be granted benefits. From 1966 to 1971, the number of AFDC recipients would more than double, from 4.5 million to 10.2 Congressional Research Service 5 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 million persons. By one estimate, by 1971 90% of families eligible to receive AFDC were participating in the program, compared to only about 33% in the early 1960s.6 As the AFDC caseload was increasing, Congress began taking action in an attempt to restrict its growth. Among its provisions, amendments to the Social Security Act in 1967 sought to restrict AFDC caseload growth through the establishment of work and training requirements for adult recipients, and an effort to freeze federal matching payments to states with additional caseload growth attributable to cases with an absent parent (i.e., other than widows, or disabled parents). (See Appendix A for a brief history of the AFDC program.) Policy Landscape on the Eve of 1996 Welfare Reform A variety of welfare reforms were already beginning to be implemented by states in the years preceding the more sweeping reforms that would be allowed under the 1996 welfare reform law. The Family Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485) extended work requirements (which could include work preparation activities such as education and training) for mothers with a child as young as six to mothers with a child as young as three and, at a state’s option, extended work requirements to mothers with a child as young as age one. A number of states experimented with changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).7 Among the features of state programs tested under waiver authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements, experiments requiring a “work first” approach rather than “training first, followed by work,” time limits, strengthened sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare benefits for a new baby conceived or born while a mother was receiving welfare. In addition, eligibility and funding for child care were expanded, helping to make work possible for mothers who otherwise might have difficulty finding affordable child care. The Family Support Act expanded eligibility for child care assistance in the form of transitional child care assistance for families working their way off AFDC, as well as for families “at risk” of qualifying for AFDC. In 1990, federally funded child care assistance was extended to low-income families generally, not just those receiving or at risk of receiving welfare, under the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG). The numbers of cases and persons receiving AFDC remained relatively level during the 1970s and most of the 1980s, but began to rise again in 1989 just prior to the onset of an eight-month long economic recession that was marked as beginning in July 19908 (see Figure 2, above). From 1988 to 1994, the number of persons receiving AFDC would increase by 30%—a much larger increase than might be expected from the recession alone.9 The caseload increase contributed to 6 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty, 1900-1985 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 179. 7 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance of states with certain sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or demonstrations that the Secretary judges to promote specific objectives of the act. 8 Economic recessions are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee. 9 For analyses of AFDC caseload growth over this period, see CRS Report 93-7, Demographic Trends Affecting Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Caseload Growth, by (name redacted) (archived report, available to congressional clients upon request); also, Janice Peskin, Forecasting AFDC Caseloads, with an Emphasis on Economic Factors, Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum, July 1993; and, Rebecca Blank, “What Causes Public Assistance Caseloads to Grow?,” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 36, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 85-118. Congressional Research Service 6 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 new calls for welfare reform—and welfare reform would once again move into the policy spotlight. Welfare Dependency as a Political Theme In his January 1992 State of the Union Address before a joint session of Congress, President George H. W. Bush, who would be running for a second term as President, expressed his intention to make it quicker and easier for states to restructure their welfare programs through the federal waiver process: Welfare was never meant to be a lifestyle. It was never meant to be a habit. It was never supposed to be passed from generation to generation like a legacy. It’s time to replace the assumptions of the welfare state and help reform the welfare system. States throughout the country are beginning to operate with new assumptions that when ablebodied people receive Government assistance, they have responsibilities to the taxpayer: A responsibility to seek work, education, or job training; a responsibility to get their lives in order; a responsibility to hold their families together and refrain from having children out of wedlock; and a responsibility to obey the law. We are going to help this movement. Often, State reform requires waiving certain Federal regulations. I will act to make that process easier and quicker for every State that asks for our help.10 In September 1992, during a presidential campaign speech, candidate William J. Clinton pledged, if elected, to “end welfare as we know it.” As reported in the New York Times, he stated: The changing face of welfare and the changing nature of it, and the enormous barriers of people moving from welfare to a productive life deserve special attention ... Especially now that most people on welfare are young women and their little children.... By the time we’re through, we shouldn’t have a welfare program in America ... We ought to have a helping hand program followed by a jobs program.11 The previous day, the Clinton campaign began airing a campaign ad in which the candidate stated his plan to “end welfare as we know it”: For so long, Government has failed us, and one of its worst failures has been welfare. I have a plan to end welfare as we know it, to break the cycle of welfare dependency. We’ll provide education, job training and child care, but even those who are able must go to work, either in the private sector or in public service.... It’s time to make welfare what it should be—a second chance, not a way of life.”12 10 Available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1992_public_papers_vol1_text&docid= pap_text-79.pdf. 11 Gwen Ifill, “Clinton Presses Welfare Overhaul, Stressing Job Training and Work,” New York Times, September 10, 1992, pp. A1, A19. 12 Richard L. Berke, “The Ad Campaign—Clinton: Getting People Off Welfare,” New York Times, September 10, 1992, p. A-19. Congressional Research Service 7 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Nearly 20 welfare reform bills would be introduced in the 103rd Congress,13 but it was not until June 1994, before the mid-term elections, that President Clinton would unveil his welfare reform proposal, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 (S. 2224, H.R. 4605). Three months later, House Republicans announced their Contract with America just six weeks before the mid-term elections. The document, unveiled on September 27, 1994, included wideranging provisions, including changes to House rules, and legislative proposals to address 10 policy domains ranging from fiscal responsibility, crime, national security, and job creation to welfare reform, among others. In the introduction to the welfare reform provisions, the Contract viewed the issue as follows: Isn't it time for the government to encourage work rather than rewarding dependency? The Great Society has had the unintended consequence of snaring millions of Americans into the welfare trap. Government programs designed to give a helping hand to the neediest of Americans have instead bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty. Our Contract with America will change this destructive social behavior by requiring welfare recipients to take personal responsibility for the decisions they make. Our Contract will achieve what some thirty years of massive welfare spending has not been able to accomplish: reduce illegitimacy, require work, and save taxpayers money.14 The Contract’s welfare proposal, the Work Opportunity Act of 1995, was introduced as H.R. 4 on January 4, 1995, the first day of the 104th Congress. EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay” The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), first introduced in 1975, was meant to help offset social security (FICA15) taxes paid by workers with lower earnings. Since then, the EITC has become an important policy tool in helping to encourage work. Legislated expansions to the credit over the years have increased the size and scope of the credit, extending its reach to higher earned income levels. As a supplement to families with low earnings, the EITC not only helps offset FICA payroll taxes and federal income taxes families would otherwise pay, but it also helps to offset some of the “implicit taxes” families face as public assistance benefits are reduced when their income increases. As a refundable tax credit, the EITC provides payments to qualified individuals with no federal income tax liability. Over the period examined in this report, the EITC was expanded both under the George H. W. Bush Administration in 1990 (phased-in in 1991 and 1992), and early in the first term of the Clinton Administration in 1993 (phased-in from 1994 through 1996). By 1996, the expanded EITC was providing a “work bonus” to families with children, amounting to as much as 34 cents on each dollar earned for a low-income family with one child, and as much as 40 cents for a family with two or more. The EITC expansions early in President Clinton’s first term were the centerpiece of part of a policy of “making work pay”—that people who work shouldn’t be poor—and a critical first step towards the President’s campaign promise to “end welfare as we know it” by moving people off public cash assistance and into work. 13 “House GOP Offers Descriptions Of Bills To Enact ‘Contract’.” In CQ Almanac 1994, 50th ed., 39-D-52-D. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal94-843-25141-1102086. 14 “Welfare Reform,” in Contract with America: the bold plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to change the nation, ed. Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas (New York: Times Books, 1994), p. 65. 15 Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes. Congressional Research Service 8 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 TANF and Other Policies in the Post-AFDC Era Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), signed into law in 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193), replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement program to low-income families with children. TANF eliminated the federal entitlement to assistance that existed under AFDC, replacing an open-ended matching grant program with a fixed-dollar block grant program (with the possible addition of recession-related contingency funds). States must maintain spending levels equal to 75% of what they spent on AFDC at the time the program was repealed—a provision known as State Maintenance of Effort (MOE). Adults must be engaged in approved “work activities” within two years of initial TANF receipt, subject to sanction for noncompliance. Under TANF, federal work participation standards (i.e., “work-requirements”) apply to states’ TANF caseloads. As such, states are required to have 50% of families, and 90% of two-parent families, engaged in “work” or they will be at risk of having their block grant reduced.16 TANF gives states increased flexibility to design programs to assist needy families with children compared to its predecessor program, but with fixed federal dollars. A major goal of TANF is to end dependence of needy families on government assistance by limiting the time they may receive assistance and by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage. TANF law imposes a maximum five-year lifetime limit on receipt of federally funded assistance,17 and allows states to impose shorter limits than the maximum. States have implemented a wide range of policy options and program approaches in the design of their TANF programs. Many of their programs have evolved from approaches first experimented with under federal waiver authority in the pre-TANF era. Cash welfare under the AFDC program was an entitlement, though states were allowed to set income-eligibility levels and the size of cash benefits, which, under the program, varied widely among them. Since passage of TANF, states’ cash welfare programs have evolved over time, becoming more complex and diverging from the cash assistance rules in place under AFDC. States’ TANF policies vary widely in determining who is eligible for assistance, the benefits they receive, the behavioral requirements recipients must meet, and the duration they may receive assistance. States’ cash welfare policies are described elsewhere.18 Since the passage of TANF, most states have increased financial work incentives for families receiving cash assistance by allowing families to keep more of their cash welfare benefit as their earnings increase.19 Additionally, as was the case before welfare reform, most states have allowed inflation to substantially erode the real value of welfare benefits over time, diminishing the value of welfare relative to work.20 16 A state’s work participation requirement may be reduced for specified reasons (e.g., reductions in a state’s caseload “caseload reduction credit,” or states spent more than that required by TANF’s MOE). See CRS Report RL32760, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, by (name redacted). 17 Up to 20% of the TANF caseload can be extended to receive assistance beyond five years due to “hardship,” as defined by the states. See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by (name redacted). 18 See, for example, the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, on the Internet at http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/ WRDWelcome.cfm. 19 For a discussion of changes in work incentives under TANF compared to AFDC, see CRS Report RL30579, Welfare Reform: Financial Eligibility Rules and Cash Assistance Amounts under TANF, by Craig Abbey (archived report, available upon request). 20 Maximum TANF benefits available for a family of three in the median state in July 2013 were 42% below the (continued...) Congressional Research Service 9 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 States may use both federal and state MOE dollars for a wide range of activities, other than the provision of “cash assistance.”21 In FY2013, only 28% of total federal TANF and state (MOE) dollars under the program went toward basic cash assistance. When administrative costs and work activities are added to basic cash assistance—the three spending categories most commonly associated with “welfare”—those expenditures accounted for about two-fifths (41%) of total TANF spending in FY2013. States have also redirected funds previously used to provide cash assistance to pay for child care, either directly or by transferring funds to the child care block grant. In FY2013, 16% of all TANF funds used were either expended on child care or transferred to the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF). TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect. It should be noted that among state and federal TANF spending, only those dollars provided as “cash assistance” are included as income for poverty measurement purposes, although dollars expended for other purposes, such as child care, may help to indirectly reduce poverty by making it “affordable” for a parent to work. Other Federal and State Policies that Encourage Work In addition to policy changes described above, a variety of other policies implemented at both the federal and state levels have served to reward work. Over the period examined in this report, the minimum wage was increased six times—three times in the pre-welfare reform era and three times since.22 Moreover, in 31 states (includes the District of Columbia) state minimum wages exceeded the federal minimum wage in one or more years over the period.23 Many states have implemented state earned income tax credits (SEITC), which piggyback on the federal EITC. In most cases, states structure their SEITC as a percentage of the federal EITC. In tax year 2000, for example, 14 states and the District of Columbia had SEITCs, and in 10 of those jurisdictions, the credit was fully refundable. By tax year 2012, 24 states and the District of Columbia had SEITCs, and in 22 of those jurisdictions the credit was fully refundable.24 (...continued) maximum level available to a family under AFDC in July 1988, after adjusting for the effects of price inflation. In July 1988, the maximum benefit level in the median state amounted to 45% of the Department of Health and Human Services Federal Poverty Guidelines (FPL), but by 2013, only 26%. In 1988, the maximum benefit ranged from a low of 14.6% of FPL (Alabama) to 82.1% of FPL (California). By 2013, the maximum benefit ranged from a low of 10.4% of FPL (Mississippi) to a high of 48.5% of FPL (New York). Author’s calculations based on data from U.S. Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, 2008 Green Book, Section 7—Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 111th Cong., Table 7-22, pp. 49-50, available on the internet at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/tanf.pdf; and Erika Huber, David Kassabian, and Elissa Cohen, Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2013, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC, September 2014, Table L5, Maximum Monthly Benefit for A Family of Three with No income, 1996-2013 (July), pp. 224-225 http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413208-Welfare-Rules-Databook.pdf. 21 See CRS Report RL32760, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, by (name redacted). 22 The federal minimum wage increased from $3.35 per hour to $3.80 per hour, effective April 1990, to $4.25 per hour, effective April 1991, to $4.75 per hour, effective October 1996, $5.15 per hour, effective September 1997, $5.85 per hour, effective July 2007, and $6.65 per hour, effective July 2008. In July 2009, the minimum wage was increased to $7.25 per hour. For an analysis of possible effects of minimum wage increases on welfare participation, see Mark Turner, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Welfare Recipiency, paper presented at the National Association for Welfare Research and Statistics, August 1998. 23 U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Employment Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2011, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm. 24 For tax year 2012 see Policy Basics: State Earned Income Tax Credit, Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, (continued...) Congressional Research Service 10 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Child Support Enforcement25 The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program (Title IV-D of the Social Security Act). The CSE program is funded with both state and federal dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program goals.26 The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) locating absent parents, (2) establishing paternity, (3) establishing child support orders, (4) reviewing and modifying child support orders, (5) collecting child support payments, (6) distributing child support payments, and (7) establishing and enforcing support for children’s medical needs. The CSE program has the potential to impact more children and for longer periods of time than most other federal programs. In many cases, the CSE program may interact with parents and children for 18 years. One of the original purposes of the CSE program was to recover from noncustodial parents some of the costs of providing cash welfare to their children’s families. Families receiving cash assistance must assign (legally turn over) to the state their rights to child support collections. These collections are split between the federal government and the states to recover the costs of providing cash assistance. States have options to pay some or all of such collections to families directly, but they are not required to do so. Over the last 10-15 years, the CSE program has expanded its mission beyond its initial welfare cost-recovery goal to focus on providing its clients with more effective and efficient CSE services and fostering parental responsibility. The 1996 welfare reform law established some new systems for tracking down and enforcing the obligations of noncustodial parents to pay child support. It also established a “family first” policy, sending more child support collected on behalf of families that formerly received cash assistance directly to the family. These policy changes, combined with the decline in cash assistance rolls, have resulted in the bulk of CSE collections going (...continued) December 2012, http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-seitc.pdf. For earlier tax years, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/Excel/state_eitc.xls. 25 This section is based on CRS Report RS22380, Child Support Enforcement: Program Basics, by (name redacted) ; CRS Report RL34203, Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues, by (name redacted) (archived report); and CRS Report R41431, Child Well-Being and Noncustodial Fathers, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted). 26 The federal government reimburses each state 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE activities. The federal government’s funding is “open-ended” in that it pays its percentage of expenditures by matching the amounts spent by state and local governments with no upper limit or ceiling. The federal government also provides incentive payments to states to encourage them to operate effective programs. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments back into the CSE program or related activities. In addition to state and federal matching funds and incentive payments, states collect child support on behalf of families receiving AFDC/TANF to reimburse themselves (and the federal government) for the cost of AFDC/TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires families who receive AFDC/TANF cash assistance to assign their child support rights to the state in order to receive AFDC/TANF. In addition, such families must cooperate with the state if necessary to establish paternity and secure child support. CSE collections on behalf of families receiving AFDC/TANF cash benefits are used to reimburse state and federal governments for AFDC/TANF payments made to the family (i.e., child support payments go to the state instead of the family, except for amounts that states choose to “pass through” to the family as additional income that does not affect TANF eligibility or benefit amounts). Additionally, states may charge application fees and apply recovered costs from non-welfare families to help finance their CSE programs. Congressional Research Service 11 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 directly to families. In FY2013, the CSE program collected $28.0 billion in child support payments from noncustodial parents and served nearly15.6 million child support cases. Of the $28.0 billion collected in child support payments, about 93% went to families, 5% went to state and federal governments, and nearly 2% consisted of medical support payments or fees paid to states. Policies Addressing Marriage and Childbearing27 Among TANF’s four stated goals, three relate directly to marriage and childbearing (italics added below). States may spend TANF funds on a wide range of activities for cash welfare recipients and other families toward achieving these goals. TANF’s Four Goals “(1) Provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.” Since TANF became law, a number of federal, state, and local initiatives have been undertaken in the attempt to reduce non-marital childbearing and promote responsible fatherhood and healthy marriage. Policy initiatives seek to reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancy through abstinence education, comprehensive sex education programs, and youth programs. Other programs focus on promoting healthy marriage, generally through public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage, and more targeted efforts at providing “social skills” education and training (e.g., marriage education, conflict resolution, and relationship skills) to couples interested in marriage or who are already married. Responsible fatherhood programs are intended to connect or reconnect children to their noncustodial parents, with the hope of improving the prospects of children being raised in single-parent families. Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions It is useful to view the policy changes discussed above in the context of prevailing economic conditions. Over the 27 years examined, the country experienced three economic recessions. The first, lasting eight months (July 1990 to March 1991) and occurring well before welfare reform, was followed by the longest period of economic expansion in the post-World War II era. The expansion ended with a second eight-month recession (March to November of 2001), which occurred well after passage and state implementation of new welfare reform rules. More recently, the economy suffered from what has been marked as the longest and deepest recession in the post-World War II era, lasting some 18 months from its official beginning to end (December 2007 to June 2009). In response, Congress passed a wide range of provisions under economic stimulus 27 For a discussion of issues and policies and programs relating to this topic see CRS Report RL34756, Nonmarital Childbearing: Trends, Reasons, and Public Policy Interventions, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 12 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 and recovery legislation to bolster the economy and to help support low- and middle-income families and individuals. Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits A number of policy interventions were undertaken in response to the most recent recession to both stimulate the economy and cushion the most economically vulnerable. Under provisions in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-185), single and head-of-household tax filers, such as single mothers, who had filed federal income taxes in 2007 became eligible to receive a minimum tax rebate in 2008 of $300 ($600 for married joint filers) if their 2007 earned income (plus any Social Security benefits, tier 1 railroad retirement, and veteran’s disability payments) was at least $3,000, and up to $600 ($1,200 for married joint filers) to the extent of their 2008 tax liability. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) provided rebates, under the Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credit, of up to $400 for single and head-of-household tax filers and up to $800 for joint filers in 2009 and 2010 by reducing FICA tax withholding. Congress legislated a payroll (FICA) “tax holiday” (P.L. 111-312), temporarily reducing the employee share of Social Security taxes from 6.2% to 4.2% for 2011. In 2011, for a single working parent with one child, earning poverty level wages ($15,504), her payroll taxes would be reduced from $961 to $651, a tax savings of $310. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) extended the tax reduction through 2012. The Emergency and Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) included a provision that temporarily lowered the income limit for receipt of the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit28 (CTC), which is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) to distinguish it from the nonrefundable portion of the CTC. Refundable credits, such as the ACTC and EITC, extend benefits to tax filers even though they owe no taxes. For the 2008 tax year, EESA effectively lowered the ACTC refundable income limit from $12,050 to $8,500. ARRA further expanded eligibility, temporarily, for the ACTC to tax filers with earnings of $3,000 or more for tax years 2009 and 2010. The refundable income limits set a lower threshold at which tax filers may begin to receive the refundable ACTC. A tax filer with a qualifying child could receive a “refund” amounting to 15 cents on every dollar earned above the refundable income threshold, up to a maximum credit amount of $1,000 per qualifying child. Under the EESA, a single mother with earned income of $12,050 became eligible for an ACTC of $532.50 in 2008, whereas absent the EESA provisions she would have received nothing. In 2009, under the ARRA provisions, a single parent with one child and having annual earnings in excess of $3,000 may have been eligible for the credit, and eligible for the full $1,000 credit once her earned income reached $9,667.29 Absent the legislative changes noted above, she would not have begun to become eligible for the credit until her earned income exceeded $12,550, and would not have been eligible for the full $1,000 credit until her income reached $19,217.30 28 For a discussion see CRS Report R41873, The Child Tax Credit: Current Law and Legislative History, by (name reda cted). 29 $3,000 + ($1,000/.15) = $9,667. 30 $12,550 + ($1,000/.15) = $19,217. Congressional Research Service 13 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Under ARRA, certain ACTC provisions were set to expire at the end of the 2010 tax year. Among other things, expiring provisions would have caused the maximum allowable credit to revert from $1,000 to $500 per qualifying child, and for credit refundability to extend only to families with three or more qualifying children. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the ARRA ACTC provisions through tax year 2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (H.R. 8, as amended by the Senate, and signed into law by the President on January 2, 2013), among other things, extends ARRA’s ACTC provisions for another five years, through 2017. ARRA also temporarily raised the EITC credit rate for tax years 2009 and 2010 from 40% for families with two or more qualifying children to 45% for families with three or more qualifying children. In 2009, for a single parent with three or more children, the maximum available credit under ARRA increased to $5,657, from what would have been $5,028 absent ARRA. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the ARRA EITC provisions through tax year 2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extends these provisions through 2017. Unemployment Insurance Benefits Unemployment Compensation (UC) under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system typically provides up to 26 weeks of unemployment compensation covering a portion of lost wages to qualified covered workers who become eligible due to job loss.31 Under the permanent Extended Benefits (EB) program, unemployment compensation may be extended for an additional 13 or 20 weeks to workers in qualifying states with high unemployment. Both UC and EB payments to workers are funded jointly through federal and state taxes on employers. Additionally, as in some past recessions, Congress funded a temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program (EUC08; P.L. 110-252), which began in 2008.32 Under the EB and EUC08 programs, Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits have been extended from a maximum of 26 weeks under the UC program to a maximum of 60 to 99 weeks, depending on states’ circumstances. Additionally, ARRA made several changes to Unemployment Compensation (UC) to assist individuals who become unemployed.33 It provided a temporary supplemental benefit increase of $25 per week under all UC programs (UC, EB, EUC08, and others34), payable until July 2010, and excluded $2,400 in UC benefits from gross income under the federal income tax for 2009. ARRA also provided $7 billion in incentives to states to modify their basis for computing UC benefits and for extending benefits to currently ineligible individuals. Two-thirds of the $7 billion available to states is contingent on states first adopting an alternative method of determining 31 For a thorough discussion of the UI system, see CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and Benefits, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 32 EUC08 benefits are fully federally funded out of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) and from general funds. Since originally passed into law, authorization for the EUC08 program has been extended a number of times— most recently on December, 17, 2010, when the President signed P.L. 111-312, the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, which extended the EUC08 program’s authorization until January 3, 2012. 33 See CRS Report R40368, Unemployment Insurance Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RS21356, Taxation of Unemployment Benefits, by (name redacted). 34 Other UC programs include unemployment benefits for former U.S. military service members (UCX program), Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits, workers who lose their jobs because of international competition who receive additional or supplemental support through the Trade Adjustment Act (TAA) programs. Congressional Research Service 14 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 eligibility for individuals who do not qualify under the regular method based on their wage and employment history. The states could then be eligible for the remaining two-thirds of the $7 billion if they adopt at least two of the following four provisions: 1. permit former part-time workers to seek part-time work; 2. permit voluntary separations from employment for compelling family reasons, which must include (i) domestic violence, (ii) illness or disability of an immediate family member, and (iii) the need to accompany a spouse who is relocating for employment; 3. provide extended compensation to UC recipients in qualifying training programs for high-demand occupations; or 4. provide dependents’ allowances to UC recipients with dependents. Upon accepting the federal incentive payments, states are required to maintain the adopted changes after the incentive payments expire. The above provisions could especially assist single mothers whose job attachment has been sporadic or limited to part-time employment due to competing family responsibilities. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits ARRA raised maximum benefit amounts under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program), effective in April 2009.35 ARRA effectively increased maximum monthly SNAP benefits by 13.6%, as a replacement for annual benefit adjustments based on annual food-price inflation. As a result, average household benefits (typically less than the maximum) were boosted by more than 15%. ARRA SNAP benefit increases reverted back to annual adjustment based on food-price inflation in November 2013, as specified in SNAP law. Other Social Policies ARRA also included provisions that added a new temporary “emergency contingency fund” under TANF for FY2009 and FY2010, which allowed states receiving extra federal grants to cover 80% of increased recession-related costs in those two years.36 Recession-related costs are defined as increased basic assistance (for states with increased basic assistance caseloads), nonrecurrent short-term benefits, or subsidized employment expenditures. Other ARRA provisions may also directly help single mothers.37 For example, expanded funding for child care for low-income working families might help single mothers secure and retain employment, and increased federal incentive payments to states to run effective child support 35 See CRS Report R41374, Reducing SNAP (Food Stamp) Benefits Provided by the ARRA: P.L. 111-226 and P.L. 111296, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted) (archived). 36 CRS Report R40211, Human Services Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, by (name redacted) et al. (archived). Also see CRS Report R41078, The TANF Emergency Contingency Fund, by (name redacted). 37 CRS Report R40211, Human Services Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, op. cit. Congressional Research Service 15 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 enforcement programs may help states’ efforts to establish and maintain absent parents’ child support obligations. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of FemaleHeaded Families with Children A dramatic transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status has occurred over the 27-year period examined in this report. The period has seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over the period, in part a response to structural changes to income “safety net” programs, with more mothers working and fewer relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their children in the postwelfare reform era. Figure 3 completes the administrative data series presented earlier (Figure 2) through 2013. The figure shows a dramatic decline in the number of recipients (total, adults and children) receiving AFDC/TANF after having reached a historical peak in 1993. In 1993, 14.2 million persons were receiving AFDC in the average month; by 2008, the number receiving TANF had fallen to 4 million, a decline of 10.2 million persons from 2003—6.5 million fewer children and 3.7 million fewer adults. In 2008, the number of persons receiving cash aid under TANF was the lowest since 1963, when 3.9 million received assistance under AFDC. Reflecting the effects of the most recent recession, the number of persons receiving TANF has increased from 4.0 million in 2008 to 4.6 million in 2010. Accompanying the economic recovery, the number of recipients has fallen slightly since 2010, reaching 4.0 million in 2013—the same level as its 2008 pre-recession low. Congressional Research Service 16 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 3. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013 (Annual Monthly Average, in Millions) Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA). See Table C-2 for supporting data. Note: Includes enrollment in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Separate estimates for children and adults are not available from 1997 to 1999 due to changes in state reporting requirements during the transition from AFDC to TANF. From 2001 and later, includes enrollment in Separate State Programs (SSP) under state Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements. Moreover, since welfare reform, poverty among children living in female-headed households38 has also fallen significantly. Figure 4 shows that the incidence of poverty among children in female-headed households fell from 55.4% in 1991 to 39.3% by 2001, which represents the largest 10-year decline in poverty among such children since that which commenced in the early 1960s. The poverty rate of children in female-headed families has risen consequent to two recessions since 2001, reaching a recent high of 47.7% in 2011,and since falling to 45.8% in 2013—still well above its 2001 low of 39.3%. Since 1996 welfare reform, progress appears to have been largely sustained in both reducing welfare dependency and poverty among children in female-headed families, in spite of the recent recession. 38 Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Congressional Research Service 17 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 4. Poverty Rate of Children Under Age 18 in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present), 1960 to 2013 (Percent poor) Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Census Bureau historical series, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html, “Table 10. Related Children in Female Householder Families, by Poverty Status.” See Table C-3 for supporting data. Notes: Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. The remainder of this report focuses primarily on single mothers, as single mothers have been a primary focus of social policy. Untangling the effects of demographic factors, the economy, welfare policy, and other policy interventions on single mothers’ work behavior, welfare receipt, income, and poverty status is beyond the scope of this report. Others have attempted to parcel out these effects with mixed success and differing conclusions as to the relative impacts of each.39 In contrast to these efforts, the remainder of this report provides a descriptive analysis of U.S. 39 See, for example Council of Economic Advisors, Technical Report: The Effects of Welfare Policy and the Economic Expansion on Welfare Caseloads: An Update, A Report by the Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, DC, August 1999; James P. Ziliak, David N. Figlio, and Elizabeth E. Davis, et al., “Accounting for the Decline in AFDC Caseloads, Welfare Reform or the Economy?,” The Journal of Human Resources, vol. XXXV, no. 3, pp. 570-586; Robert A. Moffitt, “The Effect of Pre-PRWORA Waivers on AFDC Caseloads and Female Earnings, Income, and Labor Force Behavior,” in Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform, ed. Sheldon Danziger (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999); June E. O’Neill and Anne M. Hill, Gaining Ground? Measuring the Impact of Welfare Reform on Welfare and Work, Manhattan Institute, Civic Report No. 17, New York, New York, 2001; Caroline Danielson and Jacob Alex Klerman, “Did Welfare Reform Cause the Caseload Decline,” Social Service Review, vol. 82, no. 4 (December 2008), pp. 703-730. Congressional Research Service 18 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Census Bureau CPS/ASEC data, with the goal of increasing understanding of changes in single mothers’ welfare, work, income, and poverty status that have occurred over the past 27 years. Number of Families Headed by Single Mothers Over the 27-year period examined, the number of single-mother families increased from 8.2 million in 1987 to a peak of 11.5 million in 2011, falling somewhat since, to 11.0 million in 2013 (Figure 5). The total number of single mothers increased from 8.4 million in 1989 to about 9.9 million in 1993, an increase of 1.8 million, or 17%. From 1993 through 2000, the number of single mothers remained fairly stable, ranging between 9.7 million and 10.1 million. From 2000 to 2011, the number of single mothers increased by 1.5 million (from 9.7 million to 11.5 million, respectively). (The number of single mothers fell somewhat in 2013, to 11.0 million.) The overall increase in single-mother families has largely been due to an increase in single mothers who have never been married. From 1987 to 2011, the number of never-married single mothers more than doubled, increasing from 2.7 million to 5.8 million over the period. The number of single mothers in 2013, 5.6 million, was only slightly below its 2011 peak of 5.8 million. In contrast, the number of separated mothers (no spouse present), and the number of divorced mothers in 2013, was only slightly above their 1987 number, while the number of widowed mothers in 2013 was well below the number in 1987. Moreover, in 2013 the number of married-couple families with children was just slightly below their number in 1987 (not shown in the figure, see Table C-4). Congressional Research Service 19 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 5. Number of Single-Mother Families, by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 (Number in millions) Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-4 for supporting data. Incidence of Poverty by Mothers’ Marital Status The incidence of poverty among families headed by single mothers fell substantially from a peak of 45.4% of all single-mother families in 1992 and 1993 to a historical low for the 27-year period of 31.8% in 2000 (Figure 6). Since 2000, poverty rates for single mothers have increased, but they still remain well below levels of the early 1990s. The poverty rate among single-mother families rose to 34.9% by 2004, consequent to an eight-month recession (March to November 2001), and continued to drift upwards until increasing more sharply, to 39.5% in 2010, consequent to a deep 18-month recession (December 2007 to June 2009). The poverty rate for single-mother families fell from 39.8% in 2012 to 38.0% in 2013. Poverty rates are highest among never-married mothers, followed by separated mothers (no spouse present) and widowed and divorced mothers. Poverty rates of single mothers are several times that of married mothers. Poverty rates for never-married, separated, and divorced mothers fell substantially over the 1990s, reaching historical lows by the beginning of the next decade. (Note: the wide variability in the poverty rate among widowed mothers over the period reflects sample variation relating to the comparatively small sample of such mothers represented on the CPS/ASEC.) Congressional Research Service 20 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 6. Poverty Rates by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 (Percent poor) Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-4 for supporting data. Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt among Single Mothers CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance (GA)40) among single mothers during the late 1980s and early 1990s and a decrease in the mid- to late1990s. The CPS data generally correspond to the caseload’s rise and fall, documented by administrative program data, but underestimate the caseload statistics to some extent.41 Figure 7 shows that the number of single mothers in families reporting receipt of cash welfare on the CPS increased from 2.5 million in 1989 to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase of 900,000, or 36%, over the four-year period. Compared to 1993, the peak year of welfare receipt, the number of single mothers reporting cash welfare was down to 795,000 in 2013—77% below that of 1993 (the bottom-shaded portion of the figure).42 The CPS/ASEC data show very little if any take-up in 40 The CPS/ASEC data groups any General Assistance individuals or families may have received with AFDC and TANF. GA programs are financed and administered at the state, county, or local level, and are generally used to meet the needs of people who are ineligible for federally funded cash assistance (e.g., AFDC/TANF, SSI) or are awaiting approval for such benefits. In 1998, 35 states and the District of Columbia had GA programs. See L. Jerome Gallagher, Cori E. Uccello, and Alicia B. Pierce, et al., State General Assistance Programs 1998, The Urban Institute, Assessing the New Federalism, Discussion Paper 99-01, Washington, DC, April 1999, http://www.urban.org/publications/ 409066.html. 41 See Appendix B, which compares CPS estimates to AFDC/TANF caseload counts. 42 Administrative caseload statistics show the caseload as peaking in March 1994, with nearly 5.1 million cases. In (continued...) Congressional Research Service 21 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 receipt of cash welfare by single mothers in response to the most recent recession, and little if any take-up in cash welfare in response to the one preceding it. This differs from the administrative data presented earlier (Figure 3), which showed a modest increase in the TANF caseload from 2008 to 2010, no increase from 2010 to 2011, and a slight decline from 2011 to 2013. From 1993 to 2013, the number of poor single mothers who reported receiving no cash welfare increased from 1.722 million in 1993 to 3.605 million in 2013, more than doubling over the period (the middle-shaded area of the figure). Figure 7. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-5 for supporting data. Note: Welfare is cash welfare in the form of AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance. Work, Poverty, and Cash Welfare Receipt of Single Mothers Figure 8 provides an overview of single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status from 1987 to 2013. The figure shows that since 1993, the share of single mothers who worked at some time (...continued) December 2007, at the onset of the recession, the caseload stood at 1.691 million, or only about one-third the level of its March 1994 peak. By December 2010, the caseload had increased somewhat from that of two years earlier, to 1.936 million, a 14.3% increase. In December 2011, the caseload was down slightly from a year earlier, at 1.862 million, and in December 2013, down further, to 1.654 million. Congressional Research Service 22 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 during the year has increased markedly, and that the share who received cash welfare (AFDC, TANF, or GA) has declined significantly, as has the share who are poor under the official poverty definition. The figure illustrates that while both cash welfare recipiency rates and poverty rates for single mothers have generally fallen since 1993, single mothers’ welfare recipiency rate has fallen faster than their poverty rate. More recently, since 2000, the poverty rate of single mothers has increased, but cash welfare receipt has not—a growing share of single mothers are poor under the official poverty measure but receive no cash welfare assistance. This suggests that TANF and other policies implemented in the mid-1990s (e.g., EITC expansion) may have had a lasting behavioral impact on reducing the incidence of cash welfare receipt among families headed by single mothers. Figure 8. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-6 for supporting data. Note: Welfare is cash welfare in the form of AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance. Single Mothers’ Employment While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single mothers’ employment have occurred since 1993. Figure 9 shows employment rates of single and married mothers by age of youngest child in March, from 1988 to 2014. The chart shows that gaps that had existed between single and married mothers’ employment have been virtually eliminated in recent years, with single mothers now being as, and in some cases more, likely than their married counterparts to be working. Congressional Research Service 23 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Over the period, the increase in employment among single mothers with young children has been most dramatic. Among mothers with a child under the age of 3, their employment rate increased from a low of 35.1% in March 1993 to a high of 59.1% in March 2000, a 24 percentage point increase over the period. Their employment rate fell to 53.7% in March 2005 but rebounded to 57.0% in March 2006, marking a recent high; it fell to a recent low of 49.6% in March 2010, and in March 2014 stood at 54.9%. Single mothers with a youngest child age 3 to 5 also experienced marked employment gains over the mid-to-late 1990s. Their employment rate grew from a low of 54.1% in March 1992 to 72.7% by March 2000, an 18.6 percentage point increase over the period. In March 2008, their employment rate stood at 68.5%, but fell to a recent low of 59.7% in March 2010—13.0 percentage points below its March 2000 peak, with over two-thirds of the decline having occurred since March 2007. By March 2014, the employment rate for this group of single mothers had rebounded to 66.0%. Single mothers whose youngest child was of school age (age 6-17) had employment rates about equal to those of their married counterparts over the 1988-2014 period. In March 2014, the employment rate of single mothers with school-age children stood at 73.0%—6.1 percentage points below a peak employment rate of 79.1% in 2001. Figure 9. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2014 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-7 for supporting data. Congressional Research Service 24 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Unemployment Rates Across the Business Cycle Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, the unemployment rate of women maintaining families has increased from a recent low of 6.2% in August 2007, just prior to the recession’s onset, to 11.7% in June 2009, the recession’s official end date (see Figure 10). Over a year past the recession’s end, the unemployment rate of women maintaining families rose further, reaching a high of 13.4% in July and August 2010. The annual average unemployment rate for women maintaining families was 12.3% in 2010, and 12.4% in 2011, and the poverty rate among single mothers essentially leveled off over those two years. Since then, their annual average unemployment rate has fallen, to 11.4% in 2012, and 10.5% in 2013. Comparing the most recent unemployment statistics for women maintaining families, their annual average unemployment rate for the first 10 months of 2014 (8.8%) is well below that of the same period in 2013 (10.5%), providing encouragement that the poverty rate for single mothers and their children will show continued improvement in 2014, when estimates become available in late summer 2015. However, given the pace of economic recovery, official poverty among single mothers and their children may be expected to remain above pre-recession levels for some years to come. Figure 10. Unemployment Rate of Women Maintaining Families, January 1987 through October 2014 (Rates not seasonally adjusted) Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. See Table C-8 for supporting data. Notes: Economic recessions: July 1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June 2009. Economic recessions are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating Committee. Congressional Research Service 25 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status There is a greater likelihood today than in years past that a poor single mother will be working rather than receiving welfare. Changes in poor mothers’ participation in work and welfare status first became evident in the early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of employment increasing after 1992 (solid green line, Figure 11) and rates of welfare receipt declining after 1993 (solid orange line, Figure 11). A crossover point was reached by 1996, when the chances that a poor single mother would be working exceeded the chances that she would be receiving welfare. The initial decline in welfare receipt and increase in work among poor single mothers coincides with an economy recovering from recession, a phasing-in of expanded EITC benefits that encouraged work (19941996), increased experimentation among states attempting to transform their cash welfare programs through the Section 1115 waiver process, and increased political messaging that national welfare was looming on the horizon. The trend of declining welfare receipt and increased work intensified further after passage of national welfare reform legislation in 1996. Figure 11 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash welfare at any time during the year fell from just over 60% in the 1987-1993 period to 17% in 2010. Welfare receipt among poor single mothers began to decline significantly after 1993, and even more so after 1996. Similarly, the share of poor single mothers who were working at any time during the year increased from around 44% in 1992 to a peak of 64% in 1999, but in 2010 had dropped to 51%, a full 13 percentage points below its 1999 peak. In 2014, 54% of poor single mothers worked at some time during the year. Congressional Research Service 26 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 11. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-9 for supporting data. The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare without working dropped from a peak of 43% in 1991 to a low of 9% in 2013 (one-fifth its 1991 rate), and has shown little change since, despite the recession. The share who worked without relying on cash welfare increased from a recent low of 25% in 1993 to a recent pre-recession high of 49% in 2007—essentially doubling over the period—after which the share fell to 45% in 2010 and 2011 consequent to the recession. The share has since rebounded in 2012 (48%) and 2013 (49%). The share of poor single mothers who combined work and welfare over the year has fallen by nearly three-quarters, from about 20% in 1996 to about 5% in 2013—one quarter of its 1996 level. Poor single mothers who reported that they neither worked nor received cash welfare during the year (the dashed blue line in Figure 11) has increased from a low of about 12% in 1991 to 37% in 2013, tripling over the period. This surprising combination may reflect a mix of circumstances, including income support from unrelated household members (which is not included in the official poverty measure), including cohabiting partners, and other means of support from outside the household not captured on the CPS. It may also reflect income reporting problems on the CPS, especially with regard to welfare income.43 43 See Appendix B on CPS under-reporting. Congressional Research Service 27 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families with Children As shown above, cash welfare receipt among female-headed families with children has dramatically declined in the post-1996 welfare reform era, with the decline having begun in the years just prior to the passage and subsequent implementation of reform. Figure 12 shows recipiency rates among female-headed families with children with earnings below their families’ poverty thresholds for six income “safety-net” program categories: AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance (GA); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); Unemployment Insurance Benefits; Food Stamp/SNAP benefits; the EITC; and the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit, the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). The analysis is restricted to “earnings poor” families, as earnings are the primary means by which most families with working-age members support themselves. Earnings (along with other income) deemed insufficient to provide for a family’s basic needs (i.e., poverty level income) and the reasons associated with insufficient earnings (or other income) are often used in determining eligibility for need-tested and other programs. Over the 27-year period examined, there has been a marked change in the provision of benefits among the six programs, reflecting a structural change in aspects of the “income safety net.” It is important to note that the “official” U.S. poverty measure does not include in-kind benefits, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, nor does it include tax transfers, in the form of the EITC or ACTC, or taxes paid (e.g., federal and state income taxes, FICA payroll taxes). Among the six program categories examined, only AFDC/TANF/GA, SSI, and UI are included in the “official” poverty measure. As will be shown later, this has important implications for how one assesses the role of income support policies, especially in the post-1996 welfare reform era and over the course of the most recent recession and recovery. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Figure 12 shows a substantial increase in EITC from 1993 to 1999, as mothers with comparatively low earnings prospects turned away from cash public assistance toward work. In 1993, about 44% of “earnings poor” female-headed families with children were estimated to have received the EITC; by 1999, 64% of such families were estimated to have received it. In contrast, over the same period, cash welfare receipt in the form of AFDC, TANF, or GA fell from about 56% to 31%. EITC benefit increases that phased in between 1993 and 1996 may have served to lure some single mothers away from welfare, in part evidenced by increased work seen earlier in Figure 9. Additionally, states’ use of AFDC waivers to strengthen work requirements and sanctions for noncompliance in the pre-welfare reform years may have served to increase work participation and consequent EITC receipt. TANF’s provisions further encouraged work and accompanying EITC eligibility over welfare. The figure shows a marked decrease in estimated EITC receipt in 2003 and 2004, and then a rebound in 2005—these years are marked by a dashed-line; caution should be exercised in attempting to interpret this phenomena, as it appears to be an aberration that is not readily explainable.44 44 Email exchanges with Census Bureau contacts, relaying the author’s findings, have not resulted in an attributable explanation for the sudden dip and recovery of EITC receipt among this subgroup of the population. EITC receipt is not directly reported on the CPS/ASEC. The Census Bureau estimates the EITC and other tax variables on the CPS/ASEC using a tax model. Beginning with the 2004 CPS, the Census Bureau implemented a new tax model, providing new tax (continued...) Congressional Research Service 28 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 12. Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families with Children, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C10 for supporting data. Notes: “Earnings poor” families are those whose annual earned income is below their poverty income threshold. Other sources of income received by these families might subsequently lift their total income above poverty. Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Receipt of SSI among families headed by single mothers increased over the first half of the 1990s, as shown in Figure 12. In 1988, 7% of “earnings poor” families headed by single mothers reported receiving SSI; by 1996, 12.6% of such families were reporting SSI receipt. The populations served by AFDC and SSI overlap somewhat. Some persons may be eligible for both programs, but individuals cannot receive benefits under both, although families can.45 In contrast to AFDC and TANF, individuals applying for SSI must pass an often strict and lengthy disability determination process in order to qualify. SSI benefits are higher than those available under (...continued) estimates for income year 2003. It’s uncertain whether model changes may have contributed the sudden aberration in trend of estimated EITC receipt. 45 For example, a disabled child might qualify for SSI, while the parent could potentially qualify for AFDC, or vice versa if the parent were disabled. For a discussion, see David C. Stapleton, David C. Wittenburg, and Michael E. Fishman, et al., “Transitions from AFDC to SSI Before Welfare Reform,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 64, no. 1 (2001), pp. 84-114. Congressional Research Service 29 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 AFDC and TANF. Additionally, SSI benefits are fully federally funded, though some states provide supplementary benefits on top of the federal SSI benefit. In contrast, AFDC benefits were jointly funded by states and the federal government, through federal matching dollars and under TANF through a fixed-dollar federal block grant. As such, if all other things were equal, both individuals and states would do better financially by shifting persons potentially eligible for TANF to SSI, assuming the person was unlikely to be able to become gainfully employed. Several administrative changes to SSI made it easier for children to be ruled eligible for the program during the early 1990s,46 which could have contributed to increased SSI receipt among families, including those headed by single mothers. Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits Receipt of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits among families headed by “earnings poor” single mothers has risen concurrent and consequent to the three economic recessions that occurred over the 27-year period examined (Figure 12). With each recession, UI receipt among these families has increased over that of the previous recession. For example, in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 recession, 7.5% of all “earnings poor” single mother families reported UI receipt in 1992; following the 2000 recession, 9.6% reported UI receipt in 2002; and in the most recent recession, 11.4% reported UI receipt. The higher incidence of UI receipt in 2002 than in 1992 most probably reflects a higher incidence of UI eligibility in the more recent period, due to increased employment of single mothers, as the two recessions were of equal length, and the unemployment rate among women maintaining families was slightly lower in 2002 than in 1992 (see Figure 10, shown earlier). UI receipt increased markedly after 2007, consequent to the recession. In 2007, 4.7% of “earnings poor” single mothers reported receiving UI benefits; by 2010, the share had increased by nearly three times, with 13.5% reporting UI receipt. The unemployment rate among earnings-poor single mothers has since dropped to 8.0%, in 2013. The higher incidence of UI receipt among these mothers consequent to the most recent recession reflects both the severity of the recession and congressional response to it, whereby the duration for which the unemployed may receive UI benefits had been extended through the end of 2013.47 Increased employment among single mothers subsequent to 1996 welfare reform likely led to more mothers being covered in UI in the most recent recession than in previous ones. Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefits Food Stamp/SNAP benefit receipt is depicted by the green line in Figure 12. The figure shows that Food Stamp/SNAP receipt reached a historical peak among “earnings poor” single mother families in 1993 (69.3%), subsequent to the 1990-1991 recession. Food Stamp receipt for this group of families reached an historical low in 2002, with 48.3% reporting benefit receipt. The comparatively low rate of Food Stamp receipt in 2002, compared to earlier periods, may in part be attributable to the decline of such families on AFDC/TANF, as persons who enrolled in those programs were generally enrolled in Food Stamps automatically through administrative processes. The figure shows a modest rise in Food Stamp receipt from 2002 to 2005, subsequent 46 Ibid., p. 86. For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34340, Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During Recessions, by (name redacted) and (name redacted). 47 Congressional Research Service 30 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 to the 2000 recession, and a more substantial rise from 2007 to 2009, consequent to the most recent recession. Still, the SNAP benefit receipt rate among the depicted families in 2009 (60.2%) was nearly identical to that of Food Stamps in 1989 even though economic conditions in 2009 were much worse. By 2013, 64.0% of “earnings poor” single-mother families received SNAP benefits—12.8 percentage points above its pre-recession low (51.2% in 2007). Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) Finally, the figure shows estimated receipt of the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) among depicted families.48 Census Bureau estimates of ACTC receipt on the CPS are first available in 2004. As discussed earlier (in “Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits”), the Emergency and Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) temporarily lowered the income threshold for receipt of the ACTC in tax year 2008. There appears to be no discernible effect of the provision from 2007 to 2008 in the CPS/ASEC estimates for depicted families. However, the figure shows that estimated ACTC receipt more than doubled from 2008 (21.5%) to 2009 (45.8%). This large increase in ACTC eligibility reflects changes in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), which lowered the ACTC income threshold to $3,000, first taking effect in 2009. In 2013, estimated receipt of ACTC by “earnings poor” single-mother families, at 45.9%, remained well above its pre-ARRA level. As shown earlier in Figure 6, single mothers’ poverty status has improved since 1993. Changes in the economy and changes in welfare policy and other programs, such as the EITC, have both direct and indirect effects on income and poverty. However, the official U.S. poverty measure counts only family pre-tax cash income (excluding capital gains and lump sum or one-time payments) against families’ poverty thresholds (which vary by family size and composition) to determine whether a family is counted as poor. The “official” U.S. poverty definition does not include the value of in-kind benefits, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, or public housing subsidies, nor does it include the effects of taxes or tax credits such as the EITC and the ACTC. Inclusion of in-kind benefits and refundable tax credits, net of taxes families pay, provides a more comprehensive income definition than the official poverty income definition. Failing to include them can have important implications for how one assesses the role of income support policies, especially in the post-1996 welfare reform era and over the course of the most recent recession and recovery. Additionally, other unrelated household members may contribute to the family’s economic well-being, but determining the extent to which resources are shared among unrelated household members is difficult. Anti-Poverty Effects of Cash Income, Taxes, and Transfers on Poverty—Female-Headed Families with Children Figure 13 shows the marginal effects of income from a number of sources on poverty. Components of family income are sequentially added and measured against families’ poverty thresholds, as one moves from the top line of the chart to subsequent lines below.49 Starting with 48 49 As with the EITC, ACTC estimates are Census Bureau model-based estimates. The order in which income components are added can influence the measured marginal effect of each. Congressional Research Service 31 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 the top line, the effect on poverty of family earnings alone is depicted. Poverty measures based on earned income alone give an indication of the labor market’s effect on poverty, in the context of other sources of income individuals, families, and households might receive. Moving to the second line down, the effect of earnings plus all other cash income other than cash welfare (AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance) is shown. Adding cash welfare, the third line down, to those income sources shown above, completes the accounting of pre-tax cash income that is used under the “official” U.S. poverty definition. Congressional Research Service 32 Figure 13. Effects of Earnings,Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-11 for supporting data. * Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008, Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009, and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits received in 2009 and 2010. CRS-33 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Addition of Income from Sources Not Included in the “Official” U.S. Poverty Measure As noted above, the “official” U.S. poverty definition is based on families’ pre-tax cash income. It excludes a number of benefits families receive, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, and refundable tax credits, such as the EITC and ACTC, and it does not take into account taxes families might pay in the form of federal payroll (FICA) taxes and federal and state income taxes. In this section, some of the weaknesses of the current “official” poverty measure are addressed, by sequentially adding a number of other income sources to, and subtracting selected taxes from, cash income to develop a more comprehensive income measure for assessing poverty than that offered by the “official” poverty income measure. For example, the market value of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits is added to pre-tax cash income, to assess their antipoverty effects. Next, the EITC is added in, net of any FICA, federal, and state income taxes (including state refundable tax credits). The poverty reducing effect of the ACTC is then assessed, followed by economic stimulus and recovery payments families may have received in 2008 and 2009, respectively, and the Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credit in 2009 and 2010. A cautionary note is in order with regards to assessing the effects tax credits such as the EITC and ACTC have on family income and poverty. The effects of the credits shown in the CPS/ASEC are estimates of the amount of the EITC and/or ACTC benefits families would have been eligible to receive based on their calendar year (i.e., tax year) income. However, while the tax credits’ effects are shown for the depicted year in which the credits are earned, families would not actually receive the credits until early in the following year, after filing their federal income tax forms. Finally, the bottom-most line of Figure 13 shows the effects of counting all income in the household in which the single mother lives, not just that of her related family members, and compares it to “household low-income thresholds.” The household low-income thresholds used here are scaled the same way as Census Bureau family income poverty thresholds, but are based on household (rather than family) size and composition. It is important to note that official poverty measurement is based on a family concept, which assumes that family members share income and economies of scale that result from shared living arrangements. It is generally agreed among researchers that assumptions regarding income sharing and shared economies of scale among related family members, who have ties based on blood, marriage, and adoption, do not apply to the same extent among unrelated household members. Consequently, these estimates of household low-income status likely overstate the effect of household income on reducing poverty among families headed by single mothers. Effect of Earnings and Other Non-welfare Cash Income on Poverty Figure 13 shows that between 1993 and 2000, single mothers’ poverty, based on family earnings alone (top line), fell from 56.2% to 40.8%, reaching a historical low for the 27-year period. Their “earned-income poverty rate” rose consequent to two recessions, reaching 44.3% in 2004, and rose again from 44.7% in 2007 to 50.1% in 2010. Adding other cash income, except cash welfare Congressional Research Service 34 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 (second line down), to family earnings reduces poverty in 1993 from 56.2% (top line) to 47.4% (line 2), and in 2013 from 47.6% to 38.3%. Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty Cash welfare benefits have only a small impact on the poverty rate, as these benefits generally are not sufficient, even when combined with other cash income, to lift families above the federal poverty threshold. In the vast majority of states, the level of earnings or other cash income at which states’ cash welfare benefits under AFDC/TANF become unavailable for a family are well below the poverty line. For example, in July 2013, in only six states could a single mother with two children have earnings at or above the poverty line and still continue to receive TANF cash assistance after one year of benefit receipt.50 Consequently, cash welfare benefits have little impact on the poverty rate. The addition of cash welfare (line 3, representing the official income definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only slightly: from 47.4% (line 2) to 45.2% (line 3) in 1993, and from 38.3% to 38.0% in 2013. Nonetheless, cash welfare benefits can have a significant impact on the level of poor families’ incomes, affecting the degree to which their incomes fall below the poverty income standard. This impact is not captured by changes in the poverty rate as shown in Figure 13. The Invisible Safety Net—Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure As noted above, the “official” U.S. poverty measure counts only families’ pre-tax cash income for purposes of poverty determination. Inclusion of selected benefits, such as food assistance (in the form of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits), the refundable EITC, and the partially refundable ACTC, allows for a more comprehensive assessment of the role of government policy in addressing vulnerable families’ income needs. Effect of Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits on Poverty SNAP benefits played a substantively larger role in reducing poverty among single mothers and their families in the wake of the recent recession, than in any previous period. The fourth line from the top in Figure 13 shows the effect on the poverty rate of single mothers by counting the value of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits. The line shows that Food Stamps/SNAP reduced the poverty rate of single mothers by about 2 to 3 percentage points over most of the period (compare the reduction in poverty from line 3 to line 4). In 2009, SNAP benefits nearly offset the rise in pre-tax cash income poverty (i.e., the “official” poverty measure) from 2008. Whereas on a pretax cash-only basis, poverty among single mothers and their families increased from 33.8% in 2008 to 37.6% in 2009 (line 3), SNAP benefits, when added to cash income, caused the poverty rate of single mothers to remain essentially level over the two years (33.% in 2008, and 33.5% in 2009). In 2010, SNAP benefits continued to play an important role in reducing poverty among 50 Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia. See. Erika Huber, David Kassabian, and Elissa Cohen, Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2013, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC, September 2014, Table IV.A.6, Maximum Income for Ongoing Eligibility for a Family of Three, July 2013, pp. 176177 http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413208-Welfare-Rules-Databook.pdf. Congressional Research Service 35 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 single mothers and their families, reducing poverty from 39.5% under the “official” measure to 35.8% when SNAP benefits are added to family cash income. However, unlike 2009, SNAP benefits in 2010 and 2011 did little to alter the trend toward increased poverty being driven by unemployment’s effect on earned-income poverty (top line). After counting SNAP benefits, the poverty rate among single mothers increased from 33.5% to 35.8% from 2009 to 2010, where it essentially remained unchanged for the next two years. In 2013, single mothers’ post-SNAP benefit poverty rate fell to 34.3%, The increased role of SNAP benefits in addressing the rising cash income deficiency of single mothers in the wake of the recent recession reflects not only an increase in the take-up rate of SNAP benefits by low-income families headed by single mothers, seen earlier in Figure 12, but also the legislatively enacted increase of SNAP benefit payments to needy households under ARRA. As noted earlier (in “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits”), ARRA SNAP provisions resulted in an average 15% increase in monthly SNAP benefits going into effect in April 2009 and remaining in place through October 2013. Net Effect of the EITC on Poverty The EITC has had a comparatively large poverty-reducing effect on single mothers and their families since legislative expansions to the credit from 1993 took effect. The poverty reducing effect of the EITC51 is shown net of FICA, federal, and state income taxes (including refundable state tax credits) (line 5), when added to family cash income and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits (line 4). As discussed earlier (in “EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay””), a major expansion of the EITC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996, increased the amount of the EITC work bonus families might receive. The anti-poverty effectiveness of the EITC net of taxes was nearly six times greater in 2013 than in 1993.52 As receipt of the EITC is conditioned on earnings, the growing impact of the EITC in part reflects the rise in work rates among single mothers. Among those who are working and poor (before counting the EITC), the EITC helps lift the income of some above the poverty line. Although the EITC expansion provided additional income to low-income families who were already working, it may also have helped induce increased employment among family heads with low to moderate earnings potential, and thus contributed to the lower levels of poverty based on earned income alone that have been evidenced since 1993 (shown as the top line in the chart). Note, too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare programs in recent years have encouraged work (such as work requirements and increased earnings disregards), these changes may have had a direct effect on poverty by increasing the incidence of work (earnings), which in turn resulted in expanded EITC receipt among single mothers. 51 Note that the value of the EITC on the CPS is based on Census Bureau imputations, rather than actual reported tax credits. Also, the EITC is different from most sources of income, as most families receive the EITC as a lump sum refund at the beginning of year following that in which income used in determining the credit was earned. 52 In 1993, the after-tax poverty rate (counting Food Stamps/SNAP) among single mothers dropped from 42.7% (line 4) to 41.9% (line 5), a 0.8 percentage point (1.8%) reduction. In 2013, the EITC reduced poverty from 34.3% to 30.7%, a 3.6 percentage point (10.5%) reduction. Congressional Research Service 36 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Effect of the ACTC on Poverty The Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC; the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit) can provide a refund to tax filers with one or more qualified children, even if they have no federal income tax liability. Overall, tax filers may receive a Child Tax Credit (CTC) up to $1,000 per qualifying child. If the CTC is greater than the amount of income tax owed, the tax filer may be eligible to claim the ACTC. As noted earlier (in “Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits”), The Emergency and Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) reduced the ACTC’s refundable income limit from $12,050 to $8,500 for 2008. ARRA (P.L. 111-5) further reduced the credit’s refundable income limit from a scheduled $12,550 in 2009 to $3,000 for 2009 and 2010, and P.L. 111-312, extended the ACTC’s reduced refundable income limit for another two years, through 2011. (As noted earlier, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extends these provisions through 2017.) As shown above (Figure 13), the lowered ACTC refundable income limit for 2009 through 2013 reduced the poverty rate of single mothers and their families by 1.7 percentage points in 2009, 1.1 percentage points in 2010, 1.3 percentage points in 2011, 1.4 percentage points in 2012, and 1.5 percentage points in 2013 (6th, compared to 5th, line down). Prior to the legislative changes discussed above, most poor families were beyond the credit’s reach. Effect of Federal Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments and Making Work Pay Tax Credits on Poverty In addition to the changes to the EITC and ACTC made as part of legislative action to stimulate the economy, the Census Bureau provides estimates of economic stimulus payments families may have received in 2008, and economic recovery payments in 2009, and MWP tax credits in 2009 and 2010 (see earlier discussion in “Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits”). The effects of economic stimulus and economic recovery payments and MWP tax credits on single mothers’ poverty status for 2008 through 2010 are shown together on line 6 above (Figure 13). Economic stimulus/recovery payments and MWP tax credits reduced the poverty rate among single mothers by 1.1 percentage points in 2008, and by 0.6 percentage points in 2009 and 2010. Effect of Unrelated Household Members’ Income on Poverty The household low-income line (bottom line, Figure 13) shows that if all household members’ income is counted, as though shared equally among household members, the poverty rate among single mothers would drop by at most 3 to 5 percentage points over the 1987 to 2013 period. Using the household, as opposed to the family, as the economic unit for determining poverty reduces the post in-kind transfer, post-tax poverty rate in 2013 from 29.2% to 24.0%. Again, this is most likely an overstatement of the possible effect that shared household living arrangements might have on single mothers’ poverty status because of the uncertainty about the extent to which such income is actually shared. Comparison of the Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Poverty, by Single Mothers’ Work Status The analysis above examines the effects of earning, transfers, taxes, and other income on families headed by single mothers. Here, the effects are broken out by whether or not mothers worked at Congressional Research Service 37 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 any time during the year. There is a stark contrast in the incidence of poverty among single mothers who worked at any time during a year, and those who did not. Moreover, selected income “safety-net” programs have quite different effects in reducing poverty among the two groups, as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, respectively. The figures show, for example, that mothers who worked at any time during the year were less likely to be poor based on their earnings alone than mothers who did not work based on total household income. In comparing across the two figures, it should be noted that the scale shown in Figure 14 ranges from 0% to 50%, while that of Figure 15 ranges from 50% to 100%, as if it were stacked above in Figure 14 (i.e., the two figures’ scales are the same with regard to relative range of their vertical axes, but the levels at which those axes start differ). Several observations follow. Single Mothers Who Worked During the Year—Figure 14 Effects of Selected Cash Income Sources on Poverty • Among single mothers who worked during the year, their incidence of poverty based on earned income alone was at a low in 2000, and has increased markedly since 2005 (top line). • Cash income from sources other than UI and cash welfare (second line down) has had a relatively consistent effect of reducing their poverty rate from that measured by earnings alone, ranging from 6 to 8 percentage points over the 27year period. • In correspondence with the past recession, UI benefits in 2009 through 2012 reduced their poverty rate by about 1 percentage point, which was about the same as in 2002, the previous peak year of UI poverty reduction which also corresponded with a recession. • Adding in SSI benefits has little effect on poverty reduction among this group, largely by virtue that mothers worked during the year, and were consequently unlikely to have had an SSI qualifying disability (although other members of their family might). • AFDC, TANF, and GA have very little impact on poverty reduction among single mothers who worked in recent years, but had more measurable effects in the first part of the 27-year period, when poor mothers were more likely to combine work with welfare (refer back to Figure 11). Based on the “official” poverty measure, which takes into account most sources of pre-tax cash income families receive, the poverty rate among single mothers in 2013 was 3.9 percentage points higher than in 2001—a historical low for the period. Congressional Research Service 38 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Effects on Poverty of Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure • Food Stamp and SNAP benefit receipt have had a sizeable effect on poverty reduction, reducing the poverty rate among working single mothers by 3.3 percentage points in 2013. • The EITC (net of FICA and federal and state income taxes) has contributed to substantial reductions in poverty among working single mothers, especially after 1993 legislated expansions to the credit began taking effect. In 2013, net EITC among working single mothers reduced their post SNAP benefit poverty rate by 5.2 percentage points, from 24.0% to 18.8%. • ARRA’s reduction of the ACTC’s refundable income limit to $3,000, effective in 2009, is readily apparent by the substantially larger decrease in poverty resulting from the credit, than in earlier years. After including the ACTC, the incidence of poverty among single mothers with any work during the year reached a historical low in 2009 (14.9%). In 2009, the ACTC accounted for an additional 2.1 percentage point reduction in poverty beyond that of the post-EITC poverty level in 2009, compared to a 0.3 percentage point reduction in 2008, before the reduction in the credit’s refundable income limit. In 2013, the post-ACTC poverty rate was 16.9%—2 percentage points above its 2009 historical low. • Economic Stimulus payments received in 2008, reduced poverty among single mothers who worked during the year by 1.3 percentage points. Combined Economic Recovery Payments and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits helped reduce poverty among working single mothers by 0.7 percentage points in 2009, and in 2010, the MWP tax credit reduced poverty among this group by 0.6 percentage points. • If the income of all unrelated household members is included as income, the poverty rate among working single mothers is estimated at 13.3% in 2013, which compares to an “official” poverty rate of 27.3%. Note that working mothers could also incur work-related expenses (e.g., child care, transportation, uniforms) that are not accounted for here. Inclusion of such expenses, if available, would result in somewhat higher poverty rates than those shown here. Congressional Research Service 39 Figure 14. Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year: Effects of Earnings,Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-12 for supporting data. * Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008, Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009, and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits received in 2009 and 2010. CRS-40 Figure 15. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year: Effects of Earnings,Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-13 for supporting data. * Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008, Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009, and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits received in 2009 and 2010. CRS-41 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15 As a precautionary reminder, the reader should note that the origin of the vertical axis begins at a poverty rate of 50%. Effects of Selected Cash Income Sources on Poverty • The top-most line indicates that even though single mothers themselves did not work during the year, and thus had no earnings, other related family members may have worked, accounting for an “earnings-only” poverty level around 90% in the pre-welfare reform era (1996 and earlier), and around 85% since 2000. • The next line down, which includes most all other sources of income other than UI benefits and cash welfare, shows a somewhat greater reduction in poverty in the TANF era (about 10 percentage points), than in the pre-welfare reform era (about 5 percentage points). In part, this may be due to a somewhat greater tendency of nonworking single mothers to be living in “extended” families (i.e., living with family members other than just their children) in the post-welfare reform era, than before. For example, in 1996, 24% of nonworking single mothers lived in extended family settings, but by 2000, 33% were living in such settings.53 • The figure shows UI benefits, when added to earnings and other cash income from the line above, accounted for a 2 percentage point reduction in poverty over the 2009-2011 period—over twice the effect in 2002, the previous peak year of UI poverty reduction for this group. • Comparing the relative effects of SSI and TANF/AFDC/GA on poverty over the period, SSI has assumed a greater role in poverty reduction among nonworking single mothers in the TANF era, than in the pre-TANF era, and the role of TANF in reducing poverty among this group is substantially less than what it was under AFDC. • Examining just the trend in “official” poverty among nonworking single mothers, their poverty rate in the post-welfare reform era has averaged 8 percentage points below what it was under AFDC. In 2002, which marked a historical low poverty rate for this group, their poverty rate (66.9%) was nearly 14 percentage points below their peak rate of 80.8% in 1991. In 2013, 70.0% of nonworking single mothers were poor—still well below their pre-welfare reform levels. 53 CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC. About 25% of nonworking single mothers, on average, lived in extended families in the pre-TANF era (1987-1996), compared to about 28% in the TANF era. Congressional Research Service 42 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Effects on Poverty of Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure • Food Stamp/SNAP benefits appear to have had a somewhat smaller effect on poverty reduction among nonworking single mothers in the post-welfare reform era (2.9 percentage point reduction, on average) than earlier (about 3.6 percentage point reduction, on average, in the pre-welfare reform era). However, in 2009, reflecting ARRA’s SNAP benefit provisions, discussed earlier (“Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits”), SNAP benefits reduced poverty for this group from the “official” poverty rate of 69.9%, to 64.7%, a 5.2 percentage point reduction; in 2010, SNAP reduced poverty among this group by 4.1 percentage points, by 3.9 percentage points in 2011, 3.6 percentage points in 2012, and 4.8 percentage points in 2013, the last year in which the ARRA SNAP benefit expansions were in effect.54 • In that these mothers did not work during the year, the figure shows refundable and partially refundable tax provisions have had very little measurable effect on poverty reduction for this group; nor did economic stimulus or recovery payments. In fact, the after-tax poverty line is at times above the Food Stamp/SNAP line, indicating that some poor families had members with a tax liability, net of any credits. If the income of all unrelated household members is included as income, the poverty rate among nonworking single mothers is estimated at 66.1% in 2013. Counting unrelated household members’ income reduced poverty among nonworking single mothers by 10.2 percentage points in 2013, compared to 3.6 percentage points in 1987. This largely reflects what has been a growing tendency of nonworking single mothers to be living with other unrelated household members. In 2013, for example, 21% of nonworking single mothers were living with other unrelated family members, of which nearly nine out of ten were designated as “cohabiting partners” (see Table C14). In comparison, about 9% of nonworking single mothers lived with unrelated family members in 1987.55 Trend in Poverty among Children in Female-Headed Families under Selected Income Measures Figure 16 depicts the trend in poverty among children in female-headed families under four of the selected income measures applied to single mothers, above—earnings only poverty, pre-tax cash income poverty (the official poverty measure), post-tax and Food Stamp/SNAP benefit poverty, and total household post-tax post-transfer income poverty. The figure shows, for example, that the official poverty rate among children in female-headed families increased from 41.3% in 2007 to 46.3% in 2010—a 5.2 percentage point increase, commensurate with a 5.3 percentage point increase in “earnings only” poverty over the period resulting from the recession. 54 The ARRA SNAP benefit expansion reverted to pre-ARRA levels November 1, 2013. CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC. Beginning with the 2007 CPS/ASEC cohabiting couples are identifiable based on self-report. In earlier years, cohabiting couples are identifiable indirectly by inference. The method used here, for CPS/ASEC years before 2007 is based on households with two unmarried adults, who are unrelated and of the opposite sex, and no other adults reside in the household. 55 Congressional Research Service 43 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 In contrast, under a more comprehensive income definition that includes tax credits net of payroll taxes and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits (the third line down), their poverty rate over the same period rose by just under one percentage point, from 33.3% in 2007 to 29.7% in 2010. The official poverty rate among children in female-headed families fell to 44.1% in 2013, but remains 5.7 percentage points above its historical low of 38.4% in 2001. In contrast, under a more comprehensive accounting of income that includes the effects of tax credits net of payroll taxes and SNAP benefits, the corresponding child poverty rate in 2013 was 33.4%, compared to an official rate of 44.1%, and was only 1.6 percentage points above its historical low of 31.8% in 2002. When all household income is included (the bottom-most line), the child poverty rate was estimated at 28.0%—essentially at a statistically tied historical low. Figure 16. Poverty Among Children in Female-Headed Families Under Alternative Measures, 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C16 for supporting data. Discussion/Conclusion CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data presented in this report shows a dramatic transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period. The period has seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over the period, with more mothers working, and fewer relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their children, in part in response to structural changes to income “safety-net” programs. Congressional Research Service 44 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Progress towards achieving the often elusive and conflicting dual goals of reducing child poverty and cash welfare dependency is only partially apparent under the official U.S. poverty measure, but much more so under an alternative, more comprehensive income measure. Poverty under the official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows that since 2000, which marked a historical low, the poverty rate among single mothers increased in step with two recessions. By 2010, the official poverty rate for single mothers had reached a post-2000 high, and remained at that level through 2012, before falling somewhat in 2013. In 2013, the official poverty level was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels, despite two recessions since 1996. Using a more comprehensive income definition than that used by the official poverty measure indicates that poverty among single mothers and their children in 2009, rather than having increased since 2000, was at or near a 27-year low when Food Stamp/SNAP benefits and workrelated refundable tax credits are taken into account. In particular, congressional action in response to the recession, which increased SNAP benefits and extended the reach of refundable tax credits, contributed to a decline in poverty among single mothers and their children in the midst of the recession. (See Figure 13 and Figure 16, for example). The Invisible Safety-Net—Benefits not Officially Counted Toward Poverty Reduction While the provision of cash welfare has fallen dramatically under TANF, poor and lower-income families with earnings are more likely to receive assistance in the form of supplemental nutrition assistance, or refundable income credits administered through federal and state tax systems. Neither in-kind benefits, such as those provided through Food Stamps/SNAP, nor refundable credits, such as the EITC, or partially refundable ACTC, are counted as income under the official U.S. poverty measure, yet these three programs are among the 10 largest, in terms of federal spending for people with low income.56 Clearly, these programs constitute important strands in the nation’s income safety-net, yet they generally are not taken into account when assessing its strengths and weaknesses. Under an alternative, more comprehensive, measure of poverty than the official one, which includes the net effects of refundable tax credits and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, a quite different assessment of the effects of the safety net on poverty among single mothers and their children emerges. Transformation of Income Safety-Net Programs Toward WorkConditioned Support Since the eve of 1996 welfare reform, work-conditioned requirements for individuals’ receipt of government assistance have become more prevalent. Prior to 1996 welfare reform, federal law (The Family Support Act of 1988; P.L. 100-485) had extended work requirements (which included work preparation activities, such as education and training) to mothers receiving AFDC to mothers with a child as young as three, and at state option, to mothers with a child as young as age one. Child care funding was increased to make it possible for mothers to go to work. A 56 CRS Report R41625, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Programs, Policy, and Spending, FY2008-FY2009, by (name redacted). Congressional Research Service 45 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 number of states experimented with changes to their welfare programs under waivers of federal rules, granted by DHHS. Among the features tested under waiver authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements, experiments to test models of facilitating the transition from welfare to work, and the use of sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, among others. Expansions to the EITC, under both President George H. W. Bush, and President Clinton, increased the financial rewards of work, through earnings supplements administered through the tax system. The EITC helped to offset the welfare income loss, or implicit tax, that mothers might face as they moved from welfare to work. The 1996 welfare reform law repealed the 61-year-old AFDC program, replacing it with TANF. TANF ended the entitlement of low-income families with children to federal assistance. It limits the provision of federal assistance under the program to five years57—states are allowed to set shorter time limits. Under TANF, states no longer receive an open-ended federal matching grant, as they did under AFDC, but rather a fixed dollar block grant (with the possible addition of recession-related contingency funds). Adults must be engaged in approved “work activities” within two years of initial TANF receipt, subject to sanction for noncompliance. Under TANF, federal work participation standards (i.e., “work-requirements”) apply to states’ TANF caseloads, and adult recipients are required to be engaged in work, or work-related activities after two years of benefit receipt. TANF has provided states increased flexibility and limited federal requirements, compared to AFDC, but with fixed federal dollars. Since 1996 welfare reform, cash welfare support for “earnings poor” mothers and their children has contracted, whereas work-based support has increased. The EITC, for example, has a direct effect on poverty reduction, by encouraging work, increasing earnings, and reducing reliance on cash welfare. One estimate suggests that single mothers’ employment in 1996 was 7 percentage points higher than it would have been otherwise, absent the EITC.58 This “work/earnings inducing” effect of EITC among single mothers is captured in official poverty statistics, as part of families’ earnings, but the credit itself—the earnings supplement which induces work and earnings—is not. Likewise, the ACTC may also have a potential work inducing effect among single mothers, but, like the EITC, the effects of the credit itself on poverty reduction are not measured under the official poverty income definition. Additionally, through earnings, working individuals not only gain potential access to tax benefits, such as the EITC and ACTC, which with full-time work exceeds cash welfare assistance they might have received by not working, but also earn credit towards insurance coverage under Unemployment Insurance, as well as Social Security retirement, disability, and death benefits for themselves, their dependents, and survivors. The report shows that receipt of cash welfare (AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance) has declined substantially among single mothers since the passage of TANF, and their engagement in work has increased (Figure 8). The transformation from welfare dependency to work appears to have begun in the years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, as the economy prospered, and as a number of work supports (e.g., EITC, and child care assistance) were strengthened. Moreover, under the official U.S. poverty measure, the poverty rate of single mothers (Figure 6), and that of their children (Figure 4), has consistently been lower since welfare reform, than before. Prior to 57 Up to 20% of the TANF caseload can be extended to receive assistance beyond five years due to “hardship,” as defined by the states. See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by (name redacted). 58 Bruce D. Meyer and Dan T. Rosenbaum, “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. CXVI, no. 3 (2001), pp. 1163-1114. Congressional Research Service 46 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 TANF, poor single mothers were more likely to be receiving cash welfare (AFDC or GA) than to be working; after passage of TANF, just the opposite was true: poor single mothers were more likely to be working than receiving cash welfare (TANF or GA) (Figure 11). TANF and other work-promoting policies have helped to reduce poverty among single mothers and their children through increased earnings. Based on earnings alone, poverty among single mothers who worked reached a historical low for the period, in 2000 (Figure 14), as did their poverty rate based on total pre-tax cash income, under the “official” U.S. poverty measure. Following the 2000 recession, poverty among working single mothers increased slightly, and much more so since 2007, in step with, and consequent to, the 2007-2009 recession. Cash Welfare’s Residual Safety-Net Role Welfare reform ended the provision of cash assistance as an entitlement, by replacing AFDC with a fixed dollar block grant for the provision of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Under TANF, a greater share of funds goes toward services (child care, social services) either directly, or through transfers to other programs (CCDBG, Title XX Social Services) than towards direct cash support. While many of these services may help to reduce dependency, and promote selfsufficiency through work, receipt of cash assistance has shrunk markedly in the TANF era. While TANF caseloads increased modestly in 2009 and 2010 in response to the recession, they are at a fraction of what they were at their peak, just prior to 1996 welfare reform, and reflect levels not seen in over 40 years. The marked decline in cash welfare caseloads since the eve of 1996 welfare reform reflects an apparent behavioral shift among many single mothers with respect to work and welfare, with more selecting the former than the latter. A restructuring of income safety-net programs to support work is likely to have contributed to single mothers’ changed behavior. The EITC appears to be an important component of the restructured safety net, as it encourages work, even among mothers whose earnings prospects at initial job entry are low. In most states, full time work at the minimum wage provides income sufficient for a mother to work her way off of cash welfare. In lieu of cash welfare, a single mother working full time at the minimum wage will receive the EITC. Additionally, in 2009 through 2017, due to legislative changes relating to the recession and recovery, she would be eligible for the ACTC, which provides additional income support for her children. Living Arrangements as an Alternative to Welfare Cash welfare receipt and poverty among single mothers is lower since TANF’s enactment than before. Some of this effect appears to be due to an increase in work among single mothers. However, even among nonworking mothers, their receipt of cash assistance and incidence of poverty under the official measure is lower since welfare reform. It appears that other family members’ earnings and other cash income has contributed to the lower poverty rates of nonworking single mothers in the post-AFDC era (see the earlier discussion, Figure 15). In spite of policies to increase work among single mothers, not all single mothers work, and lack of work contributes significantly to the likelihood that they and their children will be poor. However, poor non-working single mothers are much less likely to be receiving cash welfare assistance under TANF than they did under AFDC (Figure 11). In the post-AFDC era, nonworking single mothers are somewhat more likely to live in extended family settings than Congressional Research Service 47 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 before.59 It appears that living with other relatives helps to reduce their reliance on welfare and incidence of poverty under the official poverty measure. Moreover, nonworking single mothers are considerably more likely (more than twice as likely) to live with other unrelated family members in the post-AFDC era than before, although income of these unrelated household members is not taken into account in determining poverty status.60 These alternative living arrangements might help provide an alternative to cash welfare receipt for some single mothers. Figure 17 suggests that this statement has some bearing. The figure depicts single mothers by their work and welfare status, according to whether they live independently with just their children, or whether they live with others, either in an extended family household with other family members than just her children, or with one or more other, unrelated, persons, including a cohabiting partner. The figure shows that among mothers who worked, or received welfare during the year, the majority (roughly 65% to 70%) lived independently over the period; a minority (roughly 30% to 35%) lived with others (extended family and/or one or more unrelated persons). Interestingly, both mothers who worked, as well as those who received welfare, were about equally as likely to live independently, as not, over the period. In contrast, nonworking single mothers, as a group, are less likely than their working counterparts to live independently than mothers who work or receive welfare during the year. In the pre-1996 welfare reform era, nonworking single mothers were slightly less likely to live independently (roughly 65% to 60%), than their working counterparts (roughly 70% to 65%) or those who received welfare (also, roughly 70% to 65%). Note that some of these nonworking mothers may also have received cash welfare during the year, as evidenced earlier in Figure 8. Welfare receipt among nonworking single mothers may have contributed to their ability to live independently, apart from other relatives or nonrelatives. While many single mothers selected work as an alternative to welfare in the years immediately following 1996 welfare reform, others appear to have found alternative living arrangements instead. In 1996, 62% of nonworking single mothers were living independently, three years later, only 52% were. Most of this change in living arrangements was due to an increase in nonworking single mothers’ increased tendency to live in extended family households, with other relatives (see Table C-14), with the share increasing from 24% in 1996, to 33% by 1999, and then ebbing to 27% by 2001. In more recent years, at least since 2005, nonworking single mothers have shown a greater tendency to be living with other nonrelatives, of which most are cohabiting partners (see Table C-14). Whereas in 1987, 65% of nonworking single mothers were living in independent households, by 2013, only about half (51%) were. In part, cash welfare in the pre-welfare reform era may have helped some single mothers to live in independent family settings. Stricter requirements and time limits in the postreform era may have contributed to some mothers’ consideration of living arrangements as an alternative to cash welfare receipt. 59 On average, 25% lived in extended family settings in the 1987 to 1996 period. Just following welfare reform, the share living in extended families increased to 29% in 1998 and 33% in 1999, and then to an average of 28% from 2000 to 2013. (Based on CRS estimates from U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 CPS/ASEC data. See Table C-14 for supporting data.) 60 In 2013, for example, 21% of nonworking single mothers were living with other unrelated family members, of whom nearly nine out of ten were designated as “cohabiting partners.” In comparison, about 9% of nonworking single mothers lived with unrelated family members in 1987. (Based on CRS estimates from U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 CPS/ASEC data.) Congressional Research Service 48 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 17. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C14 for supporting data. Illness or Disability Among Nonworking Single Mothers Nonworking single mothers are much more likely to attribute illness or disability as the reason for not working in the post-welfare reform era, than before. This is consistent with the somewhat greater role of SSI relative to other cash welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA) since welfare reform. One conjecture is that single mothers who are most able to work, are doing so in the post-welfare reform era, and that with support from the EITC, even those with comparatively low earnings capacity (e.g., “earnings poor”) have sought work over welfare. Those remaining, who are not engaged in work, may be less able to work, as indicated by a higher self-reported incidence of illness or disability. In the pre-welfare reform era, roughly 10% of nonworking single mothers reported “illness or disability” as the primary reason for not working during the year (Figure 18), and roughly 70% reported “taking care of home or family” as the primary reason.61 In the postwelfare reform era, the share of nonworking single mothers who self-reported “illness or disability” as the reason for not working is about three times higher than before welfare reform; the share who reported “taking care of home or family” as the primary reason for not working has 61 The self reporting of “illness or disability” on the CPS/ASEC as the reason for not working may also be suspect if, as a greater share of mothers have gone to work, the attribution of “taking care of home or family” as the reason for not working has become less socially acceptable for not working, especially among mothers who receive welfare benefits. Congressional Research Service 49 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 fallen from roughly 70% to about 50% since welfare reform. From 2007 to 2009, the share of nonworking single mothers who reported that they “could not find work” more than tripled, from 4.0% to 13.4%, and has remained well above its 2007 pre-recession low since (11.9% in 2013). Nonetheless, reported “illness or disability” still ranks second, only to “taking care of home or family,” as the primary attributed reason of single mothers for not having worked during the year. Figure 18. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year, by Self-Reported Reason for Not Working 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C15 for supporting data. Cash Welfare Receipt among Ill or Disabled Nonworking Single Mothers Whereas nonworking single mothers have a greater tendency to report illness or disability as the primary reason for having not worked during the year, cash safety-net programs in the form of AFDC/TANF and SSI appear to be assisting a smaller share of such mothers in the post-welfare reform era, than before. Moreover, the number of single mothers reporting illness or disability in 2013 has more than doubled since 1987 (see Figure 19). In the pre-welfare reform era, roughly 70% to 80% of nonworking single mothers who reported illness or disability as the reason for not working were being assisted by AFDC, SSI, or both—in 2013, 42% were. The SSI program taken alone (not counting in combination with AFDC/TANF receipt) accounts for a considerably larger share of nonworking ill or disabled single mothers in the post-welfare reform era (roughly double) than before. In turn, the share reporting receipt of AFDC/TANF, either alone, or in Congressional Research Service 50 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 combination with SSI, has fallen by nearly two thirds since welfare reform, with about 60% reporting AFDC in the pre-welfare reform era, and about 14% reporting TANF in 2013. While a larger share of single mothers who are able to work appear to be engaged in work or looking for work in the post-welfare reform era than before, among the smaller residual who are not, a greater share report illness or disability as the primary reason for being out of the labor market. In 2013, of the 654,000 single mothers who reported no work during the year due to illness or disability, well over half (376,000) reported neither receiving SSI nor TANF/GA assistance. The nature of these mothers’ reported illness or disability is not known, nor is it known whether they have sought and been denied government assistance. Whether and how these mothers might be falling through cracks in the income safety-net is a question of policy interest, and possible concern. Congressional Research Service 51 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 19. Nonworking Single Mothers with Self-Reported “Illness or Disability” as the Primary Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare Recipiency Status 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C15 for supporting data. Congressional Research Service 52 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 The Work-Based Income Safety Net in Times of Recession and Recovery By the official measure, poverty among single mothers reached a historical low in 2000 (31.8%), but has since increased in step with two recessions, reaching a recent peak in 2012 (39.8%)—the same level as that of 1996, when welfare reform was signed into law, but lower than previous years. Single mothers’ poverty rate began to show signs of improvement, falling to 38.0% in 2013, but it is still well above its historical low. An improved economy, contributing to a falling unemployment rate among mothers maintaining families (Figure 10, shown earlier) suggests that their official poverty rate will likely continue to fall in 2014, but it will remain above its prerecession level, and well above its 2000 historical low. The official U.S. poverty measure provides little insight as to how the transformed work-based income safety net has performed since the expansions to EITC in the early 1990s, and 1996 welfare reform, in reducing poverty. As shown in the body of this report, a very different story from the one offered by the official poverty measure emerges by using an expanded income measure that includes the EITC, and more recently, the ACTC, refundable tax credits, and Food Stamp/SNAP assistance. Single Mothers’ Attachment to the Work-Based Safety Net With an increased share of single mothers engaged in the labor market since welfare reform, the availability of work, and especially full-time work for those who want it, is of special concern, given the past recession and pace of recovery. Full-time, full-year work among single mothers peaked in 2000, and has fallen twice since, in response to two recessions (2000, and 2007-2009) (see Figure 20). A high-water mark was reached in 2000 when over four-fifths (83%) of single mothers had a job at some point during the year. By 2010, the share of single mothers with some attachment during the year had fallen to about three-quarters (73%), and was only slightly above that level in 2013 (75%). In 2000, 46% worked full-time full-year in 2000, whereas only twofifths (40%) did so in 2013. The share of single mothers who were marginally employed during the year for economic reasons—they had a job at some time during the year, but for fewer hours or weeks than they desired—rose from 13% of all single mothers in 2000, to 18% in 2008, and to 19% over the past three years (2011-2013). Among this group are those who were unemployed (i.e., without a job for part of the year and looked for work) as well as “discouraged” workers (i.e., those who were without a job for part of the year and did not look for work because they believed no jobs were available); it also includes mothers who worked less than full-time, but desired full-time work. In 2013, three quarters (75%) of single mothers had some attachment to a job, and thus potentially had some connection to the work-based safety net. All of these mothers—those who worked full-time full-year, those who were marginally employed for economic reasons, and mothers who worked less than full-time full-year for personal reasons (i.e., taking care of home or family, going to school, ill or disabled, or retired/other)—might potentially benefit from the EITC, or the ACTC, depending on their annual earnings. Among those who worked for part of the year, but experienced a period of unemployment, some might qualify for UI benefits, depending on their work history and the conditions under which they separated from a job. In addition to the 75% of mothers with some job attachment, another 5% of single mothers were unemployed for the entire year, or without a job and did not work because they believed no work was available. Some of these mothers might also qualify for UI benefits depending on their circumstances. Congressional Research Service 53 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Figure 20. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment,1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C17 for supporting data Notes: Persons who worked for 50 weeks or more, and 35 or more hours per week, are designated as fulltime, full-year workers. The unemployed are persons who were without a job and searched for work. Discouraged workers are persons who were without a job but did not search for work because they believed no jobs were available. Personal reasons for not working during the year, or working less than full-time, full-year, include taking care of a home or family, attending school, illness or disability, retired, or other. The Work-Based “Safety Net” and the Role of Traditional Welfare A work-based income safety net depends upon a strong economy and available jobs for those who are able and willing to work. The EITC, as an earnings supplement, and the ACTC, as a family income supplement, are only available to working individuals. Work-based safety-net programs may still help those who were without a job for part of the year, or who have a job, but work fewer hours than they would like. However, as support programs, income benefits from the EITC and ACTC are provided as a lump sum refund at the beginning of the year following that in which they were earned. As such, the EITC and ACTC may not help a family meet its immediate income needs due to job loss, or limited work hours. UI benefits are available only to those with an established work history and who lose a job for qualifying reasons. Work-based safety-net benefits are of no use to individuals who have not recently held a job, and cannot find one. Absent available jobs, single mothers may turn to the traditional cash welfare system (i.e., TANF), food assistance (SNAP), relatives and friends, for basic income support. In part contingent on the nature and pace of economic recovery, and federal and state budget pressures, funding for traditional welfare programs, as well as their structure (e.g., time limits, Congressional Research Service 54 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 work/participation requirements, education and training, and subsidized employment) may garner increased attention. Congressional Research Service 55 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Appendix A. From Mothers’ Pensions to TANF— A Brief History TANF, signed into law in 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193), replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement program to low-income families with children. The precursor program which TANF replaced, AFDC, had its beginnings in the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program, part of the 1935 Social Security Act, which introduced federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent children. Mothers’ Pensions to Aid to Dependent Children62 Since at least the first White House Conference on Children in 1909 (Conference on the Care of Dependent Children), and the subsequent creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912, the federal government has been concerned with social conditions of children. The conference was an impetus for states’ enactment of state or locally financed mothers’ pensions (also referred to as widows’ pensions and or mothers’ aid), which provided minimal cash support to mothers made destitute, usually due to a husband’s death. Mothers’ aid was intended to help keep mothers at home to supervise and care for their children, as an alternative to sending children to orphanages and/or putting them up for adoption, which was a common practice of the time.63 Mothers’ pensions largely went to widows, and payments were limited and restrictive (e.g., many states imposed rigid requirements as to the “character” of parents to assure that the child was living in a “suitable home” before granting aid; mothers were required to prove destitution,64 and to agree to cease or limit employment upon receipt of a pension65). Prior to the Social Security Act of 1935, most states had adopted mothers’ pension laws.66 As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program introduced federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent children. The ADC program essentially provided federal dollars to help support states mothers’ pension programs, that nearly all states had established. Under the 1935 act, a “dependent child” was defined as “a child under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or 62 For summary of the legislative history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, see http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ programs/ofa/policy/legisum.htm. Also, CRS Report 84-546 EPW, Brief legislative History of Title IV-A of the Social Security Act: Grants to States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), by (name redacted), February 24, 1984 (archived report, available to congressional clients upon request). 63 Mark H. Leff, “Consensus for Reform: The Mothers’-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era,” The Social Service Review, vol. 47, no. 3 (September 1973), pp. 397-417. 64 See Jane M. Hoey, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Appraising the Social Security Program, vol. 202 (March 1939), pp. 76-78 65 Mark H. Leff, op. cit., p. 402. 66 Missouri and Illinois were the first states to establish mothers’ pensions, in 1911. By 1913, 20 states had mothers’ pensions, and by 1919, 39 states and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii had mothers’ pensions. In 1931, every state except for Georgia and South Carolina had mothers’ pensions. See Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996), p. 133. Congressional Research Service 56 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 mental incapacity of a parent,” and is living with one or more relatives in his or their own home.67 The ADC program provided payments to states for aid to dependent children with approved state plans; federal payments at the time were one-third of the sums expended by the state up to a capped monthly expenditure amount per dependent child.68 The federal program had no provision for assisting a parent or other relative in the household, although this changed over time.69 In 1950, the federal government began to share in the maintenance costs of the parent or other caretaker relative. In 1962, support of a second parent in a family who was incapacitated or unemployed was allowed, and the program’s name was changed to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Under state administration, ADC, as well as the mothers’ pension programs which preceded it, favored children of widows over others. Early evidence from the program indicated that over half of all children assisted were dependent because of the death of a parent, with most living with their widowed mother; most of the remainder were living with mothers who were “deserted, divorced, or separated,” or were living in other settings in which the mother was not present; about 2% were living with an unmarried mother.70 The comparatively small share of unmarried mothers receiving ADC assistance in part reflected a program preference to serve widows, and some unmarried mothers were denied assistance by failing to meet ”suitable home requirements.” However, children of unmarried mothers at the time represented a relatively small share of all fatherless children in the early years of the ADC program. In 1938, children of unwed mothers represented an estimated 3.8% of all children in female-headed households in the U.S.71 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, extending Social Security benefits to widows and surviving children of deceased workers covered by the program, would have the effect of reducing the number of widows and their children from needing ADC, resulting in the program coming to primarily serve families in which fathers were absent due to divorce or abandonment. By 1961, widowed families would comprise only 7.7% of the ADC caseload, down from 43% in 1937.72 Increased Federal Involvement In 1938, three years after enactment of the ADC, eight states were still not participating in the program.73 In 1939, the federal payment rate was raised from one-third to one-half of a raised maximum payment amount per child, effective January 1940. With increasing federal dollars, the federal government would help assure state participation in the program, while at the same time gaining greater leverage in influencing the provision of assistance at the state level.74 By June 67 See Legislative History, Social Security Act of 1935, on the Internet at http://www.ssa.gov/history/35activ.html. The federal maximum payment amounted to $6 per month for the first child in a family, plus $4 per month for each additional child. The federal matching rate of state AFDC expenditures would grow over time. 69 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, A Brief History of the AFDC Program, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/1history.pdf. 70 Jane M. Hoey, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Appraising the Social Security Program, vol. 202 (March 1939), pp. 76, 78. 71 Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 21. 72 Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy form Colonial Times to Present (Boston: South End Press, 1988), p. 321. 73 Ibid., p. 76. 74 For an in depth discussion, see for example: Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants, Public Assistance in Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 68 Congressional Research Service 57 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 1940, all states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were participating in programs providing child welfare services under the Social Security Act.75 Over time, the federal share of AFDC expenditures would increase, reaching a minimum of 50% and a permitted maximum of 83% of total AFDC expenditures by 1965, effective January 1966, for states with an approved plan for medical assistance programs under Title IXX of the Social Security Act (i.e., Medicaid).76 In 1961, the federal Bureau of Public Assistance (BPA), which ran the ADC program, issued a directive against states’ and localities’ use of “suitable home” rules, that had traditionally been used to keep children of unwed mothers out of the program. In 1966, the Bureau of Family Services, which had replaced the BPA in 1962, ordered that state plans for determining eligibility for AFDC “respect the rights of individuals ... .and not result in practices that violate the individual’s privacy or personal dignity, or harass him, or violate his constitutional rights.” Implicitly, states that did not comply could risk losing federal matching funds.77 Legal Challenges to Restrictive State Welfare Practices Greater federal involvement and regulation of AFDC gave petitioners greater legal standing in federal court to challenge restrictive state welfare policies. While AFDC was an entitlement to eligible individuals, as defined by federal law, states still retained control in administering the program, which included determining eligibility of families applying for assistance. Although AFDC was an entitlement, practices of granting eligibility for the program varied widely among states and localities, as had been the case under the mothers’ pensions in the pre-ADC era. The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-452), the centerpiece of President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” focused national attention and federal assistance in helping to combat poverty. Among its provisions was the establishment of an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which administered a number of programs under the act. Community Action Programs (CAP) were among OEO’s programs, under which Community Action Agencies (CAAs) took root in local communities to help promote “maximum feasible participation” of the poor, intended to engage the poor in seeking solutions to poverty in their communities. OEO also set up legal services to aid the poor in local communities. At the same time, a burgeoning National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO), independently began to advocate for the rights of the poor.78 Growing political empowerment of the poor, combined with legal advocacy helped to overturn a number of restrictive state welfare policies by the U.S. Supreme Court. Such policies included “man-in-thehouse” rules (King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)); long-term residency requirements (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)), and termination of assistance without a fair hearing (Goldberg 75 See http://www.ssa.gov/history/1940.html. Under 1958 amendments to the Social Security Act, federal ADC payments to states were no longer based on individual assistance payments, but on total state expenditures, which were matched within an average payment per recipient. The federal matching percent could be no less than 50% and no greater than 65%. Under 1965 amendments to the act, the federal matching rate grew to a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 83% of expenditures, which varied by state, depending on an inverse relationship of state per capita income relative to U.S. per capita income. See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/policy/legisum.htm. 77 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty, 1900-1985 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 181. 78 Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 264-361. 76 Congressional Research Service 58 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)), among others. By one estimate, elimination of the residency requirements alone added some 800,000 persons to the AFDC rolls by 1970.79 Federal Efforts to Stem Rising Public Assistance Caseloads Figure 2 depicts the number of recipients (children and adults) and welfare cases receiving assistance under AFDC (and ADC) from 1960 to 1994, the eve of the programs’ repeal. While some federal efforts served to expand assistance caseloads, such as regulations and enforcement activities to promote states’ administration of the program’s individual entitlement provisions, and increasing federal matching payments to states, which shifted more of the financial burden of providing assistance from states to the federal government, other efforts would seek to restrain caseload growth and its underlying causes. Expanding welfare caseloads were beginning to contribute to what some would refer to as a “welfare crisis,” by the mid-1960s.80 Contributing to the “crisis” was a growing number of families potentially eligible for cash assistance, as the baby-boom generation began entering adulthood, as well as changing social behavior relating to marriage, divorce, and childbearing. As noted earlier, in 1961 families headed by widowed mothers accounted for only about 8% of ADC families; from 1961 to 1967, the share of families receiving AFDC who were headed by nevermarried mothers would increase from 21% to 28%.81 In addition to an increasing number of potentially eligible families, an increasing share of such families applied for and were granted assistance during the 1960s, with the participation of eligible families in AFDC increasing “from perhaps 33 percent in the early 1960s to more than 90 percent in 1971.82” The Rise (and Fall) of Social Services as an Answer to Reducing Welfare Dependency The 1939 extension of social benefits to widows and surviving children of deceased covered workers had the effect of reducing the number of widows and their children needing assistance under ADC, resulting in the program coming to primarily serve families in which fathers were absent due to divorce or abandonment. Changing social trends regarding marriage, divorce, and childbearing in the post World War II era, contributed to the ADC program’s growth. Under 1956 amendments to the Social Security Act (P.L. 84-880), Congress permitted federal funding to reimburse states for 50% of the costs of providing social services to public assistance recipients. Among the legislation’s stated purpose was to enable states to “furnish financial assistance and other services ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and ... attain the maximum level of self-support and personal independence.” Under 1962 amendments, funding for social services was expanded, and the federal matching rate was increased to 75%. Expanded funds for social services and training of skilled welfare workers marked the advent of the “casework approach” for addressing the multiple problems that many 79 Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 335. See for example, Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 25. 81 Ibid., p. 334. 82 Patterson, op. cit., p. 179. 80 Congressional Research Service 59 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 public assistance recipients faced. In his statement at the signing of the 1962 amendments, President Kennedy described it as “a new approach-stressing services in addition to support, rehabilitation instead of relief, and training for useful work instead of prolonged dependency ... [the] objective is to prevent or reduce dependency and to encourage self-care and self-support to maintain family life where it is adequate and to restore it where it is deficient.”83 Increased case supervision by social workers was intended to identify and address problems aid recipients faced, leading to their “rehabilitation” and helping to move them toward selfsufficiency. A major premise was that the provision of social services could break the bonds of dependency many welfare families faced, by addressing their underlying problems. Consequent to the increased emphasis on social services, income maintenance workers often came to serve the dual function of eligibility technician and social caseworker. In implementing the law, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), set caseload and supervisory standards to assure smaller workloads and time for workers to deal with clients.84 The amendments also provided additional funds for training welfare personnel in assuming the additional casework functions associated with identifying clients’ need for services, as well as brokering and/or providing those services. Provision of social services became an integrated function with the provision of cash aid. States provided a panoply of services within a broad, somewhat ill-defined, range of service categories (e.g., educational or vocational training, health care, improved financial functioning, maintaining family life and improving family functioning, maintaining and improving social relationships and community life, self-care services, self-support services). In order to receive reimbursement at the 75% federal matching rate, a case had to be considered a “service case” and had to be part of a caseload of designated size. States faced a financial incentive to provide social services as a result of the comparatively high federal matching rate, which contributed to burgeoning federal spending on social services in the early 1970s.85 AFDC caseloads continued to rise through the course of the 1960s, in spite of increased funding for the provision of rehabilitative services. In 1972, HEW issued a mandate to states to separate the provision of services from the administrative function of determining eligibility for aid.86 Under the mandate, social services would still be provided at the families’ request, rather than on a routine basis. The 1974 Social Security Amendments created a new Title XX, which expanded eligibility for free or subsidized social services to the non-poor, but with a spending cap, rather than an open-ended matching grant. Title XX further severed the provision of social services from the provision of cash aid. 83 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Welfare Amendments Bill, July 26, 1962, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available on the Internet at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8788. 84 A case worker was to carry no more than 60 cases and no supervisor to have more than five workers. President’s Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, Background Papers, 1970, pp. 299-309. 85 See Martha Derthick, Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1975). 86 For a brief discussion of the separation of social services from income maintenance, see Mark E. Courtney et al., “Comparing Welfare and Child Welfare Populations: An Argument for Rethinking the Safety Net,” in Child Welfare Research: Advances for Practice and Policy, ed. Duncan Lindsey and Aron Shlonsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 273-275. Congressional Research Service 60 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Federal Efforts to Constrain AFDC Caseload Growth Due to Absent Fathers Under 1967 Social Security Act amendments, Congress attempted to restrain AFDC caseload growth resulting from children’s fathers continued absence from the home. States were required to establish programs to determine paternity and to locate absent parents and secure support from them.87 Additionally, Congress imposed a “freeze” on federal matching payments for AFDC, which would limit the availability of federal matching funds for children who were receiving AFDC due to continued absence of a parent from the home.88 Under the provision, federal matching funds would not be available to states after July 1, 1969, for any increase above the January-March 1968 level in the proportion of the state’s children under age 18 receiving AFDC on grounds of the continued absence of their father. Implementation of the provision was postponed, and subsequently repealed by Congress in 1969 before taking effect (P.L. 91-41). Under 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act, a new part D89, Child Support and Establishment of Paternity, was added to title IV. Among Part D provisions, states were required to have plans for establishing paternity and establishing child support and were subject to loss of 5% of AFDC federal matching funds for failure to have “effective” programs. AFDC applicants and recipients were required to “cooperate” in identifying and locating children’s fathers, and were required to assign child support rights to the state. Additionally, Part D required the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to establish a separate organizational unit to monitor state programs and to operate a Parent Locator Service, making use of federal and state records.90 Promoting Self-Sufficiency—Work Incentives, Requirements, and Sanctions In 1961, Congress permitted states to include a second, unemployed, parent as part of the assistance unit under AFDC, the Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program, but were required to deny assistance if the unemployed parent refused to accept work without “good cause.”91 In 1962, Congress authorized federal funds for states to establish Community Work and Training (CWT) programs for federally aided adult recipients. CWT jobs were to pay at least an equivalent wage for the same type of work as prevailing in the community, or the minimum wage, if higher. States were required to deduct only “net” earnings from the grant of the working welfare recipient (i.e., after any reasonable work-related expenses) and were permitted to allow working welfare recipients to deduct any income set aside for identifiable needs of the dependent child.92 87 (name redacted), op. cit., p. 7. Ibid., p. 7. For a more detailed discussion see Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service Report (HV 84 D, ED-372), The Limitation on Federal Matching in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program – The SoCalled AFDC Freeze, by William Fullerton, April 1, 1969 (archived report, available by request). 89 The 1967 amendments also restructured title IV (Grants to States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children) of the act into parts: with Part A—AFDC; Part B—Child Welfare Services (a new part, transferred from title V, and revised; and a new Part C—Work Incentive Program (WIN), discussed later. (name redacted), op. cit., p. 6. 90 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 91 Ibid., p. 4. 92 Ibid., p. 4. 88 Congressional Research Service 61 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Amendments of 1967 replaced CWT with the Work Incentive (WIN) program, a joint program between HEW and the Department of Labor (DOL), that required states to set up work and training programs for “appropriate” AFDC recipients.93 The federal share of WIN spending was set at 80%, with states assuming the remainder. The 1967 amendments also required states to disregard a portion of AFDC adults’ earnings—the first $30 plus one-third of the remainder— from income counted against the AFDC grant. Under prior law, other than a required deduction for work expenses from net earnings, the AFDC grant could be reduced by one dollar for every dollar earned. Under the 1967 provisions, the AFDC benefit would phase out more gradually, with a benefit reduction of 67 cents for each dollar earned during the month, in excess of $30. While providing a financial incentive for AFDC recipients to engage in work, the higher disregard would allow working recipients to stay on the program at higher income levels than otherwise, tending to have a potential countervailing influence on caseloads. The 1967 amendments also signaled a shift in emphasis in the provision of services from “rehabilitative,” personal “competence-enhancing,” services, to work-related services, such as vocational training, job and work training referral, and child care, to promote self-sufficiency.94 In 1971, Congress required that all AFDC parents register for work or training, except for mothers with a child under age 6. In 1981, Congress gave states the authority to design and test their own “welfare-to-work” programs. In 1988, the Family Support Act replaced the WIN program with the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (JOBS). The program extended work requirements (which could include work preparation activities, such as education and training) from mothers with a child as young as six to mothers with a child as young as three and, at states’ option, of extending work requirements to mothers with a child as young as age one. The act also required states to provide benefits to a second parent who was incapacitated or unemployed (AFDC-UP program). A number of states experimented with changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).95 Among the features of state programs tested under waiver authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements, experiments requiring a “work first” approach rather than “training first, followed by work,” time limits, strengthened sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare benefits for a new baby conceived or born while a mother was receiving welfare. 93 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, A Brief History of the AFDC Program, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/1history.pdf. 94 Mildred Rein, “Social Services as a Work Strategy,” The Social Service Review, vol. 49, no. 4 (December 1975), pp. 515-538. 95 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, established in 1962, grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance of states with certain sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or demonstrations that the Secretary judges to promote specific objectives of the act. For a discussion of waiver authority under this section, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, State Welfare Waivers: An Overview, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/isp/waiver2/waivers.htm. Congressional Research Service 62 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Appendix B. Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on the CPS A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated caseload counts suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases and that the CPS undercount has worsened in recent years. Figure B-1 shows that from 1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80% of the AFDC administrative caseload count, but in 2013 the CPS captured only about 56%.96 Worsened reporting of cash welfare on the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop in welfare receipt among single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive assistance, rather than families who do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS. Figure B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts (Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2013 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data and Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA) caseload data. See B-1 for supporting data. 96 The CPS estimates are for all adults reporting receipt of AFDC or TANF during the year, converted to an estimate of an annual monthly average, based on the number of months over the year recipients reported receiving assistance. For a detailed discussion of cash welfare under-reporting on the CPS and other surveys see Richard Bavier, Accounting for increases in failure to report AFDC/TANF receipt, Office of Management and Budget, Unpublished manuscript, Washington, DC, 2000. Congressional Research Service 63 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Versus Administrative Caseload Counts, Annual Monthly Average, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in millions) Year Persons Reporting AFDC or TANF Receipt on the CPSa 1987 3.039 3.719 81.7% 1988 3.056 3.691 82.8% 1989 2.901 3.738 77.6% 1990 3.226 3.995 80.8% 1991 3.554 4.434 80.2% 1992 3.596 4.765 75.5% 1993 3.844 4.949 77.7% 1994 3.551 4.972 71.4% 1995 3.193 4.734 67.8% 1996 3.022 4.380 69.0% 1997 2.355 3.690 63.8% 1998 1.892 3.007 62.9% 1999 1.464 2.515 58.2% 2000 1.392 2.181 63.8% 2001 1.216 2.162 56.2% 2002 1.140 2.162 52.7% 2003 1.346 2.158 62.4% 2004 1.160 2.134 54.4% 2005 1.227 2.042 60.1% 2006 0.955 1.890 50.5% 2007 0.907 1.715 52.9% 2008 0.905 1.688 53.6% 2009 1.017 1.824 55.7% 2010 1.088 1.903 57.2% 2011 1.190 1.890 63.0% 2012 1.033 1.837 56.3% 2013 0.965 1.711 56.4% Congressional Research Service AFDC and TANF cases Based on Administrative Datab CPS as a Percent of Administrative Total 64 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA), AFDC and TANF caseload data. Note: Support table for Figure B-1. a. Estimated average monthly number based on number of months CPS respondents indicated they received AFDC or TANF during the year. b. Average monthly number of AFDC or TANF cases in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. From 2001 and after, includes cases in Separate State Programs (SSP) under state Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements. Congressional Research Service 65 Appendix C. Support Tables Table C-1. Children’s Family Living Arrangements and Poverty Status, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Female-Headed Families Year Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents All Children—Numbers in 1,000s CRS-66 1987 62,906 46,062 13,617 4,231 3,405 5,041 939 1,795 1,433 1988 63,398 46,562 13,700 4,290 3,380 5,227 803 1,795 1,341 1989 63,816 46,526 13,874 4,365 3,416 5,118 975 1,994 1,421 1990 64,730 46,674 14,608 5,040 3,583 5,206 780 2,022 1,426 1991 65,576 46,662 15,396 5,410 3,790 5,507 688 2,185 1,333 1992 66,511 47,197 15,586 5,511 3,739 5,687 649 2,287 1,441 1993 68,879 48,128 16,338 6,003 3,839 5,800 696 2,262 2,150 1994 69,596 48,300 16,480 5,865 3,901 6,019 695 2,467 2,350 1995 70,140 48,246 16,993 6,363 3,928 6,040 662 2,764 2,136 1996 70,194 48,412 16,740 6,596 3,753 5,824 566 3,061 1,981 1997 70,561 48,649 16,639 6,696 3,560 5,708 676 3,146 2,126 1998 70,864 48,805 16,833 6,759 3,561 5,828 685 3,098 2,129 1999 71,200 49,814 16,172 6,590 3,225 5,658 698 3,062 2,152 2000 71,261 49,820 16,120 6,734 3,109 5,577 699 3,137 2,184 Female-Headed Families Year Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents 2001 71,534 49,685 16,483 6,872 3,289 5,602 720 3,294 2,072 2002 72,238 49,925 16,780 7,008 3,351 5,758 663 3,321 2,211 2003 72,484 49,596 17,116 7,202 3,298 5,910 706 3,392 2,379 2004 72,757 49,499 17,229 7,428 3,395 5,809 597 3,500 2,528 2005 72,717 49,675 17,162 7,441 3,331 5,769 621 3,467 2,413 2006 73,259 49,992 17,921 7,833 3,616 5,876 596 3,327 2,018 2007 73,554 49,406 18,178 8,203 3,512 5,799 663 3,718 2,251 2008 73,637 49,583 18,086 8,394 3,688 5,367 637 3,614 2,355 2009 74,101 49,117 18,706 8,646 3,895 5,524 641 3,898 2,380 2010 74,094 48,516 19,258 9,333 3,620 5,640 666 3,972 2,348 2011 73,376 47,350 19,595 9,669 3,727 5,591 607 4,297 2,134 2012 73,364 47,361 19,071 9,603 3,471 5,474 522 4,539 2,123 2013 73,262 48,004 18,741 9,437 3,315 5,480 508 4,332 2,185 All Children—Percent Distribution CRS-67 1987 100.0% 73.2% 21.6% 6.7% 5.4% 8.0% 1.5% 2.9% 2.3% 1988 100.0% 73.4% 21.6% 6.8% 5.3% 8.2% 1.3% 2.8% 2.1% 1989 100.0% 72.9% 21.7% 6.8% 5.4% 8.0% 1.5% 3.1% 2.2% 1990 100.0% 72.1% 22.6% 7.8% 5.5% 8.0% 1.2% 3.1% 2.2% 1991 100.0% 71.2% 23.5% 8.3% 5.8% 8.4% 1.0% 3.3% 2.0% 1992 100.0% 71.0% 23.4% 8.3% 5.6% 8.6% 1.0% 3.4% 2.2% 1993 100.0% 69.9% 23.7% 8.7% 5.6% 8.4% 1.0% 3.3% 3.1% Female-Headed Families Year CRS-68 Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents 1994 100.0% 69.4% 23.7% 8.4% 5.6% 8.6% 1.0% 3.5% 3.4% 1995 100.0% 68.8% 24.2% 9.1% 5.6% 8.6% 0.9% 3.9% 3.0% 1996 100.0% 69.0% 23.8% 9.4% 5.3% 8.3% 0.8% 4.4% 2.8% 1997 100.0% 68.9% 23.6% 9.5% 5.0% 8.1% 1.0% 4.5% 3.0% 1998 100.0% 68.9% 23.8% 9.5% 5.0% 8.2% 1.0% 4.4% 3.0% 1999 100.0% 70.0% 22.7% 9.3% 4.5% 7.9% 1.0% 4.3% 3.0% 2000 100.0% 69.9% 22.6% 9.5% 4.4% 7.8% 1.0% 4.4% 3.1% 2001 100.0% 69.5% 23.0% 9.6% 4.6% 7.8% 1.0% 4.6% 2.9% 2002 100.0% 69.1% 23.2% 9.7% 4.6% 8.0% 0.9% 4.6% 3.1% 2003 100.0% 68.4% 23.6% 9.9% 4.5% 8.2% 1.0% 4.7% 3.3% 2004 100.0% 68.0% 23.7% 10.2% 4.7% 8.0% 0.8% 4.8% 3.5% 2005 100.0% 68.3% 23.6% 10.2% 4.6% 7.9% 0.9% 4.8% 3.3% 2006 100.0% 68.2% 24.5% 10.7% 4.9% 8.0% 0.8% 4.5% 2.8% 2007 100.0% 67.2% 24.7% 11.2% 4.8% 7.9% 0.9% 5.1% 3.1% 2008 100.0% 67.3% 24.6% 11.4% 5.0% 7.3% 0.9% 4.9% 3.2% 2009 100.0% 66.3% 25.2% 11.7% 5.3% 7.5% 0.9% 5.3% 3.2% 2010 100.0% 65.5% 26.0% 12.6% 4.9% 7.6% 0.9% 5.4% 3.2% 2011 100.0% 64.5% 26.7% 13.2% 5.1% 7.6% 0.8% 5.9% 2.9% 2012 100.0% 64.9% 26.0% 13.1% 4.7% 7.5% 0.7% 6.2% 2.9% 2013 100.0% 65.5% 25.6% 12.9% 4.5% 7.5% 0.7% 5.9% 3.0% Female-Headed Families Year Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents Poor Children—Numbers in 1,000s CRS-69 1987 12,580 4,619 7,081 2,845 2,106 1,801 329 332 549 1988 12,224 4,317 7,088 2,821 2,040 1,925 301 365 456 1989 12,380 4,535 6,904 2,800 1,879 1,856 369 416 524 1990 13,214 4,718 7,615 3,306 2,127 1,910 273 378 503 1991 14,054 4,869 8,223 3,578 2,439 2,016 191 469 493 1992 14,385 4,987 8,252 3,654 2,204 2,183 210 541 606 1993 15,456 5,571 8,532 3,869 2,230 2,178 255 546 807 1994 15,013 5,258 8,367 3,655 2,201 2,297 214 644 743 1995 14,345 4,763 8,221 4,015 2,140 1,875 191 606 755 1996 14,126 4,802 7,861 3,882 1,917 1,878 183 682 781 1997 13,786 4,503 7,907 3,870 1,814 2,034 188 628 749 1998 13,144 4,380 7,541 3,720 1,794 1,799 228 613 610 1999 11,812 4,100 6,515 3,437 1,346 1,532 200 558 639 2000 11,337 3,905 6,216 3,211 1,368 1,393 243 575 641 2001 11,450 3,896 6,334 3,233 1,326 1,540 236 634 585 2002 11,869 4,188 6,443 3,269 1,497 1,465 212 606 631 2003 12,591 4,218 6,868 3,631 1,444 1,588 205 775 729 2004 12,760 4,315 7,065 3,742 1,582 1,541 200 641 739 2005 12,582 4,104 7,077 3,819 1,597 1,492 169 645 756 2006 12,589 3,978 7,371 3,884 1,625 1,655 209 678 562 Female-Headed Families Year Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents 2007 13,114 4,125 7,511 4,111 1,593 1,577 231 765 714 2008 13,826 4,792 7,536 4,230 1,633 1,469 203 762 735 2009 15,168 5,355 8,113 4,482 1,826 1,613 192 1,063 637 2010 16,162 5,596 8,804 4,947 1,889 1,761 207 1,051 711 2011 15,922 5,147 9,063 5,286 1,840 1,756 182 1,041 671 2012 15,856 5,252 8,772 5,210 1,764 1,611 187 1,163 670 2013 14,497 4,581 8,256 4,961 1,556 1,645 94 992 649 Poor Children—Percentage Distribution CRS-70 1987 100.0% 36.7% 56.3% 22.6% 16.7% 14.3% 2.6% 2.6% 4.4% 1988 100.0% 35.3% 58.0% 23.1% 16.7% 15.7% 2.5% 3.0% 3.7% 1989 100.0% 36.6% 55.8% 22.6% 15.2% 15.0% 3.0% 3.4% 4.2% 1990 100.0% 35.7% 57.6% 25.0% 16.1% 14.5% 2.1% 2.9% 3.8% 1991 100.0% 34.6% 58.5% 25.5% 17.4% 14.3% 1.4% 3.3% 3.5% 1992 100.0% 34.7% 57.4% 25.4% 15.3% 15.2% 1.5% 3.8% 4.2% 1993 100.0% 36.0% 55.2% 25.0% 14.4% 14.1% 1.7% 3.5% 5.2% 1994 100.0% 35.0% 55.7% 24.3% 14.7% 15.3% 1.4% 4.3% 4.9% 1995 100.0% 33.2% 57.3% 28.0% 14.9% 13.1% 1.3% 4.2% 5.3% 1996 100.0% 34.0% 55.6% 27.5% 13.6% 13.3% 1.3% 4.8% 5.5% 1997 100.0% 32.7% 57.4% 28.1% 13.2% 14.8% 1.4% 4.6% 5.4% 1998 100.0% 33.3% 57.4% 28.3% 13.6% 13.7% 1.7% 4.7% 4.6% 1999 100.0% 34.7% 55.2% 29.1% 11.4% 13.0% 1.7% 4.7% 5.4% Female-Headed Families Year Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents 2000 100.0% 34.4% 54.8% 28.3% 12.1% 12.3% 2.1% 5.1% 5.7% 2001 100.0% 34.0% 55.3% 28.2% 11.6% 13.4% 2.1% 5.5% 5.1% 2002 100.0% 35.3% 54.3% 27.5% 12.6% 12.3% 1.8% 5.1% 5.3% 2003 100.0% 33.5% 54.6% 28.8% 11.5% 12.6% 1.6% 6.2% 5.8% 2004 100.0% 33.8% 55.4% 29.3% 12.4% 12.1% 1.6% 5.0% 5.8% 2005 100.0% 32.6% 56.3% 30.4% 12.7% 11.9% 1.3% 5.1% 6.0% 2006 100.0% 31.6% 58.6% 30.9% 12.9% 13.1% 1.7% 5.4% 4.5% 2007 100.0% 31.5% 57.3% 31.3% 12.1% 12.0% 1.8% 5.8% 5.4% 2008 100.0% 34.7% 54.5% 30.6% 11.8% 10.6% 1.5% 5.5% 5.3% 2009 100.0% 35.3% 53.5% 29.5% 12.0% 10.6% 1.3% 7.0% 4.2% 2010 100.0% 34.6% 54.5% 30.6% 11.7% 10.9% 1.3% 6.5% 4.4% 2011 100.0% 32.3% 56.9% 33.2% 11.6% 11.0% 1.1% 6.5% 4.2% 2012 100.0% 33.1% 55.3% 32.9% 11.1% 10.2% 1.2% 7.3% 4.2% 2013 100.0% 31.6% 57.0% 34.3% 10.7% 11.4% 0.7% 6.9% 4.5% Child Poverty Rate—Poor Children as a Percent of Total Children, By Family Living Arrangement CRS-71 1987 20.0% 10.0% 52.0% 67.2% 61.8% 35.7% 35.1% 18.5% 38.3% 1988 19.3% 9.3% 51.7% 65.7% 60.4% 36.8% 37.5% 20.3% 34.0% 1989 19.4% 9.7% 49.8% 64.1% 55.0% 36.3% 37.8% 20.9% 36.9% 1990 20.4% 10.1% 52.1% 65.6% 59.4% 36.7% 34.9% 18.7% 35.3% 1991 21.4% 10.4% 53.4% 66.1% 64.3% 36.6% 27.7% 21.5% 37.0% 1992 21.6% 10.6% 52.9% 66.3% 58.9% 38.4% 32.3% 23.6% 42.1% Female-Headed Families Year CRS-72 Total Married-Couple Families Total Never Married Separated, Spouse Absent Divorced Widowed MaleHeaded Families, Spouse Absent Lives with Other Relatives, Apart from Parents 1993 22.4% 11.6% 52.2% 64.4% 58.1% 37.5% 36.7% 24.1% 37.5% 1994 21.6% 10.9% 50.8% 62.3% 56.4% 38.2% 30.8% 26.1% 31.6% 1995 20.5% 9.9% 48.4% 63.1% 54.5% 31.0% 28.8% 21.9% 35.4% 1996 20.1% 9.9% 47.0% 58.8% 51.1% 32.2% 32.4% 22.3% 39.4% 1997 19.5% 9.3% 47.5% 57.8% 51.0% 35.6% 27.8% 20.0% 35.2% 1998 18.5% 9.0% 44.8% 55.0% 50.4% 30.9% 33.3% 19.8% 28.7% 1999 16.6% 8.2% 40.3% 52.2% 41.7% 27.1% 28.7% 18.2% 29.7% 2000 15.9% 7.8% 38.6% 47.7% 44.0% 25.0% 34.8% 18.3% 29.4% 2001 16.0% 7.8% 38.4% 47.0% 40.3% 27.5% 32.7% 19.3% 28.3% 2002 16.4% 8.4% 38.4% 46.6% 44.7% 25.5% 31.9% 18.3% 28.5% 2003 17.4% 8.5% 40.1% 50.4% 43.8% 26.9% 29.1% 22.8% 30.6% 2004 17.5% 8.7% 41.0% 50.4% 46.6% 26.5% 33.5% 18.3% 29.2% 2005 17.3% 8.3% 41.2% 51.3% 47.9% 25.9% 27.2% 18.6% 31.3% 2006 17.2% 8.0% 41.1% 49.6% 44.9% 28.2% 35.0% 20.4% 27.9% 2007 17.8% 8.3% 41.3% 50.1% 45.3% 27.2% 34.9% 20.6% 31.7% 2008 18.8% 9.7% 41.7% 50.4% 44.3% 27.4% 31.9% 21.1% 31.2% 2009 20.5% 10.9% 43.4% 51.8% 46.9% 29.2% 29.9% 27.3% 26.8% 2010 21.8% 11.5% 45.7% 53.0% 52.2% 31.2% 31.1% 26.5% 30.3% 2011 21.7% 10.9% 46.3% 54.7% 49.4% 31.4% 30.0% 24.2% 31.4% 2012 21.6% 11.0% 46.0% 54.3% 50.8% 29.4% 35.7% 25.6% 29.4% 2013 19.8% 9.5% 44.1% 52.6% 46.9% 30.0% 18.6% 22.9% 29.7% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 1. CRS-73 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013 (Annual monthly average, in millions) Calendar Year Cases Recipients Children Adults 1960 790,910 3,011,508 2,330,042 691,956 1961 872,722 3,362,722 2,597,700 765,022 1962 939,275 3,703,896 2,843,652 860,244 1963 963,368 3,944,635 2,956,962 987,673 1964 1,010,107 4,194,603 3,144,690 1,049,913 1965 1,060,214 4,421,650 3,320,559 1,101,091 1966 1,095,533 4,546,122 3,433,908 1,112,215 1967 1,219,553 5,013,795 3,771,218 1,242,578 1968 1,409,664 5,702,377 4,273,606 1,428,771 1969 1,695,612 6,689,158 4,973,458 1,715,700 1970 2,206,799 8,461,892 6,211,583 2,250,308 1971 2,762,619 10,242,130 7,434,512 2,807,618 1972 3,048,031 10,944,008 7,905,071 3,038,937 1973 3,147,972 10,949,112 7,902,756 3,046,356 1974 3,187,232 10,825,730 7,803,440 3,022,291 1975 3,481,362 11,318,736 8,070,972 3,247,764 1976 3,564,887 11,283,516 7,981,688 3,301,829 1977 3,568,481 11,015,176 7,742,535 3,272,641 1978 3,516,649 10,550,607 7,363,099 3,187,509 1979 3,509,192 10,311,586 7,181,272 3,130,314 1980 3,712,309 10,774,046 7,419,183 3,354,864 1981 3,835,489 11,079,117 7,526,934 3,552,183 1982 3,541,525 10,358,302 6,902,830 3,455,472 1983 3,686,163 10,760,935 7,097,744 3,663,191 1984 3,713,929 10,830,529 7,143,705 3,686,824 1985 3,701,033 10,855,284 7,197,601 3,657,683 1986 3,763,252 11,037,797 7,333,801 3,703,996 1987 3,775,573 11,026,664 7,366,159 3,660,505 1988 3,748,580 10,914,679 7,328,786 3,585,893 1989 3,798,348 10,992,248 7,418,966 3,573,282 1990 4,056,584 11,694,712 7,910,836 3,783,876 1991 4,497,186 12,930,472 8,714,749 4,215,723 Congressional Research Service 74 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Calendar Year Cases Recipients Children Adults 1992 4,829,094 13,773,319 9,302,846 4,470,473 1993 5,011,827 14,205,484 9,574,475 4,631,010 1994 5,032,632 14,160,920 9,568,359 4,592,561 1995 4,790,749 13,418,386 9,134,603 4,283,783 1996 4,434,160 12,320,970 8,468,759 3,852,212 1997 3,740,179 10,375,993 n/a n/a 1998 3,050,335 8,347,136 n/a n/a 1999 2,554,069 6,824,347 n/a n/a 2000 2,302,780 6,143,156 4,478,742 1,654,818 2001 2,191,506 5,716,797 4,200,666 1,515,552 2002 2,187,158 5,609,012 4,118,797 1,479,433 2003 2,180,075 5,489,786 4,062,665 1,416,022 2004 2,153,066 5,341,859 3,969,376 1,361,701 2005 2,060,282 5,025,650 3,758,077 1,261,392 2006 1,905,785 4,577,114 3,455,961 1,121,153 2007 1,729,894 4,075,611 3,119,519 956,091 2008 1,700,249 4,001,330 3,056,690 944,640 2009 1,838,438 4,367,817 3,294,766 1,073,282 2010 1,917,943 4,594,409 3,432,780 1,161,628 2011 1,907,794 4,559,126 3,409,383 1,149,742 2012 1,852,628 4,400,230 3,298,369 1,101,861 2013 1,725,649 4,042,375 3,049,590 992,785 Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA). Notes: Includes enrollment in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands N/A separated estimates for children and adults not available from 1997 to 1999, due to changes in state reporting requirements during the transition from AFDC to TANF. From 2000 and later, data are for combined enrollment in TANF and Separate State Programs (SSP) under state Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements. Support table for Figure 2 and Figure 3. Congressional Research Service 75 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-3. Poverty Among Related Children Under Age 18, All Children and Children in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present) 1960 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Children in Female-Headed Households All Children Year Total Poor Poverty Rate (percent poor) Total Share of all Children Poor Share of all Poor Children Poverty Rate (percent poor) 1960 65,275 17,288 26.5 5,987 9.2 4,095 23.7 68.4 1961 65,792 16,577 25.2 6,212 9.4 4,044 24.4 65.1 1962 67,385 16,630 24.7 6,419 9.5 4,506 27.1 70.2 1963 68,837 15,691 22.8 6,419 9.3 4,554 29.0 70.9 1964 69,364 15,736 22.7 6,838 9.9 4,422 28.1 64.7 1965 69,638 14,388 20.7 7,098 10.2 4,562 31.7 64.3 1966 69,869 12,146 17.4 7,106 10.2 4,262 35.1 60.0 1967 70,058 11,427 16.3 7,344 10.5 4,246 37.2 57.8 1968 70,035 10,739 15.3 7,323 10.5 4,409 41.1 60.2 1969 68,746 9,501 13.8 7,820 11.4 4,247 44.7 54.3 1970 68,815 10,235 14.9 7,987 11.6 4,689 45.8 58.7 1971 68,474 10,344 15.1 9,127 13.3 4,850 46.9 53.1 1972 67,592 10,082 14.9 9,600 14.2 5,094 50.5 53.1 1973 66,626 9,453 14.2 9,929 14.9 5,171 54.7 52.1 1974 65,802 9,967 15.1 10,458 15.9 5,387 54.0 51.5 1975 64,750 10,882 16.8 10,622 16.4 5,597 51.4 52.7 1976 63,729 10,081 15.8 10,739 16.9 5,583 55.4 52.0 1977 62,823 10,028 16.0 11,238 17.9 5,658 56.4 50.3 1978 61,987 9,722 15.7 11,232 18.1 5,687 58.5 50.6 1979 62,646 9,993 16.0 11,595 18.5 5,635 56.4 48.6 1980 62,168 11,114 17.9 11,539 18.6 5,866 52.8 50.8 1981 61,756 12,068 19.5 12,059 19.5 6,305 52.2 52.3 1982 61,565 13,139 21.3 11,946 19.4 6,696 51.0 56.1 1983 61,578 13,427 21.8 12,172 19.8 6,747 50.2 55.4 1984 61,681 12,929 21.0 12,536 20.3 6,772 52.4 54.0 1985 62,019 12,483 20.1 12,531 20.2 6,716 53.8 53.6 1986 62,009 12,257 19.8 12,763 20.6 6,943 56.6 54.4 1987 62,423 12,275 19.7 13,066 20.9 7,019 57.2 53.7 1988 62,906 11,935 19.0 13,146 20.9 6,955 58.3 52.9 1989 63,225 12,001 19.0 13,316 21.1 6,808 56.7 51.1 Congressional Research Service 76 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Children in Female-Headed Households All Children Year Total Poor Poverty Rate (percent poor) Total Share of all Children Poor Share of all Poor Children Poverty Rate (percent poor) 1990 63,908 12,715 19.9 13,793 21.6 7,363 57.9 53.4 1991 64,800 13,658 21.1 14,545 22.4 8,065 59.0 55.4 1992 67,256 14,521 21.6 15,319 22.8 8,368 57.6 54.6 1993 68,040 14,961 22.0 15,844 23.3 8,503 56.8 53.7 1994 68,819 14,610 21.2 15,924 23.1 8,427 57.7 52.9 1995 69,425 13,999 20.2 16,637 24.0 8,364 59.7 50.3 1996 69,411 13,764 19.8 16,213 23.4 7,990 58.0 49.3 1997 69,844 13,422 19.2 16,175 23.2 7,928 59.1 49.0 1998 70,253 12,845 18.3 16,550 23.6 7,627 59.4 46.1 1999 70,424 11,678 16.6 15,891 22.6 6,694 57.3 42.1 2000 70,538 11,005 15.6 15,717 22.3 6,300 57.2 40.1 2001 70,950 11,175 15.8 16,137 22.7 6,341 56.7 39.3 2002 71,619 11,646 16.3 16,565 23.1 6,564 56.4 39.6 2003 71,907 12,340 17.2 16,964 23.6 7,085 57.4 41.8 2004 72,133 12,473 17.3 17,081 23.7 7,152 57.3 41.9 2005 72,095 12,335 17.1 16,862 23.4 7,210 58.4 42.8 2006 72,609 12,299 16.9 17,416 24.0 7,341 59.7 42.2 2007 72,792 12,802 17.6 17,557 24.1 7,546 58.9 43.0 2008 72,980 13,507 18.5 17,456 23.9 7,587 56.2 43.5 2009 73,410 14,774 20.1 17,907 24.4 7,942 53.8 44.4 2010a 72,581 15,598 21.5 18,451 25.4 8,603 55.2 46.6 2011 72,568 15,539 21.4 18,942 26.1 9,026 58.1 47.7 2012 72,545 15,437 21.3 18,368 25.3 8,664 56.1 47.2 2013 72,573 14,142 19.5 18,122 25.0 8,305 58.7 45.8 Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Census Bureau historical series, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html, “Table 10. Related Children in Female Householder Families, by Poverty Status.” Notes: Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Support table for Figure 4 a. Revised estimates based on 2010 Census population control totals. Congressional Research Service 77 Table C-4. Mothers with Related Children Under Age 18, by Poverty and Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in thousands) Single Mothers All Single Mothers Year Total Poor 1987 8,193 3,661 1988 8,321 1989 Pct. Poor Never Married Total Poor 44.7% 2,689 1,559 3,650 43.9% 2,798 8,400 3,506 41.7% 1990 8,745 3,821 1991 9,031 1992 Pct. Poor Separated, Spouse Absent Total Poor 58.0% 1,787 975 1,595 57.0% 1,770 2,775 1,536 55.4% 43.7% 3,100 1,730 4,101 45.4% 3,284 9,567 4,339 45.4% 1993 9,860 4,456 1994 9,837 1995 Pct. Poor Divorced Total Poor 54.6% 3,130 948 911 51.5% 3,224 1,836 860 46.9% 55.8% 1,922 986 1,909 58.1% 1,950 3,595 2,059 57.3% 45.2% 3,830 2,139 4,203 42.7% 3,681 9,887 3,971 40.2% 1996 10,052 4,005 1997 9,874 1998 Married, Spouse Present Widowed Pct. Poor Total Poor 30.3% 588 180 966 30.0% 529 3,197 930 29.1% 51.3% 3,225 956 1,075 55.1% 3,349 2,027 1,039 51.3% 55.8% 2,044 1,050 1,982 53.8% 2,050 3,724 1,963 52.7% 39.8% 4,097 2,033 3,946 40.0% 4,154 9,881 3,685 37.3% 1999 9,741 3,314 2000 9,712 2001 Pct. Poor Pct. Poor Total Poor 30.6% 24,992 1,912 7.7% 177 33.5% 25,096 1,785 7.1% 593 179 30.2% 24,921 1,816 7.3% 29.6% 498 148 29.7% 24,863 1,938 7.8% 1,017 30.4% 448 99 22.2% 24,880 2,075 8.3% 3,524 1,128 32.0% 421 112 26.6% 25,386 2,178 8.6% 51.4% 3,544 1,128 31.8% 443 140 31.7% 25,614 2,295 9.0% 992 48.4% 3,674 1,113 30.3% 432 117 27.0% 25,646 2,170 8.5% 2,083 960 46.1% 3,668 949 25.9% 411 99 24.0% 25,386 1,923 7.6% 49.6% 1,965 869 44.3% 3,605 988 27.4% 385 115 29.9% 25,603 1,921 7.5% 2,043 49.2% 1,838 794 43.2% 3,448 1,014 29.4% 435 95 21.8% 25,735 1,785 6.9% 4,184 1,933 46.2% 1,813 754 41.6% 3,489 884 25.3% 396 115 29.1% 25,573 1,775 6.9% 34.0% 4,197 1,869 44.5% 1,725 598 34.6% 3,425 750 21.9% 394 98 24.8% 25,806 1,647 6.4% 3,090 31.8% 4,199 1,668 39.7% 1,662 610 36.7% 3,404 696 20.5% 447 116 26.0% 26,563 1,557 5.9% 10,044 3,259 32.4% 4,311 1,716 39.8% 1,787 614 34.4% 3,501 804 23.0% 445 124 27.9% 26,303 1,574 6.0% 2002 10,206 3,284 32.2% 4,422 1,737 39.3% 1,822 695 38.2% 3,538 736 20.8% 424 115 27.2% 26,484 1,789 6.8% 2003 10,411 3,525 33.9% 4,511 1,917 42.5% 1,758 650 37.0% 3,699 847 22.9% 443 110 24.8% 26,414 1,841 7.0% 2004 10,489 3,663 34.9% 4,647 2,016 43.4% 1,806 726 40.2% 3,631 810 22.3% 404 111 27.4% 26,797 1,858 6.9% 2005 10,476 3,640 34.7% 4,657 2,040 43.8% 1,777 716 40.3% 3,618 786 21.7% 424 98 23.1% 26,507 1,729 6.5% 2006 10,938 3,841 35.1% 4,934 2,100 42.6% 1,970 777 39.5% 3,652 850 23.3% 381 114 29.9% 26,857 1,709 6.4% 2007 10,748 3,790 35.3% 4,961 2,135 43.0% 1,873 734 39.2% 3,507 796 22.7% 407 124 30.6% 25,851 1,718 6.6% CRS-78 Single Mothers All Single Mothers Year Total Poor 2008 10,797 3,863 2009 10,990 2010 Pct. Poor Never Married Total Poor 35.8% 5,120 2,220 4,128 37.6% 5,225 11,185 4,418 39.5% 2011 11,467 4,540 2012 11,125 2013 10,970 Pct. Poor Separated, Spouse Absent Total Poor 43.4% 2,002 772 2,365 45.3% 2,019 5,497 2,535 46.1% 39.6% 5,766 2,707 4,422 39.8% 5.760 4,164 38.0% 5,635 Pct. Poor Divorced Total Poor 38.5% 3,284 759 825 40.8% 3,333 1,893 845 44.6% 46.9% 1,960 833 2,709 47.0% 1,844 2,549 45.2% 1,744 Married, Spouse Present Widowed Pct. Poor Total Poor 23.1% 391 112 831 24.9% 413 3,380 916 27.1% 42.5% 3,386 906 799 43.4% 3,198 704 40.4% 3,248 Pct. Poor Poor 28.6% 25,861 1,933 7.5% 107 26.0% 25,398 2,109 8.3% 416 122 29.5% 24,807 2,210 8.9% 26.7% 356 94 26.4% 24,519 2,169 8.8% 817 25.5% 324 97 30.0% 24,645 2,194 8.9% 850 26.2% 343 61 17.8% 24,830 1,924 7.7% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 5 and Figure 6. CRS-79 Pct. Poor Total Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-5. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in thousands) Year Number of Mother-Only Families Number Receiving AFDC/TANF Poor but Not Receiving AFDC/TANF Neither Poor nor Receiving AFDC/TANF 1987 8,193 2,719 1,399 4,076 1988 8,321 2,737 1,380 4,204 1989 8,400 2,537 1,452 4,411 1990 8,745 2,901 1,456 4,387 1991 9,031 3,101 1,554 4,375 1992 9,567 3,300 1,691 4,575 1993 9,860 3,439 1,722 4,700 1994 9,837 3,166 1,754 4,916 1995 9,887 2,862 1,818 5,207 1996 10,052 2,669 1,946 5,437 1997 9,874 2,225 2,211 5,438 1998 9,881 1,872 2,253 5,756 1999 9,741 1,543 2,216 5,981 2000 9,712 1,215 2,251 6,246 2001 10,044 1,064 2,501 6,479 2002 10,206 1,025 2,577 6,604 2003 10,411 1,253 2,610 6,448 2004 10,442 1,054 2,890 6,498 2005 10,476 1,102 2,837 6,537 2006 10,938 991 3,120 6,827 2007 10,748 878 3,142 6,728 2008 10,797 974 3,161 6,662 2009 10,990 967 3,408 6,615 2010 11,185 1,009 3,680 6,497 2011 11,467 1,088 3,776 6,603 2012 11,125 962 3,715 6,448 2013 10,970 795 3,605 6,570 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 7. Congressional Research Service 80 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-6. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 Percent who Received AFDC/TANF During the Year Year Percent who Worked During Year Percent Poor (“official definition”) Total 1987 67.3% 44.7% 33.2% 21.8% 11.4% 1988 68.9% 43.9% 32.9% 21.1% 11.8% 1989 70.1% 41.7% 30.2% 20.1% 10.1% 1990 69.8% 43.7% 33.2% 20.9% 12.3% 1991 68.7% 45.4% 34.3% 22.0% 12.3% 1992 67.2% 45.4% 34.5% 22.2% 12.3% 1993 68.1% 45.2% 34.9% 21.8% 13.1% 1994 71.4% 42.7% 32.2% 18.8% 13.4% 1995 73.0% 40.2% 28.9% 16.5% 12.4% 1996 75.1% 39.8% 26.65 14.6% 12.0% 1997 77.3% 40.0% 22.5% 11.4% 11.1% 1998 79.6% 37.3% 18.9% 8.2% 10.7% 1999 82.0% 34.0% 15.8% 6.5% 9.3% 2000 82.7% 31.8% 12.5% 5.3% 7.2% 2001 81.1% 32.4% 10.6% 5.1% 5.5% 2002 80.3% 32.2% 10.0% 4.6% 5.4% 2003 78.7% 33.9% 12.0% 6.1% 5.9% 2004 77.7% 34.9% 10.1% 5.2% 4.9% 2005 77.6% 34.7% 10.5% 6.6% 3.9% 2006 77.3% 35.1% 9.1% 4.6% 4.4% 2007 77.9% 35.3% 8.2% 4.1% 4.1% 2008 76.9% 35.8% 9.0% 4.4% 4.6% 2009 74.0% 37.6% 8.8% 5.2% 3.6% 2010 72.8% 39.5% 9.0% 5.1% 3.9% 2011 73.7% 39.6% 9.5% 5.3% 4.2% 2012 74.1% 39.8% 8.6% 5.0% 3.6% 2013 75.0% 38.9% 7.3% 4.2% 3.1% Did not Work During Year Worked During Year Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Notes: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Support table for Figure 8. Congressional Research Service 81 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-7. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2014 (Percent of single mothers employed in March) Married Mothers Single Mothers Year With a Child Under Age 18 Youngest Child Under Age 3 Youngest Child Age 3 to 5 Youngest Child Age 6 to 17 With a Child Under Age 18 Youngest Child Under Age 3 Youngest Child Age 3 to 5 Youngest Child Age 6 to 17 1988 57.4% 35.1% 52.9% 69.1% 61.8% 50.7% 58.1% 69.6% 1989 58.2% 37.9% 53.1% 70.0% 63.0% 51.4% 60.8% 70.6% 1990 60.3% 38.0% 61.0% 70.9% 63.4% 52.7% 60.9% 70.8% 1991 58.1% 36.6% 55.7% 70.2% 63.1% 52.7% 60.5% 70.5% 1992 57.3% 35.2% 54.1% 69.8% 63.9% 53.1% 59.4% 71.9% 1993 57.3% 35.1% 54.8% 70.1% 63.9% 53.2% 59.4% 71.9% 1994 58.0% 37.7% 55.2% 69.3% 65.5% 56.0% 61.2% 72.6% 1995 61.1% 43.1% 58.5% 70.5% 67.1% 57.4% 63.9% 73.4% 1996 63.5% 44.7% 60.4% 72.9% 67.6% 58.2% 63.3% 74.2% 1997 65.6% 51.5% 64.3% 72.0% 68.5% 58.3% 64.4% 75.2% 1998 68.8% 54.8% 63.7% 76.4% 67.9% 58.3% 64.1% 74.2% 1999 70.7% 55.8% 69.8% 77.1% 67.9% 57.0% 63.1% 75.1% 2000 72.8% 59.1% 72.7% 78.5% 68.4% 56.8% 66.0% 75.0% 2001 72.5% 57.6% 71.3% 79.1% 68.0% 56.0% 64.2% 75.1% 2002 71.2% 57.9% 71.0% 76.3% 66.7% 54.9% 61.7% 74.1% 2003 69.6% 54.8% 69.3% 75.4% 66.3% 53.5% 61.7% 74.2% 2004 69.7% 54.1% 69.5% 75.7% 65.3% 52.4% 62.3% 72.7% 2005 68.9% 53.7% 66.7% 75.7% 65.9% 54.9% 61.9% 72.8% 2006 69.6% 57.0% 68.0% 75.1% 66.1% 55.4% 61.8% 73.1% 2007 70.0% 56.5% 68.6% 76.0% 67.3% 56.9% 63.0% 74.25 2008 69.1% 54.5% 68.5% 75.5% 67.0% 56.1% 63.6% 73.7% 2009 65.8% 52.5% 62.3% 72.9% 66.0% 56.3% 60.1% 72.7% 2010 64.1% 52.9% 59.7% 70.7% 65.3% 54.9% 62.6% 71.3% 2011 63.6% 49.6% 60.1% 70.8% 64.9% 55.7% 61.7% 70.6% 2012 65.7% 51.4% 65.1% 72.2% 65.0% 55.7% 62.8% 70.1% 2013 65.3% 54.3% 62.2% 71.0% 64.4% 56.9% 61.1% 68.9% 2014 67.5% 54.9% 66.0% 73.1% 65.3% 56.5% 60.5% 70.8% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 9. Congressional Research Service 82 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-8. Monthly Unemployment Rate of Women Who Maintain Families, January 1987 to October 2014 (Rates are not seasonally adjusted) Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual Average 1987 9.8 10.0 9.7 9.0 9.1 9.5 9.0 9.7 9.3 9.2 8.4 7.6 9.2 1988 8.9 8.6 7.5 8.2 8.1 7.9 8.2 7.9 8.5 8.1 7.5 7.6 8.1 1989 8.1 8.3 7.8 7.3 8.1 7.9 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.8 8.1 7.5 8.1 1990 7.8 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.4 8.1 8.8 9.0 9.4 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.3 1991 9.2 9.4 9.0 9.2 9.0 9.1 8.8 10.2 9.6 9.8 9.1 8.6 9.3 1992 9.2 9.8 9.9 9.8 9.7 10.2 11.0 11.4 9.6 9.4 10.4 9.7 10.0 1993 10.5 10.5 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.4 9.6 9.1 9.4 9.0 9.8 9.7 1994 9.5 9.9 9.5 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.3 9.4 8.7 8.8 8.1 8.7 8.9 1995 9.1 8.5 7.7 8.8 7.8 8.3 8.8 7.4 7.9 7.9 7.3 6.6 8.0 1996 8.4 7.7 7.4 7.0 8.3 7.6 9.7 9.0 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.2 1997 9.5 9.1 8.7 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.2 8.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.2 8.1 1998 8.3 7.9 7.6 6.8 7.2 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.5 6.9 6.9 5.8 7.2 1999 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.5 5.8 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.0 6.0 5.7 6.4 2000 6.6 6.4 7.0 5.8 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.4 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.5 5.9 2001 6.7 6.3 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.6 7.7 7.2 6.6 2002 8.2 8.3 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.6 7.6 7.0 7.7 8.0 7.9 8.0 2003 8.0 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.3 8.7 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5 2004 8.3 8.1 8.4 7.5 7.4 8.2 9.0 8.3 8.2 7.8 7.7 7.1 8.0 2005 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.9 8.2 8.8 7.2 7.6 7.3 7.2 6.9 7.8 2006 8.2 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.3 7.2 7.4 6.7 6.8 6.5 6.9 6.2 7.1 2007 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.9 6.5 2008 7.0 6.7 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.9 8.5 9.6 8.2 8.8 9.3 9.5 8.0 2009 10.3 10.3 10.8 10.0 11.0 11.7 12.6 12.2 11.6 12.9 11.4 13.0 11.5 2010 12.3 11.6 11.3 11.0 11.6 12.1 13.4 13.4 12.9 12.4 13.0 12.0 12.3 2011 12.7 13.0 12.3 11.7 12.7 12.8 12.1 11.9 12.4 12.3 12.4 12.9 12.4 2012 12.0 11.7 10.8 10.2 10.9 11.8 11.7 12.3 11.3 11.5 10.7 11.3 11.4 2013 11.3 11.0 10.7 10.3 9.9 10.7 10.5 11.0 8.8 9.5 9.7 8.7 10.2 2014 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.5 8.4 8.1 9.1 9.3 8.3 8.7 Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data extracted from the internet on November 10, 2014. Data available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (Series: LNU04000313). Note: Support table for Figure 10. Congressional Research Service 83 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Table C-9. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2013 Combined Work and Welfare over the Year Worked at Any Time During the Year Worked but Did Not Receive Cash Welfare at Any Time During the Year 43.3% 18.5% 42.2% 23.7% 14.5% 62.2% 43.0% 19.2% 43.5% 24.3% 13.5% 3,506 58.6% 42.7% 15.9% 43.1% 27.2% 14.2% 1990 3,821 61.9% 41.4% 20.5% 46.0% 25.5% 12.6% 1991 4,101 62.1% 43.3% 18.8% 44.3% 25.5% 12.5% 1992 4,339 61.0% 42.1% 18.9% 43.6% 24.7% 14.3% 1993 4,456 61.4% 41.5% 19.8% 44.3% 24.5% 14.1% 1994 4,203 58.3% 37.8% 20.5% 47.3% 26.8% 14.9% 1995 3,971 54.2% 34.2% 20.0% 49.7% 29.7% 16.1% 1996 4,005 51.4% 31.1% 20.3% 52.6% 32.2% 16.4% 1997 3,946 44.0% 24.5% 19.5% 57.8% 38.3% 17.7% 1998 3,685 38.9% 19.2% 19.7% 60.4% 40.7% 20.4% 1999 3,314 33.1% 15.4% 17.8% 64.3% 46.5% 20.3% 2000 3,090 27.2% 13.6% 13.6% 61.6% 48.1% 24.8% 2001 3,259 23.2% 12.9% 10.4% 58.6% 48.2% 28.6% 2002 3,284 21.5% 11.8% 9.8% 59.0% 49.2% 29.3% 2003 3,525 26.0% 14.7% 11.2 % 56.5% 45.3% 28.7% 2004 3,648 20.8% 12.1% 8.7% 55.3% 46.6% 32.6% 2005 3,640 22.1% 13.2% 8.9% 54.0% 45.1% 32.8% 2006 3,841 18.8% 11.0% 7.8% 54.4% 46.7% 34.6% 2007 3,790 17.1% 10.0% 7.1% 55.9% 48.8% 34.1% 2008 3,863 18.2% 10.4% 7.8% 55.0% 47.2% 34.6% 2009 4,128 17.5% 11.4% 6.1% 51.6% 45.6% 37.0% 2010 4,418 16.7% 10.9% 5.8% 50.8% 45.0% 38.3% 2011 4,540 16.8% 10.7% 6.1% 51.5% 45.3% 37.8% 2012 4,422 16.0% 10.7% 5.3% 52.9% 47.7% 36.3% 2013 4,164 13.4% 8.7% 4.7% 53.9% 49.2% 37.4% Year Number of Poor Single Mothers (in 000s) Received Cash Welfare During Year 1987 3,661 61.8% 1988 3,650 1989 Received Cash Welfare but Did Not Work During Year Neither Worked nor Received Welfare During the Year Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 11. Congressional Research Service 84 Table C-10. Receipt of Selected Benefits by Female-Headed Families with Children, All Families and “Earnings Poor” Families, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Received AFDC, TANF, or GA Year Total Num. Pct. Received SSI Received Food Stamps/SNAP Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received UI Num. Pct. Received Child Support Num. Pct. Received the EITC Num. Pct. All Families 1987 8,193 2,719 33.2% 412 5.0% 2,958 36.1% 421 5.1% 2,322 28.3% 3,437 41.9% 1988 8,321 2,737 32.9% 383 4.6% 3,034 36.5% 446 5.4% 2,286 27.5% 3,994 48.0% 1989 8,400 2,537 30.2% 404 4.8% 2,860 34.0% 493 5.9% 2,451 29.2% 4,086 48.6% 1990 8,745 2,901 33.2% 430 4.9% 3,260 37.3% 628 7.2% 2,531 28.9% 4,365 49.9% 1991 9,031 3,101 34.3% 474 5.3% 3,572 39.6% 694 7.7% 2,603 28.8% 4,441 49.2% 1992 9,567 3,300 34.5% 555 5.8% 3,981 41.6% 721 7.5% 2,849 29.8% 4,745 49.6% 1993 9,860 3,439 34.9% 748 7.6% 4,295 43.6% 699 7.1% 2,968 30.1% 4,963 50.3% 1994 9,837 3,166 32.2% 725 7.4% 4,036 41.0% 706 7.2% 3,097 31.5% 5,312 54.0% 1995 9,887 2,862 28.9% 722 7.3% 3,755 38.0% 615 6.2% 3,263 33.0% 5,589 56.5% 1996 10,052 2,669 26.6% 755 7.5% 3,674 36.5% 692 6.9% 3,204 31.9% 5,987 59.6% 1997 9,874 2,225 22.5% 723 7.3% 3,291 33.3% 554 5.6% 3,015 30.5% 5,950 60.3% 1998 9,881 1,872 18.9% 661 6.7% 3,019 30.6% 543 5.5% 3,077 31.1% 6,064 61.4% 1999 9,741 1,543 15.8% 619 6.4% 2,491 25.6% 496 5.1% 3,158 32.4% 6,196 63.6% 2000 9,712 1,215 12.5% 614 6.3% 2,298 23.7% 519 5.3% 3,194 32.9% 6,039 62.2% 2001 10,044 1,064 10.6% 630 6.3% 2,433 24.2% 705 7.0% 3,387 33.7% 6,033 60.1% 2002 10,206 1,025 10.0% 591 5.8% 2,574 25.2% 800 7.8% 3,330 32.6% 6,018 59.0% 2003 10,411 1,253 12.0% 600 5.8% 2,758 26.5% 766 7.4% 3,333 32.0% 5,187 49.8% CRS-85 Received the ACTCa Num. Pct. Received AFDC, TANF, or GA Year Total Num. Pct. Received SSI Received Food Stamps/SNAP Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received UI Num. Pct. Received Child Support Num. Pct. Received the EITC Num. Pct. Received the ACTCa Num. Pct. 2004 10,442 1,054 10.1% 704 6.7% 2,918 27.9% 659 6.3% 3,373 32.3% 5,209 49.9% 3,876 37.1% 2005 10,476 1,102 10.5% 699 6.7% 3,005 28.7% 608 5.8% 3,205 30.6% 6,170 58.9% 3,384 32.3% 2006 10,938 991 9.1% 694 6.3% 2,982 27.3% 533 4.9% 3,233 29.6% 6,451 59.0% 3,625 33.1% 2007 10,748 878 8.2% 668 6.2% 2,979 27.7% 499 4.6% 3,157 29.4% 6,454 60.0% 3,526 32.8% 2008 10,797 974 9.0% 663 6.1% 3,464 32.1% 813 7.5% 3,044 28.2% 6,384 59.1% 3,366 31.2% 2009 10,990 967 8.8% 716 6.5% 3,908 35.6% 1,100 10.0% 3,004 27.3% 6,546 59.6% 4,976 45.3% 2010 11,185 1,009 9.0% 676 6.0% 4,165 37.2% 1,229 11.0% 3,041 27.2% 6,479 57.9% 4,831 43.2% 2011 11,467 1,088 9.5% 707 6.2% 4,391 38.3% 1,099 9.6% 3,099 27.0% 6,836 59.6% 5,030 43.9% 2012 11,125 962 8.6% 698 6.3% 4,452 40.0% 879 7.9% 3,093 27.8% 6,749 60.7% 5,095 45.8% 2013 10,970 795 7.3% 679 6.2% 4,301 39.2% 719 6.6% 2,936 26.8% 6,562 59.8% 4,900 44.7% “Earnings Poor” Families 1987 4,417 2,515 56.9% 352 8.0% 2,756 62.4% 206 4.7% 942 21.3% 1,798 40.7% 1988 4,476 2,506 56.0% 312 7.0% 2,782 62.2% 198 4.4% 928 20.7% 1,940 43.3% 1989 4,384 2,318 52.9% 318 7.3% 2,635 60.1% 224 5.1% 1,012 23.1% 1,959 44.7% 1990 4,707 2,670 56.7% 353 7.5% 3,012 64.0% 261 5.5% 1,057 22.4% 2,159 45.9% 1991 4,983 2,840 57.0% 412 8.3% 3,232 64.9% 320 6.4% 1,049 21.0% 2,277 45.7% 1992 5,292 2,968 56.1% 469 8.9% 3,557 67.2% 398 7.5% 1,217 23.0% 2,372 44.8% 1993 5,540 3,114 56.2% 611 11.0% 3,831 69.1% 362 6.5% 1,333 24.1% 2,425 43.8% 1994 5,297 2,848 53.8% 623 11.8% 3,576 67.5% 344 6.5% 1,300 24.5% 2,609 49.3% 1995 5,040 2,495 49.5% 585 11.6% 3,233 64.1% 307 6.1% 1,432 28.4% 2,635 52.3% 1996 5,009 2,330 46.5% 633 12.6% 3,125 62.4% 333 6.7% 1,299 25.9% 2,722 54.3% 1997 4,993 2,038 40.8% 574 11.5% 2,867 57.4% 300 6.0% 1,247 25.0% 2,821 56.5% 1998 4,730 1,688 35.7% 548 11.6% 2,584 54.6% 289 6.1% 1,131 23.9% 2,895 61.2% 1999 4,249 1,321 31.1% 474 11.2% 2,135 50.3% 230 5.4% 1,101 25.9% 2,720 64.0% CRS-86 Received AFDC, TANF, or GA Year Total Num. Pct. Received SSI Received Food Stamps/SNAP Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received UI Num. Pct. Received Child Support Num. Pct. Received the EITC Num. Pct. Received the ACTCa Num. Pct. 2000 3,966 1,026 25.9% 462 11.7% 1,931 48.7% 200 5.0% 1,100 27.7% 2,508 63.2% 2001 4,205 920 21.9% 484 11.5% 2,029 48.3% 307 7.3% 1,233 29.3% 2,502 59.5% 2002 4,308 863 20.0% 451 10.5% 2,080 48.3% 414 9.6% 1,301 30.2% 2,531 58.8% 2003 4,470 1,078 24.1% 465 10.4% 2,294 51.3% 380 8.5% 1,293 28.9% 2,182 48.8% 2004 4,625 913 19.7% 526 11.4% 2,428 52.5% 317 6.9% 1,326 28.7% 2,219 48.0% 1,187 25.7% 2005 4,605 956 20.8% 571 12.4% 2,487 54.0% 285 6.2% 1,225 26.6% 2,636 57.2% 874 19.0% 2006 4,866 844 17.3% 548 11.3% 2,554 52.5% 256 5.3% 1,346 27.7% 2,800 57.5% 1,008 20.7% 2007 4,801 765 15.9% 533 11.1% 2,456 51.2% 223 4.7% 1,303 27.1% 2,846 59.3% 1,085 22.6% 2008 4,961 838 16.9% 524 10.6% 2,787 56.2% 381 7.7% 1,258 25.4% 2,954 59.5% 1,067 21.5% 2009 5,313 864 16.3% 575 10.8% 3,197 60.2% 607 11.4% 1,345 25.3% 3,072 57.8% 2,433 45.8% 2010 5,599 871 15.5% 551 9.8% 3,344 59.7% 758 13.5% 1,385 24.7% 3,154 56.3% 2,435 43.5% 2011 5,666 917 16.2% 540 9.5% 3,495 61.7% 640 11.3% 1,426 25.2% 3,213 56.7% 2,522 44.5% 2012 5,516 825 14.9% 551 10.0% 3,565 64.6% 532 9.6% 1,463 26.5% 3,203 58.1% 2,599 47.1% 2013 5,22 647 12.4% 538 10.3% 3,341 64.0% 417 8.0% 1,362 26.1% 3,040 58.2% 2,399 45.9% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Notes: “Earnings poor” families whose annual earned income is below their poverty income threshold. Other sources of income received by these families might subsequently lift their total income above poverty. Support table for Figure 12. a. CRS-87 The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) made the Child Tax Credit (CTC) partially refundable. Beginning in 2004, the Census Bureau began modeling the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), the refundable portion of the CTC, on the CPS/ASEC. Table C-11. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, All Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Poverty Rates by Income Concept Year Number of Families Earned Income Only 1987 8,193 53.9% 1988 8,321 1989 + Cash, Other than Child Support, UI, and Cash Welfare + AFDC, TANF, GA ("Official Poverty Rate”) + Food Stamp / SNAP Benefits + EITC Less FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes + Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments + Making Work Pay Tax Credit Total Household AfterTax Income + Child Support + UI Benefits 49.2% 47.4% 47.1% 46.6% 44.7% 42.3% 42.6% 42.6% 42.6% 39.5% 53.8% 48.6% 46.5% 46.1% 45.9% 43.9% 42.2% 42.1% 42.1% 42.1% 38.9% 8,400 52.2% 46.8% 44.4% 44.0% 43.7% 41.7% 39.7% 39.9% 39.9% 39.9% 36.3% 1990 8,745 53.8% 49.0% 46.9% 46.6% 46.1% 43.7% 41.5% 41.2% 41.2% 41.2% 37.4% 1991 9,031 55.2% 50.1% 48.3% 47.8% 47.4% 45.4% 42.8% 42.2% 42.2% 42.2% 38.0% 1992 9,567 55.3% 50.8% 48.8% 48.2% 47.4% 45.4% 42.5% 41.7% 41.7% 41.7% 37.5% 1993 9,860 56.2% 50.9% 48.7% 48.1% 47.4% 45.2% 42.7% 41.9% 41.9% 41.9% 37.8% 1994 9,837 53.9% 48.5% 46.5% 46.0% 45.5% 42.7% 39.8% 37.5% 37.5% 37.5% 33.3% 1995 9,887 51.0% 46.4% 43.6% 43.2% 42.3% 40.2% 36.9% 33.4% 33.4% 33.4% 30.0% 1996 10,052 49.8% 45.2% 43.1% 42.6% 41.5% 39.8% 37.1% 33.9% 33.9% 33.9% 30.2% 1997 9,874 50.6% 45.1% 43.0% 42.6% 41.7% 40.0% 37.7% 33.5% 33.5% 33.5% 29.2% 1998 9,881 47.9% 42.6% 40.1% 39.5% 38.8% 37.3% 35.2% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 27.3% 1999 9,741 43.6% 38.9% 36.7% 36.3% 35.3% 34.0% 32.2% 28.5% 28.5% 28.5% 24.7% 2000 9,712 40.8% 36.0% 33.9% 33.7% 32.8% 31.8% 30.5% 26.8% 26.8% 26.8% 22.8% 2001 10,044 41.9% 37.6% 34.9% 34.3% 33.3% 32.4% 30.9% 27.2% 27.2% 27.2% 23.4% 2002 10,206 42.2% 37.1% 34.8% 33.8% 32.9% 32.2% 30.5% 26.6% 26.6% 26.6% 23.4% CRS-88 + SSI + ACTC Poverty Rates by Income Concept Year Number of Families Earned Income Only 2003 10,411 42.9% 2004 10,442 2005 + Cash, Other than Child Support, UI, and Cash Welfare + AFDC, TANF, GA ("Official Poverty Rate”) + Food Stamp / SNAP Benefits + EITC Less FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes + Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments + Making Work Pay Tax Credit Total Household AfterTax Income + Child Support + UI Benefits 38.4% 36.1% 35.3% 34.5% 33.9% 32.2% 29.0% 29.0% 29.0% 24.8% 44.3% 39.6% 37.1% 36.5% 35.7% 34.9% 32.5% 29.9% 29.2% 29.2% 24.8% 10,476 44.0% 39.5% 37.0% 36.4% 35.5% 34.7% 32.6% 28.9% 28.5% 28.5% 24.4% 2006 10,938 44.5% 39.6% 37.5% 36.9% 35.7% 35.1% 32.9% 29.2% 28.7% 28.7% 23.7% 2007 10,748 44.7% 39.4% 37.1% 36.7% 35.8% 35.3% 33.1% 29.1% 28.8% 28.8% 24.4% 2008 10,797 45.9% 40.5% 38.1% 37.3% 36.3% 35.8% 33.3% 29.7% 29.4% 28.3% 23.8% 2009 10,990 48.3% 42.6% 40.3% 38.9% 38.0% 37.6% 33.5% 29.6% 27.9% 27.3% 22.6% 2010 11,185 50.1% 44.4% 42.3% 40.8% 39.9% 39.5% 35.8% 31.3% 30.2% 29.6% 24.8% 2011 11,467 49.4% 44.1% 42.1% 40.9% 40.2% 39.6% 35.7% 30.8% 29.5% 29.5% 25.2% 2012 11,125 49.6% 44.0% 41.9% 41.1% 40.1% 39.8% 35.6% 31.0% 29.6% 29.6% 24.9% 2013 10,970 47.6% 41.9% 39.9% 39.2% 38.3% 38.0% 34.3% 30.7% 29.2% 29.2% 24.0% + SSI + ACTC Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 13. CRS-89 Table C-12. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Poverty Rates by Income Concept Year Number of Families Earned Income Only 1987 5,518 36.8% 1988 5,733 1989 + Cash, Other than Child Support, UI, and Cash Welfare + AFDC, TANF, GA ("Official Poverty Rate”) + Food Stamp / SNAP Benefits + EITC Less FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes + Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments + Making Work Pay Tax Credit Total Household AfterTax Income + Child Support + UI Benefits 32.3% 30.1% 29.7% 29.4% 28.0% 26.1% 26.1% 26.1% 26.1% 23.4% 37.5% 32.6% 29.9% 29.4% 29.2% 27.7% 26.5% 26.3% 26.3% 26.3% 23.8% 5,891 35.9% 30.9% 27.9% 27.4% 27.2% 25.7% 23.8% 23.9% 23.9% 23.9% 21.0% 1990 6,108 38.5% 33.7% 31.3% 30.8% 30.4% 28.8% 27.1% 26.4% 26.4% 26.4% 23.5% 1991 6,205 38.8% 33.8% 31.7% 31.0% 30.6% 29.3% 26.9% 26.0% 26.0% 26.0% 22.5% 1992 6,433 38.9% 34.6% 32.2% 31.4% 30.9% 29.4% 27.0% 25.9% 25.9% 25.9% 22.4% 1993 6,717 39.7% 35.0% 32.3% 31.5% 31.0% 29.4% 27.5% 26.1% 26.1% 26.1% 22.6% 1994 7,022 38.8% 33.9% 31.5% 30.9% 30.6% 28.3% 26.0% 22.7% 22.7% 22.7% 19.3% 1995 7,220 37.4% 33.4% 30.0% 29.5% 28.9% 27.3% 24.6% 19.9% 19.9% 19.9% 17.3% 1996 7,548 37.1% 32.6% 30.1% 29.4% 28.8% 27.9% 25.5% 21.1% 21.1% 21.1% 17.9% 1997 7,636 39.0% 34.5% 32.1% 31.6% 31.1% 29.9% 27.8% 22.3% 22.3% 22.3% 18.6% 1998 7,868 38.0% 33.5% 30.7% 30.0% 29.7% 28.3% 26.3% 20.9% 20.9% 20.9% 18.2% 1999 7,986 34.7% 30.9% 28.7% 28.2% 27.6% 26.7% 25.1% 20.6% 20.6% 20.6% 17.7% 2000 8,030 31.6% 27.4% 25.2% 24.9% 24.4% 23.7% 22.6% 18.1% 18.1% 18.1% 15.0% 2001 8,148 31.5% 28.3% 25.3% 24.6% 24.0% 23.4% 22.0% 17.6% 17.6% 17.6% 14.8% 2002 8,193 31.9% 28.0% 25.7% 24.6% 24.1% 23.6% 22.2% 17.3% 17.3% 17.3% 14.8% CRS-90 + SSI + ACTC Poverty Rates by Income Concept Year Number of Families Earned Income Only 2003 8,191 32.0% 2004 8,110 2005 + Cash, Other than Child Support, UI, and Cash Welfare + AFDC, TANF, GA ("Official Poverty Rate”) + Food Stamp / SNAP Benefits + EITC Less FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes + Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments + Making Work Pay Tax Credit Total Household AfterTax Income + Child Support + UI Benefits 28.7% 26.1% 25.2% 24.7% 24.3% 22.8% 18.7% 18.7% 18.7% 15.8% 32.5% 28.8% 26.4% 25.7% 25.3% 24.9% 22.7% 19.1% 18.4% 18.4% 15.2% 8,124 32.0% 28.5% 25.9% 25.2% 24.7% 24.2% 22.1% 17.1% 16.7% 16.7% 13.7% 2006 8,458 32.6% 28.6% 26.5% 25.9% 25.1% 24.7% 22.6% 17.5% 17.0% 17.0% 13.2% 2007 8,372 33.2% 29.2% 26.6% 26.3% 25.7% 25.3% 23.1% 17.6% 17.3% 17.3% 14.2% 2008 8,301 34.2% 30.1% 27.6% 26.8% 25.9% 25.6% 23.2% 18.3% 18.0% 16.7% 13.7% 2009 8,133 35.6% 30.7% 28.3% 27.1% 26.5% 26.2% 22.5% 17.0% 14.9% 14.2% 11.2% 2010 8,138 36.9% 32.0% 29.5% 28.4% 27.9% 27.6% 24.0% 17.6% 16.1% 15.5% 12.4% 2011 8,451 36.3% 31.7% 29.3% 28.5% 28.1% 27.6% 23.7% 17.1% 15.3% 15.3% 12.7% 2012 8,242 36.9% 32.5% 30.1% 29.3% 28.6% 28.4% 24.1% 17.9% 15.9% 15.9% 13.2% 2013 8,226 35.4% 30.8% 28.5% 28.0% 27.4% 27.3% 24.0% 18.8% 16.9% 16.9% 13.3% + SSI + ACTC Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data Notes: Support table for Figure 14. CRS-91 Table C-13. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Did Not Work at Any Time During the Year, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Poverty Rates by Income Concept Year Number of Families Earned Income Only 1987 2,676 89.1% 1988 2,588 1989 + Cash, Other than Child Support, UI, and Cash Welfare + AFDC, TANF, GA ("Official Poverty Rate”) + Food Stamp / SNAP Benefits + EITC Less FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes + Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments + Making Work Pay Tax Credit Total Household AfterTax Income + Child Support + UI Benefits 84.2% 83.3% 83.0% 82.1% 79.1% 75.7% 76.5% 76.5% 76.5% 72.9% 89.8% 84.2% 83.4% 83.3% 82.8% 79.7% 76.8% 77.2% 77.2% 77.2% 72.3% 2,510 90.3% 84.0% 83.0% 83.0% 82.5% 79.5% 76.8% 77.3% 77.3% 77.3% 72.3% 1990 2,637 89.3% 84.2% 83.2% 83.1% 82.3% 78.3% 74.9% 75.4% 75.4% 75.4% 69.5% 1991 2,826 91.2% 85.8% 84.8% 84.6% 84.1% 80.8% 77.6% 77.9% 77.9% 77.9% 72.0% 1992 3,135 89.0% 83.9% 83.0% 82.7% 81.2% 78.1% 74.2% 74.3% 74.3% 74.3% 68.5% 1993 3,144 91.5% 84.9% 83.8% 83.5% 82.6% 78.9% 75.1% 75.6% 75.6% 75.6% 70.3% 1994 2,815 91.5% 84.9% 83.9% 83.7% 82.7% 78.7% 74.2% 74.5% 74.5% 74.5% 68.1% 1995 2,667 87.6% 81.7% 80.5% 80.4% 78.6% 74.9% 70.2% 69.9% 69.9% 69.9% 64.2% 1996 2,504 88.2% 83.3% 82.4% 82.1% 79.5% 75.9% 72.2% 72.5% 72.5% 72.5% 66.9% 1997 2,238 90.1% 81.3% 80.2% 80.1% 77.8% 74.4% 71.5% 71.6% 71.6% 71.6% 65.2% 1998 2,013 86.3% 77.8% 76.6% 76.5% 74.3% 72.5% 69.8% 69.2% 69.2% 69.2% 62.8% 1999 1,755 84.4% 75.3% 73.6% 73.3% 70.8% 67.4% 65.0% 64.9% 64.9% 64.9% 56.5% 2000 1,682 84.8% 77.0% 75.8% 75.5% 72.9% 70.5% 68.3% 68.6% 68.6% 68.6% 60.0% 2001 1,896 86.5% 77.5% 76.1% 75.6% 73.3% 71.2% 69.1% 68.9% 68.9% 68.9% 60.3% 2002 2,013 84.0% 74.0% 72.0% 71.2% 68.7% 66.9% 64.6% 64.9% 64.9% 64.9% 58.5% CRS-92 + SSI + ACTC Poverty Rates by Income Concept Year Number of Families Earned Income Only 2003 2,220 83.1% 2004 2,332 2005 + Cash, Other than Child Support, UI, and Cash Welfare + AFDC, TANF, GA ("Official Poverty Rate”) + Food Stamp / SNAP Benefits + EITC Less FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes + Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments + Making Work Pay Tax Credit Total Household AfterTax Income + Child Support + UI Benefits 74.0% 72.8% 72.5% 70.5% 69.0% 66.8% 66.7% 66.7% 66.7% 58.0% 85.2% 76.8% 74.4% 73.9% 71.7% 69.9% 66.6% 67.2% 66.7% 66.7% 58.2% 2,352 85.4% 77.8% 75.7% 75.3% 72.7% 71.2% 68.9% 69.7% 69.4% 69.4% 61.3% 2006 2,479 85.0% 76.8% 75.1% 74.4% 72.0% 70.6% 67.9% 68.9% 68.8% 68.8% 59.7% 2007 2,376 85.1% 75.5% 73.9% 73.4% 71.3% 70.3% 68.5% 69.6% 69.5% 69.5% 60.3% 2008 2,496 85.1% 75.0% 72.9% 72.3% 70.6% 69.6% 67.0% 67.5% 67.5% 66.9% 57.3% 2009 2,856 84.7% 76.5% 74.6% 72.6% 70.8% 69.9% 64.7% 65.2% 64.8% 64.5% 55.1% 2010 3,048 85.1% 77.4% 76.2% 73.9% 71.8% 71.3% 67.2% 67.9% 67.6% 67.3% 57.9% 2011 3,016 86.2% 78.7% 77.8% 75.9% 74.3% 73.1% 69.2% 69.3% 69.3% 69.3% 60.0% 2012 2,882 85.8% 76.8% 75.6% 74.7% 73.0% 72.2% 68.6% 68.7% 68.5% 68.5% 58.3% 2013 2,744 84.2% 75.0% 73.8% 72.7% 70.9% 70.0% 65.2% 66.3% 66.1% 66.1% 55.9% + SSI + ACTC Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 15. CRS-93 Table C-14. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Lives with Others Independent Families Total Year Number Percent Number Percent Total Number Extended Families Percent Number Percent Cohabitinga Number Percent Unrelated Familiesa Number Percent All Single Mothers 1987 8,193 100.0% 5,526 67.4% 2,668 32.6% 1,703 20.8% 590 7.2% 375 4.6% 1988 8,321 100.0% 5,703 68.5% 2,618 31.5% 1,667 20.0% 603 7.3% 348 4.2% 1989 8,400 100.0% 5,681 67.6% 2,720 32.4% 1,650 19.6% 603 7.2% 466 5.6% 1990 8,745 100.0% 5,916 67.7% 2,829 32.3% 1,693 19.4% 695 7.9% 441 5.0% 1991 9,031 100.0% 5,993 66.4% 3,038 33.6% 1,690 18.7% 835 9.2% 512 5.7% 1992 9,567 100.0% 6,294 65.8% 3,273 34.2% 1,872 19.6% 880 9.2% 522 5.5% 1993 9,860 100.0% 6,555 66.5% 3,306 33.5% 1,890 19.2% 849 8.6% 567 5.7% 1994 9,837 100.0% 6,357 64.6% 3,479 35.4% 1,968 20.0% 914 9.3% 597 6.1% 1995 9,887 100.0% 6,347 64.2% 3,536 35.8% 2,030 20.5% 948 9.6% 562 5.7% 1996 10,052 100.0% 6,593 65.6% 3,456 34.4% 1,930 19.2% 945 9.4% 584 5.8% 1997 9,874 100.0% 6,362 64.4% 3,511 35.6% 1,966 19.9% 967 9.8% 580 5.9% 1998 9,881 100.0% 6,497 65.8% 3,382 34.2% 1,884 19.1% 951 9.6% 549 5.6% 1999 9,741 100.0% 6,217 63.8% 3,524 36.2% 1,882 19.3% 1,064 10.9% 578 5.9% 2000 9,712 100.0% 6,160 63.4% 3,552 36.6% 1,913 19.7% 1,076 11.1% 563 5.8% 2001 10,044 100.0% 6,639 66.1% 3,405 33.9% 1,831 18.2% 999 9.9% 574 5.7% 2002 10,206 100.0% 6,714 65.8% 3,492 34.2% 1,825 17.9% 1,050 10.3% 617 6.0% 2003 10,411 100.0% 6,745 64.8% 3,664 35.2% 1,950 18.7% 1,062 10.2% 654 6.3% 2004 10,442 100.0% 6,820 65.3% 3,622 34.7% 1,946 18.6% 1,031 9.9% 646 6.2% 2005 10,476 100.0% 6,866 65.5% 3,610 34.5% 1,882 18.0% 1,103 10.5% 624 6.0% 2006 10,938 100.0% 6,905 63.1% 4,033 36.9% 2,136 19.5% 1,581a 14.5%a 315a 2.9%a CRS-94 Lives with Others Independent Families Total Percent Number Percent Total Number Extended Families Percent Number Percent Cohabitinga Number Percent Unrelated Familiesa Year Number Number Percent 2007 10,748 100.0% 6,791 63.2% 3,957 36.8% 2,101 19.5% 1,581a 14.7%a 275a 2.6%a 2008 10,797 100.0% 6,814 63.1% 3,983 36.9% 2,177 20.2% 1,503a 13.9%a 303a 2.8%a 2009 10,990 100.0% 6,592 60.0% 4,398 40.0% 2,345 21.3% 1,647a 15.0%a 406a 3.7%a 2010 11,185 100.0% 6,738 60.2% 4,447 39.8% 2,277 20.4% 1,806a 16.2%a 364a 3.3%a 2011 11,467 100.0% 6,949 60.6% 4,519 39.4% 2,293 20.0% 1,860a 16.2%a 365a 3.2%a 2012 11,125 100.0% 6,751 60.7% 4,373 39.3% 2,180 19.6% 1,846a 16.6%a 348a 3.1%a 2013 10,970 100.0% 6,556 59.8% 4,414 40.2% 2,227 20.3% 1,833a 16.7%a 354a 3.2%a Worked During the Year 1987 5,518 100.0% 3,797 68.8% 1,721 31.2% 1,004 18.2% 422 7.7% 295 5.3% 1988 5,733 100.0% 4,048 70.6% 1,685 29.4% 981 17.1% 449 7.8% 255 4.4% 1989 5,891 100.0% 4,059 68.9% 1,832 31.1% 1,025 17.4% 439 7.4% 368 6.2% 1990 6,108 100.0% 4,246 69.5% 1,862 30.5% 1,031 16.9% 506 8.3% 326 5.3% 1991 6,205 100.0% 4,182 67.4% 2,023 32.6% 1,004 16.2% 613 9.9% 406 6.5% 1992 6,433 100.0% 4,398 68.4% 2,035 31.6% 1,044 16.2% 619 9.6% 372 5.8% 1993 6,717 100.0% 4,535 67.5% 2,181 32.5% 1,150 17.1% 607 9.0% 425 6.3% 1994 7,022 100.0% 4,620 65.8% 2,402 34.2% 1,240 17.7% 690 9.8% 472 6.7% 1995 7,220 100.0% 4,755 65.9% 2,465 34.1% 1,286 17.8% 729 10.1% 451 6.2% 1996 7,548 100.0% 5,019 66.5% 2,529 33.5% 1,321 17.5% 772 10.2% 436 5.8% 1997 7,636 100.0% 5,033 65.9% 2,603 34.1% 1,373 18.0% 763 10.0% 467 6.1% 1998 7,868 100.0% 5,336 67.8% 2,532 32.2% 1,287 16.4% 780 9.9% 465 5.9% 1999 7,986 100.0% 5,317 66.6% 2,669 33.4% 1,303 16.3% 891 11.2% 474 5.9% 2000 8,030 100.0% 5,229 65.1% 2,801 34.9% 1,433 17.8% 899 11.2% 469 5.8% 2001 8,148 100.0% 5,521 67.8% 2,627 32.2% 1,328 16.3% 802 9.8% 497 6.1% 2002 8,193 100.0% 5,517 67.3% 2,675 32.7% 1,283 15.7% 863 10.5% 529 6.5% CRS-95 Lives with Others Independent Families Total Year Number Percent Number Percent Total Number Extended Families Percent Number Percent Cohabitinga Number Percent Unrelated Familiesa Number Percent 2003 8,191 100.0% 5,528 67.5% 2,662 32.5% 1,331 16.2% 809 9.9% 523 6.4% 2004 8,110 100.0% 5,493 67.7% 2,617 32.3% 1,285 15.8% 820 10.1% 511 6.3% 2005 8,124 100.0% 5,496 67.7% 2,628 32.3% 1,277 15.7% 846 10.4% 505 6.2% 14.5%a 238a 2.8%a 2006 8,458 100.0% 5,558 65.7% 2,900 34.3% 1,436 17.0% 1,226a 2007 8,372 100.0% 5,551 66.3% 2,822 33.7% 1,409 16.8% 1,192a 14.2%a 220a 2.6%a 2008 8,301 100.0% 5,504 66.3% 2,797 33.7% 1,445 17.4% 1,119a 13.5%a 233a 2.8%a 2009 8,133 100.0% 5,133 63.1% 3,001 36.9% 1,508 18.5% 1,189a 14.6%a 304a 3.7%a 2010 8,138 100.0% 5,198 63.9% 2,940 36.1% 1,407 17.3% 1,257a 15.4%a 276a 3.4%a 2011 8,451 100.0% 5,374 63.6% 3,077 36.4% 1,491 17.6% 1,334a 15.8%a 252a 3.0%a 2012 8,242 100.0% 5,264 63.9% 2,978 36.1% 1,394 16.9% 1,313a 15.9%a 271a 3.3%a 2013 8,226 100.0% 5,169 62.8% 3,056 37.2% 1,441 17.5% 1,344a 16.3%a 270a 3.3%a Did Not Work During Year 1987 2,676 100.0% 1,729 64.6% 947 35.4% 699 26.1% 168 6.3% 80 3.0% 1988 2,588 100.0% 1,655 64.0% 933 36.0% 686 26.5% 154 6.0% 93 3.6% 1989 2,510 100.0% 1,622 64.6% 888 35.4% 624 24.9% 165 6.6% 98 3.9% 1990 2,637 100.0% 1,671 63.4% 966 36.6% 662 25.1% 189 7.2% 115 4.3% 1991 2,826 100.0% 1,811 64.1% 1,015 35.9% 687 24.3% 222 7.8% 106 3.8% 1992 3,135 100.0% 1,897 60.5% 1,238 39.5% 828 26.4% 260 8.3% 150 4.8% 1993 3,144 100.0% 2,020 64.2% 1,124 35.8% 740 23.5% 242 7.7% 142 4.5% 1994 2,815 100.0% 1,737 61.7% 1,078 38.3% 728 25.9% 224 7.9% 126 4.5% 1995 2,667 100.0% 1,592 59.7% 1,075 40.3% 744 27.9% 219 8.2% 111 4.2% 1996 2,504 100.0% 1,574 62.9% 930 37.1% 609 24.3% 173 6.9% 148 5.9% 1997 2,238 100.0% 1,329 59.4% 910 40.6% 593 26.5% 204 9.1% 113 5.1% 1998 2,013 100.0% 1,161 57.7% 852 42.3% 597 29.7% 171 8.5% 84 4.1% CRS-96 Lives with Others Independent Families Total Year Number Percent Number Percent Total Number Extended Families Percent Number Percent Cohabitinga Number Percent Unrelated Familiesa Number Percent 1999 1,755 100.0% 900 51.3% 855 48.7% 578 33.0% 172 9.8% 104 5.9% 2000 1,682 100.0% 931 55.3% 751 44.7% 481 28.6% 177 10.5% 94 5.6% 2001 1,896 100.0% 1,119 59.0% 777 41.0% 503 26.5% 197 10.4% 77 4.1% 2002 2,013 100.0% 1,196 59.4% 817 40.6% 542 26.9% 187 9.3% 88 4.4% 2003 2,220 100.0% 1,216 54.8% 1,004 45.2% 620 27.9% 253 11.4% 131 5.9% 2004 2,332 100.0% 1,327 56.9% 1,005 43.1% 660 28.3% 210 9.0% 135 5.8% 2005 2,352 100.0% 1,370 58.2% 982 41.8% 606 25.8% 257 10.9% 119 5.1% 2006 2,479 100.0% 1,347 54.3% 1,133 45.7% 701 28.3% 355a 14.3%a 77a 3.1%a 2007 2,376 100.0% 1,241 52.2% 1,135 47.8% 692 29.1% 388a 16.3%a 55a 2.3%a 2008 2,496 100.0% 1,310 52.5% 1,186 47.5% 733 29.3% 384a 15.4%a 70a 2.8%a 2009 2,856 100.0% 1,459 51.1% 1,397 48.9% 837 29.3% 458a 16.0%a 102a 3.6%a 2010 3,048 100.0% 1,540 50.5% 1,508 49.5% 870 28.5% 549a 18.0%a 88a 2.9%a 2011 3,016 100.0% 1,575 52.2% 1,441 47.8% 802 26.6% 526a 17.4%a 113a 3.8%a 2012 2,882 100.0% 1,478 51.6% 1,395 48.4% 786 27.3% 533a 18.5%a 77a 2.7%a 2013 2,744 100.0% 1,387 50.5% 1,358 49.5% 785 28.6% 489a 17.8%a 84a 3.1%a Received Welfare During the Year 1987 2,905 100.0% 1,995 68.7% 910 31.3% 654 22.5% 156 5.4% 99 3.4% 1988 2,919 100.0% 2,074 71.0% 845 29.0% 614 21.0% 174 6.0% 57 2.0% 1989 2,717 100.0% 1,908 70.2% 809 29.8% 552 20.3% 154 5.7% 103 3.8% 1990 3,081 100.0% 2,137 69.4% 944 30.6% 655 21.3% 196 6.4% 92 3.0% 1991 3,296 100.0% 2,225 67.5% 1,071 32.5% 696 21.1% 241 7.3% 135 4.1% 1992 3,545 100.0% 2,399 67.7% 1,146 32.3% 769 21.7% 234 6.6% 142 4.0% 1993 3,757 100.0% 2,561 68.2% 1,197 31.8% 742 19.7% 269 7.2% 185 4.9% 1994 3,470 100.0% 2,330 67.2% 1,140 32.8% 702 20.2% 306 8.8% 132 3.8% CRS-97 Lives with Others Independent Families Total Percent Number Percent Total Number Extended Families Percent Number Percent Cohabitinga Number Percent Unrelated Familiesa Year Number Number Percent 1995 3,247 100.0% 2,102 64.7% 1,145 35.3% 770 23.7% 260 8.0% 114 3.5% 1996 3,075 100.0% 2,079 67.6% 996 32.4% 640 20.8% 212 6.9% 144 4.7% 1997 2,646 100.0% 1,764 66.7% 882 33.3% 573 21.7% 195 7.4% 114 4.3% 1998 2,265 100.0% 1,636 72.2% 629 27.8% 386 17.0% 159 7.0% 85 3.7% 1999 1,950 100.0% 1,258 64.5% 692 35.5% 452 23.2% 150 7.7% 90 4.6% 2000 1,647 100.0% 1,122 68.2% 524 31.8% 357 21.7% 124 7.5% 44 2.7% 2001 1,524 100.0% 1,031 67.6% 493 32.4% 335 22.0% 102 6.7% 57 3.7% 2002 1,464 100.0% 1,017 69.5% 447 30.5% 298 20.4% 102 6.9% 47 3.2% 2003 1,673 100.0% 1,143 68.3% 530 31.7% 348 20.8% 136 8.1% 46 2.8% 2004 1,592 100.0% 1,087 68.3% 505 31.7% 353 22.2% 87 5.5% 65 4.1% 2005 1,617 100.0% 1,153 71.3% 464 28.7% 284 17.6% 116 7.1% 64 4.0% 11.5%a 27a 1.7%a 2006 1,526 100.0% 1,068 70.0% 458 30.0% 256 16.8% 176a 2007 1,419 100.0% 972 68.5% 447 31.5% 316 22.2% 105a 7.4%a 27a 1.9%a 2008 1,507 100.0% 1,031 68.4% 476 31.6% 298 19.8% 145a 9.6%a 33a 2.2%a 2009 1,527 100.0% 950 62.2% 577 37.8% 363 23.8% 169a 11.1%a 45a 3.0%a 2010 1,552 100.0% 998 64.3% 554 35.7% 335 21.6% 186a 12.0%a 33a 2.1%a 2011 1,658 100.0% 997 60.1% 661 39.9% 431 26.0% 181a 10.9%a 49a 2.9%a 2012 1,500 100.0% 953 63.6% 547 36.4% 351 23.4% 170a 11.3%a 26a 1.7%a 2013 1,369 100.0% 807 59.0% 562 41.0% 378 27.6% 152a 11.1%a 33a 2.4%a Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Notes: Independent families are families headed by a single mother with no other members other than her children. Extended families include mothers and their children who live with other family members. Cohabiting mothers live with another unrelated member who is identified or inferred to be a co-resident partner. Mothers in unrelated families co-reside with other unrelated household members, other than those identified or inferred to be a cohabiting partner. Support table for Figure 17. CRS-98 a. Beginning with the 2007 CPS/ASEC, cohabiting couples are identifiable based on self-report. In earlier years, cohabiting couples are identifiable indirectly by inference. The method used here, for CPS/ASEC years before 2007, is based on households with two unmarried adults, who are unrelated and of the opposite sex, and no other adults reside in the household. As a result, estimates for single mothers who are cohabiting or in unrelated families in CPS/ASEC years 2007 and after are not comparable to earlier years. Table C-15. Single Mothers’ Work Status During the Year and Self-Reported Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA SSI) Receipt, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Worked Ill or Disabled Total Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 1987 8,193 5,518 67.3% 2,676 32.7% 100.0% 285 10.7% 1,724 64.4% 283 10.6% 309 11.5% 65 2.4% 1988 8,321 5,733 68.9% 2,588 31.1% 100.0% 235 9.1% 1,759 68.0% 271 10.5% 244 9.4% 72 2.8% 1989 8,400 5,891 70.1% 2,510 29.9% 100.0% 227 9.0% 1,744 69.5% 272 10.8% 186 7.4% 81 3.2% 1990 8,745 6,108 69.8% 2,637 30.2% 100.0% 286 10.9% 1,831 69.5% 276 10.5% 160 6.1% 83 3.2% 1991 9,031 6,205 68.7% 2,826 31.3% 100.0% 243 8.6% 1,928 68.2% 315 11.1% 245 8.7% 95 3.4% 1992 9,567 6,433 67.2% 3,135 32.8% 100.0% 364 11.6% 2,011 64.2% 398 12.7% 278 8.9% 84 2.7% 1993 9,860 6,717 68.1% 3,144 31.9% 100.0% 434 13.8% 1,960 62.4% 443 14.1% 225 7.1% 77 2.5% 1994 9,837 7,022 71.4% 2,815 28.6% 100.0% 470 16.7% 1,626 57.8% 462 16.4% 177 6.3% 79 2.8% 1995 9,887 7,220 73.0% 2,667 27.0% 100.0% 491 18.4% 1,531 57.4% 400 15.0% 163 6.1% 81 3.0% 1996 10,052 7,548 75.1% 2,504 24.9% 100.0% 501 20.0% 1,349 53.9% 375 15.0% 183 7.3% 97 3.9% 1997 9,874 7,636 77.3% 2,238 22.7% 100.0% 446 19.9% 1,197 53.5% 331 14.8% 164 7.3% 100 4.5% 1998 9,881 7,868 79.6% 2,013 20.4% 100.0% 419 20.8% 1,038 51.5% 361 17.9% 113 5.6% 83 4.1% 1999 9,741 7,986 82.0% 1,755 18.0% 100.0% 444 25.3% 875 49.9% 311 17.7% 55 3.1% 67 3.8% 2000 9,712 8,030 82.7% 1,682 17.3% 100.0% 442 26.3% 911 54.2% 223 13.3% 48 2.9% 57 3.4% 2001 10,044 8,148 81.1% 1,896 18.9% 100.0% 527 27.8% 974 51.4% 228 12.0% 89 4.7% 78 4.1% CRS-99 Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 2002 10,206 8,193 80.3% 2,013 19.7% 100.0% 540 26.8% 989 49.1% 285 14.1% 116 5.8% 83 4.1% 2003 10,411 8,191 78.7% 2,220 21.3% 100.0% 574 25.8% 1,093 49.2% 351 15.8% 130 5.9% 73 3.3% 2004 10,442 8,110 77.7% 2,332 22.3% 100.0% 614 26.3% 1,176 50.4% 328 14.1% 133 5.7% 80 3.4% 2005 10,476 8,124 77.6% 2,352 22.4% 100.0% 616 26.2% 1,257 53.4% 292 12.4% 98 4.2% 90 3.8% 2006 10,938 8,458 77.3% 2,479 22.7% 100.0% 689 27.8% 1,245 50.2% 342 13.8% 96 3.9% 108 4.4% 2007 10,748 8,372 77.9% 2,376 22.1% 100.0% 633 26.6% 1,248 52.5% 283 11.9% 95 4.0% 118 5.0% 2008 10,797 8,301 76.9% 2,496 23.1% 100.0% 650 26.0% 1,243 49.8% 356 14.2% 157 6.3% 90 3.6% 2009 10,990 8,133 74.0% 2,856 26.0% 100.0% 679 23.8% 1,292 45.2% 398 13.9% 382 13.4% 105 3.7% 2010 11,185 8,138 72.8% 3,048 28.2% 100.0% 678 22.2% 1,394 45.7% 435 14.3% 421 13.8% 121 4.0% 2011 11,467 8,451 73.7% 3,016 26.3% 100.0% 634 21.0% 1,422 47.1% 423 14.0% 420 13.9% 116 3.8% 2012 11,125 8,242 74.1% 2.882 25.9% 100.0% 672 23.3% 1,333 46.2% 381 13.2% 362 12.6% 135 4.7% 2013 10,970 8,226 75.0% 2,744 25.0% 100.0% 654 23.8% 1,280 46.6% 385 14.0% 325 11.9% 101 3,7% Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Did Not Receive Cash Welfare 1987 5,288 4,511 85.3% 778 14.7% 100.0% 84 10.7% 456 58.7% 124 16.0% 75 9.7% 28 3.6% 1988 5,402 4,651 86.1% 751 13.9% 100.0% 74 9.8% 427 56.8% 134 17.9% 58 7.7% 52 7.0% 1989 5,683 4,930 86.7% 754 13.3% 100.0% 75 10.0% 492 65.2% 100 13.2% 42 5.6% 45 5.9% 1990 5,664 4,945 87.3% 719 12.7% 100.0% 67 9.3% 469 65.2% 90 12.6% 39 5.4% 54 7.5% 1991 5,735 5,005 87.3% 730 12.7% 100.0% 69 9.4% 454 62.2% 98 13.4% 72 9.8% 38 5.2% 1992 6,022 5,146 85.4% 876 14.6% 100.0% 102 11.7% 508 58.0% 155 17.7% 71 8.1% 40 4.6% 1993 6,103 5,237 85.8% 866 14.2% 100.0% 124 14.3% 490 56.6% 157 18.1% 45 5.2% 45 5.2% 1994 6,367 5,549 87.2% 817 12.8% 100.0% 130 15.9% 445 54.4% 171 20.9% 38 4.6% 34 4.2% 1995 6,640 5,798 87.3% 842 12.7% 100.0% 119 14.2% 473 56.2% 150 17.8% 53 6.3% 46 5.5% CRS-100 Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 1996 6,976 6,118 87.7% 858 12.3% 100.0% 108 12.6% 463 54.0% 173 20.2% 66 7.7% 48 5.6% 1997 7,228 6,313 87.3% 916 12.7% 100.0% 121 13.2% 516 56.4% 160 17.4% 60 6.6% 59 6.5% 1998 7,616 6,628 87.0% 989 13.0% 100.0% 162 16.4% 523 52.8% 204 20.6% 42 4.3% 58 5.9% 1999 7,791 6,859 88.0% 933 12.0% 100.0% 172 18.5% 499 53.5% 174 18.7% 31 3.3% 54 5.8% 2000 8,065 7,105 88.1% 961 11.9% 100.0% 176 18.3% 558 58.1% 159 16.6% 22 2.3% 46 4.7% 2001 8,520 7,342 86.2% 1,178 13.8% 100.0% 216 18.3% 655 55.6% 175 14.9% 66 5.6% 67 5.7% 2002 8,741 7,453 85.3% 1,288 14.7% 100.0% 234 18.2% 709 55.0% 212 16.5% 61 4.8% 71 5.5% 2003 8,738 7,397 84.7% 1,341 15.3% 100.0% 230 17.1% 726 54.2% 242 18.1% 86 6.4% 56 4.2% 2004 8,850 7,334 82.9% 1,516 17.1% 100.0% 305 20.1% 818 54.0% 241 15.9% 86 5.7% 66 4.3% 2005 8,859 7,379 83.3% 1,480 16.7% 100.0% 275 18.5% 881 59.5% 214 14.5% 48 3.3% 62 4.2% 2006 9,411 7,723 82.1% 1,688 17.9% 100.0% 354 21.0% 910 53.9% 266 15.8% 67 4.0% 90 5.3% 2007 9,329 7,693 82.5% 1,636 17.5% 100.0% 300 18.4% 946 57.8% 225 13.8% 62 3.8% 103 6.3% 2008 9,290 7,545 81.2% 1,745 18.8% 100.0% 341 19.5% 929 53.2% 298 17.1% 102 5.8% 76 4.3% 2009 9,463 7,486 79.1% 1,976 20.9% 100.0% 346 17.5% 939 47.5% 312 15.8% 290 14.7% 89 4.5% 2010 9,634 7,478 77.6% 2,156 22.4% 100.0% 360 16.7% 1,052 48.8% 354 16.4% 303 14.0% 88 4.1% 2011 9,809 7,701 78.5% 2,108 21.5% 100.0% 297 14.1% 1,078 51.1% 322 15.3% 312 14.8% 99 4.7% 2012 9,625 7,598 78.9% 2,027 21.1% 100.0% 364 18.0% 972 47.9% 298 14.7% 289 14.3% 103 5.1% 2013 9,601 7,643 79.6% 1,959 20.4% 100.0% 376 19.25 970 49.5% 308 15.7% 216 11.0% 89 4.5% Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA or SSI) 1987 2,905 1,007 34.7% 1,898 65.3% 100.0% 202 10.6% 1,267 66.8% 159 8.4% 233 12.3% 37 1.9% 1988 2,919 1,083 37.1% 1,836 62.9% 100.0% 162 8.8% 1,332 72.5% 137 7.4% 186 10.1% 20 1.1% 1989 2,717 961 35.4% 1,756 64.6% 100.0% 152 8.6% 1,253 71.3% 172 9.8% 144 8.2% 36 2.1% CRS-101 Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 1990 3,081 1,163 37.7% 1,918 62.3% 100.0% 219 11.4% 1,363 71.0% 186 9.7% 121 6.3% 30 1.6% 1991 3,296 1,200 36.4% 2,096 63.6% 100.0% 175 8.3% 1,474 70.3% 217 10.4% 173 8.3% 57 2.7% 1992 3,545 1,286 36.3% 2,258 63.7% 100.0% 262 11.6% 1,503 66.6% 242 10.7% 207 9.2% 44 1.9% 1993 3,757 1,480 39.4% 2,278 60.6% 100.0% 310 13.6% 1,470 64.5% 286 12.5% 179 7.9% 33 1.4% 1994 3,470 1,473 42.4% 1,997 57.6% 100.0% 339 17.0% 1,182 59.2% 292 14.6% 139 7.0% 45 2.3% 1995 3,247 1,422 43.8% 1,825 56.2% 100.0% 372 20.4% 1,058 58.0% 250 13.7% 110 6.0% 35 1.9% 1996 3,075 1,430 46.5% 1,645 53.5% 100.0% 393 23.9% 886 53.8% 201 12.2% 117 7.1% 49 3.0% 1997 2,646 1,324 50.0% 1,323 50.0% 100.0% 326 24.6% 681 51.5% 171 12.9% 104 7.9% 41 3.1% 1998 2,265 1,240 54.8% 1,025 45.2% 100.0% 257 25.1% 515 50.3% 157 15.3% 70 6.9% 25 2.5% 1999 1,950 1,128 57.8% 822 42.2% 100.0% 272 33.1% 376 45.7% 137 16.7% 24 2.9% 13 1.6% 2000 1,647 925 56.2% 721 43.8% 100.0% 266 36.9% 353 49.0% 64 8.9% 26 3.6% 12 1.6% 2001 1,524 806 52.9% 718 47.1% 100.0% 312 43.4% 319 44.4% 53 7.4% 23 3.2% 12 1.7% 2002 1,464 739 50.5% 725 49.5% 100.0% 306 42.2% 280 38.6% 72 10.0% 55 7.5% 12 1.7% 2003 1,673 793 47.4% 880 52.6% 100.0% 344 39.1% 366 41.6% 109 12.4% 44 5.0% 17 1.9% 2004 1,592 776 48.8% 815 51.2% 100.0% 309 37.9% 358 43.9% 87 10.6% 47 5.8% 14 1.8% 2005 1,617 745 46.1% 871 53.9% 100.0% 341 39.1% 376 43.1% 77 8.9% 49 5.7% 28 3.2% 2006 1,526 735 48.2% 791 51.8% 100.0% 335 42.4% 334 42.2% 76 9.6% 28 3.6% 18 2.2% 2007 1,419 679 47.9% 740 52.1% 100.0% 332 44.9% 302 40.8% 58 7.9% 32 4.4% 15 2.1% 2008 1,507 756 50.2% 751 49.8% 100.0% 309 41.2% 314 41.9% 58 7.7% 55 7.3% 14 1.9% 2009 1,527 647 42.4% 880 57.6% 100.0% 333 37.9% 353 40.1% 86 9.8% 92 10.5% 16 1.9% 2010 1,552 660 42.5% 892 57.5% 100.0% 318 35.6% 342 38.4% 81 9.1% 118 13.3% 32 3.6% 2011 1,658 750 45.3% 908 54.7% 100.0% 337 37.1% 344 37.9% 101 11.2% 108 11.9% 17 1.8% CRS-102 Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 2012 1,500 644 42.9% 856 57.1% 100.0% 308 36.0% 361 42.2% 82 9.6% 73 8.5% 32 3.7% 2013 1,369 583 42.6% 786 57.4% 100.0% 277 35,3% 319 39.4% 77 9.8% 109 13.9% 13 1.6% Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received AFDC/TANF/GA Only 1987 2,493 887 35.6% 1,606 64.4% 100.0% 111 6.9% 1,117 69.6% 138 8.6% 212 13.2% 26 1.6% 1988 2,536 935 36.9% 1,600 63.1% 100.0% 88 5.5% 1,200 75.0% 133 8.3% 164 10.2% 15 0.9% 1989 2,313 817 35.3% 1,496 64.7% 100.0% 92 6.2% 1,113 74.4% 147 9.8% 121 8.1% 23 1.5% 1990 2,651 1,013 38.2% 1,638 61.8% 100.0% 106 6.5% 1,235 75.4% 164 10.0% 109 6.6% 25 1.5% 1991 2,822 1,036 36.7% 1,786 63.3% 100.0% 90 5.0% 1,308 73.3% 190 10.6% 157 8.8% 41 2.3% 1992 2,990 1,095 36.6% 1,895 63.4% 100.0% 133 7.0% 1,331 70.3% 221 11.7% 172 9.1% 37 2.0% 1993 3,010 1,198 39.8% 1,812 60.2% 100.0% 145 8.0% 1,248 68.9% 240 13.2% 153 8.4% 26 1.4% 1994 2,745 1,228 44.7% 1,517 55.3% 100.0% 124 8.1% 994 65.5% 247 16.3% 117 7.7% 37 2.4% 1995 2,525 1,157 45.8% 1,368 54.2% 100.0% 156 11.4% 859 62.8% 230 16.8% 99 7.2% 24 1.8% 1996 2,321 1,129 48.7% 1,191 51.3% 100.0% 157 13.2% 699 58.7% 179 15.1% 111 9.3% 45 3.7% 1997 1,923 1,017 52.9% 906 47.1% 100.0% 106 11.7% 539 59.5% 131 14.5% 94 10.4% 36 3.9% 1998 1,604 984 61.3% 620 38.7% 100.0% 61 9.9% 374 60.4% 118 19.0% 56 9.1% 10 1.7% 1999 1,331 839 63.0% 492 37.0% 100.0% 96 19.4% 267 54.3% 107 21.7% 12 2.4% 11 2.2% 2000 1,033 642 62.1% 391 37.9% 100.0% 60 15.3% 256 65.5% 49 12.5% 20 5.1% 6 1.6% 2001 894 516 57.8% 377 42.2% 100.0% 80 21.3% 229 60.6% 42 11.2% 18 4.7% 8 2.1% 2002 874 500 57.2% 374 42.8% 100.0% 72 19.2% 192 51.5% 57 15.2% 45 12.1% 7 2.0% 2003 1,073 568 52.9% 505 47.1% 100.0% 95 18.8% 296 58.6% 75 14.9% 27 5.4% 12 2.4% 2004 888 481 54.1% 407 45.9% 100.0% 61 15.1% 253 62.1% 53 13.0% 35 8.7% 4 1.0% 2005 917 486 53.0% 431 47.0% 100.0% 93 21.6% 233 54.1% 63 14.5% 32 7.4% 10 2.3% CRS-103 Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 2006 833 456 54.7% 377 45.3% 100.0% 92 24.5% 207 54.8% 49 12.9% 21 5.4% 9 2.3% 2007 751 417 55.6% 334 44.4% 100.0% 81 24.3% 177 53.0% 44 13.2% 21 6.3% 11 3.3% 2008 844 467 55.3% 377 44.7% 100.0% 76 20.1% 219 58.2% 42 11.1% 32 8.4% 8 2.2% 2009 811 360 44.4% 451 55.6% 100.0% 91 20.2% 228 50.4% 52 11.4% 69 15.3% 11 2.5% 2010 876 407 46.5% 469 53.5% 100.0% 80 17.0% 221 47.1% 49 10.5% 97 20.8% 21 4.6% 2011 951 459 48.3% 492 51.7% 100.0% 81 16.4% 247 50.1% 73 14.8% 81 16.5% 11 2.2% 2012 802 375 46.7% 427 53.3% 100.0% 70 16.4% 244 57.1% 48 11.2% 48 11.3% 17 3.9% 2013 690 321 46.6% 369 53.4% 100.0% 54 14.8% 190 51.5% 47 12.8% 69 18.8% 8 2.1% Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received SSI Only 1987 186 70 37.4% 117 62.6% 100.0% 30 25.5% 60 51.4% 14 12.1% 10 8.9% 2 2.0% 1988 182 104 57.0% 78 43.0% 100.0% 26 33.7% 43 55.3% 2 2.7% 2 2.0% 5 6.2% 1989 180 111 61.5% 69 38.5% 100.0% 10 14.3% 33 47.7% 11 15.7% 10 15.0% 5 7.3% 1990 179 91 50.6% 89 49.4% 100.0% 35 39.7% 43 49.0% 9 10.5% 1 0.8% 0 0.0% 1991 195 90 46.3% 105 53.7% 100.0% 26 25.0% 48 45.8% 15 14.1% 3 2.9% 13 12.2% 1992 244 114 46.8% 130 53.2% 100.0% 60 45.9% 46 35.4% 5 3.8% 17 12.7% 3 2.3% 1993 318 183 57.6% 135 42.4% 100.0% 70 51.5% 42 31.4% 13 9.7% 8 5.9% 2 1.5% 1994 304 156 51.5% 147 48.5% 100.0% 69 47.1% 65 44.0% 7 4.6% 4 2.9% 2 1.5% 1995 385 192 50.0% 193 50.0% 100.0% 97 50.2% 78 40.7% 6 3.3% 4 1.9% 8 4.0% 1996 406 225 55.4% 181 44.6% 100.0% 99 54.8% 73 40.6% 3 1.4% 3 1.7% 3 1.5% 1997 421 223 53.0% 198 47.0% 100.0% 111 56.2% 54 27.5% 23 11.7% 4 1.9% 5 2.7% 1998 393 187 47.7% 205 52.3% 100.0% 121 59.1% 59 28.6% 8 4.1% 4 1.8% 13 6.4% 1999 406 222 54.7% 184 45.3% 100.0% 93 50.7% 69 37.7% 12 6.3% 10 5.2% 0 0.0% CRS-104 Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 2000 431 227 52.7% 204 47.3% 100.0% 122 59.8% 63 30.9% 11 5.5% 5 2.3% 3 1.5% 2001 461 253 54.9% 208 45.1% 100.0% 135 65.1% 56 27.0% 8 3.9% 5 2.3% 4 1.8% 2002 440 188 42.7% 252 57.3% 100.0% 165 65.5% 68 27.2% 10 3.9% 3 1.4% 5 2.0% 2003 421 180 42.7% 241 57.3% 100.0% 165 68.5% 45 18.7% 21 8.9% 6 2.5% 4 1.5% 2004 537 261 48.6% 276 51.4% 100.0% 163 59.0% 74 26.9% 28 10.0% 3 1.2% 8 2.9% 2005 515 228 44.2% 287 55.8% 100.0% 159 55.5% 97 33.6% 12 4.1% 7 2.3% 13 4.6% 2006 536 252 47.0% 284 53.0% 100.0% 177 62.4% 77 27.0% 18 6.4% 3 1.0% 9 3.1% 2007 542 238 44.0% 303 56.0% 100.0% 185 61.0% 96 31.6% 10 3.3% 8 2.7% 4 1.4% 2008 533 257 48.3% 276 51.7% 100.0% 170 61.8% 68 24.6% 16 5.9% 16 5.8% 5 1.9% 2009 560 249 44.5% 311 55.5% 100.0% 168 54.0% 95 30.7% 27 8.8% 15 4.9% 5 1.6% 2010 543 225 41.5% 318 58.5% 100.0% 165 51.8% 103 32.4% 24 7.6% 18 5.8% 8 2.4% 2011 569 266 46.8% 303 53.2% 100.0% 188 62.0% 65 21.3% 21 6.8% 24 7.9% 6 2.0% 2012 538 239 44.5% 299 55.5% 100.0% 169 56.5% 81 27.2% 22 7.4% 15 5.1% 11 3.8% 2013 573 247 43.1% 327 56.9% 100.0% 185 56.6% 90 27.6% 23 7.0% 24 7.2% 5 1.5% Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Received AFDC/TANF/GA and SSI 1987 226 51 22.4% 175 77.6% 100.0% 61 34.7% 90 51.2% 6 3.5% 11 6.1% 8 4.4% 1988 201 43 21.5% 158 78.5% 100.0% 47 29.8% 89 56.2% 1 0.7% 21 13.3% 0 0.0% 1989 224 34 15.0% 191 85.0% 100.0% 50 26.0% 106 55.7% 14 7.3% 13 6.6% 8 4.4% 1990 251 59 23.5% 192 76.5% 100.0% 78 40.7% 85 44.1% 13 6.6% 11 6.0% 5 2.7% 1991 279 74 26.5% 205 73.5% 100.0% 59 28.6% 118 57.3% 13 6.1% 13 6.4% 3 1.5% 1992 311 77 24.8% 234 75.2% 100.0% 69 29.5% 126 53.8% 17 7.1% 19 8.0% 4 1.5% 1993 429 99 23.0% 331 77.0% 100.0% 95 28.7% 180 54.4% 33 9.9% 19 5.6% 5 1.5% CRS-105 Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working Ill or Disabled Total Worked Taking Care of Home or Family Attending School Could Not Find Work Retired or Other Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Subtotal Pct. 1994 421 89 21.1% 333 78.9% 100.0% 146 44.0% 123 37.0% 38 11.5% 19 5.6% 6 1.9% 1995 337 73 21.6% 264 78.4% 100.0% 119 45.0% 121 45.8% 14 5.3% 7 2.7% 3 1.2% 1996 348 75 21.6% 273 78.4% 100.0% 137 50.1% 113 41.3% 19 7.1% 3 1.1% 1 0.4% 1997 302 83 27.5% 219 72.5% 100.0% 109 49.7% 87 39.7% 17 7.8% 6 2.8% 0 0.0% 1998 268 69 25.8% 199 74.2% 100.0% 74 37.4% 82 41.2% 31 15.4% 10 5.2% 2 0.8% 1999 213 66 31.2% 146 68.8% 100.0% 83 57.0% 39 26.9% 19 12.7% 2 1.7% 2 1.6% 2000 183 57 31.0% 126 69.0% 100.0% 84 66.9% 34 26.9% 4 3.0% 2 1.2% 2 1.9% 2001 170 37 21.5% 133 78.5% 100.0% 96 72.0% 34 25.9% 3 2.0% 0 0.2% 0 0.0% 2002 151 51 33.9% 100 66.1% 100.0% 69 69.3% 19 18.8% 6 5.7% 6 6.1% 0 0.0% 2003 180 46 25.5% 134 74.5% 100.0% 84 62.9% 26 19.2% 12 9.2% 11 7.9% 1 0.8% 2004 167 35 20.8% 132 79.2% 100.0% 84 64.1% 31 23.5% 6 4.4% 8 6.4% 2 1.6% 2005 184 31 16.9% 153 83.1% 100.0% 89 57.9% 46 29.8% 3 2.0% 11 7.0% 5 3.3% 2006 158 28 17.6% 130 82.4% 100.0% 66 50.5% 50 38.8% 9 6.8% 5 3.8% 0 0.0% 2007 126 24 18.7% 103 81.3% 100.0% 66 64.5% 29 28.3% 4 4.1% 3 3.1% 0 0.0% 2008 130 32 24.4% 99 75.6% 100.0% 63 63.9% 27 27.8% 0 0.0% 7 7.5% 1 0.8% 2009 156 38 24.2% 119 75.8% 100.0% 74 62.7% 30 25.1% 7 5.8% 8 6.4% 0 0.0% 2010 133 27 20.6% 105 79.4% 100.0% 74 69.7% 19 17.7% 7 7.1% 2 2.2% 3 3.2% 2011 137 25 18.0% 113 82.0% 100.0% 68 60.4% 33 29.2% 8 7.3% 4 3.1% 0 0.0% 2012 160 30 18.7% 130 81.3% 100.0% 69 53.3% 36 27.6% 12 9.5% 9 6.9% 4 2,7% 2013 106 15 14.3% 91 85.7% 100.0% 38 42.1% 29 32.55 7 7.3% 16 18.1% 0 0.0% Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 18 and Figure 19. CRS-106 Pct. Table C-16. Poverty Status of Children in Female-Headed Families Under Selected Income Measures, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Below Household Low-Income Threshold Based on Total Household Income Poor Based on Earned Income Only Poor Based on Total Cash Income “Official” Poverty Measure Total Number Number 1987 13,617 8,360 61.4% 7,081 52.0% 6,822 50.1% 6,437 47.3% 1988 13,700 8,406 61.4% 7,088 51.7% 6,827 49.8% 6,453 47.1% 1989 13,874 8,310 59.9% 6,904 49.8% 6,582 47.4% 6,083 43.8% 1990 14,608 9,003 61.6% 7,615 52.1% 7,258 49.7% 6,712 45.9% 1991 15,396 9,682 62.9% 8,223 53.4% 7,712 50.1% 7,092 46.1% 1992 15,586 9,724 62.4% 8,252 52.9% 7,660 49.1% 7,042 45.2% 1993 16,338 10,311 63.1% 8,532 52.2% 8,026 49.1% 7,346 45.0% 1994 16,480 10,132 61.5% 8,367 50.8% 7,444 45.2% 6,791 41.2% 1995 16,993 10,038 59.1% 8,221 48.4% 7,002 41.2% 6,457 38.0% 1996 16,740 9,547 57.0% 7,861 47.0% 6,780 40.5% 6,108 36.5% 1997 16,639 9,615 57.8% 7,907 47.5% 6,713 40.3% 6,023 36.2% 1998 16,833 9,280 55.1% 7,541 44.8% 6,311 37.5% 5,752 34.2% 1999 16,172 8,171 50.5% 6,515 40.3% 5,468 33.8% 4,844 30.0% 2000 16,120 7,733 48.0% 6,216 38.6% 5,294 32.8% 4,640 28.8% 2001 16,483 7,981 48.4% 6,334 38.4% 5,407 32.8% 4,755 28.8% 2002 16,780 8,202 48.9% 6,443 38.4% 5,341 31.8% 4,810 28.7% 2003 17,116 8,492 49.6% 6,868 40.1% 5,895 34.4% 5,211 30.4% 2004 17,229 8,725 50.6% 7,065 41.0% 5,805 33.7% 5,100 29.6% Year CRS-107 Poor Based on Cash Income Plus Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits, EITC and ACTC Net of Federal and State Income Taxes, Plus Stimulus and Recovery Payments Percent Percent Number Percent Number Percent Poor Based on Cash Income Plus Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits, EITC and ACTC Net of Federal and State Income Taxes, Plus Stimulus and Recovery Payments Below Household Low-Income Threshold Based on Total Household Income Poor Based on Earned Income Only Poor Based on Total Cash Income “Official” Poverty Measure Total Number Number 2005 17,162 8,654 50.4% 7,077 41.2% 5,820 33.9% 5,084 29.6% 2006 17,921 9,111 50.8% 7,371 41.1% 6,025 33.6% 5,272 29.4% 2007 18,178 9,195 50.6% 7,511 41.3% 6,056 33.3% 5,268 29.0% 2008 18,086 9,390 51.9% 7,536 41.7% 6,502 36.0% 5,626 31.1% 2009 18,706 10,114 54.1% 8,113 43.4% 6,011 32.1% 5,222 27.9% 2010 19,258 10,790 56.0% 8,804 45.7% 6,694 34.8% 5,851 30.4% 2011 19,595 10,953 55.9% 9,063 46.3% 6,669 34.0% 5,820 29.7% 2012 19,071 10,644 55.8% 8,770 46.0% 6,560 34.4% 5,622 29.5% 2013 18,741 10,018 53.5% 8,256 44.1% 6,256 33.4% 5,253 28.0% Year Percent Percent Number Percent Number Percent Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Note: Support table for Figure 16. CRS-108 Table C-17. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2013 (Numbers in 1,000s) Did Not Work During the Year Worked During the Year Total Worked FullTime, FullYear Num. Pct. Worked Less Than Full-Time, FullYear, for Personal Reasons Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Num. 1987 8,193 5,518 67.3% 2,636 32.2% 1,296 15.8% 1,586 1988 8,321 5,733 68.9% 2,809 33.8% 1,299 15.6% 1989 8,400 5,891 70.1% 2,810 33.4% 1,325 1990 8,745 6,108 69.8% 2,815 32.2% 1991 9,031 6,205 68.7% 2,925 1992 9,567 6,433 67.2% 1993 9,860 6,717 1994 9,837 1995 Pct. Total Did Not Work Due to Unemployment or Discouragement Num. Pct. Did Not Work Due to Personal Reasons Num. Pct. 19.4% 2,676 32.7% 449 5.5% 2,217 27.1% 1,625 19.5% 2,588 31.1% 434 5.2% 2,147 25.8% 15.8% 1,756 20.9% 2,510 29.9% 324 3.9% 2,185 26.0% 1,461 16.7% 1,825 20.9% 2,637 30.2% 343 3.9% 2,294 26.2% 32.4% 1,569 17.4% 1,709 18.9% 2,826 31.3% 427 4.7% 2,399 26.6% 3,030 31.7% 1,668 17.4% 1,735 18.1% 3,135 32.8% 468 4.9% 2,666 27.9% 68.1% 3,143 31.9% 1,695 17.2% 1,871 19.0% 3,144 31.9% 557 5.7% 2,582 26.2% 7,022 71.4% 3,259 33.1% 1,720 17.5% 2,038 20.7% 2,815 28.6% 442 4.5% 2,372 24.1% 9,887 7,220 73.0% 3,589 36.3% 1,609 16.3% 2,020 20.4% 2,667 27.0% 406 4.1% 2,261 22.9% 1996 10,052 7,548 75.1% 3,646 36.3% 1,693 16.8% 2,200 21.9% 2,504 24.9% 425 4.2% 2,079 20.7% 1997 9,874 7,636 77.3% 3,838 38.9% 1,568 15.9% 2,225 22.5% 2,238 22.7% 362 3.7% 1,877 19.0% 1998 9,881 7,868 79.6% 4,116 41.7% 1,543 15.6% 2,200 22.3% 2,013 20.4% 270 2.7% 1,744 17.6% 1999 9,741 7,986 82.0% 4,286 44.0% 1,428 14.7% 2,269 23.3% 1,755 18.0% 151 1.5% 1,602 16.4% 2000 9,712 8,030 82.7% 4,459 45.9% 1,251 12.9% 2,307 23.8% 1,682 17.3% 174 1.8% 1,508 15.5% 2001 10,044 8,148 81.1% 4,505 44.9% 1,492 14.9% 2,138 21.3% 1,896 18.9% 193 1.9% 1,701 16.9% 2002 10,206 8,193 80.3% 4,649 45.6% 1,556 15.2% 1,980 19.4% 2,013 19.7% 271 2.7% 1,742 17.1% 2003 10,411 8,191 78.7% 4,569 43.9% 1,575 15.1% 2,040 19.6% 2,220 21.3% 297 2.8% 1,924 18.5% 2004 10,442 8,110 77.7% 4,476 42.9% 1,497 14.3% 2,134 20.4% 2,332 22.3% 294 2.8% 2,038 19.5% CRS-109 Pct. Worked Less Than Full-Time, Full-Year, Due to Unemployment or Discouragement Num. Pct. Did Not Work During the Year Worked During the Year Total Worked FullTime, FullYear Pct. Worked Less Than Full-Time, Full-Year, Due to Unemployment or Discouragement Num. Pct. Worked Less Than Full-Time, FullYear, for Personal Reasons Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Num. 2005 10,476 8,124 77.6% 4,657 44.5% 1,398 13.3% 2,060 2006 10,938 8,458 77.3% 4,845 44.3% 1,452 13.3% 2007 10,748 8,372 77.9% 4,702 43.8% 1,519 2008 10,797 8,301 76.9% 4,426 41.0% 2009 10,990 8,133 74.0% 4,252 2010 11,185 8,138 72.8% 2011 11,467 8,451 2012 11,125 2013 10,970 Pct. Total Did Not Work Due to Unemployment or Discouragement Num. Pct. Did Not Work Due to Personal Reasons Num. Pct. Num. Pct. 19.7% 2,352 22.4% 249 2.4% 2,102 20.1% 2,156 19.7% 2,479 22.7% 233 2.1% 2,245 20.5% 14.1% 2,142 19.9% 2,376 22.1% 229 2.1% 2,146 20.0% 1,989 18.4% 1,882 17.4% 2,496 23.1% 281 2.6% 2,212 20.5% 38.7% 2,041 18.6% 1,832 16.7% 2,856 26.0% 569 5.2% 2,285 20.8% 4,250 38.0% 2,029 18.1% 1,848 16.5% 3,048 27.2% 666 6.0% 2,382 21.3% 73.7% 4,488 39.1% 2,150 18.7% 1,806 15.7% 3,016 26.3% 611 5.3% 2,403 21.0% 8,242 74.1% 4,197 37.7% 2,104 18.9% 1,927 17.3% 2,882 25.9% 600 5.4% 2,281 20.5% 8,226 75.0% 4,348 39.6% 2,077 18.9% 1,797 16.4% 2,744 25.0% 542 4.9% 2,203 20.1% Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Notes: Persons who worked for 50 weeks or more and 35 or more hours per week are designated as full-time, full-year workers. Unemployed are persons who were without a job and searched for work. Discouraged workers are persons who were without a job but did not search for work because they believed no jobs were available. Personal reasons for not working during the year, or working less than full-time, full-year, include taking care of home or family, attending school, illness or disability, retired, or other. Support table for Figure 20. CRS-110 Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013 Author Contact Information (name redacted) Specialist in Social Policy [redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-.... Congressional Research Service 111 EveryCRSReport.com The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on issues that may come before Congress. EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to the public. Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com. CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material. Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in connection with CRS' institutional role. EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim copyright on any CRS report we have republished.