INSIGHTi

Status of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms
Control Talks

October 19, 2020
Introduction
The New START Treaty will expire on February 5, 2021, unless the United States and Russia agree to
extend it, possibly for up to five years. In April 2019, President Trump called for expanded arms control
efforts with Russia and China, both to capture all types of Russian weapons and to bring China into the
process for the first time. The Administration argued that this would serve U.S. national security interests
better than an extension of New START. In December 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated
that he was willing to extend New START for the five-year period, without preconditions, with Russian
officials noting that the two countries could address other weapons systems in separate talks after
extending New START.
The United States and Russia held several meetings during 2020 to discuss a New START extension and a
framework for a future agreement. China has refused to participate, noting that it has far fewer nuclear
weapons than either the United States or Russia.
Issues in the Negotiations
China
Prior to beginning negotiations with Russia, the U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea
suggested that Washington would not extend New START unless China joined the talks. He invited China
to participate, but China declined. He then suggested that the United States would seek to convince Russia
to pressure China to participate. Foreign Minister Ryabkov rejected this, noting that a decision on whether
to join would be the “sovereign right of China.” Moreover, Russian officials have argued that a
multilateral treaty should include the United Kingdom and France, a suggestion the United States has
rejected.
After their second meeting in August, Ambassador Billingslea reiterated the U.S. goal of including China
in the negotiations but, in contrast to earlier statements, indicated that the United States was “not
suggesting … that we would amend the New START Treaty to include China.” He also did not insist that
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China participate before the United States agreed to extend New START. Instead, he indicated the
framework for the next treaty would have to include a path for China to join later.
Extension and Future Agreement
When the United States and Russia met in July, Ambassador Billingslea stated that the United States
would “contemplate an extension” of New START if Russia agreed to negotiate a new agreement to limit
its shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons and its new types of longer-range strategic systems.
During the meeting, U.S. and Russian officials did not reach an agreement on whether to extend New
START, nor did they agree on a framework for a future agreement. They established several working
groups to address strategic stability issues, although they disagreed on the subjects for some of the
groups.
In August, Ambassador Billingslea reiterated the U.S. view that New START is “deeply flawed and that it
is not particularly in the U.S. interest to simply extend that treaty.” But he noted the United States might
agree to an extension if Russia signed “a politically binding agreement” that provided a framework for a
new treaty. The United States presented Russia with detailed proposals for a treaty that would count all
nuclear warheads and would have better verification and transparency measures than New START.
Billingslea did not offer any insights into whether, or how, the proposed framework would address
Russia’s stated concerns about U.S. weapons in space, U.S. ballistic missile defenses, and other issues
that affect strategic stability. Billingslea also stated that the cost of extending New START could increase
if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals before the election, perhaps by including “a lot of the other bad
behavior that the Russians are engaged in around the world.” He also indicated that if Russia did not
accept the U.S. proposals, the United States would allow New START to lapse and promptly increase the
numbers of warheads on its strategic forces.
After reviewing the U.S. proposals in July, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov noted that Russia was ready
to extend New START but would not do so at any cost. Moreover, he indicated that Russia would not
accept the U.S. proposals unless the United States also addressed Russian concerns. In August, he noted
that Russia had taken “American ideas into consideration,” and repeated that Russia “is not ready to pay
any price” for New START extension.
In October, the United States seemed to narrow its position by seeking to pair a short-term extension of
New START with a short-term freeze on both sides’ nuclear arsenals. The freeze would accommodate
U.S. demands for limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons without addressing all the issues
included in the August proposal. After meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov on October 12,
Ambassador Billingslea stated that Presidents Trump and Putin had reached an “agreement in principle”
on this deal and that he and Ryabkov could complete an agreement quickly. U.S. officials believed the
two sides could reach an agreement in time for the Presidents to sign it before the U.S. election.
Russian officials, however, disputed this assessment. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov called the U.S.
reports of a quick agreement “an illusion.” He stated that the proposed freeze “is unacceptable” because it
would not address Russian concerns about U.S. weapons. Ryabkov also disputed the U.S. assertion that
the two sides could conclude the agreement before the election.
On October 16, President Putin proposed that the two sides extend New START “unconditionally
for at least a year” while they continue to hold talks on other arms control issues. President Trump’s
National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, dismissed the Russian proposal as a “non-starter” without the
freeze on nuclear arsenals, and suggested that Russia’s position could lead to “a costly arms race.” On
October 20, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would accept a one-year freeze on nuclear
arsenals if the United States did not add any conditions to the freeze. Russia also stated that the countries
could “hold comprehensive bilateral talks” on “all factors that can influence strategic stability” during the
extension. The U.S. State Department responded by welcoming the Russian statement and noting that the


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“United States is prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement.” Russia may consider
the requirement for verification to be an unacceptable condition added to the freeze.


Author Information

Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy




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