Status of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Talks

INSIGHTi

Status of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms
Control Talks
Updated February 3, 2021
Introduction
The New START Treaty would have expired on February 5, 2021, unless the United States and Russia
agreed to extend it for up to five years. On January 21, 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it
would seek a five-year extension of New START, leading to an exchange of diplomatic notes and the
formal extension of the treaty on February 3, 2021. The State Department noted that the extension was a
first step that would provide “the stability and predictability [needed] to enhance and expand discussions
with Russia and China.”
The United States and Russia held several meetings during 2020 to discuss New START extension and a
framework for a future agreement, but did not reach an agreement. In April 2019, President Trump had
called for expanded arms control efforts with Russia and China, both to capture all types of Russian
weapons and to bring China into the process. In December 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin had
indicated that he would extend New START for five years, without preconditions; Russian officials also
noted that the countries could address other weapons systems in separate talks after extending New
START.
Issues in the Negotiations
China
Prior to beginning negotiations with Russia, the U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea
suggested that Washington would not extend New START unless China joined the talks. He invited China
to participate, but China refused, as it has far fewer nuclear weapons than the United States or Russia. He
then suggested that Russia pressure China to participate. Foreign Minister Ryabkov rejected this, noting
that such a decision would be the “sovereign right of China.” Moreover, Russian officials have argued
that a multilateral treaty should include the United Kingdom and France, a suggestion the United States
has rejected.
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After meeting again in August, Ambassador Billingslea reiterated the U.S. goal of including China, but
indicated that the United States was “not suggesting … that we would amend the New START Treaty to
include China.” He did not insist that China participate before the United States agreed to extend New
START, but indicated that the framework for the next treaty would have to include a path for China to
join later.
The Biden Administration has affirmed that the United States will “pursue arms control to reduce the
dangers from China’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal.”
Extension and Future Agreement
In July, Ambassador Billingslea stated that the United States would “contemplate an extension” of New
START if Russia would negotiate an agreement limiting shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
its new types of longer-range strategic systems. During the July meeting, U.S. and Russian officials did
not agree on whether to extend New START or on a framework for a future agreement. They established
working groups to address strategic stability issues, but disagreed on the subjects for some of the groups.
In August, Ambassador Billingslea reiterated that the United States considered New START “deeply
flawed” and noted that “it is not particularly in the U.S. interest to simply extend that treaty.” He said the
United States might agree to an extension if Russia signed “a politically binding agreement” that provided
a framework for a new treaty. The United States presented Russia with detailed proposals to count all
nuclear warheads and to incorporate more verification and transparency measures than New START.
Billingslea did not indicate whether, or how, the framework would address Russia’s concerns about U.S.
weapons in space, U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and other issues that affect strategic stability. Billingslea
also stated that the cost of extending New START could increase if Russia did not accept the U.S.
proposals before the election, perhaps by including “a lot of the other bad behavior that the Russians are
engaged in around the world.” He also indicated that if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals, the
United States would allow New START to lapse and promptly increase the numbers of warheads on its
strategic forces.
After reviewing the U.S. proposals, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov noted that Russia was ready to
extend New START but would not do so at any cost. He indicated that Russia would not accept these
proposals unless the United States also addressed Russian concerns. In August, he repeated that Russia “is
not ready to pay any price” for New START extension.
In October, the United States seemed to narrow its position by seeking to pair a short-term extension of
New START with a short-term freeze on both sides’ nuclear arsenals. The freeze would accommodate
U.S. demands for limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons without addressing other issues in the
August proposal. After meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov on October 12, Ambassador
Billingslea stated that Presidents Trump and Putin had reached an “agreement in principle” on this deal
and that he and Ryabkov could complete an agreement quickly. U.S. officials believed the two sides could
reach an agreement in time for the Presidents to sign it before the U.S. election.
Russian officials disputed this assessment. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov called the U.S. reports of a
quick agreement “an illusion.” He stated that the proposed freeze “is unacceptable” because it would not
address Russian concerns about U.S. weapons. Ryabkov also disputed the U.S. assertion that the two
sides could conclude the agreement before the election.
On October 16, President Putin proposed that the two sides extend New START “unconditionally
for at least a year” while they continue talks on other arms control issues. President Trump’s National
Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, dismissed this as a “non-starter” without the freeze on nuclear arsenals,
and suggested that Russia’s position could lead to “a costly arms race.” On October 20, the Russian
Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would accept a one-year freeze on nuclear arsenals if the United States

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did not add any conditions to the freeze. Russia also indicated the countries could “hold comprehensive
bilateral talks” on “all factors that can influence strategic stability” during the extension. The U.S. State
Department welcomed the Russian statement and noted that the “United States is prepared to meet
immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement.” Russia, however, considered the requirement for
verification to be an unacceptable condition added to the freeze.
On October 22, President Putin repeated his call to extend the treaty and freeze weapons for a year,
without preconditions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and NSA O’Brien acknowledged that the two
sides remained at odds over whether to codify verification measures before extending New START or to
work them out in discussions following the extension. In mid-November, after the U.S. election, Steve
Biegun, the Deputy Secretary of State, noted that the two sides had reached a “plateau” in their
discussions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov said it was still possible for the two sides to conclude an
agreement during the Trump Administration, but only if the United States “softened” its position.
The Biden Administration did not pair the extension of New START with a freeze on all weapons. The
State Department noted, however, that the five-year extension would provide time to “pursue ... arms
control that addresses all of [Russia’s] nuclear weapons.”

Author Information

Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy




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