Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-
Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013
(name redacted)
Specialist in Social Policy
November 21, 2014
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
R41917

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Summary
Eighteen years have passed since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program
assisting low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed
families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF.
Female-headed families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such
families account for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons,
single female-headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report
details trends in income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of
the 1996 welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare
dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform
and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs
other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children.
CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data shows that there has been a dramatic
transformation with regard to welfare, work, and poverty status of single mothers. The period has
seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that
contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has
changed markedly over the period; more mothers are working and fewer are relying on cash
welfare to support themselves and their children.
In the years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, and in the years since, the nation’s
income safety net has been transformed into one supporting work. Cash-welfare work
requirements, the end of cash welfare as an open-ended entitlement by limiting the duration that
individuals may receive federally funded benefits, and expanded earnings and family income
supplements administered through the federal income tax system have helped to change the
dynamics between work and welfare. The transformed system has helped to both reduce single
mothers’ reliance on traditional cash welfare and reduce poverty among their children.
Poverty under the official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows
that since 2000, which marked a historical low, the poverty rate among single mothers increased
in step with two recessions. By 2010, the official poverty rate for single mothers had reached a
post-2000 high, and remained at that level through 2012, before falling somewhat in 2013. In
2013, the official poverty level was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels, despite two
recessions since 1996.
Using a more comprehensive income definition than that used by the official poverty measure
indicates that the increase in poverty among single mothers and their children over the past 13
years has been substantially mitigated by Food Stamp/SNAP benefits and work-related
refundable tax credits—benefits not captured by the “official” poverty measure. Use of an
expanded income poverty measure that includes these benefits highlights effects of congressional
action that helped reduce child poverty amidst, and subsequent to, the most severe recession since
the Great Depression.
The role of work-conditioned benefits, and the provision of traditional cash welfare, will likely
continue to garner attention, in part contingent on the nature and pace of economic recovery, and
federal and state budget pressures.

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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Contents
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1
A Road Map ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Female-Headed Families with Children—A Policy Concern .......................................................... 3
Policy Landscape on the Eve of 1996 Welfare Reform ................................................................... 6
Welfare Dependency as a Political Theme ................................................................................ 7
EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay” .................................................................................. 8
TANF and Other Policies in the Post-AFDC Era ............................................................................ 9
Other Federal and State Policies that Encourage Work ........................................................... 10
Child Support Enforcement ..................................................................................................... 11
Policies Addressing Marriage and Childbearing ..................................................................... 12
Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions ................................................................... 12
Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits ..................................................................................... 13
Unemployment Insurance Benefits ......................................................................................... 14
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits .......................... 15
Other Social Policies ............................................................................................................... 15
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children ............................ 16
Number of Families Headed by Single Mothers ..................................................................... 19
Incidence of Poverty by Mothers’ Marital Status .................................................................... 20
Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt among Single Mothers ..................................................... 21
Work, Poverty, and Cash Welfare Receipt of Single Mothers ................................................. 22
Single Mothers’ Employment ........................................................................................................ 23
Unemployment Rates Across the Business Cycle ................................................................... 25
Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status ...................................................................... 26
Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families with Children .......... 28
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) .......................................................................................... 28
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) ...................................................................................... 29
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits .................................................................................. 30
Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Benefits .......................... 30
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) ...................................................................................... 31
Anti-Poverty Effects of Cash Income, Taxes, and Transfers on Poverty—Female-Headed
Families with Children ............................................................................................................... 31
Addition of Income from Sources Not Included in the “Official” U.S. Poverty
Measure ................................................................................................................................ 34
Effect of Earnings and Other Non-welfare Cash Income on Poverty ...................................... 34
Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty .......................................................................................... 35
The Invisible Safety Net—Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected Income Sources
Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure .................................................................. 35
Effect of Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits on Poverty ............................................................. 35
Net Effect of the EITC on Poverty .................................................................................... 36
Effect of the ACTC on Poverty ......................................................................................... 37
Effect of Federal Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments and Making Work
Pay Tax Credits on Poverty ............................................................................................ 37
Effect of Unrelated Household Members’ Income on Poverty ......................................... 37
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Comparison of the Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Poverty, by Single
Mothers’ Work Status ........................................................................................................... 37
Single Mothers Who Worked During the Year—Figure 14 .............................................. 38
Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15 .................................... 42
Trend in Poverty among Children in Female-Headed Families under Selected Income
Measures ..................................................................................................................................... 43
Discussion/Conclusion................................................................................................................... 44
The Invisible Safety-Net—Benefits not Officially Counted Toward
Poverty Reduction ................................................................................................................ 45
Transformation of Income Safety-Net Programs Toward Work-Conditioned Support ........... 45
Cash Welfare’s Residual Safety-Net Role ............................................................................... 47
Living Arrangements as an Alternative to Welfare ........................................................... 47
Illness or Disability Among Nonworking Single Mothers ................................................ 49
The Work-Based Income Safety Net in Times of Recession and Recovery ............................ 53
Single Mothers’ Attachment to the Work-Based Safety Net ............................................. 53
The Work-Based “Safety Net” and the Role of Traditional Welfare ................................. 54

Figures
Figure 1. Children’s Poverty Status by Family Living Arrangement, 2013..................................... 4
Figure 2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC,
AFDC, 1960 to 1994 .................................................................................................................... 5
Figure 3. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC,
AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013 ................................................................................................ 17
Figure 4. Poverty Rate of Children Under Age 18 in Female-Headed Households (No
Spouse Present), 1960 to 2013.................................................................................................... 18
Figure 5. Number of Single-Mother Families, by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 ............ 20
Figure 6. Poverty Rates by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013 ............................................... 21
Figure 7. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2013................................ 22
Figure 8. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 .................... 23
Figure 9. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest Child,
March 1988 to March 2014 ........................................................................................................ 24
Figure 10. Unemployment Rate of Women Maintaining Families, January 1987 through
October 2014 .............................................................................................................................. 25
Figure 11. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2013 .......... 27
Figure 12. Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor” Female-Headed Families
with Children, 1987 to 2013 ....................................................................................................... 29
Figure 13. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 ................................................................ 33
Figure 14. Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year: Effects of
Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 40
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Figure 15. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year: Effects of Earnings,
Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status, 1987 to
2013 ............................................................................................................................................ 41
Figure 16. Poverty Among Children in Female-Headed Families Under
Alternative Measures, 1987 to 2013 ........................................................................................... 44
Figure 17. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status ............ 49
Figure 18. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year, by Self-Reported Reason
for Not Working .......................................................................................................................... 50
Figure 19. Nonworking Single Mothers with Self-Reported “Illness or Disability” as the
Primary Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare Recipiency Status ..................................... 52
Figure 20. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment,1987 to 2013 ............................................................ 54
Figure B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts
(Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2013 .................................................................................. 63

Tables
Table B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases: CPS Versus Administrative Caseload Counts, Annual
Monthly Average, 1987 to 2013 ................................................................................................. 64
Table C-1. Children’s Family Living Arrangements and Poverty Status, 1987 to 2013 ................ 66
Table C-2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC,
AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013 ................................................................................................ 74
Table C-3. Poverty Among Related Children Under Age 18, All Children and Children in
Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present) 1960 to 2013 ............................................... 76
Table C-4. Mothers with Related Children Under Age 18, by Poverty and Marital Status,
1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 78
Table C-5. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt, 1987 to 2013 ............................. 80
Table C-6. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013 ................. 81
Table C-7. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers, by Age of Youngest
Child, March 1988 to March 2014 ............................................................................................. 82
Table C-8. Monthly Unemployment Rate of Women Who Maintain Families, January
1987 to October 2014 ................................................................................................................. 83
Table C-9. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year, 1987 to 2013 .......... 84
Table C-10. Receipt of Selected Benefits by Female-Headed Families with Children, All
Families and “Earnings Poor” Families, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................... 85
Table C-11. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status, All Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013.............................................................. 88
Table C-12. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year, 1987
to 2013 ........................................................................................................................................ 90
Table C-13. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household
Low-Income Status, Single Mothers Who Did Not Work at Any Time During the Year,
1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 92
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-14. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements, by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status,
1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................................................... 94
Table C-15. Single Mothers’ Work Status During the Year and Self-Reported Reason for
Not Working, by Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA SSI) Receipt, 1987 to 2013 ....................... 99
Table C-16. Poverty Status of Children in Female-Headed Families Under Selected
Income Measures, 1987 to 2013 ............................................................................................... 107
Table C-17. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2013 ....................................................... 109

Appendixes
Appendix A. From Mothers’ Pensions to TANF—A Brief History ............................................... 56
Appendix B. Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on the CPS ............................................................. 63
Appendix C. Support Tables .......................................................................................................... 66

Contacts
Author Contact Information......................................................................................................... 111

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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Introduction
Eighteen years have passed since repeal of what was the nation’s major cash welfare program
assisting low-income families with children, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, and its replacement with a block grant of Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). This report focuses on trends in the economic well-being of female-headed
families with children, the principal group affected by the replacement of AFDC with TANF.
Female-headed families and their children are especially at risk of poverty, and children in such
families account for well over half of all poor children in the United States. For these reasons,
single female-headed families continue to be of particular concern to policymakers. The report
details trends in income and poverty status of these families, prior and subsequent to enactment of
the 1996 welfare reform law and other policy changes. The report focuses especially on welfare
dependency and work engagement among single mothers, a major dynamic that welfare reform
and accompanying policy changes have attempted to affect. It also examines the role of programs
other than TANF in providing support to single female-headed families with children.
Since at least the first White House Conference on Children in 1909 (Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children), and the subsequent creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912, the federal
government has been concerned with the social conditions of children. The conference was an
impetus for states’ enactment of state or locally financed mothers’ pensions (also referred to as
widows’ pensions and/or mothers’ aid), which provided minimal cash support to mothers made
destitute, usually due to a husband’s death. Mothers’ aid was intended to help keep the mother at
home to care for her children, as an alternative to institutionalization or adoption. As part of the
Social Security Act of 1935, the federal Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program introduced
federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent
children, basically as a supplement to states’ mothers’ pension programs. Federal involvement in
attempting to address the problem of child poverty associated with the loss of parental support
grew over the next 61 years, at which point the AFDC program, formerly named ADC, was
repealed and replaced by Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
Two dominant, often conflicting, themes have pervaded public discourse and policy responses to
providing public assistance to poor families with children. One has been to help improve the
economic and social well-being of children who, through no fault of their own, live in poor
circumstances. The other has been reducing welfare dependency. A persistent challenge has been
how public policy and programs can address the first theme of reducing child poverty without
undermining the second by encouraging welfare dependency. A major goal of social policy, at
least since passage of the 1967 Social Security Act welfare amendments, has been to reduce
welfare dependency and, as a consequence, child poverty, by encouraging work. This report
focuses on the results of efforts to attain these goals, focusing on female-headed families with
children.
CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data1 presented in this report shows a dramatic
transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period. The period

1 Most data presented in this report are based on CRS analysis of 27 years of data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s
Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS/ASEC). The CPS/ASEC is the
principal source for annual income, poverty, and health insurance coverage estimates issued by the Census Bureau. The
annual survey is a supplement to the monthly CPS conducted for the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) used in
deriving monthly labor force statistics, such as the national unemployment rate. Estimates from the annual supplement,
(continued...)
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

examined encompasses a fundamental transformation in the provision of income support through
cash welfare to a system promoting and supplementing work. The period has been marked by
three recessions, one in the pre-welfare reform era (1990-1991), and two after (2001; 2007-2009);
the latter was so severe that it has come to be identified by many as “The Great Recession.”2
Policy interventions to both stimulate the economy and protect those most vulnerable in response
to the most recent recession are examined in the context of their effects on families headed by
single mothers. The 27-year period examined provides for a range of insights about social
programs’ and policies’ effects, under varying economic conditions, on families headed by single
mothers—a group at considerable risk of poverty.3
A Road Map
The body of the report begins with a brief discussion as to why female-headed families with
children are a focus of policy concern. Most directly, children living in such families are many
times more likely to be poor than children in married-couple families. Moreover, the families in
which they reside have been especially likely to depend on public assistance (i.e., welfare) for at
least part of their financial support.
The dual goals of reducing child poverty and breaking the bonds of welfare dependency have
proven to be an enduring, and often vexing, policy challenge. The report briefly describes the
policy landscape prior to 1996 welfare reform and policy changes that have occurred since—
especially those that were undertaken in response to the recent recession. A brief, 100-year
historical perspective as to how past policy efforts attempted to address the dual problems of
child poverty and welfare dependency is presented in Appendix A.
The report then turns to an empirical analysis of trends in single mothers’ work, welfare, and
poverty status over the 27-year period from 1987 to 2013. Trends in the incidence of poverty and
cash welfare receipt and work among single mothers are presented, as are trends in cash welfare
receipt (ADC, AFDC, and TANF) and other selected benefits. Particular attention is paid to the
role of selected income sources on poverty reduction among single-mother families, overall and
by whether or not mothers worked during the year. Some sources of income are not included in
the “official” U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income. The analysis shows
that the inclusion of other income sources not included in the official measure, such as Food
Stamp or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits and refundable federal
income tax credits, has a significant effect on poverty reduction among single mothers and their
children. The inclusion of such benefits yields a very different picture as to the apparent trend in
poverty, especially when viewed in the context of the most recent recession.

(...continued)
conducted in February through April, represent characteristics at the time of the survey, and income, poverty, and
health insurance status in the previous year. The analysis is limited to survey data collected from 1988 through 2014
(the most recent available), representing income and poverty status from 1987 through 2013. The CPS/ASEC analysis
in this report is limited to the past 27 years due to relative consistency in design and content of the CPS/ASEC over the
period.
2 See, for example, Catherine Rampell, “‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology,” New York Times (internet edition),
March 11, 2009, available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-etymology/.
3 Single fathers and their children have received comparatively little study, nor have they emerged as a matter of policy
concern, as have single mothers and their children.
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A final section of the report offers a concluding discussion. It highlights the transformation from
income safety net to work-conditioned support, and cash welfare’s resulting residual safety net
role. It assesses the effectiveness of income safety net programs in reducing poverty among
female-headed families, especially in the context of the recent recession and selected
congressional action.
The report contains three appendixes. Appendix A provides a brief history of the AFDC
program—the precursor to TANF. Appendix B examines under-reporting of cash welfare on the
CPS/ASEC relative to administrative benchmarks. Appendix C provides data underlying the
figures presented in the body of the report.
Female-Headed Families with Children—
A Policy Concern
Two dominant, often conflicting, themes have pervaded public discourse and policy responses to
providing public assistance to poor families with children. One has been to help improve the
economic and social well-being of children who, through no fault of their own, live in poor
circumstances. The other has been to reduce welfare dependency and to promote parental
responsibility and family self-sufficiency. A persistent challenge has been how public policy and
programs can address the first theme of reducing child poverty without undermining the second
by encouraging welfare dependency.
Children living in families headed by single mothers with no spouse present are especially at risk
of being poor. In 2013, under the official U.S. poverty measure,4 about one-fifth of all children
were poor (19.8%), but among children living in single-mother families, well over two-fifths
(44.1%) were poor, compared to about one in ten children (9.5%) living in married-couple
families (See Figure 1).5 In 2013, one in four children (25.6%) lived in female-headed families,
but children in such families accounted for well over half (57.0%) of all poor children (see
bottom panel of Figure 1). About one in eight children (12.9%) live in families headed by single
mothers who have never been married; about half of all such children were poor in 2013 (52.6%),
and they accounted for about one third (34.3%) of all poor children.

4 The official U.S. statistical poverty measure is based on families’ annual pre-tax income relative to family poverty
income thresholds, which vary by family size and composition. For example, in 2013, a family consisting of a single
mother with one child was considered poor if its annual pre-tax cash income was less than $16,057, and if she had two
children, she and her children would be considered poor if her family income was below $18,769. In turn, a married
couple with one child would be considered poor if the family’s income was less than $18,751, and if they had two
children, if its income was less than $23,707.
5 The definition of “children” used here represents dependent children under the age of 18 who are related to another
family member by birth or adoption. It excludes children who are unrelated to other household members, and excludes
persons under the age of 18 who, themselves, have a dependent child residing with them.
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Figure 1. Children’s Poverty Status by Family Living Arrangement, 2013
Share of Children by Family Living Arrangements
All Children
Poor Children

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 2014
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Table C-1 for supporting data.
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Figure 2 shows the number of recipients (total, children, and adults) and cases (families, and
child-only cases) receiving cash assistance under AFDC (ADC, prior to 1962) from 1960 to 1994,
the eve of the 1996 welfare reform debate. The AFDC caseload was comprised almost entirely of
women with no husband present and their children.
Figure 2. Number of Recipients and Cases
Receiving Cash Assistance Under ADC, AFDC,
1960 to 1994
(Annual monthly average, in millions)
Millions
15
Recipients
14
13
12
11
10
Children
9
8
7
6
5
Cases
Adults
4
3
2
1
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Year

Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA). See Table C-2 for supporting data.
Note: Includes enrollment in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
The surge in recipients and cases over the course of the 1960s reflects a variety of factors,
including the baby boom generation entering adulthood; an increase in the number and share of
children living in female-headed families with a high likelihood of being poor; a rediscovery of
poverty in the United States and resultant efforts to address its causes and consequences; and
outreach efforts by government and organizations to aid the poor by helping to ensure that they
were treated fairly and received benefits to which they were entitled. Additionally, during the late
1960s and early 1970s, U.S. Supreme Court rulings overturned a number of state practices that
had denied providing assistance to entitled individuals. Thus, AFDC caseload growth over the
period reflected both a growth in the number of persons legally entitled to receive benefits and
also an increasing likelihood that legally entitled individuals would be granted benefits. From
1966 to 1971, the number of AFDC recipients would more than double, from 4.5 million to 10.2
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million persons. By one estimate, by 1971 90% of families eligible to receive AFDC were
participating in the program, compared to only about 33% in the early 1960s.6 As the AFDC
caseload was increasing, Congress began taking action in an attempt to restrict its growth. Among
its provisions, amendments to the Social Security Act in 1967 sought to restrict AFDC caseload
growth through the establishment of work and training requirements for adult recipients, and an
effort to freeze federal matching payments to states with additional caseload growth attributable
to cases with an absent parent (i.e., other than widows, or disabled parents). (See Appendix A for
a brief history of the AFDC program.)
Policy Landscape on the Eve of 1996 Welfare Reform
A variety of welfare reforms were already beginning to be implemented by states in the years
preceding the more sweeping reforms that would be allowed under the 1996 welfare reform law.
The Family Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485) extended work requirements (which could
include work preparation activities such as education and training) for mothers with a child as
young as six to mothers with a child as young as three and, at a state’s option, extended work
requirements to mothers with a child as young as age one. A number of states experimented with
changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted to the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS).7 Among the features of state programs tested under waiver
authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements, experiments requiring a “work first”
approach rather than “training first, followed by work,” time limits, strengthened sanctions for
noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare benefits for a new baby conceived or
born while a mother was receiving welfare. In addition, eligibility and funding for child care were
expanded, helping to make work possible for mothers who otherwise might have difficulty
finding affordable child care. The Family Support Act expanded eligibility for child care
assistance in the form of transitional child care assistance for families working their way off
AFDC, as well as for families “at risk” of qualifying for AFDC. In 1990, federally funded child
care assistance was extended to low-income families generally, not just those receiving or at risk
of receiving welfare, under the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG).
The numbers of cases and persons receiving AFDC remained relatively level during the 1970s
and most of the 1980s, but began to rise again in 1989 just prior to the onset of an eight-month
long economic recession that was marked as beginning in July 19908 (see Figure 2, above). From
1988 to 1994, the number of persons receiving AFDC would increase by 30%—a much larger
increase than might be expected from the recession alone.9 The caseload increase contributed to

6 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty, 1900-1985 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1986), p. 179.
7 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance of states with certain
sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or demonstrations that the Secretary judges to promote specific
objectives of the act.
8 Economic recessions are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle Dating
Committee.
9 For analyses of AFDC caseload growth over this period, see CRS Report 93-7, Demographic Trends Affecting Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) Caseload Growth, by (name redacted) (archived report, available to
congressional clients upon request); also, Janice Peskin, Forecasting AFDC Caseloads, with an Emphasis on Economic
Factors, Congressional Budget Office Staff Memorandum, July 1993; and, Rebecca Blank, “What Causes Public
Assistance Caseloads to Grow?,” Journal of Human Resources, vol. 36, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 85-118.
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new calls for welfare reform—and welfare reform would once again move into the policy
spotlight.
Welfare Dependency as a Political Theme
In his January 1992 State of the Union Address before a joint session of Congress, President
George H. W. Bush, who would be running for a second term as President, expressed his intention
to make it quicker and easier for states to restructure their welfare programs through the federal
waiver process:
Welfare was never meant to be a lifestyle. It was never meant to be a habit. It was never
supposed to be passed from generation to generation like a legacy. It’s time to replace the
assumptions of the welfare state and help reform the welfare system.
States throughout the country are beginning to operate with new assumptions that when able-
bodied people receive Government assistance, they have responsibilities to the taxpayer: A
responsibility to seek work, education, or job training; a responsibility to get their lives in
order; a responsibility to hold their families together and refrain from having children out of
wedlock; and a responsibility to obey the law. We are going to help this movement. Often,
State reform requires waiving certain Federal regulations. I will act to make that process
easier and quicker for every State that asks for our help.10
In September 1992, during a presidential campaign speech, candidate William J. Clinton pledged,
if elected, to “end welfare as we know it.” As reported in the New York Times, he stated:
The changing face of welfare and the changing nature of it, and the enormous barriers of
people moving from welfare to a productive life deserve special attention ... Especially now
that most people on welfare are young women and their little children.... By the time we’re
through, we shouldn’t have a welfare program in America ... We ought to have a helping
hand program followed by a jobs program.11
The previous day, the Clinton campaign began airing a campaign ad in which the candidate stated
his plan to “end welfare as we know it”:
For so long, Government has failed us, and one of its worst failures has been welfare. I have
a plan to end welfare as we know it, to break the cycle of welfare dependency. We’ll provide
education, job training and child care, but even those who are able must go to work, either in
the private sector or in public service.... It’s time to make welfare what it should be—a
second chance, not a way of life.”12

10 Available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=1992_public_papers_vol1_text&docid=
pap_text-79.pdf.
11 Gwen Ifill, “Clinton Presses Welfare Overhaul, Stressing Job Training and Work,” New York Times, September 10,
1992, pp. A1, A19.
12 Richard L. Berke, “The Ad Campaign—Clinton: Getting People Off Welfare,” New York Times, September 10,
1992, p. A-19.
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Nearly 20 welfare reform bills would be introduced in the 103rd Congress,13 but it was not until
June 1994, before the mid-term elections, that President Clinton would unveil his welfare reform
proposal, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994 (S. 2224, H.R. 4605).
Three months later, House Republicans announced their Contract with America just six weeks
before the mid-term elections. The document, unveiled on September 27, 1994, included wide-
ranging provisions, including changes to House rules, and legislative proposals to address 10
policy domains ranging from fiscal responsibility, crime, national security, and job creation to
welfare reform, among others. In the introduction to the welfare reform provisions, the Contract
viewed the issue as follows:
Isn't it time for the government to encourage work rather than rewarding dependency? The
Great Society has had the unintended consequence of snaring millions of Americans into the
welfare trap. Government programs designed to give a helping hand to the neediest of
Americans have instead bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty. Our Contract
with America will change this destructive social behavior by requiring welfare recipients to
take personal responsibility for the decisions they make. Our Contract will achieve what
some thirty years of massive welfare spending has not been able to accomplish: reduce
illegitimacy, require work, and save taxpayers money.14
The Contract’s welfare proposal, the Work Opportunity Act of 1995, was introduced as H.R. 4 on
January 4, 1995, the first day of the 104th Congress.
EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay”
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), first introduced in 1975, was meant to help offset social
security (FICA15) taxes paid by workers with lower earnings. Since then, the EITC has become an
important policy tool in helping to encourage work. Legislated expansions to the credit over the
years have increased the size and scope of the credit, extending its reach to higher earned income
levels. As a supplement to families with low earnings, the EITC not only helps offset FICA
payroll taxes and federal income taxes families would otherwise pay, but it also helps to offset
some of the “implicit taxes” families face as public assistance benefits are reduced when their
income increases. As a refundable tax credit, the EITC provides payments to qualified individuals
with no federal income tax liability. Over the period examined in this report, the EITC was
expanded both under the George H. W. Bush Administration in 1990 (phased-in in 1991 and
1992), and early in the first term of the Clinton Administration in 1993 (phased-in from 1994
through 1996). By 1996, the expanded EITC was providing a “work bonus” to families with
children, amounting to as much as 34 cents on each dollar earned for a low-income family with
one child, and as much as 40 cents for a family with two or more. The EITC expansions early in
President Clinton’s first term were the centerpiece of part of a policy of “making work pay”—that
people who work shouldn’t be poor—and a critical first step towards the President’s campaign
promise to “end welfare as we know it” by moving people off public cash assistance and into
work.

13 “House GOP Offers Descriptions Of Bills To Enact ‘Contract’.” In CQ Almanac 1994, 50th ed., 39-D-52-D.
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1995, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal94-843-25141-1102086.
14 “Welfare Reform,” in Contract with America: the bold plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House
Republicans to change the nation, ed. Ed Gillespie and Bob Schellhas (New York: Times Books, 1994), p. 65.
15 Federal Insurance Contributions Act taxes.
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TANF and Other Policies in the Post-AFDC Era
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), signed into law in 1996 as part of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, P.L. 104-193),
replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal
entitlement program to low-income families with children. TANF eliminated the federal
entitlement to assistance that existed under AFDC, replacing an open-ended matching grant
program with a fixed-dollar block grant program (with the possible addition of recession-related
contingency funds). States must maintain spending levels equal to 75% of what they spent on
AFDC at the time the program was repealed—a provision known as State Maintenance of Effort
(MOE). Adults must be engaged in approved “work activities” within two years of initial TANF
receipt, subject to sanction for noncompliance. Under TANF, federal work participation standards
(i.e., “work-requirements”) apply to states’ TANF caseloads. As such, states are required to have
50% of families, and 90% of two-parent families, engaged in “work” or they will be at risk of
having their block grant reduced.16 TANF gives states increased flexibility to design programs to
assist needy families with children compared to its predecessor program, but with fixed federal
dollars. A major goal of TANF is to end dependence of needy families on government assistance
by limiting the time they may receive assistance and by promoting job preparation, work, and
marriage. TANF law imposes a maximum five-year lifetime limit on receipt of federally funded
assistance,17 and allows states to impose shorter limits than the maximum.
States have implemented a wide range of policy options and program approaches in the design of
their TANF programs. Many of their programs have evolved from approaches first experimented
with under federal waiver authority in the pre-TANF era. Cash welfare under the AFDC program
was an entitlement, though states were allowed to set income-eligibility levels and the size of
cash benefits, which, under the program, varied widely among them. Since passage of TANF,
states’ cash welfare programs have evolved over time, becoming more complex and diverging
from the cash assistance rules in place under AFDC. States’ TANF policies vary widely in
determining who is eligible for assistance, the benefits they receive, the behavioral requirements
recipients must meet, and the duration they may receive assistance. States’ cash welfare policies
are described elsewhere.18 Since the passage of TANF, most states have increased financial work
incentives for families receiving cash assistance by allowing families to keep more of their cash
welfare benefit as their earnings increase.19 Additionally, as was the case before welfare reform,
most states have allowed inflation to substantially erode the real value of welfare benefits over
time, diminishing the value of welfare relative to work.20

16 A state’s work participation requirement may be reduced for specified reasons (e.g., reductions in a state’s caseload
“caseload reduction credit,” or states spent more than that required by TANF’s MOE). See CRS Report RL32760, The
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, by (name
redacted).
17 Up to 20% of the TANF caseload can be extended to receive assistance beyond five years due to “hardship,” as
defined by the states. See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant:
A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by (name redacted).
18 See, for example, the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, on the Internet at http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd/
WRDWelcome.cfm.
19 For a discussion of changes in work incentives under TANF compared to AFDC, see CRS Report RL30579, Welfare
Reform: Financial Eligibility Rules and Cash Assistance Amounts under TANF, by Craig Abbey (archived report,
available upon request).
20 Maximum TANF benefits available for a family of three in the median state in July 2013 were 42% below the
(continued...)
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States may use both federal and state MOE dollars for a wide range of activities, other than the
provision of “cash assistance.”21 In FY2013, only 28% of total federal TANF and state (MOE)
dollars under the program went toward basic cash assistance. When administrative costs and work
activities are added to basic cash assistance—the three spending categories most commonly
associated with “welfare”—those expenditures accounted for about two-fifths (41%) of total
TANF spending in FY2013. States have also redirected funds previously used to provide cash
assistance to pay for child care, either directly or by transferring funds to the child care block
grant. In FY2013, 16% of all TANF funds used were either expended on child care or transferred
to the Child Care Development Fund (CCDF). TANF is also a major contributor to the child
welfare system, which provides foster care, adoption assistance, and services to families with
children who either have experienced or are at risk of experiencing child abuse or neglect. It
should be noted that among state and federal TANF spending, only those dollars provided as
“cash assistance” are included as income for poverty measurement purposes, although dollars
expended for other purposes, such as child care, may help to indirectly reduce poverty by making
it “affordable” for a parent to work.
Other Federal and State Policies that Encourage Work
In addition to policy changes described above, a variety of other policies implemented at both the
federal and state levels have served to reward work. Over the period examined in this report, the
minimum wage was increased six times—three times in the pre-welfare reform era and three
times since.22 Moreover, in 31 states (includes the District of Columbia) state minimum wages
exceeded the federal minimum wage in one or more years over the period.23 Many states have
implemented state earned income tax credits (SEITC), which piggyback on the federal EITC. In
most cases, states structure their SEITC as a percentage of the federal EITC. In tax year 2000, for
example, 14 states and the District of Columbia had SEITCs, and in 10 of those jurisdictions, the
credit was fully refundable. By tax year 2012, 24 states and the District of Columbia had SEITCs,
and in 22 of those jurisdictions the credit was fully refundable.24

(...continued)
maximum level available to a family under AFDC in July 1988, after adjusting for the effects of price inflation. In July
1988, the maximum benefit level in the median state amounted to 45% of the Department of Health and Human
Services Federal Poverty Guidelines (FPL), but by 2013, only 26%. In 1988, the maximum benefit ranged from a low
of 14.6% of FPL (Alabama) to 82.1% of FPL (California). By 2013, the maximum benefit ranged from a low of 10.4%
of FPL (Mississippi) to a high of 48.5% of FPL (New York). Author’s calculations based on data from U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Ways and Means, 2008 Green Book, Section 7—Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, 111th
Cong., Table 7-22, pp. 49-50, available on the internet at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/110/tanf.pdf; and
Erika Huber, David Kassabian, and Elissa Cohen, Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2013, The
Urban Institute, Washington, DC, September 2014, Table L5, Maximum Monthly Benefit for A Family of Three with
No income, 1996-2013 (July), pp. 224-225 http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413208-Welfare-Rules-Databook.pdf.
21 See CRS Report RL32760, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant: Responses to
Frequently Asked Questions, by (name redacted).
22 The federal minimum wage increased from $3.35 per hour to $3.80 per hour, effective April 1990, to $4.25 per hour,
effective April 1991, to $4.75 per hour, effective October 1996, $5.15 per hour, effective September 1997, $5.85 per
hour, effective July 2007, and $6.65 per hour, effective July 2008. In July 2009, the minimum wage was increased to
$7.25 per hour. For an analysis of possible effects of minimum wage increases on welfare participation, see Mark
Turner, The Effects of Minimum Wages on Welfare Recipiency, paper presented at the National Association for Welfare
Research and Statistics, August 1998.
23 U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Changes in Basic Minimum Wages in Non-Farm Employment
Under State Law: Selected Years 1968 to 2011, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm.
24 For tax year 2012 see Policy Basics: State Earned Income Tax Credit, Center for Budget and Policy Priorities,
(continued...)
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Child Support Enforcement25
The Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program was enacted in 1975 as a federal-state program
(Title IV-D of the Social Security Act). The CSE program is funded with both state and federal
dollars. The federal government bears the majority of CSE program expenditures and provides
incentive payments to the states for success in meeting CSE program goals.26
The CSE program provides seven major services on behalf of children: (1) locating absent
parents, (2) establishing paternity, (3) establishing child support orders, (4) reviewing and
modifying child support orders, (5) collecting child support payments, (6) distributing child
support payments, and (7) establishing and enforcing support for children’s medical needs.
The CSE program has the potential to impact more children and for longer periods of time than
most other federal programs. In many cases, the CSE program may interact with parents and
children for 18 years.
One of the original purposes of the CSE program was to recover from noncustodial parents some
of the costs of providing cash welfare to their children’s families. Families receiving cash
assistance must assign (legally turn over) to the state their rights to child support collections.
These collections are split between the federal government and the states to recover the costs of
providing cash assistance. States have options to pay some or all of such collections to families
directly, but they are not required to do so.
Over the last 10-15 years, the CSE program has expanded its mission beyond its initial welfare
cost-recovery goal to focus on providing its clients with more effective and efficient CSE services
and fostering parental responsibility. The 1996 welfare reform law established some new systems
for tracking down and enforcing the obligations of noncustodial parents to pay child support. It
also established a “family first” policy, sending more child support collected on behalf of families
that formerly received cash assistance directly to the family. These policy changes, combined
with the decline in cash assistance rolls, have resulted in the bulk of CSE collections going

(...continued)
December 2012, http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-seitc.pdf. For earlier tax years, see
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/Excel/state_eitc.xls.
25 This section is based on CRS Report RS22380, Child Support Enforcement: Program Basics, by (name redacted)
; CRS Report RL34203,
Child Support Enforcement Program Incentive Payments: Background and Policy Issues,
by (name redacted) (archived report); and CRS Report R41431,
Child Well-Being and Noncustodial Fathers, by
(name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).
26 The federal government reimburses each state 66% of all allowable expenditures on CSE activities. The federal
government’s funding is “open-ended” in that it pays its percentage of expenditures by matching the amounts spent by
state and local governments with no upper limit or ceiling. The federal government also provides incentive payments to
states to encourage them to operate effective programs. Federal law requires states to reinvest CSE incentive payments
back into the CSE program or related activities. In addition to state and federal matching funds and incentive payments,
states collect child support on behalf of families receiving AFDC/TANF to reimburse themselves (and the federal
government) for the cost of AFDC/TANF cash payments to the family. Federal law requires families who receive
AFDC/TANF cash assistance to assign their child support rights to the state in order to receive AFDC/TANF. In
addition, such families must cooperate with the state if necessary to establish paternity and secure child support. CSE
collections on behalf of families receiving AFDC/TANF cash benefits are used to reimburse state and federal
governments for AFDC/TANF payments made to the family (i.e., child support payments go to the state instead of the
family, except for amounts that states choose to “pass through” to the family as additional income that does not affect
TANF eligibility or benefit amounts). Additionally, states may charge application fees and apply recovered costs from
non-welfare families to help finance their CSE programs.
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directly to families. In FY2013, the CSE program collected $28.0 billion in child support
payments from noncustodial parents and served nearly15.6 million child support cases. Of the
$28.0 billion collected in child support payments, about 93% went to families, 5% went to state
and federal governments, and nearly 2% consisted of medical support payments or fees paid to
states.
Policies Addressing Marriage and Childbearing27
Among TANF’s four stated goals, three relate directly to marriage and childbearing (italics added
below). States may spend TANF funds on a wide range of activities for cash welfare recipients
and other families toward achieving these goals.
TANF’s Four Goals
“(1) Provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in their own
homes or in the homes of relatives;
(2) end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage;
(3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical
goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and
(4) encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.”
Since TANF became law, a number of federal, state, and local initiatives have been undertaken in
the attempt to reduce non-marital childbearing and promote responsible fatherhood and healthy
marriage. Policy initiatives seek to reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancy through abstinence
education, comprehensive sex education programs, and youth programs. Other programs focus on
promoting healthy marriage, generally through public advertising campaigns on the value of
marriage, and more targeted efforts at providing “social skills” education and training (e.g.,
marriage education, conflict resolution, and relationship skills) to couples interested in marriage
or who are already married. Responsible fatherhood programs are intended to connect or
reconnect children to their noncustodial parents, with the hope of improving the prospects of
children being raised in single-parent families.
Policy Responses to Changing Economic Conditions
It is useful to view the policy changes discussed above in the context of prevailing economic
conditions. Over the 27 years examined, the country experienced three economic recessions. The
first, lasting eight months (July 1990 to March 1991) and occurring well before welfare reform,
was followed by the longest period of economic expansion in the post-World War II era. The
expansion ended with a second eight-month recession (March to November of 2001), which
occurred well after passage and state implementation of new welfare reform rules. More recently,
the economy suffered from what has been marked as the longest and deepest recession in the
post-World War II era, lasting some 18 months from its official beginning to end (December 2007
to June 2009). In response, Congress passed a wide range of provisions under economic stimulus

27 For a discussion of issues and policies and programs relating to this topic see CRS Report RL34756, Nonmarital
Childbearing: Trends, Reasons, and Public Policy Interventions, by (name redacted).
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and recovery legislation to bolster the economy and to help support low- and middle-income
families and individuals.
Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits
A number of policy interventions were undertaken in response to the most recent recession to
both stimulate the economy and cushion the most economically vulnerable. Under provisions in
the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-185), single and head-of-household tax filers, such
as single mothers, who had filed federal income taxes in 2007 became eligible to receive a
minimum tax rebate in 2008 of $300 ($600 for married joint filers) if their 2007 earned income
(plus any Social Security benefits, tier 1 railroad retirement, and veteran’s disability payments)
was at least $3,000, and up to $600 ($1,200 for married joint filers) to the extent of their 2008 tax
liability. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) provided rebates,
under the Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credit, of up to $400 for single and head-of-household
tax filers and up to $800 for joint filers in 2009 and 2010 by reducing FICA tax withholding.
Congress legislated a payroll (FICA) “tax holiday” (P.L. 111-312), temporarily reducing the
employee share of Social Security taxes from 6.2% to 4.2% for 2011. In 2011, for a single
working parent with one child, earning poverty level wages ($15,504), her payroll taxes would be
reduced from $961 to $651, a tax savings of $310. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation
Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96) extended the tax reduction through 2012.
The Emergency and Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) included a
provision that temporarily lowered the income limit for receipt of the refundable portion of the
Child Tax Credit28 (CTC), which is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) as the
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) to distinguish it from the nonrefundable portion of the CTC.
Refundable credits, such as the ACTC and EITC, extend benefits to tax filers even though they
owe no taxes. For the 2008 tax year, EESA effectively lowered the ACTC refundable income
limit from $12,050 to $8,500. ARRA further expanded eligibility, temporarily, for the ACTC to
tax filers with earnings of $3,000 or more for tax years 2009 and 2010. The refundable income
limits set a lower threshold at which tax filers may begin to receive the refundable ACTC. A tax
filer with a qualifying child could receive a “refund” amounting to 15 cents on every dollar
earned above the refundable income threshold, up to a maximum credit amount of $1,000 per
qualifying child. Under the EESA, a single mother with earned income of $12,050 became
eligible for an ACTC of $532.50 in 2008, whereas absent the EESA provisions she would have
received nothing. In 2009, under the ARRA provisions, a single parent with one child and having
annual earnings in excess of $3,000 may have been eligible for the credit, and eligible for the full
$1,000 credit once her earned income reached $9,667.29 Absent the legislative changes noted
above, she would not have begun to become eligible for the credit until her earned income
exceeded $12,550, and would not have been eligible for the full $1,000 credit until her income
reached $19,217.30

28 For a discussion see CRS Report R41873, The Child Tax Credit: Current Law and Legislative History, by (name reda
cted).
29 $3,000 + ($1,000/.15) = $9,667.
30 $12,550 + ($1,000/.15) = $19,217.
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Under ARRA, certain ACTC provisions were set to expire at the end of the 2010 tax year. Among
other things, expiring provisions would have caused the maximum allowable credit to revert from
$1,000 to $500 per qualifying child, and for credit refundability to extend only to families with
three or more qualifying children. The Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and
Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312) extended the ARRA ACTC provisions through tax year
2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (H.R. 8, as amended by the Senate, and signed
into law by the President on January 2, 2013), among other things, extends ARRA’s ACTC
provisions for another five years, through 2017.
ARRA also temporarily raised the EITC credit rate for tax years 2009 and 2010 from 40% for
families with two or more qualifying children to 45% for families with three or more qualifying
children. In 2009, for a single parent with three or more children, the maximum available credit
under ARRA increased to $5,657, from what would have been $5,028 absent ARRA. The Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-312)
extended the ARRA EITC provisions through tax year 2012. The American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012 extends these provisions through 2017.
Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Unemployment Compensation (UC) under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system typically
provides up to 26 weeks of unemployment compensation covering a portion of lost wages to
qualified covered workers who become eligible due to job loss.31 Under the permanent Extended
Benefits (EB) program, unemployment compensation may be extended for an additional 13 or 20
weeks to workers in qualifying states with high unemployment. Both UC and EB payments to
workers are funded jointly through federal and state taxes on employers. Additionally, as in some
past recessions, Congress funded a temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program
(EUC08; P.L. 110-252), which began in 2008.32 Under the EB and EUC08 programs,
Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits have been extended from a maximum of 26 weeks under
the UC program to a maximum of 60 to 99 weeks, depending on states’ circumstances.
Additionally, ARRA made several changes to Unemployment Compensation (UC) to assist
individuals who become unemployed.33 It provided a temporary supplemental benefit increase of
$25 per week under all UC programs (UC, EB, EUC08, and others34), payable until July 2010,
and excluded $2,400 in UC benefits from gross income under the federal income tax for 2009.
ARRA also provided $7 billion in incentives to states to modify their basis for computing UC
benefits and for extending benefits to currently ineligible individuals. Two-thirds of the $7 billion
available to states is contingent on states first adopting an alternative method of determining

31 For a thorough discussion of the UI system, see CRS Report RL33362, Unemployment Insurance: Programs and
Benefits, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
32 EUC08 benefits are fully federally funded out of the federal Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) and from general
funds. Since originally passed into law, authorization for the EUC08 program has been extended a number of times—
most recently on December, 17, 2010, when the President signed P.L. 111-312, the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, which extended the EUC08 program’s authorization until
January 3, 2012.
33 See CRS Report R40368, Unemployment Insurance Provisions in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, by (name redacted); and CRS Report RS21356, Taxation of Unemployment Benefits, by (name redacted).
34 Other UC programs include unemployment benefits for former U.S. military service members (UCX program),
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) benefits, workers who lose their jobs because of international competition
who receive additional or supplemental support through the Trade Adjustment Act (TAA) programs.
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eligibility for individuals who do not qualify under the regular method based on their wage and
employment history. The states could then be eligible for the remaining two-thirds of the $7
billion if they adopt at least two of the following four provisions:
1. permit former part-time workers to seek part-time work;
2. permit voluntary separations from employment for compelling family reasons,
which must include (i) domestic violence, (ii) illness or disability of an
immediate family member, and (iii) the need to accompany a spouse who is
relocating for employment;
3. provide extended compensation to UC recipients in qualifying training programs
for high-demand occupations; or
4. provide dependents’ allowances to UC recipients with dependents.
Upon accepting the federal incentive payments, states are required to maintain the adopted
changes after the incentive payments expire. The above provisions could especially assist single
mothers whose job attachment has been sporadic or limited to part-time employment due to
competing family responsibilities.
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp)
Benefits
ARRA raised maximum benefit amounts under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp program), effective in April 2009.35 ARRA effectively increased
maximum monthly SNAP benefits by 13.6%, as a replacement for annual benefit adjustments
based on annual food-price inflation. As a result, average household benefits (typically less than
the maximum) were boosted by more than 15%. ARRA SNAP benefit increases reverted back to
annual adjustment based on food-price inflation in November 2013, as specified in SNAP law.
Other Social Policies
ARRA also included provisions that added a new temporary “emergency contingency fund”
under TANF for FY2009 and FY2010, which allowed states receiving extra federal grants to
cover 80% of increased recession-related costs in those two years.36 Recession-related costs are
defined as increased basic assistance (for states with increased basic assistance caseloads), non-
recurrent short-term benefits, or subsidized employment expenditures.
Other ARRA provisions may also directly help single mothers.37 For example, expanded funding
for child care for low-income working families might help single mothers secure and retain
employment, and increased federal incentive payments to states to run effective child support

35 See CRS Report R41374, Reducing SNAP (Food Stamp) Benefits Provided by the ARRA: P.L. 111-226 and P.L. 111-
296, by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted) (archived).
36 CRS Report R40211, Human Services Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, by (name redacted) et
al. (archived). Also see CRS Report R41078, The TANF Emergency Contingency Fund, by (name redacted).
37 CRS Report R40211, Human Services Provisions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, op. cit.
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enforcement programs may help states’ efforts to establish and maintain absent parents’ child
support obligations.
Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-
Headed Families with Children
A dramatic transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status has occurred over
the 27-year period examined in this report. The period has seen a marked structural change in the
provision of benefits under a number of programs that contribute to the fabric of the nation’s
“income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has changed markedly over the period, in
part a response to structural changes to income “safety net” programs, with more mothers
working and fewer relying on cash welfare to support themselves and their children in the post-
welfare reform era.
Figure 3 completes the administrative data series presented earlier (Figure 2) through 2013. The
figure shows a dramatic decline in the number of recipients (total, adults and children) receiving
AFDC/TANF after having reached a historical peak in 1993. In 1993, 14.2 million persons were
receiving AFDC in the average month; by 2008, the number receiving TANF had fallen to 4
million, a decline of 10.2 million persons from 2003—6.5 million fewer children and 3.7 million
fewer adults. In 2008, the number of persons receiving cash aid under TANF was the lowest since
1963, when 3.9 million received assistance under AFDC. Reflecting the effects of the most recent
recession, the number of persons receiving TANF has increased from 4.0 million in 2008 to 4.6
million in 2010. Accompanying the economic recovery, the number of recipients has fallen
slightly since 2010, reaching 4.0 million in 2013—the same level as its 2008 pre-recession low.
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Figure 3. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance
Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013
(Annual Monthly Average, in Millions)

Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA). See Table C-2 for supporting data.
Note: Includes enrollment in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Separate estimates for children and adults are not available from 1997 to 1999 due to changes in state reporting
requirements during the transition from AFDC to TANF. From 2001 and later, includes enrol ment in Separate
State Programs (SSP) under state Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements.
Moreover, since welfare reform, poverty among children living in female-headed households38
has also fallen significantly. Figure 4 shows that the incidence of poverty among children in
female-headed households fell from 55.4% in 1991 to 39.3% by 2001, which represents the
largest 10-year decline in poverty among such children since that which commenced in the early
1960s. The poverty rate of children in female-headed families has risen consequent to two
recessions since 2001, reaching a recent high of 47.7% in 2011,and since falling to 45.8% in
2013—still well above its 2001 low of 39.3%. Since 1996 welfare reform, progress appears to
have been largely sustained in both reducing welfare dependency and poverty among children in
female-headed families, in spite of the recent recession.

38 Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS definition of
female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey
(CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
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Figure 4. Poverty Rate of Children Under Age 18
in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present), 1960 to 2013
(Percent poor)

Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Census Bureau historical
series, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html, “Table 10. Related
Children in Female Householder Families, by Poverty Status.” See Table C-3 for supporting data.
Notes: Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS
definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current
Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
The remainder of this report focuses primarily on single mothers, as single mothers have been a
primary focus of social policy. Untangling the effects of demographic factors, the economy,
welfare policy, and other policy interventions on single mothers’ work behavior, welfare receipt,
income, and poverty status is beyond the scope of this report. Others have attempted to parcel out
these effects with mixed success and differing conclusions as to the relative impacts of each.39 In
contrast to these efforts, the remainder of this report provides a descriptive analysis of U.S.

39 See, for example Council of Economic Advisors, Technical Report: The Effects of Welfare Policy and the Economic
Expansion on Welfare Caseloads: An Update, A Report by the Council of Economic Advisors, Washington, DC,
August 1999; James P. Ziliak, David N. Figlio, and Elizabeth E. Davis, et al., “Accounting for the Decline in AFDC
Caseloads, Welfare Reform or the Economy?,” The Journal of Human Resources, vol. XXXV, no. 3, pp. 570-586;
Robert A. Moffitt, “The Effect of Pre-PRWORA Waivers on AFDC Caseloads and Female Earnings, Income, and
Labor Force Behavior,” in Economic Conditions and Welfare Reform, ed. Sheldon Danziger (Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999); June E. O’Neill and Anne M. Hill, Gaining Ground? Measuring the
Impact of Welfare Reform on Welfare and Work, Manhattan Institute, Civic Report No. 17, New York, New York,
2001; Caroline Danielson and Jacob Alex Klerman, “Did Welfare Reform Cause the Caseload Decline,” Social Service
Review, vol. 82, no. 4 (December 2008), pp. 703-730.
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Census Bureau CPS/ASEC data, with the goal of increasing understanding of changes in single
mothers’ welfare, work, income, and poverty status that have occurred over the past 27 years.
Number of Families Headed by Single Mothers
Over the 27-year period examined, the number of single-mother families increased from 8.2
million in 1987 to a peak of 11.5 million in 2011, falling somewhat since, to 11.0 million in 2013
(Figure 5). The total number of single mothers increased from 8.4 million in 1989 to about 9.9
million in 1993, an increase of 1.8 million, or 17%. From 1993 through 2000, the number of
single mothers remained fairly stable, ranging between 9.7 million and 10.1 million. From 2000
to 2011, the number of single mothers increased by 1.5 million (from 9.7 million to 11.5 million,
respectively). (The number of single mothers fell somewhat in 2013, to 11.0 million.) The overall
increase in single-mother families has largely been due to an increase in single mothers who have
never been married. From 1987 to 2011, the number of never-married single mothers more than
doubled, increasing from 2.7 million to 5.8 million over the period. The number of single mothers
in 2013, 5.6 million, was only slightly below its 2011 peak of 5.8 million. In contrast, the number
of separated mothers (no spouse present), and the number of divorced mothers in 2013, was only
slightly above their 1987 number, while the number of widowed mothers in 2013 was well below
the number in 1987. Moreover, in 2013 the number of married-couple families with children was
just slightly below their number in 1987 (not shown in the figure, see Table C-4).
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Figure 5. Number of Single-Mother Families, by Mothers’ Marital Status,
1987 to 2013
(Number in millions)

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-4
for supporting data.
Incidence of Poverty by Mothers’ Marital Status
The incidence of poverty among families headed by single mothers fell substantially from a peak
of 45.4% of all single-mother families in 1992 and 1993 to a historical low for the 27-year period
of 31.8% in 2000 (Figure 6). Since 2000, poverty rates for single mothers have increased, but
they still remain well below levels of the early 1990s. The poverty rate among single-mother
families rose to 34.9% by 2004, consequent to an eight-month recession (March to November
2001), and continued to drift upwards until increasing more sharply, to 39.5% in 2010,
consequent to a deep 18-month recession (December 2007 to June 2009). The poverty rate for
single-mother families fell from 39.8% in 2012 to 38.0% in 2013. Poverty rates are highest
among never-married mothers, followed by separated mothers (no spouse present) and widowed
and divorced mothers. Poverty rates of single mothers are several times that of married mothers.
Poverty rates for never-married, separated, and divorced mothers fell substantially over the 1990s,
reaching historical lows by the beginning of the next decade. (Note: the wide variability in the
poverty rate among widowed mothers over the period reflects sample variation relating to the
comparatively small sample of such mothers represented on the CPS/ASEC.)
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Figure 6. Poverty Rates by Mothers’ Marital Status, 1987 to 2013
(Percent poor)

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-4
for supporting data.
Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt among Single Mothers
CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance (GA)40)
among single mothers during the late 1980s and early 1990s and a decrease in the mid- to late-
1990s. The CPS data generally correspond to the caseload’s rise and fall, documented by
administrative program data, but underestimate the caseload statistics to some extent.41 Figure 7
shows that the number of single mothers in families reporting receipt of cash welfare on the CPS
increased from 2.5 million in 1989 to 3.4 million in 1993, an increase of 900,000, or 36%, over
the four-year period. Compared to 1993, the peak year of welfare receipt, the number of single
mothers reporting cash welfare was down to 795,000 in 2013—77% below that of 1993 (the
bottom-shaded portion of the figure).42 The CPS/ASEC data show very little if any take-up in

40 The CPS/ASEC data groups any General Assistance individuals or families may have received with AFDC and
TANF. GA programs are financed and administered at the state, county, or local level, and are generally used to meet
the needs of people who are ineligible for federally funded cash assistance (e.g., AFDC/TANF, SSI) or are awaiting
approval for such benefits. In 1998, 35 states and the District of Columbia had GA programs. See L. Jerome Gallagher,
Cori E. Uccello, and Alicia B. Pierce, et al., State General Assistance Programs 1998, The Urban Institute, Assessing
the New Federalism, Discussion Paper 99-01, Washington, DC, April 1999, http://www.urban.org/publications/
409066.html.
41 See Appendix B, which compares CPS estimates to AFDC/TANF caseload counts.
42 Administrative caseload statistics show the caseload as peaking in March 1994, with nearly 5.1 million cases. In
(continued...)
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receipt of cash welfare by single mothers in response to the most recent recession, and little if any
take-up in cash welfare in response to the one preceding it. This differs from the administrative
data presented earlier (Figure 3), which showed a modest increase in the TANF caseload from
2008 to 2010, no increase from 2010 to 2011, and a slight decline from 2011 to 2013. From 1993
to 2013, the number of poor single mothers who reported receiving no cash welfare increased
from 1.722 million in 1993 to 3.605 million in 2013, more than doubling over the period (the
middle-shaded area of the figure).
Figure 7. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt,
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-5
for supporting data.
Note: Welfare is cash welfare in the form of AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance.
Work, Poverty, and Cash Welfare Receipt of Single Mothers
Figure 8 provides an overview of single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status from 1987 to
2013. The figure shows that since 1993, the share of single mothers who worked at some time

(...continued)
December 2007, at the onset of the recession, the caseload stood at 1.691 million, or only about one-third the level of
its March 1994 peak. By December 2010, the caseload had increased somewhat from that of two years earlier, to 1.936
million, a 14.3% increase. In December 2011, the caseload was down slightly from a year earlier, at 1.862 million, and
in December 2013, down further, to 1.654 million.
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during the year has increased markedly, and that the share who received cash welfare (AFDC,
TANF, or GA) has declined significantly, as has the share who are poor under the official poverty
definition. The figure illustrates that while both cash welfare recipiency rates and poverty rates
for single mothers have generally fallen since 1993, single mothers’ welfare recipiency rate has
fallen faster than their poverty rate. More recently, since 2000, the poverty rate of single mothers
has increased, but cash welfare receipt has not—a growing share of single mothers are poor under
the official poverty measure but receive no cash welfare assistance. This suggests that TANF and
other policies implemented in the mid-1990s (e.g., EITC expansion) may have had a lasting
behavioral impact on reducing the incidence of cash welfare receipt among families headed by
single mothers.
Figure 8. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers,
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-6
for supporting data.
Note: Welfare is cash welfare in the form of AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance.
Single Mothers’ Employment
While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in single mothers’ employment have occurred
since 1993. Figure 9 shows employment rates of single and married mothers by age of youngest
child in March, from 1988 to 2014. The chart shows that gaps that had existed between single and
married mothers’ employment have been virtually eliminated in recent years, with single mothers
now being as, and in some cases more, likely than their married counterparts to be working.
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Over the period, the increase in employment among single mothers with young children has been
most dramatic. Among mothers with a child under the age of 3, their employment rate increased
from a low of 35.1% in March 1993 to a high of 59.1% in March 2000, a 24 percentage point
increase over the period. Their employment rate fell to 53.7% in March 2005 but rebounded to
57.0% in March 2006, marking a recent high; it fell to a recent low of 49.6% in March 2010, and
in March 2014 stood at 54.9%.
Single mothers with a youngest child age 3 to 5 also experienced marked employment gains over
the mid-to-late 1990s. Their employment rate grew from a low of 54.1% in March 1992 to 72.7%
by March 2000, an 18.6 percentage point increase over the period. In March 2008, their
employment rate stood at 68.5%, but fell to a recent low of 59.7% in March 2010—13.0
percentage points below its March 2000 peak, with over two-thirds of the decline having occurred
since March 2007. By March 2014, the employment rate for this group of single mothers had
rebounded to 66.0%.
Single mothers whose youngest child was of school age (age 6-17) had employment rates about
equal to those of their married counterparts over the 1988-2014 period. In March 2014, the
employment rate of single mothers with school-age children stood at 73.0%—6.1 percentage
points below a peak employment rate of 79.1% in 2001.
Figure 9. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers,
by Age of Youngest Child, March 1988 to March 2014

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-7
for supporting data.
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Unemployment Rates Across the Business Cycle
Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, the unemployment rate of women maintaining
families has increased from a recent low of 6.2% in August 2007, just prior to the recession’s
onset, to 11.7% in June 2009, the recession’s official end date (see Figure 10). Over a year past
the recession’s end, the unemployment rate of women maintaining families rose further, reaching
a high of 13.4% in July and August 2010. The annual average unemployment rate for women
maintaining families was 12.3% in 2010, and 12.4% in 2011, and the poverty rate among single
mothers essentially leveled off over those two years. Since then, their annual average
unemployment rate has fallen, to 11.4% in 2012, and 10.5% in 2013. Comparing the most recent
unemployment statistics for women maintaining families, their annual average unemployment
rate for the first 10 months of 2014 (8.8%) is well below that of the same period in 2013 (10.5%),
providing encouragement that the poverty rate for single mothers and their children will show
continued improvement in 2014, when estimates become available in late summer 2015.
However, given the pace of economic recovery, official poverty among single mothers and their
children may be expected to remain above pre-recession levels for some years to come.
Figure 10. Unemployment Rate of Women Maintaining Families,
January 1987 through October 2014
(Rates not seasonally adjusted)

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
data. See Table C-8 for supporting data.
Notes: Economic recessions: July 1990 to March 1991, March to November 2001, and December 2007 to June
2009. Economic recessions are defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Business Cycle
Dating Committee.
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Poor Single Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status
There is a greater likelihood today than in years past that a poor single mother will be working
rather than receiving welfare. Changes in poor mothers’ participation in work and welfare status
first became evident in the early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of employment increasing after 1992
(solid green line, Figure 11) and rates of welfare receipt declining after 1993 (solid orange line,
Figure 11). A crossover point was reached by 1996, when the chances that a poor single mother
would be working exceeded the chances that she would be receiving welfare. The initial decline
in welfare receipt and increase in work among poor single mothers coincides with an economy
recovering from recession, a phasing-in of expanded EITC benefits that encouraged work (1994-
1996), increased experimentation among states attempting to transform their cash welfare
programs through the Section 1115 waiver process, and increased political messaging that
national welfare was looming on the horizon. The trend of declining welfare receipt and increased
work intensified further after passage of national welfare reform legislation in 1996.
Figure 11 shows that the share of poor single mothers who received cash welfare at any time
during the year fell from just over 60% in the 1987-1993 period to 17% in 2010. Welfare receipt
among poor single mothers began to decline significantly after 1993, and even more so after
1996. Similarly, the share of poor single mothers who were working at any time during the year
increased from around 44% in 1992 to a peak of 64% in 1999, but in 2010 had dropped to 51%, a
full 13 percentage points below its 1999 peak. In 2014, 54% of poor single mothers worked at
some time during the year.
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Figure 11. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year,
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-9
for supporting data.
The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare without working dropped from a
peak of 43% in 1991 to a low of 9% in 2013 (one-fifth its 1991 rate), and has shown little change
since, despite the recession. The share who worked without relying on cash welfare increased
from a recent low of 25% in 1993 to a recent pre-recession high of 49% in 2007—essentially
doubling over the period—after which the share fell to 45% in 2010 and 2011 consequent to the
recession. The share has since rebounded in 2012 (48%) and 2013 (49%). The share of poor
single mothers who combined work and welfare over the year has fallen by nearly three-quarters,
from about 20% in 1996 to about 5% in 2013—one quarter of its 1996 level.
Poor single mothers who reported that they neither worked nor received cash welfare during the
year (the dashed blue line in Figure 11) has increased from a low of about 12% in 1991 to 37% in
2013, tripling over the period. This surprising combination may reflect a mix of circumstances,
including income support from unrelated household members (which is not included in the
official poverty measure), including cohabiting partners, and other means of support from outside
the household not captured on the CPS. It may also reflect income reporting problems on the
CPS, especially with regard to welfare income.43

43 See Appendix B on CPS under-reporting.
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Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor”
Female-Headed Families with Children
As shown above, cash welfare receipt among female-headed families with children has
dramatically declined in the post-1996 welfare reform era, with the decline having begun in the
years just prior to the passage and subsequent implementation of reform. Figure 12 shows
recipiency rates among female-headed families with children with earnings below their families’
poverty thresholds for six income “safety-net” program categories: AFDC, TANF, or General
Assistance (GA); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); Unemployment Insurance Benefits; Food
Stamp/SNAP benefits; the EITC; and the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit, the
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). The analysis is restricted to “earnings poor” families, as
earnings are the primary means by which most families with working-age members support
themselves. Earnings (along with other income) deemed insufficient to provide for a family’s
basic needs (i.e., poverty level income) and the reasons associated with insufficient earnings (or
other income) are often used in determining eligibility for need-tested and other programs.
Over the 27-year period examined, there has been a marked change in the provision of benefits
among the six programs, reflecting a structural change in aspects of the “income safety net.” It is
important to note that the “official” U.S. poverty measure does not include in-kind benefits, such
as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, nor does it include tax transfers, in the form of the EITC or
ACTC, or taxes paid (e.g., federal and state income taxes, FICA payroll taxes). Among the six
program categories examined, only AFDC/TANF/GA, SSI, and UI are included in the “official”
poverty measure. As will be shown later, this has important implications for how one assesses the
role of income support policies, especially in the post-1996 welfare reform era and over the
course of the most recent recession and recovery.
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
Figure 12 shows a substantial increase in EITC from 1993 to 1999, as mothers with
comparatively low earnings prospects turned away from cash public assistance toward work. In
1993, about 44% of “earnings poor” female-headed families with children were estimated to have
received the EITC; by 1999, 64% of such families were estimated to have received it. In contrast,
over the same period, cash welfare receipt in the form of AFDC, TANF, or GA fell from about
56% to 31%. EITC benefit increases that phased in between 1993 and 1996 may have served to
lure some single mothers away from welfare, in part evidenced by increased work seen earlier in
Figure 9. Additionally, states’ use of AFDC waivers to strengthen work requirements and
sanctions for noncompliance in the pre-welfare reform years may have served to increase work
participation and consequent EITC receipt. TANF’s provisions further encouraged work and
accompanying EITC eligibility over welfare. The figure shows a marked decrease in estimated
EITC receipt in 2003 and 2004, and then a rebound in 2005—these years are marked by a
dashed-line; caution should be exercised in attempting to interpret this phenomena, as it appears
to be an aberration that is not readily explainable.44

44 Email exchanges with Census Bureau contacts, relaying the author’s findings, have not resulted in an attributable
explanation for the sudden dip and recovery of EITC receipt among this subgroup of the population. EITC receipt is not
directly reported on the CPS/ASEC. The Census Bureau estimates the EITC and other tax variables on the CPS/ASEC
using a tax model. Beginning with the 2004 CPS, the Census Bureau implemented a new tax model, providing new tax
(continued...)
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Figure 12. Receipt of Selected Benefits by “Earnings Poor”
Female-Headed Families with Children, 1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-
10 for supporting data.
Notes: “Earnings poor” families are those whose annual earned income is below their poverty income
threshold. Other sources of income received by these families might subsequently lift their total income above
poverty.
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
Receipt of SSI among families headed by single mothers increased over the first half of the
1990s, as shown in Figure 12. In 1988, 7% of “earnings poor” families headed by single mothers
reported receiving SSI; by 1996, 12.6% of such families were reporting SSI receipt. The
populations served by AFDC and SSI overlap somewhat. Some persons may be eligible for both
programs, but individuals cannot receive benefits under both, although families can.45 In contrast
to AFDC and TANF, individuals applying for SSI must pass an often strict and lengthy disability
determination process in order to qualify. SSI benefits are higher than those available under

(...continued)
estimates for income year 2003. It’s uncertain whether model changes may have contributed the sudden aberration in
trend of estimated EITC receipt.
45 For example, a disabled child might qualify for SSI, while the parent could potentially qualify for AFDC, or vice
versa if the parent were disabled. For a discussion, see David C. Stapleton, David C. Wittenburg, and Michael E.
Fishman, et al., “Transitions from AFDC to SSI Before Welfare Reform,” Social Security Bulletin, vol. 64, no. 1
(2001), pp. 84-114.
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AFDC and TANF. Additionally, SSI benefits are fully federally funded, though some states
provide supplementary benefits on top of the federal SSI benefit. In contrast, AFDC benefits were
jointly funded by states and the federal government, through federal matching dollars and under
TANF through a fixed-dollar federal block grant. As such, if all other things were equal, both
individuals and states would do better financially by shifting persons potentially eligible for
TANF to SSI, assuming the person was unlikely to be able to become gainfully employed.
Several administrative changes to SSI made it easier for children to be ruled eligible for the
program during the early 1990s,46 which could have contributed to increased SSI receipt among
families, including those headed by single mothers.
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Benefits
Receipt of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefits among families headed by “earnings poor”
single mothers has risen concurrent and consequent to the three economic recessions that
occurred over the 27-year period examined (Figure 12). With each recession, UI receipt among
these families has increased over that of the previous recession. For example, in the aftermath of
the 1990-1991 recession, 7.5% of all “earnings poor” single mother families reported UI receipt
in 1992; following the 2000 recession, 9.6% reported UI receipt in 2002; and in the most recent
recession, 11.4% reported UI receipt. The higher incidence of UI receipt in 2002 than in 1992
most probably reflects a higher incidence of UI eligibility in the more recent period, due to
increased employment of single mothers, as the two recessions were of equal length, and the
unemployment rate among women maintaining families was slightly lower in 2002 than in 1992
(see Figure 10, shown earlier). UI receipt increased markedly after 2007, consequent to the
recession. In 2007, 4.7% of “earnings poor” single mothers reported receiving UI benefits; by
2010, the share had increased by nearly three times, with 13.5% reporting UI receipt. The
unemployment rate among earnings-poor single mothers has since dropped to 8.0%, in 2013. The
higher incidence of UI receipt among these mothers consequent to the most recent recession
reflects both the severity of the recession and congressional response to it, whereby the duration
for which the unemployed may receive UI benefits had been extended through the end of 2013.47
Increased employment among single mothers subsequent to 1996 welfare reform likely led to
more mothers being covered in UI in the most recent recession than in previous ones.
Food Stamp/Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
Benefits
Food Stamp/SNAP benefit receipt is depicted by the green line in Figure 12. The figure shows
that Food Stamp/SNAP receipt reached a historical peak among “earnings poor” single mother
families in 1993 (69.3%), subsequent to the 1990-1991 recession. Food Stamp receipt for this
group of families reached an historical low in 2002, with 48.3% reporting benefit receipt. The
comparatively low rate of Food Stamp receipt in 2002, compared to earlier periods, may in part
be attributable to the decline of such families on AFDC/TANF, as persons who enrolled in those
programs were generally enrolled in Food Stamps automatically through administrative
processes. The figure shows a modest rise in Food Stamp receipt from 2002 to 2005, subsequent

46 Ibid., p. 86.
47 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34340, Extending Unemployment Compensation Benefits During
Recessions, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).
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to the 2000 recession, and a more substantial rise from 2007 to 2009, consequent to the most
recent recession. Still, the SNAP benefit receipt rate among the depicted families in 2009 (60.2%)
was nearly identical to that of Food Stamps in 1989 even though economic conditions in 2009
were much worse. By 2013, 64.0% of “earnings poor” single-mother families received SNAP
benefits—12.8 percentage points above its pre-recession low (51.2% in 2007).
Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC)
Finally, the figure shows estimated receipt of the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC) among
depicted families.48 Census Bureau estimates of ACTC receipt on the CPS are first available in
2004. As discussed earlier (in “Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits”), the Emergency and
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) temporarily lowered the income
threshold for receipt of the ACTC in tax year 2008. There appears to be no discernible effect of
the provision from 2007 to 2008 in the CPS/ASEC estimates for depicted families. However, the
figure shows that estimated ACTC receipt more than doubled from 2008 (21.5%) to 2009
(45.8%). This large increase in ACTC eligibility reflects changes in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA; P.L. 111-5), which lowered the ACTC income threshold to $3,000,
first taking effect in 2009. In 2013, estimated receipt of ACTC by “earnings poor” single-mother
families, at 45.9%, remained well above its pre-ARRA level.
As shown earlier in Figure 6, single mothers’ poverty status has improved since 1993. Changes in
the economy and changes in welfare policy and other programs, such as the EITC, have both
direct and indirect effects on income and poverty. However, the official U.S. poverty measure
counts only family pre-tax cash income (excluding capital gains and lump sum or one-time
payments) against families’ poverty thresholds (which vary by family size and composition) to
determine whether a family is counted as poor. The “official” U.S. poverty definition does not
include the value of in-kind benefits, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, or public housing
subsidies, nor does it include the effects of taxes or tax credits such as the EITC and the ACTC.
Inclusion of in-kind benefits and refundable tax credits, net of taxes families pay, provides a more
comprehensive income definition than the official poverty income definition. Failing to include
them can have important implications for how one assesses the role of income support policies,
especially in the post-1996 welfare reform era and over the course of the most recent recession
and recovery. Additionally, other unrelated household members may contribute to the family’s
economic well-being, but determining the extent to which resources are shared among unrelated
household members is difficult.
Anti-Poverty Effects of Cash Income, Taxes, and
Transfers on Poverty—Female-Headed Families
with Children
Figure 13 shows the marginal effects of income from a number of sources on poverty.
Components of family income are sequentially added and measured against families’ poverty
thresholds, as one moves from the top line of the chart to subsequent lines below.49 Starting with

48 As with the EITC, ACTC estimates are Census Bureau model-based estimates.
49 The order in which income components are added can influence the measured marginal effect of each.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

the top line, the effect on poverty of family earnings alone is depicted. Poverty measures based on
earned income alone give an indication of the labor market’s effect on poverty, in the context of
other sources of income individuals, families, and households might receive. Moving to the
second line down, the effect of earnings plus all other cash income other than cash welfare
(AFDC, TANF, or state General Assistance) is shown. Adding cash welfare, the third line down,
to those income sources shown above, completes the accounting of pre-tax cash income that is
used under the “official” U.S. poverty definition.

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Figure 13. Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty
and Household Low-Income Status of Single Mothers, 1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-11 for supporting data.
* Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008, Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009, and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits
received in 2009 and 2010.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Addition of Income from Sources Not Included in the “Official”
U.S. Poverty Measure
As noted above, the “official” U.S. poverty definition is based on families’ pre-tax cash income. It
excludes a number of benefits families receive, such as Food Stamp/SNAP benefits, and
refundable tax credits, such as the EITC and ACTC, and it does not take into account taxes
families might pay in the form of federal payroll (FICA) taxes and federal and state income taxes.
In this section, some of the weaknesses of the current “official” poverty measure are addressed,
by sequentially adding a number of other income sources to, and subtracting selected taxes from,
cash income to develop a more comprehensive income measure for assessing poverty than that
offered by the “official” poverty income measure. For example, the market value of Food
Stamp/SNAP benefits is added to pre-tax cash income, to assess their antipoverty effects. Next,
the EITC is added in, net of any FICA, federal, and state income taxes (including state refundable
tax credits). The poverty reducing effect of the ACTC is then assessed, followed by economic
stimulus and recovery payments families may have received in 2008 and 2009, respectively, and
the Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credit in 2009 and 2010.

A cautionary note is in order with regards to assessing the effects tax credits such as the
EITC and ACTC have on family income and poverty. The effects of the credits shown in the
CPS/ASEC are estimates of the amount of the EITC and/or ACTC benefits families would
have been eligible to receive based on their calendar year (i.e., tax year) income. However,
while the tax credits’ effects are shown for the depicted year in which the credits are earned,
families would not actually receive the credits until early in the following year, after filing their
federal income tax forms.

Finally, the bottom-most line of Figure 13 shows the effects of counting all income in the
household in which the single mother lives, not just that of her related family members, and
compares it to “household low-income thresholds.” The household low-income thresholds used
here are scaled the same way as Census Bureau family income poverty thresholds, but are based
on household (rather than family) size and composition. It is important to note that official
poverty measurement is based on a family concept, which assumes that family members share
income and economies of scale that result from shared living arrangements. It is generally agreed
among researchers that assumptions regarding income sharing and shared economies of scale
among related family members, who have ties based on blood, marriage, and adoption, do not
apply to the same extent among unrelated household members. Consequently, these estimates of
household low-income status likely overstate the effect of household income on reducing poverty
among families headed by single mothers.
Effect of Earnings and Other Non-welfare Cash Income on Poverty
Figure 13 shows that between 1993 and 2000, single mothers’ poverty, based on family earnings
alone (top line), fell from 56.2% to 40.8%, reaching a historical low for the 27-year period. Their
“earned-income poverty rate” rose consequent to two recessions, reaching 44.3% in 2004, and
rose again from 44.7% in 2007 to 50.1% in 2010. Adding other cash income, except cash welfare
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

(second line down), to family earnings reduces poverty in 1993 from 56.2% (top line) to 47.4%
(line 2), and in 2013 from 47.6% to 38.3%.
Effect of Cash Welfare on Poverty
Cash welfare benefits have only a small impact on the poverty rate, as these benefits generally are
not sufficient, even when combined with other cash income, to lift families above the federal
poverty threshold. In the vast majority of states, the level of earnings or other cash income at
which states’ cash welfare benefits under AFDC/TANF become unavailable for a family are well
below the poverty line. For example, in July 2013, in only six states could a single mother with
two children have earnings at or above the poverty line and still continue to receive TANF cash
assistance after one year of benefit receipt.50 Consequently, cash welfare benefits have little
impact on the poverty rate. The addition of cash welfare (line 3, representing the official income
definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only slightly: from 47.4% (line 2) to 45.2%
(line 3) in 1993, and from 38.3% to 38.0% in 2013. Nonetheless, cash welfare benefits can have a
significant impact on the level of poor families’ incomes, affecting the degree to which their
incomes fall below the poverty income standard. This impact is not captured by changes in the
poverty rate as shown in Figure 13.
The Invisible Safety Net—Effect on Poverty of Counting Selected
Income Sources Not Included in the “Official” Poverty Measure
As noted above, the “official” U.S. poverty measure counts only families’ pre-tax cash income for
purposes of poverty determination. Inclusion of selected benefits, such as food assistance (in the
form of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits), the refundable EITC, and the partially refundable ACTC,
allows for a more comprehensive assessment of the role of government policy in addressing
vulnerable families’ income needs.
Effect of Food Stamp/SNAP Benefits on Poverty
SNAP benefits played a substantively larger role in reducing poverty among single mothers and
their families in the wake of the recent recession, than in any previous period. The fourth line
from the top in Figure 13 shows the effect on the poverty rate of single mothers by counting the
value of Food Stamp/SNAP benefits. The line shows that Food Stamps/SNAP reduced the
poverty rate of single mothers by about 2 to 3 percentage points over most of the period (compare
the reduction in poverty from line 3 to line 4). In 2009, SNAP benefits nearly offset the rise in
pre-tax cash income poverty (i.e., the “official” poverty measure) from 2008. Whereas on a pre-
tax cash-only basis, poverty among single mothers and their families increased from 33.8% in
2008 to 37.6% in 2009 (line 3), SNAP benefits, when added to cash income, caused the poverty
rate of single mothers to remain essentially level over the two years (33.% in 2008, and 33.5% in
2009). In 2010, SNAP benefits continued to play an important role in reducing poverty among

50 Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia. See. Erika Huber, David Kassabian, and Elissa
Cohen, Welfare Rules Databook: State TANF Policies as of July 2013, The Urban Institute, Washington, DC,
September 2014, Table IV.A.6, Maximum Income for Ongoing Eligibility for a Family of Three, July 2013, pp. 176-
177 http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413208-Welfare-Rules-Databook.pdf.

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single mothers and their families, reducing poverty from 39.5% under the “official” measure to
35.8% when SNAP benefits are added to family cash income. However, unlike 2009, SNAP
benefits in 2010 and 2011 did little to alter the trend toward increased poverty being driven by
unemployment’s effect on earned-income poverty (top line). After counting SNAP benefits, the
poverty rate among single mothers increased from 33.5% to 35.8% from 2009 to 2010, where it
essentially remained unchanged for the next two years. In 2013, single mothers’ post-SNAP
benefit poverty rate fell to 34.3%,
The increased role of SNAP benefits in addressing the rising cash income deficiency of single
mothers in the wake of the recent recession reflects not only an increase in the take-up rate of
SNAP benefits by low-income families headed by single mothers, seen earlier in Figure 12, but
also the legislatively enacted increase of SNAP benefit payments to needy households under
ARRA. As noted earlier (in “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp)
Benefits”), ARRA SNAP provisions resulted in an average 15% increase in monthly SNAP
benefits going into effect in April 2009 and remaining in place through October 2013.
Net Effect of the EITC on Poverty
The EITC has had a comparatively large poverty-reducing effect on single mothers and their
families since legislative expansions to the credit from 1993 took effect. The poverty reducing
effect of the EITC51 is shown net of FICA, federal, and state income taxes (including refundable
state tax credits) (line 5), when added to family cash income and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits (line
4). As discussed earlier (in “EITC Expansions—“Making Work Pay””), a major expansion of the
EITC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996, increased the amount
of the EITC work bonus families might receive. The anti-poverty effectiveness of the EITC net of
taxes was nearly six times greater in 2013 than in 1993.52 As receipt of the EITC is conditioned
on earnings, the growing impact of the EITC in part reflects the rise in work rates among single
mothers. Among those who are working and poor (before counting the EITC), the EITC helps lift
the income of some above the poverty line. Although the EITC expansion provided additional
income to low-income families who were already working, it may also have helped induce
increased employment among family heads with low to moderate earnings potential, and thus
contributed to the lower levels of poverty based on earned income alone that have been evidenced
since 1993 (shown as the top line in the chart).
Note, too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare programs in recent years have
encouraged work (such as work requirements and increased earnings disregards), these changes
may have had a direct effect on poverty by increasing the incidence of work (earnings), which in
turn resulted in expanded EITC receipt among single mothers.

51 Note that the value of the EITC on the CPS is based on Census Bureau imputations, rather than actual reported tax
credits. Also, the EITC is different from most sources of income, as most families receive the EITC as a lump sum
refund at the beginning of year following that in which income used in determining the credit was earned.
52 In 1993, the after-tax poverty rate (counting Food Stamps/SNAP) among single mothers dropped from 42.7% (line 4)
to 41.9% (line 5), a 0.8 percentage point (1.8%) reduction. In 2013, the EITC reduced poverty from 34.3% to 30.7%, a
3.6 percentage point (10.5%) reduction.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Effect of the ACTC on Poverty
The Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC; the refundable portion of the Child Tax Credit) can
provide a refund to tax filers with one or more qualified children, even if they have no federal
income tax liability. Overall, tax filers may receive a Child Tax Credit (CTC) up to $1,000 per
qualifying child. If the CTC is greater than the amount of income tax owed, the tax filer may be
eligible to claim the ACTC. As noted earlier (in “Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits”), The
Emergency and Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) reduced the ACTC’s
refundable income limit from $12,050 to $8,500 for 2008. ARRA (P.L. 111-5) further reduced the
credit’s refundable income limit from a scheduled $12,550 in 2009 to $3,000 for 2009 and 2010,
and P.L. 111-312, extended the ACTC’s reduced refundable income limit for another two years,
through 2011. (As noted earlier, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extends these
provisions through 2017.)
As shown above (Figure 13), the lowered ACTC refundable income limit for 2009 through 2013
reduced the poverty rate of single mothers and their families by 1.7 percentage points in 2009, 1.1
percentage points in 2010, 1.3 percentage points in 2011, 1.4 percentage points in 2012, and 1.5
percentage points in 2013 (6th, compared to 5th, line down). Prior to the legislative changes
discussed above, most poor families were beyond the credit’s reach.
Effect of Federal Economic Stimulus and Recovery Payments and Making
Work Pay Tax Credits on Poverty
In addition to the changes to the EITC and ACTC made as part of legislative action to stimulate
the economy, the Census Bureau provides estimates of economic stimulus payments families may
have received in 2008, and economic recovery payments in 2009, and MWP tax credits in 2009
and 2010 (see earlier discussion in “Tax Rebates, Reductions, and Credits”). The effects of
economic stimulus and economic recovery payments and MWP tax credits on single mothers’
poverty status for 2008 through 2010 are shown together on line 6 above (Figure 13). Economic
stimulus/recovery payments and MWP tax credits reduced the poverty rate among single mothers
by 1.1 percentage points in 2008, and by 0.6 percentage points in 2009 and 2010.
Effect of Unrelated Household Members’ Income on Poverty
The household low-income line (bottom line, Figure 13) shows that if all household members’
income is counted, as though shared equally among household members, the poverty rate among
single mothers would drop by at most 3 to 5 percentage points over the 1987 to 2013 period.
Using the household, as opposed to the family, as the economic unit for determining poverty
reduces the post in-kind transfer, post-tax poverty rate in 2013 from 29.2% to 24.0%. Again, this
is most likely an overstatement of the possible effect that shared household living arrangements
might have on single mothers’ poverty status because of the uncertainty about the extent to which
such income is actually shared.
Comparison of the Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on
Poverty, by Single Mothers’ Work Status
The analysis above examines the effects of earning, transfers, taxes, and other income on families
headed by single mothers. Here, the effects are broken out by whether or not mothers worked at
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

any time during the year. There is a stark contrast in the incidence of poverty among single
mothers who worked at any time during a year, and those who did not. Moreover, selected income
“safety-net” programs have quite different effects in reducing poverty among the two groups, as
shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15, respectively. The figures show, for example, that mothers
who worked at any time during the year were less likely to be poor based on their earnings alone
than mothers who did not work based on total household income.

In comparing across the two figures, it should be noted that the scale shown in Figure 14
ranges from 0% to 50%, while that of Figure 15 ranges from 50% to 100%, as if it were
stacked above in Figure 14 (i.e., the two figures’ scales are the same with regard to relative
range of their vertical axes, but the levels at which those axes start differ).

Several observations follow.
Single Mothers Who Worked During the Year—Figure 14
Effects of Selected Cash Income Sources on Poverty
• Among single mothers who worked during the year, their incidence of poverty
based on earned income alone was at a low in 2000, and has increased markedly
since 2005 (top line).
• Cash income from sources other than UI and cash welfare (second line down) has
had a relatively consistent effect of reducing their poverty rate from that
measured by earnings alone, ranging from 6 to 8 percentage points over the 27-
year period.
• In correspondence with the past recession, UI benefits in 2009 through 2012
reduced their poverty rate by about 1 percentage point, which was about the same
as in 2002, the previous peak year of UI poverty reduction which also
corresponded with a recession.
• Adding in SSI benefits has little effect on poverty reduction among this group,
largely by virtue that mothers worked during the year, and were consequently
unlikely to have had an SSI qualifying disability (although other members of
their family might).
• AFDC, TANF, and GA have very little impact on poverty reduction among single
mothers who worked in recent years, but had more measurable effects in the first
part of the 27-year period, when poor mothers were more likely to combine work
with welfare (refer back to Figure 11).
Based on the “official” poverty measure, which takes into account most sources of pre-tax cash
income families receive, the poverty rate among single mothers in 2013 was 3.9 percentage points
higher than in 2001—a historical low for the period.
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Effects on Poverty of Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official”
Poverty Measure
• Food Stamp and SNAP benefit receipt have had a sizeable effect on poverty
reduction, reducing the poverty rate among working single mothers by 3.3
percentage points in 2013.
• The EITC (net of FICA and federal and state income taxes) has contributed to
substantial reductions in poverty among working single mothers, especially after
1993 legislated expansions to the credit began taking effect. In 2013, net EITC
among working single mothers reduced their post SNAP benefit poverty rate by
5.2 percentage points, from 24.0% to 18.8%.
• ARRA’s reduction of the ACTC’s refundable income limit to $3,000, effective in
2009, is readily apparent by the substantially larger decrease in poverty resulting
from the credit, than in earlier years. After including the ACTC, the incidence of
poverty among single mothers with any work during the year reached a historical
low in 2009 (14.9%). In 2009, the ACTC accounted for an additional 2.1
percentage point reduction in poverty beyond that of the post-EITC poverty level
in 2009, compared to a 0.3 percentage point reduction in 2008, before the
reduction in the credit’s refundable income limit. In 2013, the post-ACTC
poverty rate was 16.9%—2 percentage points above its 2009 historical low.
• Economic Stimulus payments received in 2008, reduced poverty among single
mothers who worked during the year by 1.3 percentage points. Combined
Economic Recovery Payments and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits helped
reduce poverty among working single mothers by 0.7 percentage points in 2009,
and in 2010, the MWP tax credit reduced poverty among this group by 0.6
percentage points.
• If the income of all unrelated household members is included as income, the
poverty rate among working single mothers is estimated at 13.3% in 2013, which
compares to an “official” poverty rate of 27.3%.
Note that working mothers could also incur work-related expenses (e.g., child care,
transportation, uniforms) that are not accounted for here. Inclusion of such expenses, if available,
would result in somewhat higher poverty rates than those shown here.

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Figure 14. Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year:
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-12 for supporting data.
* Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008, Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009, and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits
received in 2009 and 2010.
CRS-40

Figure 15. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year:
Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-13 for supporting data.
* Census Bureau estimates of Economic Stimulus Payments received in 2008, Economic Recovery Payments received in 2009, and Making Work Pay (MWP) tax credits
received in 2009 and 2010.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year—Figure 15

As a precautionary reminder, the reader should note that the origin of the vertical axis begins
at a poverty rate of 50%.
Effects of Selected Cash Income Sources on Poverty
• The top-most line indicates that even though single mothers themselves did not
work during the year, and thus had no earnings, other related family members
may have worked, accounting for an “earnings-only” poverty level around 90%
in the pre-welfare reform era (1996 and earlier), and around 85% since 2000.
• The next line down, which includes most all other sources of income other than
UI benefits and cash welfare, shows a somewhat greater reduction in poverty in
the TANF era (about 10 percentage points), than in the pre-welfare reform era
(about 5 percentage points). In part, this may be due to a somewhat greater
tendency of nonworking single mothers to be living in “extended” families (i.e.,
living with family members other than just their children) in the post-welfare
reform era, than before. For example, in 1996, 24% of nonworking single
mothers lived in extended family settings, but by 2000, 33% were living in such
settings.53
• The figure shows UI benefits, when added to earnings and other cash income
from the line above, accounted for a 2 percentage point reduction in poverty over
the 2009-2011 period—over twice the effect in 2002, the previous peak year of
UI poverty reduction for this group.
• Comparing the relative effects of SSI and TANF/AFDC/GA on poverty over the
period, SSI has assumed a greater role in poverty reduction among nonworking
single mothers in the TANF era, than in the pre-TANF era, and the role of TANF
in reducing poverty among this group is substantially less than what it was under
AFDC.
• Examining just the trend in “official” poverty among nonworking single mothers,
their poverty rate in the post-welfare reform era has averaged 8 percentage points
below what it was under AFDC. In 2002, which marked a historical low poverty
rate for this group, their poverty rate (66.9%) was nearly 14 percentage points
below their peak rate of 80.8% in 1991. In 2013, 70.0% of nonworking single
mothers were poor—still well below their pre-welfare reform levels.

53 CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC. About 25% of nonworking single mothers, on average, lived in extended
families in the pre-TANF era (1987-1996), compared to about 28% in the TANF era.
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Effects on Poverty of Selected Income Sources Not Included in the “Official”
Poverty Measure
• Food Stamp/SNAP benefits appear to have had a somewhat smaller effect on
poverty reduction among nonworking single mothers in the post-welfare reform
era (2.9 percentage point reduction, on average) than earlier (about 3.6
percentage point reduction, on average, in the pre-welfare reform era). However,
in 2009, reflecting ARRA’s SNAP benefit provisions, discussed earlier
(“Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP/Food Stamp) Benefits”),
SNAP benefits reduced poverty for this group from the “official” poverty rate of
69.9%, to 64.7%, a 5.2 percentage point reduction; in 2010, SNAP reduced
poverty among this group by 4.1 percentage points, by 3.9 percentage points in
2011, 3.6 percentage points in 2012, and 4.8 percentage points in 2013, the last
year in which the ARRA SNAP benefit expansions were in effect.54
• In that these mothers did not work during the year, the figure shows refundable
and partially refundable tax provisions have had very little measurable effect on
poverty reduction for this group; nor did economic stimulus or recovery
payments. In fact, the after-tax poverty line is at times above the Food
Stamp/SNAP line, indicating that some poor families had members with a tax
liability, net of any credits.
If the income of all unrelated household members is included as income, the poverty rate among
nonworking single mothers is estimated at 66.1% in 2013. Counting unrelated household
members’ income reduced poverty among nonworking single mothers by 10.2 percentage points
in 2013, compared to 3.6 percentage points in 1987. This largely reflects what has been a growing
tendency of nonworking single mothers to be living with other unrelated household members. In
2013, for example, 21% of nonworking single mothers were living with other unrelated family
members, of which nearly nine out of ten were designated as “cohabiting partners” (see Table C-
14). In comparison, about 9% of nonworking single mothers lived with unrelated family members
in 1987.55
Trend in Poverty among Children in Female-Headed
Families under Selected Income Measures
Figure 16 depicts the trend in poverty among children in female-headed families under four of
the selected income measures applied to single mothers, above—earnings only poverty, pre-tax
cash income poverty (the official poverty measure), post-tax and Food Stamp/SNAP benefit
poverty, and total household post-tax post-transfer income poverty. The figure shows, for
example, that the official poverty rate among children in female-headed families increased from
41.3% in 2007 to 46.3% in 2010—a 5.2 percentage point increase, commensurate with a 5.3
percentage point increase in “earnings only” poverty over the period resulting from the recession.

54 The ARRA SNAP benefit expansion reverted to pre-ARRA levels November 1, 2013.
55 CRS estimates from the CPS/ASEC. Beginning with the 2007 CPS/ASEC cohabiting couples are identifiable based
on self-report. In earlier years, cohabiting couples are identifiable indirectly by inference. The method used here, for
CPS/ASEC years before 2007 is based on households with two unmarried adults, who are unrelated and of the opposite
sex, and no other adults reside in the household.
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In contrast, under a more comprehensive income definition that includes tax credits net of payroll
taxes and Food Stamp/SNAP benefits (the third line down), their poverty rate over the same
period rose by just under one percentage point, from 33.3% in 2007 to 29.7% in 2010. The
official poverty rate among children in female-headed families fell to 44.1% in 2013, but remains
5.7 percentage points above its historical low of 38.4% in 2001. In contrast, under a more
comprehensive accounting of income that includes the effects of tax credits net of payroll taxes
and SNAP benefits, the corresponding child poverty rate in 2013 was 33.4%, compared to an
official rate of 44.1%, and was only 1.6 percentage points above its historical low of 31.8% in
2002. When all household income is included (the bottom-most line), the child poverty rate was
estimated at 28.0%—essentially at a statistically tied historical low.
Figure 16. Poverty Among Children in Female-Headed Families Under
Alternative Measures, 1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-
16 for supporting data.
Discussion/Conclusion
CRS analysis of 27 years of U.S. Census Bureau data presented in this report shows a dramatic
transformation in single mothers’ welfare, work, and poverty status over the period. The period
has seen a marked structural change in the provision of benefits under a number of programs that
contribute to the fabric of the nation’s “income safety net.” In turn, single mothers’ behavior has
changed markedly over the period, with more mothers working, and fewer relying on cash
welfare to support themselves and their children, in part in response to structural changes to
income “safety-net” programs.
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Progress towards achieving the often elusive and conflicting dual goals of reducing child poverty
and cash welfare dependency is only partially apparent under the official U.S. poverty measure,
but much more so under an alternative, more comprehensive income measure.
Poverty under the official U.S. poverty measure, which is based on pre-tax cash income, shows
that since 2000, which marked a historical low, the poverty rate among single mothers increased
in step with two recessions. By 2010, the official poverty rate for single mothers had reached a
post-2000 high, and remained at that level through 2012, before falling somewhat in 2013. In
2013, the official poverty level was still below pre-1996 welfare reform levels, despite two
recessions since 1996.
Using a more comprehensive income definition than that used by the official poverty measure
indicates that poverty among single mothers and their children in 2009, rather than having
increased since 2000, was at or near a 27-year low when Food Stamp/SNAP benefits and work-
related refundable tax credits are taken into account. In particular, congressional action in
response to the recession, which increased SNAP benefits and extended the reach of refundable
tax credits, contributed to a decline in poverty among single mothers and their children in the
midst of the recession. (See Figure 13 and Figure 16, for example).
The Invisible Safety-Net—Benefits not Officially Counted Toward
Poverty Reduction
While the provision of cash welfare has fallen dramatically under TANF, poor and lower-income
families with earnings are more likely to receive assistance in the form of supplemental nutrition
assistance, or refundable income credits administered through federal and state tax systems.
Neither in-kind benefits, such as those provided through Food Stamps/SNAP, nor refundable
credits, such as the EITC, or partially refundable ACTC, are counted as income under the official
U.S. poverty measure, yet these three programs are among the 10 largest, in terms of federal
spending for people with low income.56 Clearly, these programs constitute important strands in
the nation’s income safety-net, yet they generally are not taken into account when assessing its
strengths and weaknesses. Under an alternative, more comprehensive, measure of poverty than
the official one, which includes the net effects of refundable tax credits and Food Stamp/SNAP
benefits, a quite different assessment of the effects of the safety net on poverty among single
mothers and their children emerges.
Transformation of Income Safety-Net Programs Toward Work-
Conditioned Support
Since the eve of 1996 welfare reform, work-conditioned requirements for individuals’ receipt of
government assistance have become more prevalent. Prior to 1996 welfare reform, federal law
(The Family Support Act of 1988; P.L. 100-485) had extended work requirements (which
included work preparation activities, such as education and training) to mothers receiving AFDC
to mothers with a child as young as three, and at state option, to mothers with a child as young as
age one. Child care funding was increased to make it possible for mothers to go to work. A

56 CRS Report R41625, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Programs, Policy, and Spending,
FY2008-FY2009, by (name redacted).
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number of states experimented with changes to their welfare programs under waivers of federal
rules, granted by DHHS. Among the features tested under waiver authority were efforts to
strengthen work requirements, experiments to test models of facilitating the transition from
welfare to work, and the use of sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, among others.
Expansions to the EITC, under both President George H. W. Bush, and President Clinton,
increased the financial rewards of work, through earnings supplements administered through the
tax system. The EITC helped to offset the welfare income loss, or implicit tax, that mothers might
face as they moved from welfare to work.
The 1996 welfare reform law repealed the 61-year-old AFDC program, replacing it with TANF.
TANF ended the entitlement of low-income families with children to federal assistance. It limits
the provision of federal assistance under the program to five years57—states are allowed to set
shorter time limits. Under TANF, states no longer receive an open-ended federal matching grant,
as they did under AFDC, but rather a fixed dollar block grant (with the possible addition of
recession-related contingency funds). Adults must be engaged in approved “work activities”
within two years of initial TANF receipt, subject to sanction for noncompliance. Under TANF,
federal work participation standards (i.e., “work-requirements”) apply to states’ TANF caseloads,
and adult recipients are required to be engaged in work, or work-related activities after two years
of benefit receipt. TANF has provided states increased flexibility and limited federal
requirements, compared to AFDC, but with fixed federal dollars.
Since 1996 welfare reform, cash welfare support for “earnings poor” mothers and their children
has contracted, whereas work-based support has increased. The EITC, for example, has a direct
effect on poverty reduction, by encouraging work, increasing earnings, and reducing reliance on
cash welfare. One estimate suggests that single mothers’ employment in 1996 was 7 percentage
points higher than it would have been otherwise, absent the EITC.58 This “work/earnings
inducing” effect of EITC among single mothers is captured in official poverty statistics, as part of
families’ earnings, but the credit itself—the earnings supplement which induces work and
earnings—is not. Likewise, the ACTC may also have a potential work inducing effect among
single mothers, but, like the EITC, the effects of the credit itself on poverty reduction are not
measured under the official poverty income definition. Additionally, through earnings, working
individuals not only gain potential access to tax benefits, such as the EITC and ACTC, which
with full-time work exceeds cash welfare assistance they might have received by not working, but
also earn credit towards insurance coverage under Unemployment Insurance, as well as Social
Security retirement, disability, and death benefits for themselves, their dependents, and survivors.
The report shows that receipt of cash welfare (AFDC, TANF, or General Assistance) has declined
substantially among single mothers since the passage of TANF, and their engagement in work has
increased (Figure 8). The transformation from welfare dependency to work appears to have
begun in the years immediately preceding 1996 welfare reform, as the economy prospered, and as
a number of work supports (e.g., EITC, and child care assistance) were strengthened. Moreover,
under the official U.S. poverty measure, the poverty rate of single mothers (Figure 6), and that of
their children (Figure 4), has consistently been lower since welfare reform, than before. Prior to

57 Up to 20% of the TANF caseload can be extended to receive assistance beyond five years due to “hardship,” as
defined by the states. See CRS Report RL32748, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant:
A Primer on TANF Financing and Federal Requirements, by (name redacted).
58 Bruce D. Meyer and Dan T. Rosenbaum, “Welfare, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and the Labor Supply of Single
Mothers,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. CXVI, no. 3 (2001), pp. 1163-1114.
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TANF, poor single mothers were more likely to be receiving cash welfare (AFDC or GA) than to
be working; after passage of TANF, just the opposite was true: poor single mothers were more
likely to be working than receiving cash welfare (TANF or GA) (Figure 11).
TANF and other work-promoting policies have helped to reduce poverty among single mothers
and their children through increased earnings. Based on earnings alone, poverty among single
mothers who worked reached a historical low for the period, in 2000 (Figure 14), as did their
poverty rate based on total pre-tax cash income, under the “official” U.S. poverty measure.
Following the 2000 recession, poverty among working single mothers increased slightly, and
much more so since 2007, in step with, and consequent to, the 2007-2009 recession.
Cash Welfare’s Residual Safety-Net Role
Welfare reform ended the provision of cash assistance as an entitlement, by replacing AFDC with
a fixed dollar block grant for the provision of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Under
TANF, a greater share of funds goes toward services (child care, social services) either directly, or
through transfers to other programs (CCDBG, Title XX Social Services) than towards direct cash
support. While many of these services may help to reduce dependency, and promote self-
sufficiency through work, receipt of cash assistance has shrunk markedly in the TANF era. While
TANF caseloads increased modestly in 2009 and 2010 in response to the recession, they are at a
fraction of what they were at their peak, just prior to 1996 welfare reform, and reflect levels not
seen in over 40 years.
The marked decline in cash welfare caseloads since the eve of 1996 welfare reform reflects an
apparent behavioral shift among many single mothers with respect to work and welfare, with
more selecting the former than the latter. A restructuring of income safety-net programs to support
work is likely to have contributed to single mothers’ changed behavior. The EITC appears to be
an important component of the restructured safety net, as it encourages work, even among
mothers whose earnings prospects at initial job entry are low. In most states, full time work at the
minimum wage provides income sufficient for a mother to work her way off of cash welfare. In
lieu of cash welfare, a single mother working full time at the minimum wage will receive the
EITC. Additionally, in 2009 through 2017, due to legislative changes relating to the recession and
recovery, she would be eligible for the ACTC, which provides additional income support for her
children.
Living Arrangements as an Alternative to Welfare
Cash welfare receipt and poverty among single mothers is lower since TANF’s enactment than
before. Some of this effect appears to be due to an increase in work among single mothers.
However, even among nonworking mothers, their receipt of cash assistance and incidence of
poverty under the official measure is lower since welfare reform. It appears that other family
members’ earnings and other cash income has contributed to the lower poverty rates of
nonworking single mothers in the post-AFDC era (see the earlier discussion, Figure 15).
In spite of policies to increase work among single mothers, not all single mothers work, and lack
of work contributes significantly to the likelihood that they and their children will be poor.
However, poor non-working single mothers are much less likely to be receiving cash welfare
assistance under TANF than they did under AFDC (Figure 11). In the post-AFDC era,
nonworking single mothers are somewhat more likely to live in extended family settings than
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before.59 It appears that living with other relatives helps to reduce their reliance on welfare and
incidence of poverty under the official poverty measure. Moreover, nonworking single mothers
are considerably more likely (more than twice as likely) to live with other unrelated family
members in the post-AFDC era than before, although income of these unrelated household
members is not taken into account in determining poverty status.60
These alternative living arrangements might help provide an alternative to cash welfare receipt
for some single mothers. Figure 17 suggests that this statement has some bearing. The figure
depicts single mothers by their work and welfare status, according to whether they live
independently with just their children, or whether they live with others, either in an extended
family household with other family members than just her children, or with one or more other,
unrelated, persons, including a cohabiting partner. The figure shows that among mothers who
worked, or received welfare during the year, the majority (roughly 65% to 70%) lived
independently over the period; a minority (roughly 30% to 35%) lived with others (extended
family and/or one or more unrelated persons). Interestingly, both mothers who worked, as well as
those who received welfare, were about equally as likely to live independently, as not, over the
period.
In contrast, nonworking single mothers, as a group, are less likely than their working counterparts
to live independently than mothers who work or receive welfare during the year. In the pre-1996
welfare reform era, nonworking single mothers were slightly less likely to live independently
(roughly 65% to 60%), than their working counterparts (roughly 70% to 65%) or those who
received welfare (also, roughly 70% to 65%). Note that some of these nonworking mothers may
also have received cash welfare during the year, as evidenced earlier in Figure 8. Welfare receipt
among nonworking single mothers may have contributed to their ability to live independently,
apart from other relatives or nonrelatives. While many single mothers selected work as an
alternative to welfare in the years immediately following 1996 welfare reform, others appear to
have found alternative living arrangements instead. In 1996, 62% of nonworking single mothers
were living independently, three years later, only 52% were. Most of this change in living
arrangements was due to an increase in nonworking single mothers’ increased tendency to live in
extended family households, with other relatives (see Table C-14), with the share increasing from
24% in 1996, to 33% by 1999, and then ebbing to 27% by 2001. In more recent years, at least
since 2005, nonworking single mothers have shown a greater tendency to be living with other
nonrelatives, of which most are cohabiting partners (see Table C-14). Whereas in 1987, 65% of
nonworking single mothers were living in independent households, by 2013, only about half
(51%) were. In part, cash welfare in the pre-welfare reform era may have helped some single
mothers to live in independent family settings. Stricter requirements and time limits in the post-
reform era may have contributed to some mothers’ consideration of living arrangements as an
alternative to cash welfare receipt.

59 On average, 25% lived in extended family settings in the 1987 to 1996 period. Just following welfare reform, the
share living in extended families increased to 29% in 1998 and 33% in 1999, and then to an average of 28% from 2000
to 2013. (Based on CRS estimates from U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 CPS/ASEC data. See Table C-14 for
supporting data.)
60 In 2013, for example, 21% of nonworking single mothers were living with other unrelated family members, of whom
nearly nine out of ten were designated as “cohabiting partners.” In comparison, about 9% of nonworking single
mothers lived with unrelated family members in 1987. (Based on CRS estimates from U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to
2014 CPS/ASEC data.)
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Figure 17. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements,
by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-
14 for supporting data.
Illness or Disability Among Nonworking Single Mothers
Nonworking single mothers are much more likely to attribute illness or disability as the reason for
not working in the post-welfare reform era, than before. This is consistent with the somewhat
greater role of SSI relative to other cash welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA) since welfare reform. One
conjecture is that single mothers who are most able to work, are doing so in the post-welfare
reform era, and that with support from the EITC, even those with comparatively low earnings
capacity (e.g., “earnings poor”) have sought work over welfare. Those remaining, who are not
engaged in work, may be less able to work, as indicated by a higher self-reported incidence of
illness or disability. In the pre-welfare reform era, roughly 10% of nonworking single mothers
reported “illness or disability” as the primary reason for not working during the year (Figure 18),
and roughly 70% reported “taking care of home or family” as the primary reason.61 In the post-
welfare reform era, the share of nonworking single mothers who self-reported “illness or
disability” as the reason for not working is about three times higher than before welfare reform;
the share who reported “taking care of home or family” as the primary reason for not working has

61 The self reporting of “illness or disability” on the CPS/ASEC as the reason for not working may also be suspect if, as
a greater share of mothers have gone to work, the attribution of “taking care of home or family” as the reason for not
working has become less socially acceptable for not working, especially among mothers who receive welfare benefits.
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fallen from roughly 70% to about 50% since welfare reform. From 2007 to 2009, the share of
nonworking single mothers who reported that they “could not find work” more than tripled, from
4.0% to 13.4%, and has remained well above its 2007 pre-recession low since (11.9% in 2013).
Nonetheless, reported “illness or disability” still ranks second, only to “taking care of home or
family,” as the primary attributed reason of single mothers for not having worked during the year.
Figure 18. Single Mothers Who Did Not Work During the Year,
by Self-Reported Reason for Not Working
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-
15 for supporting data.
Cash Welfare Receipt among Ill or Disabled Nonworking Single Mothers
Whereas nonworking single mothers have a greater tendency to report illness or disability as the
primary reason for having not worked during the year, cash safety-net programs in the form of
AFDC/TANF and SSI appear to be assisting a smaller share of such mothers in the post-welfare
reform era, than before. Moreover, the number of single mothers reporting illness or disability in
2013 has more than doubled since 1987 (see Figure 19). In the pre-welfare reform era, roughly
70% to 80% of nonworking single mothers who reported illness or disability as the reason for not
working were being assisted by AFDC, SSI, or both—in 2013, 42% were. The SSI program taken
alone (not counting in combination with AFDC/TANF receipt) accounts for a considerably larger
share of nonworking ill or disabled single mothers in the post-welfare reform era (roughly
double) than before. In turn, the share reporting receipt of AFDC/TANF, either alone, or in
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combination with SSI, has fallen by nearly two thirds since welfare reform, with about 60%
reporting AFDC in the pre-welfare reform era, and about 14% reporting TANF in 2013.
While a larger share of single mothers who are able to work appear to be engaged in work or
looking for work in the post-welfare reform era than before, among the smaller residual who are
not, a greater share report illness or disability as the primary reason for being out of the labor
market. In 2013, of the 654,000 single mothers who reported no work during the year due to
illness or disability, well over half (376,000) reported neither receiving SSI nor TANF/GA
assistance. The nature of these mothers’ reported illness or disability is not known, nor is it
known whether they have sought and been denied government assistance. Whether and how these
mothers might be falling through cracks in the income safety-net is a question of policy interest,
and possible concern.
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Figure 19. Nonworking Single Mothers with Self-Reported “Illness or Disability”
as the Primary Reason for Not Working, by Cash Welfare Recipiency Status
1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-
15 for supporting data.
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The Work-Based Income Safety Net in Times of Recession
and Recovery
By the official measure, poverty among single mothers reached a historical low in 2000 (31.8%),
but has since increased in step with two recessions, reaching a recent peak in 2012 (39.8%)—the
same level as that of 1996, when welfare reform was signed into law, but lower than previous
years. Single mothers’ poverty rate began to show signs of improvement, falling to 38.0% in
2013, but it is still well above its historical low. An improved economy, contributing to a falling
unemployment rate among mothers maintaining families (Figure 10, shown earlier) suggests that
their official poverty rate will likely continue to fall in 2014, but it will remain above its pre-
recession level, and well above its 2000 historical low.
The official U.S. poverty measure provides little insight as to how the transformed work-based
income safety net has performed since the expansions to EITC in the early 1990s, and 1996
welfare reform, in reducing poverty. As shown in the body of this report, a very different story
from the one offered by the official poverty measure emerges by using an expanded income
measure that includes the EITC, and more recently, the ACTC, refundable tax credits, and Food
Stamp/SNAP assistance.
Single Mothers’ Attachment to the Work-Based Safety Net
With an increased share of single mothers engaged in the labor market since welfare reform, the
availability of work, and especially full-time work for those who want it, is of special concern,
given the past recession and pace of recovery. Full-time, full-year work among single mothers
peaked in 2000, and has fallen twice since, in response to two recessions (2000, and 2007-2009)
(see Figure 20). A high-water mark was reached in 2000 when over four-fifths (83%) of single
mothers had a job at some point during the year. By 2010, the share of single mothers with some
attachment during the year had fallen to about three-quarters (73%), and was only slightly above
that level in 2013 (75%). In 2000, 46% worked full-time full-year in 2000, whereas only two-
fifths (40%) did so in 2013. The share of single mothers who were marginally employed during
the year for economic reasons—they had a job at some time during the year, but for fewer hours
or weeks than they desired—rose from 13% of all single mothers in 2000, to 18% in 2008, and to
19% over the past three years (2011-2013). Among this group are those who were unemployed
(i.e., without a job for part of the year and looked for work) as well as “discouraged” workers
(i.e., those who were without a job for part of the year and did not look for work because they
believed no jobs were available); it also includes mothers who worked less than full-time, but
desired full-time work.
In 2013, three quarters (75%) of single mothers had some attachment to a job, and thus
potentially had some connection to the work-based safety net. All of these mothers—those who
worked full-time full-year, those who were marginally employed for economic reasons, and
mothers who worked less than full-time full-year for personal reasons (i.e., taking care of home or
family, going to school, ill or disabled, or retired/other)—might potentially benefit from the
EITC, or the ACTC, depending on their annual earnings. Among those who worked for part of the
year, but experienced a period of unemployment, some might qualify for UI benefits, depending
on their work history and the conditions under which they separated from a job. In addition to the
75% of mothers with some job attachment, another 5% of single mothers were unemployed for
the entire year, or without a job and did not work because they believed no work was available.
Some of these mothers might also qualify for UI benefits depending on their circumstances.
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Figure 20. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment,1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. See Table C-
17 for supporting data
Notes: Persons who worked for 50 weeks or more, and 35 or more hours per week, are designated as ful -
time, ful -year workers. The unemployed are persons who were without a job and searched for work.
Discouraged workers are persons who were without a job but did not search for work because they believed no
jobs were available. Personal reasons for not working during the year, or working less than full-time, full-year,
include taking care of a home or family, attending school, illness or disability, retired, or other.
The Work-Based “Safety Net” and the Role of Traditional Welfare
A work-based income safety net depends upon a strong economy and available jobs for those who
are able and willing to work. The EITC, as an earnings supplement, and the ACTC, as a family
income supplement, are only available to working individuals. Work-based safety-net programs
may still help those who were without a job for part of the year, or who have a job, but work
fewer hours than they would like. However, as support programs, income benefits from the EITC
and ACTC are provided as a lump sum refund at the beginning of the year following that in which
they were earned. As such, the EITC and ACTC may not help a family meet its immediate
income needs due to job loss, or limited work hours. UI benefits are available only to those with
an established work history and who lose a job for qualifying reasons. Work-based safety-net
benefits are of no use to individuals who have not recently held a job, and cannot find one.
Absent available jobs, single mothers may turn to the traditional cash welfare system (i.e.,
TANF), food assistance (SNAP), relatives and friends, for basic income support. In part
contingent on the nature and pace of economic recovery, and federal and state budget pressures,
funding for traditional welfare programs, as well as their structure (e.g., time limits,
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work/participation requirements, education and training, and subsidized employment) may garner
increased attention.
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Appendix A. From Mothers’ Pensions to TANF—
A Brief History
TANF, signed into law in 1996 as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193), replaced the 61-year-old Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement program to low-income families with
children. The precursor program which TANF replaced, AFDC, had its beginnings in the Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) program, part of the 1935 Social Security Act, which introduced
federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid dependent
children.
Mothers’ Pensions to Aid to Dependent Children62
Since at least the first White House Conference on Children in 1909 (Conference on the Care of
Dependent Children), and the subsequent creation of the Children’s Bureau in 1912, the federal
government has been concerned with social conditions of children. The conference was an
impetus for states’ enactment of state or locally financed mothers’ pensions (also referred to as
widows’ pensions and or mothers’ aid), which provided minimal cash support to mothers made
destitute, usually due to a husband’s death. Mothers’ aid was intended to help keep mothers at
home to supervise and care for their children, as an alternative to sending children to orphanages
and/or putting them up for adoption, which was a common practice of the time.63 Mothers’
pensions largely went to widows, and payments were limited and restrictive (e.g., many states
imposed rigid requirements as to the “character” of parents to assure that the child was living in a
“suitable home” before granting aid; mothers were required to prove destitution,64 and to agree to
cease or limit employment upon receipt of a pension65). Prior to the Social Security Act of 1935,
most states had adopted mothers’ pension laws.66
As part of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program
introduced federal involvement in helping provide financial aid, or “public assistance,” to aid
dependent children. The ADC program essentially provided federal dollars to help support states
mothers’ pension programs, that nearly all states had established. Under the 1935 act, a
“dependent child” was defined as “a child under the age of sixteen who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or

62 For summary of the legislative history of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, see http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/ofa/policy/legisum.htm. Also, CRS Report 84-546 EPW, Brief legislative History of Title IV-A of the Social
Security Act: Grants to States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), by (name redacted), February 24, 1984
(archived report, available to congressional clients upon request).
63 Mark H. Leff, “Consensus for Reform: The Mothers’-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era,” The Social Service
Review, vol. 47, no. 3 (September 1973), pp. 397-417.
64 See Jane M. Hoey, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Appraising the Social Security Program, vol. 202 (March 1939), pp. 76-78
65 Mark H. Leff, op. cit., p. 402.
66 Missouri and Illinois were the first states to establish mothers’ pensions, in 1911. By 1913, 20 states had mothers’
pensions, and by 1919, 39 states and the territories of Alaska and Hawaii had mothers’ pensions. In 1931, every state
except for Georgia and South Carolina had mothers’ pensions. See Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A
Social History of Welfare in America (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996), p. 133.
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mental incapacity of a parent,” and is living with one or more relatives in his or their own home.67
The ADC program provided payments to states for aid to dependent children with approved state
plans; federal payments at the time were one-third of the sums expended by the state up to a
capped monthly expenditure amount per dependent child.68 The federal program had no provision
for assisting a parent or other relative in the household, although this changed over time.69 In
1950, the federal government began to share in the maintenance costs of the parent or other
caretaker relative. In 1962, support of a second parent in a family who was incapacitated or
unemployed was allowed, and the program’s name was changed to the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC).
Under state administration, ADC, as well as the mothers’ pension programs which preceded it,
favored children of widows over others. Early evidence from the program indicated that over half
of all children assisted were dependent because of the death of a parent, with most living with
their widowed mother; most of the remainder were living with mothers who were “deserted,
divorced, or separated,” or were living in other settings in which the mother was not present;
about 2% were living with an unmarried mother.70 The comparatively small share of unmarried
mothers receiving ADC assistance in part reflected a program preference to serve widows, and
some unmarried mothers were denied assistance by failing to meet ”suitable home requirements.”
However, children of unmarried mothers at the time represented a relatively small share of all
fatherless children in the early years of the ADC program. In 1938, children of unwed mothers
represented an estimated 3.8% of all children in female-headed households in the U.S.71 Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, extending Social Security benefits to widows and surviving
children of deceased workers covered by the program, would have the effect of reducing the
number of widows and their children from needing ADC, resulting in the program coming to
primarily serve families in which fathers were absent due to divorce or abandonment. By 1961,
widowed families would comprise only 7.7% of the ADC caseload, down from 43% in 1937.72
Increased Federal Involvement
In 1938, three years after enactment of the ADC, eight states were still not participating in the
program.73 In 1939, the federal payment rate was raised from one-third to one-half of a raised
maximum payment amount per child, effective January 1940. With increasing federal dollars, the
federal government would help assure state participation in the program, while at the same time
gaining greater leverage in influencing the provision of assistance at the state level.74 By June

67 See Legislative History, Social Security Act of 1935, on the Internet at http://www.ssa.gov/history/35activ.html.
68 The federal maximum payment amounted to $6 per month for the first child in a family, plus $4 per month for each
additional child. The federal matching rate of state AFDC expenditures would grow over time.
69 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, A Brief
History of the AFDC Program, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/1history.pdf.
70 Jane M. Hoey, “Aid to Families with Dependent Children,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, Appraising the Social Security Program, vol. 202 (March 1939), pp. 76, 78.
71 Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890-1935 (New York: The Free
Press, 1994), p. 21.
72 Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy form Colonial Times to Present (Boston:
South End Press, 1988), p. 321.
73 Ibid., p. 76.
74 For an in depth discussion, see for example: Martha Derthick, The Influence of Federal Grants, Public Assistance in
Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
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1940, all states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico were participating in
programs providing child welfare services under the Social Security Act.75 Over time, the federal
share of AFDC expenditures would increase, reaching a minimum of 50% and a permitted
maximum of 83% of total AFDC expenditures by 1965, effective January 1966, for states with an
approved plan for medical assistance programs under Title IXX of the Social Security Act (i.e.,
Medicaid).76
In 1961, the federal Bureau of Public Assistance (BPA), which ran the ADC program, issued a
directive against states’ and localities’ use of “suitable home” rules, that had traditionally been
used to keep children of unwed mothers out of the program. In 1966, the Bureau of Family
Services, which had replaced the BPA in 1962, ordered that state plans for determining eligibility
for AFDC “respect the rights of individuals ... .and not result in practices that violate the
individual’s privacy or personal dignity, or harass him, or violate his constitutional rights.”
Implicitly, states that did not comply could risk losing federal matching funds.77
Legal Challenges to Restrictive State Welfare Practices
Greater federal involvement and regulation of AFDC gave petitioners greater legal standing in
federal court to challenge restrictive state welfare policies. While AFDC was an entitlement to
eligible individuals, as defined by federal law, states still retained control in administering the
program, which included determining eligibility of families applying for assistance. Although
AFDC was an entitlement, practices of granting eligibility for the program varied widely among
states and localities, as had been the case under the mothers’ pensions in the pre-ADC era. The
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-452), the centerpiece of President Lyndon Johnson’s
“War on Poverty,” focused national attention and federal assistance in helping to combat poverty.
Among its provisions was the establishment of an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which
administered a number of programs under the act. Community Action Programs (CAP) were
among OEO’s programs, under which Community Action Agencies (CAAs) took root in local
communities to help promote “maximum feasible participation” of the poor, intended to engage
the poor in seeking solutions to poverty in their communities. OEO also set up legal services to
aid the poor in local communities. At the same time, a burgeoning National Welfare Rights
Organization (NWRO), independently began to advocate for the rights of the poor.78 Growing
political empowerment of the poor, combined with legal advocacy helped to overturn a number of
restrictive state welfare policies by the U.S. Supreme Court. Such policies included “man-in-the-
house” rules (King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)); long-term residency requirements (Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)), and termination of assistance without a fair hearing (Goldberg

75 See http://www.ssa.gov/history/1940.html.
76 Under 1958 amendments to the Social Security Act, federal ADC payments to states were no longer based on
individual assistance payments, but on total state expenditures, which were matched within an average payment per
recipient. The federal matching percent could be no less than 50% and no greater than 65%. Under 1965 amendments
to the act, the federal matching rate grew to a minimum of 50% and a maximum of 83% of expenditures, which varied
by state, depending on an inverse relationship of state per capita income relative to U.S. per capita income. See
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/policy/legisum.htm.
77 James T. Patterson, America’s Struggle Against Poverty, 1900-1985 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1986), p. 181.
78 Francis Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New
York: Vintage Books, 1979), pp. 264-361.
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v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)), among others. By one estimate, elimination of the residency
requirements alone added some 800,000 persons to the AFDC rolls by 1970.79
Federal Efforts to Stem Rising Public Assistance Caseloads
Figure 2 depicts the number of recipients (children and adults) and welfare cases receiving
assistance under AFDC (and ADC) from 1960 to 1994, the eve of the programs’ repeal. While
some federal efforts served to expand assistance caseloads, such as regulations and enforcement
activities to promote states’ administration of the program’s individual entitlement provisions, and
increasing federal matching payments to states, which shifted more of the financial burden of
providing assistance from states to the federal government, other efforts would seek to restrain
caseload growth and its underlying causes.
Expanding welfare caseloads were beginning to contribute to what some would refer to as a
“welfare crisis,” by the mid-1960s.80 Contributing to the “crisis” was a growing number of
families potentially eligible for cash assistance, as the baby-boom generation began entering
adulthood, as well as changing social behavior relating to marriage, divorce, and childbearing. As
noted earlier, in 1961 families headed by widowed mothers accounted for only about 8% of ADC
families; from 1961 to 1967, the share of families receiving AFDC who were headed by never-
married mothers would increase from 21% to 28%.81 In addition to an increasing number of
potentially eligible families, an increasing share of such families applied for and were granted
assistance during the 1960s, with the participation of eligible families in AFDC increasing “from
perhaps 33 percent in the early 1960s to more than 90 percent in 1971.82”
The Rise (and Fall) of Social Services as an Answer to Reducing
Welfare Dependency
The 1939 extension of social benefits to widows and surviving children of deceased covered
workers had the effect of reducing the number of widows and their children needing assistance
under ADC, resulting in the program coming to primarily serve families in which fathers were
absent due to divorce or abandonment. Changing social trends regarding marriage, divorce, and
childbearing in the post World War II era, contributed to the ADC program’s growth. Under 1956
amendments to the Social Security Act (P.L. 84-880), Congress permitted federal funding to
reimburse states for 50% of the costs of providing social services to public assistance recipients.
Among the legislation’s stated purpose was to enable states to “furnish financial assistance and
other services ... to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they are
living to help maintain and strengthen family life and ... attain the maximum level of self-support
and personal independence.”
Under 1962 amendments, funding for social services was expanded, and the federal matching rate
was increased to 75%. Expanded funds for social services and training of skilled welfare workers
marked the advent of the “casework approach” for addressing the multiple problems that many

79 Abramovitz, op. cit., p. 335.
80 See for example, Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the
Family Assistance Plan (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 25.
81 Ibid., p. 334.
82 Patterson, op. cit., p. 179.
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public assistance recipients faced. In his statement at the signing of the 1962 amendments,
President Kennedy described it as “a new approach-stressing services in addition to support,
rehabilitation instead of relief, and training for useful work instead of prolonged dependency ...
[the] objective is to prevent or reduce dependency and to encourage self-care and self-support to
maintain family life where it is adequate and to restore it where it is deficient.”83
Increased case supervision by social workers was intended to identify and address problems aid
recipients faced, leading to their “rehabilitation” and helping to move them toward self-
sufficiency. A major premise was that the provision of social services could break the bonds of
dependency many welfare families faced, by addressing their underlying problems. Consequent
to the increased emphasis on social services, income maintenance workers often came to serve
the dual function of eligibility technician and social caseworker. In implementing the law, the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), set caseload and supervisory standards to
assure smaller workloads and time for workers to deal with clients.84 The amendments also
provided additional funds for training welfare personnel in assuming the additional casework
functions associated with identifying clients’ need for services, as well as brokering and/or
providing those services. Provision of social services became an integrated function with the
provision of cash aid. States provided a panoply of services within a broad, somewhat ill-defined,
range of service categories (e.g., educational or vocational training, health care, improved
financial functioning, maintaining family life and improving family functioning, maintaining and
improving social relationships and community life, self-care services, self-support services). In
order to receive reimbursement at the 75% federal matching rate, a case had to be considered a
“service case” and had to be part of a caseload of designated size. States faced a financial
incentive to provide social services as a result of the comparatively high federal matching rate,
which contributed to burgeoning federal spending on social services in the early 1970s.85
AFDC caseloads continued to rise through the course of the 1960s, in spite of increased funding
for the provision of rehabilitative services. In 1972, HEW issued a mandate to states to separate
the provision of services from the administrative function of determining eligibility for aid.86
Under the mandate, social services would still be provided at the families’ request, rather than on
a routine basis. The 1974 Social Security Amendments created a new Title XX, which expanded
eligibility for free or subsidized social services to the non-poor, but with a spending cap, rather
than an open-ended matching grant. Title XX further severed the provision of social services from
the provision of cash aid.

83 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Welfare Amendments
Bill, July 26, 1962, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA. Available on the Internet at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8788.
84 A case worker was to carry no more than 60 cases and no supervisor to have more than five workers. President’s
Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, Background Papers, 1970, pp. 299-309.
85 See Martha Derthick, Uncontrollable Spending for Social Services Grants (Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution, 1975).
86 For a brief discussion of the separation of social services from income maintenance, see Mark E. Courtney et al.,
“Comparing Welfare and Child Welfare Populations: An Argument for Rethinking the Safety Net,” in Child Welfare
Research: Advances for Practice and Policy, ed. Duncan Lindsey and Aron Shlonsky (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008), pp. 273-275.
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Federal Efforts to Constrain AFDC Caseload Growth Due to Absent Fathers
Under 1967 Social Security Act amendments, Congress attempted to restrain AFDC caseload
growth resulting from children’s fathers continued absence from the home. States were required
to establish programs to determine paternity and to locate absent parents and secure support from
them.87 Additionally, Congress imposed a “freeze” on federal matching payments for AFDC,
which would limit the availability of federal matching funds for children who were receiving
AFDC due to continued absence of a parent from the home.88 Under the provision, federal
matching funds would not be available to states after July 1, 1969, for any increase above the
January-March 1968 level in the proportion of the state’s children under age 18 receiving AFDC
on grounds of the continued absence of their father. Implementation of the provision was
postponed, and subsequently repealed by Congress in 1969 before taking effect (P.L. 91-41).
Under 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act, a new part D89, Child Support and
Establishment of Paternity, was added to title IV. Among Part D provisions, states were required
to have plans for establishing paternity and establishing child support and were subject to loss of
5% of AFDC federal matching funds for failure to have “effective” programs. AFDC applicants
and recipients were required to “cooperate” in identifying and locating children’s fathers, and
were required to assign child support rights to the state. Additionally, Part D required the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to establish a separate organizational unit
to monitor state programs and to operate a Parent Locator Service, making use of federal and
state records.90
Promoting Self-Sufficiency—Work Incentives, Requirements,
and Sanctions
In 1961, Congress permitted states to include a second, unemployed, parent as part of the
assistance unit under AFDC, the Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program, but were required to
deny assistance if the unemployed parent refused to accept work without “good cause.”91 In 1962,
Congress authorized federal funds for states to establish Community Work and Training (CWT)
programs for federally aided adult recipients. CWT jobs were to pay at least an equivalent wage
for the same type of work as prevailing in the community, or the minimum wage, if higher. States
were required to deduct only “net” earnings from the grant of the working welfare recipient (i.e.,
after any reasonable work-related expenses) and were permitted to allow working welfare
recipients to deduct any income set aside for identifiable needs of the dependent child.92

87 (name redacted), op. cit., p. 7.
88 Ibid., p. 7. For a more detailed discussion see Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service Report (HV 84 D,
ED-372), The Limitation on Federal Matching in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program – The So-
Called AFDC Freeze, by William Fullerton, April 1, 1969 (archived report, available by request).
89 The 1967 amendments also restructured title IV (Grants to States for Aid to Families with Dependent Children) of
the act into parts: with Part A—AFDC; Part B—Child Welfare Services (a new part, transferred from title V, and
revised; and a new Part C—Work Incentive Program (WIN), discussed later. (name redacted), op. cit., p. 6.
90 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
91 Ibid., p. 4.
92 Ibid., p. 4.
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Amendments of 1967 replaced CWT with the Work Incentive (WIN) program, a joint program
between HEW and the Department of Labor (DOL), that required states to set up work and
training programs for “appropriate” AFDC recipients.93 The federal share of WIN spending was
set at 80%, with states assuming the remainder. The 1967 amendments also required states to
disregard a portion of AFDC adults’ earnings—the first $30 plus one-third of the remainder—
from income counted against the AFDC grant. Under prior law, other than a required deduction
for work expenses from net earnings, the AFDC grant could be reduced by one dollar for every
dollar earned. Under the 1967 provisions, the AFDC benefit would phase out more gradually,
with a benefit reduction of 67 cents for each dollar earned during the month, in excess of $30.
While providing a financial incentive for AFDC recipients to engage in work, the higher
disregard would allow working recipients to stay on the program at higher income levels than
otherwise, tending to have a potential countervailing influence on caseloads.
The 1967 amendments also signaled a shift in emphasis in the provision of services from
“rehabilitative,” personal “competence-enhancing,” services, to work-related services, such as
vocational training, job and work training referral, and child care, to promote self-sufficiency.94
In 1971, Congress required that all AFDC parents register for work or training, except for
mothers with a child under age 6. In 1981, Congress gave states the authority to design and test
their own “welfare-to-work” programs. In 1988, the Family Support Act replaced the WIN
program with the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training program (JOBS). The program
extended work requirements (which could include work preparation activities, such as education
and training) from mothers with a child as young as six to mothers with a child as young as three
and, at states’ option, of extending work requirements to mothers with a child as young as age
one. The act also required states to provide benefits to a second parent who was incapacitated or
unemployed (AFDC-UP program).
A number of states experimented with changes to welfare policy under waiver authority granted
to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).95 Among the features
of state programs tested under waiver authority were efforts to strengthen work requirements,
experiments requiring a “work first” approach rather than “training first, followed by work,” time
limits, strengthened sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules, and capping of welfare
benefits for a new baby conceived or born while a mother was receiving welfare.

93 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, A Brief History of
the AFDC Program, available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/AFDC/baseline/1history.pdf.
94 Mildred Rein, “Social Services as a Work Strategy,” The Social Service Review, vol. 49, no. 4 (December 1975), pp.
515-538.
95 Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, established in 1962, grants the Secretary authority to waive compliance of
states with certain sections of the Social Security Act for state experiments or demonstrations that the Secretary judges
to promote specific objectives of the act. For a discussion of waiver authority under this section, see U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, State Welfare Waivers: An Overview,
available on the Internet at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/isp/waiver2/waivers.htm.
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Appendix B. Cash Welfare Under-Reporting on
the CPS
A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-estimated caseload counts
suggests that the CPS undercounts actual cases and that the CPS undercount has worsened in
recent years. Figure B-1 shows that from 1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80% of
the AFDC administrative caseload count, but in 2013 the CPS captured only about 56%.96
Worsened reporting of cash welfare on the CPS makes it difficult to gauge how much of the drop
in welfare receipt among single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive
assistance, rather than families who do not report actual welfare aid on the CPS.
Figure B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases:
CPS Estimates Versus Administrative Caseload Counts
(Annual Monthly Average), 1987 to 2013

Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988
to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data and Department
of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA) caseload data. See B-1 for supporting
data.

96 The CPS estimates are for all adults reporting receipt of AFDC or TANF during the year, converted to an estimate of
an annual monthly average, based on the number of months over the year recipients reported receiving assistance. For a
detailed discussion of cash welfare under-reporting on the CPS and other surveys see Richard Bavier, Accounting for
increases in failure to report AFDC/TANF receipt, Office of Management and Budget, Unpublished manuscript,
Washington, DC, 2000.
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Table B-1. AFDC/TANF Cases:
CPS Versus Administrative Caseload Counts,
Annual Monthly Average, 1987 to 2013
(Numbers in millions)
Persons
Reporting
AFDC and
AFDC or
TANF cases
CPS as a
TANF
Based on
Percent of
Receipt on
Administrative
Administrative
Year
the CPSa
Datab
Total
1987 3.039
3.719
81.7%
1988 3.056
3.691
82.8%
1989 2.901
3.738
77.6%
1990 3.226
3.995
80.8%
1991 3.554
4.434
80.2%
1992 3.596
4.765
75.5%
1993 3.844
4.949
77.7%
1994 3.551
4.972
71.4%
1995 3.193
4.734
67.8%
1996 3.022
4.380
69.0%
1997 2.355
3.690
63.8%
1998 1.892
3.007
62.9%
1999 1.464
2.515
58.2%
2000 1.392
2.181
63.8%
2001 1.216
2.162
56.2%
2002 1.140
2.162
52.7%
2003 1.346
2.158
62.4%
2004 1.160
2.134
54.4%
2005 1.227
2.042
60.1%
2006 0.955
1.890
50.5%
2007 0.907
1.715
52.9%
2008 0.905
1.688
53.6%
2009 1.017
1.824
55.7%
2010 1.088
1.903
57.2%
2011 1.190
1.890
63.0%
2012 1.033
1.837
56.3%
2013 0.965
1.711
56.4%
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988 to 2014
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data and U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA), AFDC and TANF caseload data.
Note: Support table for Figure B-1.
a. Estimated average monthly number based on number of months CPS respondents indicated they received
AFDC or TANF during the year.
b. Average monthly number of AFDC or TANF cases in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. From
2001 and after, includes cases in Separate State Programs (SSP) under state Maintenance of Effort (MOE)
requirements.
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Appendix C. Support Tables

Table C-1. Children’s Family Living Arrangements and Poverty Status, 1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families Total
Married
Absent Divorced
Widowed Absent
Parents
All Children—Numbers in 1,000s
1987
62,906 46,062
13,617 4,231 3,405 5,041 939 1,795 1,433
1988
63,398 46,562
13,700 4,290 3,380 5,227 803 1,795 1,341
1989
63,816 46,526
13,874 4,365 3,416 5,118 975 1,994 1,421
1990
64,730 46,674
14,608 5,040 3,583 5,206 780 2,022 1,426
1991
65,576 46,662
15,396 5,410 3,790 5,507 688 2,185 1,333
1992
66,511 47,197
15,586 5,511 3,739 5,687 649 2,287 1,441
1993
68,879 48,128
16,338 6,003 3,839 5,800 696 2,262 2,150
1994
69,596 48,300
16,480 5,865 3,901 6,019 695 2,467 2,350
1995
70,140 48,246
16,993 6,363 3,928 6,040 662 2,764 2,136
1996
70,194 48,412
16,740 6,596 3,753 5,824 566 3,061 1,981
1997
70,561 48,649
16,639 6,696 3,560 5,708 676 3,146 2,126
1998
70,864 48,805
16,833 6,759 3,561 5,828 685 3,098 2,129
1999
71,200 49,814
16,172 6,590 3,225 5,658 698 3,062 2,152
2000
71,261 49,820
16,120 6,734 3,109 5,577 699 3,137 2,184
CRS-66

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families
Total
Married
Absent
Divorced Widowed Absent
Parents
2001
71,534 49,685
16,483 6,872 3,289 5,602 720 3,294 2,072
2002
72,238 49,925
16,780 7,008 3,351 5,758 663 3,321 2,211
2003
72,484 49,596
17,116 7,202 3,298 5,910 706 3,392 2,379
2004
72,757 49,499
17,229 7,428 3,395 5,809 597 3,500 2,528
2005
72,717 49,675
17,162 7,441 3,331 5,769 621 3,467 2,413
2006
73,259 49,992
17,921 7,833 3,616 5,876 596 3,327 2,018
2007
73,554 49,406
18,178 8,203 3,512 5,799 663 3,718 2,251
2008
73,637 49,583
18,086 8,394 3,688 5,367 637 3,614 2,355
2009
74,101 49,117
18,706 8,646 3,895 5,524 641 3,898 2,380
2010
74,094 48,516
19,258 9,333 3,620 5,640 666 3,972 2,348
2011
73,376 47,350
19,595 9,669 3,727 5,591 607 4,297 2,134
2012
73,364 47,361
19,071 9,603 3,471 5,474 522 4,539 2,123
2013
73,262 48,004
18,741 9,437 3,315 5,480 508 4,332 2,185
All Children—Percent Distribution
1987
100.0% 73.2%
21.6% 6.7% 5.4% 8.0% 1.5% 2.9% 2.3%
1988
100.0% 73.4%
21.6% 6.8% 5.3% 8.2% 1.3% 2.8% 2.1%
1989
100.0% 72.9%
21.7% 6.8% 5.4% 8.0% 1.5% 3.1% 2.2%
1990
100.0% 72.1%
22.6% 7.8% 5.5% 8.0% 1.2% 3.1% 2.2%
1991
100.0% 71.2%
23.5% 8.3% 5.8% 8.4% 1.0% 3.3% 2.0%
1992
100.0% 71.0%
23.4% 8.3% 5.6% 8.6% 1.0% 3.4% 2.2%
1993
100.0% 69.9%
23.7% 8.7% 5.6% 8.4% 1.0% 3.3% 3.1%
CRS-67

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families
Total
Married
Absent
Divorced Widowed Absent
Parents
1994
100.0% 69.4%
23.7% 8.4% 5.6% 8.6% 1.0% 3.5% 3.4%
1995
100.0% 68.8%
24.2% 9.1% 5.6% 8.6% 0.9% 3.9% 3.0%
1996
100.0% 69.0%
23.8% 9.4% 5.3% 8.3% 0.8% 4.4% 2.8%
1997
100.0% 68.9%
23.6% 9.5% 5.0% 8.1% 1.0% 4.5% 3.0%
1998
100.0% 68.9%
23.8% 9.5% 5.0% 8.2% 1.0% 4.4% 3.0%
1999
100.0% 70.0%
22.7% 9.3% 4.5% 7.9% 1.0% 4.3% 3.0%
2000
100.0% 69.9%
22.6% 9.5% 4.4% 7.8% 1.0% 4.4% 3.1%
2001
100.0% 69.5%
23.0% 9.6% 4.6% 7.8% 1.0% 4.6% 2.9%
2002
100.0% 69.1%
23.2% 9.7% 4.6% 8.0% 0.9% 4.6% 3.1%
2003
100.0% 68.4%
23.6% 9.9% 4.5% 8.2% 1.0% 4.7% 3.3%
2004 100.0% 68.0%
23.7% 10.2% 4.7% 8.0% 0.8% 4.8% 3.5%
2005 100.0% 68.3%
23.6% 10.2% 4.6% 7.9% 0.9% 4.8% 3.3%
2006 100.0% 68.2%
24.5% 10.7% 4.9% 8.0% 0.8% 4.5% 2.8%
2007 100.0% 67.2%
24.7% 11.2% 4.8% 7.9% 0.9% 5.1% 3.1%
2008 100.0% 67.3%
24.6% 11.4% 5.0% 7.3% 0.9% 4.9% 3.2%
2009 100.0% 66.3%
25.2% 11.7% 5.3% 7.5% 0.9% 5.3% 3.2%
2010 100.0% 65.5%
26.0% 12.6% 4.9% 7.6% 0.9% 5.4% 3.2%
2011 100.0% 64.5%
26.7% 13.2% 5.1% 7.6% 0.8% 5.9% 2.9%
2012 100.0% 64.9%
26.0% 13.1% 4.7% 7.5% 0.7% 6.2% 2.9%
2013 100.0% 65.5%
25.6% 12.9% 4.5% 7.5% 0.7% 5.9% 3.0%

CRS-68

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families
Total
Married
Absent
Divorced Widowed Absent
Parents
Poor Children—Numbers in 1,000s
1987
12,580 4,619
7,081 2,845 2,106 1,801 329 332 549
1988
12,224 4,317
7,088 2,821 2,040 1,925 301 365 456
1989
12,380 4,535
6,904 2,800 1,879 1,856 369 416 524
1990
13,214 4,718
7,615 3,306 2,127 1,910 273 378 503
1991
14,054 4,869
8,223 3,578 2,439 2,016 191 469 493
1992
14,385 4,987
8,252 3,654 2,204 2,183 210 541 606
1993
15,456 5,571
8,532 3,869 2,230 2,178 255 546 807
1994
15,013 5,258
8,367 3,655 2,201 2,297 214 644 743
1995
14,345 4,763
8,221 4,015 2,140 1,875 191 606 755
1996
14,126 4,802
7,861 3,882 1,917 1,878 183 682 781
1997
13,786 4,503
7,907 3,870 1,814 2,034 188 628 749
1998
13,144 4,380
7,541 3,720 1,794 1,799 228 613 610
1999
11,812 4,100
6,515 3,437 1,346 1,532 200 558 639
2000
11,337 3,905
6,216 3,211 1,368 1,393 243 575 641
2001
11,450 3,896
6,334 3,233 1,326 1,540 236 634 585
2002
11,869 4,188
6,443 3,269 1,497 1,465 212 606 631
2003
12,591 4,218
6,868 3,631 1,444 1,588 205 775 729
2004
12,760 4,315
7,065 3,742 1,582 1,541 200 641 739
2005
12,582 4,104
7,077 3,819 1,597 1,492 169 645 756
2006
12,589 3,978
7,371 3,884 1,625 1,655 209 678 562
CRS-69

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families
Total
Married
Absent
Divorced Widowed Absent
Parents
2007
13,114 4,125
7,511 4,111 1,593 1,577 231 765 714
2008
13,826 4,792
7,536 4,230 1,633 1,469 203 762 735
2009
15,168 5,355
8,113 4,482 1,826 1,613 192 1,063 637
2010
16,162 5,596
8,804 4,947 1,889 1,761 207 1,051 711
2011
15,922 5,147
9,063 5,286 1,840 1,756 182 1,041 671
2012
15,856 5,252
8,772 5,210 1,764 1,611 187 1,163 670
2013
14,497 4,581
8,256 4,961 1,556 1,645
94 992 649
Poor Children—Percentage Distribution
1987 100.0% 36.7%
56.3% 22.6% 16.7% 14.3% 2.6% 2.6% 4.4%
1988 100.0% 35.3%
58.0% 23.1% 16.7% 15.7% 2.5% 3.0% 3.7%
1989 100.0% 36.6%
55.8% 22.6% 15.2% 15.0% 3.0% 3.4% 4.2%
1990 100.0% 35.7%
57.6% 25.0% 16.1% 14.5% 2.1% 2.9% 3.8%
1991 100.0% 34.6%
58.5% 25.5% 17.4% 14.3% 1.4% 3.3% 3.5%
1992 100.0% 34.7%
57.4% 25.4% 15.3% 15.2% 1.5% 3.8% 4.2%
1993 100.0% 36.0%
55.2% 25.0% 14.4% 14.1% 1.7% 3.5% 5.2%
1994 100.0% 35.0%
55.7% 24.3% 14.7% 15.3% 1.4% 4.3% 4.9%
1995 100.0% 33.2%
57.3% 28.0% 14.9% 13.1% 1.3% 4.2% 5.3%
1996 100.0% 34.0%
55.6% 27.5% 13.6% 13.3% 1.3% 4.8% 5.5%
1997 100.0% 32.7%
57.4% 28.1% 13.2% 14.8% 1.4% 4.6% 5.4%
1998 100.0% 33.3%
57.4% 28.3% 13.6% 13.7% 1.7% 4.7% 4.6%
1999 100.0% 34.7%
55.2% 29.1% 11.4% 13.0% 1.7% 4.7% 5.4%
CRS-70

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families
Total
Married
Absent
Divorced Widowed Absent
Parents
2000 100.0% 34.4%
54.8% 28.3% 12.1% 12.3% 2.1% 5.1% 5.7%
2001 100.0% 34.0%
55.3% 28.2% 11.6% 13.4% 2.1% 5.5% 5.1%
2002 100.0% 35.3%
54.3% 27.5% 12.6% 12.3% 1.8% 5.1% 5.3%
2003 100.0% 33.5%
54.6% 28.8% 11.5% 12.6% 1.6% 6.2% 5.8%
2004 100.0% 33.8%
55.4% 29.3% 12.4% 12.1% 1.6% 5.0% 5.8%
2005 100.0% 32.6%
56.3% 30.4% 12.7% 11.9% 1.3% 5.1% 6.0%
2006 100.0% 31.6%
58.6% 30.9% 12.9% 13.1% 1.7% 5.4% 4.5%
2007 100.0% 31.5%
57.3% 31.3% 12.1% 12.0% 1.8% 5.8% 5.4%
2008 100.0% 34.7%
54.5% 30.6% 11.8% 10.6% 1.5% 5.5% 5.3%
2009 100.0% 35.3%
53.5% 29.5% 12.0% 10.6% 1.3% 7.0% 4.2%
2010 100.0% 34.6%
54.5% 30.6% 11.7% 10.9% 1.3% 6.5% 4.4%
2011 100.0% 32.3%
56.9% 33.2% 11.6% 11.0% 1.1% 6.5% 4.2%
2012 100.0% 33.1%
55.3% 32.9% 11.1% 10.2% 1.2% 7.3% 4.2%
2013 100.0% 31.6%
57.0% 34.3% 10.7% 11.4% 0.7% 6.9% 4.5%
Child Poverty Rate—Poor Children as a Percent of Total Children, By Family Living Arrangement
1987 20.0% 10.0%
52.0% 67.2% 61.8% 35.7% 35.1% 18.5% 38.3%
1988 19.3% 9.3%
51.7% 65.7% 60.4% 36.8% 37.5% 20.3% 34.0%
1989 19.4% 9.7%
49.8% 64.1% 55.0% 36.3% 37.8% 20.9% 36.9%
1990 20.4% 10.1%
52.1% 65.6% 59.4% 36.7% 34.9% 18.7% 35.3%
1991 21.4% 10.4%
53.4% 66.1% 64.3% 36.6% 27.7% 21.5% 37.0%
1992 21.6% 10.6%
52.9% 66.3% 58.9% 38.4% 32.3% 23.6% 42.1%
CRS-71

Female-Headed Families

Male-
Lives with
Headed
Other
Separated,
Families,
Relatives,
Married-Couple
Never
Spouse
Spouse
Apart from
Year Total Families
Total
Married
Absent
Divorced Widowed Absent
Parents
1993 22.4% 11.6%
52.2% 64.4% 58.1% 37.5% 36.7% 24.1% 37.5%
1994 21.6% 10.9%
50.8% 62.3% 56.4% 38.2% 30.8% 26.1% 31.6%
1995 20.5% 9.9%
48.4% 63.1% 54.5% 31.0% 28.8% 21.9% 35.4%
1996 20.1% 9.9%
47.0% 58.8% 51.1% 32.2% 32.4% 22.3% 39.4%
1997 19.5% 9.3%
47.5% 57.8% 51.0% 35.6% 27.8% 20.0% 35.2%
1998 18.5% 9.0%
44.8% 55.0% 50.4% 30.9% 33.3% 19.8% 28.7%
1999 16.6% 8.2%
40.3% 52.2% 41.7% 27.1% 28.7% 18.2% 29.7%
2000 15.9% 7.8%
38.6% 47.7% 44.0% 25.0% 34.8% 18.3% 29.4%
2001 16.0% 7.8%
38.4% 47.0% 40.3% 27.5% 32.7% 19.3% 28.3%
2002 16.4% 8.4%
38.4% 46.6% 44.7% 25.5% 31.9% 18.3% 28.5%
2003 17.4% 8.5%
40.1% 50.4% 43.8% 26.9% 29.1% 22.8% 30.6%
2004 17.5% 8.7%
41.0% 50.4% 46.6% 26.5% 33.5% 18.3% 29.2%
2005 17.3% 8.3%
41.2% 51.3% 47.9% 25.9% 27.2% 18.6% 31.3%
2006 17.2% 8.0%
41.1% 49.6% 44.9% 28.2% 35.0% 20.4% 27.9%
2007 17.8% 8.3%
41.3% 50.1% 45.3% 27.2% 34.9% 20.6% 31.7%
2008 18.8% 9.7%
41.7% 50.4% 44.3% 27.4% 31.9% 21.1% 31.2%
2009 20.5% 10.9%
43.4% 51.8% 46.9% 29.2% 29.9% 27.3% 26.8%
2010 21.8% 11.5%
45.7% 53.0% 52.2% 31.2% 31.1% 26.5% 30.3%
2011 21.7% 10.9%
46.3% 54.7% 49.4% 31.4% 30.0% 24.2% 31.4%
2012 21.6% 11.0%
46.0% 54.3% 50.8% 29.4% 35.7% 25.6% 29.4%
2013 19.8% 9.5%
44.1% 52.6% 46.9% 30.0% 18.6% 22.9% 29.7%
CRS-72

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 1.

CRS-73

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-2. Number of Recipients and Cases Receiving Cash Assistance
Under ADC, AFDC, and TANF, 1960 to 2013
(Annual monthly average, in millions)
Calendar
Year
Cases Recipients
Children Adults
1960 790,910
3,011,508
2,330,042
691,956
1961 872,722
3,362,722
2,597,700
765,022
1962 939,275
3,703,896
2,843,652
860,244
1963 963,368
3,944,635
2,956,962
987,673
1964
1,010,107 4,194,603 3,144,690 1,049,913
1965
1,060,214 4,421,650 3,320,559 1,101,091
1966
1,095,533 4,546,122 3,433,908 1,112,215
1967
1,219,553 5,013,795 3,771,218 1,242,578
1968
1,409,664 5,702,377 4,273,606 1,428,771
1969
1,695,612 6,689,158 4,973,458 1,715,700
1970
2,206,799 8,461,892 6,211,583 2,250,308
1971
2,762,619 10,242,130 7,434,512 2,807,618
1972
3,048,031 10,944,008 7,905,071 3,038,937
1973
3,147,972 10,949,112 7,902,756 3,046,356
1974
3,187,232 10,825,730 7,803,440 3,022,291
1975
3,481,362 11,318,736 8,070,972 3,247,764
1976
3,564,887 11,283,516 7,981,688 3,301,829
1977
3,568,481 11,015,176 7,742,535 3,272,641
1978
3,516,649 10,550,607 7,363,099 3,187,509
1979
3,509,192 10,311,586 7,181,272 3,130,314
1980
3,712,309 10,774,046 7,419,183 3,354,864
1981
3,835,489 11,079,117 7,526,934 3,552,183
1982
3,541,525 10,358,302 6,902,830 3,455,472
1983
3,686,163 10,760,935 7,097,744 3,663,191
1984
3,713,929 10,830,529 7,143,705 3,686,824
1985
3,701,033 10,855,284 7,197,601 3,657,683
1986
3,763,252 11,037,797 7,333,801 3,703,996
1987
3,775,573 11,026,664 7,366,159 3,660,505
1988
3,748,580 10,914,679 7,328,786 3,585,893
1989
3,798,348 10,992,248 7,418,966 3,573,282
1990
4,056,584 11,694,712 7,910,836 3,783,876
1991
4,497,186 12,930,472 8,714,749 4,215,723
Congressional Research Service
74

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Calendar
Year Cases Recipients
Children Adults
1992
4,829,094 13,773,319 9,302,846 4,470,473
1993
5,011,827 14,205,484 9,574,475 4,631,010
1994
5,032,632 14,160,920 9,568,359 4,592,561
1995
4,790,749 13,418,386 9,134,603 4,283,783
1996
4,434,160 12,320,970 8,468,759 3,852,212
1997
3,740,179
10,375,993 n/a n/a
1998
3,050,335
8,347,136 n/a n/a
1999
2,554,069
6,824,347 n/a n/a
2000
2,302,780 6,143,156 4,478,742 1,654,818
2001
2,191,506 5,716,797 4,200,666 1,515,552
2002
2,187,158 5,609,012 4,118,797 1,479,433
2003
2,180,075 5,489,786 4,062,665 1,416,022
2004
2,153,066 5,341,859 3,969,376 1,361,701
2005
2,060,282 5,025,650 3,758,077 1,261,392
2006
1,905,785 4,577,114 3,455,961 1,121,153
2007 1,729,894
4,075,611
3,119,519 956,091
2008 1,700,249
4,001,330
3,056,690 944,640
2009
1,838,438 4,367,817 3,294,766 1,073,282
2010
1,917,943 4,594,409 3,432,780 1,161,628
2011
1,907,794
4,559,126 3,409,383
1,149,742
2012 1,852,628
4,400,230
3,298,369
1,101,861
2013 1,725,649
4,042,375
3,049,590 992,785
Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) from Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS), Office of Family Assistance (OFA).
Notes: Includes enrollment in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
N/A separated estimates for children and adults not available from 1997 to 1999, due to changes in state
reporting requirements during the transition from AFDC to TANF. From 2000 and later, data are for combined
enrol ment in TANF and Separate State Programs (SSP) under state Maintenance of Effort (MOE) requirements.
Support table for Figure 2 and Figure 3.

Congressional Research Service
75

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-3. Poverty Among Related Children Under Age 18,
All Children and Children in Female-Headed Households (No Spouse Present)
1960 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

All Children
Children in Female-Headed Households
Poverty
Poverty
Rate
Share of
Share of
Rate
(percent
all
all Poor
(percent
Year Total Poor poor) Total
Children Poor Children
poor)
1960 65,275
17,288
26.5 5,987 9.2 4,095
23.7 68.4
1961 65,792
16,577
25.2 6,212 9.4 4,044
24.4 65.1
1962 67,385
16,630
24.7 6,419 9.5 4,506
27.1 70.2
1963 68,837
15,691
22.8 6,419 9.3 4,554
29.0 70.9
1964 69,364
15,736
22.7 6,838 9.9 4,422
28.1 64.7
1965 69,638
14,388
20.7 7,098
10.2 4,562
31.7 64.3
1966 69,869
12,146
17.4 7,106
10.2 4,262
35.1 60.0
1967 70,058
11,427
16.3 7,344
10.5 4,246
37.2 57.8
1968 70,035
10,739
15.3 7,323
10.5 4,409
41.1 60.2
1969 68,746
9,501
13.8 7,820
11.4 4,247
44.7 54.3
1970 68,815
10,235
14.9 7,987
11.6 4,689
45.8 58.7
1971 68,474
10,344
15.1 9,127
13.3 4,850
46.9 53.1
1972 67,592
10,082
14.9 9,600
14.2 5,094
50.5 53.1
1973 66,626
9,453
14.2 9,929
14.9 5,171
54.7 52.1
1974 65,802
9,967
15.1 10,458
15.9 5,387
54.0 51.5
1975 64,750
10,882
16.8 10,622
16.4 5,597
51.4 52.7
1976 63,729
10,081
15.8 10,739
16.9 5,583
55.4 52.0
1977 62,823
10,028
16.0 11,238
17.9 5,658
56.4 50.3
1978 61,987
9,722
15.7 11,232
18.1 5,687
58.5 50.6
1979 62,646
9,993
16.0 11,595
18.5 5,635
56.4 48.6
1980 62,168
11,114
17.9 11,539
18.6 5,866
52.8 50.8
1981 61,756
12,068
19.5 12,059
19.5 6,305
52.2 52.3
1982 61,565
13,139
21.3 11,946
19.4 6,696
51.0 56.1
1983 61,578
13,427
21.8 12,172
19.8 6,747
50.2 55.4
1984 61,681
12,929
21.0 12,536
20.3 6,772
52.4 54.0
1985 62,019
12,483
20.1 12,531
20.2 6,716
53.8 53.6
1986 62,009
12,257
19.8 12,763
20.6 6,943
56.6 54.4
1987 62,423
12,275
19.7 13,066
20.9 7,019
57.2 53.7
1988 62,906
11,935
19.0 13,146
20.9 6,955
58.3 52.9
1989 63,225
12,001
19.0 13,316
21.1 6,808
56.7 51.1
Congressional Research Service
76

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

All Children
Children in Female-Headed Households
Poverty
Poverty
Rate
Share of
Share of
Rate
(percent
all
all Poor
(percent
Year Total Poor poor)
Total
Children
Poor
Children
poor)
1990 63,908
12,715
19.9 13,793
21.6 7,363
57.9 53.4
1991 64,800
13,658
21.1 14,545
22.4 8,065
59.0 55.4
1992 67,256
14,521
21.6 15,319
22.8 8,368
57.6 54.6
1993 68,040
14,961
22.0 15,844
23.3 8,503
56.8 53.7
1994 68,819
14,610
21.2 15,924
23.1 8,427
57.7 52.9
1995 69,425
13,999
20.2 16,637
24.0 8,364
59.7 50.3
1996 69,411
13,764
19.8 16,213
23.4 7,990
58.0 49.3
1997 69,844
13,422
19.2 16,175
23.2 7,928
59.1 49.0
1998 70,253
12,845
18.3 16,550
23.6 7,627
59.4 46.1
1999 70,424
11,678
16.6 15,891
22.6 6,694
57.3 42.1
2000 70,538
11,005
15.6 15,717
22.3 6,300
57.2 40.1
2001 70,950
11,175
15.8 16,137
22.7 6,341
56.7 39.3
2002 71,619
11,646
16.3 16,565
23.1 6,564
56.4 39.6
2003 71,907
12,340
17.2 16,964
23.6 7,085
57.4 41.8
2004 72,133
12,473
17.3 17,081
23.7 7,152
57.3 41.9
2005 72,095
12,335
17.1 16,862
23.4 7,210
58.4 42.8
2006 72,609
12,299
16.9 17,416
24.0 7,341
59.7 42.2
2007 72,792
12,802
17.6 17,557
24.1 7,546
58.9 43.0
2008 72,980
13,507
18.5 17,456
23.9 7,587
56.2 43.5
2009 73,410
14,774
20.1 17,907
24.4 7,942
53.8 44.4
2010a
72,581 15,598 21.5 18,451 25.4 8,603 55.2 46.6
2011 72,568
15,539
21.4 18,942
26.1 9,026
58.1 47.7
2012 72,545
15,437
21.3 18,368
25.3 8,664
56.1 47.2
2013 72,573
14,142
19.5 18,122
25.0 8,305
58.7 45.8
Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) based on U.S. Census Bureau historical series,
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html, “Table 10. Related Children in
Female Householder Families, by Poverty Status.”
Notes: Estimates are for children in female-headed “households,” which differs somewhat from the CRS
definition of female-headed ”families” used later in this report based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau Current
Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data. Support table for Figure 4
a. Revised estimates based on 2010 Census population control totals.
Congressional Research Service
77

Table C-4. Mothers with Related Children Under Age 18, by Poverty and Marital Status, 1987 to 2013
(Numbers in thousands)

Single Mothers

Separated,
Married,

All Single Mothers
Never Married
Spouse Absent
Divorced
Widowed
Spouse Present
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Year Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
1987 8,193
3,661 44.7% 2,689
1,559 58.0% 1,787 975 54.6% 3,130 948 30.3% 588 180 30.6%
24,992
1,912 7.7%
1988 8,321
3,650 43.9% 2,798
1,595 57.0% 1,770 911 51.5% 3,224 966 30.0% 529 177 33.5%
25,096
1,785 7.1%
1989 8,400
3,506 41.7% 2,775
1,536 55.4% 1,836 860 46.9% 3,197 930 29.1% 593 179 30.2%
24,921
1,816 7.3%
1990 8,745
3,821 43.7% 3,100
1,730 55.8% 1,922 986 51.3% 3,225 956 29.6% 498 148 29.7%
24,863
1,938 7.8%
1991 9,031 4,101 45.4% 3,284 1,909 58.1% 1,950 1,075 55.1% 3,349 1,017 30.4% 448
99 22.2% 24,880 2,075
8.3%
1992 9,567 4,339 45.4% 3,595 2,059 57.3% 2,027 1,039 51.3% 3,524 1,128 32.0% 421 112 26.6% 25,386 2,178
8.6%
1993 9,860 4,456 45.2% 3,830 2,139 55.8% 2,044 1,050 51.4% 3,544 1,128 31.8% 443 140 31.7% 25,614 2,295
9.0%
1994 9,837 4,203 42.7% 3,681 1,982 53.8% 2,050 992 48.4% 3,674 1,113 30.3% 432 117 27.0% 25,646 2,170
8.5%
1995 9,887
3,971 40.2% 3,724
1,963 52.7% 2,083 960 46.1% 3,668 949 25.9% 411 99 24.0%
25,386
1,923 7.6%
1996 10,052
4,005 39.8% 4,097
2,033 49.6% 1,965 869 44.3% 3,605 988 27.4% 385 115 29.9%
25,603
1,921 7.5%
1997 9,874 3,946 40.0% 4,154 2,043 49.2% 1,838 794 43.2% 3,448 1,014 29.4% 435
95 21.8% 25,735 1,785
6.9%
1998 9,881
3,685 37.3% 4,184
1,933 46.2% 1,813 754 41.6% 3,489 884 25.3% 396 115 29.1%
25,573
1,775 6.9%
1999 9,741
3,314 34.0% 4,197
1,869 44.5% 1,725 598 34.6% 3,425 750 21.9% 394 98 24.8%
25,806
1,647 6.4%
2000 9,712
3,090 31.8% 4,199
1,668 39.7% 1,662 610 36.7% 3,404 696 20.5% 447 116 26.0%
26,563
1,557 5.9%
2001 10,044
3,259 32.4% 4,311
1,716 39.8% 1,787 614 34.4% 3,501 804 23.0% 445 124 27.9%
26,303
1,574 6.0%
2002 10,206
3,284 32.2% 4,422
1,737 39.3% 1,822 695 38.2% 3,538 736 20.8% 424 115 27.2%
26,484
1,789 6.8%
2003 10,411
3,525 33.9% 4,511
1,917 42.5% 1,758 650 37.0% 3,699 847 22.9% 443 110 24.8%
26,414
1,841 7.0%
2004 10,489
3,663 34.9% 4,647
2,016 43.4% 1,806 726 40.2% 3,631 810 22.3% 404 111 27.4%
26,797
1,858 6.9%
2005 10,476
3,640 34.7% 4,657
2,040 43.8% 1,777 716 40.3% 3,618 786 21.7% 424 98 23.1%
26,507
1,729 6.5%
2006 10,938
3,841 35.1% 4,934
2,100 42.6% 1,970 777 39.5% 3,652 850 23.3% 381 114 29.9%
26,857
1,709 6.4%
2007 10,748
3,790 35.3% 4,961
2,135 43.0% 1,873 734 39.2% 3,507 796 22.7% 407 124 30.6%
25,851
1,718 6.6%
CRS-78

Single Mothers

Separated,
Married,

All Single Mothers
Never Married
Spouse Absent
Divorced
Widowed
Spouse Present
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Pct.
Year Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
Total Poor Poor
2008 10,797
3,863 35.8% 5,120
2,220 43.4% 2,002 772 38.5% 3,284 759 23.1% 391 112 28.6%
25,861
1,933 7.5%
2009 10,990
4,128 37.6% 5,225
2,365 45.3% 2,019 825 40.8% 3,333 831 24.9% 413 107 26.0%
25,398
2,109 8.3%
2010 11,185
4,418 39.5% 5,497
2,535 46.1% 1,893 845 44.6% 3,380 916 27.1% 416 122 29.5%
24,807
2,210 8.9%
2011 11,467
4,540 39.6% 5,766
2,707 46.9% 1,960 833 42.5% 3,386 906 26.7% 356 94 26.4%
24,519
2,169 8.8%
2012 11,125
4,422 39.8% 5.760
2,709 47.0% 1,844 799 43.4% 3,198 817 25.5% 324 97 30.0%
24,645
2,194 8.9%
2013 10,970
4,164 38.0% 5,635
2,549 45.2% 1,744 704 40.4% 3,248 850 26.2% 343 61 17.8%
24,830
1,924 7.7%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 5 and Figure 6.
CRS-79

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-5. Single Mothers: Poverty and Cash Welfare Receipt,
1987 to 2013
(Numbers in thousands)
Number of
Number
Poor but Not
Neither Poor
Mother-Only
Receiving
Receiving
nor Receiving
Year
Families
AFDC/TANF
AFDC/TANF
AFDC/TANF
1987 8,193
2,719 1,399
4,076
1988 8,321
2,737 1,380
4,204
1989 8,400
2,537 1,452
4,411
1990 8,745
2,901 1,456
4,387
1991 9,031
3,101 1,554
4,375
1992 9,567
3,300 1,691
4,575
1993 9,860
3,439 1,722
4,700
1994 9,837
3,166 1,754
4,916
1995 9,887
2,862 1,818
5,207
1996 10,052
2,669
1,946
5,437
1997 9,874
2,225 2,211
5,438
1998 9,881
1,872 2,253
5,756
1999 9,741
1,543 2,216
5,981
2000 9,712
1,215 2,251
6,246
2001 10,044
1,064
2,501
6,479
2002 10,206
1,025
2,577

6,604
2003
10,411
1,253
2,610
6,448
2004
10,442
1,054
2,890
6,498
2005
10,476
1,102
2,837
6,537
2006
10,938
991
3,120
6,827
2007 10,748
878
3,142
6,728
2008 10,797
974
3,161
6,662
2009 10,990
967
3,408
6,615
2010 11,185
1,009
3,680
6,497
2011 11,467
1,088
3,776
6,603
2012 11,125
962
3,715
6,448
2013 10,970
795
3,605
6,570
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 7.

Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-6. Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status Among Single Mothers,
1987 to 2013
Percent who Received AFDC/TANF

During the Year
Percent
Percent
who
Poor
Worked
Worked
(“official
Did not Work
During
Year
During Year
definition”) Total During Year
Year
1987 67.3%
44.7% 33.2%
21.8% 11.4%
1988 68.9%
43.9% 32.9%
21.1% 11.8%
1989 70.1%
41.7% 30.2%
20.1% 10.1%
1990 69.8%
43.7% 33.2%
20.9% 12.3%
1991 68.7%
45.4% 34.3%
22.0% 12.3%
1992 67.2%
45.4% 34.5%
22.2% 12.3%
1993 68.1%
45.2% 34.9%
21.8% 13.1%
1994 71.4%
42.7% 32.2%
18.8% 13.4%
1995 73.0%
40.2% 28.9%
16.5% 12.4%
1996 75.1%
39.8% 26.65
14.6% 12.0%
1997 77.3%
40.0% 22.5%
11.4% 11.1%
1998 79.6%
37.3% 18.9%
8.2% 10.7%
1999 82.0%
34.0% 15.8%
6.5%
9.3%
2000 82.7%
31.8% 12.5%
5.3%
7.2%
2001 81.1%
32.4% 10.6%
5.1%
5.5%
2002 80.3%
32.2% 10.0%
4.6%
5.4%
2003 78.7%
33.9% 12.0%
6.1%
5.9%
2004 77.7%
34.9% 10.1%
5.2%
4.9%
2005 77.6%
34.7% 10.5%
6.6%
3.9%
2006 77.3%
35.1%
9.1%
4.6%
4.4%
2007 77.9%
35.3%
8.2%
4.1%
4.1%
2008 76.9%
35.8%
9.0%
4.4%
4.6%
2009 74.0%
37.6%
8.8%
5.2%
3.6%
2010 72.8%
39.5%
9.0%
5.1%
3.9%
2011 73.7%
39.6%
9.5%
5.3%
4.2%
2012 74.1%
39.8%
8.6%
5.0%
3.6%
2013 75.0%
38.9%
7.3%
4.2%
3.1%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: Details may not sum to totals due to rounding. Support table for Figure 8.

Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-7. Employment Rates of Single and Married Mothers,
by Age of Youngest Child,
March 1988 to March 2014
(Percent of single mothers employed in March)
Single Mothers
Married Mothers
With a Youngest Youngest Youngest
With a
Youngest
Youngest
Child
Child
Child
Child
Child
Child
Youngest
Child
Under
Under
Age 3 to
Age 6 to
Under
Under
Child Age
Age 6 to
Year
Age 18
Age 3
5
17
Age 18
Age 3
3 to 5
17
1988
57.4% 35.1% 52.9% 69.1% 61.8% 50.7% 58.1% 69.6%
1989
58.2% 37.9% 53.1% 70.0% 63.0% 51.4% 60.8% 70.6%
1990
60.3% 38.0% 61.0% 70.9% 63.4% 52.7% 60.9% 70.8%
1991
58.1% 36.6% 55.7% 70.2% 63.1% 52.7% 60.5% 70.5%
1992
57.3% 35.2% 54.1% 69.8% 63.9% 53.1% 59.4% 71.9%
1993
57.3% 35.1% 54.8% 70.1% 63.9% 53.2% 59.4% 71.9%
1994
58.0% 37.7% 55.2% 69.3% 65.5% 56.0% 61.2% 72.6%
1995
61.1% 43.1% 58.5% 70.5% 67.1% 57.4% 63.9% 73.4%
1996
63.5% 44.7% 60.4% 72.9% 67.6% 58.2% 63.3% 74.2%
1997
65.6% 51.5% 64.3% 72.0% 68.5% 58.3% 64.4% 75.2%
1998
68.8% 54.8% 63.7% 76.4% 67.9% 58.3% 64.1% 74.2%
1999
70.7% 55.8% 69.8% 77.1% 67.9% 57.0% 63.1% 75.1%
2000
72.8% 59.1% 72.7% 78.5% 68.4% 56.8% 66.0% 75.0%
2001
72.5% 57.6% 71.3% 79.1% 68.0% 56.0% 64.2% 75.1%
2002
71.2% 57.9% 71.0% 76.3% 66.7% 54.9% 61.7% 74.1%
2003
69.6% 54.8% 69.3% 75.4% 66.3% 53.5% 61.7% 74.2%
2004
69.7% 54.1% 69.5% 75.7% 65.3% 52.4% 62.3% 72.7%
2005
68.9% 53.7% 66.7% 75.7% 65.9% 54.9% 61.9% 72.8%
2006
69.6% 57.0% 68.0% 75.1% 66.1% 55.4% 61.8% 73.1%
2007
70.0% 56.5% 68.6% 76.0% 67.3% 56.9% 63.0% 74.25
2008
69.1% 54.5% 68.5% 75.5% 67.0% 56.1% 63.6% 73.7%
2009
65.8% 52.5% 62.3% 72.9% 66.0% 56.3% 60.1% 72.7%
2010
64.1% 52.9% 59.7% 70.7% 65.3% 54.9% 62.6% 71.3%
2011
63.6% 49.6% 60.1% 70.8% 64.9% 55.7% 61.7% 70.6%
2012
65.7% 51.4% 65.1% 72.2% 65.0% 55.7% 62.8% 70.1%
2013
65.3% 54.3% 62.2% 71.0% 64.4% 56.9% 61.1% 68.9%
2014
67.5% 54.9% 66.0% 73.1% 65.3% 56.5% 60.5% 70.8%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 9.
Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-8. Monthly Unemployment Rate of Women Who Maintain Families,
January 1987 to October 2014
(Rates are not seasonally adjusted)
Annual
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average
1987 9.8 10.0 9.7 9.0 9.1 9.5 9.0 9.7 9.3 9.2 8.4 7.6 9.2
1988 8.9 8.6 7.5 8.2 8.1 7.9 8.2 7.9 8.5 8.1 7.5 7.6 8.1
1989 8.1 8.3 7.8 7.3 8.1 7.9 8.5 8.4 8.0 7.8 8.1 7.5 8.1
1990 7.8 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.4 8.1 8.8 9.0 9.4 8.8 8.7 8.4 8.3
1991 9.2 9.4 9.0 9.2 9.0 9.1 8.8
10.2 9.6 9.8 9.1 8.6 9.3
1992 9.2 9.8 9.9 9.8 9.7 10.2
11.0
11.4 9.6 9.4 10.4 9.7 10.0
1993 10.5 10.5 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.4 9.6 9.1 9.4 9.0 9.8
9.7
1994 9.5 9.9 9.5 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.3 9.4 8.7 8.8 8.1 8.7 8.9
1995 9.1 8.5 7.7 8.8 7.8 8.3 8.8 7.4 7.9 7.9 7.3 6.6 8.0
1996 8.4 7.7 7.4 7.0 8.3 7.6 9.7 9.0 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.2
1997 9.5 9.1 8.7 7.1 7.5 7.9 8.2 8.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.2 8.1
1998 8.3 7.9 7.6 6.8 7.2 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.5 6.9 6.9 5.8 7.2
1999 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.5 5.8 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.0 6.0 5.7 6.4
2000 6.6 6.4 7.0 5.8 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.4 5.4 5.3 5.1 4.5 5.9
2001 6.7 6.3 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.2 6.5 7.0 6.9 6.6 7.7 7.2 6.6
2002 8.2 8.3 7.9 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.6 7.6 7.0 7.7 8.0 7.9 8.0
2003 8.0 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.3 8.7 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.4 8.3 8.4 8.5
2004 8.3 8.1 8.4 7.5 7.4 8.2 9.0 8.3 8.2 7.8 7.7 7.1 8.0
2005 8.2 8.0 8.0 7.7 7.9 8.2 8.8 7.2 7.6 7.3 7.2 6.9 7.8
2006 8.2 7.5 7.5 7.5 6.3 7.2 7.4 6.7 6.8 6.5 6.9 6.2 7.1
2007 6.6 6.5 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.8 6.8 6.2 6.4 6.3 6.6 6.9 6.5
2008 7.0 6.7 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.9 8.5 9.6 8.2 8.8 9.3 9.5 8.0
2009 10.3 10.3 10.8 10.0 11.0 11.7 12.6 12.2 11.6 12.9 11.4 13.0 11.5
2010 12.3 11.6 11.3 11.0 11.6 12.1 13.4 13.4 12.9 12.4 13.0 12.0 12.3
2011 12.7 13.0 12.3 11.7 12.7 12.8 12.1 11.9 12.4 12.3 12.4 12.9 12.4
2012 12.0 11.7 10.8 10.2 10.9 11.8 11.7 12.3 11.3 11.5 10.7 11.3 11.4
2013 11.3 11.0 10.7 10.3 9.9 10.7 10.5 11.0 8.8 9.5 9.7 8.7 10.2
2014 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.5 8.4 8.1 9.1 9.3 8.3 8.7

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data extracted from the internet on November 10, 2014. Data available
at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (Series: LNU04000313).
Note: Support table for Figure 10.

Congressional Research Service
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Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Table C-9. Poor Single Mothers: Work and Welfare Status During the Year,
1987 to 2013
Worked
but Did
Received
Not
Neither
Cash
Receive
Worked
Number
Received
Welfare
Combined
Cash
nor
of Poor
Cash
but Did
Work and
Worked at
Welfare at
Received
Single
Welfare
Not Work
Welfare
Any Time
Any Time
Welfare
Mothers
During
During
over the
During the
During the
During the
Year
(in 000s)
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
Year
1987 3,661
61.8%
43.3%
18.5%
42.2%
23.7%
14.5%
1988 3,650
62.2%
43.0%
19.2%
43.5%
24.3%
13.5%
1989 3,506
58.6%
42.7%
15.9%
43.1%
27.2%
14.2%
1990 3,821
61.9%
41.4%
20.5%
46.0%
25.5%
12.6%
1991 4,101
62.1%
43.3%
18.8%
44.3%
25.5%
12.5%
1992 4,339
61.0%
42.1%
18.9%
43.6%
24.7%
14.3%
1993 4,456
61.4%
41.5%
19.8%
44.3%
24.5%
14.1%
1994 4,203
58.3%
37.8%
20.5%
47.3%
26.8%
14.9%
1995 3,971
54.2%
34.2%
20.0%
49.7%
29.7%
16.1%
1996 4,005
51.4%
31.1%
20.3%
52.6%
32.2%
16.4%
1997 3,946
44.0%
24.5%
19.5%
57.8%
38.3%
17.7%
1998 3,685
38.9%
19.2%
19.7%
60.4%
40.7%
20.4%
1999 3,314
33.1%
15.4%
17.8%
64.3%
46.5%
20.3%
2000 3,090
27.2%
13.6%
13.6%
61.6%
48.1%
24.8%
2001 3,259
23.2%
12.9%
10.4%
58.6%
48.2%
28.6%
2002
3,284
21.5%
11.8%
9.8%
59.0%
49.2%
29.3%
2003 3,525
26.0%
14.7%
11.2
%
56.5%
45.3%
28.7%
2004 3,648
20.8%
12.1%

8.7%
55.3%
46.6%
32.6%
2005 3,640
22.1%
13.2%

8.9%
54.0%
45.1%
32.8%
2006 3,841
18.8%
11.0%

7.8%
54.4%
46.7%
34.6%
2007 3,790
17.1%
10.0%
7.1%
55.9%
48.8%
34.1%
2008 3,863
18.2%
10.4%
7.8%
55.0%
47.2%
34.6%
2009 4,128
17.5%
11.4%
6.1%
51.6%
45.6%
37.0%
2010 4,418
16.7%
10.9%
5.8%
50.8%
45.0%
38.3%
2011 4,540
16.8%
10.7%
6.1%
51.5%
45.3%
37.8%
2012 4,422
16.0%
10.7%
5.3%
52.9%
47.7%
36.3%
2013 4,164
13.4%
8.7%
4.7%
53.9%
49.2%
37.4%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014
Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 11.
Congressional Research Service
84

Table C-10. Receipt of Selected Benefits by Female-Headed Families with Children,
All Families and “Earnings Poor” Families,
1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Received
AFDC, TANF,
Received
Received Food
Received
Received
Received the
Received the

or GA
SSI
Stamps/SNAP
UI
Child Support
EITC
ACTCa
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
All Families
1987 8,193 2,719
33.2% 412 5.0% 2,958 36.1% 421 5.1%
2,322 28.3% 3,437 41.9%

1988 8,321 2,737
32.9% 383 4.6% 3,034 36.5% 446 5.4%
2,286 27.5% 3,994 48.0%

1989 8,400 2,537
30.2% 404 4.8% 2,860 34.0% 493 5.9%
2,451 29.2% 4,086 48.6%

1990 8,745 2,901
33.2% 430 4.9% 3,260 37.3% 628 7.2%
2,531 28.9% 4,365 49.9%

1991 9,031 3,101
34.3% 474 5.3% 3,572 39.6% 694 7.7%
2,603 28.8% 4,441 49.2%

1992 9,567 3,300
34.5% 555 5.8% 3,981 41.6% 721 7.5%
2,849 29.8% 4,745 49.6%

1993 9,860 3,439
34.9% 748 7.6% 4,295 43.6% 699 7.1%
2,968 30.1% 4,963 50.3%

1994 9,837 3,166
32.2% 725 7.4% 4,036 41.0% 706 7.2%
3,097 31.5% 5,312 54.0%

1995 9,887 2,862
28.9% 722 7.3% 3,755 38.0% 615 6.2%
3,263 33.0% 5,589 56.5%

1996
10,052 2,669
26.6% 755 7.5% 3,674 36.5% 692 6.9%
3,204 31.9% 5,987 59.6%

1997 9,874 2,225
22.5% 723 7.3% 3,291 33.3% 554 5.6%
3,015 30.5% 5,950 60.3%

1998 9,881 1,872
18.9% 661 6.7% 3,019 30.6% 543 5.5%
3,077 31.1% 6,064 61.4%

1999 9,741 1,543
15.8% 619 6.4% 2,491 25.6% 496 5.1%
3,158 32.4% 6,196 63.6%

2000 9,712 1,215
12.5% 614 6.3% 2,298 23.7% 519 5.3%
3,194 32.9% 6,039 62.2%

2001
10,044 1,064
10.6% 630 6.3% 2,433 24.2% 705 7.0%
3,387 33.7% 6,033 60.1%

2002
10,206 1,025
10.0% 591 5.8% 2,574 25.2% 800 7.8%
3,330 32.6% 6,018 59.0%

2003
10,411 1,253
12.0% 600 5.8% 2,758 26.5% 766 7.4%
3,333 32.0% 5,187 49.8%

CRS-85

Received
AFDC, TANF,
Received
Received Food
Received
Received
Received the
Received the

or GA
SSI
Stamps/SNAP
UI
Child Support
EITC
ACTCa
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2004
10,442 1,054
10.1% 704 6.7% 2,918 27.9% 659 6.3%
3,373 32.3% 5,209 49.9%
3,876 37.1%
2005
10,476 1,102
10.5% 699 6.7% 3,005 28.7% 608 5.8%
3,205 30.6% 6,170 58.9%
3,384 32.3%
2006
10,938 991
9.1% 694 6.3% 2,982 27.3% 533 4.9%
3,233 29.6% 6,451 59.0%
3,625 33.1%
2007
10,748 878
8.2% 668 6.2% 2,979 27.7% 499 4.6%
3,157 29.4% 6,454 60.0%
3,526 32.8%
2008
10,797 974
9.0% 663 6.1% 3,464 32.1% 813 7.5%
3,044 28.2% 6,384 59.1%
3,366 31.2%
2009 10,990 967 8.8% 716 6.5% 3,908 35.6% 1,100 10.0% 3,004 27.3% 6,546 59.6% 4,976
45.3%
2010 11,185 1,009 9.0% 676 6.0% 4,165 37.2% 1,229 11.0% 3,041 27.2% 6,479 57.9% 4,831
43.2%
2011 11,467 1,088 9.5% 707 6.2% 4,391 38.3% 1,099 9.6% 3,099 27.0% 6,836 59.6% 5,030
43.9%
2012
11,125 962
8.6% 698 6.3% 4,452 40.0% 879 7.9%
3,093 27.8% 6,749 60.7%
5,095 45.8%
2013
10,970 795
7.3% 679 6.2% 4,301 39.2% 719 6.6%
2,936 26.8% 6,562 59.8%
4,900 44.7%
“Earnings Poor” Families
1987 4,417 2,515
56.9% 352 8.0% 2,756 62.4% 206 4.7% 942 21.3% 1,798 40.7%

1988 4,476 2,506
56.0% 312 7.0% 2,782 62.2% 198 4.4% 928 20.7% 1,940 43.3%

1989 4,384 2,318
52.9% 318 7.3% 2,635 60.1% 224 5.1%
1,012 23.1% 1,959 44.7%

1990 4,707 2,670
56.7% 353 7.5% 3,012 64.0% 261 5.5%
1,057 22.4% 2,159 45.9%

1991 4,983 2,840
57.0% 412 8.3% 3,232 64.9% 320 6.4%
1,049 21.0% 2,277 45.7%

1992 5,292 2,968
56.1% 469 8.9% 3,557 67.2% 398 7.5%
1,217 23.0% 2,372 44.8%

1993 5,540 3,114
56.2% 611
11.0% 3,831 69.1% 362 6.5%
1,333 24.1% 2,425 43.8%

1994 5,297 2,848
53.8% 623
11.8% 3,576 67.5% 344 6.5%
1,300 24.5% 2,609 49.3%

1995 5,040 2,495
49.5% 585
11.6% 3,233 64.1% 307 6.1%
1,432 28.4% 2,635 52.3%

1996 5,009 2,330
46.5% 633
12.6% 3,125 62.4% 333 6.7%
1,299 25.9% 2,722 54.3%

1997 4,993 2,038
40.8% 574
11.5% 2,867 57.4% 300 6.0%
1,247 25.0% 2,821 56.5%

1998 4,730 1,688
35.7% 548
11.6% 2,584 54.6% 289 6.1%
1,131 23.9% 2,895 61.2%

1999 4,249 1,321
31.1% 474
11.2% 2,135 50.3% 230 5.4%
1,101 25.9% 2,720 64.0%

CRS-86

Received
AFDC, TANF,
Received
Received Food
Received
Received
Received the
Received the

or GA
SSI
Stamps/SNAP
UI
Child Support
EITC
ACTCa
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2000 3,966 1,026
25.9% 462
11.7% 1,931 48.7% 200 5.0%
1,100 27.7% 2,508 63.2%

2001 4,205 920
21.9% 484
11.5% 2,029 48.3% 307 7.3%
1,233 29.3% 2,502 59.5%

2002 4,308 863
20.0% 451
10.5% 2,080 48.3% 414 9.6%
1,301 30.2% 2,531 58.8%

2003 4,470 1,078
24.1% 465
10.4% 2,294 51.3% 380 8.5%
1,293 28.9% 2,182 48.8%

2004 4,625 913
19.7% 526
11.4% 2,428 52.5% 317 6.9%
1,326 28.7% 2,219 48.0%
1,187 25.7%
2005 4,605 956
20.8% 571
12.4% 2,487 54.0% 285 6.2%
1,225 26.6% 2,636 57.2% 874 19.0%
2006 4,866 844
17.3% 548
11.3% 2,554 52.5% 256 5.3%
1,346 27.7% 2,800 57.5%
1,008 20.7%
2007 4,801 765
15.9% 533
11.1% 2,456 51.2% 223 4.7%
1,303 27.1% 2,846 59.3%
1,085 22.6%
2008 4,961 838
16.9% 524
10.6% 2,787 56.2% 381 7.7%
1,258 25.4% 2,954 59.5%
1,067 21.5%
2009 5,313 864
16.3% 575
10.8% 3,197 60.2% 607 11.4%
1,345 25.3% 3,072 57.8% 2,433 45.8%
2010 5,599 871
15.5% 551 9.8% 3,344 59.7% 758 13.5%
1,385 24.7% 3,154 56.3% 2,435 43.5%
2011 5,666 917
16.2% 540 9.5% 3,495 61.7% 640 11.3%
1,426 25.2% 3,213 56.7% 2,522 44.5%
2012 5,516 825
14.9% 551
10.0% 3,565 64.6% 532 9.6%
1,463 26.5% 3,203 58.1%
2,599 47.1%
2013 5,22 647
12.4% 538
10.3% 3,341 64.0% 417 8.0%
1,362 26.1% 3,040 58.2%
2,399 45.9%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: “Earnings poor” families whose annual earned income is below their poverty income threshold. Other sources of income received by these families might
subsequently lift their total income above poverty. Support table for Figure 12.
a. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) made the Child Tax Credit (CTC) partially refundable. Beginning in 2004,
the Census Bureau began modeling the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC), the refundable portion of the CTC, on the CPS/ASEC.

CRS-87

Table C-11. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
All Single Mothers,
1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+
+ EITC
Economic
+ Cash,
Less
Stimulus
Other
FICA
and
than
+ AFDC,
and
Recovery
Total
Child
TANF,
Federal
Payments
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
and
+ Making
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
State
Work
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Pay Tax
Tax
Year Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Credit
Income
1987 8,193
53.9% 49.2% 47.4% 47.1% 46.6% 44.7% 42.3% 42.6%
42.6%
42.6% 39.5%
1988 8,321
53.8% 48.6% 46.5% 46.1% 45.9% 43.9% 42.2% 42.1%
42.1%
42.1% 38.9%
1989 8,400
52.2% 46.8% 44.4% 44.0% 43.7% 41.7% 39.7% 39.9%
39.9%
39.9% 36.3%
1990 8,745
53.8% 49.0% 46.9% 46.6% 46.1% 43.7% 41.5% 41.2%
41.2%
41.2% 37.4%
1991 9,031
55.2% 50.1% 48.3% 47.8% 47.4% 45.4% 42.8% 42.2%
42.2%
42.2% 38.0%
1992 9,567
55.3% 50.8% 48.8% 48.2% 47.4% 45.4% 42.5% 41.7%
41.7%
41.7% 37.5%
1993 9,860
56.2% 50.9% 48.7% 48.1% 47.4% 45.2% 42.7% 41.9%
41.9%
41.9% 37.8%
1994 9,837
53.9% 48.5% 46.5% 46.0% 45.5% 42.7% 39.8% 37.5%
37.5%
37.5% 33.3%
1995 9,887
51.0% 46.4% 43.6% 43.2% 42.3% 40.2% 36.9% 33.4%
33.4%
33.4% 30.0%
1996
10,052
49.8% 45.2% 43.1% 42.6% 41.5% 39.8% 37.1% 33.9%
33.9%
33.9% 30.2%
1997 9,874
50.6% 45.1% 43.0% 42.6% 41.7% 40.0% 37.7% 33.5%
33.5%
33.5% 29.2%
1998 9,881
47.9% 42.6% 40.1% 39.5% 38.8% 37.3% 35.2% 30.8%
30.8%
30.8% 27.3%
1999 9,741
43.6% 38.9% 36.7% 36.3% 35.3% 34.0% 32.2% 28.5%
28.5%
28.5% 24.7%
2000 9,712
40.8% 36.0% 33.9% 33.7% 32.8% 31.8% 30.5% 26.8%
26.8%
26.8% 22.8%
2001
10,044
41.9% 37.6% 34.9% 34.3% 33.3% 32.4% 30.9% 27.2%
27.2%
27.2% 23.4%
2002
10,206
42.2% 37.1% 34.8% 33.8% 32.9% 32.2% 30.5% 26.6%
26.6%
26.6% 23.4%
CRS-88

Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+
+ EITC
Economic
+ Cash,
Less
Stimulus
Other
FICA
and
than
+ AFDC,
and
Recovery
Total
Child
TANF,
Federal
Payments
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
and
+ Making
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
State
Work
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Pay Tax
Tax
Year Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Credit
Income
2003
10,411
42.9% 38.4% 36.1% 35.3% 34.5% 33.9% 32.2% 29.0%
29.0%
29.0% 24.8%
2004
10,442
44.3% 39.6% 37.1% 36.5% 35.7% 34.9% 32.5% 29.9%
29.2%
29.2% 24.8%
2005
10,476
44.0% 39.5% 37.0% 36.4% 35.5% 34.7% 32.6% 28.9%
28.5%
28.5% 24.4%
2006
10,938
44.5% 39.6% 37.5% 36.9% 35.7% 35.1% 32.9% 29.2%
28.7%
28.7% 23.7%
2007
10,748
44.7% 39.4% 37.1% 36.7% 35.8% 35.3% 33.1% 29.1%
28.8%
28.8% 24.4%
2008
10,797
45.9% 40.5% 38.1% 37.3% 36.3% 35.8% 33.3% 29.7%
29.4%
28.3% 23.8%
2009
10,990
48.3% 42.6% 40.3% 38.9% 38.0% 37.6% 33.5% 29.6%
27.9%
27.3% 22.6%
2010
11,185
50.1% 44.4% 42.3% 40.8% 39.9% 39.5% 35.8% 31.3%
30.2%
29.6% 24.8%
2011
11,467
49.4% 44.1% 42.1% 40.9% 40.2% 39.6% 35.7% 30.8%
29.5%
29.5% 25.2%
2012
11,125
49.6% 44.0% 41.9% 41.1% 40.1% 39.8% 35.6% 31.0%
29.6%
29.6% 24.9%
2013
10,970
47.6% 41.9% 39.9% 39.2% 38.3% 38.0% 34.3% 30.7%
29.2%
29.2% 24.0%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 13.
CRS-89

Table C-12. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
Single Mothers Who Worked at Any Time During the Year,
1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+
+ EITC
Economic
+ Cash,
Less
Stimulus
Other
FICA
and
than
+ AFDC,
and
Recovery
Total
Child
TANF,
Federal
Payments
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
and
+ Making
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
State
Work
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Pay Tax
Tax
Year Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Credit
Income
1987 5,518
36.8% 32.3% 30.1% 29.7% 29.4% 28.0% 26.1% 26.1%
26.1%
26.1% 23.4%
1988 5,733
37.5% 32.6% 29.9% 29.4% 29.2% 27.7% 26.5% 26.3%
26.3%
26.3% 23.8%
1989 5,891
35.9% 30.9% 27.9% 27.4% 27.2% 25.7% 23.8% 23.9%
23.9%
23.9% 21.0%
1990 6,108
38.5% 33.7% 31.3% 30.8% 30.4% 28.8% 27.1% 26.4%
26.4%
26.4% 23.5%
1991 6,205
38.8% 33.8% 31.7% 31.0% 30.6% 29.3% 26.9% 26.0%
26.0%
26.0% 22.5%
1992 6,433
38.9% 34.6% 32.2% 31.4% 30.9% 29.4% 27.0% 25.9%
25.9%
25.9% 22.4%
1993 6,717
39.7% 35.0% 32.3% 31.5% 31.0% 29.4% 27.5% 26.1%
26.1%
26.1% 22.6%
1994 7,022
38.8% 33.9% 31.5% 30.9% 30.6% 28.3% 26.0% 22.7%
22.7%
22.7% 19.3%
1995 7,220
37.4% 33.4% 30.0% 29.5% 28.9% 27.3% 24.6% 19.9%
19.9%
19.9% 17.3%
1996 7,548
37.1% 32.6% 30.1% 29.4% 28.8% 27.9% 25.5% 21.1%
21.1%
21.1% 17.9%
1997 7,636
39.0% 34.5% 32.1% 31.6% 31.1% 29.9% 27.8% 22.3%
22.3%
22.3% 18.6%
1998 7,868
38.0% 33.5% 30.7% 30.0% 29.7% 28.3% 26.3% 20.9%
20.9%
20.9% 18.2%
1999 7,986
34.7% 30.9% 28.7% 28.2% 27.6% 26.7% 25.1% 20.6%
20.6%
20.6% 17.7%
2000 8,030
31.6% 27.4% 25.2% 24.9% 24.4% 23.7% 22.6% 18.1%
18.1%
18.1% 15.0%
2001 8,148
31.5% 28.3% 25.3% 24.6% 24.0% 23.4% 22.0% 17.6%
17.6%
17.6% 14.8%
2002 8,193
31.9% 28.0% 25.7% 24.6% 24.1% 23.6% 22.2% 17.3%
17.3%
17.3% 14.8%
CRS-90

Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+
+ EITC
Economic
+ Cash,
Less
Stimulus
Other
FICA
and
than
+ AFDC,
and
Recovery
Total
Child
TANF,
Federal
Payments
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
and
+ Making
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
State
Work
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Pay Tax
Tax
Year Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Credit
Income
2003 8,191
32.0% 28.7% 26.1% 25.2% 24.7% 24.3% 22.8% 18.7%
18.7%
18.7% 15.8%
2004 8,110
32.5% 28.8% 26.4% 25.7% 25.3% 24.9% 22.7% 19.1%
18.4%
18.4% 15.2%
2005 8,124
32.0% 28.5% 25.9% 25.2% 24.7% 24.2% 22.1% 17.1%
16.7%
16.7% 13.7%
2006 8,458
32.6% 28.6% 26.5% 25.9% 25.1% 24.7% 22.6% 17.5%
17.0%
17.0% 13.2%
2007 8,372
33.2% 29.2% 26.6% 26.3% 25.7% 25.3% 23.1% 17.6%
17.3%
17.3% 14.2%
2008 8,301
34.2% 30.1% 27.6% 26.8% 25.9% 25.6% 23.2% 18.3%
18.0%
16.7% 13.7%
2009 8,133
35.6% 30.7% 28.3% 27.1% 26.5% 26.2% 22.5% 17.0%
14.9%
14.2% 11.2%
2010 8,138
36.9% 32.0% 29.5% 28.4% 27.9% 27.6% 24.0% 17.6%
16.1%
15.5% 12.4%
2011 8,451
36.3% 31.7% 29.3% 28.5% 28.1% 27.6% 23.7% 17.1%
15.3%
15.3% 12.7%
2012 8,242
36.9% 32.5% 30.1% 29.3% 28.6% 28.4% 24.1% 17.9%
15.9%
15.9% 13.2%
2013 8,226
35.4% 30.8% 28.5% 28.0% 27.4% 27.3% 24.0% 18.8%
16.9%
16.9% 13.3%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data
Notes: Support table for Figure 14.

CRS-91

Table C-13. Effect of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Family Poverty and Household Low-Income Status,
Single Mothers Who Did Not Work at Any Time During the Year,
1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+
+ EITC
Economic
+ Cash,
Less
Stimulus
Other
FICA
and
than
+ AFDC,
and
Recovery
Total
Child
TANF,
Federal
Payments
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
and
+ Making
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
State
Work
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Pay Tax
Tax
Year Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits
+ SSI
Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Credit
Income
1987 2,676
89.1% 84.2% 83.3% 83.0% 82.1% 79.1% 75.7% 76.5%
76.5%
76.5% 72.9%
1988 2,588
89.8% 84.2% 83.4% 83.3% 82.8% 79.7% 76.8% 77.2%
77.2%
77.2% 72.3%
1989 2,510
90.3% 84.0% 83.0% 83.0% 82.5% 79.5% 76.8% 77.3%
77.3%
77.3% 72.3%
1990 2,637
89.3% 84.2% 83.2% 83.1% 82.3% 78.3% 74.9% 75.4%
75.4%
75.4% 69.5%
1991 2,826
91.2% 85.8% 84.8% 84.6% 84.1% 80.8% 77.6% 77.9%
77.9%
77.9% 72.0%
1992 3,135
89.0% 83.9% 83.0% 82.7% 81.2% 78.1% 74.2% 74.3%
74.3%
74.3% 68.5%
1993 3,144
91.5% 84.9% 83.8% 83.5% 82.6% 78.9% 75.1% 75.6%
75.6%
75.6% 70.3%
1994 2,815
91.5% 84.9% 83.9% 83.7% 82.7% 78.7% 74.2% 74.5%
74.5%
74.5% 68.1%
1995 2,667
87.6% 81.7% 80.5% 80.4% 78.6% 74.9% 70.2% 69.9%
69.9%
69.9% 64.2%
1996 2,504
88.2% 83.3% 82.4% 82.1% 79.5% 75.9% 72.2% 72.5%
72.5%
72.5% 66.9%
1997 2,238
90.1% 81.3% 80.2% 80.1% 77.8% 74.4% 71.5% 71.6%
71.6%
71.6% 65.2%
1998 2,013
86.3% 77.8% 76.6% 76.5% 74.3% 72.5% 69.8% 69.2%
69.2%
69.2% 62.8%
1999 1,755
84.4% 75.3% 73.6% 73.3% 70.8% 67.4% 65.0% 64.9%
64.9%
64.9% 56.5%
2000 1,682
84.8% 77.0% 75.8% 75.5% 72.9% 70.5% 68.3% 68.6%
68.6%
68.6% 60.0%
2001 1,896
86.5% 77.5% 76.1% 75.6% 73.3% 71.2% 69.1% 68.9%
68.9%
68.9% 60.3%
2002 2,013
84.0% 74.0% 72.0% 71.2% 68.7% 66.9% 64.6% 64.9%
64.9%
64.9% 58.5%
CRS-92

Poverty Rates by Income Concept
+
+ EITC
Economic
+ Cash,
Less
Stimulus
Other
FICA
and
than
+ AFDC,
and
Recovery
Total
Child
TANF,
Federal
Payments
House-
Support,
GA
+ Food
and
+ Making
hold
Number
Earned
UI, and
("Official
Stamp /
State
Work
After-
of
Income
Cash
+ Child
+ UI
Poverty
SNAP
Income
+
Pay Tax
Tax
Year Families
Only
Welfare
Support
Benefits +
SSI Rate”)
Benefits
Taxes
ACTC
Credit
Income
2003 2,220
83.1% 74.0% 72.8% 72.5% 70.5% 69.0% 66.8% 66.7%
66.7%
66.7% 58.0%
2004 2,332
85.2% 76.8% 74.4% 73.9% 71.7% 69.9% 66.6% 67.2%
66.7%
66.7% 58.2%
2005 2,352
85.4% 77.8% 75.7% 75.3% 72.7% 71.2% 68.9% 69.7%
69.4%
69.4% 61.3%
2006 2,479
85.0% 76.8% 75.1% 74.4% 72.0% 70.6% 67.9% 68.9%
68.8%
68.8% 59.7%
2007 2,376
85.1% 75.5% 73.9% 73.4% 71.3% 70.3% 68.5% 69.6%
69.5%
69.5% 60.3%
2008 2,496
85.1% 75.0% 72.9% 72.3% 70.6% 69.6% 67.0% 67.5%
67.5%
66.9% 57.3%
2009 2,856
84.7% 76.5% 74.6% 72.6% 70.8% 69.9% 64.7% 65.2%
64.8%
64.5% 55.1%
2010 3,048
85.1% 77.4% 76.2% 73.9% 71.8% 71.3% 67.2% 67.9%
67.6%
67.3% 57.9%
2011 3,016
86.2% 78.7% 77.8% 75.9% 74.3% 73.1% 69.2% 69.3%
69.3%
69.3% 60.0%
2012 2,882
85.8% 76.8% 75.6% 74.7% 73.0% 72.2% 68.6% 68.7%
68.5%
68.5% 58.3%
2013 2,744
84.2% 75.0% 73.8% 72.7% 70.9% 70.0% 65.2% 66.3%
66.1%
66.1% 55.9%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 15.

CRS-93

Table C-14. Single Mothers’ Living Arrangements,
by Mothers’ Work and Welfare Status, 1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Lives with Others

Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
All Single Mothers
1987 8,193 100.0% 5,526 67.4% 2,668 32.6% 1,703 20.8%
590 7.2%
375 4.6%
1988 8,321 100.0% 5,703 68.5% 2,618 31.5% 1,667 20.0%
603 7.3%
348 4.2%
1989 8,400 100.0% 5,681 67.6% 2,720 32.4% 1,650 19.6%
603 7.2%
466 5.6%
1990 8,745 100.0% 5,916 67.7% 2,829 32.3% 1,693 19.4%
695 7.9%
441 5.0%
1991 9,031 100.0% 5,993 66.4% 3,038 33.6% 1,690 18.7%
835 9.2%
512 5.7%
1992 9,567 100.0% 6,294 65.8% 3,273 34.2% 1,872 19.6%
880 9.2%
522 5.5%
1993 9,860 100.0% 6,555 66.5% 3,306 33.5% 1,890 19.2%
849 8.6%
567 5.7%
1994 9,837 100.0% 6,357 64.6% 3,479 35.4% 1,968 20.0%
914 9.3%
597 6.1%
1995 9,887 100.0% 6,347 64.2% 3,536 35.8% 2,030 20.5%
948 9.6%
562 5.7%
1996 10,052 100.0% 6,593 65.6% 3,456 34.4% 1,930 19.2%
945 9.4%
584 5.8%
1997 9,874 100.0% 6,362 64.4% 3,511 35.6% 1,966 19.9%
967 9.8%
580 5.9%
1998 9,881 100.0% 6,497 65.8% 3,382 34.2% 1,884 19.1%
951 9.6%
549 5.6%
1999 9,741 100.0% 6,217 63.8% 3,524 36.2% 1,882 19.3% 1,064 10.9%
578 5.9%
2000 9,712 100.0% 6,160 63.4% 3,552 36.6% 1,913 19.7% 1,076 11.1%
563 5.8%
2001 10,044 100.0% 6,639 66.1% 3,405 33.9% 1,831 18.2%
999 9.9%
574 5.7%
2002 10,206 100.0% 6,714 65.8% 3,492 34.2% 1,825 17.9% 1,050 10.3%
617 6.0%
2003 10,411 100.0% 6,745 64.8% 3,664 35.2% 1,950 18.7% 1,062 10.2%
654 6.3%
2004 10,442 100.0% 6,820 65.3% 3,622 34.7% 1,946 18.6% 1,031 9.9%
646 6.2%
2005 10,476 100.0% 6,866 65.5% 3,610 34.5% 1,882 18.0% 1,103 10.5%
624 6.0%
2006 10,938 100.0% 6,905 63.1% 4,033 36.9% 2,136 19.5% 1,581a 14.5%a 315a 2.9%a
CRS-94

Lives with Others

Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2007 10,748 100.0% 6,791 63.2% 3,957 36.8% 2,101 19.5% 1,581a 14.7%a 275a 2.6%a
2008 10,797 100.0% 6,814 63.1% 3,983 36.9% 2,177 20.2% 1,503a 13.9%a 303a 2.8%a
2009 10,990 100.0% 6,592 60.0% 4,398 40.0% 2,345 21.3% 1,647a 15.0%a
406a 3.7%a
2010 11,185 100.0% 6,738 60.2% 4,447 39.8% 2,277 20.4% 1,806a 16.2%a 364a 3.3%a
2011 11,467 100.0% 6,949 60.6% 4,519 39.4% 2,293 20.0% 1,860a 16.2%a 365a 3.2%a
2012 11,125 100.0% 6,751 60.7% 4,373 39.3% 2,180 19.6% 1,846a 16.6%a 348a 3.1%a
2013 10,970 100.0% 6,556 59.8% 4,414 40.2% 2,227 20.3% 1,833a 16.7%a 354a 3.2%a
Worked
During
the
Year

1987 5,518
100.0% 3,797 68.8% 1,721 31.2% 1,004 18.2%
422 7.7%
295 5.3%
1988 5,733
100.0% 4,048 70.6% 1,685 29.4% 981 17.1%
449 7.8%
255 4.4%
1989 5,891
100.0% 4,059 68.9% 1,832 31.1% 1,025 17.4%
439 7.4%
368 6.2%
1990 6,108
100.0% 4,246 69.5% 1,862 30.5% 1,031 16.9%
506 8.3%
326 5.3%
1991 6,205
100.0% 4,182 67.4% 2,023 32.6% 1,004 16.2%
613 9.9%
406 6.5%
1992 6,433
100.0% 4,398 68.4% 2,035 31.6% 1,044 16.2%
619 9.6%
372 5.8%
1993 6,717
100.0% 4,535 67.5% 2,181 32.5% 1,150 17.1%
607 9.0%
425 6.3%
1994 7,022
100.0% 4,620 65.8% 2,402 34.2% 1,240 17.7%
690 9.8%
472 6.7%
1995 7,220
100.0% 4,755 65.9% 2,465 34.1% 1,286 17.8%
729 10.1%
451 6.2%
1996 7,548
100.0% 5,019 66.5% 2,529 33.5% 1,321 17.5%
772 10.2%
436 5.8%
1997 7,636
100.0% 5,033 65.9% 2,603 34.1% 1,373 18.0%
763 10.0%
467 6.1%
1998 7,868
100.0% 5,336 67.8% 2,532 32.2% 1,287 16.4%
780 9.9%
465 5.9%
1999 7,986
100.0% 5,317 66.6% 2,669 33.4% 1,303 16.3%
891 11.2%
474 5.9%
2000 8,030
100.0% 5,229 65.1% 2,801 34.9% 1,433 17.8%
899 11.2%
469 5.8%
2001 8,148
100.0% 5,521 67.8% 2,627 32.2% 1,328 16.3%
802 9.8%
497 6.1%
2002 8,193
100.0% 5,517 67.3% 2,675 32.7% 1,283 15.7%
863 10.5%
529 6.5%
CRS-95

Lives with Others

Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2003 8,191
100.0% 5,528 67.5% 2,662 32.5% 1,331 16.2%
809 9.9%
523 6.4%
2004 8,110
100.0% 5,493 67.7% 2,617 32.3% 1,285 15.8%
820 10.1%
511 6.3%
2005 8,124
100.0% 5,496 67.7% 2,628 32.3% 1,277 15.7%
846 10.4%
505 6.2%
2006 8,458
100.0% 5,558 65.7% 2,900 34.3% 1,436 17.0% 1,226a 14.5%a 238a 2.8%a
2007 8,372
100.0% 5,551 66.3% 2,822 33.7% 1,409 16.8% 1,192a 14.2%a 220a 2.6%a
2008 8,301
100.0% 5,504 66.3% 2,797 33.7% 1,445 17.4% 1,119a 13.5%a 233a 2.8%a
2009 8,133
100.0% 5,133 63.1% 3,001 36.9% 1,508 18.5% 1,189a 14.6%a 304a 3.7%a
2010 8,138
100.0% 5,198 63.9% 2,940 36.1% 1,407 17.3% 1,257a 15.4%a 276a 3.4%a
2011 8,451
100.0% 5,374 63.6% 3,077 36.4% 1,491 17.6% 1,334a 15.8%a 252a 3.0%a
2012 8,242
100.0% 5,264 63.9% 2,978 36.1% 1,394 16.9% 1,313a 15.9%a 271a 3.3%a
2013 8,226
100.0% 5,169 62.8% 3,056 37.2% 1,441 17.5% 1,344a 16.3%a 270a 3.3%a
Did Not Work During Year

1987 2,676 100.0% 1,729 64.6% 947 35.4% 699 26.1%
168 6.3%
80 3.0%
1988 2,588 100.0% 1,655 64.0% 933 36.0% 686 26.5%
154 6.0%
93 3.6%
1989 2,510 100.0% 1,622 64.6% 888 35.4% 624 24.9%
165 6.6%
98 3.9%
1990 2,637 100.0% 1,671 63.4% 966 36.6% 662 25.1%
189 7.2%
115 4.3%
1991 2,826 100.0% 1,811 64.1% 1,015 35.9% 687 24.3%
222 7.8%
106 3.8%
1992 3,135 100.0% 1,897 60.5% 1,238 39.5% 828 26.4%
260 8.3%
150 4.8%
1993 3,144 100.0% 2,020 64.2% 1,124 35.8% 740 23.5%
242 7.7%
142 4.5%
1994 2,815 100.0% 1,737 61.7% 1,078 38.3% 728 25.9%
224 7.9%
126 4.5%
1995 2,667 100.0% 1,592 59.7% 1,075 40.3% 744 27.9%
219 8.2%
111 4.2%
1996 2,504 100.0% 1,574 62.9% 930 37.1% 609 24.3%
173 6.9%
148 5.9%
1997 2,238 100.0% 1,329 59.4% 910 40.6% 593 26.5%
204 9.1%
113 5.1%
1998 2,013 100.0% 1,161 57.7% 852 42.3% 597 29.7%
171 8.5%
84 4.1%
CRS-96

Lives with Others

Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1999 1,755 100.0% 900 51.3% 855 48.7% 578 33.0%
172 9.8%
104 5.9%
2000 1,682 100.0% 931 55.3% 751 44.7% 481 28.6%
177 10.5%
94 5.6%
2001 1,896 100.0% 1,119 59.0% 777 41.0% 503 26.5%
197 10.4%
77 4.1%
2002 2,013 100.0% 1,196 59.4% 817 40.6% 542 26.9%
187 9.3%
88 4.4%
2003 2,220 100.0% 1,216 54.8% 1,004 45.2% 620 27.9%
253 11.4%
131 5.9%
2004 2,332 100.0% 1,327 56.9% 1,005 43.1% 660 28.3%
210 9.0%
135 5.8%
2005 2,352 100.0% 1,370 58.2% 982 41.8% 606 25.8%
257 10.9%
119 5.1%
2006 2,479 100.0% 1,347 54.3% 1,133 45.7% 701 28.3%
355a 14.3%a 77a 3.1%a
2007 2,376 100.0% 1,241 52.2% 1,135 47.8% 692 29.1%
388a 16.3%a 55a 2.3%a
2008 2,496 100.0% 1,310 52.5% 1,186 47.5% 733 29.3%
384a 15.4%a 70a 2.8%a
2009 2,856 100.0% 1,459 51.1% 1,397 48.9% 837 29.3%
458a 16.0%a 102a 3.6%a
2010 3,048 100.0% 1,540 50.5% 1,508 49.5% 870 28.5%
549a 18.0%a 88a 2.9%a
2011 3,016 100.0% 1,575 52.2% 1,441 47.8% 802 26.6%
526a 17.4%a 113a 3.8%a
2012 2,882 100.0% 1,478 51.6% 1,395 48.4% 786 27.3%
533a 18.5%a 77a 2.7%a
2013 2,744 100.0% 1,387 50.5% 1,358 49.5% 785 28.6%
489a 17.8%a 84a 3.1%a
Received Welfare During the Year

1987 2,905 100.0% 1,995 68.7% 910 31.3% 654 22.5%
156 5.4%
99 3.4%
1988 2,919 100.0% 2,074 71.0% 845 29.0% 614 21.0%
174 6.0%
57 2.0%
1989 2,717 100.0% 1,908 70.2% 809 29.8% 552 20.3%
154 5.7%
103 3.8%
1990 3,081 100.0% 2,137 69.4% 944 30.6% 655 21.3%
196 6.4%
92 3.0%
1991 3,296 100.0% 2,225 67.5% 1,071 32.5% 696 21.1%
241 7.3%
135 4.1%
1992 3,545 100.0% 2,399 67.7% 1,146 32.3% 769 21.7%
234 6.6%
142 4.0%
1993 3,757 100.0% 2,561 68.2% 1,197 31.8% 742 19.7%
269 7.2%
185 4.9%
1994 3,470 100.0% 2,330 67.2% 1,140 32.8% 702 20.2%
306 8.8%
132 3.8%
CRS-97

Lives with Others

Independent
Total
Families
Total
Extended Families
Cohabitinga
Unrelated Familiesa
Year Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1995 3,247 100.0% 2,102 64.7% 1,145 35.3% 770 23.7%
260 8.0%
114 3.5%
1996 3,075 100.0% 2,079 67.6% 996 32.4% 640 20.8%
212 6.9%
144 4.7%
1997 2,646 100.0% 1,764 66.7% 882 33.3% 573 21.7%
195 7.4%
114 4.3%
1998 2,265 100.0% 1,636 72.2% 629 27.8% 386 17.0%
159 7.0%
85 3.7%
1999 1,950 100.0% 1,258 64.5% 692 35.5% 452 23.2%
150 7.7%
90 4.6%
2000 1,647 100.0% 1,122 68.2% 524 31.8% 357 21.7%
124 7.5%
44 2.7%
2001 1,524 100.0% 1,031 67.6% 493 32.4% 335 22.0%
102 6.7%
57 3.7%
2002 1,464 100.0% 1,017 69.5% 447 30.5% 298 20.4%
102 6.9%
47 3.2%
2003 1,673 100.0% 1,143 68.3% 530 31.7% 348 20.8%
136 8.1%
46 2.8%
2004 1,592 100.0% 1,087 68.3% 505 31.7% 353 22.2%
87 5.5%
65 4.1%
2005 1,617 100.0% 1,153 71.3% 464 28.7% 284 17.6%
116 7.1%
64 4.0%
2006 1,526 100.0% 1,068 70.0% 458 30.0% 256 16.8%
176a 11.5%a 27a 1.7%a
2007 1,419 100.0% 972 68.5% 447 31.5% 316 22.2%
105a 7.4%a 27a 1.9%a
2008 1,507 100.0% 1,031 68.4% 476 31.6% 298 19.8%
145a 9.6%a 33a 2.2%a
2009 1,527 100.0% 950 62.2% 577 37.8% 363 23.8%
169a 11.1%a 45a 3.0%a
2010 1,552 100.0% 998 64.3% 554 35.7% 335 21.6%
186a 12.0%a 33a 2.1%a
2011 1,658 100.0% 997 60.1% 661 39.9% 431 26.0%
181a 10.9%a 49a 2.9%a
2012 1,500 100.0% 953 63.6% 547 36.4% 351 23.4%
170a 11.3%a 26a 1.7%a
2013 1,369 100.0% 807 59.0% 562 41.0% 378 27.6%
152a 11.1%a 33a 2.4%a
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: Independent families are families headed by a single mother with no other members other than her children. Extended families include mothers and their children
who live with other family members. Cohabiting mothers live with another unrelated member who is identified or inferred to be a co-resident partner. Mothers in
unrelated families co-reside with other unrelated household members, other than those identified or inferred to be a cohabiting partner.
Support table for Figure 17.
CRS-98

a. Beginning with the 2007 CPS/ASEC, cohabiting couples are identifiable based on self-report. In earlier years, cohabiting couples are identifiable indirectly by inference.
The method used here, for CPS/ASEC years before 2007, is based on households with two unmarried adults, who are unrelated and of the opposite sex, and no other
adults reside in the household. As a result, estimates for single mothers who are cohabiting or in unrelated families in CPS/ASEC years 2007 and after are not
comparable to earlier years.

Table C-15. Single Mothers’ Work Status During the Year and Self-Reported Reason for Not Working,
by Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA SSI) Receipt, 1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct. Num. Pct. Num.
Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1987 8,193 5,518 67.3% 2,676 32.7% 100.0%
285 10.7%
1,724
64.4%
283 10.6%
309 11.5%
65 2.4%
1988 8,321 5,733 68.9% 2,588 31.1% 100.0%
235 9.1%
1,759
68.0%
271 10.5%
244
9.4%
72 2.8%
1989 8,400 5,891 70.1% 2,510 29.9% 100.0%
227 9.0%
1,744
69.5%
272 10.8%
186
7.4%
81 3.2%
1990 8,745 6,108 69.8% 2,637 30.2% 100.0%
286 10.9%
1,831
69.5%
276 10.5%
160
6.1%
83 3.2%
1991 9,031 6,205 68.7% 2,826 31.3% 100.0%
243 8.6%
1,928
68.2%
315 11.1%
245
8.7%
95 3.4%
1992 9,567 6,433 67.2% 3,135 32.8% 100.0%
364 11.6%
2,011
64.2%
398 12.7%
278
8.9%
84 2.7%
1993 9,860 6,717 68.1% 3,144 31.9% 100.0%
434 13.8%
1,960
62.4%
443 14.1%
225
7.1%
77 2.5%
1994 9,837 7,022 71.4% 2,815 28.6% 100.0%
470 16.7%
1,626
57.8%
462 16.4%
177
6.3%
79 2.8%
1995 9,887 7,220 73.0% 2,667 27.0% 100.0%
491 18.4%
1,531
57.4%
400 15.0%
163
6.1%
81 3.0%
1996 10,052 7,548 75.1% 2,504 24.9% 100.0%
501 20.0%
1,349
53.9%
375 15.0%
183
7.3%
97 3.9%
1997 9,874 7,636 77.3% 2,238 22.7% 100.0%
446 19.9%
1,197
53.5%
331 14.8%
164
7.3%
100 4.5%
1998 9,881 7,868 79.6% 2,013 20.4% 100.0%
419 20.8%
1,038
51.5%
361 17.9%
113
5.6%
83 4.1%
1999 9,741 7,986 82.0% 1,755 18.0% 100.0%
444 25.3%
875
49.9%
311 17.7%
55
3.1%
67 3.8%
2000 9,712 8,030 82.7% 1,682 17.3% 100.0%
442 26.3%
911
54.2%
223 13.3%
48
2.9%
57 3.4%
2001 10,044 8,148 81.1% 1,896 18.9% 100.0%
527 27.8%
974
51.4%
228 12.0%
89
4.7%
78 4.1%
CRS-99

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2002 10,206 8,193 80.3% 2,013 19.7% 100.0%
540 26.8%
989
49.1%
285 14.1%
116
5.8%
83 4.1%
2003 10,411 8,191 78.7% 2,220 21.3% 100.0%
574 25.8%
1,093
49.2%
351 15.8%
130
5.9%
73 3.3%
2004 10,442 8,110 77.7% 2,332 22.3% 100.0%
614 26.3%
1,176
50.4%
328 14.1%
133
5.7%
80 3.4%
2005 10,476 8,124 77.6% 2,352 22.4% 100.0%
616 26.2%
1,257
53.4%
292 12.4%
98
4.2%
90 3.8%
2006 10,938 8,458 77.3% 2,479 22.7% 100.0%
689 27.8%
1,245
50.2%
342 13.8%
96
3.9%
108 4.4%
2007 10,748 8,372 77.9% 2,376 22.1% 100.0%
633 26.6%
1,248
52.5%
283 11.9%
95
4.0%
118 5.0%
2008 10,797 8,301 76.9% 2,496 23.1% 100.0%
650 26.0%
1,243
49.8%
356 14.2%
157
6.3%
90 3.6%
2009 10,990 8,133 74.0% 2,856 26.0% 100.0%
679 23.8%
1,292
45.2%
398 13.9%
382 13.4%
105 3.7%
2010 11,185 8,138 72.8% 3,048 28.2% 100.0%
678 22.2%
1,394
45.7%
435 14.3%
421 13.8%
121 4.0%
2011 11,467 8,451 73.7% 3,016 26.3% 100.0%
634 21.0%
1,422
47.1%
423 14.0%
420 13.9%
116 3.8%
2012 11,125 8,242 74.1% 2.882 25.9% 100.0%
672 23.3%
1,333
46.2%
381 13.2%
362 12.6%
135 4.7%
2013 10,970 8,226 75.0% 2,744 25.0% 100.0%
654 23.8%
1,280
46.6%
385 14.0%
325 11.9%
101 3,7%
Did Not Receive Cash Welfare
1987 5,288 4,511 85.3% 778 14.7% 100.0%
84 10.7%
456
58.7%
124 16.0%
75
9.7%
28 3.6%
1988 5,402 4,651 86.1% 751 13.9% 100.0%
74 9.8%
427
56.8%
134 17.9%
58
7.7%
52 7.0%
1989 5,683 4,930 86.7% 754 13.3% 100.0%
75 10.0%
492
65.2%
100 13.2%
42
5.6%
45 5.9%
1990 5,664 4,945 87.3% 719 12.7% 100.0%
67 9.3%
469
65.2%
90 12.6%
39
5.4%
54 7.5%
1991 5,735 5,005 87.3% 730 12.7% 100.0%
69 9.4%
454
62.2%
98 13.4%
72
9.8%
38 5.2%
1992 6,022 5,146 85.4% 876 14.6% 100.0%
102 11.7%
508
58.0%
155 17.7%
71
8.1%
40 4.6%
1993 6,103 5,237 85.8% 866 14.2% 100.0%
124 14.3%
490
56.6%
157 18.1%
45
5.2%
45 5.2%
1994 6,367 5,549 87.2% 817 12.8% 100.0%
130 15.9%
445
54.4%
171 20.9%
38
4.6%
34 4.2%
1995 6,640 5,798 87.3% 842 12.7% 100.0%
119 14.2%
473
56.2%
150 17.8%
53
6.3%
46 5.5%
CRS-100

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1996 6,976 6,118 87.7% 858 12.3% 100.0%
108 12.6%
463
54.0%
173 20.2%
66
7.7%
48 5.6%
1997 7,228 6,313 87.3% 916 12.7% 100.0%
121 13.2%
516
56.4%
160 17.4%
60
6.6%
59 6.5%
1998 7,616 6,628 87.0% 989 13.0% 100.0%
162 16.4%
523
52.8%
204 20.6%
42
4.3%
58 5.9%
1999 7,791 6,859 88.0% 933 12.0% 100.0%
172 18.5%
499
53.5%
174 18.7%
31
3.3%
54 5.8%
2000 8,065 7,105 88.1% 961 11.9% 100.0%
176 18.3%
558
58.1%
159 16.6%
22
2.3%
46 4.7%
2001 8,520 7,342 86.2% 1,178 13.8% 100.0%
216 18.3%
655
55.6%
175 14.9%
66
5.6%
67 5.7%
2002 8,741 7,453 85.3% 1,288 14.7% 100.0%
234 18.2%
709
55.0%
212 16.5%
61
4.8%
71 5.5%
2003 8,738 7,397 84.7% 1,341 15.3% 100.0%
230 17.1%
726
54.2%
242 18.1%
86
6.4%
56 4.2%
2004 8,850 7,334 82.9% 1,516 17.1% 100.0%
305 20.1%
818
54.0%
241 15.9%
86
5.7%
66 4.3%
2005 8,859 7,379 83.3% 1,480 16.7% 100.0%
275 18.5%
881
59.5%
214 14.5%
48
3.3%
62 4.2%
2006 9,411 7,723 82.1% 1,688 17.9% 100.0%
354 21.0%
910
53.9%
266 15.8%
67
4.0%
90 5.3%
2007 9,329 7,693 82.5% 1,636 17.5% 100.0%
300 18.4%
946
57.8%
225 13.8%
62
3.8%
103 6.3%
2008 9,290 7,545 81.2% 1,745 18.8% 100.0%
341 19.5%
929
53.2%
298 17.1%
102
5.8%
76 4.3%
2009 9,463 7,486 79.1% 1,976 20.9% 100.0%
346 17.5%
939
47.5%
312 15.8%
290 14.7%
89 4.5%
2010 9,634 7,478 77.6% 2,156 22.4% 100.0%
360 16.7%
1,052
48.8%
354 16.4%
303 14.0%
88 4.1%
2011 9,809 7,701 78.5% 2,108 21.5% 100.0%
297 14.1%
1,078
51.1%
322 15.3%
312 14.8%
99 4.7%
2012 9,625 7,598 78.9% 2,027 21.1% 100.0%
364 18.0%
972
47.9%
298 14.7%
289 14.3%
103 5.1%
2013 9,601 7,643 79.6% 1,959 20.4% 100.0%
376 19.25
970
49.5%
308 15.7%
216 11.0%
89 4.5%
Received Cash Welfare (AFDC/TANF/GA or SSI)
1987 2,905 1,007 34.7% 1,898 65.3% 100.0%
202 10.6%
1,267
66.8%
159 8.4%
233 12.3%
37 1.9%
1988 2,919 1,083 37.1% 1,836 62.9% 100.0%
162 8.8%
1,332
72.5%
137 7.4%
186 10.1%
20 1.1%
1989 2,717 961 35.4% 1,756 64.6% 100.0%
152 8.6%
1,253
71.3%
172 9.8%
144
8.2%
36 2.1%
CRS-101

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1990 3,081 1,163 37.7% 1,918 62.3% 100.0%
219 11.4%
1,363
71.0%
186 9.7%
121
6.3%
30 1.6%
1991 3,296 1,200 36.4% 2,096 63.6% 100.0%
175 8.3%
1,474
70.3%
217 10.4%
173
8.3%
57 2.7%
1992 3,545 1,286 36.3% 2,258 63.7% 100.0%
262 11.6%
1,503
66.6%
242 10.7%
207
9.2%
44 1.9%
1993 3,757 1,480 39.4% 2,278 60.6% 100.0%
310 13.6%
1,470
64.5%
286 12.5%
179
7.9%
33 1.4%
1994 3,470 1,473 42.4% 1,997 57.6% 100.0%
339 17.0%
1,182
59.2%
292 14.6%
139
7.0%
45 2.3%
1995 3,247 1,422 43.8% 1,825 56.2% 100.0%
372 20.4%
1,058
58.0%
250 13.7%
110
6.0%
35 1.9%
1996 3,075 1,430 46.5% 1,645 53.5% 100.0%
393 23.9%
886
53.8%
201 12.2%
117
7.1%
49 3.0%
1997 2,646 1,324 50.0% 1,323 50.0% 100.0%
326 24.6%
681
51.5%
171 12.9%
104
7.9%
41 3.1%
1998 2,265 1,240 54.8% 1,025 45.2% 100.0%
257 25.1%
515
50.3%
157 15.3%
70
6.9%
25 2.5%
1999 1,950 1,128 57.8% 822 42.2% 100.0%
272 33.1%
376
45.7%
137 16.7%
24
2.9%
13 1.6%
2000 1,647 925 56.2% 721 43.8% 100.0%
266 36.9%
353
49.0%
64 8.9%
26
3.6%
12 1.6%
2001 1,524 806 52.9% 718 47.1% 100.0%
312 43.4%
319
44.4%
53 7.4%
23
3.2%
12 1.7%
2002 1,464 739 50.5% 725 49.5% 100.0%
306 42.2%
280
38.6%
72 10.0%
55
7.5%
12 1.7%
2003 1,673 793 47.4% 880 52.6% 100.0%
344 39.1%
366
41.6%
109 12.4%
44
5.0%
17 1.9%
2004 1,592 776 48.8% 815 51.2% 100.0%
309 37.9%
358
43.9%
87 10.6%
47
5.8%
14 1.8%
2005 1,617 745 46.1% 871 53.9% 100.0%
341 39.1%
376
43.1%
77 8.9%
49
5.7%
28 3.2%
2006 1,526 735 48.2% 791 51.8% 100.0%
335 42.4%
334
42.2%
76 9.6%
28
3.6%
18 2.2%
2007 1,419 679 47.9% 740 52.1% 100.0%
332 44.9%
302
40.8%
58 7.9%
32
4.4%
15 2.1%
2008 1,507 756 50.2% 751 49.8% 100.0%
309 41.2%
314
41.9%
58 7.7%
55
7.3%
14 1.9%
2009 1,527 647 42.4% 880 57.6% 100.0%
333 37.9%
353
40.1%
86 9.8%
92 10.5%
16 1.9%
2010 1,552 660 42.5% 892 57.5% 100.0%
318 35.6%
342
38.4%
81 9.1%
118 13.3%
32 3.6%
2011 1,658 750 45.3% 908 54.7% 100.0%
337 37.1%
344
37.9%
101 11.2%
108 11.9%
17 1.8%
CRS-102

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2012 1,500 644 42.9% 856 57.1% 100.0%
308 36.0%
361
42.2%
82 9.6%
73
8.5%
32 3.7%
2013 1,369 583 42.6% 786 57.4% 100.0%
277 35,3%
319
39.4%
77 9.8%
109 13.9%
13 1.6%
Received AFDC/TANF/GA Only
1987 2,493 887 35.6% 1,606 64.4% 100.0%
111 6.9%
1,117
69.6%
138 8.6%
212 13.2%
26 1.6%
1988 2,536 935 36.9% 1,600 63.1% 100.0%
88 5.5%
1,200
75.0%
133 8.3%
164 10.2%
15 0.9%
1989 2,313 817 35.3% 1,496 64.7% 100.0%
92 6.2%
1,113
74.4%
147 9.8%
121
8.1%
23 1.5%
1990 2,651 1,013 38.2% 1,638 61.8% 100.0%
106 6.5%
1,235
75.4%
164 10.0%
109
6.6%
25 1.5%
1991 2,822 1,036 36.7% 1,786 63.3% 100.0%
90 5.0%
1,308
73.3%
190 10.6%
157
8.8%
41 2.3%
1992 2,990 1,095 36.6% 1,895 63.4% 100.0%
133 7.0%
1,331
70.3%
221 11.7%
172
9.1%
37 2.0%
1993 3,010 1,198 39.8% 1,812 60.2% 100.0%
145 8.0%
1,248
68.9%
240 13.2%
153
8.4%
26 1.4%
1994 2,745 1,228 44.7% 1,517 55.3% 100.0%
124 8.1%
994
65.5%
247 16.3%
117
7.7%
37 2.4%
1995 2,525 1,157 45.8% 1,368 54.2% 100.0%
156 11.4%
859
62.8%
230 16.8%
99
7.2%
24 1.8%
1996 2,321 1,129 48.7% 1,191 51.3% 100.0%
157 13.2%
699
58.7%
179 15.1%
111
9.3%
45 3.7%
1997 1,923 1,017 52.9% 906 47.1% 100.0%
106 11.7%
539
59.5%
131 14.5%
94 10.4%
36 3.9%
1998 1,604 984 61.3% 620 38.7% 100.0%
61 9.9%
374
60.4%
118 19.0%
56
9.1%
10 1.7%
1999 1,331 839 63.0% 492 37.0% 100.0%
96 19.4%
267
54.3%
107 21.7%
12
2.4%
11 2.2%
2000 1,033 642 62.1% 391 37.9% 100.0%
60 15.3%
256
65.5%
49 12.5%
20
5.1%
6 1.6%
2001
894 516 57.8% 377 42.2% 100.0%
80 21.3%
229
60.6%
42 11.2%
18
4.7%
8 2.1%
2002
874 500 57.2% 374 42.8% 100.0%
72 19.2%
192
51.5%
57 15.2%
45 12.1%
7 2.0%
2003 1,073 568 52.9% 505 47.1% 100.0%
95 18.8%
296
58.6%
75 14.9%
27
5.4%
12 2.4%
2004
888 481 54.1% 407 45.9% 100.0%
61 15.1%
253
62.1%
53 13.0%
35
8.7%
4 1.0%
2005
917 486 53.0% 431 47.0% 100.0%
93 21.6%
233
54.1%
63 14.5%
32
7.4%
10 2.3%
CRS-103

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2006
833 456 54.7% 377 45.3% 100.0%
92 24.5%
207
54.8%
49 12.9%
21
5.4%
9 2.3%
2007
751 417 55.6% 334 44.4% 100.0%
81 24.3%
177
53.0%
44 13.2%
21
6.3%
11 3.3%
2008
844 467 55.3% 377 44.7% 100.0%
76 20.1%
219
58.2%
42 11.1%
32
8.4%
8 2.2%
2009
811 360 44.4% 451 55.6% 100.0%
91 20.2%
228
50.4%
52 11.4%
69 15.3%
11 2.5%
2010
876 407 46.5% 469 53.5% 100.0%
80 17.0%
221
47.1%
49 10.5%
97 20.8%
21 4.6%
2011
951 459 48.3% 492 51.7% 100.0%
81 16.4%
247
50.1%
73 14.8%
81 16.5%
11 2.2%
2012
802 375 46.7% 427 53.3% 100.0%
70 16.4%
244
57.1%
48 11.2%
48 11.3%
17 3.9%
2013
690 321 46.6% 369 53.4% 100.0%
54 14.8%
190
51.5%
47 12.8%
69 18.8%
8 2.1%
Received SSI Only
1987
186
70 37.4% 117 62.6% 100.0%
30 25.5%
60
51.4%
14 12.1%
10
8.9%
2 2.0%
1988
182 104 57.0%
78 43.0% 100.0%
26 33.7%
43
55.3%
2 2.7%
2
2.0%
5 6.2%
1989
180 111 61.5%
69 38.5% 100.0%
10 14.3%
33
47.7%
11 15.7%
10 15.0%
5 7.3%
1990
179
91 50.6%
89 49.4% 100.0%
35 39.7%
43
49.0%
9 10.5%
1
0.8%
0 0.0%
1991
195
90 46.3% 105 53.7% 100.0%
26 25.0%
48
45.8%
15 14.1%
3
2.9%
13 12.2%
1992
244 114 46.8% 130 53.2% 100.0%
60 45.9%
46
35.4%
5 3.8%
17 12.7%
3 2.3%
1993
318 183 57.6% 135 42.4% 100.0%
70 51.5%
42
31.4%
13 9.7%
8
5.9%
2 1.5%
1994
304 156 51.5% 147 48.5% 100.0%
69 47.1%
65
44.0%
7 4.6%
4
2.9%
2 1.5%
1995
385 192 50.0% 193 50.0% 100.0%
97 50.2%
78
40.7%
6 3.3%
4
1.9%
8 4.0%
1996
406 225 55.4% 181 44.6% 100.0%
99 54.8%
73
40.6%
3 1.4%
3
1.7%
3 1.5%
1997
421 223 53.0% 198 47.0% 100.0%
111 56.2%
54
27.5%
23 11.7%
4
1.9%
5 2.7%
1998
393 187 47.7% 205 52.3% 100.0%
121 59.1%
59
28.6%
8 4.1%
4
1.8%
13 6.4%
1999
406 222 54.7% 184 45.3% 100.0%
93 50.7%
69
37.7%
12 6.3%
10
5.2%
0 0.0%
CRS-104

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2000
431 227 52.7% 204 47.3% 100.0%
122 59.8%
63
30.9%
11 5.5%
5
2.3%
3 1.5%
2001
461 253 54.9% 208 45.1% 100.0%
135 65.1%
56
27.0%
8 3.9%
5
2.3%
4 1.8%
2002
440 188 42.7% 252 57.3% 100.0%
165 65.5%
68
27.2%
10 3.9%
3
1.4%
5 2.0%
2003
421 180 42.7% 241 57.3% 100.0%
165 68.5%
45
18.7%
21 8.9%
6
2.5%
4 1.5%
2004
537 261 48.6% 276 51.4% 100.0%
163 59.0%
74
26.9%
28 10.0%
3
1.2%
8 2.9%
2005
515 228 44.2% 287 55.8% 100.0%
159 55.5%
97
33.6%
12 4.1%
7
2.3%
13 4.6%
2006
536 252 47.0% 284 53.0% 100.0%
177 62.4%
77
27.0%
18 6.4%
3
1.0%
9 3.1%
2007
542 238 44.0% 303 56.0% 100.0%
185 61.0%
96
31.6%
10 3.3%
8
2.7%
4 1.4%
2008
533 257 48.3% 276 51.7% 100.0%
170 61.8%
68
24.6%
16 5.9%
16
5.8%
5 1.9%
2009
560 249 44.5% 311 55.5% 100.0%
168 54.0%
95
30.7%
27 8.8%
15
4.9%
5 1.6%
2010
543 225 41.5% 318 58.5% 100.0%
165 51.8%
103
32.4%
24 7.6%
18
5.8%
8 2.4%
2011
569 266 46.8% 303 53.2% 100.0%
188 62.0%
65
21.3%
21 6.8%
24
7.9%
6 2.0%
2012
538 239 44.5% 299 55.5% 100.0%
169 56.5%
81
27.2%
22 7.4%
15
5.1%
11 3.8%
2013
573 247 43.1% 327 56.9% 100.0%
185 56.6%
90
27.6%
23 7.0%
24
7.2%
5 1.5%
Received AFDC/TANF/GA and SSI
1987
226
51 22.4% 175 77.6% 100.0%
61 34.7%
90
51.2%
6 3.5%
11
6.1%
8 4.4%
1988
201
43 21.5% 158 78.5% 100.0%
47 29.8%
89
56.2%
1 0.7%
21 13.3%
0 0.0%
1989
224
34 15.0% 191 85.0% 100.0%
50 26.0%
106
55.7%
14 7.3%
13
6.6%
8 4.4%
1990
251
59 23.5% 192 76.5% 100.0%
78 40.7%
85
44.1%
13 6.6%
11
6.0%
5 2.7%
1991
279
74 26.5% 205 73.5% 100.0%
59 28.6%
118
57.3%
13 6.1%
13
6.4%
3 1.5%
1992
311
77 24.8% 234 75.2% 100.0%
69 29.5%
126
53.8%
17 7.1%
19
8.0%
4 1.5%
1993
429
99 23.0% 331 77.0% 100.0%
95 28.7%
180
54.4%
33 9.9%
19
5.6%
5 1.5%
CRS-105

Did Not Work During the Year—Primary Reason for Not Working
Ill or
Taking Care of Home
Attending
Could Not Find
Retired or

Worked
Total
Disabled
or Family
School
Work
Other
Sub-
total
Year Total Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1994
421
89 21.1% 333 78.9% 100.0%
146 44.0%
123
37.0%
38 11.5%
19
5.6%
6 1.9%
1995
337
73 21.6% 264 78.4% 100.0%
119 45.0%
121
45.8%
14 5.3%
7
2.7%
3 1.2%
1996
348
75 21.6% 273 78.4% 100.0%
137 50.1%
113
41.3%
19 7.1%
3
1.1%
1 0.4%
1997
302
83 27.5% 219 72.5% 100.0%
109 49.7%
87
39.7%
17 7.8%
6
2.8%
0 0.0%
1998
268
69 25.8% 199 74.2% 100.0%
74 37.4%
82
41.2%
31 15.4%
10
5.2%
2 0.8%
1999
213
66 31.2% 146 68.8% 100.0%
83 57.0%
39
26.9%
19 12.7%
2
1.7%
2 1.6%
2000
183
57 31.0% 126 69.0% 100.0%
84 66.9%
34
26.9%
4 3.0%
2
1.2%
2 1.9%
2001
170
37 21.5% 133 78.5% 100.0%
96 72.0%
34
25.9%
3 2.0%
0
0.2%
0 0.0%
2002
151
51 33.9% 100 66.1% 100.0%
69 69.3%
19
18.8%
6 5.7%
6
6.1%
0 0.0%
2003
180
46 25.5% 134 74.5% 100.0%
84 62.9%
26
19.2%
12 9.2%
11
7.9%
1 0.8%
2004
167
35 20.8% 132 79.2% 100.0%
84 64.1%
31
23.5%
6 4.4%
8
6.4%
2 1.6%
2005
184
31 16.9% 153 83.1% 100.0%
89 57.9%
46
29.8%
3 2.0%
11
7.0%
5 3.3%
2006
158
28 17.6% 130 82.4% 100.0%
66 50.5%
50
38.8%
9 6.8%
5
3.8%
0 0.0%
2007
126
24 18.7% 103 81.3% 100.0%
66 64.5%
29
28.3%
4 4.1%
3
3.1%
0 0.0%
2008
130
32 24.4%
99 75.6% 100.0%
63 63.9%
27
27.8%
0 0.0%
7
7.5%
1 0.8%
2009
156
38 24.2% 119 75.8% 100.0%
74 62.7%
30
25.1%
7 5.8%
8
6.4%
0 0.0%
2010
133
27 20.6% 105 79.4% 100.0%
74 69.7%
19
17.7%
7 7.1%
2
2.2%
3 3.2%
2011
137
25 18.0% 113 82.0% 100.0%
68 60.4%
33
29.2%
8 7.3%
4
3.1%
0 0.0%
2012
160
30 18.7% 130 81.3% 100.0%
69 53.3%
36
27.6%
12 9.5%
9
6.9%
4 2,7%
2013
106
15 14.3%
91 85.7% 100.0%
38 42.1%
29
32.55
7 7.3%
16 18.1%
0 0.0%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 18 and Figure 19.
CRS-106

Table C-16. Poverty Status of Children in Female-Headed Families Under Selected Income Measures,
1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)
Poor Based on Cash
Income Plus Food
Stamp/SNAP Benefits,
EITC and ACTC Net
Below Household
Poor Based on Total
of Federal and State
Low-Income
Cash Income
Income Taxes, Plus
Threshold Based on
Poor Based on Earned
“Official” Poverty
Stimulus and Recovery
Total Household

Income Only
Measure
Payments
Income
Year Total Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
1987 13,617 8,360 61.4% 7,081 52.0%
6,822 50.1% 6,437 47.3%
1988 13,700 8,406 61.4% 7,088 51.7%
6,827 49.8% 6,453 47.1%
1989 13,874 8,310 59.9% 6,904 49.8%
6,582 47.4% 6,083 43.8%
1990 14,608 9,003 61.6% 7,615 52.1%
7,258 49.7% 6,712 45.9%
1991 15,396 9,682 62.9% 8,223 53.4%
7,712 50.1% 7,092 46.1%
1992 15,586 9,724 62.4% 8,252 52.9%
7,660 49.1% 7,042 45.2%
1993 16,338 10,311 63.1% 8,532 52.2%
8,026 49.1% 7,346 45.0%
1994 16,480 10,132 61.5% 8,367 50.8%
7,444 45.2% 6,791 41.2%
1995 16,993 10,038 59.1% 8,221 48.4%
7,002 41.2% 6,457 38.0%
1996 16,740 9,547 57.0% 7,861 47.0%
6,780 40.5% 6,108 36.5%
1997 16,639 9,615 57.8% 7,907 47.5%
6,713 40.3% 6,023 36.2%
1998 16,833 9,280 55.1% 7,541 44.8%
6,311 37.5% 5,752 34.2%
1999 16,172 8,171 50.5% 6,515 40.3%
5,468 33.8% 4,844 30.0%
2000 16,120 7,733 48.0% 6,216 38.6%
5,294 32.8% 4,640 28.8%
2001 16,483 7,981 48.4% 6,334 38.4%
5,407 32.8% 4,755 28.8%
2002 16,780 8,202 48.9% 6,443 38.4%
5,341 31.8% 4,810 28.7%
2003 17,116 8,492 49.6% 6,868 40.1%
5,895 34.4% 5,211 30.4%
2004 17,229 8,725 50.6% 7,065 41.0%
5,805 33.7% 5,100 29.6%
CRS-107

Poor Based on Cash
Income Plus Food
Stamp/SNAP Benefits,
EITC and ACTC Net
Below Household
Poor Based on Total
of Federal and State
Low-Income
Cash Income
Income Taxes, Plus
Threshold Based on
Poor Based on Earned
“Official” Poverty
Stimulus and Recovery
Total Household

Income Only
Measure
Payments
Income
Year Total Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
2005 17,162 8,654 50.4% 7,077 41.2%
5,820 33.9% 5,084 29.6%
2006 17,921 9,111 50.8% 7,371 41.1%
6,025 33.6% 5,272 29.4%
2007 18,178 9,195 50.6% 7,511 41.3%
6,056 33.3% 5,268 29.0%
2008 18,086 9,390 51.9% 7,536 41.7%
6,502 36.0% 5,626 31.1%
2009 18,706 10,114 54.1% 8,113 43.4%
6,011 32.1% 5,222 27.9%
2010 19,258 10,790 56.0% 8,804 45.7%
6,694 34.8% 5,851 30.4%
2011 19,595 10,953 55.9% 9,063 46.3%
6,669 34.0% 5,820 29.7%
2012 19,071 10,644 55.8% 8,770 46.0%
6,560 34.4% 5,622 29.5%
2013 18,741 10,018 53.5% 8,256 44.1%
6,256 33.4% 5,253 28.0%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Note: Support table for Figure 16.
CRS-108

Table C-17. Single Mothers’ Job Attachment, 1987 to 2013
(Numbers in 1,000s)

Worked During the Year
Did Not Work During the Year

Worked Less Than
Full-Time, Full-Year,
Worked Less Than
Did Not Work
Worked Full-
Due to Unemploy-
Full-Time, Full-
Due to Unemploy-
Did Not Work
Time, Full-
ment or
Year, for Personal
ment or
Due to Personal
Total
Year
Discouragement
Reasons
Total
Discouragement
Reasons
Year
Total
Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct. Num. Pct. Num.
Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
1987 8,193 5,518 67.3% 2,636 32.2%
1,296
15.8%
1,586 19.4% 2,676 32.7%
449 5.5% 2,217 27.1%
1988 8,321 5,733 68.9% 2,809 33.8%
1,299
15.6%
1,625 19.5% 2,588 31.1%
434 5.2% 2,147 25.8%
1989 8,400 5,891 70.1% 2,810 33.4%
1,325
15.8%
1,756 20.9% 2,510 29.9%
324 3.9% 2,185 26.0%
1990 8,745 6,108 69.8% 2,815 32.2%
1,461
16.7%
1,825 20.9% 2,637 30.2%
343 3.9% 2,294 26.2%
1991 9,031 6,205 68.7% 2,925 32.4%
1,569
17.4%
1,709 18.9% 2,826 31.3%
427 4.7% 2,399 26.6%
1992 9,567 6,433 67.2% 3,030 31.7%
1,668
17.4%
1,735 18.1% 3,135 32.8%
468 4.9% 2,666 27.9%
1993 9,860 6,717 68.1% 3,143 31.9%
1,695
17.2%
1,871 19.0% 3,144 31.9%
557 5.7% 2,582 26.2%
1994 9,837 7,022 71.4% 3,259 33.1%
1,720
17.5%
2,038 20.7% 2,815 28.6%
442 4.5% 2,372 24.1%
1995 9,887 7,220 73.0% 3,589 36.3%
1,609
16.3%
2,020 20.4% 2,667 27.0%
406 4.1% 2,261 22.9%
1996 10,052 7,548 75.1% 3,646 36.3%
1,693
16.8%
2,200 21.9% 2,504 24.9%
425 4.2% 2,079 20.7%
1997 9,874 7,636 77.3% 3,838 38.9%
1,568
15.9%
2,225 22.5% 2,238 22.7%
362 3.7% 1,877 19.0%
1998 9,881 7,868 79.6% 4,116 41.7%
1,543
15.6%
2,200 22.3% 2,013 20.4%
270 2.7% 1,744 17.6%
1999 9,741 7,986 82.0% 4,286 44.0%
1,428
14.7%
2,269 23.3% 1,755 18.0%
151 1.5% 1,602 16.4%
2000 9,712 8,030 82.7% 4,459 45.9%
1,251
12.9%
2,307 23.8% 1,682 17.3%
174 1.8% 1,508 15.5%
2001 10,044 8,148 81.1% 4,505 44.9%
1,492
14.9%
2,138 21.3% 1,896 18.9%
193 1.9% 1,701 16.9%
2002 10,206 8,193 80.3% 4,649 45.6%
1,556
15.2%
1,980 19.4% 2,013 19.7%
271 2.7% 1,742 17.1%
2003 10,411 8,191 78.7% 4,569 43.9%
1,575
15.1%
2,040 19.6% 2,220 21.3%
297 2.8% 1,924 18.5%
2004 10,442 8,110 77.7% 4,476 42.9%
1,497
14.3%
2,134 20.4% 2,332 22.3%
294 2.8% 2,038 19.5%
CRS-109

Worked During the Year
Did Not Work During the Year

Worked Less Than
Full-Time, Full-Year,
Worked Less Than
Did Not Work
Worked Full-
Due to Unemploy-
Full-Time, Full-
Due to Unemploy-
Did Not Work
Time, Full-
ment or
Year, for Personal
ment or
Due to Personal
Total
Year
Discouragement
Reasons
Total
Discouragement
Reasons
Year
Total
Num.
Pct.
Num. Pct. Num.
Pct. Num. Pct. Num.
Pct. Num. Pct. Num. Pct.
2005 10,476 8,124 77.6% 4,657 44.5%
1,398
13.3%
2,060 19.7% 2,352 22.4%
249 2.4% 2,102 20.1%
2006 10,938 8,458 77.3% 4,845 44.3%
1,452
13.3%
2,156 19.7% 2,479 22.7%
233 2.1% 2,245 20.5%
2007 10,748 8,372 77.9% 4,702 43.8%
1,519
14.1%
2,142 19.9% 2,376 22.1%
229 2.1% 2,146 20.0%
2008 10,797 8,301 76.9% 4,426 41.0%
1,989
18.4%
1,882 17.4% 2,496 23.1%
281 2.6% 2,212 20.5%
2009 10,990 8,133 74.0% 4,252 38.7%
2,041
18.6%
1,832 16.7% 2,856 26.0%
569 5.2% 2,285 20.8%
2010 11,185 8,138 72.8% 4,250 38.0%
2,029
18.1%
1,848 16.5% 3,048 27.2%
666 6.0% 2,382 21.3%
2011 11,467 8,451 73.7% 4,488 39.1%
2,150
18.7%
1,806 15.7% 3,016 26.3%
611 5.3% 2,403 21.0%
2012 11,125 8,242 74.1% 4,197 37.7%
2,104
18.9%
1,927 17.3% 2,882 25.9%
600 5.4% 2,281 20.5%
2013 10,970 8,226 75.0% 4,348 39.6%
2,077
18.9%
1,797 16.4% 2,744 25.0%
542 4.9% 2,203 20.1%
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 1988 to 2014 Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and
Economic Supplement (ASEC) data.
Notes: Persons who worked for 50 weeks or more and 35 or more hours per week are designated as ful -time, ful -year workers. Unemployed are persons who were
without a job and searched for work. Discouraged workers are persons who were without a job but did not search for work because they believed no jobs were available.
Personal reasons for not working during the year, or working less than full-time, full-year, include taking care of home or family, attending school, illness or disability,
retired, or other.
Support table for Figure 20.

CRS-110

Welfare, Work, and Poverty Status of Female-Headed Families with Children: 1987-2013

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Specialist in Social Policy
[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service
111

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