INSIGHTi
Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Overview
of U.S. Sanctions and Other Responses
Updated October 21, 2022
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an undeclared war against Ukraine, a country Russia first invaded
and partially occupied in 2014. The United States and many countries around the world have condemned
Russia’s “unprecedented military aggression” as “unprovoked and unjustified.” On March 2, 2022, the
U.N. General Assembly voted 141-5 to demand Russia “immediately, completely and unconditionally
withdraw” from Ukraine (47 countries, including China and India, abstained or did not vote). In response
to Russian efforts to claim Ukrainian territory in fall 2022, the General Assembly declared by a vote of
143-5 that Russia’s “illegal so-called referendums” and “attempted illegal annexation” of occupied
Ukrainian regions “have no validity under international law.”
After Russia launched its new invasion in 2022, the United States, the European Union (EU), and others
imposed a series of increasingly severe sanctions on Russia and substantially increased military,
humanitarian, and economic assistance to Ukraine. To date, FY2022 and FY2023 supplemental
appropriations have included $66 billion in assistance for Ukraine and other affected countries, as well as
funding for U.S. European Command operations and the administration and operations of U.S. agencies
that have responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Congress also has enacted legislation enabling the
expedited leasing or lending of defense articles to Ukraine (P.L. 117-118). The House and Senate have
passed related resolutions (H.Res. 956, S.Res. 546, S.Res. 589, S.Res. 623).
U.S. Sanctions
Prior to 2022, the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia in response to Moscow’s 2014 invasion
of Ukraine and other malign activities. Beginning in December 2021, the United States and others warned
Russia’s leadership that a new attack on Ukraine would lead to severe new sanctions (in addition to
increased security assistance to Ukraine and an enhanced NATO presence in Central and Eastern Europe).
Sanctions designations and related actions the Biden Administration and Congress have taken since
February 2022 include actions targeting Russian government assets, international trade, broad economic
sectors, and specific individuals and entities. These sanctions and related actions include the following:
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN11869
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
Congressional Research Service
2
Restrictions on transactions with Russia’s central bank, limiting its ability to draw on
dollar-denominated foreign reserves, as well as on transactions with Russia’s Ministry of
Finance and National Wealth Fund.
Export controls that target Russia’s defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors; energy
production; and “a wide range of commercial and industrial operations.” Export controls
include restrictions on “sensitive U.S. technologies produced in foreign countries using
U.S.-origin software, technology, or equipment.”
Legislation suspending normal trade relations with Russia and its ally Belarus (P.L. 117-
110) and prohibiting the import to the United States of Russian oil and other energy
products (P.L. 117-109). Prior to this legislation’s passage, President Biden established a
ban via executive order on the U.S. import of Russian crude oil, petroleum products,
liquefied natural gas, and coal.
Since February, the Biden Administration also has prohibited the following:
New U.S. investment in Russia.
U.S. import of Russian gold, diamonds, seafood, and alcoholic beverages.
Export of U.S. luxury goods and dollar-denominated banknotes.
The provision of accounting, trust and corporate formation, management consulting, and
quantum computing services.
Secondary-market transactions by U.S. financial institutions in Russian sovereign debt.
Entrance into and use of U.S. airspace by Russian aircraft.
Entrance into U.S. ports by Russian-affiliated vessels.
U.S. trade or investment in Russia-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine.
The Administration also has targeted Russian individuals and entities (including with restrictions on
transactions and access to U.S.-based property). New targets since February 2022 include the following:
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, and members of
Russia’s Security Council and Administration, including ministers of foreign affairs,
defense, and finance, and heads of the armed forces and central bank.
The State Duma and Federation Council (Russia’s legislature) and their members.
Six of Russia’s largest banks, including the largest two (Sberbank and VTB Bank) that
account for 80% of bank deposits.
VEB, a large state development bank, and the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
Rostec, a state-owned defense, industrial, and technology conglomerate.
Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond-mining company.
Severstal and MMK, major steel producers.
Skolkovo, a prominent technology development park.
Nord Stream 2 AG, the parent company for a Russian natural gas pipeline project to
Europe.
Dozens of Russia’s Kremlin-connected business elite (many of whom are referred to as
oligarchs), their family members, and business executives.
Dozens of aerospace and defense-industrial firms, disinformation and propaganda
operations, sanctions evaders, and virtual currency mining companies.
Russian or proxy occupation officials.
Congressional Research Service
3
The Administration also has imposed visa restrictions on thousands of Russian military officers and
officials.
In addition, the Administration has imposed restrictions against new equity investment and financing for
several companies including Gazprom, a state-owned energy company and Russia’s largest firm;
Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest maritime and freight shipping firm; and Russian Railways.
International Sanctions
The EU, the United Kingdom, other countries in Europe (including Switzerland), Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, among others, have imposed sanctions, export
controls, or both in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Many of these sanctions are identical or
similar to U.S. sanctions. The EU, with U.S. support, directed the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) and other specialized financial messaging services to cease
serving 10 leading Russian financial institutions. In addition, two days before Russia’s attack, the German
government suspended certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Starting in December 2022, the EU is to ban most Russian oil imports. Countries in the Group of Seven
(G7) also have stated they intend to establish a cap on the price of Russian oil exports worldwide.
Since March 2022, the U.S. Departments of Justice and the Treasury have collaborated with counterpart
agencies in the EU, other G7 countries, and Australia in forming a Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs
(REPO) Task Force to strengthen enforcement of sanctions and other measures.
In addition to sanctions, hundreds of U.S. and international companies have withdrawn from Russia or
suspended or curtailed their Russia-based operations.
Also see CRS In Focus IF12062, New Financial and Trade Sanctions Against Russia; CRS In Focus
IF12092, Russia’s War on Ukraine: The Economic Impact of Sanctions; and CRS Insight IN11897,
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: European Union Responses and Implications for U.S.-EU Relations.
Author Information
Cory Welt
Specialist in Russian and European Affairs
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.
Congressional Research Service
4
IN11869 · VERSION 11 · UPDATED