

INSIGHTi
Status of U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms
Control Talks
Updated January 22, 2021
Introduction
The New START Treaty will expire on February 5, 2021, unless the United States and Russia agree to
extend it, possibly for up to five years. In April 2019, President Trump called for expanded arms control
efforts with Russia and China, both to capture all types of Russian weapons and to bring China into the
process for the first time. In December 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin indicated that he would
extend New START for five years, without preconditions; Russian officials noted that the countries could
address other weapons systems in separate talks after extending New START.
The United States and Russia held several meetings during 2020 to discuss New START extension and a
framework for a future agreement. These talks did not produce an agreement before the end of the
Administration. On January 21, 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it would seek a five-year
extension of New START.
Issues in the Negotiations
China
Prior to beginning negotiations with Russia, the U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea
suggested that Washington would not extend New START unless China joined the talks. He invited China
to participate, but China refused, as it has far fewer nuclear weapons than the United States or Russia. He
then suggested that Russia pressure China to participate. Foreign Minister Ryabkov rejected this, noting
that such a decision would be the “sovereign right of China.” Moreover, Russian officials have argued
that a multilateral treaty should include the United Kingdom and France, a suggestion the United States
has rejected.
After meeting again in August, Ambassador Billingslea reiterated the U.S. goal of including China, but, in
contrast to earlier statements, indicated that the United States was “not suggesting … that we would
amend the New START Treaty to include China.” He also did not insist that China participate before the
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United States agreed to extend New START, but indicated that the framework for the next treaty would
have to include a path for China to join later.
Extension and Future Agreement
In July, Ambassador Billingslea stated that the United States would “contemplate an extension” of New
START if Russia would negotiate an agreement limiting shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons and
its new types of longer-range strategic systems. During the July meeting, U.S. and Russian officials did
not reach an agreement on whether to extend New START, nor did they agree on a framework for a future
agreement. They established several working groups to address strategic stability issues, although they
disagreed on the subjects for some of the groups.
In August, Ambassador Billingslea reiterated the U.S. view that New START is “deeply flawed and that it
is not particularly in the U.S. interest to simply extend that treaty.” But he noted the United States might
agree to an extension if Russia signed “a politically binding agreement” that provided a framework for a
new treaty. The United States presented Russia with detailed proposals to count all nuclear warheads and
to incorporate more verification and transparency measures than New START. Billingslea did not indicate
whether, or how, the framework would address Russia’s concerns about U.S. weapons in space, U.S.
ballistic missile defenses, and other issues that affect strategic stability. Billingslea also stated that the cost
of extending New START could increase if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals before the election,
perhaps by including “a lot of the other bad behavior that the Russians are engaged in around the world.”
He also indicated that if Russia did not accept the U.S. proposals, the United States would allow New
START to lapse and promptly increase the numbers of warheads on its strategic forces.
After reviewing the U.S. proposals in July, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov noted that Russia was ready
to extend New START but would not do so at any cost. Moreover, he indicated that Russia would not
accept the U.S. proposals unless the United States also addressed Russian concerns. In August, he
repeated that Russia “is not ready to pay any price” for New START extension.
In October, the United States seemed to narrow its position by seeking to pair a short-term extension of
New START with a short-term freeze on both sides’ nuclear arsenals. The freeze would accommodate
U.S. demands for limits on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons without addressing other issues in the
August proposal. After meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov on October 12, Ambassador
Billingslea stated that Presidents Trump and Putin had reached an “agreement in principle” on this deal
and that he and Ryabkov could complete an agreement quickly. U.S. officials believed the two sides could
reach an agreement in time for the Presidents to sign it before the U.S. election.
Russian officials disputed this assessment. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov called the U.S. reports of a
quick agreement “an illusion.” He stated that the proposed freeze “is unacceptable” because it would not
address Russian concerns about U.S. weapons. Ryabkov also disputed the U.S. assertion that the two
sides could conclude the agreement before the election.
On October 16, President Putin proposed that the two sides extend New START “unconditionally
for at least a year” while they continue talks on other arms control issues. President Trump’s National
Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, dismissed this as a “non-starter” without the freeze on nuclear arsenals,
and suggested that Russia’s position could lead to “a costly arms race.” On October 20, the Russian
Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would accept a one-year freeze on nuclear arsenals if the United States
did not add any conditions to the freeze. Russia also indicated the countries could “hold comprehensive
bilateral talks” on “all factors that can influence strategic stability” during the extension. The U.S. State
Department responded by welcoming the Russian statement and noting that the “United States is prepared
to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement.” Russia, however, considers the requirement for
verification to be an unacceptable condition added to the freeze.
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On October 22, President Putin repeated his call to extend the treaty and freeze weapons for a year,
without preconditions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov and NSA O’Brien acknowledged that the two
sides remained at odds over whether to codify verification measures before extending New START or to
work them out in discussions following the extension. In mid-November, after the U.S. election, Steve
Biegun, the Deputy Secretary of State, noted that the two sides had reached a “plateau” in their
discussions. Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov said it was still possible for the two sides to conclude an
agreement during the Trump Administration, but only if the United States “softened” its position. The
negotiations remained stalled through the end of the Trump Administration.
Author Information
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy
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