Brazil’s October 2022 Presidential Election

INSIGHTi

Brazil’s October 2022 Presidential Election
Updated November 21, 2022
Brazil, the world’s 7th most populous country and 12th largest economy, held a presidential runoff election
on October 30, 2022. Former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula, 2003-2010) of the center-left
Workers’ Party (PT) defeated incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) of the center-right Liberal
Party, 50.9% to 49.1%. Bolsonaro, who repeatedly questioned the electoral system’s integrity in the lead-
up to the vote, has not contested the results, and his administration is cooperating with the transition.
In September 2022, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution (S.Res. 753) urging the Brazilian government to
ensure “free, fair, credible, transparent, and peaceful” elections. As President-elect Lula prepares to take
office on January 1, 2023, Congress may continue to monitor the Biden Administration’s policy toward
Brazil and assess the potential implications of the change in government for U.S-Brazilian relations.
Electoral Context
Bolsonaro’s defeat was the first for an incumbent Brazilian president since the restoration of democracy
in 1985. However, it was the 16th consecutive loss for incumbent political parties in democratic
presidential elections in Latin America since 2018. Like leaders throughout the region, Bolsonaro faced
voter discontent over weak economic growth and income losses resulting from the Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. His polarizing approach to governance and widely criticized public health
response to the pandemic further weakened his appeal. Nevertheless, Bolsonaro nearly secured reelection
by rallying his conservative base and recovering some popular support in the final months of the
campaign as the Brazilian government increased cash transfers to low-income Brazilians, unemployment
fell to a seven-year low, and real wages began to rise.
The election marks a political comeback for Lula, who was convicted on corruption charges in 2017 and
imprisoned for 19 months. He was cleared to run for office again in 2021 after the Brazilian supreme
court annulled those convictions and ruled that the judge presiding over the case for which Lula had been
imprisoned had acted with bias. Anti-PT sentiment remains widespread in Brazil, particularly among
evangelical Christians and those whose living standards stagnated or declined during the PT-led
administration of President Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016). Lula won over a majority of voters, however, by
pledging to restore the upward social mobility that characterized his first two terms and by assembling a
broad coalition of Brazilians from across the ideological spectrum who viewed Bolsonaro as a threat to
democracy.
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Prior to the election, many analysts expressed concerns that Bolsonaro could contest a loss, potentially
with the support of Brazil’s security forces. To deter such an action, officials from other branches of
government, business and civil society leaders, and foreign governments—including the United States—
expressed confidence in Brazil’s electoral system and quickly recognized Lula’s victory. Some Bolsonaro
supporters took to the streets after the runoff, setting up roadblocks and calling for military intervention.
Although Bolsonaro expressed sympathy with the protesters, he urged them to lift their blockades and
authorized his administration to cooperate with Lula’s transition team.
Policy Implications
Brazil’s change in government is likely to result in several policy shifts with implications for U.S.-
Brazilian relations. Under Bolsonaro, bilateral security ties have expanded and Brazil has aligned with the
United States on certain regional challenges, such as the ongoing crisis in Venezuela. To build on this
rapprochement, the Trump Administration designated Brazil as a major non-NATO ally for the purposes
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. §§2151 et seq.), and the Arms Export
Control Act (22 U.S.C. §§2751 et seq.), and the Biden Administration expressed support for Brazil’s
participation as a NATO global partner. Bolsonaro has diverged from U.S. policy on some international
security issues, however, adopting a neutral stance on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and resisting U.S.
pressure to ban equipment from Huawei and other Chinese companies in Brazil’s fifth-generation (5G)
telecommunications infrastructure.
Similar to his previous terms, Lula is likely to pursue an active role in international affairs, seeking to
increase Brazil’s influence while maintaining autonomy and cordial relations with all countries. Within
the Western Hemisphere, this approach is likely to include increased cooperation with other Latin
American governments, potentially through the resuscitation of various regional organizations. Lula is
also likely to restore relations with the Nicolás Maduro government in Venezuela and oppose broader
U.S. efforts to isolate authoritarian regimes in the region. At the same time, Lula has called for free
elections in Venezuela and could help facilitate negotiations between Maduro and the political opposition.
Globally, Lula is likely to maintain close ties with fellow members of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa) group and work with other developing countries to advance their interests in
multilateral organizations. He is unlikely to shift Brazil’s stance regarding the Russia-Ukraine war and is
likely to avoid direct involvement in competition between the United States and China—Brazil’s two
largest trade partners. Nevertheless, in the view of one former U.S. Ambassador, the United States and
Brazil are well-positioned to work together on related challenges, such as increasing global food and
energy security and demonstrating that democracies can deliver for their citizens. The United States and
Brazil also could collaborate on international peacekeeping, as Lula reportedly intends to roll back the
Brazilian military’s involvement in domestic affairs and may seek alternative missions for the armed
forces.
Brazil’s change in government may have particularly far-reaching effects on the country’s environmental
policies. Under Bolsonaro, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon climbed to a 15-year high, jeopardizing
global efforts to mitigate climate change and generating tensions with the Biden Administration. At the
November 2022 U.N. climate summit, Lula pledged to strengthen environmental enforcement and called
for increased international cooperation on conservation efforts. U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for
Climate John Kerry has acknowledged Lula’s commitment to environmental protection and has expressed
interest in revising existing bilateral initiatives and mobilizing additional international financial support
for Brazil.
Lula is likely to face several constraints in advancing his domestic and international agendas, including
slowing economic growth and a conservative-leaning congress that may oppose some of his objectives
and/or seek to allocate scarce resources to other priorities.

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Author Information

Peter J. Meyer

Specialist in Latin American and Canadian Affairs




Disclaimer
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IN12022 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED

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