Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-
Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Thomas Gabe
Specialist in Social Policy
July 15, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
R41917
CRS Report for Congress
P
repared for Members and Committees of Congress
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Summary
It is almost 15 years since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program assisting
low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed families with
children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF. Female-headed
families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such families account
for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons, single female-
headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report details trends in
income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of the 1996
welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare
dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform
and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs
other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children.
CRS analysis of 23 years of U.S. Census Bureau data shows that there has been a dramatic
transformation with regard to welfare, work, and poverty status of single mothers. The period has
seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that
contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has
changed markedly over the period; more mothers are working and fewer are relying on cash
welfare to support themselves and their children.
In the years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, and in the years since, the nation’s
income safety net has been transformed into one supporting work. Cash-welfare work
requirements, the end of cash welfare as an open-ended entitlement by limiting the duration that
individuals may receive federally funded benefits, and expanded earnings and family income
supplements administered through the federal income tax system have helped to change the
dynamics between work and welfare. The transformed system has helped to both reduce single
mothers’ reliance on traditional cash welfare and reduce poverty among their children.
Poverty under the official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows
that since 2000, which marked an historical low, the poverty rate among single mothers has
increased in step with two recessions. In 2009, the official poverty rate for single mothers, at a
post-2000 high, was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels despite two recessions. Using a
more comprehensive income definition than that used by the official poverty measure indicates
that poverty among single mothers and their children in 2009, rather than having increased since
2000, was at or near a 23-year low when Food Stamp/SNAP benefits and work-related refundable
tax credits are taken into account. These programs’ anti-poverty effects go unnoticed under the
official U.S. measure. Congressional action in response to the recession, which increased SNAP
benefits and extended the reach of refundable tax credits, contributed to a decline in poverty
among single mothers and their children. Use of an expanded income poverty measure highlights
effects of congressional action that helped reduce child poverty amidst the deepest and longest
recession since the Great Depression. Some of the provisions that helped to reduce child poverty
are due to expire at the end of 2012.
The role of work-conditioned benefits, and the provision of traditional cash welfare, will likely
come under increased attention given the slow pace of economic recovery, the federal and state
budget deficits, and a dearth of jobs.
Congressional Research Service
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
A Road Map................................................................................................................................ 2
Female-Headed Families with Children—A Policy Concern........................................................ 3
Policy Landscape on the Eve of 1996 Welfare Reform................................................................. 6
Welfare Dependency as a Political Theme ............................................................................. 7
EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay” ............................................................................... 8
TANF and Other Policies in the Post-AFDC Era.......................................................................... 8
Other Federal and State Policies that Encourage Work......................................................... 10
Child Support Enforcement ................................................................................................. 11
Policies Addressing Marriage and Childbearing................................................................... 12
Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions ................................................................ 12
Tax Rebates and Credits ...................................................................................................... 13
Unemployment Insurance Benefits ...................................................................................... 14
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits ......................... 15
Other Social Policies ........................................................................................................... 15
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children ........................... 16
Number of Families Headed by Single Mothers................................................................... 19
Incidence of Poverty by Mothers’ Marital Status ................................................................. 20
Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt Among Single Mothers .................................................. 21
Work, Poverty, and Cash Welfare Receipt of Single Mothers ............................................... 22
Single Mothers’ Employment .................................................................................................... 23
Unemployment Rates Across the Business Cycle................................................................. 24
Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status.................................................................... 25
Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families with Children.......... 27
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)....................................................................................... 27
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ................................................................................... 28
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits .............................................................................. 29
Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefits ......................... 29
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC)................................................................................... 30
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Single Mothers’ Poverty Status ............................. 30
Addition of Income from Sources Not Included in the “Official” U.S. Poverty
Measure ........................................................................................................................... 32
Effect of Earnings and Other Non-Welfare Cash Income on Poverty.................................... 33
Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty....................................................................................... 33
The Invisible Safety Net—Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected Income Sources
Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure ............................................................... 34
Effect of Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits on Poverty .......................................................... 34
Net Effect of the EITC on Poverty................................................................................. 34
Effect of the ACTC on Poverty...................................................................................... 35
Effect of Federal Economic Stimulus and Economic Recovery Payments
on Poverty ................................................................................................................. 35
Effect of Unrelated Household Member’s Income on Poverty........................................ 36
Comparison of the Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Poverty, by Single
Mothers’ Work Status....................................................................................................... 36
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Single Mothers Who Worked During the Year—Figure 14............................................. 36
Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15 ................................... 40
Discussion/Conclusion.............................................................................................................. 43
Transformation of Income Safety-Net Programs Toward Work-Conditioned Support ........... 43
Cash Welfare’s Residual Safety-Net Role ............................................................................ 44
Living Arrangements as an Alternative to Welfare ......................................................... 45
Illness or Disability Among Nonworking Single Mothers .............................................. 47
The Work-Based Income Safety Net in Times of Recession and Recovery........................... 50
The Invisible Safety-Net—Benefits not Officially Counted Toward
Poverty Reduction...................................................................................................... 50
Single Mothers’ Attachment to the Work-Based Safety Net............................................ 52
Role of Traditional Welfare ........................................................................................... 53
Figures
Figure 1. Children’s Poverty Status by Family Living Arrangement, 2009 ................................... 4
Figure 2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Assistance Under AFDC, 1960 to
1994 ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Figure 3. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Assistance Under ADC, AFDC, and
TANF, 1960 to 2010............................................................................................................... 17
Figure 4. Poverty Rate of Children Under Age 18 in Female-Headed Households (No
Spouse Present), 1960 to 2009................................................................................................ 18
Figure 5. Number of Single-Mother Families, by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2009............ 19
Figure 6. Poverty Rates by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2009 ............................................. 20
Figure 7. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2009 .............................. 22
Figure 8. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2009 ................... 23
Figure 9. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child,
March 1988 to March 2010 .................................................................................................... 24
Figure 10. Unemployment Rate of Women Maintaining Families, January 1987 through
June 2011............................................................................................................................... 25
Figure 11. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2009.......... 26
Figure 12. Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families
with Children, 1987 to 2009................................................................................................... 28
Figure 13. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2009.............................................................. 31
Figure 14. Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year: Effects of
Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
1987 to 2009.......................................................................................................................... 39
Figure 15. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year: Effects of Earnings,
Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, 1987 to
2009 ...................................................................................................................................... 42
Figure 16. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status ........... 46
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 17. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year, by Self-Reported Reason
for Not Working..................................................................................................................... 47
Figure 18. Nonworking Single Mothers with Self-Reported “Illness or Disability” as the
Primary Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare Recipiency Status.................................... 49
Figure 19. Poverty Among Children in Female-Headed Families Under Alternative
Measures, 1987 to 2009 ......................................................................................................... 51
Figure 20. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2009 ......................................................... 53
Figure B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts
(Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2009............................................................................... 61
Tables
Table B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Versus Administrative Caseload Counts, Annual
Monthly Average, 1987 to 2009.............................................................................................. 62
Table C-1. Children’s Family Living Arrangements and Poverty Status, 1987 to 2009 ............... 63
Table C-2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Assistance Under ADC, AFDC,
and TANF, 1960 to 2010 ........................................................................................................ 67
Table C-3. Poverty Among Related Children Under Age 18, All Children and Children in
Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present) 1960 to 2009 ............................................. 69
Table C-4. Mothers with Related Children Under Age 18, by Poverty and Marital Status,
1987 to 2009.......................................................................................................................... 71
Table C-5. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2009 ............................ 73
Table C-6. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2009................. 74
Table C-7. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest
Child, March 1988 to March 2010.......................................................................................... 75
Table C-8. Monthly Unemployment Rate of Women Who Maintain Families, January
1987 to June 2011 .................................................................................................................. 76
Table C-9. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2009 ......... 77
Table C-10. Receipt of Selected Benefits by Female-Headed Families with Children, All
Families and “Earnings Poor” Families .................................................................................. 78
Table C-11. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status, All Single Mothers, 1987 to 2009 ........................................................... 81
Table C-12. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year, 1987
to 2009................................................................................................................................... 83
Table C-13. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Did Not Work at Any Time During the Year,
1987 to 2009.......................................................................................................................... 85
Table C-14. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status,
1987 to 2009.......................................................................................................................... 87
Table C-15. Poverty Status of Children in Female-Headed Families Under Selected
Income Measures, 1987 to 2009 ............................................................................................. 92
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-16. Single Mothers’ Work Status During the Year and Self-Reported Reason for
Not Working, by Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA SSI) Receipt, 1987 to 2009 ...................... 94
Table C-17. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2009..................................................... 101
Appendixes
Appendix A. From Mothers’ Pensions to TANF—A Brief History ............................................. 54
Appendix B. Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on the CPS ........................................................... 61
Appendix C. Support Tables...................................................................................................... 63
Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 103
Congressional Research Service
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Introduction
It is almost 15 years since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program assisting
low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed families with
children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF. Female-headed
families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such families account
for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons, single female-
headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report details trends in
income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of the 1996
welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare
dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform
and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs
other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children.
Since at least the first White House Conference on Children in 1909 (Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children), and the subsequent creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912, the federal
government has been concerned with the social conditions of children. The Conference was an
impetus for states’ enactment of state or locally financed mothers’ pensions (also referred to as
widows’ pensions and/or mothers’ aid), which provided minimal cash support to mothers made
destitute, usually due to a husband’s death. Mothers’ aid was intended to help keep the mother at
home to care for her children, as an alternative to institutionalization or adoption. As part of the
Social Security Act of 1935, the federal Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program introduced
federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent
children, basically as a supplement to states’ mothers’ pension programs. Federal involvement in
attempting to address the problem of child poverty associated with the loss of parental support
grew over the next 61 years, at which point the AFDC program, formerly named ADC, was
repealed and replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Two dominant, often conflicting, themes have pervaded public discourse and policy responses to
providing public assistance to poor families with children. One has been to help improve the
economic and social well-being of children who, through no fault of their own, live in poor
circumstances. The other has been reducing welfare dependency. A persistent challenge has been
how public policy and programs can address the first theme of reducing child poverty without
undermining the second by encouraging welfare dependency. A major goal of social policy over
at least the past 45 years, since passage of the 1967 Social Security Act welfare amendments, has
been to reduce welfare dependency and, as a consequence, child poverty, by encouraging work.
This report focuses on the results of efforts to attain these goals, focusing on female-headed
families with children.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
CRS analysis of 23 years of U.S. Census Bureau data1 presented in this report shows a dramatic
transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period. The period
examined encompasses a fundamental transformation in the provision of income support through
cash welfare to a system promoting and supplementing work. The period has been marked by
three recessions, one in the pre-welfare reform era (1990-1991), and two after (2001; 2007-
2009); the latter was so severe that it has come to be identified by many as “The Great
Recession.”2 Policy interventions to both stimulate the economy and protect those most
vulnerable in response to the most recent recession are examined in the context of their effects on
families headed by single mothers. The 23-year period examined provides for a range of insights
about social programs’ and policies’ effects, under varying economic conditions, on families
headed by single mothers—a group at considerable risk of poverty.3
A Road Map
The body of the report begins with a brief discussion as to why female-headed families with
children are a focus of policy concern. Most directly, children living in such families are many
times more likely to be poor than children in married-couple families. Moreover, the families in
which they reside are especially likely to depend on public assistance (i.e., welfare) for at least
part of their financial support.
The dual goals of reducing child poverty and breaking the bonds of welfare dependency have
proven to be an enduring, and often vexing, policy challenge. The report briefly describes the
policy landscape prior to 1996 welfare reform and policy changes that have occurred since—
especially those that were undertaken in response to the recent recession. A brief, 100-year
historical perspective as to how past policy efforts attempted to address the dual problems of
child poverty and welfare dependency is presented in Appendix A.
The report then turns to an empirical analysis of trends in single mothers’ work, welfare, and
poverty status over the 23-year period from 1987 to 2009. Trends in the incidence of poverty and
cash welfare receipt and work among single mothers are presented, as are trends in the cash
welfare receipt (ADC, AFDC, and TANF) and other selected benefits. Particular attention is paid
to the role of selected income sources on poverty reduction among single-mother families, overall
and by whether or not mothers worked during the year. Some sources of income are not included
in the “official” U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income. The analysis
shows that the inclusion of other income sources not included in the official measure, such as
1 Most data presented in this report are based on CRS analysis of 23 years of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS/ASEC). The CPS/ASEC is the
principal source for annual income, poverty, and health insurance coverage estimates issued by the Census Bureau. The
annual survey is a supplement to the monthly CPS conducted for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) used in
deriving monthly labor force statistics, such as the national unemployment rate. Estimates from the annual supplement,
conducted in February through April, represent characteristics at the time of the survey, and income, poverty, and
health insurance status in the previous year. The analysis is limited to survey data collected from 1988 through 2010
(the most recent available), representing income and poverty status from 1987 through 2009. The CPS/ASEC analysis
in this report is limited to the past 23 years due to relative consistency in design and content of the CPS/ASEC over the
period.
2 See, for example, Catherine Rampell, “‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology,” New York Times (internet edition),
March 11, 2009, available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/.
3 Single fathers and their children have received comparative little study, nor have they emerged as a matter of policy
concern, as have single mothers and their children.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Food Stamp or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits and refundable
federal income tax credits, have a significant effect on poverty reduction among single mothers
and their children. The inclusion of such benefits yields a very different picture as to the apparent
trend in poverty, especially when viewed in the context of the most recent recession.
A final section of the report offers a concluding discussion. It highlights the transformation from
income safety net to work-conditioned support, and cash welfare’s resulting residual safety net
role. It assesses the effectiveness of income safety net programs in reducing poverty among
female-headed families, especially in the context of the recent recession and selected
congressional action.
The report contains three appendices. Appendix A provides a brief history of the AFDC
program—the precursor to TANF. Appendix B examines under-reporting of cash welfare on the
CPS/ASEC relative to administrative benchmarks. Appendix C provides data underlying the
figures presented in the body of the report.
Female-Headed Families with Children—
A Policy Concern
Two dominant, often conflicting, themes have pervaded public discourse and policy responses to
providing public assistance to poor families with children. One has been to help improve the
economic and social well-being of children who, through no fault of their own, live in poor
circumstances. The other has been to reduce welfare dependency and to promote parental
responsibility and family self sufficiency. A persistent challenge has been how public policy and
programs can address the first theme of reducing child poverty without undermining the second
by encouraging welfare dependency.
Children living in families headed by single mothers with no spouse present are especially at risk
of being poor. In 2009, under the official U.S. poverty measure,4 about one-fifth of all children
were poor (20.5%), but among children living in single-mother families, over two-fifths (43.4%)
were poor, compared to about one-in-nine children (10.9%) living in married-couple families
(See Figure 1).5 In 2009, one-in-four children (25.2%) lived in female-headed families, but
children in such families accounted for over half (53.5%) of all poor children (see bottom panel
of Figure 1). About one-in-nine children (11.7%) live in families headed by single mothers who
have never been married; over half of all such children were poor in 2009 (51.8%), and they
accounted for three children out of 10 (29.5%) who were poor.
4 The official U.S. statistical poverty measure is based on families’ annual pre-tax income relative to family poverty
income thresholds, which vary by family size and composition. For example, in 2009, a family consisting of a single
mother with one child was considered poor if its annual pre-tax cash income was less than $14,787, and if she had two
children, she and her children would be considered poor if her family income was below $17,285. In turn, a married
couple with one child would be considered poor if the family’s income was less than $17,268, and if they had two
children, if its income was less than $21,756.
5 The definition of “children” used here represents dependent children under the age of 18 who are related to another
family member by birth or adoption. It excludes children who are unrelated to other household members, and excludes
persons under the age of 18 who themselves have a dependent child residing with them.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 1. Children’s Poverty Status by Family Living Arrangement, 2009
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-1 for
supporting data.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 2 shows the number of recipients (total, children, and adults) and cases (families, and
child-only cases) receiving cash assistance under AFDC (ADC, prior to 1962) from 1960 to 1994,
the eve of the 1996 welfare reform debate. The AFDC caseload was comprised almost entirely of
women with no husband present and their children.
Figure 2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Assistance Under AFDC,
1960 to 1994
(Annual monthly average, in millions)
Millions
15
Recipients
14
13
12
11
10
Children
9
8
7
6
5
Cas es
Adults
4
3
2
1
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Year
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/
data-reports/index.htm. See Table C-2 for supporting data.
The surge in recipients and cases over the course of the 1960s reflects a variety of factors,
including the baby boom generation entering adulthood; an increase in the number and share of
children living in female-headed families with a high likelihood of being poor; a rediscovery of
poverty in the United States and resultant efforts to address its causes and consequences; and
outreach efforts by government and organizations to aid the poor by helping to ensure that they
were treated fairly and received benefits to which they were entitled. Additionally, during the late
1960s and early 1970s, U.S. Supreme Court rulings overturned a number of state practices that
had denied providing assistance to entitled individuals. Thus, AFDC caseload growth over the
period reflected both a growth in the number of persons legally entitled to receive benefits and
also an increasing likelihood that legally entitled individuals would be granted benefits. From
1966 to 1971, the number of AFDC recipients would more than double, from 4.5 million to 10.2
million persons. By one estimate, by 1971 90% of families eligible to receive AFDC were
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
participating in the program, compared to only about 33% in the early 1960s.6 As the AFDC
caseload was increasing, Congress began taking action in an attempt to restrict its growth. Among
its provisions, amendments to the Social Security Act in 1967 sought to restrict AFDC caseload
growth through the establishment of work and training requirements for adult recipients, and an
effort to freeze federal matching payments to states with additional caseload growth attributable
to cases with an absent parent (i.e., other than widows, or disabled parents). (See Appendix A for
brief history of the AFDC program.)
Policy Landscape on the Eve of 1996 Welfare Reform
A variety of welfare reforms were already beginning to be implemented by states in the years
preceding the more sweeping reforms that would be allowed under the 1996 welfare reform law.
The Family Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485) extended work requirements (which could
include work preparation activities such as education and training) for mothers with a child as
young as six to mothers with a child as young as three and, at a state’s option, extended work
requirements to mothers with a child as young as age one. A number of states experimented with
changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted to the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS).7 Among the features of state programs tested under waiver
authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements, experiments requiring a “work first”
approach rather than “training first, followed by work,” time limits, strengthened sanctions for
noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare benefits for a new baby conceived or
born while a mother was receiving welfare. In addition, eligibility and funding for child care was
expanded, helping to make work possible for mothers who otherwise might have difficulty
finding affordable child care. The Family Support Act expanded eligibility for child care
assistance in the form of transitional child care assistance for families working their way off
AFDC, as well as for families “at risk” of qualifying for AFDC. In 1990, federally funded child
care assistance was extended to low-income families generally, not just those receiving or at risk
of receiving welfare, under the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG).
The number of cases and persons receiving AFDC remained relatively level during the 1970s and
most of the 1980s, but it began to rise again in 1989 just prior to the onset of an eight-month long
economic recession that was marked as beginning in July 19908 (see Figure 2, above). From
1988 to 1994, the number of persons receiving AFDC would increase by 30%—a much larger
increase than might be expected from the recession alone.9 The caseload increase contributed to
new calls for welfare reform—and welfare reform would once again move into the policy
spotlight.
6 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty, 1900-1985 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1986), p. 179.
7 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance of states with certain
sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or demonstrations that the Secretary judges to promote specific
objectives of the act.
8 Economic recessions are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating
Committee.
9 For analyses of AFDC caseload growth over this period, see CRS Report 93-7, Demographic Trends Affecting Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Caseload Growth, by Thomas Gabe (archived report, available to
congressional clients upon request ); also, Janice Peskin, Forecasting AFDC Caseloads, with an Emphasis on Economic
Factors, Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum, July 1993; and, Rebecca Blank, “What Causes Public
Assistance Caseloads to Grow?,” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 36, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 85-118.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Welfare Dependency as a Political Theme
In his January 1992 State of the Union Address before a joint session of Congress, President G. H.
W. Bush, who would be running for a second term as president, expressed his intention to make it
quicker and easier for states to restructure their welfare programs through the federal waiver
process:
Welfare was never meant to be a lifestyle. It was never meant to be a habit. It was never
supposed to be passed from generation to generation like a legacy. It’s time to replace the
assumptions of the welfare state and help reform the welfare system.
States throughout the country are beginning to operate with new assumptions that when able-
bodied people receive Government assistance, they have responsibilities to the taxpayer: A
responsibility to seek work, education, or job training; a responsibility to get their lives in
order; a responsibility to hold their families together and refrain from having children out of
wedlock; and a responsibility to obey the law. We are going to help this movement. Often,
State reform requires waiving certain Federal regulations. I will act to make that process
easier and quicker for every State that asks for our help.10
In September 1992, during a presidential campaign speech, candidate William J. Clinton pledged,
if elected, to “end welfare as we know it.” As reported in the New York Times, he stated:
The changing face of welfare and the changing nature of it, and the enormous barriers of
people moving from welfare to a productive life deserve special attention ... Especially now
that most people on welfare are young women and their little children.... By the time we’re
through, we shouldn’t have a welfare program in America ... We ought to have a helping
hand program followed by a jobs program.11
The previous day, the Clinton campaign began airing a campaign ad in which the candidate stated
his plan to “end welfare as we know it”:
For so long, Government has failed us, and one of its worst failures has been welfare. I have
a plan to end welfare as we know it, to break the cycle of welfare dependency. We’ll provide
education, job training and child care, but even those who are able must go to work, either in
the private sector or in public service.... It’s time to make welfare what it should be—a
second chance, not a way of life.”12
Nearly 20 welfare reform bills would be introduced in the 103rd Congress,13 but it was not until
June 1994, before the mid-term elections, that President Clinton would unveil his welfare reform
proposal, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 (S. 2224, H.R. 4605).
10 Available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1992_public_papers_vol1_text&docid=
pap_text-79.pdf.
11 Gwen Ifill, “Clinton Presses Welfare Overhaul, Stressing Job Training and Work,” New York Times, September 10,
1992, pp. A1, A19.
12 Richard L. Berke, “The Ad Campaign—Clinton: Getting People Off Welfare,” New York Times, September 10,
1992, p. A-19.
13 “House GOP Offers Descriptions Of Bills To Enact ‘Contract’.” In CQ Almanac 1994, 50th ed., 39-D-52-D.
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal94-843-25141-1102086.
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Three months later, House Republicans announced their Contract with America just six weeks
before the mid-term elections. The document, unveiled on September 27, 1994, included wide-
ranging provisions, including changes to House rules, and legislative proposals to address 10
policy domains ranging from fiscal responsibility, crime, national security, and job creation to
welfare reform, among others. In the introduction to the welfare reform provisions, the Contract
viewed the issue as follows:
Isn't it time for the government to encourage work rather than rewarding dependency? The
Great Society has had the unintended consequence of snaring millions of Americans into the
welfare trap. Government programs designed to give a helping hand to the neediest of
Americans have instead bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty. Our Contract
with America will change this destructive social behavior by requiring welfare recipients to
take personal responsibility for the decisions they make. Our Contract will achieve what
some thirty years of massive welfare spending has not been able to accomplish: reduce
illegitimacy, require work, and save taxpayers money.14
The Contract’s welfare proposal, the Work Opportunity Act of 1995, was introduced as H.R. 4 on
January 4, 1995, the first day of the 104th Congress.
EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay”
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), first introduced in 1975, was meant to help offset social
security (FICA15) taxes paid by workers with lower earnings. Since then, the EITC has become an
important policy tool in helping to encourage work. Legislated expansions to the credit over the
years have increased the size and scope of the credit, extending its reach to higher earned income
levels. As a supplement to families with low earnings, the EITC not only helps offset FICA
payroll taxes and federal income taxes families would otherwise pay, but it also helps to offset
some of the “implicit taxes” families face as public assistance benefits are reduced when their
income increases. As a refundable tax credit, the EITC provides payments to qualified individuals
with no federal income tax liability. Over the period examined in this report, the EITC was
expanded both under the G.H.W. Bush Administration in 1990 (phased-in in 1991 and 1992), and
early in the first term of the Clinton Administration in 1993 (phased-in from 1994 through 1996).
By 1996, the expanded EITC was providing a “work bonus” to families with children, amounting
to as much as 34 cents on each dollar earned for a low-income family with one child, and as much
as 40 cents for a family with two or more. The EITC expansions early in President Clinton’s first
term were the centerpiece of part of a policy of “making work pay”—that people who work
shouldn’t be poor—and a critical first step towards the President’s campaign promise to “end
welfare as we know it” by moving people off public cash assistance and into work.
TANF and Other Policies in the Post-AFDC Era
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), signed into law in 1996 as part of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193),
replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal
14 “Welfare Reform,” in Contract with America : the bold plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the
House Republicans to change the nation, ed. Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas (New York: Times Books, 1994), p. 65.
15 Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes.
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entitlement program to low-income families with children. TANF eliminated the federal
entitlement to assistance that existed under AFDC, replacing an open-ended matching grant
program with a fixed-dollar block grant program (with the possible addition of recession-related
contingency funds). States must maintain spending levels equal to 75% of what they spent on
AFDC at the time the program was repealed—a provision known as State Maintenance of Effort
(MOE). Adults must be engaged in approved “work activities” within two years of initial TANF
receipt, subject to sanction for noncompliance. Under TANF, federal work participation standards
(i.e., “work-requirements”) apply to states’ TANF caseloads. As such, states are required to have
50% of families, and 90% of two-parent families, engaged in “work” or they will be at risk of
having their block grant reduced.16 TANF gives states increased flexibility to design programs to
assist needy families with children compared to its predecessor program, but with fixed federal
dollars. A major goal of TANF is to end dependence of needy families on government assistance
by limiting the time they may receive assistance and by promoting job preparation, work, and
marriage. TANF law imposes a maximum five-year lifetime limit on receipt of federally funded
assistance,17 and allows states to impose shorter limits than the maximum.
States have implemented a wide range of policy options and program approaches in the design of
their TANF programs. Many of their programs have evolved from approaches first experimented
with under federal waiver authority in the pre-TANF era. Cash welfare under the AFDC program
was an entitlement, though states were allowed to set income-eligibility levels and the size of
cash benefits, which, under the program, varied widely among them. Since passage of TANF,
states’ cash welfare programs have evolved over time, becoming more complex and diverging
from the cash assistance rules in place under AFDC. States’ TANF policies vary widely in
determining who is eligible for assistance, the benefits they receive, the behavioral requirements
recipients must meet, and the duration they may receive assistance. States’ cash welfare policies
are described elsewhere.18 Since the passage of TANF, most states have increased financial work
incentives for families receiving cash assistance by allowing families to keep more of their cash
welfare benefit as their earnings increase.19 Additionally, as was the case before welfare reform,
most states have allowed inflation to substantially erode the real value of welfare benefits over
time, diminishing the value of welfare relative to work.20
16 A state’s work participation requirement may be reduced for specified reasons (e.g., reductions in a state’s caseload
“caseload reduction credit,” or states spent more than that required by TANF’s MOE). See CRS Report RL32760, The
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, by Gene
Falk.
17 Up to 20% of the TANF caseload can be extended to receive assistance beyond five years due to “hardship,” as
defined by the states. See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant:
A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk.
18 See, for example, the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, on the Internet at http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/
WRDWelcome.cfm.
19 For a discussion of changes in work incentives under TANF compared to AFDC, see CRS Report RL30579, Welfare
Reform: Financial Eligibility Rules and Cash Assistance Amounts under TANF, by Craig Abbey (archived report,
available upon request).
20 Maximum TANF benefits available for a family of three in the median state in July 2008 were 36% below the
maximum level available to a family under AFDC in July 1988, after adjusting for the effects of price inflation. In July
1988, the maximum benefit level in the median state amounted to 45% of the Department of Health and Human
Services Federal Poverty Guidelines (FPL), but by 2008, only 29%. In 1988, the maximum benefit ranged from a low
of 14.6% of FPL (Alabama) to 82.1% of FPL (California). By 2008, the maximum benefit ranged from a low of 11.6%
of FPL (Mississippi) to a high of 50.3% of FPL (Alaska). Author’s estimates based on data from U.S. Congress, House
Committee on Ways and Means, 2008 Green Book, Section 7—Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 111th
Cong., Table 7-22, pp. 49-50, available on the internet at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/tanf.pdf; and
(continued...)
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States may use both federal and state MOE dollars for a wide range of activities, other than the
provision of “cash assistance.”21 In FY2009, only 28% of total federal TANF and state (MOE)
dollars under the program went toward basic cash assistance. When administrative costs and work
activities are added to basic cash assistance—the three spending categories most commonly
associated with “welfare”—those expenditures accounted for less than half (42%) of total TANF
spending in FY2009. States have also redirected funds previously used to provide cash assistance
to pay for child care, either directly or by transferring funds to the child care block grant. In
FY2009, 18% of all TANF funds used were either expended on child care or transferred to the
Child Care Development Fund (CCDF). TANF is also a major contributor to the child welfare
system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with children
who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect. It should be
noted that among state and federal TANF spending, only those dollars provided as “cash
assistance” are included as income for poverty measurement purposes, although dollars expended
for other purposes, such as child care, may help to indirectly reduce poverty by making it
“affordable” for a parent to work.
Other Federal and State Policies that Encourage Work
In addition to policy changes described above, a variety of other policies implemented at both the
federal and state levels have served to reward work. Over the period examined in this report, the
minimum wage was increased six times—three times in the pre-welfare reform era and three
times since.22 Moreover, in 29 states state minimum wages exceeded the federal minimum wage
in one or more years over the period.23 Many states have implemented state earned income tax
credits (SEITC), which piggyback on the federal EITC. In most cases, states structure their
SEITC as a percentage of the federal EITC. In tax year 2000, for example, 14 states and the
District of Columbia had SEITCs, and in 10 of those jurisdictions, the credit was fully refundable.
By tax year 2010, 23 states and the District of Columbia had SEITCs, and in 19 of those
jurisdictions the credit was fully refundable.24
(...continued)
Gretchen Rowe and Mary Murphy, Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2008, The Urban Institute,
Washington, DC, August 2009, Table L5, Maximum Monthly Benefit for A Family of Three with No income, August
2009, pp. 184-185, http://anfdata.urban.org/databooks/Databook%202008%20FINAL.pdf.
21 See CRS Report RL32760, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to
Frequently Asked Questions, by Gene Falk.
22 The federal minimum wage increased from $3.35 per hour to $3.80 per hour, effective April 1990, to $4.25 per hour,
effective April 1991, to $4.75 per hour, effective October 1996, $5.15 per hour, effective September 1997, $5.85 per
hour, effective July 2007, and $6.65 per hour, effective July 2008. In July 2009, the minimum wage was increased to
$7.25 per hour. For an analysis of possible effects of minimum wage increases on welfare participation, see Mark
Turner, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Welfare Recipiency, paper presented at the National Association for Welfare
Research and Statistics, August 1998.
23 U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Employment
Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2011, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm.
24 For tax year 2010 see Erica Williams, Nicholas Johnson, and Jon Shure, State Earned Income Tax Credits: 2010
Legislative Update, Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, December 9, 2010, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?
fa=view&id=2987. For earlier tax years, see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/Excel/state_eitc.xls.
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Child Support Enforcement25
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program
(Title IV-D of the Social Security Act). The CSE program is funded with both state and federal
dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides
incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program goals.26
The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) locating absent
parents, (2) establishing paternity, (3) establishing child support orders, (4) reviewing and
modifying child support orders, (5) collecting child support payments, (6) distributing child
support payments, and (7) establishing and enforcing support for children’s medical needs.
The CSE program has the potential to impact more children and for longer periods of time than
most other federal programs. In many cases, the CSE program may interact with parents and
children for 18 years.
One of the original purposes of the CSE program was to recover from noncustodial parents some
of the costs of providing cash welfare to their children’s families. Families receiving cash
assistance must assign (legally turn-over) to the state their rights to child support collections.
These collections are split between the federal government and the states to recover the costs of
providing cash assistance. States have options to pay some or all of such collections to families
directly, but are not required to do so.
Over the last 10-15 years, the CSE program has expanded its mission beyond its initial welfare
cost-recovery goal to focus on providing its clients with more effective and efficient CSE services
and fostering parental responsibility. The 1996 welfare reform law established some new systems
for tracking down and enforcing the obligations of noncustodial parents to pay child support. It
also established a “family first” policy, sending more collected child support on behalf of families
that formerly received cash assistance directly to the family. These policy changes, combined
with the decline in cash assistance rolls, have resulted in the bulk of CSE collections going
directly to families. In FY2010, the CSE program collected $26.6 billion in child support
payments from noncustodial parents and served 15.9 million child support cases. Of the $26.5
25 This section is based on CRS Report RS22380, Child Support Enforcement: Program Basics, by Carmen Solomon-
Fears; CRS Report RL34203, Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues,
by Carmen Solomon-Fears; and, CRS Report R41431, Child Well-Being and Noncustodial Fathers, by Carmen
Solomon-Fears, Gene Falk, and Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara.
26 The federal government reimburses each state 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE activities. The federal
government’s funding is “open-ended” in that it pays its percentage of expenditures by matching the amounts spent by
state and local governments with no upper limit or ceiling. The federal government also provides incentive payments to
states to encourage them to operate effective programs. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments
back into the CSE program or related activities. In addition to state and federal matching funds and incentive payments,
states collect child support on behalf of families receiving AFDC/TANF to reimburse themselves (and the federal
government) for the cost of AFDC/TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires families who receive
AFDC/TANF cash assistance to assign their child support rights to the state in order to receive AFDC/TANF. In
addition, such families must cooperate with the state if necessary to establish paternity and secure child support. CSE
collections on behalf of families receiving AFDC/TANF cash benefits are used to reimburse state and federal
governments for AFDC/TANF payments made to the family (i.e., child support payments go to the state instead of the
family, except for amounts that states choose to “pass through” to the family as additional income that does not affect
TANF eligibility or benefit amounts). Additionally, states may charge application fees and apply recovered costs from
nonwelfare families to help finance their CSE programs.
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billion collected in child support payments, about 93% went to families, 6% went to state and
federal governments, and 1% consisted of medical support payments or fees paid to states.
Policies Addressing Marriage and Childbearing27
Among TANF’s four stated goals, three relate directly to marriage and childbearing (italics
added, below). States may spend TANF funds on a wide range of activities for cash welfare
recipients and other families towards achieving these goals.
TANF’s Four Goals
“(1) Provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives;
(2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and
(4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.”
Since TANF became law, a number of federal, state, and local initiatives have been undertaken in
the attempt to reduce nonmarital childbearing, to promote responsible fatherhood, and healthy
marriage. Policy initiatives seek to reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancy, through abstinence
education, comprehensive sex education programs, and youth programs. Other programs focus on
promoting healthy marriage generally through public advertising campaigns on the value of
marriage, and more targeted efforts at providing “social skills” education and training (e.g.,
marriage education, conflict resolution, and relationship skills,) to couples interested in marriage,
or who are already married. Responsible fatherhood programs are intended to connect or
reconnect children to their noncustodial parents, with the hope of improving the prospects of
children being raised in single parent families.
Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions
It is useful to view the policy changes discussed above in context of prevailing economic
conditions. Over the 23 years examined, the country experienced three economic recessions. The
first, lasting 8 months (July 1990 to March 1991), occurring well before welfare reform, was
followed by the longest period of economic expansion in the post-World War II era. The
expansion ended with a second 8-month long recession (March to November of 2001), well after
passage and state implementation of new welfare reform rules. More recently the economy is
recovering from the longest and deepest recession in the post-World War II era, having lasted 18
months (from December 2007 to June 2009). The unemployment rate, after having peaked at
10.1% in 2009, has only slowly improved, and is not expected to approach a “natural level” until
2016.28 Given the depth and duration of the most recent recession, Congress passed a wide range
27 For a discussion of issues and policies and programs relating to this topic see CRS Report RL34756, Nonmarital
Childbearing: Trends, Reasons, and Public Policy Interventions, by Carmen Solomon-Fears.
28 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that it will not be until 2016 that the U.S. unemployment rate will
reach 5.3%, near what the agency estimates as the natural rate of unemployment of 5.2% (the rate of unemployment
arising from all sources except fluctuations in aggregate demand). See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and
(continued...)
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of provisions under economic stimulus and recovery legislation to bolster the economy and to
help support low- and middle-income families and individuals.
Tax Rebates and Credits
A number of policy interventions were undertaken in response to the most recent recession, to
both stimulate the economy, as well as to cushion the most economically vulnerable. Under
provisions in the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-185), single and head-of-household
tax filers, such as single mothers, who had filed federal income taxes in 2007 became eligible to
receive a minimum tax rebate in 2008 of $300 ($600 for married joint filers) if their 2007 earned
income (plus any Social Security benefits, tier 1 railroad retirement, and veteran’s disability
payments) was at least $3,000, and up to $600 ($1,200 for married joint filers) to the extent of
their 2008 tax liability. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (P.L. 111-5)
provided rebates of up to $400 for single and head-of-household tax filers, and up to $800 for
joint filers, in 2009, by reducing FICA tax withholding.
The Emergency and Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) (P.L. 110-343) included a
provision that temporarily lowered the income limit for receipt of the refundable portion of the
Child Tax Credit29 (CTC), which is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as the
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), to distinguish it from the nonrefundable portion of the
CTC. Refundable credits, such as the ACTC and EITC, extend benefits to tax filers even though
they owe no taxes. For the 2008 tax year, EESA effectively lowered the ACTC refundable income
limit from $12,050, to $8,500. ARRA further temporarily expanded eligibility for the ACTC to
tax filers with earnings of $3,000 or more for tax years 2009 and 2010. The refundable income
limits set a lower threshold at which tax filers may begin to receive the refundable ACTC. A tax
filer with a qualifying child could receive a “refund” amounting to 15 cents on every dollar
earned above the refundable income threshold, up to a maximum credit amount of $1,000 per
qualifying child. Under the EESA, a single mother with earned income of $12,050 became
eligible for an ACTC of $532.50 in 2008, whereas absent the EESA provisions she would have
received nothing. In 2009, under the ARRA provisions, a single parent with one child and having
annual earnings in excess over $3,000 may be eligible for the credit, and eligible for the full
$1,000 credit once her earned income reaches $9,667.30 Absent the legislative changes noted
above, she would not have begun to become eligible for the credit until her earned income
exceeded $12,550, and would not have been eligible for the full $1,000 credit until her income
reached $19,217.31
Under ARRA certain ACTC provisions were set to expire at the end of the 2010 tax year. Among
other things, expiring provisions would have caused the maximum allowable credit to revert from
$1,000 to $500 per qualifying child, and for credit refundability to extend only to families with
three or more qualifying children. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and
(...continued)
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2011 to 2021, January 2011, p. XII, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/120xx/doc12039/01-
26_FY2011Outlook.pdf.
29 For a discussion see CRS Report RL34715, The Child Tax Credit, by Maxim Shvedov.
30 $3,000 + ($1,000/.15) = $9,667.
31 $12,550 + ($1,000/.15) = $19,217.
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Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extends the ARRA ACTC provisions through tax year
2012.
ARRA also temporarily raised the EITC credit rate for tax years 2009 and 2010 from 40% for
families with two or more qualifying children to 45% for families with three or more qualifying
children. In 2009, for a single parent with three or more children, the maximum available credit
under ARRA increased to $5,657, from what otherwise would have been $5,028 absent ARRA.
The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L.
111-312) extended the ARRA EITC provisions through tax year 2012.
Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Unemployment Compensation (UC) under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system typically
provides up to 26 weeks of unemployment compensation covering a portion of lost wages to
qualified covered workers who become eligible due to job loss.32 Under the permanent Extended
Benefits (EB) program, unemployment compensation may be extended for an additional 13 or 20
weeks to workers in qualifying states with high unemployment. Both UC and EB payments to
workers are funded jointly through federal and state taxes on employers. Additionally, as in some
past recessions, Congress funded a temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program
(EUC08, P.L. 110-252), which began in 2008.33 Under the EB and EUC08 programs,
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits have been extended from a maximum 26 weeks under the
UC program, up to a maximum of 60 to 99 weeks, depending on states’ circumstances.
Additionally, ARRA made several changes to Unemployment Compensation (UC) to assist
individuals who become unemployed.34 It provided a temporary supplemental benefit increase of
$25 per week under all UC programs (UC, EB, EUC08, and others35), payable until July 2010,
and excluded $2,400 in UC benefits from gross income under the federal income tax for 2009.
ARRA also provided $7 billion in incentives to states to modify their basis for computing UC
benefits and for extending benefits to currently ineligible individuals. Two-thirds of the $7 billion
available to states is contingent on states first adopting an alternative method of determining
eligibility for individuals who do not qualify under the regular method, based on their wage and
employment history. The states could then be eligible for the remaining two-thirds of the $7
billion if they adopt at least two of the following four provisions:
1. permit former part-time workers to seek part-time work;
32 For a thorough discussion of the UI system, see CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and
Benefits, by Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker.
33 EUC08 benefits are fully federally funded out of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) and from general
funds. Since originally passed into law, authorization for the EUC08 program has been extended a number of times—
most recently on December, 17, 2010, when the President signed P.L. 111-312, the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, which extended the EUC08 program’s authorization until
January 3, 2012.
34 See CRS Report R40368, Unemployment Insurance Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, by Alison M. Shelton, and Julie M. Whittaker, and CRS Report RS21356, Taxation of Unemployment Benefits,
by Julie M. Whittaker.
35 Other UC programs include unemployment benefits for former U.S. military service members (UCX program),
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits, workers who lose their jobs because of international competition
who receive additional or supplemental support through the Trade Adjustment Act (TAA) programs.
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2. permit voluntary separations from employment for compelling family reasons,
which must include (i) domestic violence, (ii) illness or disability of an
immediate family member, and (iii) the need to accompany a spouse who is
relocating for employment;
3. provide extended compensation to UC recipients in qualifying training programs
for high demand occupations; or
4. provide dependents’ allowances to UC recipients with dependents.
Upon accepting the federal incentive payments, states are required to maintain the adopted
changes after the incentive payments expire. The above provisions could especially assist single
mothers who whose job attachment has been sporadic or limited to part-time employment due to
competing family responsibilities.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp)
Benefits
ARRA raised maximum benefit amounts under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program), effective in April 2009.36 ARRA effectively increased
maximum monthly SNAP benefits by 13.6%, as a replacement for annual benefit adjustments
based on annual food-price inflation. As a result, average household benefits (typically less than
the maximum) were boosted by more than 15%. Under current funding levels, ARRA SNAP
benefit increases are projected to be maintained until October 31, 2013, at which time SNAP
benefit adjustments will revert back to annual adjustment based on food-price inflation, as
specified in SNAP law.
Other Social Policies
ARRA also included provisions that added a new temporary “emergency contingency fund”
under TANF for FY2009 and FY2010, which allowed states receiving extra federal grants to
cover 80% of increased recession-related costs in those two years.37 Recession-related costs are
defined as increased basic assistance (for states with increased basic assistance caseloads), non-
recurrent short-term benefits, or subsidized employment expenditures.
Other ARRA provisions may also directly help single mothers.38 For example, expanded funding
for child care for low-income working families might help single mothers secure and retain
employment, and increased federal incentive payments to states to run effective child support
enforcement programs may help states’ efforts to establish and maintain absent parents’ child
support obligations.
36 See CRS Report R41374, Reducing SNAP (Food Stamp) Benefits Provided by the ARRA: P.L. 111-226 and P.L. 111-
296, by Joe Richardson, Jim Monke, and Gene Falk.
37 CRS Report R40211 , Human Services Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, by Gene Falk et
al (archived). Also see CRS Report R41078, The TANF Emergency Contingency Fund, by Gene Falk.
38 CRS Report R40211, op. cit.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-
Headed Families with Children
A dramatic transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status has occurred over
the 23-year period examined in this report. The period has seen a marked structural change in the
provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the fabric of the nation’s
“income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over the period, in
part response to structural changes to income “safety net” programs, with more mothers working,
and fewer relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their children in the post welfare
reform era, than before.
Figure 3 completes the administrative data series presented earlier (Figure 2) through 2010. The
figure shows a dramatic decline in the number of recipients (total, adults and children) receiving
AFDC/TANF after having reached an historic peak in 1993. In 1993, 14.2 million persons were
receiving ADFC in the average month; by 2008, the number receiving TANF had fallen to 4
million, a decline of 10.2 million persons from 2003, comprised of 6.5 million fewer children and
3.7 million fewer adults. In 2008, the number of persons receiving cash aid under TANF was the
lowest since 1963, when 3.9 million received assistance under AFDC. Reflecting the effects of
the most recent recession, the number of persons receiving TANF has increased from 4.0 million
in 2008, to 4.6 million in 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 3. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Assistance
Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2010
(Annual Monthly Average, in Millions)
Millions
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
Recipients
4
Children
3
2
Cas es
Adults
1
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Year
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/index.htm. See Table C-2 for supporting data.
Note: Separate estimates for children and adults are not available from 1997 to 1999 due to changes in state
reporting requirements during the transition from AFDC to TANF.
Moreover, since welfare reform, poverty among children living in female-headed households39
has also fallen significantly. Figure 4 shows that the incidence of poverty among children in
female-headed households fell from 55.4% in 1991, to 39.3% by 2001, representing the largest
ten-year decline in poverty among such children since that which commenced in the early 1960s.
The poverty rate of children in female-headed families has risen consequent to two recessions
since 2001, reaching a recent high of 44.4% in 2009. Since 1996 welfare reform, progress appears
to have been largely sustained in both reducing welfare dependency and poverty among children
in female-headed families, in spite of the recent recession.
39 Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS definition of
female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey
(CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 4. Poverty Rate of Children Under Age 18
in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present), 1960 to 2009
(Percent poor)
Percent Poor
80%
1963,
70.9%
70%
1970,
58.7%
1982,
1991,
60%
56.1%
55.4%
1996,
49.3%
50%
2009,
1974,
1989,
44.4%
51.5%
1979,
51.1%
48.6%
40%
2001,
39.3%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Ye ar
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Census Bureau historical
series, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html, “Table 10. Related
Children in Female Householder Families, by Poverty Status.” See Table C-3 for supporting data.
Notes: Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS
definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current
Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
The remainder of this report focuses primarily on single mothers, as single mothers have been a
primary focus of social policy. Untangling the effects of demographic factors, the economy,
welfare policy and other policy interventions on single mothers’ work behavior, welfare receipt,
income, and poverty status, is beyond the scope of this report. Others have attempted to parcel out
these effects with mixed success and differing conclusions as to the relative impacts of each.40 In
contrast to these efforts, the remainder of this report provides a descriptive analysis of U.S.
40 See, for example Council of Economic Advisors, Technical Report: The Effects of Welfare Policy and the Economic
Expansion on Welfare Caseloads: An Update, A Report by the Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, DC,
August 1999; James P. Ziliak, David N. Figlio, and Elizabeth E. Davis, et al., “Accounting for the Decline in AFDC
Caseloads, Welfare Reform or the Economy?,” The Journal of Human Resources, vol. XXXV, no. 3, pp. 570-586;
Robert A. Moffitt, “The Effect of Pre-PRWORA Waivers on AFDC Caseloads and Female Earnings, Income, and
Labor Force Behavior,” in Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform, ed. Sheldon Danziger (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999); June E. O’Neill and Anne M. Hill, Gaining Ground? Measuring the
Impact of Welfare Reform on Welfare and Work, Manhattan Institute, Civic Report No. 17, New York, New York,
2001; Caroline Danielson and Jacob Alex Klerman, “Did Welfare Reform Cause the Caseload Decline,” Social Service
Review, vol. 82, no. 4 (December 2008), pp. 703-730.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Census Bureau CPS/ASEC data, with the goal of increasing understanding of changes in single
mothers’ welfare, work, income and poverty status that have occurred over the past 23 years.
Number of Families Headed by Single Mothers
Over the 23-year period examined, the number of single-mother families increased from 8.2
million in 1987 to 11.0 million in 2009 (Figure 5). The total number of single mothers increased
from 8.4 million in 1989 to about 9.9 million in 1993, an increase of 1.5 million, or 17%. From
1993 through 2000, the number of single mothers remained fairly stable, ranging between 9.7
million and 10.1 million. Since 2000, the number of single mothers has increased by 1.3 million,
from 9.7 million in 2000 to 11.0 million in 2009. The overall increase in single-mother families
has largely been due to an increase in single mothers who have never been married. From 1987 to
2009, the number of never-married single mothers increased from 2.7 million to 5.2 million, an
increase of 2.5 million, or 94%, over the period. In contrast, the number of separated mothers (no
spouse present) increased by 232,000, a 13% increase, and the number of divorced mothers
increased by 203,000, a 6% increase; the number of widowed mothers fell by 175,000, a 30%
decrease. In contrast, the number of married-couple families with children increased by 406,000,
a 2% increase, over the period (not shown in the figure).
Figure 5. Number of Single-Mother Families, by Mothers’ Marital Status,
1987 to 2009
(Number in millions)
Number (in millions)
11
All single-mother families
10
9
8
7
6
Never married
5
4
Divorced
3
2
Separated, spouse absent
1
Widowed
0
7
9
0
2
3
5
6
8
9
1
2
4
5
7
8
198 1988 198 199 1991 199 199 1994 199 199 1997 199 199 2000 200 200 2003 200 200 2006 200 200 2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-4
for supporting data.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Incidence of Poverty by Mothers’ Marital Status
The incidence of poverty among families headed by single mothers fell substantially from a peak
of 45.4% of all single-mother families in 1992 and 1993 to an historic low for the 23-year period
of 31.8% in 2000 (Figure 6). Since 2000, poverty rates for single mothers have increased, but
still remain well below levels of the early 1990s. The poverty rate among single-mother families
rose to 34.9% by 2004, consequent to an 8 month-long recession (March to November 2001 and
continued to drift upwards, until more sharply increasing, to 37.6% in 2009, consequent to a deep
18 month-long recession (December 2007 to June 2009). Poverty rates are highest among never-
married mothers, followed by separated mothers (no spouse present) and widowed and divorced
mothers. Poverty rates of single mothers are several times that of married mothers. Poverty rates
for never-married, separated, and divorced mothers fell substantially over the 1990s, reaching
historic lows by the beginning of the next decade. (Note: the wide variability in the poverty rate
among widowed mothers over the period reflects sample variation relating to the comparatively
small sample of such mothers represented on the CPS/ASEC.)
Figure 6. Poverty Rates by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2009
(Percent poor)
Poverty rate (percent poor)
60.0%
50.0%
Never married
Separated, spouse absent
40.0%
All single-mother families
30.0%
Widowed
Divorced
20.0%
10.0%
Married, husband present
0.0%
87
88
89
0
91
92
93
94
5
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
8
09
19
19
19
199
19
19
19
19
199
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
200
20
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-4
for supporting data.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt Among Single Mothers
CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance (GA)41)
among single mothers during the late 1980s and early 1990s and a decrease in the mid- to late-
1990s. The CPS data generally correspond to the caseload rise and fall documented by
administrative program data, but underestimate the caseload statistics to some extent.42 Figure 7
shows that the number of single mothers in families reporting receipt of cash welfare on the CPS
increased from 2.5 million in 1989 to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase of 900,000, or 36%, over
the four-year period. Compared to 1993, the peak year of welfare receipt, the number of single
mothers reporting cash welfare was down to under 1 million (967,000) in 2009—a 72% decline
from 1993 (the bottom-shaded portion of the figure).43 The CPS/ASEC data show very little if
any take-up in receipt of cash welfare by single mothers in response to the most recent recession,
and little if any take-up in cash welfare in response to the one preceding it. This differs from the
administrative data presented earlier (Figure 3) which showed a modest increase in the TANF
caseload from 2008 to 2009. From 1993 to 2009, the number of poor single mothers who reported
receiving no cash welfare increased from 1.722 million in 1993 to 3.408 million in 2009, nearly
doubling over the period (the middle-shaded area of the figure).
41 The CPS/ASEC data groups any General Assistance individuals or families may have received with AFDC and
TANF. GA programs are financed and administered at the state, county, or local level, and are generally used to meet
the needs of people who are ineligible for federally funded cash assistance (e.g., AFDC/TANF, SSI) or are awaiting
approval for such benefits. In 1998, 35 states and the District of Columbia had GA programs. See L. Jerome Gallagher,
Cori E. Uccello, and Alicia B. Pierce, et al., State General Assistance Programs 1998, The Urban Institute, Assessing
the New Federalism, Discussion Paper 99-01, Washington, DC, April 1999, http://www.urban.org/publications/
409066.html.
42 See Appendix B, which compares CPS estimates to AFDC/TANF caseload counts.
43 Administrative caseload statistics show the caseload as peaking in March 1994, with nearly 5.1 million cases. In
December 2007, at the onset of the recession, the caseload stood at 1.653 million, or only about one-third the level of
its March 1994 peak. By December 2009, the caseload had increased somewhat from that of two years earlier, to 1.860
million, a 12.5% increase.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 7. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt,
1987 to 2009
Number (in millions)
11
10
9
8
Neither poor nor receiving cash welfare
7
6
5
4
3
Poor, but not receiving cash welfare
2
Receiving cash welfare,
including those who are not poor
1
0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-5
for supporting data.
Note: Welfare is cash welfare in the form of AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance.
Work, Poverty, and Cash Welfare Receipt of Single Mothers
Figure 8 provides an overview of single mothers’ welfare, work and poverty status from 1987 to
2009. The figure shows that since 1993, the share of single mothers who worked at some time
during the year has increased markedly and that the share who received cash welfare (AFDC,
TANF, or GA) has declined significantly, as has the share who are poor under the official poverty
definition. The figure illustrates that while both cash welfare recipiency rates and poverty rates
for single mothers have generally fallen since 1993, single mothers’ welfare recipiency rate has
fallen faster than their poverty rate. More recently, since 2000, the poverty rate of single mothers
has increased, but cash welfare receipt has not—a growing share of single mothers are poor under
the official poverty measure, but receive no cash welfare assistance. This suggests that TANF and
other policies implemented in the mid-1990s (e.g., EITC expansion) may have had a lasting
behavioral impact on reducing the incidence of cash welfare receipt among families headed by
single mothers.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 8. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers,
1987 to 2009
Percent
100.0%
Single mothers who worked
90.0%
at any time during the year
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
Poverty rate
40.0%
30.0%
Received cash welfare but
Received cash welfare
20.0%
did not work during year
during the year
10.0%
Worked and received cash
welfare during the year
0.0%
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
99
00
01
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
1998
19
20
20
2002
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-6
for supporting data.
Note: Welfare is cash welfare in the form of AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance.
Single Mothers’ Employment
While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single mothers’ employment have occurred
since 1993. Figure 9 shows employment rates of single and married mothers by age of youngest
child in March, from 1988 to 2010. The chart shows that gaps that had existed between single and
married mothers’ employment have been virtually eliminated in recent years, with single mothers
now being as, and in some cases more, likely than their married counterparts to be working.
Over the period, the increase in employment among single mothers with young children has been
most dramatic. Among mothers with a child under the age of 3, their employment rate increased
from a recent low of 35.1% in March 1993 to a high of 59.1% in March 2000, a 24 percentage
point increase over the period. Their employment rate fell to 53.7% in March 2005 but rebounded
to 57.0% in March 2006, marking a recent high; it has since fallen, to 52.9% in March 2009.
Single mothers with a youngest child aged 3-5 also experienced marked employment gains over
the mid-to-late 1990s. Their employment rate grew from a recent low of 54.1% in March 1992, to
72.7% by March 2000, an 18.6 percentage point increase over the period. In March 2008, their
employment rate stood at 68.5%, but by March 2010 had fallen to 59.7%—13 percentage points
below its March 2000 peak, with over two-thirds of the decline having occurred since March
2007. Single mothers whose youngest child was of school age (age 6-17) had employment rates
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
about equal to those of their married counterparts over the 1988-2010 period. In March 2010, the
employment rate of single mothers with school age children stood at 70.7%—8.4 percentage
points below a peak employment rate of 79.1% in 2001.
Figure 9. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers,
by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2010
Percent
100%
90%
80%
Age 6 to 17
70%
60%
Age 3 to 5
Unde r age 3
50%
40%
30%
Married mothers
Single mothers
20%
10%
0%
9
2
4
6
9
1
4
6
9
1988 198
1990 1991 199
1993 199
1995 199
1997 1998
199
2000 200
2002 2003 200
2005 200
2007 2008 200
2010
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-7
for supporting data.
Unemployment Rates Across the Business Cycle
Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, the unemployment rate of women maintaining
families has increased from a recent low of 6.2% in August 2007, just prior to the recession’s
onset, to 11.7% in June 2009, the recession’s official end-date (see Figure 10). Over a year past
the recession’s end, the unemployment rate of women maintaining families rose further, to a most
recent high of 13.4% in July and August 2010. The annual average unemployment rate among
women maintaining families increased from 6.5% in 2007, to 8.0% in 2008, 11.5% in 2009, and
to 12.3% in 2010. Whereas poverty estimates for 2010 won’t be available until the fall of 2011,
persistently high unemployment rates among women maintaining families in 2010 suggest that
the incidence of “official” poverty among single mothers and their children in 2010 may eclipse
that experienced in 2009. Given the pace of economic recovery, poverty among single mothers
and their children may remain above pre-recession levels for some years to come.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 10. Unemployment Rate of Women Maintaining Families,
January 1987 through June 2011
(Rates not seasonally adjusted)
Unemployment Rate
Aug-10
14%
13.4%
Jun-11
13%
12.8%
Aug-92
12%
11.4%
11%
Jul-96
9.7%
10%
Mar-03
9.0%
9%
8%
7%
Apr-90
7.2%
Dec-95,
6%
Aug-07
6.6%
6.2%
5%
Dec-00
4%
4.5%
3%
Economic Recessions
2%
1%
0%
Jan-
Jan- Jan-
Jan-
Jan- Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan- Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan- Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan- Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
Jan-
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
M onth and Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
data. See Table C-8 for supporting data.
Notes: Economic recessions: July 1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June
2009. Economic recessions are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle
Dating Committee.
Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status
There is a greater likelihood today than in years past that a poor single mother will be working,
rather than receiving welfare. Changes in poor mothers’ participation in work and welfare status
first became evident in the early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of employment increasing after 1992
(solid green line, Figure 11) and rates of welfare receipt declining after 1993 (solid orange line,
Figure 11). A crossover point was reached by 1996, when the chances that a poor single mother
would be working exceeded the chances that she would be receiving welfare. The initial decline
in welfare receipt, and increase in work among poor single mothers coincides with an economy
recovering from recession, a phasing in of expanded EITC benefits that encouraged work (1994 –
1996), increased experimentation among states attempting to transform their cash welfare
programs through the section 1115 waiver process, and increased political messaging that
national welfare was looming on the horizon. The trend of declining welfare receipt and increased
work intensified further, after passage of national welfare reform legislation in 1996.
Figure 11 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash welfare at any time
during the year fell from just over 60% in the 1987-1993 period, to 17% in 2007 and 2009.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Welfare receipt among poor single mothers began to decline significantly after 1993, and even
more so after 1996. Similarly, the share of poor single mothers who were working at any time
during the year increased from around 44% in 1992, to a peak of 64% in 1999, but has dropped
since, to 52% in 2009.
The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare without working dropped from a
peak of 43% in 1991, to a low of 10% in 2007 (a 77% drop from the 1991 rate). The share who
worked without relying on cash welfare has increased from a recent low of nearly 25% in 1993,
to 46% in 2009. Poor single mothers who combined work and welfare over the year has fallen by
well over two-thirds from 1996 (20%) to 2009 (6%).
Figure 11. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year,
1987 to 2009
Percent
70%
60%
Worked during year
50%
Worked during year,
did not receive cash welfare
40%
Neither worked, nor received
cash welfare during the year
30%
20%
Received cash welfare
during the year
Received cash welfare
10%
during the year, did not work
Worked and received cash
welfare during the year
0%
8
1
3
5
7
0
2
4
9
1987 198
1989 1990 199
1992 199
1994 199
1996 199
1998 1999 200
2001 200
2003 200
2005 2006 2007 2008 200
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-9
for supporting data.
Poor single mothers who reported that they neither worked nor received cash welfare during the
year (the dashed blue line in Figure 11) has increased from a low of about 12% in 1991 to 37% in
2009. This surprising combination may reflect a mix of circumstances, including income support
from unrelated household members (which is not included in the official poverty measure),
including cohabiting partners, and other means of support from outside the household not
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
captured on the CPS. It may also reflect income reporting problems on the CPS, especially with
regard to welfare income.44
Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor”
Female-Headed Families with Children
As shown above, cash welfare receipt among female-headed families with children has
dramatically declined in the post-1996 welfare reform era, with the decline having begun in the
years just prior to the passage and subsequent implementation of reform. Figure 12 shows
recipiency rates among female-headed families with children with earnings below their families’
poverty thresholds, for six income “safety-net” program categories: AFDC, TANF or General
Assistance (GA); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); Unemployment Insurance Benefits; Food
Stamp/SNAP benefits; the EITC; and the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit, the
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). The analysis is restricted to “earnings poor” families, as
earnings are the primary means by which most families with working age members support
themselves. Earnings (along with other income) deemed insufficient to provide for a family’s
basic needs (i.e., poverty level income) and the reasons associated with insufficient earnings (or
other income) are often used in determining eligibility for need-tested and other programs.
Over the 23-year period examined, there has been a marked change in the provision of benefits
among the six programs, reflecting a structural change in aspects of the “income safety net.” It is
important to note that the “official” U.S. poverty measure does not include in-kind benefits, such
as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, nor does it include tax transfers, in the form of the EITC, or
ACTC. Among the six program categories examined, only AFDC/TANF/GA, SSI, and UI are
included in the “official” poverty measure. As will be shown later, this has important implications
as to how one assesses the role of income support policies, especially in the post 1996 welfare
reform era and over the course of the most recent recession and recovery.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Figure 12 shows a substantial increase in EITC from 1993 to 1999, as mothers with
comparatively low earnings prospects turned away from cash public assistance towards work. In
1993, about 44% of “earnings poor” female-headed families with children are estimated to have
received the EITC, by 1999, 64% of such families were estimated to have received it. In contrast,
over the same period, cash welfare receipt in the form of AFDC, TANF, or GA fell from about
56% to 31%. EITC benefit increases that phased in between 1993 and 1996 may have served to
lure some single mothers away from welfare, in part evidenced by increased work seen earlier in
Figure 9. Additionally, states’ use of AFDC waivers to strengthen work requirements and
sanctions for noncompliance in the pre-welfare reform years, may have served to increase work
participation and consequent EITC receipt. TANF’s provisions further encouraged work and
accompanying EITC eligibility over welfare. The figure shows a marked decrease in estimated
EITC receipt in 2003 and 2004, and then a rebound in 2005—these years are marked by a
44 See Appendix B on CPS under-reporting.
Congressional Research Service
27
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
dashed-line, as caution should be exercised in attempting to interpret this phenomena, as it
appears to be an aberation that is not readily explainable.45
Figure 12. Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor”
Female-Headed Families with Children, 1987 to 2009
Percent
69.1
70
67.2
67.5
64.9
64.0
64.1
64.0
63.2
62.4
62.2
62.4
61.2
60.1
59.5
60.2Food Stam ps/
58.8
59.3
59.5
SNAP Benefits
56
60 .9
56.7
57.0
57.4
57.2
57.5
56.0
56.1
56.2
54.3
54.6
56.2
EITC
53.8
52.9
52.3
52.5 54.0
52.5
56.5
57.8
51.3
51.2
50.3
49.3
48.7
48.3
48.3
50
46.5
45.9
45.7
44.7
44.8
49.5
45.8
43.3
43.8
48.8
48.0
ACTC
40.7
40.8
40
35.7
31.1
30
25.9
25.7
24.1
21.9
22.6
20.8
20.7
21.5
20.0
19.7
20
16.9
15.9
16.3
AFDC, TANF,
19.0
12.6
17.3
12.4
or GA
11.0
11.8
11.6
11.5
11.6
11.2
11.7
11.5
11.4
11.3
11.1
10.5
10.4
10.6
11.4
8.0
8.3
8.9
SSI
10
7.0
7.3
7.5
10.8
9.6
8.5
7.5
7.3
7.7 UI Benefits
6.4
6.5
6.5
6.9
6.1
6.7
6.0
6.1
5.4
6.2
4.7
5.1
5.5
5.3
4.4
5.0
4.7
0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table
C-10 for supporting data.
Notes: “Earnings poor” families are those whose annual earned income is below their poverty income
threshold. Other sources of income received by these families might subsequently lift their total income above
poverty.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Receipt of SSI among families headed by single mothers increased over the first half of the
1990s, as shown in Figure 12. In 1988, 7% of families headed by single mothers reported
receiving SSI; by 1996, 12.6% of such families were reporting SSI receipt. The populations
served by AFDC and SSI overlap somewhat. Some persons may be eligible for both programs,
45 Email exchanges with Census Bureau contacts, relaying the author’s findings, have not resulted in an attributable
explanation for the sudden dip and recovery of EITC receipt among this subgroup of the population. EITC receipt is not
directly reported on the CPS/ASEC. The Census Bureau estimates the EITC and other tax variables on the CPS/ASEC
using a tax model. Beginning with the 2004 CPS, the Census Bureau implemented a new tax model, providing new tax
estimates for income year 2003. It’s uncertain whether model changes may have contributed the sudden aberration in
trend of estimated EITC receipt.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
but individuals cannot receive benefits under both, although families can.46 In contrast to AFDC
and TANF, individuals applying for SSI must pass an often strict and lengthy disability
determination process in order to qualify. SSI benefits are higher than those available under
AFDC and TANF. Additionally, SSI benefits are fully federally funded, though some states
provide supplementary benefits on top of the federal SSI benefit. In contrast, AFDC benefits were
jointly funded by states and the federal government, through federal matching dollars, and under
TANF through a fixed-dollar federal block grant. As such, if all other things were equal, both
individuals and states would do better financially by shifting persons potentially eligible for
TANF to SSI, assuming the person was unlikely able to become gainfully employed. Several
administrative changes to SSI made it easier for children to be ruled eligible for the program
during the early 1990s,47 which could have contributed to increased SSI receipt among families,
including those headed by single mothers.
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits
Receipt of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits among families headed by earnings poor single
mothers has risen concurrent and consequent to the three economic recessions that occurred over
the 23-year period examined (Figure 12). With each recession, UI receipt among these families
has increased over that of the previous recession. For example, in the aftermath of the 1990-1991
recession, 7.5% of all earnings poor single mother families reported UI receipt in 1992; following
the 2000 recession, 9.6% reported UI receipt 2002; and in the most recent recession, 11.4%
reported UI receipt. The higher incidence of UI receipt in 2002 than in 1992 most probably
reflects a higher incidence of UI eligibility in the more recent period, due to increased
employment of single mothers, as the two recessions were of equal length, and the unemployment
rate among women maintaining families was slightly lower in 2002 than in 1992 (see Figure 10,
shown earlier). The higher incidence of UI receipt in 2009 most likely reflects both the severity of
the recession, as well as increased UI coverage among single mothers as a result of having better
established work histories than in previous years.
Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
Benefits
Food Stamp/SNAP benefit receipt is depicted by the green line in Figure 12. The figure shows
that Food Stamp/SNAP receipt reached an historic peak among earnings poor single mother
families in 1993 (69.3%), subsequent to the 1990-1991 recession. Food Stamp receipt for this
group of families reached an historic low in 2002, with 48.3% reporting benefit receipt. The
comparatively low rate of Food Stamp receipt in 2002, compared to earlier periods, may in part
be attributable to the decline of such families on AFDC/TANF, as persons who enrolled in those
programs were generally enrolled in Food Stamps automatically through administrative
processes. The figure shows a modest rise in Food Stamp receipt from 2002 to 2005, subsequent
to the 2000 recession, and a more substantial rise from 2007 to 2009, consequent to the most
recent recession. Still, the SNAP benefit receipt rate among the depicted families in 2009 (60.2%)
46 For example, a disabled child might qualify for SSI, while the parent could potentially qualify for AFDC, or vice
versa if the parent were disabled. For a discussion, see David C. Stapleton, David C. Wittenburg, and Michael E.
Fishman, et al., “Transitions from AFDC to SSI Before Welfare Reform,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 64, no. 1
(2001), pp. 84-114.
47 Ibid., p. 86.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
was nearly identical to that of Food Stamps in 1989, even though economic conditions in 2009
were much worse.
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC)
Finally, the figure shows estimated receipt of the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) among
depicted families.48 Census Bureau estimates of ACTC receipt on the CPS are first available
beginning in 2004. As discussed earlier (“Tax Rebates and Credits”), the Emergency and
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) (P.L. 110-343), temporarily lowered the income
threshold for receipt of the ACTC in tax year 2008. There appears to be no discernable effect of
the provision from 2007 to 2008 in the CPS/ASEC estimates for depicted families. However, the
figure shows that estimated ACTC receipt more than doubled from 2008 (21.5%) to 2009
(45.8%). This large increase in ACTC eligibility reflects changes in The American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) (P.L. 111-5) which lowered the ACTC income threshold to $3,000,
and took effect in 2009.
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Single
Mothers’ Poverty Status
As shown earlier in Figure 6, single mothers’ poverty status has improved since 1993. Changes in
the economy and changes in welfare policy and other programs, such as the EITC, have both
direct and indirect effects on income and poverty. However, the official U.S. poverty measure
counts only family pre-tax cash income (excluding capital gains and lump sum or one-time
payments) against families’ poverty thresholds (which vary by family size and composition) to
determine whether a family is counted as poor. The “official” U.S. poverty definition does not
include the value of in-kind benefits, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, or public housing
subsidies, nor does it include the effects of taxes or tax credits such as the EITC and the ACTC.
Inclusion of in-kind benefits and refundable tax credits, net of taxes families pay, provides a more
comprehensive income definition than the official poverty income definition. Failing to include
them can have important implications as to how one assesses the role of income support policies,
especially in the post 1996 welfare reform era, and over the course of the most recent recession
and recovery. Additionally, other unrelated household members may contribute to the family’s
economic well-being, but determining the extent to which resources are shared among unrelated
household members is difficult.
Figure 13 shows the marginal effects of income from a number of sources on poverty.
Components of family income are sequentially added and measured against families’ poverty
thresholds, as one moves from the top line of the chart to subsequent lines below.49 Starting with
the top line, the effect on poverty of family earnings alone is depicted. Poverty measures based on
earned income alone give an indication of the labor market’s effect on poverty, in context of other
sources of income individuals, families, and households might receive. Moving to the second line
down, the effect of earnings plus all other cash income other than cash welfare (AFDC, TANF, or
state General Assistance) is shown. Adding cash welfare, the third line down, to those income
sources shown above, completes the accounting of pre-tax cash income that is used under the
“official” U.S. poverty definition.
48 As with the EITC, ACTC estimates are Census Bureau model-based estimates.
49 The order in which income components are added can influence the measured marginal effect of each.
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Figure 13. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty
and Household Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2009
Pe rcent
60%
50%
Poor base d on:
Earned incom e only
+ cash incom e other than Child Support,
UI and cas h w elfare
+ Child Support
40%
+ UI be ne fits
+ SSI
+ TANF/AFDC/GA (Offical Poverty)
+ Food Stam ps (SNAP)
30%
+ EITC les s FICA and federal and state incom e taxes
+ ACTC
+ Econom ic Stim ulus and Re cove ry Paym ents*
House hold Incom e Be low Low -Incom e Thre shold:
20%
House hold cas h + food s tam ps (SNAP) + EITC
le ss FICA and fe de ral and state incom e taxe s +
ACTC + Econom ic Stim ulus and Re cove ry
Paym ents *
10%
0%
87
88
90
92
93
96
98
01
02
3
04
06
07
9
19
19
1989 19
1991 19
19
1994 1995 19
1997 19
1999 2000 20
20
200 20
2005 20
20
2008 200
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-10 for supporting data.
* Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008 and Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Addition of Income from Sources Not Included in the “Official”
U.S. Poverty Measure
As noted above, the “official” U.S. poverty definition is based on families’ pre-tax cash income. It
excludes a number of benefits families receive, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, and
refundable tax credits, such as the EITC and ACTC, nor does it take into account taxes families
might pay, in the form of federal payroll (FICA) taxes and federal and state income taxes. A
congressionally commissioned study, issued in 1995 by a National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
expert panel proposed major changes to the way in which poverty is measured in the U.S.50 After
15 years of study, the Department of Commerce Economic and Statistics Administration, under an
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sponsored initiative, announced that the Census
Bureau, in coordination with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), will develop a Supplemental
Poverty Measure (SPM), using NAS panel recommendations and subsequent research as a
framework.51 The proposed measure will supplement, rather than replace, the current poverty
measure, which will continue to be deemed the “official” statistical measure of poverty in the
United States. Among features of the proposed SPM is that it would include a number of in-kind
and tax benefits in the measure. The Census Bureau has yet to release a regular poverty series
based on the SPM, due to lack of funding. Absent the availability of an alternate, supplemental,
measure to the official one, the following poverty estimates include income sources in addition to
those used under the official measure, and compares those combined sources to the official
poverty income thresholds.
In addition to the income sources used by the “official” poverty measure, a number of other
income sources are sequentially added to estimate their anti-poverty effects under more
comprehensive income definitions. For example, the market value of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits
is added to pre-tax cash income, to assess their antipoverty effects. Next, the EITC is added in,
net of any FICA, federal, and state income taxes (including state refundable tax credits). The
poverty reducing effect of the ACTC is then assessed, followed by economic stimulus and
recovery payments families may have received in 2008 and 2009, respectively.
A cautionary note is in order with regards to assessing the effects tax credits such as the
EITC and ACTC on family income and poverty. The effect of the credits shown in the
CPS/ASEC are estimates of the amount of the EITC and/or ACTC benefits families would
have been eligible to receive based on their calendar year (i.e., tax year) income. However,
while the tax credits’ effects are shown for the depicted year in which the credits are earned,
families would not actually receive the credits until early in the following year, after filing their
federal income tax forms.
50 For discussion, see CRS Report R41187, Poverty Measurement in the United States: History, Current Practice, and
Proposed Changes, by Thomas Gabe. The NAS panel recommended that new means be developed for establishing
poverty income thresholds, and that those thresholds be based on distributions of resources families have to spend on
the basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter and utilities, plus a little bit more, for other goods and services. Among
its recommendations, the NAS panel recommended that in-kind benefits, such as Food Stamps, among others not part
of the current “official” poverty definition, be included in the family resource definition, as well as net taxes families
pay or net tax credits they receive. Additionally, they recommended that work-related expenses (e.g., child care, work-
related transportation) be subtracted from income.
51 See http://www.esa.doc.gov/news/2010/03/02/census-bureau-develop-supplemental-poverty-measure.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Finally, the bottom-most line shows the effects of counting all income in the household in which
the single mother lives, not just that of her related family members, and compares it to
“household low-income thresholds.” The household low-income thresholds used here are scaled
the same way as Census Bureau family income poverty thresholds, but are based on household
(rather than family) size and composition. It is important to note that official poverty
measurement is based on a family concept, which assumes that family members share income and
economies of scale that result from shared living arrangements. It is generally agreed among
researchers that assumptions regarding income sharing and shared economies of scale among
related family members, who have ties based on blood, marriage, and adoption, do not apply to
the same extent among unrelated household members. Consequently, these estimates of
household low-income status likely overstate the effect of household income on reducing poverty
among families headed by single mothers.
Effect of Earnings and Other Non-Welfare Cash Income on Poverty
Figure 13 shows that between 1993 and 2000, single mothers’ poverty, based on family earnings
alone (top line), fell from 56.2% to 40.8%, reaching an historic low for the 23-year period. Their
“earned-income poverty rate” rose consequent to two recessions, reaching 44.3% in 2004, and
rising again from 44.7% in 2007 to 48.3% in 2009. Adding other cash income, except cash
welfare (second line down), to family earnings, reduces poverty in 1993 from 56.2% (top line) to
47.4% (line 2), and in 2009 from 48.3% to 38.0%.
Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty
Cash welfare benefits have only a small impact on the poverty rate, as these benefits generally are
not sufficient, even when combined with other cash income, to lift families above the federal
poverty threshold. In the vast majority of states the level of earnings or other cash income at
which states’ cash welfare benefits under AFDC/TANF become unavailable for a family are well
below the poverty line. For example, in July 2009, in only five states and the District of Columbia
could a single mother with two children have earnings at or above the poverty line and still
continue to receive TANF cash assistance after one year of benefit receipt.52 Consequently, cash
welfare benefits have little impact on the poverty rate. The addition of cash welfare (line 3,
representing the official income definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only slightly:
from 47.4% (line 2) to 45.2% (line 3) in 1993, and from 38.0% to 37.6% in 2009. Nonetheless,
cash welfare benefits can have a significant impact on the level of poor families’ incomes,
affecting the degree to which their incomes fall below the poverty income standard. This impact
is not captured by changes in the poverty rate as shown in Figure 13.
52 Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Virginia. See Gretchen Rowe, Mary Murphy, and Ei Yin Mon,
Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2009, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC, August 2010,
Table IV.A.5, Maximum Income for Ongoing Eligibility for A Family of Three, July 2009, pp. 140-141
http://anfdata.urban.org/databooks/Databook%202009%20FINAL.pdf.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
The Invisible Safety Net—Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected
Income Sources Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure
As noted above, the “official” U.S. poverty measure counts only families’ pre-tax cash income for
purposes of poverty determination. Inclusion of selected benefits, such as food assistance, in the
form of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, the refundable EITC, and the partially refundable ACTC,
allows for a more comprehensive assessment of the role of government policy in addressing
vulnerable families income needs.
Effect of Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits on Poverty
SNAP benefits played a substantively larger role in reducing poverty among single mothers and
their families in 2009, in the wake of the past recession, than in any year earlier. The fourth line
from the top in Figure 13 shows the effect on the poverty rate of single mothers by counting the
value of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits. The line shows that Food Stamps/SNAP reduced the
poverty rate of single mothers from about 2 to 3 percentage points over most of the period
(compare the reduction in poverty from line 3 to line 4). In 2009, however, SNAP benefits nearly
offset the rise in pre-tax cash income poverty (i.e., the “official” poverty measure) from 2008.
Whereas on a pre-tax cash-only basis, poverty among single mothers and their families increased
from 33.8% in 2008 to 37.6% in 2009 (line 3), SNAP benefits, when added to cash income,
caused the poverty rate of single mothers to remain essentially level over the two years (33.% in
2008, and 33.5% in 2009).
The increased role of SNAP benefits in addressing the rising cash income deficiency of single
mothers in the wake of the recent recession, reflects not only an increase in the take-up rate of
SNAP benefits by low-income families headed by single mothers, seen earlier in Figure 12, but
also the legislatively enacted increase of SNAP benefit payments to needy households under
ARRA. As noted earlier (section entitled: “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits” ), ARRA SNAP provisions resulted in an average 15% increase in
monthly SNAP benefits going into effect in April 2009.
Net Effect of the EITC on Poverty
The EITC has had a comparatively large poverty reducing effect on single mothers and their
families since 1993 legislative expansions to the credit took effect. The poverty reducing effect of
the EITC53 is shown net of FICA, federal, and state income taxes (including refundable state tax
credits) (line5), when added to family cash income and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits (line 4). As
discussed earlier (section entitled: “EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay””), a major expansion
of the EITC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996, increased the
amount of the EITC work bonus families might receive. The anti-poverty effectiveness of the
EITC was six times greater in 2009 than in 1993.54 In combination with Food Stamp/SNAP
53 Note that the value of the EITC on the CPS is based on Census Bureau imputations, rather than actual reported tax
credits. Also, the EITC is different from most sources of income, as most families receive the EITC as a lump sum
refund at the beginning of year following that in which income used in determining the credit was earned.
54 In 1993, the after-tax poverty rate (counting Food Stamps/SNAP) among single mothers dropped from 42.7% (line 4)
to 41.9% (line 5), a 0.8 percentage point (1.9%) reduction. In 2009, the EITC reduced poverty from 33.5% to 29.6%, a
3.9 percentage point (11.6%) reduction.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
benefits, the EITC has kept the poverty rate of single mothers and their families level since 2004,
whereas under the official measure, poverty is shown to have increased.
As receipt of the EITC is conditioned on earnings, the growing impact of the EITC in part reflects
the rise in work rates among single mothers. Among those who are working and poor (before
counting the EITC), the EITC helps lift the income of some above the poverty line. Although the
EITC expansion provided additional income to low-income families who were already working,
it may also have helped induce increased employment among family heads with low to moderate
earnings potential, and thus contributed to the lower levels of poverty based on earned income
alone, that have been evidenced since 1993 (shown as the top line in the chart).
Note too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare programs in recent years have
encouraged work (such as work requirements and increased earnings disregards), these changes
may have had a direct effect on poverty by increasing the incidence of work (earnings), which in
turn resulted in expanded EITC receipt among single mothers.
Effect of the ACTC on Poverty
The Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) (the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit) can
provide a refund to tax filers with one or more qualified children, even if they have no federal
income tax liability. Overall, tax filers may receive a Child Tax Credit (CTC) up to $1,000 per
qualifying child. If the CTC is greater than the amount of income tax owed, the tax filer may be
eligible to claim the ACTC. As noted earlier (section entitled: “Tax Rebates and Credits”), The
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (ESSA, P.L. 110-343) reduced the ACTC’s refundable
income limit from $12,050 to $8,500 for 2008. ARRA (P.L. 111-5) further reduced the credit’s
refundable income limit from a scheduled $12,550 in 2009, to $3,000 for 2009 and 2010.
As shown above (Figure 13), the lowered ACTC refundable income limit for 2009 resulted in a
marked reduction in poverty among single mothers and their families, reducing their poverty rate
from 29.6%, before counting the credit (5th line down), to 27.9% after counting the credit (6th line
down). Prior to the legislative changes discussed above, most poor families were beyond the
credit’s reach. Moreover, ARRA provisions, when combined with EITC, SNAP benefits, and cash
income, resulted in a net decline in poverty from 2008 to 2009, which sharply contrasts the
observed increase in poverty based on cash income alone (line 3).
Effect of Federal Economic Stimulus and Economic Recovery Payments
on Poverty
In addition to the changes to the EITC and ACTC made as part of legislative action to stimulate
the economy, the Census Bureau provides estimates of economic stimulus payments families may
have received in 2008, and economic recovery payments in 2009 (see earlier discussion, “Tax
Rebates and Credits”). The effects of economic stimulus and economic recovery payments in
2008 and 2009 on single mothers’ poverty status are shown above (Figure 13). When added to
line 6, above, economic stimulus payments in 2008 reduced single mothers’ poverty rate from
29.4% to 28.3% in 2008, and from 27.9% to 27.3% in 2009.
When all taken together, the ACTC and economic stimulus and recovery payments resulted in net
reductions in poverty among single mothers and their families from 2007 to 2008, and from 2008
to 2009. Consequently, whereas poverty under the “official” pre-tax cash definition increased for
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
single mothers from 2008 to 2009, under a more comprehensive definition which includes Food
Stamp/SNAP benefits, the effects of the EITC (net of taxes), the ACTC, and economic stimulus
and recovery payments, their incidence of poverty actually declined. Moreover, whereas the
“official” poverty rate for single mothers and their families of 37.6% in 2009 was 5.8 percentage
points above its all-time low of 31.8%, in 2000, their poverty rate based on a more
comprehensive income definition that takes Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, taxes and refundable tax
credits, and economic recovery payments into account, was 27.3% in 2009, just ½ of a percentage
point above its all-time low of 26.8% in 2000.
Effect of Unrelated Household Member’s Income on Poverty
The household low-income line (bottom line, Figure 13) shows that if all household members’
income is counted, as though shared equally among household members, the poverty rate among
single mothers would drop by at most 3 to 4 percentage points over the 1987 to 2009 period.
Using the household, as opposed to the family, as the economic unit for determining poverty
reduces the post in-kind transfer, post-tax, poverty rate in 1993 from 40.7% to 36.8% and, in
2009, from 27.3% to 23.1%. Again, this is most likely an overstatement of the possible effect that
shared household living arrangements might have on single mothers’ poverty status because of
the uncertainty about the extent to which such income is actually shared.
Comparison of the Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on
Poverty, by Single Mothers’ Work Status
The analysis above examines the effects of earning, transfers, taxes, and other income on families
headed by single mothers. Here, the effects are broken out by whether or not mothers worked at
any time during the year. There is a stark contrast in the incidence of poverty among single
mothers who worked at any time during a year, and those who did not. Moreover, selected income
“safety-net” programs have quite different effects in reducing poverty among the two groups, as
shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, respectively. The figures show, for example, that mothers
who worked at any time during the year were less likely to be poor based on their earnings alone
than mothers who did not work based on total household income.
In comparing across the two figures, it should be noted that the scale shown in Figure 14
ranges from 0% to 50%, while that of Figure 15 ranges from 50% to 100%, as if it were
stacked above Figure 14 (i.e., the two figures scales are the same with regard to relative
range of their vertical axes, but the levels at which those axes start differ).
Several observations follow.
Single Mothers Who Worked During the Year—Figure 14
Effects of Selected Cash Income Sources on Poverty
• Among single mothers who worked during the year, their incidence of poverty
based on earned income alone was at a low in 2000, and has increased markedly
since 2005 (top line).
• Cash income from sources other than UI and cash welfare (second line down) has
had a relatively consistent effect of reducing their poverty rate from that
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
measured by earnings alone, ranging from 6 to 8 percentage points over the 23-
year period.
• UI benefits in 2009 reduced their poverty rate by about 1 percentage point, which
was about the same as in 2002, the previous peak year of UI poverty reduction.
• Adding in SSI benefits has little effect on poverty reduction among this group,
largely by virtue that mothers worked during the year, and were consequently
unlikely to have had an SSI qualifying disability (although, other members of
their family might).
• AFDC, TANF and GA have very little impact on poverty reduction among single
mothers who worked in recent years, but had more measurable effects in the first
part of the 23-year period, when poor mothers were more likely to combine work
with welfare (refer back to Figure 11).
• Based on the “official” poverty measure which takes into account most sources
of pre-tax cash income families receive, the poverty rate among single mothers in
2009 was 2.8 percentage points higher than in 2001—an historic low for the
period.
Effects on Poverty of Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official”
Poverty Measure
• Food Stamp and SNAP benefit receipt have had a sizeable effect on poverty
reduction, and in 2009 reversed the trend in poverty based on cash income alone.
• The EITC (net of FICA and federal and state income taxes) has contributed to
substantial reductions in poverty among working single mothers, especially after
1993 legislated expansions to the credit began taking effect. In 2009, net EITC
among working single mothers reduced their post SNAP benefit poverty rate by
5.5 percentage points, from 22.5% to 17.0%.
• ARRA’s reduction of the ACTC’s refundable income limit to $3,000, effective in
2009, is readily apparent by the substantially larger decrease in poverty resulting
from the credit, than in earlier years. In 2009, the ACTC accounted for an
additional 2.1 percentage point reduction in poverty beyond that of the post-EITC
poverty level.
• After including the ACTC, the incidence of poverty among single mothers with
any work during the year reached an historic low in 2009, in spite of the effect of
the recession on official poverty, which in that same year was at an eight-year
high.
• In 2009, after taking into account SNAP benefits, net EITC, the ACTC, and
Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments, the poverty rate of single mothers
who worked sometime during the year was 14.2%, a full 12 percentage points
below the “official” measure (26.2%) and 3.1 percentage points below its 2002
level of 17.3%.
• If the income of all unrelated household members is included as income, the
poverty rate among working single mothers is estimated at 11.2% in 2009, which
compares to an “official” poverty rate of 26.2%.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
• Note that working mothers could also incur work-related expenses (e.g., child
care, transportation, uniforms) that are not accounted for here. Inclusion of such
expenses, if available, would result in somewhat higher poverty rates than those
shown here.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 14. Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year:
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
1987 to 2009
Percent
50%
45%
40%
Poor based
on:
35%
Earned incom e only
30%
+ cash incom e other than UI and cash w elfare
+ UI benefits
+ SSI
25%
+ AFDC/TANF/GA (Offical Poverty)
+ food stam ps (SNAP)
20%
+ EITC less FICA, federal and state incom e taxes
15%
+ ACTC
+ Econom ic Stim ulus and Recovery Paym ents*
Household Incom e Below Low -Incom e
10%
Threshold:
Household cash + food stam ps (SNAP) + EITC
less FICA, federal and state incom e taxes +
ACTC + Econom ic Stim ulus and Recovery
5%
Paym ents*
0%
9
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
2
4
1987 1988 198
1990 1991 199
199
199
199
199
199
199
199
2000 200
200
2003 200
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-12 for supporting data.
* Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008 and Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009.
CRS-39
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15
As a precautionary reminder, the reader should note that the origin of the vertical axis begins
at a poverty rate of 50%.
Effects of Selected Cash Income Sources on Poverty
• The top-most line indicates that even though single mothers themselves did not
work during the year, and thus had no earnings, other related family members
may have worked, accounting for an “earnings-only” poverty level around 90%
in the pre welfare reform era (1996 and earlier), and around 85% since 2000.
• The next line down, which includes most all other sources of income other than
UI benefits and cash welfare, shows a somewhat greater reduction in poverty in
the TANF era (about 10 percentage points), than in the pre welfare reform era
(about 5 percentage points). In part, this may be due to a somewhat greater
tendency of nonworking single mothers to be living in “extended” families (i.e.,
living with family members other than just their children) in the post welfare
reform era, than before. For example, in 1996, 24% of nonworking single
mothers lived in extended family settings, but by 2000, 33% were living in such
settings.55
• The figure shows UI benefits, when added to earnings and other cash income
from the line above, accounted for a 2 percentage point reduction in poverty in
2009, over twice the effect in 2002, the previous peak year of UI poverty
reduction for this group.
• Comparing the relative effects of SSI and TANF/AFDC/GA on poverty over the
period, SSI has assumed a greater role in poverty reduction among nonworking
single mothers in the TANF, than in the pre-TANF, era, and the role of TANF in
reducing poverty among this group is substantially less than what it was under
AFDC.
• Examining just the trend in “official” poverty among nonworking single mothers,
their poverty rate in the post welfare reform era has averaged 8 percentage points
below what it was under AFDC. In 2002, which marked an historic low poverty
rate for this group, their poverty rate (66.9%) was nearly 14 percentage points
below their peak rate of 80.8% in 1991. In 2009, 69.9% of nonworking single
mothers were poor—still well below their pre welfare reform levels.
Effects on Poverty of Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official”
Poverty Measure
• Food Stamp/SNAP benefits appear to have had a somewhat smaller effect on
poverty reduction among nonworking single mothers in the post-welfare reform
era (2.7 percentage point reduction, on average) than earlier (about 3.6
55 CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC. About 25% of nonworking single mothers, on average, lived in extended
families in the pre-TANF era (1987-1996), compared to about 28% in the TANF era.
Congressional Research Service
40
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
percentage point reduction, on average, in the pre welfare reform era). However,
in 2009, reflecting ARRA’s SNAP benefit provisions, discussed earlier
(“Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits”),
SNAP benefits reduced poverty for this group from the “official” poverty rate of
69.9%, to 64.7%, a 5.2 percentage point reduction.
• In that these mothers did not work during the year, the figure shows refundable
and partially refundable tax provisions have had very little measurable effect on
poverty reduction for this group; nor have economic stimulus or recovery
payments. In fact, the after-tax poverty line is at times above the Food
Stamp/SNAP line, indicating that some poor families had members with a tax
liability, net of any credits.
• If the income of all unrelated household members is included as income, the
poverty rate among nonworking single mothers is estimated at 55.1% in 2009.
Counting unrelated household members’ income reduced poverty among
nonworking single mothers by 9.6 percentage points in 2009, compared to 3.6
percentage points in 1987. This largely reflects what has been a growing
tendency of nonworking single mothers to be living with other unrelated
household members. In 2009, for example, 20% of nonworking single mothers
were living with other unrelated family members, of which over four-fifths were
designated as “cohabiting partners” (see Table C-14). In comparison, about 9%
of nonworking single mothers lived with unrelated family members in 1987.56
56 CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC. Beginning with the 2007 CPS/ASEC cohabiting couples are identifiable based
on self-report. In earlier years, cohabiting couples are identifiable indirectly by inference. The method used here, for
CPS/ASEC years before 2007 is based on households with two unmarried adults, who are unrelated and of the opposite
sex, and no other adults reside in the household.
Congressional Research Service
41
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 15. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year:
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
1987 to 2009
Pe rcent
100%
95%
90%
Poor base d on:
85%
Earne d incom e only
80%
75%
+ cas h incom e other than UI and cas h w elfare
+ UI be ne fits
+ SSI
70%
+ AFDC/TANF/GA (Offical Pove rty)
65%
+ food stam ps (SNAP)
+ EITC le ss FICA, federal and s tate incom e
taxe s + ACTC + Econom ic Stim ulus and
60%
Re cove ry Paym ents *
House hold Incom e Be low Low -Incom e
55%
Thre shold:
Note
House hold cash + food s tam ps (SNAP) + EITC
Scale
les s FICA and fe de ral and state incom e taxe s
+ ACTC + Econom ic Stim ulus and
50%
Re cove ry Paym ents *
2
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 199
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Ye ar
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-13 for supporting data.
* Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008 and Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Discussion/Conclusion
CRS analysis of 23 years of U.S. Census Bureau data presented in this report shows a dramatic
transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period. The period has seen a
marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the
fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over
the period, with more mothers working, and fewer relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their
children, in part in response to structural changes to income “safety-net” programs. Poverty under the
official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows that since 2000, which
marked an historic low, the poverty rate among single mothers increased in step with two recessions. By
2009, the official poverty rate for single mothers had reached a post-2000 high, but in spite of two
recessions, was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels. Using a more comprehensive income
definition than that used by the official poverty measure indicates that poverty among single mothers and
their children in 2009, rather than having increased since 2000, was at or near a 23-year low when Food
Stamp/SNAP benefits and work-related refundable tax credits are taken into account. In particular,
congressional action in response to the recession, which increased SNAP benefits and extended the reach
of refundable tax credits, contributed to a decline in poverty among single mothers and their children in
the midst of the recession.
Transformation of Income Safety-Net Programs Toward Work-
Conditioned Support
Since the eve of 1996 welfare reform, work-conditioned requirements for individuals’ receipt of
government assistance have become more prevalent. Prior to 1996-welfare reform, federal law (The
Family Support Act of 1988; P.L. 100-485) had extended work requirements (which included work
preparation activities, such as education and training) to mothers receiving AFDC to mothers with a child
as young as three, and at state option, to mothers with a child as young as age one. Child care funding was
increased to make it possible for mothers to go to work. A number of states experimented with changes to
their welfare programs under waivers of federal rules, granted by DHHS. Among the features tested under
waiver authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements, experiments to test models of facilitating
the transition from welfare to work, and the use of sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, among
others. Expansions to the EITC, under both President G.H.W. Bush, and Clinton, increased the financial
rewards of work, through earnings supplements administered through the tax system. The EITC helped to
offset the welfare income loss, or implicit tax, that mothers might face as they moved from welfare to
work.
The 1996 welfare reform law repealed the 61-year-old AFDC program, replacing it with TANF. TANF
ended the entitlement of low-income families with children to federal assistance. It limits the provision of
federal assistance under the program to five years57—states are allowed to set shorter time limits. Under
TANF, states no longer receive an open-ended federal matching grant, as they did under AFDC, but rather
a fixed dollar block grant (with the possible addition of recession-related contingency funds). Adults must
be engaged in approved “work activities” within two years of initial TANF receipt, subject to sanction for
noncompliance. Under TANF, federal work participation standards (i.e., “work-requirements”) apply to
57 Up to 20% of the TANF caseload can be extended to receive assistance beyond five years due to “hardship,” as defined by the
states. See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: A Primer on TANF
Financing and Federal Requirements, by Gene Falk.
CRS-43
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
states’ TANF caseloads, and adult recipients are required to be engaged in work, or work-related activities
after two years of benefit receipt. TANF has provided states increased flexibility and limited federal
requirements, compared to AFDC, but with fixed federal dollars.
Since 1996 welfare reform, cash welfare support for “earnings poor” mothers and their children has
contracted, whereas work-based support has increased. The EITC, for example, has a direct effect on
poverty reduction, by encouraging work, increasing earnings, and reducing reliance on cash welfare. One
estimate suggests that single mothers employment in 1996 was 7 percentage points higher than it would
have been otherwise, absent the EITC.58 This “work/earnings inducing” effect of EITC among single
mothers is captured in official poverty statistics, as part of families’ earnings, but the credit itself—the
earnings supplement which induces work and earnings—is not. Likewise, the ACTC may also have a
potential work inducing effect among single mothers, but, like the EITC, the effects of the credit itself on
poverty reduction are not measured under the official poverty income definition. Additionally, through
earnings, working individuals not only gain potential access to tax benefits, such as the EITC and ACTC,
which with full-time work exceeds cash welfare assistance they might have received by not working, but
also earn credit towards insurance coverage under Unemployment Insurance, as well as Social Security
retirement, disability, and death benefits for themselves, their dependents, and survivors.
The report shows that receipt of cash welfare (AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance) has declined
substantially among single mothers since the passage of TANF, and their engagement in work has
increased (Figure 8). The transformation from welfare dependency to work appears to have begun in the
years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, as the economy prospered, and as a number of work
supports (e.g., EITC, and child care assistance) were strengthened. Moreover, under the official U.S.
poverty measure, the poverty rate of single mothers (Figure 6), and that of their children (Figure 4), has
consistently been lower since welfare reform, than before. Prior to TANF, poor single mothers were more
likely to be receiving cash welfare (AFDC or GA) than to be working; after passage of TANF, just the
opposite was true: poor single mothers were more likely to be working than receiving cash welfare
(TANF or GA) (Figure 11).
TANF and other work-promoting policies have helped to reduce poverty among single mothers and their
children through increased earnings. Based on earnings alone, poverty among single mothers who worked
reached an historic low for the period, in 2000 (Figure 14), as did their poverty rate based on total pre-tax
cash income, under the “official” U.S. poverty measure. Following the 2000 recession, poverty among
working single mothers increased slightly, and much more so since 2007, in step with the 2007-2009
recession.
Cash Welfare’s Residual Safety-Net Role
Welfare reform ended the provision of cash assistance as an entitlement, by replacing AFDC with a fixed
dollar block grant for the provision of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Under TANF, a greater
share of funds goes toward services (child care, social services) either directly, or through transfers to
other programs (CCDBG, Title XX Social Services) than towards direct cash support. While many of
these services may help to reduce dependency, and promote self-sufficiency through work, receipt of cash
assistance has shrunk markedly in the TANF era. While TANF caseloads increased modestly in 2009 and
2010 in response to the recession, they are at a fraction of what they were at their peak, just prior to 1996
welfare reform, and reflect levels not seen in over 40 years.
58 Bruce D. Meyer and Dan T. Rosenbaum, “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. CXVI, no. 3 (2001), pp. 1163-1114.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
The marked decline in cash welfare caseloads since the eve of 1996 welfare reform, reflects an apparent
behavioral shift among many single mothers with respect to work and welfare, with more selecting the
former than the later. A restructuring of income safety-net programs to support work is likely to have
contributed to single mothers’ changed behavior. The EITC appears to be an import component of the
restructured safety net, as it encourages work, even among mothers whose earnings prospects at initial job
entry are low. In most states, full time work at the minimum wage provides income sufficient for a mother
to work her way off of cash welfare. In lieu of cash welfare, a single mother working full time at the
minimum wage will receive the EITC. Additionally, in 2009 through 2012, due to legislative changes
relating to the recession and recovery, she will be eligible for the ACTC, which provides additional
income support for her children.
Living Arrangements as an Alternative to Welfare
Cash welfare receipt and poverty among single mothers is lower since TANF’s enactment than before.
Some of this effect appears to be due to an increase in work among single mothers. However, even among
nonworking mothers, their receipt of cash assistance and incidence of poverty under the official measure
is lower since welfare reform. It appears that other family members’ earnings and other cash income has
contributed to the lower poverty rates of nonworking single mothers in the post-AFDC era (see the earlier
discussion, “Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15”) .
In spite of policies to increase work among single mothers, not all single mothers work, and lack of work
contributes significantly to the likelihood that they and their children will be poor. However, poor non-
working single mothers are much less likely to be receiving cash welfare assistance under TANF than
they did under AFDC (Figure 11). In the post-AFDC era, nonworking single mothers are somewhat more
likely to live in extended family settings than before.59 It appears that living with other relatives helps to
reduce their reliance on welfare and incidence of poverty under the official poverty measure. Moreover,
nonworking single mothers are considerably more likely (more than twice as likely) to live with other
unrelated family members in the post-AFDC era than before, although income of these unrelated
household members is not taken into account in determining poverty status.60
These alternative living arrangements might help provide an alternative to cash welfare receipt for some
single mothers. Figure 16 suggests that this statement has some bearing. The figure depicts single
mothers by their work and welfare status, according to whether they live independently with just their
children, or whether they live with others, either in an extended family household with other family
members than just her children, or with one or more other, unrelated, persons, including a cohabiting
partner. The figure shows that among mothers who worked, or received welfare during the year, the
majority (roughly 65% to 70%) lived independently over the period; a minority (roughly 30% to 35%)
lived with others (extended family and/or one or more unrelated persons). Interestingly, both mothers who
worked, as well as those who received welfare, were equally as likely to live independently, as not, over
the period.
59 On average, 25% lived in extended family settings in the 1987 to 1996 period. Just following welfare reform, the share living
in extended families increased to 30% in 1998 and 33% in 1999, and then to an average of 28% from 2000 to 2009. Based on
CRS estimates from U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 CPS/ASEC data. (See Table C-14 for supporting data.)
60 In 2009, for example, 20% of nonworking single mothers were living with other unrelated family members, of which over four
fifths were designated as “cohabiting partners.” In comparison, about 9% of nonworking single mothers lived with unrelated
family members in 1987. Based on CRS estimates from U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 CPS/ASEC data.
CRS-45
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 16. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements,
by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status
1987 to 2009
Percent
80.0%
70.0%
Worke d, Lives Inde pendently
Re ceived Welfare, Live s
60.0%
Indepe nde ntly
Did not w ork, Lives
Indepe nde ntly
50.0%
Did not w ork, Lives w ith
Others
Received Welfare ,
40.0%
Lives w ith Others
Worke d, Lives w ith Others
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-14 for supporting
data.
In contrast, nonworking single mothers, as a group, are less likely than their working counterparts to live
independently than mothers who work or receive welfare during the year. In the pre-1996 welfare reform
era, nonworking single mothers were slightly less likely to live independently (roughly 65% to 60%), than
their working counterparts (roughly 70% to 65%) or those who received welfare (also, roughly 70% to
65%). Note that some of these nonworking mothers may also have received cash welfare during the year,
as evidenced earlier in Figure 8. Welfare receipt among nonworking single mothers may have contributed
to their ability to live independently, apart from other relatives or nonrelatives. While many single
mothers selected work as an alternative to welfare in the years immediately following 1996 welfare
reform, others appear to have found alternative living arrangements instead. In 1996, 62% of nonworking
single mothers were living independently, three years later, only 52% were. Most of this change in living
arrangements was due to an increase in nonworking single mothers’ increased tendency to live in
extended family households, with other relatives (see Table C-14), with the share increasing from 24% in
1996, to 33% by 1999, and then ebbing to 27% by 2001. In more recent years, at least since 2005,
nonworking single mothers have shown a greater tendency to be living with other nonrelatives, of which
most are cohabiting partners (see Table C-14). Whereas in 1987, 65% of nonworking single mothers were
living in independent households, by 2009, only about half (52%) were. In part, cash welfare in the pre-
welfare reform era may have helped some single mothers to live in independent family settings. Stricter
requirements and time limits in the post-reform era may have contributed to some mothers’ consideration
of living arrangements as an alternative to cash welfare receipt.
CRS-46
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Illness or Disability Among Nonworking Single Mothers
Nonworking single mothers are much more likely to attribute illness or disability as the reason for not
working in the post-welfare reform era, than before. This is consistent with the somewhat greater role of
SSI relative to other cash welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA) since welfare reform. One conjecture is that single
mothers who are most able to work, are doing so in the post-welfare reform era, and that with support
from the EITC, even those with comparatively low earnings capacity (e.g., earnings poor), have sought
work over welfare. Those remaining, who are not engaged in work, may be less able to work, as indicated
by a higher self-reported incidence of illness or disability. In the pre-welfare reform era, roughly 10% of
nonworking single mothers reported “illness or disability” as the primary reason for not working during
the year (Figure 17), and roughly 70% reported “taking care of home or family” as the primary reason.61
In the post-welfare reform era, the share of nonworking single mothers who self-reported “illness or
disability” as the reason for not working is about three times higher than before welfare reform; the share
who reported “taking care of home or family” as the primary reason for not working has fallen from
roughly 70% to about 50% since welfare reform.
Figure 17. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year,
by Self-Reported Reason for Not Working
1987 to 2009
Perce nt
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
Taking care of
home or family
40.0%
30.0%
Ill or disabled
20.0%
Attending school
Could not find work
10.0%
0.0%
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
04
05
06
07
08
09
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
2000
2001
2002
2003
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-16 for supporting
data.
61 The self reporting of “illness or disability” on the CPS/ASEC as the reason for not working may also be suspect if, as a greater
share of mothers have gone to work, the attribution of “taking care of home or family” as the reason for not working has become
less socially acceptable for not working, especially among mothers who receive welfare benefits.
CRS-47
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Cash Welfare Receipt Among Ill or Disabled Nonworking Single Mothers
Whereas nonworking single mothers have a greater tendency to report illness or disability as the primary
reason for having not worked during the year, cash safety-net programs in the form of AFDC/TANF and
SSI appear to be assisting a smaller share of such mothers in the post-welfare reform era, than before.
Moreover, the number of single mothers reporting illness or disability in 2009 has more than doubled
since 1987 (see Figure 18). In the pre-welfare reform era, roughly 70% to 80% of nonworking single
mothers who reported illness or disability as the reason for not working were being assisted by AFDC,
SSI, or both—in 2009, 50% were. The SSI program taken alone (not counting in combination with
AFDC/TANF receipt) accounts for a considerably larger share of nonworking ill or disabled single
mothers in the post-welfare reform era (roughly double) than before. In turn, the share reporting receipt of
AFDC/TANF, either alone, or in combination with SSI, has fallen by more than half since welfare reform,
with about 60% reporting AFDC in the pre-welfare reform era, and about 30% reporting TANF, after.
While a larger share of single mothers who are able to work appear to be engaged in work or looking for
work in the post-welfare reform era than before, among the smaller residual who are not, a greater share
report illness or disability as the primary reason for being out of the labor market. In 2009, of the 679,000
single mothers who reported no work during the year, roughly half (346,000) reported neither receiving
SSI nor TANF/GA assistance. The nature of these mothers’ reported illness or disability is not known, nor
is it known whether they have sought and been denied government assistance. Whether and how these
mothers might be falling through cracks in the income safety-net is a question of policy interest, and
possible concern.
CRS-48
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 18. Nonworking Single Mothers with Self-Reported “Illness or Disability”
as the Primary Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare Recipiency Status
1987 to 2009
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-16 for supporting
data.
CRS-49
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
The Work-Based Income Safety Net in Times of Recession and Recovery
The official U.S. poverty measure provides little insight as to how the transformed work-based income
safety net has performed since the expansions to EITC in the early 1990s, and 1996 welfare reform, in
reducing poverty. As shown in the body of this report, a very different story from the one offered by the
official poverty measure emerges by using an expanded income measure that includes the EITC, and
more recently, the ACTC, refundable tax credits, and Food Stamp/SNAP assistance.
By the official measure, poverty would appear to have increased substantially among single mothers and
their children from 2000, in step with two recessions. Official poverty among single mothers and their
children, while having reached a recent peak in 2009, is still below that of the pre-1996 welfare reform.
Given that single mothers unemployment rates in 2010 (shown earlier, in Figure 9) are above 2009 levels
(average annual unemployment rate of 12.3% in 2010, compared to 11.5% in 2009) one would expect the
official poverty rate for single mothers and their children to continue to rise in 2010 (see Table C-8).
The Invisible Safety-Net—Benefits not Officially Counted Toward
Poverty Reduction
While the provision of cash welfare has fallen dramatically under TANF, poor and lower-income families
with earnings are more likely to receive assistance in the form of supplemental nutrition assistance, or
refundable income credits administered through federal and state tax systems. Neither in-kind benefits,
such as those provided through Food Stamps/SNAP, nor refundable credits, such as the EITC, or partially
refundable ACTC, are counted as income under the official U.S. poverty measure, yet these three
programs are among the ten largest, in terms of federal spending for people with low income.62 Clearly,
these programs constitute important strands in the nation’s income safety-net, yet they generally are not
taken into account when assessing its strengths and weaknesses. Under an alternative, more
comprehensive measure of poverty than the official one, which includes the net effects of refundable tax
credits and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, a quite different assessment of the effects of the safety net on
poverty among single mothers and their children emerges.
While the Census Bureau publishes a number of alternative, experimental poverty measures, in addition
to the official one, those measures are typically not released until several months after the release of the
official measure. The alternative poverty measures typically do not receive the same focus by researchers
and the public as does the official measure, in part due to the delay in their release, but also due to the
numerous alternative measures that are released, each reflecting varying, often technical, assumptions. A
proposed Supplemental Poverty Measure being jointly developed by the Census Bureau and Bureau of
Labor Statistics, under the direction of OMB, is intended to stand out among the alternative measures as
the “preferred” alternative measure, to supplement the official measure. Among other things, the proposed
Supplemental Poverty Measure would provide a more comprehensive gauge of the effects of income
safety-net programs on poverty than the official measure.
Progress towards achieving the often elusive and conflicting dual goals of reducing child poverty and
cash welfare dependency is only partially apparent under the official U.S. poverty measure, but much
more so under an alternative, more comprehensive income measure. Under the official poverty measure,
poverty among single mothers in 2009 (37.6%) was 5.8 percentage points above its historic low for the
period (31.8% in 2000). In contrast, under a more comprehensive income measure which takes into
62 CRS Report R41625, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Programs, Policy, and Spending, FY2008-
FY2009, by Karen Spar.
CRS-50
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
account SNAP benefits, refundable tax credits (the EITC and ACTC) net of taxes, and economic stimulus
and recovery payments, poverty among single mothers in 2009 (27.3%) fell to a near all-time low (26.6%
in 2002), in spite of the severe 2007-2009 recession (Figure 13). Similarly, whereas the official poverty
rate among children in female-headed families increased from 41.7% in 2008, to 43.4% in 2009, under a
more comprehensive income definition, their poverty rate over the same period fell from 36.0% in 2008
to 32.1% in 2009 (see Figure 19).
Figure 19. Poverty Among Children in Female-Headed Families Under Alternative
Measures, 1987 to 2009
Pe rce nt Poor
70%
62.9% 62.4% 63.1%
61.4% 61.4%
61.6%
61.5%
59.9%
59.1%
60%
57.0% 57.8%
55.1%
54.1%
53.4% 52.9%
52.0% 51.7%
52.1%
52.2%
51.9%
50.8%
50.5%
50.6% 50.4% 50.8% 50.6%
49.8%
48.4%
48.0% 48.4% 48.9% 49.6%
50%
47.0% 47.5%
50.1% 49.8%
49.7% 50.1%
45.2%
49.1%
44.8%
49.1%
43.4%
47.4%
47.3% 47.1%
41.2%
45.9% 46.1%
40.5% 40.3%
45.2% 45.0%
40.3%
41.0% 41.2% 41.1% 41.3% 41.7%
40.1%
43.8%
38.6% 38.4% 38.4%
40%
37.5%
41.2%
36.0%
33.8%
34.4% 33.7% 33.9% 33.6%
38.0%
32.8% 32.8%
33.3%
36.5%
31.8%
32.1%
36.2%
34.2%
30%
31.1%
30.0%
30.4% 29.6% 29.6%
28.8% 28.8%
29.4%
28.7%
29.0%
27.9%
Earnings Poor
20%
Official Poor
Poor After Counting Food Stamps/SNAP, EITC and ACTC Net of FICA and Federal and State Income Taxes, Plus
10%
Stimulus and Recovery Payments
Household Income Below Household Low-Income Threshold
0%
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-15 for supporting
data.
The effects of congressional actions in response to the recent recession on poverty among single mothers
and their children are especially telling under a more comprehensive income measure, but largely go
unnoticed using the official measure. Congressional action in response to the recent recession appears to
have helped counteract the rise in official poverty, and in 2009, to have resulted in a decline in poverty
under a more comprehensive income definition than that offered by the official poverty measure. As noted
earlier (section entitled: “Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions”), Congress extended and
increased Unemployment Insurance benefits, expanded EITC payments to families with three or more
children, expanded ACTC payments to lower-income families by lowering the credit’s refundable income
limit, increased SNAP benefits, and provided economic stimulus and recovery payments to families and
individuals. Among these actions, only the UI benefit expansions would be captured under the official
poverty measure.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
The increased benefits under SNAP, EITC, and the ACTC are a temporary response to the recession, as
were economic stimulus and recovery payments families received. ARRA’s SNAP benefit increase is
expected to last through FY2013. Similarly, ARRA expanded the EITC for families with three or more
children, and extended the ACTC to lower income families through tax year 2010. The Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended
ARRA’s EITC and ACTC provisions through tax year 2012, at which time they are scheduled to expire.
Under the Census Bureau’s official income and poverty measures the effects of these provisions will go
unnoticed.
A work-based income safety net depends upon a strong economy and available jobs for those who are
able and willing to work. The EITC, as an earnings supplement, and the ACTC, as a family income
supplement, are only available to working individuals. Work-based safety net programs may still help
those who were without a job, for part of the year, or who have a job, but work fewer hours than they
would like. However, as support programs, income from the EITC and ACTC are provided as a lump sum
at the beginning of the year following that in which they were earned. As such, the EITC and ACTC may
not help a family meet its immediate income needs due to job loss, or limited work hours. UI benefits are
available only to those with an established work history and who lose a job for qualifying reasons. Work-
based safety net benefits are of no use to individuals who have not recently held a job, and cannot find
one.
Single Mothers’ Attachment to the Work-Based Safety Net
With an increased share of single mothers engaged in the labor market since welfare reform, the
availability of work, and especially full-time work for those who want it, is of special concern, given the
recent recession and slow pace of recovery. Full-time, full-year work among single mothers peaked in
2000, and has fallen twice since, in response to two recessions (2000, and 2007-2009) (see Figure 20). A
high-water mark was reached in 2000 when over four-fifths (83%) of single mothers had a job at some
point during the year. By 2009, the share of single mothers with some attachment during the year had
fallen to about three-quarters (74%). Comparing the two years, 46% worked full-time full-year in 2000,
whereas only about two-fifths (39%) did so in 2009. The share of single mothers who were marginally
employed during the year for economic reasons—they had a job at some time during the year, but for
fewer hours or weeks than they desired—has risen from 13% of all single mothers in 2000, to 19% in
2009. Among this group are those who were unemployed (i.e., without a job for part of the year and
looked for work) as well as “discouraged” workers (i.e., those who were without a job for part of the year
and did not look for work because they believed no jobs were available); it also includes mothers who
worked less than full-time, but desired full-time work.
In 2009, 74% of single mothers had some attachment to a job, and thus potentially had some connection
to the work-based safety net. All of these mothers—those who worked full-time full-year, those who were
marginally employed for economic reasons, and mothers who worked less than full-time full-year for
personal reasons (i.e., taking care of home or family, going to school, ill or disabled, or retired/other)—
might potentially benefit from the EITC, or the ACTC, depending on their annual earnings. Among those
who worked for part of the year, but experienced a period of unemployment, some might qualify for UI
benefits, depending on their work history and the conditions under which they separated from a job. In
addition to the 74% of mothers with some job attachment, another 5% of single mothers were
unemployed for the entire year, or without a job and did not work because they believed no work was
available. Some of these mothers might also qualify for UI benefits depending on their circumstances.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Figure 20. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2009
Percent
100%
Did Not Work During the Year
90%
Due to Per sonal Re as ons
Worked at Any Time During the Yea r
80%
Did not Work During the Year Due to
Une mploym ent or Discouragem ent
70%
Worke d Les s than Full-Year Due to
Une mploym ent or Discouragem ent
60%
Worke d Les s than Full-Tim e,
Involuntary Part-Time Wor ke r
50%
40%
Worke d Full-Tim e, Full-Ye ar
30%
20%
10%
Worke d Les s Than Full-Time
Full-Year for Per sonal Re as ons
0%
87
88
89
90
91
92
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
19
19
19
19
19
19
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-17 for supporting
data
Notes: Persons who worked for 50 weeks or more, and 35 or more hours per week, are designated as full-time, full-year
workers. The unemployed are persons who were without a job and searched for work. Discouraged workers are persons
who were without a job but did not search for work because they believed no jobs were available. Personal reasons for
not working during the year, or working less than full-time, full-year, include taking care of a home or family, attending
school, illness or disability, retired, or other.
Role of Traditional Welfare
Absent available jobs, single mothers may turn to the traditional cash welfare system (i.e., TANF), food
assistance (SNAP), relatives and friends, for basic income support. In part contingent on the nature and
pace of economic recovery, and federal and state budget pressures, funding for traditional welfare
programs, as well as their structure63 (e.g., time limits, work/participation requirements, education and
training, and subsidized employment) may face increased attention, especially if the numbers of aid
applicants increase given a dearth of jobs, and consequent lack of coverage under work-related safety net
programs.
63 For a discussion of issues relating to the TANF, see CRS Report R41781, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block
Grant: Issues for the 112th Congress, by Gene Falk.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Appendix A. From Mothers’ Pensions to TANF—
A Brief History
TANF, signed into law in 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193), replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement program to low-income families with
children. The precursor program which TANF replaced, AFDC, had its beginnings in the Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) program, part of the 1935 Social Security Act, which introduced
federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent
children.
Mothers’ Pensions to Aid to Dependent Children64
Since at least the first White House Conference on Children in 1909 (Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children), and the subsequent creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912, the federal
government has been concerned with social conditions of children. The Conference was an
impetus for states’ enactment of state or locally financed mothers’ pensions (also referred to as
widows’ pensions and or mothers’ aid), which provided minimal cash support to mothers made
destitute, usually due to a husband’s death. Mothers’ aid was intended to help keep mothers at
home to supervise and care for their children, as an alternative to sending children to orphanages
and/or putting them up for adoption, which was a common practice of the time.65 Mothers’
pensions largely went to widows, and payments were limited and restrictive (e.g., many states
imposed rigid requirements as to the “character” of parents to assure that the child was living in a
“suitable home” before granting aid; mothers were required to prove destitution,66 and to agree to
cease or limit employment upon receipt of a pension67). Prior to the 1935 Act, most states had
adopted mothers’ pension laws.68
As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program
introduced federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid
dependent children. The ADC program essentially provided federal dollars to help support states
mothers’ pension programs, that nearly all states had established. Under the 1935 Act, a
“dependent child” was defined as “a child under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or
64 For summary of the legislative history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, see http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/ofa/policy/legisum.htm. Also, CRS Report 84-546 EPW, Brief legislative History of Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act: Grants to States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), by Vee Burke, February 24, 1984
(archived report, available to congressional clients upon request).
65 Mark H. Leff, “Consensus for Reform: The Mothers’-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era,” The Social Service
Review, vol. 47, no. 3 (September 1973), pp. 397-417.
66 See Jane M. Hoey, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Appraising the Social Security Program, vol. 202 (March 1939), pp. 76-78
67 Mark H. Leff, op. cit., p. 402.
68 Missouri and Illinois were the first states to establish mothers’ pensions, in 1911. By 1913, 20 states had mothers’
pensions, and by 1919, 39 states and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii had mothers’ pensions. In 1931, every state
except for Georgia and South Carolina had mothers’ pensions. See Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A
Social History of Welfare in America (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996), p. 133.
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mental incapacity of a parent,” and is living with one or more relatives in his or their own home.69
The ADC program provided payments to states for aid to dependent children with approved state
plans; federal payments at the time were one-third of the sums expended by the state up to a
capped monthly expenditure amount per dependent child.70 The federal program had no provision
for assisting a parent or other relative in the household, although this changed over time.71 In
1950, the federal government began to share in the maintenance costs of the parent or other
caretaker relative. In 1962, support of a second parent in a family who was incapacitated or
unemployed was allowed, and the program’s name was changed to the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
Under state administration, ADC, as well as the mothers’ pension programs which preceded it,
favored children of widows over others. Early evidence from the program indicated that over half
of all children assisted were dependent because of the death of a parent, with most living with
their widowed mother; most of the remainder were living with mothers who were “deserted,
divorced, or separated,” or were living in other settings in which the mother was not present;
about 2% were living with an unmarried mother.72 The comparatively small share of unmarried
mothers receiving ADC assistance in part reflected a program preference to serve widows, and
some unmarried mothers were denied assistance by failing to meet ”suitable home requirements.”
However, children of unmarried mothers at the time represented a relatively small share of all
fatherless children in the early years of the ADC program. In 1938, children of unwed mothers
represented an estimated 3.8% of all children in female-headed households in the U.S.73 Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, extending Social Security benefits to widows and surviving
children of deceased workers covered by the program, would have the effect of reducing the
number of widows and their children from needing ADC, resulting in the program coming to
primarily serve families in which fathers were absent due to divorce or abandonment. By 1961,
widowed families would comprise only 7.7 percent of the ADC caseload, down from 43 percent
in 1937.74
Increased Federal Involvement
In 1938, three years after enactment of the ADC, eight states were still not participating in the
program.75 In 1939, the federal payment rate was raised from one-third to one-half of a raised
maximum payment amount per child, effective January 1940. With increasing federal dollars, the
federal government would help assure state participation in the program, while at the same time
gaining greater leverage in influencing the provision of assistance at the state level.76 By June
69 See Legislative History, Social Security Act of 1935, on the Internet at http://www.ssa.gov/history/35activ.html.
70 The federal maximum payment amounted to $6 per month for the first child in a family, plus $4 per month for each
additional child. The federal matching rate of state AFDC expenditures would grow over time.
71 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, A Brief
History of the AFDC Program, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/1history.pdf.
72 Jane M. Hoey, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Appraising the Social Security Program, vol. 202 (March 1939), pp. 76, 78.
73 Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New York: The Free
Press, 1994), p. 21.
74 Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy form Colonial Times to Present (Boston:
South End Press, 1988), p. 321.
75 Ibid., p. 76.
76 For an in depth discussion, see for example: Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants, Public Assistance in
(continued...)
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1940, all states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were participating in
programs providing child welfare services under the Social Security Act.77 Over time, the federal
share of AFDC expenditures would increase, reaching a minimum of 50% and a permitted
maximum of 83% of total AFDC expenditures by 1965, effective January 1966, for states with an
approved plan for medical assistance programs under Title IXX of the Social Security Act (i.e.,
Medicaid).78
In 1961, the federal Bureau of Public Assistance (BPA), which ran the ADC program, issued a
directive against states’ and localities’ use of “suitable home” rules, that had traditionally been
used to keep children of unwed mothers out of the program. In 1966, the Bureau of Family
Services, which had replaced the BPA in 1962, ordered that state plans for determining eligibility
for AFDC “respect the rights of individuals ... .and not result in practices that violate the
individual’s privacy or personal dignity, or harass him, or violate his constitutional rights.”
Implicitly, states that did not comply could risk losing federal matching funds.79
Legal Challenges to Restrictive State Welfare Practices
Greater federal involvement and regulation of AFDC gave petitioners greater legal standing in
federal court to challenge restrictive state welfare policies. While AFDC was an entitlement to
eligible individuals, as defined by federal law, states still retained control in administering the
program, which included determining eligibility of families applying for assistance. Although
AFDC was an entitlement, practices of granting eligibility for the program varied widely among
states and localities, as had been the case under the mothers’ pensions in the pre-ADC era. The
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-452), the centerpiece of President Lyndon Johnson’s
“War on Poverty,” focused national attention and federal assistance in helping to combat poverty.
Among its provisions was the establishment of an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which
administered a number of programs under the act. Community Action Programs (CAP) were
among OEO’s programs, under which Community Action Agencies (CAAs) took root in local
communities to help promote “maximum feasible participation” of the poor, intended to engage
the poor in seeking solutions to poverty in their communities. OEO also set up legal services to
aid the poor in local communities. At the same time, a burgeoning National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO), independently began to advocate for the rights of the poor.80 Growing
political empowerment of the poor, combined with legal advocacy helped to overturn a number of
restrictive state welfare policies by the U.S. Supreme Court. Such policies included “man-in-the-
house” rules (King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)); long-term residency requirements (Shapiro v.
(...continued)
Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
77 See http://www.ssa.gov/history/1940.html.
78 Under 1958 amendments to the Social Security Act, federal ADC payments to states were no longer based on
individual assistance payments, but on total state expenditures, which were matched within an average payment per
recipient. The federal matching percent could be no less than 50% and no greater than 65%. Under 1965 Amendments
to the act, the federal matching rate grew to a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 83% of expenditures, which varied
by state, depending on an inverse relationship of state per capita income relative to U.S. per capita income. See
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/policy/legisum.htm.
79 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty, 1900-1985 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1986), p. 181.
80 Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New
York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 264-361.
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Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)), and termination of assistance without a fair hearing (Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)), among others. By one estimate, elimination of the residency
requirements alone added some 800,000 persons to the AFDC rolls by 1970.81
Federal Efforts to Stem Rising Public Assistance Caseloads
Figure 2 depicts the number of recipients (children and adults) and welfare cases receiving
assistance under AFDC (and ADC) from 1960 to 1994, the eve of the programs’ repeal. While
some federal efforts served to expand assistance caseloads, such as regulations and enforcement
activities to promote states’ administration of the program’s individual entitlement provisions, and
increasing federal matching payments to states, which shifted more of the financial burden of
providing assistance from states to the federal government, other efforts would seek to restrain
caseload growth and its underlying causes.
Expanding welfare caseloads were beginning to contribute to what some would refer to as a
“welfare crisis,” by the mid-1960s.82 Contributing to the “crisis” was a growing number of
families potentially eligible for cash assistance, as the baby-boom generation began entering
adulthood, as well as changing social behavior relating to marriage, divorce, and childbearing. As
noted earlier, in 1961 families headed by widowed mothers accounted for only about 8% of ADC
families; from 1961 to 1967, the share of families receiving AFDC who were headed by never-
married mothers would increase from 21% to 28%.83 In addition to an increasing number of
potentially eligible families, an increasing share of such families applied for and were granted
assistance during the 1960s, with the participation of eligible families in AFDC increasing “from
perhaps 33 percent in the early 1960s to more than 90 percent in 1971.84”
The Rise (and Fall) of Social Services as an Answer to Reducing
Welfare Dependency
The 1939 extension of social benefits to widows and surviving children of deceased covered
workers had the effect of reducing the number of widows and their children needing assistance
under ADC, resulting in the program coming to primarily serve families in which fathers were
absent due to divorce or abandonment. Changing social trends regarding marriage, divorce, and
childbearing in the post World War II era, contributed to the ADC program’s growth. Under 1956
amendments to the Social Security Act (P.L. 84-880), Congress permitted federal funding to
reimburse states for 50% of the costs of providing social services to public assistance recipients.
Among the legislation’s stated purpose was to enable states to “furnish financial assistance and
other services ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living to help maintain and strengthen family life and ... attain the maximum level of self-support
and personal independence.”
Under 1962 amendments, funding for social services was expanded, and the federal matching rate
was increased to 75%. Expanded funds for social services and training of skilled welfare workers
81 Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 335.
82 See for example, Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the
Family Assistance Plan (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 25.
83 Ibid., p. 334.
84 Patterson, op. cit., p. 179.
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marked the advent of the “casework approach” for addressing the multiple problems that many
public assistance recipients faced. In his statement at the signing of the 1962 Amendments,
President Kennedy described it as “a new approach-stressing services in addition to support,
rehabilitation instead of relief, and training for useful work instead of prolonged dependency ...
[the] objective is to prevent or reduce dependency and to encourage self-care and self-support to
maintain family life where it is adequate and to restore it where it is deficient.”85
Increased case supervision by social workers was intended to identify and address problems aid
recipients faced, leading to their “rehabilitation” and helping to move them toward self
sufficiency. A major premise was that the provision of social servicers could break the bonds of
dependency many welfare families faced, by addressing their underlying problems. Consequent
to the increased emphasis on social services, income maintenance workers often came to serve
the dual function of eligibility technician and social caseworker. In implementing the law, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), set caseload and supervisory standards to
assure smaller workloads and time for workers to deal with clients.86 The amendments also
provided additional funds for training welfare personnel in assuming the additional casework
functions associated with identifying clients’ need for services, as well as brokering and/or
providing those services. Provision of social services became an integrated function with the
provision of cash aid. States provided a panoply of services within a broad, somewhat ill-defined,
range of service categories (e.g., educational or vocational training, health care, improved
financial functioning, maintaining family life and improving family functioning, maintaining and
improving social relationships and community life, self-care services, self-support services). In
order to receive reimbursement at the 75% federal matching rate, a case had to be considered a
“service case” and had to be part of a caseload of designated size. States faced a financial
incentive to provide social services as a result of the comparatively high federal matching rate,
which contributed to burgeoning federal spending on social services in the early 1970s.87
AFDC caseloads continued to rise through the course of the 1960s, in spite of increased funding
for the provision of rehabilitative services. In 1972, HEW issued a mandate to states to separate
the provision of services from the administrative function of determining eligibility for aid.88
Under the mandate, social services would still be provided at the families’ request, rather than on
a routine basis. The 1974 Social Security Amendments created a new Title XX, which expanded
eligibility for free or subsidized social services to the non-poor, but with a spending cap, rather
than an open-ended matching grant. Title XX further severed the provision of social services from
the provision of cash aid.
85 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Welfare Amendments
Bill, July 26, 1962, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available on the Internet at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8788.
86 A case worker was to carry no more than 60 cases and no supervisor to have more than five workers. President’s
Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, Background Papers, 1970, pp. 299-309.
87 See Martha Derthick, Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1975).
88 For a brief discussion of the separation of social services from income maintenance, see Mark E. Courtney et al.,
“Comparing Welfare and Child Welfare Populations: An Argument for Rethinking the Safety Net,” in Child Welfare
Research: Advances for Practice and Policy, ed. Duncan Lindsey and Aron Shlonsky (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008), pp. 273-275.
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Federal Efforts to Constrain AFDC Caseload Growth Due to Absent Fathers
Under 1967 Social Security Act amendments, Congress attempted to restrain AFDC caseload
growth resulting from children’s fathers continued absence from the home. States were required
to establish programs to determine paternity and to locate absent parents and secure support from
them.89 Additionally, Congress imposed a “freeze” on federal matching payments for AFDC,
which would limit the availability of federal matching funds for children who were receiving
AFDC due to continued absence of a parent from the home.90 Under the provision, federal
matching funds would not be available to states after July 1, 1969 for any increase above the
January-March 1968 level in the proportion of the state’s children under age 18 receiving AFDC
on grounds of the continued absence of their father. Implementation of the provision was
postponed, and subsequently repealed by Congress in 1969 before taking effect (P.L. 91-41).
Under 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act, a new part D91, Child Support and
Establishment of Paternity, was added to title IV. Among Part D provisions, states were required
to have plans for establishing paternity and establishing child support and were subject to loss of
5% of AFDC federal matching funds for failure to have “effective” programs. AFDC applicants
and recipients were required to “cooperate” in identifying and locating children’s fathers, and
were required to assign child support rights to the state. Additionally, Part D required the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to establish a separate organizational unit
to monitor state programs and to operate a Parent Locator Service, making use of federal and
state records.92
Promoting Self-Sufficiency—Work Incentives, Requirements,
and Sanctions
In 1961, Congress permitted states to include a second, unemployed, parent as part of the
assistance unit under AFDC, the Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program, but were required to
deny assistance if the unemployed parent refused to accept work without “good cause”.93 In 1962,
Congress authorized federal funds for states to establish Community Work and Training (CWT)
programs for federally aided adult recipients. CWT jobs were to pay at least an equivalent wage
for the same type of work as prevailing in the community, or the minimum wage, if higher. States
were required to deduct only “net” earnings from the grant of the working welfare recipient (i.e.,
after any reasonable work-related expenses) and were permitted to allow working welfare
recipients to deduct any income set aside for identifiable needs of the dependent child.94
89 Vee Burke, op. cit., p. 7.
90 Ibid., p. 7. For a more detailed discussion see Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service Report (HV 84 D,
ED-372), The Limitation on Federal Matching in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program – The So-
Called AFDC Freeze, by William Fullerton, April 1, 1969 (archived report, available by request).
91 The 1967 amendments also restructured title IV (Grants to States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children) of
the act into parts: with Part A—AFDC; Part B—Child Welfare Services (a new part, transferred from title V, and
revised; and a new Part C—Work Incentive Program (WIN), discussed later. Vee Burke, op. cit., p. 6.
92 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
93 Ibid., p. 4.
94 Ibid., p. 4.
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Amendments of 1967 replaced CWT with the Work Incentive (WIN) program, a joint program
between HEW and the Department of Labor (DOL), that required states to set up work and
training programs for “appropriate” AFDC recipients.95 The federal share of WIN spending was
set at 80%, with states assuming the remainder. The 1967 amendments also required states to
disregard a portion of AFDC adults’ earnings—the first $30 plus one-third of the remainder—
from income counted against the AFDC grant. Under prior law, other than a required deduction
for work expenses from net earnings, the AFDC grant could be reduced by one dollar for every
dollar earned. Under the 1967 provisions, the AFDC benefit would phase out more gradually,
with a benefit reduction of 67 cents for each dollar earned during the month, in excess of $30.
While providing a financial incentive for AFDC recipients to engage in work, the higher
disregard would allow working recipients to stay on the program at higher income levels than
otherwise, tending to have a potential countervailing influence on caseloads.
The 1967 amendments also signaled a shift in emphasis in the provision of services from
“rehabilitative,” personal “competence-enhancing,” services, to work-related services, such as
vocational training, job and work training referral, and child care, to promote self-sufficiency.96
In 1971, Congress required that all AFDC parents register for work or training, except for
mothers with a child under age 6. In 1981, Congress gave states the authority to design and test
their own “welfare-to-work” programs. In 1988, the Family Support Act replaced the WIN
program with the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (JOBS). The program
extended work requirements (which could include work preparation activities, such as education
and training) from mothers with a child as young as six to mothers with a child as young as three
and, at states’ option, of extending work requirements to mothers with a child as young as age
one. The act also required states to provide benefits to a second parent who was incapacitated or
unemployed (AFDC-UP program).
A number of states experimented with changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted
to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).97 Among the features
of state programs tested under waiver authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements,
experiments requiring a “work first” approach rather than “training first, followed by work,” time
limits, strengthened sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare
benefits for a new baby conceived or born while a mother was receiving welfare.
95 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, A Brief History of
the AFDC Program, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/1history.pdf.
96 Mildred Rein, “Social Services as a Work Strategy,” The Social Service Review, vol. 49, no. 4 (December 1975), pp.
515-538.
97 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, established in 1962, grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance of
states with certain sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or demonstrations that the Secretary judges
to promote specific objectives of the act. For a discussion of waiver authority under this section, see U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, State Welfare Waivers: An Overview,
available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/isp/waiver2/waivers.htm.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Appendix B. Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on
the CPS
A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated caseload counts
suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases and that the CPS undercount has worsened in
recent years. Figure B-1 shows that from 1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80% of
the AFDC administrative caseload count, but in 2006 the CPS captured only about 55%.98
Worsened reporting of cash welfare on the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop
in welfare receipt among single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive
assistance, rather than families who do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS.
Figure B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases:
CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts
(Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2009
Millions
Percent
5.0
100%
4.5
90%
Administrative count (left axis)
4.0
80%
CPS as a percent of
administrative count
(right axis)
3.5
70%
3.0
60%
2.5
50%
CPS count (left axis)
2.0
40%
1.5
30%
1.0
20%
0.5
10%
0.0
0%
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Year
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data and Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS) caseload data. See Table B-1 for supporting data.
98 The CPS estimates are for all adults reporting receipt of AFDC or TANF during the year, converted to an estimate of
an annual monthly average, based on the number of months over the year recipients reported receiving assistance. For a
detailed discussion of cash welfare under-reporting on the CPS and other surveys see Richard Bavier, Accounting for
increases in failure to report AFDC/TANF receipt, Office of Management and Budget, Unpublished manuscript,
Washington, DC, 2000.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases:
CPS Versus Administrative Caseload Counts,
Annual Monthly Average, 1987 to 2009
(Numbers in millions)
Persons
Reporting
AFDC and
AFDC or
TANF cases
CPS as a
TANF
Based on
Percent of
Receipt on
Administrative Administrative
Year
the CPSa
Datab
Total
1987 3.039
3.719
81.7%
1988 3.056
3.691
82.8%
1989 2.901
3.738
77.6%
1990 3.226
3.995
80.8%
1991 3.554
4.434
80.2%
1992 3.596
4.765
75.5%
1993 3.844
4.949
77.7%
1994 3.551
4.972
71.4%
1995 3.193
4.734
67.8%
1996 3.022
4.380
69.0%
1997 2.355
3.690
63.8%
1998 1.892
3.007
62.9%
1999 1.464
2.515
58.2%
2000 1.392
2.181
63.8%
2001 1.216
2.075
58.6%
2002 1.140
2.023
56.3%
2003 1.346
2.001
67.3%
2004 1.160
1.958
59.3%
2005 1.227
1.876
65.4%
2006 0.955
1.766
54.1%
2007 0.907
1.659
54.7%
2008 0.905
1.620
55.9%
2009 1.017
1.755
57.9%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) AFDC and TANF caseload data.
Note: Support table for Figure B-1.
a. Estimated average monthly number based on number of months CPS respondents indicated they received
AFDC or TANF during the year.
b. Average monthly number of AFDC or TANF cases in the 50 states and the District of Columbia.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Appendix C. Support Tables
Table C-1. Children’s Family Living Arrangements and Poverty Status, 1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Female-Headed Families
Lives
with
Male-
Other
Headed
Relatives,
Married-
Separated,
Families,
Apart
Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
from
Year Total Families Total Married
Absent Divorced
Widowed
Absent
Parents
All Children—Numbers in 1,000s
1987 62,906 46,062 13,617 4,231 3,405
5,041
939
1,795 1,433
1988 63,398 46,562 13,700 4,290 3,380
5,227
803
1,795 1,341
1989 63,816 46,526 13,874 4,365 3,416
5,118
975
1,994 1,421
1990 64,730 46,674 14,608 5,040 3,583
5,206
780
2,022 1,426
1991 65,576 46,662 15,396 5,410 3,790
5,507
688
2,185 1,333
1992 66,511 47,197 15,586 5,511 3,739
5,687
649
2,287 1,441
1993 68,879 48,128 16,338 6,003 3,839
5,800
696
2,262 2,150
1994 69,596 48,300 16,480 5,865 3,901
6,019
695
2,467 2,350
1995 70,140 48,246 16,993 6,363 3,928
6,040
662
2,764 2,136
1996 70,194 48,412 16,740 6,596 3,753
5,824
566
3,061 1,981
1997 70,561 48,649 16,639 6,696 3,560
5,708
676
3,146 2,126
1998 70,864 48,805 16,833 6,759 3,561
5,828
685
3,098 2,129
1999 71,200 49,814 16,172 6,590 3,225
5,658
698
3,062 2,152
2000 71,261 49,820 16,120 6,734 3,109
5,577
699
3,137 2,184
2001 71,534 49,685 16,483 6,872 3,289
5,602
720
3,294 2,072
2002 72,238 49,925 16,780 7,008 3,351
5,758
663
3,321 2,211
2003 72,484 49,596 17,116 7,202 3,298
5,910
706
3,392 2,379
2004 72,757 49,499 17,229 7,428 3,395
5,809
597
3,500 2,528
2005 72,717 49,675 17,162 7,441 3,331
5,769
621
3,467 2,413
2006 73,259 49,992 17,921 7,833 3,616
5,876
596
3,327 2,018
2007 73,554 49,406 18,178 8,203 3,512
5,799
663
3,718 2,251
2008 73,637 49,583 18,086 8,394 3,688
5,367
637
3,614 2,355
2009 74,101 49,117 18,706 8,646 3,895
5,524
641
3,898 2,380
All Children—Percent Distribution
1987 100.0% 73.2% 21.6%
6.7%
5.4%
8.0%
1.5% 2.9%
2.3%
1988 100.0% 73.4% 21.6%
6.8%
5.3%
8.2%
1.3% 2.8%
2.1%
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Female-Headed Families
Lives
with
Male-
Other
Headed
Relatives,
Married-
Separated,
Families,
Apart
Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
from
Year Total Families Total Married
Absent Divorced
Widowed
Absent
Parents
1989 100.0% 72.9% 21.7%
6.8%
5.4%
8.0%
1.5% 3.1%
2.2%
1990 100.0% 72.1% 22.6%
7.8%
5.5%
8.0%
1.2% 3.1%
2.2%
1991 100.0% 71.2% 23.5%
8.3%
5.8%
8.4%
1.0% 3.3%
2.0%
1992 100.0% 71.0% 23.4%
8.3%
5.6%
8.6%
1.0% 3.4%
2.2%
1993 100.0% 69.9% 23.7%
8.7%
5.6%
8.4%
1.0% 3.3%
3.1%
1994 100.0% 69.4% 23.7%
8.4%
5.6%
8.6%
1.0% 3.5%
3.4%
1995 100.0% 68.8% 24.2%
9.1%
5.6%
8.6%
0.9% 3.9%
3.0%
1996 100.0% 69.0% 23.8%
9.4%
5.3%
8.3%
0.8% 4.4%
2.8%
1997 100.0% 68.9% 23.6%
9.5%
5.0%
8.1%
1.0% 4.5%
3.0%
1998 100.0% 68.9% 23.8%
9.5%
5.0%
8.2%
1.0% 4.4%
3.0%
1999 100.0% 70.0% 22.7%
9.3%
4.5%
7.9%
1.0% 4.3%
3.0%
2000 100.0% 69.9% 22.6%
9.5%
4.4%
7.8%
1.0% 4.4%
3.1%
2001 100.0% 69.5% 23.0%
9.6%
4.6%
7.8%
1.0% 4.6%
2.9%
2002 100.0% 69.1% 23.2%
9.7%
4.6%
8.0%
0.9% 4.6%
3.1%
2003 100.0% 68.4% 23.6%
9.9%
4.5%
8.2%
1.0% 4.7%
3.3%
2004 100.0% 68.0% 23.7% 10.2%
4.7%
8.0%
0.8% 4.8%
3.5%
2005 100.0% 68.3% 23.6% 10.2%
4.6%
7.9%
0.9% 4.8%
3.3%
2006 100.0% 68.2% 24.5% 10.7%
4.9%
8.0%
0.8% 4.5%
2.8%
2007 100.0% 67.2% 24.7% 11.2%
4.8%
7.9%
0.9% 5.1%
3.1%
2008 100.0% 67.3% 24.6% 11.4%
5.0%
7.3%
0.9% 4.9%
3.2%
2009 100.0% 66.3% 25.2% 11.7%
5.3%
7.5%
0.9% 5.3%
3.2%
Poor Children—Numbers in 1,000s
1987 12,580 4,619 7,081 2,845 2,106
1,801
329
332 549
1988 12,224 4,317 7,088 2,821 2,040
1,925
301
365 456
1989 12,380 4,535 6,904 2,800 1,879
1,856
369
416 524
1990 13,214 4,718 7,615 3,306 2,127
1,910
273
378 503
1991 14,054 4,869 8,223 3,578 2,439
2,016
191
469 493
1992 14,385 4,987 8,252 3,654 2,204
2,183
210
541 606
1993 15,456 5,571 8,532 3,869 2,230
2,178
255
546 807
1994 15,013 5,258 8,367 3,655 2,201
2,297
214
644 743
1995 14,345 4,763 8,221 4,015 2,140
1,875
191
606 755
1996 14,126 4,802 7,861 3,882 1,917
1,878
183
682 781
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Female-Headed Families
Lives
with
Male-
Other
Headed
Relatives,
Married-
Separated,
Families,
Apart
Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
from
Year Total Families Total Married
Absent Divorced
Widowed
Absent
Parents
1997 13,786 4,503 7,907 3,870 1,814
2,034
188
628 749
1998 13,144 4,380 7,541 3,720 1,794
1,799
228
613 610
1999 11,812 4,100 6,515 3,437 1,346
1,532
200
558 639
2000 11,337 3,905 6,216 3,211 1,368
1,393
243
575 641
2001 11,450 3,896 6,334 3,233 1,326
1,540
236
634 585
2002 11,869 4,188 6,443 3,269 1,497
1,465
212
606 631
2003 12,591 4,218 6,868 3,631 1,444
1,588
205
775 729
2004 12,760 4,315 7,065 3,742 1,582
1,541
200
641 739
2005 12,582 4,104 7,077 3,819 1,597
1,492
169
645 756
2006 12,589 3,978 7,371 3,884 1,625
1,655
209
678 562
2007 13,114 4,125 7,511 4,111 1,593
1,577
231
765 714
2008 13,826 4,792 7,536 4,230 1,633
1,469
203
762 735
2009 15,168 5,355 8,113 4,482 1,826
1,613
192 1,063 637
Poor Children—Percentage Distribution
1987 100.0% 36.7% 56.3% 22.6%
16.7%
14.3%
2.6% 2.6%
4.4%
1988 100.0% 35.3% 58.0% 23.1%
16.7%
15.7%
2.5% 3.0%
3.7%
1989 100.0% 36.6% 55.8% 22.6%
15.2%
15.0%
3.0% 3.4%
4.2%
1990 100.0% 35.7% 57.6% 25.0%
16.1%
14.5%
2.1% 2.9%
3.8%
1991 100.0% 34.6% 58.5% 25.5%
17.4%
14.3%
1.4% 3.3%
3.5%
1992 100.0% 34.7% 57.4% 25.4%
15.3%
15.2%
1.5% 3.8%
4.2%
1993 100.0% 36.0% 55.2% 25.0%
14.4%
14.1%
1.7% 3.5%
5.2%
1994 100.0% 35.0% 55.7% 24.3%
14.7%
15.3%
1.4% 4.3%
4.9%
1995 100.0% 33.2% 57.3% 28.0%
14.9%
13.1%
1.3% 4.2%
5.3%
1996 100.0% 34.0% 55.6% 27.5%
13.6%
13.3%
1.3% 4.8%
5.5%
1997 100.0% 32.7% 57.4% 28.1%
13.2%
14.8%
1.4% 4.6%
5.4%
1998 100.0% 33.3% 57.4% 28.3%
13.6%
13.7%
1.7% 4.7%
4.6%
1999 100.0% 34.7% 55.2% 29.1%
11.4%
13.0%
1.7% 4.7%
5.4%
2000 100.0% 34.4% 54.8% 28.3%
12.1%
12.3%
2.1% 5.1%
5.7%
2001 100.0% 34.0% 55.3% 28.2%
11.6%
13.4%
2.1% 5.5%
5.1%
2002 100.0% 35.3% 54.3% 27.5%
12.6%
12.3%
1.8% 5.1%
5.3%
2003 100.0% 33.5% 54.6% 28.8%
11.5%
12.6%
1.6% 6.2%
5.8%
2004 100.0% 33.8% 55.4% 29.3%
12.4%
12.1%
1.6% 5.0%
5.8%
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Female-Headed Families
Lives
with
Male-
Other
Headed
Relatives,
Married-
Separated,
Families,
Apart
Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
from
Year Total Families Total Married
Absent Divorced
Widowed
Absent
Parents
2005 100.0% 32.6% 56.3% 30.4%
12.7%
11.9%
1.3% 5.1%
6.0%
2006 100.0% 31.6% 58.6% 30.9%
12.9%
13.1%
1.7% 5.4%
4.5%
2007 100.0% 31.5% 57.3% 31.3%
12.1%
12.0%
1.8% 5.8%
5.4%
2008 100.0% 34.7% 54.5% 30.6%
11.8%
10.6%
1.5% 5.5%
5.3%
2009 100.0% 35.3% 53.5% 29.5%
12.0%
10.6%
1.3% 7.0%
4.2%
Child Poverty Rate—Poor Children as a Percent of Total Children, By Family Living Arrangement
1987 20.0% 10.0% 52.0% 67.2%
61.8%
35.7% 35.1% 18.5% 38.3%
1988 19.3% 9.3% 51.7% 65.7%
60.4%
36.8% 37.5% 20.3% 34.0%
1989 19.4% 9.7% 49.8% 64.1%
55.0%
36.3% 37.8% 20.9% 36.9%
1990 20.4% 10.1% 52.1% 65.6%
59.4%
36.7% 34.9% 18.7% 35.3%
1991 21.4% 10.4% 53.4% 66.1%
64.3%
36.6% 27.7% 21.5% 37.0%
1992 21.6% 10.6% 52.9% 66.3%
58.9%
38.4% 32.3% 23.6% 42.1%
1993 22.4% 11.6% 52.2% 64.4%
58.1%
37.5% 36.7% 24.1% 37.5%
1994 21.6% 10.9% 50.8% 62.3%
56.4%
38.2% 30.8% 26.1% 31.6%
1995 20.5% 9.9% 48.4% 63.1%
54.5%
31.0% 28.8% 21.9% 35.4%
1996 20.1% 9.9% 47.0% 58.8%
51.1%
32.2% 32.4% 22.3% 39.4%
1997 19.5% 9.3% 47.5% 57.8%
51.0%
35.6% 27.8% 20.0% 35.2%
1998 18.5% 9.0% 44.8% 55.0%
50.4%
30.9% 33.3% 19.8% 28.7%
1999 16.6% 8.2% 40.3% 52.2%
41.7%
27.1% 28.7% 18.2% 29.7%
2000 15.9% 7.8% 38.6% 47.7%
44.0%
25.0% 34.8% 18.3% 29.4%
2001 16.0% 7.8% 38.4% 47.0%
40.3%
27.5% 32.7% 19.3% 28.3%
2002 16.4% 8.4% 38.4% 46.6%
44.7%
25.5% 31.9% 18.3% 28.5%
2003 17.4% 8.5% 40.1% 50.4%
43.8%
26.9% 29.1% 22.8% 30.6%
2004 17.5% 8.7% 41.0% 50.4%
46.6%
26.5% 33.5% 18.3% 29.2%
2005 17.3% 8.3% 41.2% 51.3%
47.9%
25.9% 27.2% 18.6% 31.3%
2006 17.2% 8.0% 41.1% 49.6%
44.9%
28.2% 35.0% 20.4% 27.9%
2007 17.8% 8.3% 41.3% 50.1%
45.3%
27.2% 34.9% 20.6% 31.7%
2008 18.8% 9.7% 41.7% 50.4%
44.3%
27.4% 31.9% 21.1% 31.2%
2009 20.5% 10.9% 43.4% 51.8%
46.9%
29.2% 29.9% 27.3% 26.8%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 1.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Assistance
Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2010
(Annual monthly average, in millions)
Calendar
Year
Cases Recipients
Children Adults
1960 790,910
3,011,508
2,330,042
691,956
1961 872,722
3,362,722
2,597,700
765,022
1962 939,275
3,703,896
2,843,652
860,244
1963 963,368
3,944,635
2,956,962
987,673
1964
1,010,107 4,194,603 3,144,690 1,049,913
1965
1,060,214 4,421,650 3,320,559 1,101,091
1966
1,095,533 4,546,122 3,433,908 1,112,215
1967
1,219,553 5,013,795 3,771,218 1,242,578
1968
1,409,664 5,702,377 4,273,606 1,428,771
1969
1,695,612 6,689,158 4,973,458 1,715,700
1970
2,206,799 8,461,892 6,211,583 2,250,308
1971
2,762,619 10,242,130 7,434,512 2,807,618
1972
3,048,031 10,944,008 7,905,071 3,038,937
1973
3,147,972 10,949,112 7,902,756 3,046,356
1974
3,187,232 10,825,730 7,803,440 3,022,291
1975
3,481,362 11,318,736 8,070,972 3,247,764
1976
3,564,887 11,283,516 7,981,688 3,301,829
1977
3,568,481 11,015,176 7,742,535 3,272,641
1978
3,516,649 10,550,607 7,363,099 3,187,509
1979
3,509,192 10,311,586 7,181,272 3,130,314
1980
3,712,309 10,774,046 7,419,183 3,354,864
1981
3,835,489 11,079,117 7,526,934 3,552,183
1982
3,541,525 10,358,302 6,902,830 3,455,472
1983
3,686,163 10,760,935 7,097,744 3,663,191
1984
3,713,929 10,830,529 7,143,705 3,686,824
1985
3,701,033 10,855,284 7,197,601 3,657,683
1986
3,763,252 11,037,797 7,333,801 3,703,996
1987
3,775,573 11,026,664 7,366,159 3,660,505
1988
3,748,580 10,914,679 7,328,786 3,585,893
1989
3,798,348 10,992,248 7,418,966 3,573,282
1990
4,056,584 11,694,712 7,910,836 3,783,876
1991
4,497,186 12,930,472 8,714,749 4,215,723
1992
4,829,094 13,773,319 9,302,846 4,470,473
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Calendar
Year
Cases Recipients
Children Adults
1993
5,011,827 14,205,484 9,574,475 4,631,010
1994
5,032,632 14,160,920 9,568,359 4,592,561
1995
4,790,749 13,418,386 9,134,603 4,283,783
1996
4,434,160 12,320,970 8,468,759 3,852,212
1997
3,740,179
10,375,993 n/a n/a
1998
3,050,335
8,347,136 n/a n/a
1999
2,554,069
6,824,347 n/a n/a
2000
2,302,780 6,143,156 4,478,742 1,654,818
2001
2,191,506 5,716,797 4,200,666 1,515,552
2002
2,187,158 5,609,012 4,118,797 1,479,433
2003
2,180,075 5,489,786 4,062,665 1,416,022
2004
2,153,066 5,341,859 3,969,376 1,361,701
2005
2,060,282 5,025,650 3,758,077 1,261,392
2006
1,905,785 4,577,114 3,455,961 1,121,153
2007 1,729,894
4,075,611
3,119,519 956,091
2008 1,700,249
4,001,330
3,056,690 944,640
2009
1,838,169 4,367,414 3,294,392 1,073,254
2010a 1,909,275 4,569,433 3,418,995 1,150,438
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-
reports/index.htm.
Notes: N/A separate estimates for children and adults are not available from 1997 to 1999, due to changes in
state reporting requirements during the transition from AFDC to TANF.
Support table for Figure 2 and Figure 3.
a. Preliminary data based on the first nine months of 2010.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-3. Poverty Among Related Children Under Age 18,
All Children and Children in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present)
1960 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
All Children
Children in Female-Headed Households
Poverty
Poverty
Rate
Share of
Share of
Rate
(percent
all
all Poor (percent
Year Total Poor poor) Total
Children Poor Children
poor)
1960 65,275
17,288
26.5 5,987 9.2 4,095
23.7 68.4
1961 65,792
16,577
25.2 6,212 9.4 4,044
24.4 65.1
1962 67,385
16,630
24.7 6,419 9.5 4,506
27.1 70.2
1963 68,837
15,691
22.8 6,419 9.3 4,554
29.0 70.9
1964 69,364
15,736
22.7 6,838 9.9 4,422
28.1 64.7
1965 69,638
14,388
20.7 7,098
10.2 4,562
31.7 64.3
1966 69,869
12,146
17.4 7,106
10.2 4,262
35.1 60.0
1967 70,058
11,427
16.3 7,344
10.5 4,246
37.2 57.8
1968 70,035
10,739
15.3 7,323
10.5 4,409
41.1 60.2
1969 68,746 9,501
13.8 7,820
11.4 4,247
44.7 54.3
1970 68,815
10,235
14.9 7,987
11.6 4,689
45.8 58.7
1971 68,474
10,344
15.1 9,127
13.3 4,850
46.9 53.1
1972 67,592
10,082
14.9 9,600
14.2 5,094
50.5 53.1
1973 66,626 9,453
14.2 9,929
14.9 5,171
54.7 52.1
1974 65,802 9,967
15.1 10,458
15.9 5,387
54.0 51.5
1975 64,750
10,882
16.8 10,622
16.4 5,597
51.4 52.7
1976 63,729
10,081
15.8 10,739
16.9 5,583
55.4 52.0
1977 62,823
10,028
16.0 11,238
17.9 5,658
56.4 50.3
1978 61,987 9,722
15.7 11,232
18.1 5,687
58.5 50.6
1979 62,646 9,993
16.0 11,595
18.5 5,635
56.4 48.6
1980 62,168
11,114
17.9 11,539
18.6 5,866
52.8 50.8
1981 61,756
12,068
19.5 12,059
19.5 6,305
52.2 52.3
1982 61,565
13,139
21.3 11,946
19.4 6,696
51.0 56.1
1983 61,578
13,427
21.8 12,172
19.8 6,747
50.2 55.4
1984 61,681
12,929
21.0 12,536
20.3 6,772
52.4 54.0
1985 62,019
12,483
20.1 12,531
20.2 6,716
53.8 53.6
1986 62,009
12,257
19.8 12,763
20.6 6,943
56.6 54.4
1987 62,423
12,275
19.7 13,066
20.9 7,019
57.2 53.7
1988 62,906
11,935
19.0 13,146
20.9 6,955
58.3 52.9
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
All Children
Children in Female-Headed Households
Poverty
Poverty
Rate
Share of
Share of
Rate
(percent
all
all Poor (percent
Year Total Poor poor) Total
Children Poor Children
poor)
1989 63,225
12,001
19.0 13,316
21.1 6,808
56.7 51.1
1990 63,908
12,715
19.9 13,793
21.6 7,363
57.9 53.4
1991 64,800
13,658
21.1 14,545
22.4 8,065
59.0 55.4
1992 67,256
14,521
21.6 15,319
22.8 8,368
57.6 54.6
1993 68,040
14,961
22.0 15,844
23.3 8,503
56.8 53.7
1994 68,819
14,610
21.2 15,924
23.1 8,427
57.7 52.9
1995 69,425
13,999
20.2 16,637
24.0 8,364
59.7 50.3
1996 69,411
13,764
19.8 16,213
23.4 7,990
58.0 49.3
1997 69,844
13,422
19.2 16,175
23.2 7,928
59.1 49.0
1998 70,253
12,845
18.3 16,550
23.6 7,627
59.4 46.1
1999 70,424
11,678
16.6 15,891
22.6 6,694
57.3 42.1
2000 70,538
11,005
15.6 15,717
22.3 6,300
57.2 40.1
2001 70,950
11,175
15.8 16,137
22.7 6,341
56.7 39.3
2002 71,619
11,646
16.3 16,565
23.1 6,564
56.4 39.6
2003 71,907
12,340
17.2 16,964
23.6 7,085
57.4 41.8
2004 72,133
12,473
17.3 17,081
23.7 7,152
57.3 41.9
2005 72,095
12,335
17.1 16,862
23.4 7,210
58.4 42.8
2006 72,609
12,299
16.9 17,416
24.0 7,341
59.7 42.2
2007 72,792
12,802
17.6 17,557
24.1 7,546
58.9 43.0
2008 72,980
13,507
18.5 17,456
23.9 7,587
56.2 43.5
2009 73,410
14,774
20.1 17,907
24.4 7,942
53.8 44.4
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Census Bureau historical series,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html, “Table 10. Related Children in
Female Householder Families, by Poverty Status.”
Notes: Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS
definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current
Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Support table for Figure 4.
Congressional Research Service
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Table C-4. Mothers with Related Children Under Age 18, by Poverty and Marital Status, 1987 to 2009
(in thousands)
Single Mothers
Separated,
Married,
All Single Mothers
Never Married
Spouse Absent
Divorced
Widowed
Spouse Present
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Year Total Poor Poor Total Poor Poor Total Poor Poor Total Poor Poor Total Poor Poor Total Poor Poor
1987 8,193
3,661 44.7% 2,689
1,559 58.0% 1,787 975 54.6% 3,130 948 30.3% 588 180 30.6%
24,992
1,912 7.7%
1988 8,321
3,650 43.9% 2,798
1,595 57.0% 1,770 911 51.5% 3,224 966 30.0% 529 177 33.5%
25,096
1,785 7.1%
1989 8,400
3,506 41.7% 2,775
1,536 55.4% 1,836 860 46.9% 3,197 930 29.1% 593 179 30.2%
24,921
1,816 7.3%
1990 8,745
3,821 43.7% 3,100
1,730 55.8% 1,922 986 51.3% 3,225 956 29.6% 498 148 29.7%
24,863
1,938 7.8%
1991 9,031 4,101 45.4% 3,284 1,909 58.1% 1,950 1,075 55.1% 3,349 1,017 30.4% 448
99 22.2% 24,880 2,075
8.3%
1992 9,567 4,339 45.4% 3,595 2,059 57.3% 2,027 1,039 51.3% 3,524 1,128 32.0% 421 112 26.6% 25,386 2,178
8.6%
1993 9,860 4,456 45.2% 3,830 2,139 55.8% 2,044 1,050 51.4% 3,544 1,128 31.8% 443 140 31.7% 25,614 2,295
9.0%
1994 9,837
4,203 42.7% 3,681
1,982 53.8% 2,050 992 48.4% 3,674
1,113 30.3% 432 117 27.0%
25,646
2,170 8.5%
1995 9,887
3,971 40.2% 3,724
1,963 52.7% 2,083 960 46.1% 3,668 949 25.9% 411 99 24.0%
25,386
1,923 7.6%
1996 10,052
4,005 39.8% 4,097
2,033 49.6% 1,965 869 44.3% 3,605 988 27.4% 385 115 29.9%
25,603
1,921 7.5%
1997 9,874
3,946 40.0% 4,154
2,043 49.2% 1,838 794 43.2% 3,448
1,014 29.4% 435 95 21.8%
25,735
1,785 6.9%
1998 9,881
3,685 37.3% 4,184
1,933 46.2% 1,813 754 41.6% 3,489 884 25.3% 396 115 29.1%
25,573
1,775 6.9%
1999 9,741
3,314 34.0% 4,197
1,869 44.5% 1,725 598 34.6% 3,425 750 21.9% 394 98 24.8%
25,806
1,647 6.4%
2000 9,712
3,090 31.8% 4,199
1,668 39.7% 1,662 610 36.7% 3,404 696 20.5% 447 116 26.0%
26,563
1,557 5.9%
2001 10,044
3,259 32.4% 4,311
1,716 39.8% 1,787 614 34.4% 3,501 804 23.0% 445 124 27.9%
26,303
1,574 6.0%
2002 10,206
3,284 32.2% 4,422
1,737 39.3% 1,822 695 38.2% 3,538 736 20.8% 424 115 27.2%
26,484
1,789 6.8%
2003 10,411
3,525 33.9% 4,511
1,917 42.5% 1,758 650 37.0% 3,699 847 22.9% 443 110 24.8%
26,414
1,841 7.0%
2004 10,489
3,663 34.9% 4,647
2,016 43.4% 1,806 726 40.2% 3,631 810 22.3% 404 111 27.4%
26,797
1,858 6.9%
CRS-71
Single Mothers
Separated,
Married,
All Single Mothers
Never Married
Spouse Absent
Divorced
Widowed
Spouse Present
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Year Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
2005 10,476
3,640 34.7% 4,657
2,040 43.8% 1,777 716 40.3% 3,618 786 21.7% 424 98 23.1%
26,507
1,729 6.5%
2006 10,938
3,841 35.1% 4,934
2,100 42.6% 1,970 777 39.5% 3,652 850 23.3% 381 114 29.9%
26,857
1,709 6.4%
2007 10,748
3,790 35.3% 4,961
2,135 43.0% 1,873 734 39.2% 3,507 796 22.7% 407 124 30.6%
25,851
1,718 6.6%
2008 10,797
3,863 35.8% 5,120
2,220 43.4% 2,002 772 38.5% 3,284 759 23.1% 391 112 28.6%
25,861
1,933 7.5%
2009 10,990
4,128 37.6% 5,225
2,365 45.3% 2,019 825 40.8% 3,333 831 24.9% 413 107 26.0%
25,398
2,109 8.3%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 5 and Figure 6.
CRS-72
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-5. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt,
1987 to 2009
(in thousands)
Number of
Number
Poor but Not
Neither Poor
Mother-Only
Receiving
Receiving
nor Receiving
Year
Families
AFDC/TANF
AFDC/TANF
AFDC/TANF
1987 8,193
2,719 1,399
4,076
1988 8,321
2,737 1,380
4,204
1989 8,400
2,537 1,452
4,411
1990 8,745
2,901 1,456
4,387
1991 9,031
3,101 1,554
4,375
1992 9,567
3,300 1,691
4,575
1993 9,860
3,439 1,722
4,700
1994 9,837
3,166 1,754
4,916
1995 9,887
2,862 1,818
5,207
1996 10,052
2,669
1,946
5,437
1997 9,874
2,225 2,211
5,438
1998 9,881
1,872 2,253
5,756
1999 9,741
1,543 2,216
5,981
2000 9,712
1,215 2,251
6,246
2001 10,044
1,064
2,501
6,479
2002 10,206
1,025
2,577
6,604
2003
10,411
1,253
2,610
6,448
2004
10,442
1,054
2,890
6,498
2005
10,476
1,102
2,837
6,537
2006
10,938
991
3,120
6,827
2007 10,748
878
3,142
6,728
2008 10,797
974
3,161
6,662
2009 10,990
967
3,408
6,615
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 7.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-6. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers,
1987 to 2009
Percent who Received AFDC/TANF
During the Year
Percent
Percent
who
Poor
Worked
Worked
(“official
Did not Work
During
Year
During Year definition”) Total During Year
Year
1987 67.3%
44.7% 33.2%
21.8% 11.4%
1988 68.9%
43.9% 32.9%
21.1% 11.8%
1989 70.1%
41.7% 30.2%
20.1% 10.1%
1990 69.8%
43.7% 33.2%
20.9% 12.3%
1991 68.7%
45.4% 34.3%
22.0% 12.3%
1992 67.2%
45.4% 34.5%
22.2% 12.3%
1993 68.1%
45.2% 34.9%
21.8% 13.1%
1994 71.4%
42.7% 32.2%
18.8% 13.4%
1995 73.0%
40.2% 28.9%
16.5% 12.4%
1996 75.1%
39.8% 26.65
14.6% 12.0%
1997 77.3%
40.0% 22.5%
11.4% 11.1%
1998 79.6%
37.3% 18.9%
8.2% 10.7%
1999 82.0%
34.0% 15.8%
6.5%
9.3%
2000 82.7%
31.8% 12.5%
5.3%
7.2%
2001 81.1%
32.4% 10.6%
5.1%
5.5%
2002 80.3%
32.2% 10.0%
4.6%
5.4%
2003 78.7%
33.9% 12.0%
6.1%
5.9%
2004 77.7%
34.9% 10.1%
5.2%
4.9%
2005 77.6%
34.7% 10.5%
6.6%
3.9%
2006 77.3%
35.1%
9.1%
4.6%
4.4%
2007 77.9%
35.3%
8.2%
4.1%
4.1%
2008 76.9%
35.8%
9.0%
4.4%
4.6%
2009 74.0%
37.6%
8.8%
5.2%
3.6%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Support table for Figure 8.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-7. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers,
by Age of Youngest Child,
March 1988 to March 2010
(Percent of single mothers employed in March)
Single Mothers
Married Mothers
With a
Youngest
With a
Youngest
Child
Child
Youngest
Youngest
Child
Child
Youngest
Youngest
Under
Under
Child Age
Child Age
Under
Under
Child Age
Child Age
Year
Age 18
Age 3
3 to 5
6 to 17
Age 18
Age 3
3 to 5
6 to 17
1988
57.4%
35.1% 52.9% 69.1% 61.8% 50.7% 58.1% 69.6%
1989
58.2%
37.9% 53.1% 70.0% 63.0% 51.4% 60.8% 70.6%
1990
60.3%
38.0% 61.0% 70.9% 63.4% 52.7% 60.9% 70.8%
1991
58.1%
36.6% 55.7% 70.2% 63.1% 52.7% 60.5% 70.5%
1992
57.3%
35.2% 54.1% 69.8% 63.9% 53.1% 59.4% 71.9%
1993
57.3%
35.1% 54.8% 70.1% 63.9% 53.2% 59.4% 71.9%
1994
58.0%
37.7% 55.2% 69.3% 65.5% 56.0% 61.2% 72.6%
1995
61.1%
43.1% 58.5% 70.5% 67.1% 57.4% 63.9% 73.4%
1996
63.5%
44.7% 60.4% 72.9% 67.6% 58.2% 63.3% 74.2%
1997
65.6%
51.5% 64.3% 72.0% 68.5% 58.3% 64.4% 75.2%
1998
68.8%
54.8% 63.7% 76.4% 67.9% 58.3% 64.1% 74.2%
1999
70.7%
55.8% 69.8% 77.1% 67.9% 57.0% 63.1% 75.1%
2000
72.8%
59.1% 72.7% 78.5% 68.4% 56.8% 66.0% 75.0%
2001
72.5%
57.6% 71.3% 79.1% 68.0% 56.0% 64.2% 75.1%
2002
71.2%
57.9% 71.0% 76.3% 66.7% 54.9% 61.7% 74.1%
2003
69.6%
54.8% 69.3% 75.4% 66.3% 53.5% 61.7% 74.2%
2004
69.7%
54.1% 69.5% 75.7% 65.3% 52.4% 62.3% 72.7%
2005
68.9%
53.7% 66.7% 75.7% 65.9% 54.9% 61.9% 72.8%
2006
69.6%
57.0% 68.0% 75.1% 66.1% 55.4% 61.8% 73.1%
2007
70.0%
56.5% 68.6% 76.0% 67.3% 56.9% 63.0% 74.25
2008
69.1%
54.5% 68.5% 75.5% 67.0% 56.1% 63.6% 73.7%
2009
65.8%
52.5% 62.3% 72.9% 66.0% 56.3% 60.1% 72.7%
2010
64.1%
52.9% 59.7% 70.7% 65.3% 54.9% 62.6% 71.3%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 9.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-8. Monthly Unemployment Rate of Women Who Maintain Families,
January 1987 to June 2011
(Rates are not seasonally adjusted)
Annual
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average
1987 9.8 10.0 9.7 9.0 9.1 9.5 9.0 9.7 9.3 9.2 8.4 7.6 9.2
1988 8.9 8.6 7.5 8.2 8.1 7.9 8.2 7.9 8.5 8.1 7.5 7.6 8.1
1989 8.1 8.3 7.8 7.3 8.1 7.9 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.8 8.1 7.5 8.1
1990 7.8 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.4 8.1 8.8 9.0 9.4 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.3
1991 9.2 9.4 9.0 9.2 9.0 9.1 8.8 10.2 9.6 9.8 9.1 8.6 9.3
1992 9.2 9.8 9.9 9.8 9.7 10.2 11.0 11.4 9.6 9.4 10.4 9.7 10.0
1993 10.5 10.5 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.4 9.6 9.1 9.4 9.0 9.8
9.7
1994 9.5 9.9 9.5 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.3 9.4 8.7 8.8 8.1 8.7 8.9
1995 9.1 8.5 7.7 8.8 7.8 8.3 8.8 7.4 7.9 7.9 7.3 6.6 8.0
1996 8.4 7.7 7.4 7.0 8.3 7.6 9.7 9.0 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.2
1997 9.5 9.1 8.7 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.2 8.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.2 8.1
1998 8.3 7.9 7.6 6.8 7.2 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.5 6.9 6.9 5.8 7.2
1999 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.5 5.8 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.0 6.0 5.7 6.4
2000 6.6 6.4 7.0 5.8 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.4 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.5 5.9
2001 6.7 6.3 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.6 7.7 7.2 6.6
2002 8.2 8.3 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.6 7.6 7.0 7.7 8.0 7.9 8.0
2003 8.0 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.3 8.7 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5
2004 8.3 8.1 8.4 7.5 7.4 8.2 9.0 8.3 8.2 7.8 7.7 7.1 8.0
2005 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.9 8.2 8.8 7.2 7.6 7.3 7.2 6.9 7.8
2006 8.2 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.3 7.2 7.4 6.7 6.8 6.5 6.9 6.2 7.1
2007 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.9 6.5
2008 7.0 6.7 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.9 8.5 9.6 8.2 8.8 9.3 9.5 8.0
2009 10.3 10.3 10.8 10.0 11.0 11.7 12.6 12.2 11.6 12.9 11.4 13.0 11.5
2010 12.3 11.6 11.3 11.0 11.6 12.1 13.4 13.4 12.9 12.4 13.0 12.0 12.3
2011 12.7 13.0 12.3 11.7 12.7 12.8
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data extracted from the internet on July 12, 2011. Data available at
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (Series: LNU04000313).
Note: Support table for Figure 10.
Congressional Research Service
76
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Table C-9. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year,
1987 to 2009
Worked
but Did
Received
Not
Neither
Cash
Receive
Worked
Number
Received
Welfare
Combined
Cash
nor
of Poor
Cash
but Did
Work and
Worked at
Welfare at
Received
Single
Welfare
Not Work
Welfare
Any Time
Any Time
Welfare
Mothers
During
During
over the
During the
During the
During the
Year
(in 000s)
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
1987
3,661 61.8% 43.3% 18.5% 42.2% 23.7% 14.5%
1988
3,650 62.2% 43.0% 19.2% 43.5% 24.3% 13.5%
1989
3,506 58.6% 42.7% 15.9% 43.1% 27.2% 14.2%
1990
3,821 61.9% 41.4% 20.5% 46.0% 25.5% 12.6%
1991
4,101 62.1% 43.3% 18.8% 44.3% 25.5% 12.5%
1992
4,339 61.0% 42.1% 18.9% 43.6% 24.7% 14.3%
1993
4,456 61.4% 41.5% 19.8% 44.3% 24.5% 14.1%
1994
4,203 58.3% 37.8% 20.5% 47.3% 26.8% 14.9%
1995
3,971 54.2% 34.2% 20.0% 49.7% 29.7% 16.1%
1996
4,005 51.4% 31.1% 20.3% 52.6% 32.2% 16.4%
1997
3,946 44.0% 24.5% 19.5% 57.8% 38.3% 17.7%
1998
3,685 38.9% 19.2% 19.7% 60.4% 40.7% 20.4%
1999
3,314 33.1% 15.4% 17.8% 64.3% 46.5% 20.3%
2000
3,090 27.2% 13.6% 13.6% 61.6% 48.1% 24.8%
2001
3,259 23.2% 12.9% 10.4% 58.6% 48.2% 28.6%
2002
3,284
21.5%
11.8%
9.8%
59.0%
49.2%
29.3%
2003 3,525
26.0%
14.7%
11.2
%
56.5%
45.3%
28.7%
2004
3,648 20.8% 12.1%
8.7% 55.3% 46.6% 32.6%
2005
3,640 22.1% 13.2%
8.9% 54.0% 45.1% 32.8%
2006
3,841 18.8% 11.0%
7.8% 54.4% 46.7% 34.6%
2007
3,790 17.1% 10.0% 7.1% 55.9% 48.8% 34.1%
2008
3,863 18.2% 10.4% 7.8% 55.0% 47.2% 34.6%
2009
4,128 17.5% 11.4% 6.1% 51.6% 45.6% 37.0%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 11.
Congressional Research Service
77
Table C-10. Receipt of Selected Benefits by Female-Headed Families with Children,
All Families and “Earnings Poor” Families
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Received
AFDC, TANF,
Received
Received Food
Received
Received
Received the
Received the
or GA
SSI
Stamps/SNAP
UI
Child Support
EITC
ACTCa
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
All Families
1987
8,193 2,719 33.2% 412
5.0% 2,958 36.1% 421 5.1% 2,322 28.3% 3,437 41.9%
1988
8,321 2,737 32.9% 383
4.6% 3,034 36.5% 446 5.4% 2,286 27.5% 3,994 48.0%
1989
8,400 2,537 30.2% 404
4.8% 2,860 34.0% 493 5.9% 2,451 29.2% 4,086 48.6%
1990
8,745 2,901 33.2% 430
4.9% 3,260 37.3% 628 7.2% 2,531 28.9% 4,365 49.9%
1991
9,031 3,101 34.3% 474
5.3% 3,572 39.6% 694 7.7% 2,603 28.8% 4,441 49.2%
1992
9,567 3,300 34.5% 555
5.8% 3,981 41.6% 721 7.5% 2,849 29.8% 4,745 49.6%
1993
9,860 3,439 34.9% 748
7.6% 4,295 43.6% 699 7.1% 2,968 30.1% 4,963 50.3%
1994
9,837 3,166 32.2% 725
7.4% 4,036 41.0% 706 7.2% 3,097 31.5% 5,312 54.0%
1995
9,887 2,862 28.9% 722
7.3% 3,755 38.0% 615 6.2% 3,263 33.0% 5,589 56.5%
1996 10,052 2,669 26.6% 755
7.5% 3,674 36.5% 692 6.9% 3,204 31.9% 5,987 59.6%
1997
9,874 2,225 22.5% 723
7.3% 3,291 33.3% 554 5.6% 3,015 30.5% 5,950 60.3%
1998
9,881 1,872 18.9% 661
6.7% 3,019 30.6% 543 5.5% 3,077 31.1% 6,064 61.4%
1999
9,741 1,543 15.8% 619
6.4% 2,491 25.6% 496 5.1% 3,158 32.4% 6,196 63.6%
2000
9,712 1,215 12.5% 614
6.3% 2,298 23.7% 519 5.3% 3,194 32.9% 6,039 62.2%
2001 10,044 1,064 10.6% 630
6.3% 2,433 24.2% 705 7.0% 3,387 33.7% 6,033 60.1%
2002 10,206 1,025 10.0% 591
5.8% 2,574 25.2% 800 7.8% 3,330 32.6% 6,018 59.0%
2003 10,411 1,253 12.0% 600
5.8% 2,758 26.5% 766 7.4% 3,333 32.0% 5,187 49.8%
2004 10,442 1,054 10.1% 704
6.7% 2,918 27.9% 659 6.3% 3,373 32.3% 5,209 49.9% 3,876 37.1%
2005 10,476 1,102 10.5% 699
6.7% 3,005 28.7% 608 5.8% 3,205 30.6% 6,170 58.9% 3,384 32.3%
2006 10,938 991 9.1% 694 6.3% 2,982 27.3% 533 4.9% 3,233 29.6% 6,451 59.0% 3,625 33.1%
CRS-78
Received
AFDC, TANF,
Received
Received Food
Received
Received
Received the
Received the
or GA
SSI
Stamps/SNAP
UI
Child Support
EITC
ACTCa
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2007 10,748 878 8.2% 668 6.2% 2,979 27.7% 499 4.6% 3,157 29.4% 6,454 60.0% 3,526 32.8%
2008 10,797 974 9.0% 663 6.1% 3,464 32.1% 813 7.5% 3,044 28.2% 6,384 59.1% 3,366 31.2%
2009 10,990 967 8.8% 716 6.5% 3,908 35.6% 1,100 10.0% 3,004 27.3% 6,546 59.6% 4,976 45.3%
“Earnings Poor” Families
1987
4,417
2,515
56.9%
352
8.0%
2,756
62.4%
206
4.7%
942
21.3%
1,798
40.7%
1988
4,476
2,506
56.0%
312
7.0%
2,782
62.2%
198
4.4%
928
20.7%
1,940
43.3%
1989
4,384 2,318 52.9% 318
7.3% 2,635 60.1% 224 5.1% 1,012 23.1% 1,959 44.7%
1990
4,707 2,670 56.7% 353
7.5% 3,012 64.0% 261 5.5% 1,057 22.4% 2,159 45.9%
1991
4,983 2,840 57.0% 412
8.3% 3,232 64.9% 320 6.4% 1,049 21.0% 2,277 45.7%
1992
5,292 2,968 56.1% 469
8.9% 3,557 67.2% 398 7.5% 1,217 23.0% 2,372 44.8%
1993
5,540 3,114 56.2% 611 11.0% 3,831 69.1% 362 6.5% 1,333 24.1% 2,425 43.8%
1994
5,297 2,848 53.8% 623 11.8% 3,576 67.5% 344 6.5% 1,300 24.5% 2,609 49.3%
1995
5,040 2,495 49.5% 585 11.6% 3,233 64.1% 307 6.1% 1,432 28.4% 2,635 52.3%
1996
5,009 2,330 46.5% 633 12.6% 3,125 62.4% 333 6.7% 1,299 25.9% 2,722 54.3%
1997
4,993 2,038 40.8% 574 11.5% 2,867 57.4% 300 6.0% 1,247 25.0% 2,821 56.5%
1998
4,730 1,688 35.7% 548 11.6% 2,584 54.6% 289 6.1% 1,131 23.9% 2,895 61.2%
1999
4,249 1,321 31.1% 474 11.2% 2,135 50.3% 230 5.4% 1,101 25.9% 2,720 64.0%
2000
3,966 1,026 25.9% 462 11.7% 1,931 48.7% 200 5.0% 1,100 27.7% 2,508 63.2%
2001
4,205
920 21.9% 484 11.5% 2,029 48.3% 307 7.3% 1,233 29.3% 2,502 59.5%
2002
4,308
863 20.0% 451 10.5% 2,080 48.3% 414 9.6% 1,301 30.2% 2,531 58.8%
2003
4,470 1,078 24.1% 465 10.4% 2,294 51.3% 380 8.5% 1,293 28.9% 2,182 48.8%
2004
4,625
913 19.7% 526 11.4% 2,428 52.5% 317 6.9% 1,326 28.7% 2,219 48.0% 1,187 25.7%
2005
4,605
956 20.8% 571 12.4% 2,487 54.0% 285 6.2% 1,225 26.6% 2,636 57.2% 874 19.0%
2006
4,866
844 17.3% 548 11.3% 2,554 52.5% 256 5.3% 1,346 27.7% 2,800 57.5% 1,008 20.7%
CRS-79
Received
AFDC, TANF,
Received
Received Food
Received
Received
Received the
Received the
or GA
SSI
Stamps/SNAP
UI
Child Support
EITC
ACTCa
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2007
4,801
765 15.9% 533 11.1% 2,456 51.2% 223 4.7% 1,303 27.1% 2,846 59.3% 1,085 22.6%
2008
4,961
838 16.9% 524 10.6% 2,787 56.2% 381 7.7% 1,258 25.4% 2,954 59.5% 1,067 21.5%
2009
5,313
864 16.3% 575 10.8% 3,197 60.2% 607 11.4% 1,345 25.3% 3,072 57.8% 2,433 45.8%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: “Earnings poor” families whose annual earned income is below their poverty income threshold. Other sources of income received by these families might
subsequently lift their total income above poverty.
Support table for Figure 12.
a. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) made the Child Tax Credit (CTC) partially refundable. Beginning in 2004, the
Census Bureau began modeling the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), the refundable portion of the CTC, on the CPS/ASEC.
CRS-80
Table C-11. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
All Single Mothers,
1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+ Cash,
Other
+ EITC
than
+ AFDC,
Less
+
Total
Child
TANF,
FICA and
Economic
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
Federal
Stimulus
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
and State
and
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Recovery
Tax
Year
Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Payments
Income
1987 8,193
53.9% 49.2% 47.4% 47.1%
46.6% 44.7% 42.3% 42.6%
42.6%
42.6% 39.5%
1988 8,321
53.8% 48.6% 46.5% 46.1%
45.9% 43.9% 42.2% 42.1%
42.1%
42.1% 38.9%
1989 8,400
52.2% 46.8% 44.4% 44.0%
43.7% 41.7% 39.7% 39.9%
39.9%
39.9% 36.3%
1990 8,745
53.8% 49.0% 46.9% 46.6%
46.1% 43.7% 41.5% 41.2%
41.2%
41.2% 37.4%
1991 9,031
55.2% 50.1% 48.3% 47.8%
47.4% 45.4% 42.8% 42.2%
42.2%
42.2% 38.0%
1992 9,567
55.3% 50.8% 48.8% 48.2%
47.4% 45.4% 42.5% 41.7%
41.7%
41.7% 37.5%
1993 9,860
56.2% 50.9% 48.7% 48.1%
47.4% 45.2% 42.7% 41.9%
41.9%
41.9% 37.8%
1994 9,837
53.9% 48.5% 46.5% 46.0%
45.5% 42.7% 39.8% 37.5%
37.5%
37.5% 33.3%
1995 9,887
51.0% 46.4% 43.6% 43.2%
42.3% 40.2% 36.9% 33.4%
33.4%
33.4% 30.0%
1996
10,052
49.8% 45.2% 43.1% 42.6%
41.5% 39.8% 37.1% 33.9%
33.9%
33.9% 30.2%
1997 9,874
50.6% 45.1% 43.0% 42.6%
41.7% 40.0% 37.7% 33.5%
33.5%
33.5% 29.2%
1998 9,881
47.9% 42.6% 40.1% 39.5%
38.8% 37.3% 35.2% 30.8%
30.8%
30.8% 27.3%
1999 9,741
43.6% 38.9% 36.7% 36.3%
35.3% 34.0% 32.2% 28.5%
28.5%
28.5% 24.7%
2000 9,712
40.8% 36.0% 33.9% 33.7%
32.8% 31.8% 30.5% 26.8%
26.8%
26.8% 22.8%
2001
10,044
41.9% 37.6% 34.9% 34.3%
33.3% 32.4% 30.9% 27.2%
27.2%
27.2% 23.4%
2002
10,206
42.2% 37.1% 34.8% 33.8%
32.9% 32.2% 30.5% 26.6%
26.6%
26.6% 23.4%
2003
10,411
42.9% 38.4% 36.1% 35.3%
34.5% 33.9% 32.2% 29.0%
29.0%
29.0% 24.8%
CRS-81
Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+ Cash,
Other
+ EITC
than
+ AFDC,
Less
+
Total
Child
TANF,
FICA and
Economic
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
Federal
Stimulus
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
and State
and
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Recovery
Tax
Year
Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits
+ SSI
Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Payments
Income
2004
10,442
44.3% 39.6% 37.1% 36.5%
35.7% 34.9% 32.5% 29.9%
29.2%
29.2% 24.8%
2005
10,476
44.0% 39.5% 37.0% 36.4%
35.5% 34.7% 32.6% 28.9%
28.5%
28.5% 24.4%
2006
10,938
44.5% 39.6% 37.5% 36.9%
35.7% 35.1% 32.9% 29.2%
28.7%
28.7% 23.7%
2007
10,748
44.7% 39.4% 37.1% 36.7%
35.8% 35.3% 33.1% 29.1%
28.8%
28.8% 24.4%
2008
10,797
45.9% 40.5% 38.1% 37.3%
36.3% 35.8% 33.3% 29.7%
29.4%
28.3% 23.8%
2009
10,990
48.3% 42.6% 40.3% 38.9%
38.0% 37.6% 33.5% 29.6%
27.9%
27.3% 22.6%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 13.
CRS-82
Table C-12. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year,
1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+ Cash,
Other
+ EITC
than
+ AFDC,
Less
+
Total
Child
TANF,
FICA and
Economic
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
Federal
Stimulus
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
and State
and
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Recovery
Tax
Year
Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Payments
Income
1987 5,518
36.8% 32.3% 30.1% 29.7%
29.4% 28.0% 26.1% 26.1%
26.1%
26.1% 23.4%
1988 5,733
37.5% 32.6% 29.9% 29.4%
29.2% 27.7% 26.5% 26.3%
26.3%
26.3% 23.8%
1989 5,891
35.9% 30.9% 27.9% 27.4%
27.2% 25.7% 23.8% 23.9%
23.9%
23.9% 21.0%
1990 6,108
38.5% 33.7% 31.3% 30.8%
30.4% 28.8% 27.1% 26.4%
26.4%
26.4% 23.5%
1991 6,205
38.8% 33.8% 31.7% 31.0%
30.6% 29.3% 26.9% 26.0%
26.0%
26.0% 22.5%
1992 6,433
38.9% 34.6% 32.2% 31.4%
30.9% 29.4% 27.0% 25.9%
25.9%
25.9% 22.4%
1993 6,717
39.7% 35.0% 32.3% 31.5%
31.0% 29.4% 27.5% 26.1%
26.1%
26.1% 22.6%
1994 7,022
38.8% 33.9% 31.5% 30.9%
30.6% 28.3% 26.0% 22.7%
22.7%
22.7% 19.3%
1995 7,220
37.4% 33.4% 30.0% 29.5%
28.9% 27.3% 24.6% 19.9%
19.9%
19.9% 17.3%
1996 7,548
37.1% 32.6% 30.1% 29.4%
28.8% 27.9% 25.5% 21.1%
21.1%
21.1% 17.9%
1997 7,636
39.0% 34.5% 32.1% 31.6%
31.1% 29.9% 27.8% 22.3%
22.3%
22.3% 18.6%
1998 7,868
38.0% 33.5% 30.7% 30.0%
29.7% 28.3% 26.3% 20.9%
20.9%
20.9% 18.2%
1999 7,986
34.7% 30.9% 28.7% 28.2%
27.6% 26.7% 25.1% 20.6%
20.6%
20.6% 17.7%
2000 8,030
31.6% 27.4% 25.2% 24.9%
24.4% 23.7% 22.6% 18.1%
18.1%
18.1% 15.0%
2001 8,148
31.5% 28.3% 25.3% 24.6%
24.0% 23.4% 22.0% 17.6%
17.6%
17.6% 14.8%
2002 8,193
31.9% 28.0% 25.7% 24.6%
24.1% 23.6% 22.2% 17.3%
17.3%
17.3% 14.8%
2003 8,191
32.0% 28.7% 26.1% 25.2%
24.7% 24.3% 22.8% 18.7%
18.7%
18.7% 15.8%
CRS-83
Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+ Cash,
Other
+ EITC
than
+ AFDC,
Less
+
Total
Child
TANF,
FICA and
Economic
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
Federal
Stimulus
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
and State
and
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Recovery
Tax
Year
Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits
+ SSI
Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Payments
Income
2004 8,110
32.5% 28.8% 26.4% 25.7%
25.3% 24.9% 22.7% 19.1%
18.4%
18.4% 15.2%
2005 8,124
32.0% 28.5% 25.9% 25.2%
24.7% 24.2% 22.1% 17.1%
16.7%
16.7% 13.7%
2006 8,458
32.6% 28.6% 26.5% 25.9%
25.1% 24.7% 22.6% 17.5%
17.0%
17.0% 13.2%
2007 8,372
33.2% 29.2% 26.6% 26.3%
25.7% 25.3% 23.1% 17.6%
17.3%
17.3% 14.2%
2008 8,301
34.2% 30.1% 27.6% 26.8%
25.9% 25.6% 23.2% 18.3%
18.0%
16.7% 13.7%
2009 8,133
35.6% 30.7% 28.3% 27.1%
26.5% 26.2% 22.5% 17.0%
14.9%
14.2% 11.2%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 14.
CRS-84
Table C-13. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
Single Mothers Who Did Not Work at Any Time During the Year,
1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+ Cash,
Other
+ EITC
than
+ AFDC,
Less
+
Total
Child
TANF,
FICA and
Economic
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
Federal
Stimulus
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
and State
and
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Recovery
Tax
Year
Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Payments
Income
1987 2,676
89.1% 84.2% 83.3% 83.0%
82.1% 79.1% 75.7% 76.5%
76.5%
76.5% 72.9%
1988 2,588
89.8% 84.2% 83.4% 83.3%
82.8% 79.7% 76.8% 77.2%
77.2%
77.2% 72.3%
1989 2,510
90.3% 84.0% 83.0% 83.0%
82.5% 79.5% 76.8% 77.3%
77.3%
77.3% 72.3%
1990 2,637
89.3% 84.2% 83.2% 83.1%
82.3% 78.3% 74.9% 75.4%
75.4%
75.4% 69.5%
1991 2,826
91.2% 85.8% 84.8% 84.6%
84.1% 80.8% 77.6% 77.9%
77.9%
77.9% 72.0%
1992 3,135
89.0% 83.9% 83.0% 82.7%
81.2% 78.1% 74.2% 74.3%
74.3%
74.3% 68.5%
1993 3,144
91.5% 84.9% 83.8% 83.5%
82.6% 78.9% 75.1% 75.6%
75.6%
75.6% 70.3%
1994 2,815
91.5% 84.9% 83.9% 83.7%
82.7% 78.7% 74.2% 74.5%
74.5%
74.5% 68.1%
1995 2,667
87.6% 81.7% 80.5% 80.4%
78.6% 74.9% 70.2% 69.9%
69.9%
69.9% 64.2%
1996 2,504
88.2% 83.3% 82.4% 82.1%
79.5% 75.9% 72.2% 72.5%
72.5%
72.5% 66.9%
1997 2,238
90.1% 81.3% 80.2% 80.1%
77.8% 74.4% 71.5% 71.6%
71.6%
71.6% 65.2%
1998 2,013
86.3% 77.8% 76.6% 76.5%
74.3% 72.5% 69.8% 69.2%
69.2%
69.2% 62.8%
1999 1,755
84.4% 75.3% 73.6% 73.3%
70.8% 67.4% 65.0% 64.9%
64.9%
64.9% 56.5%
2000 1,682
84.8% 77.0% 75.8% 75.5%
72.9% 70.5% 68.3% 68.6%
68.6%
68.6% 60.0%
2001 1,896
86.5% 77.5% 76.1% 75.6%
73.3% 71.2% 69.1% 68.9%
68.9%
68.9% 60.3%
2002 2,013
84.0% 74.0% 72.0% 71.2%
68.7% 66.9% 64.6% 64.9%
64.9%
64.9% 58.5%
2003 2,220
83.1% 74.0% 72.8% 72.5%
70.5% 69.0% 66.8% 66.7%
66.7%
66.7% 58.0%
CRS-85
Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+ Cash,
Other
+ EITC
than
+ AFDC,
Less
+
Total
Child
TANF,
FICA and
Economic
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
Federal
Stimulus
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
and State
and
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Recovery
Tax
Year
Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits
+ SSI
Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Payments
Income
2004 2,332
85.2% 76.8% 74.4% 73.9%
71.7% 69.9% 66.6% 67.2%
66.7%
66.7% 58.2%
2005 2,352
85.4% 77.8% 75.7% 75.3%
72.7% 71.2% 68.9% 69.7%
69.4%
69.4% 61.3%
2006 2,479
85.0% 76.8% 75.1% 74.4%
72.0% 70.6% 67.9% 68.9%
68.8%
68.8% 59.7%
2007 2,376
85.1% 75.5% 73.9% 73.4%
71.3% 70.3% 68.5% 69.6%
69.5%
69.5% 60.3%
2008 2,496
85.1% 75.0% 72.9% 72.3%
70.6% 69.6% 67.0% 67.5%
67.5%
66.9% 57.3%
2009 2,856
84.7% 76.5% 74.6% 72.6%
70.8% 69.9% 64.7% 65.2%
64.8%
64.5% 55.1%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 15.
CRS-86
Table C-14. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements,
by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status, 1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Lives with Others
Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1987 8,193 100.0% 5,526 67.4% 2,668 32.6% 1,703 20.8%
590 7.2%
375 4.6%
1988 8,321 100.0% 5,703 68.5% 2,618 31.5% 1,667 20.0%
603 7.3%
348 4.2%
1989 8,400 100.0% 5,681 67.6% 2,720 32.4% 1,650 19.6%
603 7.2%
466 5.6%
1990 8,745 100.0% 5,916 67.7% 2,829 32.3% 1,693 19.4%
695 7.9%
441 5.0%
1991 9,031 100.0% 5,993 66.4% 3,038 33.6% 1,690 18.7%
835 9.2%
512 5.7%
1992 9,567 100.0% 6,294 65.8% 3,273 34.2% 1,872 19.6%
880 9.2%
522 5.5%
1993 9,860 100.0% 6,555 66.5% 3,306 33.5% 1,890 19.2%
849 8.6%
567 5.7%
1994 9,837 100.0% 6,357 64.6% 3,479 35.4% 1,968 20.0%
914 9.3%
597 6.1%
1995 9,887 100.0% 6,347 64.2% 3,536 35.8% 2,030 20.5%
948 9.6%
562 5.7%
1996 10,052 100.0% 6,593 65.6% 3,456 34.4% 1,930 19.2%
945 9.4%
584 5.8%
1997 9,874 100.0% 6,362 64.4% 3,511 35.6% 1,966 19.9%
967 9.8%
580 5.9%
1998 9,881 100.0% 6,497 65.8% 3,382 34.2% 1,884 19.1%
951 9.6%
549 5.6%
1999 9,741 100.0% 6,217 63.8% 3,524 36.2% 1,882 19.3% 1,064 10.9%
578 5.9%
2000 9,712 100.0% 6,160 63.4% 3,552 36.6% 1,913 19.7% 1,076 11.1%
563 5.8%
2001 10,044 100.0% 6,639 66.1% 3,405 33.9% 1,831 18.2%
999 9.9%
574 5.7%
2002 10,206 100.0% 6,714 65.8% 3,492 34.2% 1,825 17.9% 1,050 10.3%
617 6.0%
2003 10,411 100.0% 6,745 64.8% 3,664 35.2% 1,950 18.7% 1,062 10.2%
654 6.3%
2004 10,442 100.0% 6,820 65.3% 3,622 34.7% 1,946 18.6% 1,031 9.9%
646 6.2%
2005 10,476 100.0% 6,866 65.5% 3,610 34.5% 1,882 18.0% 1,103 10.5%
624 6.0%
2006 10,938 100.0% 6,905 63.1% 4,033 36.9% 2,136 19.5% 1,581a 14.5%a 315a 2.9%a
CRS-87
Lives with Others
Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2007 10,748 100.0% 6,791 63.2% 3,957 36.8% 2,101 19.5% 1,581a 14.7%a 275a 2.6%a
2008 10,797 100.0% 6,814 63.1% 3,983 36.9% 2,177 20.2% 1,503a 13.9%a 303a 2.8%a
2009 10,990 100.0% 6,592 60.0% 4,398 40.0% 2,345 21.3% 1,647a 15.0%a
406a 3.7%a
Worked During the Year
1987 5,434 100.0% 3,743 68.9% 1,691 31.1% 984 18.1%
417 7.7%
291 5.3%
1988 5,646 100.0% 3,989 70.7% 1,656 29.3% 961 17.0%
444 7.9%
251 4.5%
1989 5,832 100.0% 4,011 68.8% 1,821 31.2% 1,021 17.5%
433 7.4%
368 6.3%
1990 5,998 100.0% 4,179 69.7% 1,820 30.3% 1,005 16.8%
489 8.2%
325 5.4%
1991 6,134 100.0% 4,146 67.6% 1,988 32.4% 982 16.0%
604 9.8%
402 6.6%
1992 6,326 100.0% 4,330 68.4% 1,996 31.6% 1,019 16.1%
612 9.7%
365 5.8%
1993 6,580 100.0% 4,432 67.4% 2,147 32.6% 1,130 17.2%
601 9.1%
417 6.3%
1994 6,920 100.0% 4,544 65.7% 2,375 34.3% 1,229 17.8%
678 9.8%
468 6.8%
1995 7,108 100.0% 4,703 66.2% 2,401 33.8% 1,254 17.6%
705 9.9%
446 6.3%
1996 7,435 100.0% 4,960 66.7% 2,474 33.3% 1,288 17.3%
753 10.1%
434 5.8%
1997 7,578 100.0% 4,989 65.8% 2,588 34.2% 1,360 18.0%
763 10.1%
465 6.1%
1998 7,759 100.0% 5,259 67.8% 2,501 32.2% 1,273 16.4%
771 9.9%
457 5.9%
1999 7,913 100.0% 5,268 66.6% 2,646 33.4% 1,288 16.3%
884 11.2%
474 6.0%
2000 7,971 100.0% 5,187 65.1% 2,784 34.9% 1,417 17.8%
899 11.3%
468 5.9%
2001 8,058 100.0% 5,467 67.8% 2,591 32.2% 1,303 16.2%
793 9.8%
495 6.1%
2002 8,107 100.0% 5,458 67.3% 2,649 32.7% 1,268 15.6%
861 10.6%
521 6.4%
2003 8,111 100.0% 5,476 67.5% 2,633 32.5% 1,315 16.2%
804 9.9%
516 6.4%
2004 8,051 100.0% 5,451 67.7% 2,599 32.3% 1,273 15.8%
818 10.2%
508 6.3%
2005 8,048 100.0% 5,439 67.6% 2,609 32.4% 1,264 15.7%
843 10.5%
502 6.2%
2006 8,381 100.0% 5,512 65.8% 2,869 34.2% 1,421 17.0% 1,212a 14.5%a 235a 2.8%a
CRS-88
Lives with Others
Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2007 8,292 100.0% 5,509 66.4% 2,784 33.6% 1,389 16.7% 1,180a 14.2%a 215a 2.6%a
2008 8,223 100.0% 5,454 66.3% 2,768 33.7% 1,425 17.3% 1,110a 13.5%a 233a 2.8%a
2009 8,033 100.0% 5,066 63.1% 2,966 36.9% 1,495 18.6% 1,169a 14.6%a 303a 3.8%a
Did Not Work During Year
1987 2,759 100.0% 1,783 64.6% 976 35.4% 719 26.1%
173 6.3%
84 3.0%
1988 2,675 100.0% 1,714 64.1% 962 35.9% 705 26.4%
160 6.0%
97 3.6%
1989 2,569 100.0% 1,670 65.0% 899 35.0% 629 24.5%
171 6.6%
99 3.8%
1990 2,746 100.0% 1,737 63.3% 1,009 36.7% 688 25.0%
206 7.5%
115 4.2%
1991 2,897 100.0% 1,847 63.8% 1,049 36.2% 709 24.5%
231 8.0%
110 3.8%
1992 3,241 100.0% 1,964 60.6% 1,277 39.4% 852 26.3%
268 8.3%
156 4.8%
1993 3,281 100.0% 2,122 64.7% 1,158 35.3% 760 23.2%
248 7.6%
150 4.6%
1994 2,917 100.0% 1,813 62.2% 1,104 37.8% 739 25.3%
236 8.1%
129 4.4%
1995 2,779 100.0% 1,644 59.2% 1,135 40.8% 776 27.9%
243 8.7%
116 4.2%
1996 2,616 100.0% 1,633 62.4% 981 37.5% 642 24.5%
192 7.3%
149 5.7%
1997 2,297 100.0% 1,372 59.7% 923 40.2% 605 26.4%
204 8.9%
116 5.0%
1998 2,122 100.0% 1,238 58.4% 881 41.5% 611 28.8%
181 8.5%
92 4.3%
1999 1,827 100.0% 950 52.0% 878 48.0% 594 32.5%
180 9.8%
104 5.7%
2000 1,742 100.0% 973 55.9% 768 44.1% 497 28.5%
177 10.2%
95 5.4%
2001 1,986 100.0% 1,172 59.0% 813 41.0% 528 26.6%
206 10.4%
79 4.0%
2002 2,099 100.0% 1,256 59.8% 843 40.2% 557 26.5%
190 9.0%
96 4.6%
2003 2,300 100.0% 1,268 55.2% 1,031 44.8% 636 27.7%
258 11.2%
137 6.0%
2004 2,392 100.0% 1,369 57.2% 1,023 42.8% 672 28.1%
213 8.9%
138 5.8%
2005 2,428 100.0% 1,427 58.8% 1,001 41.2% 618 25.5%
261 10.7%
121 5.0%
2006 2,556 100.0% 1,392 54.5% 1,164 45.5% 715 28.0%
369a 14.4%a
80a 3.1%a
CRS-89
Lives with Others
Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2007 2,456 100.0% 1,283 52.2% 1,173 47.8% 712 29.0%
401a 16.3%a
60a 2.5%a
2008 2,574 100.0% 1,359 52.8% 1,215 47.2% 752 29.2%
393a 15.3%a 70a 2.7%a
2009 2,957 100.0% 1,525 51.6% 1,431 48.4% 851 28.8%
478a 16.2%a
103a 3.5%a
Received Welfare During the Year
1987 2,905 100.0% 1,995 68.7% 910 31.3% 654 22.5%
156 5.4%
99 3.4%
1988 2,919 100.0% 2,074 71.0% 845 29.0% 614 21.0%
174 6.0%
57 2.0%
1989 2,717 100.0% 1,908 70.2% 809 29.8% 552 20.3%
154 5.7%
103 3.8%
1990 3,081 100.0% 2,137 69.4% 944 30.6% 655 21.3%
196 6.4%
92 3.0%
1991 3,296 100.0% 2,225 67.5% 1,071 32.5% 696 21.1%
241 7.3%
135 4.1%
1992 3,545 100.0% 2,399 67.7% 1,146 32.3% 769 21.7%
234 6.6%
142 4.0%
1993 3,757 100.0% 2,561 68.2% 1,197 31.8% 742 19.7%
269 7.2%
185 4.9%
1994 3,470 100.0% 2,330 67.2% 1,140 32.8% 702 20.2%
306 8.8%
132 3.8%
1995 3,247 100.0% 2,102 64.7% 1,145 35.3% 770 23.7%
260 8.0%
114 3.5%
1996 3,075 100.0% 2,079 67.6% 994 32.3% 640 20.8%
212 6.9%
144 4.7%
1997 2,646 100.0% 1,764 66.7% 882 33.3% 573 21.7%
195 7.4%
114 4.3%
1998 2,265 100.0% 1,636 72.2% 629 27.8% 386 17.0%
159 7.0%
85 3.7%
1999 1,950 100.0% 1,258 64.5% 692 35.5% 452 23.2%
150 7.7%
90 4.6%
2000 1,647 100.0% 1,122 68.2% 524 31.8% 357 21.7%
124 7.5%
44 2.7%
2001 1,524 100.0% 1,031 67.6% 493 32.4% 335 22.0%
102 6.7%
57 3.7%
2002 1,464 100.0% 1,017 69.5% 447 30.5% 298 20.4%
102 6.9%
47 3.2%
2003 1,673 100.0% 1,143 68.3% 530 31.7% 348 20.8%
136 8.1%
46 2.8%
2004 1,592 100.0% 1,087 68.3% 505 31.7% 353 22.2%
87 5.5%
65 4.1%
2005 1,617 100.0% 1,153 71.3% 464 28.7% 284 17.6%
116 7.1%
64 4.0%
2006 1,526 100.0% 1,068 70.0% 458 30.0% 256 16.8%
176a 11.5%a
27a 1.7%a
CRS-90
Lives with Others
Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2007 1,419 100.0% 972 68.5% 447 31.5% 316 22.2%
105a 7.4%a
27a 1.9%a
2008 1,507 100.0% 1,031 68.4% 476 31.6% 298 19.8%
145a 9.6%a
33a 2.2%a
2009 1,527 100.0% 950 62.2% 577 37.8% 363 23.8%
169a 11.1%a
45a 3.0%a
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: Independent families are families headed by a single mother with no other members other than her children. Extended families include mothers and their children
who live with other family members. Cohabiting mothers live with another unrelated member who is identified or inferred to be a co-resident partner. Mothers in
unrelated families co-reside with other unrelated household members, other than those identified or inferred to be a cohabiting partner.
Support table for Figure 16.
a. Beginning with the 2007 CPS/ASEC, cohabiting couples are identifiable based on self-report. In earlier years, cohabiting couples are identifiable indirectly by inference.
The method used here, for CPS/ASEC years before 2007, is based on households with two unmarried adults, who are unrelated and of the opposite sex, and no other
adults reside in the household. As a result, estimates for single mothers who are cohabiting or in unrelated families in CPS/ASEC years 2007 and after are not
comparable to earlier years.
CRS-91
Table C-15. Poverty Status of Children in Female-Headed Families Under Selected Income Measures,
1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Poor Based on Cash
Income Plus Food
Stamp/SNAP Benefits,
EITC and ACTC Net
Below Household
Poor Based on Total
of Federal and State
Low-Income
Cash Income
Income Taxes, Plus
Threshold Based on
Poor Based on Earned
“Official” Poverty
Stimulus and Recovery
Total Household
Income Only
Measure
Payments
Income
Year Total Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1987 13,617 8,360 61.4% 7,081 52.0% 6,822 50.1% 6,437 47.3%
1988 13,700 8,406 61.4% 7,088 51.7% 6,827 49.8% 6,453 47.1%
1989 13,874 8,310 59.9% 6,904 49.8% 6,582 47.4% 6,083 43.8%
1990 14,608 9,003 61.6% 7,615 52.1% 7,258 49.7% 6,712 45.9%
1991 15,396 9,682 62.9% 8,223 53.4% 7,712 50.1% 7,092 46.1%
1992 15,586 9,724 62.4% 8,252 52.9% 7,660 49.1% 7,042 45.2%
1993 16,338 10,311 63.1% 8,532 52.2% 8,026 49.1% 7,346 45.0%
1994 16,480 10,132 61.5% 8,367 50.8% 7,444 45.2% 6,791 41.2%
1995 16,993 10,038 59.1% 8,221 48.4% 7,002 41.2% 6,457 38.0%
1996 16,740 9,547 57.0% 7,861 47.0% 6,780 40.5% 6,108 36.5%
1997 16,639 9,615 57.8% 7,907 47.5% 6,713 40.3% 6,023 36.2%
1998 16,833 9,280 55.1% 7,541 44.8% 6,311 37.5% 5,752 34.2%
1999 16,172 8,171 50.5% 6,515 40.3% 5,468 33.8% 4,844 30.0%
2000 16,120 7,733 48.0% 6,216 38.6% 5,294 32.8% 4,640 28.8%
2001 16,483 7,981 48.4% 6,334 38.4% 5,407 32.8% 4,755 28.8%
2002 16,780 8,202 48.9% 6,443 38.4% 5,341 31.8% 4,810 28.7%
2003 17,116 8,492 49.6% 6,868 40.1% 5,895 34.4% 5,211 30.4%
2004 17,229 8,725 50.6% 7,065 41.0% 5,805 33.7% 5,100 29.6%
CRS-92
Poor Based on Cash
Income Plus Food
Stamp/SNAP Benefits,
EITC and ACTC Net
Below Household
Poor Based on Total
of Federal and State
Low-Income
Cash Income
Income Taxes, Plus
Threshold Based on
Poor Based on Earned
“Official” Poverty
Stimulus and Recovery
Total Household
Income Only
Measure
Payments
Income
Year Total Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2005 17,162 8,654 50.4% 7,077 41.2% 5,820 33.9% 5,084 29.6%
2006 17,921 9,111 50.8% 7,371 41.1% 6,025 33.6% 5,272 29.4%
2007 18,178 9,195 50.6% 7,511 41.3% 6,056 33.3% 5,268 29.0%
2008 18,086 9,390 51.9% 7,536 41.7% 6,502 36.0% 5,626 31.1%
2009 18,706 10,114 54.1% 8,113 43.4% 6,011 32.1% 5,222 27.9%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 19.
CRS-93
Table C-16. Single Mothers’ Work Status During the Year and Self-Reported Reason for Not Working,
by Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA SSI) Receipt, 1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1987 8,193
5,518
67.3%
2,676 32.7%
100.0% 285
10.7%
1,724 64.4% 283 10.6% 309 11.5% 65 2.4%
1988 8,321
5,733
68.9%
2,588 31.1%
100.0% 235 9.1%
1,759 68.0% 271 10.5% 244 9.4% 72 2.8%
1989 8,400
5,891
70.1%
2,510 29.9%
100.0% 227 9.0%
1,744 69.5% 272 10.8% 186 7.4% 81 3.2%
1990 8,745
6,108
69.8%
2,637 30.2%
100.0% 286
10.9%
1,831 69.5% 276 10.5% 160 6.1% 83 3.2%
1991 9,031
6,205
68.7%
2,826 31.3%
100.0% 243 8.6%
1,928 68.2% 315 11.1% 245 8.7% 95 3.4%
1992 9,567
6,433
67.2%
3,135 32.8%
100.0% 364
11.6%
2,011 64.2% 398 12.7% 278 8.9% 84 2.7%
1993 9,860
6,717
68.1%
3,144 31.9%
100.0% 434
13.8%
1,960 62.4% 443 14.1% 225 7.1% 77 2.5%
1994 9,837
7,022
71.4%
2,815 28.6%
100.0% 470
16.7%
1,626 57.8% 462 16.4% 177 6.3% 79 2.8%
1995 9,887
7,220
73.0%
2,667 27.0%
100.0% 491
18.4%
1,531 57.4% 400 15.0% 163 6.1% 81 3.0%
1996 10,052
7,548
75.1%
2,504 24.9%
100.0% 501
20.0%
1,349 53.9% 375 15.0% 183 7.3% 97 3.9%
1997 9,874
7,636
77.3%
2,238 22.7%
100.0% 446
19.9%
1,197 53.5% 331 14.8% 164 7.3% 100 4.5%
1998 9,881
7,868
79.6%
2,013 20.4%
100.0% 419
20.8%
1,038 51.5% 361 17.9% 113 5.6% 83 4.1%
1999 9,741
7,986
82.0%
1,755 18.0%
100.0% 444
25.3% 875 49.9% 311 17.7% 55 3.1% 67 3.8%
2000 9,712
8,030
82.7%
1,682 17.3%
100.0% 442
26.3% 911 54.2% 223 13.3% 48 2.9% 57 3.4%
2001 10,044
8,148
81.1%
1,896 18.9%
100.0% 527
27.8% 974 51.4% 228 12.0% 89 4.7% 78 4.1%
2002 10,206
8,193
80.3%
2,013 19.7%
100.0% 540
26.8% 989 49.1% 285 14.1% 116 5.8% 83 4.1%
2003 10,411
8,191
78.7%
2,220 21.3%
100.0% 574
25.8%
1,093 49.2% 351 15.8% 130 5.9% 73 3.3%
2004 10,442
8,110
77.7%
2,332 22.3%
100.0% 614
26.3%
1,176 50.4% 328 14.1% 133 5.7% 80 3.4%
CRS-94
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2005 10,476 8,124 77.6% 2,352 22.4% 100.0% 616 26.2% 1,257 53.4% 292 12.4%
98
4.2%
90 3.8%
2006 10,938 8,458 77.3% 2,479 22.7% 100.0% 689 27.8% 1,245 50.2% 342 13.8%
96
3.9% 108 4.4%
2007 10,748 8,372 77.9% 2,376 22.1% 100.0% 633 26.6% 1,248 52.5% 283 11.9%
95
4.0% 118 5.0%
2008 10,797
8,301
76.9%
2,496 23.1%
100.0% 650
26.0%
1,243 49.8% 356 14.2% 157 6.3% 90 3.6%
2009 10,990
8,133
74.0%
2,856 26.0%
100.0% 679
23.8%
1,292 45.2% 398 13.9% 382 13.4% 105 3.7%
Did Not Receive Cash Welfare
1987 5,288
4,511
85.3% 778 14.7%
100.0% 84
10.7% 456 58.7% 124 16.0% 75 9.7% 28 3.6%
1988 5,402
4,651
86.1% 751 13.9%
100.0% 74 9.8% 427 56.8% 134 17.9% 58 7.7% 52 7.0%
1989 5,683
4,930
86.7% 754 13.3%
100.0% 75
10.0% 492 65.2% 100 13.2% 42 5.6% 45 5.9%
1990 5,664
4,945
87.3% 719 12.7%
100.0% 67
9.3% 469
65.2% 90
12.6% 39 5.4% 54
7.5%
1991 5,735
5,005
87.3% 730 12.7%
100.0% 69
9.4% 454
62.2% 98
13.4% 72 9.8% 38
5.2%
1992 6,022
5,146
85.4% 876 14.6%
100.0% 102
11.7% 508 58.0% 155 17.7% 71 8.1% 40 4.6%
1993 6,103
5,237
85.8% 866 14.2%
100.0% 124
14.3% 490 56.6% 157 18.1% 45 5.2% 45 5.2%
1994 6,367
5,549
87.2% 817 12.8%
100.0% 130
15.9% 445 54.4% 171 20.9% 38 4.6% 34 4.2%
1995 6,640
5,798
87.3% 842 12.7%
100.0% 119
14.2% 473 56.2% 150 17.8% 53 6.3% 46 5.5%
1996 6,976
6,118
87.7% 858 12.3%
100.0% 108
12.6% 463 54.0% 173 20.2% 66 7.7% 48 5.6%
1997 7,228
6,313
87.3% 916 12.7%
100.0% 121
13.2% 516 56.4% 160 17.4% 60 6.6% 59 6.5%
1998 7,616
6,628
87.0% 989 13.0%
100.0% 162
16.4% 523 52.8% 204 20.6% 42 4.3% 58 5.9%
1999 7,791
6,859
88.0% 933 12.0%
100.0% 172
18.5% 499 53.5% 174 18.7% 31 3.3% 54 5.8%
2000 8,065
7,105
88.1% 961 11.9%
100.0% 176
18.3% 558 58.1% 159 16.6% 22 2.3% 46 4.7%
2001 8,520
7,342
86.2%
1,178 13.8%
100.0% 216
18.3% 655 55.6% 175 14.9% 66 5.6% 67 5.7%
2002 8,741
7,453
85.3%
1,288 14.7%
100.0% 234
18.2% 709 55.0% 212 16.5% 61 4.8% 71 5.5%
CRS-95
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2003 8,738
7,397
84.7%
1,341 15.3%
100.0% 230
17.1% 726 54.2% 242 18.1% 86 6.4% 56 4.2%
2004 8,850
7,334
82.9%
1,516 17.1%
100.0% 305
20.1% 818 54.0% 241 15.9% 86 5.7% 66 4.3%
2005 8,859
7,379
83.3%
1,480 16.7%
100.0% 275
18.5% 881 59.5% 214 14.5% 48 3.3% 62 4.2%
2006 9,411
7,723
82.1%
1,688 17.9%
100.0% 354
21.0% 910 53.9% 266 15.8% 67 4.0% 90 5.3%
2007 9,329
7,693
82.5%
1,636 17.5%
100.0% 300
18.4% 946 57.8% 225 13.8% 62 3.8% 103 6.3%
2008 9,290
7,545
81.2%
1,745 18.8%
100.0% 341
19.5% 929 53.2% 298 17.1% 102 5.8% 76 4.3%
2009 9,463
7,486
79.1%
1,976 20.9%
100.0% 346
17.5% 939 47.5% 312 15.8% 290 14.7% 89 4.5%
Received Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA or SSI)
1987 2,812 972
34.6%
1,839 65.4%
100.0% 187
10.2%
1,237 67.3% 152 8.2% 228 12.4% 35 1.9%
1988 2,828
1,031
36.4%
1,797 63.6%
100.0% 149 8.3%
1,310 72.9% 136 7.5% 185 10.3% 17 1.0%
1989 2,627 906
34.5%
1,721 65.5%
100.0% 147 8.5%
1,236 71.8% 167 9.7% 138 8.0% 34 2.0%
1990 2,991
1,117
37.4%
1,874 62.6%
100.0% 202
10.8%
1,341 71.6% 181 9.7% 120 6.4% 30 1.6%
1991 3,199
1,155
36.1%
2,043 63.9%
100.0% 162 7.9%
1,450 71.0% 210 10.3% 172 8.4% 51 2.5%
1992 3,423
1,229
35.9%
2,193 64.1%
100.0% 232
10.6%
1,480 67.5% 240 10.9% 199 9.1% 43 1.9%
1993 3,598
1,388
38.6%
2,210 61.4%
100.0% 275
12.4%
1,449 65.6% 279 12.6% 175 7.9% 32 1.4%
1994 3,318
1,395
42.0%
1,924 58.0%
100.0% 305
15.8%
1,149 59.7% 288 15.0% 137 7.1% 44 2.3%
1995 3,055
1,326
43.4%
1,729 56.6%
100.0% 324
18.7%
1,019 58.9% 247 14.3% 108 6.3% 31 1.8%
1996 2,872
1,317
45.9%
1,555 54.1%
100.0% 343
22.1% 849 54.6% 200 12.9% 115 7.4% 47 3.0%
1997 2,436
1,212
49.8%
1,224 50.2%
100.0% 270
22.1% 654 53.4% 160 13.0% 102 8.3% 38 3.1%
1998 2,069
1,147
55.4% 922 44.6%
100.0% 196
21.3% 486 52.7% 153 16.6% 68 7.4% 19 2.0%
1999 1,747
1,017
58.2% 730 41.8%
100.0% 226
30.9% 341 46.7% 131 17.9% 19 2.6% 13 1.8%
2000 1,431 812
56.7% 619 43.3%
100.0% 205
33.1% 322 51.9% 58 9.4% 24 3.8% 10 1.7%
CRS-96
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2001 1,294 679
52.5% 615 47.5%
100.0% 244
39.7% 291 47.4% 49 8.0% 20 3.3% 10 1.6%
2002 1,245 645
51.9% 599 48.1%
100.0% 224
37.3% 245 41.0% 67 11.3% 53 8.8% 10 1.6%
2003 1,463 704
48.1% 759 51.9%
100.0% 262
34.5% 344 45.3% 98 13.0% 41 5.4% 15 2.0%
2004 1,323 646
48.8% 677 51.2%
100.0% 228
33.6% 321 47.4% 73 10.7% 46 6.7% 10 1.5%
2005 1,359 631
46.5% 728 53.5%
100.0% 261
35.9% 327 45.0% 72 9.8% 46 6.3% 21 2.9%
2006 1,259 609
48.4% 649 51.6%
100.0% 247
38.0% 296 45.5% 67 10.3% 27 4.2% 13 2.0%
2007 1,149 560
48.8% 588 51.2%
100.0% 240
40.8% 254 43.1% 53 9.0% 28 4.8% 13 2.2%
2008 1,241 628
50.6% 613 49.4%
100.0% 224
36.5% 281 45.7% 50 8.1% 47 7.7% 12 1.9%
2009 1,247 522
41.9% 725 58.1%
100.0% 249
34.4% 305 42.1% 72 10.0% 84 11.6% 14 1.9%
Received AFDC/TANF/GA Only
1987 2,493 887
35.6%
1,606 64.4%
100.0% 111 6.9%
1,117 69.6% 138 8.6% 212 13.2% 26 1.6%
1988 2,536 935
36.9%
1,600 63.1%
100.0% 88 5.5%
1,200 75.0% 133 8.3% 164 10.2% 15 0.9%
1989 2,313 817
35.3%
1,496 64.7%
100.0% 92 6.2%
1,113 74.4% 147 9.8% 121 8.1% 23 1.5%
1990 2,651
1,013
38.2%
1,638 61.8%
100.0% 106 6.5%
1,235 75.4% 164 10.0% 109 6.6% 25 1.5%
1991 2,822 1,036 36.7% 1,786 63.3% 100.0%
90 5.0% 1,308 73.3% 190 10.6% 157
8.8%
41 2.3%
1992 2,990
1,095
36.6%
1,895 63.4%
100.0% 133 7.0%
1,331 70.3% 221 11.7% 172 9.1% 37 2.0%
1993 3,010
1,198
39.8%
1,812 60.2%
100.0% 145 8.0%
1,248 68.9% 240 13.2% 153 8.4% 26 1.4%
1994 2,745
1,228
44.7%
1,517 55.3%
100.0% 124 8.1% 994 65.5% 247 16.3% 117 7.7% 37 2.4%
1995 2,525
1,157
45.8%
1,368 54.2%
100.0% 156
11.4% 859 62.8% 230 16.8% 99 7.2% 24 1.8%
1996 2,321
1,129
48.7%
1,191 51.3%
100.0% 157
13.2% 699 58.7% 179 15.1% 111 9.3% 45 3.7%
1997 1,923
1,017
52.9% 906 47.1%
100.0% 106
11.7% 539 59.5% 131 14.5% 94 10.4% 36 3.9%
1998 1,604 984
61.3% 620 38.7%
100.0% 61 9.9% 374 60.4% 118 19.0% 56 9.1% 10 1.7%
CRS-97
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1999 1,331 839
63.0% 492 37.0%
100.0% 96
19.4% 267 54.3% 107 21.7% 12 2.4% 11 2.2%
2000 1,033 642
62.1% 391 37.9%
100.0% 60
15.3% 256 65.5% 49 12.5% 20 5.1% 6 1.6%
2001 894 516
57.8% 377 42.2%
100.0% 80
21.3% 229 60.6% 42 11.2% 18 4.7% 8 2.1%
2002 874 500
57.2% 374 42.8%
100.0% 72
19.2% 192 51.5% 57 15.2% 45 12.1% 7 2.0%
2003 1,073 568
52.9% 505 47.1%
100.0% 95
18.8% 296 58.6% 75 14.9% 27 5.4% 12 2.4%
2004 888 481
54.1% 407 45.9%
100.0% 61
15.1% 253 62.1% 53 13.0% 35 8.7% 4 1.0%
2005 917 486
53.0% 431 47.0%
100.0% 93
21.6% 233 54.1% 63 14.5% 32 7.4% 10 2.3%
2006 833 456
54.7% 377 45.3%
100.0% 92
24.5% 207 54.8% 49 12.9% 21 5.4% 9 2.3%
2007 751 417
55.6% 334 44.4%
100.0% 81
24.3% 177 53.0% 44 13.2% 21 6.3% 11 3.3%
2008 844 467
55.3% 377 44.7%
100.0% 76
20.1% 219 58.2% 42 11.1% 32 8.4% 8 2.2%
2009 811 360
44.4% 451 55.6%
100.0% 91
20.2% 228 50.4% 52 11.4% 69 15.3% 11 2.5%
Received SSI Only
1987 93 35
37.4% 58 62.6%
100.0% 15
25.5% 30
51.4% 7
12.1% 5 8.9% 1
2.0%
1988 91 52
57.0% 39 43.0%
100.0% 13
33.7% 22
55.3% 1 2.7% 1 2.0% 2
6.2%
1989 90 55
61.5% 35 38.5%
100.0% 5
14.3% 17
47.7% 5
15.7% 5 15.0% 3
7.3%
1990 90 45
50.6% 44 49.4%
100.0% 18
39.7% 22
49.0% 5
10.5% 0 0.8% 0
0.0%
1991 98 45
46.3% 52 53.7%
100.0% 13
25.0% 24
45.8% 7
14.1% 2 2.9% 6
12.2%
1992 122 57
46.8% 65 53.2%
100.0% 30
45.9% 23
35.4% 2 3.8% 8 12.7% 1
2.3%
1993 159 92
57.6% 68 42.4%
100.0% 35
51.5% 21
31.4% 7 9.7% 4 5.9% 1
1.5%
1994 152 78
51.5% 74 48.5%
100.0% 35
47.1% 32
44.0% 3 4.6% 2 2.9% 1
1.5%
1995 193 96
50.0% 96 50.0%
100.0% 48
50.2% 39
40.7% 3 3.3% 2 1.9% 4
4.0%
1996 203 113
55.4% 91 44.6%
100.0% 50
54.8% 37
40.6% 1 1.4% 2 1.7% 1
1.5%
CRS-98
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1997 210 112
53.0% 99 47.0%
100.0% 56
56.2% 27
27.5% 12
11.7% 2 1.9% 3
2.7%
1998 196 94
47.7% 103 52.3%
100.0% 61
59.1% 29
28.6% 4 4.1% 2 1.8% 7
6.4%
1999 203 111
54.7% 92 45.3%
100.0% 47
50.7% 35
37.7% 6 6.3% 5 5.2% 0
0.0%
2000 216 114
52.7% 102 47.3%
100.0% 61
59.8% 32 30.9% 6 5.5% 2 2.3% 2 1.5%
2001 230 127
54.9% 104 45.1%
100.0% 68
65.1% 28 27.0% 4 3.9% 2 2.3% 2 1.8%
2002 220 94
42.7% 126 57.3%
100.0% 83
65.5% 34
27.2% 5 3.9% 2 1.4% 2
2.0%
2003 210 90
42.7% 121 57.3%
100.0% 83
68.5% 22
18.7% 11 8.9% 3 2.5% 2
1.5%
2004 269 131
48.6% 138 51.4%
100.0% 82
59.0% 37
26.9% 14
10.0% 2 1.2% 4
2.9%
2005 258 114
44.2% 144 55.8%
100.0% 80
55.5% 48 33.6% 6 4.1% 3 2.3% 7 4.6%
2006 268 126
47.0% 142 53.0%
100.0% 89
62.4% 38 27.0% 9 6.4% 1 1.0% 4 3.1%
2007 271 119
44.0% 152 56.0%
100.0% 93
61.0% 48 31.6% 5 3.3% 4 2.7% 2 1.4%
2008 267 129
48.3% 138 51.7%
100.0% 85
61.8% 34 24.6% 8 5.9% 8 5.8% 3 1.9%
2009 280 125
44.5% 155 55.5%
100.0% 84
54.0% 48
30.7% 14 8.8% 8 4.9% 2
1.6%
Received AFDC/TANF/GA and SSI
1987 226 51
22.4% 175 77.6%
100.0% 61
34.7% 90
51.2% 6 3.5% 11 6.1% 8
4.4%
1988 201 43
21.5% 158 78.5%
100.0% 47
29.8% 89
56.2% 1 0.7% 21 13.3% 0
0.0%
1989 224 34
15.0% 191 85.0%
100.0% 50
26.0% 106
55.7% 14 7.3% 13 6.6% 8
4.4%
1990 251 59
23.5% 192 76.5%
100.0% 78
40.7% 85
44.1% 13 6.6% 11 6.0% 5
2.7%
1991 279 74
26.5% 205 73.5%
100.0% 59
28.6% 118
57.3% 13 6.1% 13 6.4% 3
1.5%
1992 311 77
24.8% 234 75.2%
100.0% 69
29.5% 126
53.8% 17 7.1% 19 8.0% 4
1.5%
1993 429 99
23.0% 331 77.0%
100.0% 95
28.7% 180
54.4% 33 9.9% 19 5.6% 5
1.5%
1994 421 89
21.1% 333 78.9%
100.0% 146
44.0% 123 37.0% 38 11.5% 19 5.6% 6 1.9%
CRS-99
Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Taking Care of
Home or
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or
Worked
Total
Ill or Disabled
Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1995 337 73
21.6% 264 78.4%
100.0% 119
45.0% 121 45.8% 14 5.3% 7 2.7% 3 1.2%
1996 348 75
21.6% 273 78.4%
100.0% 137
50.1% 113 41.3% 19 7.1% 3 1.1% 1 0.4%
1997 302 83
27.5% 219 72.5%
100.0% 109
49.7% 87
39.7% 17 7.8% 6 2.8% 0
0.0%
1998 268 69
25.8% 199 74.2%
100.0% 74
37.4% 82
41.2% 31
15.4% 10 5.2% 2
0.8%
1999 213 66
31.2% 146 68.8%
100.0% 83
57.0% 39
26.9% 19
12.7% 2 1.7% 2
1.6%
2000 183 57
31.0% 126 69.0%
100.0% 84
66.9% 34
26.9% 4 3.0% 2 1.2% 2
1.9%
2001 170 37
21.5% 133 78.5%
100.0% 96
72.0% 34
25.9% 3 2.0% 0 0.2% 0
0.0%
2002 151 51
33.9% 100 66.1%
100.0% 69
69.3% 19
18.8% 6 5.7% 6 6.1% 0
0.0%
2003 180 46
25.5% 134 74.5%
100.0% 84
62.9% 26
19.2% 12 9.2% 11 7.9% 1
0.8%
2004 167 35
20.8% 132 79.2%
100.0% 84
64.1% 31
23.5% 6 4.4% 8 6.4% 2
1.6%
2005 184 31
16.9% 153 83.1%
100.0% 89
57.9% 46
29.8% 3 2.0% 11 7.0% 5
3.3%
2006 158 28
17.6% 130 82.4%
100.0% 66
50.5% 50
38.8% 9 6.8% 5 3.8% 0
0.0%
2007 126 24
18.7% 103 81.3%
100.0% 66
64.5% 29
28.3% 4 4.1% 3 3.1% 0
0.0%
2008 130 32
24.4% 99 75.6%
100.0% 63
63.9% 27
27.8% 0 0.0% 7 7.5% 1
0.8%
2009 156 38
24.2% 119 75.8%
100.0% 74
62.7% 30
25.1% 7 5.8% 8 6.4% 0
0.0%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 17 and Figure 18.
CRS-100
Table C-17. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2009
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Worked During the Year
Did Not Work During the Year
Worked Less
Than Full-
Time, Full-
Worked Less
Did Not
Year, Due to
Than Full-
Work Due to
Unemploy-
Time, Full-
Unemploy-
Did Not
Worked Full-
ment or
Year, for
ment or
Work Due to
Time, Full-
Discourage-
Personal
Discourage-
Personal
Total
Year
ment
Reasons
Total
ment
Reasons
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1987 8,193 5,518 67.3% 2,636
32.2% 1,296 15.8% 1,586 19.4% 2,676
32.7% 449 5.5% 2,217
27.1%
1988 8,321 5,733 68.9% 2,809
33.8% 1,299 15.6% 1,625 19.5% 2,588
31.1% 434 5.2% 2,147
25.8%
1989 8,400 5,891 70.1% 2,810
33.4% 1,325 15.8% 1,756 20.9% 2,510
29.9% 324 3.9% 2,185
26.0%
1990 8,745 6,108 69.8% 2,815
32.2% 1,461 16.7% 1,825 20.9% 2,637
30.2% 343 3.9% 2,294
26.2%
1991 9,031 6,205 68.7% 2,925
32.4% 1,569 17.4% 1,709 18.9% 2,826
31.3% 427 4.7% 2,399
26.6%
1992 9,567 6,433 67.2% 3,030
31.7% 1,668 17.4% 1,735 18.1% 3,135
32.8% 468 4.9% 2,666
27.9%
1993 9,860 6,717 68.1% 3,143
31.9% 1,695 17.2% 1,871 19.0% 3,144
31.9% 557 5.7% 2,582
26.2%
1994 9,837 7,022 71.4% 3,259
33.1% 1,720 17.5% 2,038 20.7% 2,815
28.6% 442 4.5% 2,372
24.1%
1995 9,887 7,220 73.0% 3,589
36.3% 1,609 16.3% 2,020 20.4% 2,667
27.0% 406 4.1% 2,261
22.9%
1996 10,052 7,548 75.1% 3,646
36.3% 1,693 16.8% 2,200 21.9% 2,504
24.9% 425 4.2% 2,079
20.7%
1997 9,874 7,636 77.3% 3,838
38.9% 1,568 15.9% 2,225 22.5% 2,238
22.7% 362 3.7% 1,877
19.0%
1998 9,881 7,868 79.6% 4,116
41.7% 1,543 15.6% 2,200 22.3% 2,013
20.4% 270 2.7% 1,744
17.6%
1999 9,741 7,986 82.0% 4,286
44.0% 1,428 14.7% 2,269 23.3% 1,755
18.0% 151 1.5% 1,602
16.4%
2000 9,712 8,030 82.7% 4,459
45.9% 1,251 12.9% 2,307 23.8% 1,682
17.3% 174 1.8% 1,508
15.5%
2001 10,044 8,148 81.1% 4,505
44.9% 1,492 14.9% 2,138 21.3% 1,896
18.9% 193 1.9% 1,701
16.9%
2002 10,206 8,193 80.3% 4,649
45.6% 1,556 15.2% 1,980 19.4% 2,013
19.7% 271 2.7% 1,742
17.1%
2003 10,411 8,191 78.7% 4,569
43.9% 1,575 15.1% 2,040 19.6% 2,220
21.3% 297 2.8% 1,924
18.5%
CRS-101
Worked During the Year
Did Not Work During the Year
Worked Less
Than Full-
Time, Full-
Worked Less
Did Not
Year, Due to
Than Full-
Work Due to
Unemploy-
Time, Full-
Unemploy-
Did Not
Worked Full-
ment or
Year, for
ment or
Work Due to
Time, Full-
Discourage-
Personal
Discourage-
Personal
Total
Year
ment
Reasons
Total
ment
Reasons
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2004 10,442 8,110 77.7% 4,476
42.9% 1,497 14.3% 2,134 20.4% 2,332
22.3% 294 2.8% 2,038
19.5%
2005 10,476 8,124 77.6% 4,657
44.5% 1,398 13.3% 2,060 19.7% 2,352
22.4% 249 2.4% 2,102
20.1%
2006 10,938 8,458 77.3% 4,845
44.3% 1,452 13.3% 2,156 19.7% 2,479
22.7% 233 2.1% 2,245
20.5%
2007 10,748 8,372 77.9% 4,702
43.8% 1,519 14.1% 2,142 19.9% 2,376
22.1% 229 2.1% 2,146
20.0%
2008 10,797 8,301 76.9% 4,426
41.0% 1,989 18.4% 1,882 17.4% 2,496
23.1% 281 2.6% 2,212
20.5%
2009 10,990 8,133 74.0% 4,252
38.7% 2,041 18.6% 1,832 16.7% 2,856
26.0% 569 5.2% 2,285
20.8%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: Persons who worked for 50 weeks or more and 35 or more hours per week are designated as full-time, full-year workers. Unemployed are persons who were
without a job and searched for work. Discouraged workers are persons who were without a job but did not search for work because they believed no jobs were available.
Personal reasons for not working during the year, or working less than full-time, full-year, include taking care of home or family, attending school, illness or disability,
retired, or other.
Support table for Figure 20.
CRS-102
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2009
Author Contact Information
Thomas Gabe
Specialist in Social Policy
tgabe@crs.loc.gov, 7-7357
Congressional Research Service
103