Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Overview of U.S. Assistance and Sanctions
INSIGHTi
Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Overview of
U.S. Assistance and Sanctions
Updated December 20, 2023
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a new war against Ukraine, a country Russia first invaded in 2014
and has partially occupied for almost a decade. The United States, member states of NATO and the
European Union (EU), and other allies have called Russia’s war against Ukraine “unprovoked and
unjustified.” In March 2022, the U.N. General Assembly voted 141-5 to demand Russia “immediately,
completely and unconditionally withdraw” from Ukraine (47 countries, including China and India,
registered abstentions or did not vote). After Russia purported to annex additional Ukrainian territories in
fall 2022, the General Assembly declared by a vote of 143-5 that Russia’s actions had “no validity under
international law.”
The United States, in coordination with the EU and others, has provided substantial assistance to Ukraine,
imposed increasingly severe sanctions on Russia and enablers of its war in Ukraine, and sought to
promote accountability for Russian war crimes. For more, see CRS In Focus IF12277, Russia’s War on
Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Role of Congress.
U.S. Assistance to Ukraine
Congress enacted four supplemental appropriations laws in FY2022 and FY2023 providing assistance to
Ukraine and countries affected by the war in Ukraine, as well as related funding. Of a total $113 billion in
emergency appropriations made available by these laws, Congress appropriated about $89 billion for
assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war. Another $23 billion was appropriated to
support U.S. military operations in Europe and other U.S. agency responses to the war, including for
sanctions enforcement and refugee and entrant assistance (about $1 billion was appropriated for global
assistance purposes).
Combining funding from supplemental and regular appropriations, since February 2022, the Biden
Administration has committed more than $70 billion in assistance to Ukraine, including $44.2 billion in
security assistance, $22.9 billion in direct budget support, and $2.8 billion in humanitarian assistance
(including for neighboring countries to support the needs of Ukrainian refugees). Other funds have
supported governance (including anti-corruption), energy, and agriculture assistance, as well as civilian
security and demining assistance.
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On October 20, 2023, the Administration submitted to Congress a new request for $106 billion in FY2024
emergency supplemental funding for Ukraine, Israel, border security, and other purposes. The request
continues to be under consideration in Congress.
For more, see CRS In Focus IF12040, U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine; CRS Insight IN12107,
Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary; CRS Report R47275,
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for
Ukraine: In Brief; and CRS In Focus IF12305, U.S. Direct Financial Support for Ukraine.
U.S. Sanctions
Prior to 2022, the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia in response to Moscow’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine and other malign activities. Beginning in December 2021, the United States and others warned
Russia’s leadership that a new attack on Ukraine would lead to severe new sanctions (in addition to
increased security assistance to Ukraine and an enhanced NATO presence in Central and Eastern Europe).
Sanctions designations and related actions the Biden Administration and Congress have taken since
February 2022 include the following actions targeting Russian government assets, trade, economic
sectors, and specific individuals and entities:
• Restrictions on transactions with Russia’s central bank, limiting its ability to draw on
dollar-denominated foreign reserves
• Export controls targeting Russia’s defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors; energy
production; and “a wide range of commercial and industrial operations”
• A ban on the import to the United States of Russian oil and other energy products (P.L.
117-109) and suspension of normal trade relations with Russia and its ally Belarus (P.L.
117-110)
• A prohibition on maritime transport services for Russian oil exports above a price cap of
$60 per barrel, in coordination with the EU and others
The Biden Administration also has prohibited the following with respect to Russia:
• New U.S. investment
• U.S. import of gold, diamonds, seafood, and alcoholic beverages
• Export of U.S. luxury goods and dollar-denominated banknotes
• The provision of certain corporate, maritime transport, quantum computing, architecture,
and engineering services
• Secondary-market transactions by U.S. financial institutions in Russian sovereign debt
• Entrance into and use of U.S. airspace
• Entrance into U.S. ports
• U.S. trade or investment in Russia-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine
The Administration has designated for sanctions more than 3,500 individuals and entities (including by
restricting transactions and access to U.S.-based property). Designees includes members of the Russian
government, as well individuals and entities in the defense and technology, financial services, energy,
metals and mining, transportation, and other sectors of the Russian economy, in addition to facilitators of
sanctions evasion. Those subject to U.S. sanctions include the following:
• Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, other Cabinet
members and senior administration officials, and regional governors
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• Russia’s legislature (the State Duma and Federation Council) and its members
• Russia’s largest banks
• Hundreds of defense and technology firms and sanctions evasion facilitators
• The parent company for Nord Stream 2, a Russian gas pipeline project to Europe
• Dozens of Russia’s Kremlin-connected business elites (many of whom are referred to as
oligarchs)
• Proxy occupation officials
The Administration also has banned entry into the United States for thousands of Russian officials and
military personnel.
For more, see CRS In Focus IF12062, Russia’s War on Ukraine: Financial and Trade Sanctions; and CRS
In Focus IF12092, The Economic Impact of Russia Sanctions.
Coordinated International Sanctions
The EU, the United Kingdom (UK), other countries in Europe (including Norway and Switzerland),
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, among others, also have imposed sanctions on
Russia. Many of these sanctions are identical or similar to U.S. sanctions. The EU, with U.S. support,
directed the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and other
specialized financial messaging services to cease serving 10 leading Russian financial institutions. The
EU also has banned most Russian oil imports. Two days before Russia’s attack, the German government
suspended certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Hundreds of U.S. and international companies also
have exited the Russian market.
For more, see CRS Insight IN11897, Russia’s War Against Ukraine: European Union Responses and
U.S.-EU Relations.
Author Information
Cory Welt
Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
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