INSIGHTi

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Overview of
U.S. and International Sanctions and Other
Responses
Updated March 18, 2022
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched an undeclared war against Ukraine. The United States and
countries around the world have condemned Russia’s “unprecedented military aggression” as
“unprovoked and unjustified.” The United States, the European Union (EU), and member countries of the
EU and NATO have provided or pledged new military assistance to Ukraine ($1.35 billion in immediate
U.S. security assistance since the start of the war). Members of legislatures, local governments,
businesses, and publics in the United States and elsewhere have expressed support for Ukraine and have
condemned Russia’s invasion. Many U.S. and other companies have suspended or withdrawn operations
in Russia. On March 2, 2022, the U.N. General Assembly voted 141-5 to demand Russia “immediately,
completely and unconditionally withdraw” from Ukraine (34 countries, including China and India,
abstained).
Since December 2021, the United States and others have warned Russia’s leadership that severe sanctions
would follow a new attack on Ukraine, which Russia first invaded and partially occupied in 2014. The
United States, the EU, and others imposed an initial round of sanctions on February 21-23, 2022, in
response to Russia’s alleged recognition of two areas in eastern Ukraine as independent. Since Russia
launched its attack on February 24, the United States, the EU, and others have imposed a series of
increasingly severe sanctions.
Congress has provided substantial support for Ukraine since the start of the war. The Ukraine
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 (P.L. 117-103, Division N) provided $13.6 billion “in
humanitarian, security, and economic assistance for Ukraine and neighboring countries.” The House and
Senate have agreed to resolutions supporting Ukraine (H.Res. 956) and condemning Russian atrocities
(S.Res. 546). Dozens of other bills and resolutions intended to respond to Russia and support Ukraine are
before Congress, including the House-passed H.R. 7108, which would suspend permanent normal trading
relations treatment for Russia and Belarus. On March 16, 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
addressed Congress virtually.
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U.S. Sanctions
Recent rounds of U.S. sanctions and related actions could have a greater impact than sanctions the United
States has imposed on Russia to this point (see CRS Report R45415, U.S. Sanctions on Russia). Sanctions
and related actions the United States imposed from February 21 through March 17, 2022, include the
following (for more information on several key sanctions, see CRS In Focus IF12062, New Financial and
Trade Sanctions Against Russia).
 Restrictions on transactions with Russia’s central bank, limiting its ability to draw on
dollar-denominated foreign reserves, and transactions with Russia’s Ministry of Finance
and National Wealth Fund (with exceptions for energy-related transactions).
 Ban on the import of Russian crude oil, petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, coal,
seafood, alcoholic beverages, and non-industrial diamonds. President Biden also has
announced his intent to work with Congress to suspend permanent normal trade relations
treatment for Russia.
 Ban on the export of luxury goods and dollar-denominated banknotes and on “any
approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee” of transactions by foreign persons that
would be prohibited to U.S. persons or in the United States.
 Ban on new investment in Russia’s energy sector.
 Export controls on trade with Russia and Belarus, including restrictions on “sensitive
U.S. technologies produced in foreign countries using U.S.-origin software, technology,
or equipment” and oil and gas extraction equipment.
 Restrictions on secondary-market transactions by U.S. financial institutions in Russian
sovereign debt (previous restrictions applied to primary-market transactions).
 Restrictions on transactions by U.S. financial institutions (including correspondent and
payable-through accounts) with Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank and one of Russia’s five
largest companies (with exceptions for energy-related transactions, among others).
 Full blocking sanctions (including restrictions on transactions and access to U.S.-based
property or interests in property) on
 Russian President Vladimir Putin, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Defense
Minister Sergei Shoigu, and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov;
 VTB Bank (Russia’s second-largest financial institution); VEB, a state
development bank that “provides financing for large-scale projects”; and four
other financial institutions (with the above-mentioned exceptions);
 Russian Direct Investment Fund, one of Russia’s sovereign wealth funds, and
its chief executive officer (CEO);
 Nord Stream 2 AG, the parent company of Russia’s Nord Stream 2 natural
gas pipeline project, and its CEO;
 Additional members of Russia’s Kremlin-connected business elite
(sometimes referred to as oligarchs) and family members. In coordination
with international partners, the U.S. government has established an
interagency Task Force KleptoCapture to strengthen enforcement of
sanctions and other measures, as well as a Kleptocracy Asset Recovery
Rewards Program.
 Defense-related entities and disinformation operations; and
 Belarusian entities and individuals in response to Belarus’s support for
Russia’s invasion.

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 Restrictions against new equity investment and financing for 13 companies, including
 Gazprom, a state-owned energy company and Russia’s largest firm;
 Alrosa, the world’s largest diamond-mining firm;
 Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest maritime and freight shipping firm;
 Russian Railways; and
 Alfa Bank, Russia’s largest private bank.
 Ban on Russian aircraft entering and using U.S. airspace.
 Prohibitions on U.S. trade or investment in Russia-occupied areas of eastern Ukraine and
sanctions against those who operate in those areas.
International Sanctions
The EU, the United Kingdom (UK), other non-EU countries in Europe (including Switzerland), Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, among others, have imposed
sanctions, export controls, or both in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many sanctions imposed
by other countries are identical or similar to U.S. sanctions, including restricting transactions with
Russia’s central bank, suspending preferential trade treatment, and airspace bans.
In addition, the EU has prohibited specialized financial messaging services, including the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the world’s primary such service, from
serving seven Russian financial institutions (excluding Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank).
The EU and the UK have imposed sanctions on hundreds of Russian legislators for supporting Russia’s
alleged recognition of the separatist areas of eastern Ukraine and have suspended broadcasting of Russian
state-owned network RT (the EU also suspended Sputnik, another state-owned network). Two days before
Russia’s attack, the German government suspended certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline,
preventing it from becoming operational.

Author Information

Cory Welt

Specialist in Russian and European Affairs




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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IN11869 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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