President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan

Updated March 28, 2024
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
Introduction
American Institute in Taiwan, instructing him to seek a
Under the U.S. “one-China” policy, the U.S. government
meeting with Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo.
has, since 1979, maintained official relations with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and unofficial
Table 1. The Language of the Six Assurances
relations with self-governed Taiwan, over which the PRC
CRS has bolded the verb tenses
claims sovereignty. Like the Trump Administration before
it, the Biden Administration refers to the U.S. one-China
Eagleburger
Shultz cable:
Holdridge
policy as guided by three sets of documents: the Taiwan
cable: for
for Taiwan to
testimony before
Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.);
President
make public
Senate
three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués concluded in 1972,
Chiang (7/10/82)
(8/17/1982)
(8/17/1982)
1978, and 1982; and Six Assurances communicated to
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“[W]e did not
Taiwan’s government in 1982. Since 2017, Congress and
agreed to set a
not agreed to
agree to set a date
the President have enacted five laws referring to the TRA
and the Six Assurances as either “the foundation for”
date certain for
set a date for
certain for ending
or
“cornerstones of”
ending arms sales
ending arms
arms sales to
U.S.-Taiwan relations. The most recent
to Taiwan.”
sales to
Taiwan.”
law to reference the Six Assurances refers to the U.S. one-
Taiwan.”
China policy as “the foundation for” U.S.-Taiwan ties.
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“[The 1982 Joint
Historical Context
agreed to prior
not agreed to
Communiqué]
In the 1978 Joint Communiqué, the United States and the
consultation on
consult with the should not be read
PRC announced that they had agreed to establish diplomatic
arms sales.”
PRC on arms
to imply that we
relations on January 1, 1979. In an accompanying
sales to
have agreed to
statement, the U.S. government said it would terminate
Taiwan.”
engage in prior
diplomatic relations with Taiwan on the same date. With
consultations with
some Members portraying the moves as a betrayal of
Beijing on arms sales
Taiwan, Congress passed the TRA, enacted on April 10,
to Taiwan.”
1979. Among the TRA’s provisions is that the United States
“will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
“We have not
The U.S. “will
“[W]e see no
defense services” as necessary for Taiwan’s self-defense. In
agreed to any
not play any
mediation role for
1982, with continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan pursuant to
mediation role for
mediation role
the United States.”
the TRA a major irritant in the U.S.-PRC relationship, the
the U.S.”
between Taipei
Ronald Reagan Administration sought to address the issue
and Beijing.”
through negotiation of a third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué.
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“We have no plans
agreed to revise
not agreed to
to seek any such
In that communiqué, known as the August 17th
the Taiwan
revise the
revisions [to the
Communiqué for the day in 1982 on which it was released,
Relations Act.”
Taiwan
TRA].”
the PRC affirmed “a fundamental policy of striving for a
Relations Act.”
peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. The United States
stated that it “understands and appreciates the Chinese
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“[T]here has been
policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
agreed to take any
not altered its
no change in our
question.” With those statements “in mind,” the United
position regarding
position
longstanding
States stated “that it does not seek to carry out a long-term
sovereignty over
regarding
position on the issue
policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan
Taiwan.”
sovereignty
of sovereignty over
will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative
over Taiwan.”
Taiwan.”
terms, the level of those supplied [since 1979], and that it
“The PRC has at
The U.S. “will
“[N]or will we
intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan,
no time urged us
not exert
attempt to exert
leading over a period of time, to a final resolution.”
to put pressure on pressure on
pressure on Taiwan
Taiwan to
Taiwan to enter
to enter into
The Reagan Administration knew the communiqué would
negotiate with the
into
negotiations with
be viewed with alarm in Taiwan. On July 10, 1982, five
PRC; however, we negotiations
the PRC.”
weeks before its release, then-Under Secretary of State
can assure you
with the PRC.”
Lawrence Eagleburger sent a cable to James Lilley, director
that we will
of the unofficial U.S. representative office in Taiwan, the
never do so.”
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

link to page 1 President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
Source: “Declassified Cables,” American Institute in Taiwan; U.S.
Taking no position on Taiwan’s sovereignty has been long-
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward
standing U.S. policy. In Senate testimony on September 17,
China and Taiwan, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 1982.
2020, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs David R. Stilwell stated that the United
Eagleburger sent Lilley talking points authorized by
States “will not take a position on [Taiwan’s] sovereignty.”
President Reagan. They included a set of statements
He said, “the question of sovereignty was decided to be left
detailing what the United States had not agreed to in its
undecided and to be worked out between the two parties,” a
ongoing negotiations with the PRC over the communiqué.
reference to Taiwan and the PRC.
Lilley first delivered the assurances to President Chiang on
Mediation Between Taipei and Beijing. The Eagleburger
July 14, 1982. Taiwan’s government then requested U.S.
cable states, “We have not agreed to any mediation role for
permission to make them public. In a cable sent the day of
the U.S.” The Shultz cable and the Holdridge testimony are
the communiqué’s release, then-Secretary of State George
forward-looking, stating that the U.S. side “will not play
Shultz provided Lilley with a reworded version of the Six
any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing” and “we
Assurances for Taiwan’s government to release. The same
see no mediation role for the United States.”
day and the day after, in Washington, DC, then-Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John
Not revising the TRA. The Eagleburger and Shultz cables
H. Holdridge testified before Congress about the just-
state that the United States “have not”/“has not” “agreed to
released communiqué. He wove the Six Assurances into his
revise” the TRA. The Holdridge testimony is forward-
testimony, but did not label them as such or disclose that
looking, stating, “We have no plans to seek any such
President Reagan had offered them to Taiwan’s president
revisions [to the TRA].”
the previous month. The three U.S. government-released
versions of the Six Assurances are presented in Table 1.
Legislative Implications
In referencing the Six Assurances in law, successive
Differing U.S. Government Texts
Congresses appear to have intended for all six assurances to
For nearly 38 years, the sole publicly-released U.S.
guide future U.S. policy. Some bills introduced since the
government text for the Six Assurances was that woven into
115th Congress appear to be at odds with a fully future-
Holdridge’s 1982 testimony. The Eagleburger and Shultz
focused orientation, however. Examples include bills with
cables remained classified. In the absence of authoritative
provisions seeking to amend the TRA (such as the 118th
stand-alone text, some sources asserted that the Six
Congress’ H.R. 5072 and S. 1997) or implicitly or explicitly
Assurances stated that “the United States would not
seeking to take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty (such as
formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.”
the 118th Congress’ H.R. 2511 and H.Con.Res. 10).
House Concurrent Resolutions introduced in seven
congresses cited that purported assurance: H.Con.Res. 69
Since 2017, Congress has passed nine laws with provisions
(109th Congress), H.Con.Res. 73 (110th), H.Con.Res. 18
referencing the Six Assurances, seven of them National
(111th), H.Con.Res. 122 (112th), H.Con.Res. 29 (113th),
Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs). The other laws are
H.Con.Res. 124 (115th), and H.Con.Res. 117 (116th).
the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-409)
and the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260).
The 114th Congress approved resolutions (H.Con.Res. 88
and S.Con.Res. 38) that quoted from the assurances woven
• The NDAA for FY2024 (P.L. 118-31) alone states the
into Holdridge’s 1982 testimony. Both urged “the President
sense of Congress that “the United States’ one China
and Department of State to affirm the Six Assurances
policy, as guided by” the TRA, the three U.S.-PRC
publicly, proactively, and consistently as a cornerstone of
Communiqués, and the Six Assurances, “is the
United States-Taiwan relations.” The Trump
foundation for” U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Administration declassified the Eagleburger and Shultz
cables in 2020, entering into the public record two more
• The NDAAs for FY2021, FY2022, and FY2023 (P.L.
authoritative, but slightly different, U.S. texts for the Six
116-283, P.L. 117-81, and P.L. 117-263) state the sense
Assurances. Areas of difference are discussed below.
of Congress that the TRA and the Six Assurances “are
the foundation for” U.S.-Taiwan relations. The NDAAs
Taiwan’s sovereignty: The declassified Eagleburger cable
for FY2019 and FY2020 (P.L. 115-232 and P.L. 116-
includes an assurance that in negotiations with the PRC
92) state the sense of Congress that the TRA and the Six
over the August 17 Communiqué, “We have not agreed to
Assurances “are both cornerstones of” U.S.-Taiwan ties.
take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” The
declassified Shultz cable is more ambiguous, stating that
• The NDAAs for FY2022 through FY2024 also state the
the U.S. side “has not altered its position regarding
sense of Congress that the United States should
sovereignty over Taiwan,” without stating the U.S. position.
strengthen the U.S. partnership with Taiwan “consistent
The Shultz cable includes the parenthetical statement, “FYI:
with the Three Communiqués,” the TRA, and the Six
If asked why we have modified the statement on
Assurances.
sovereignty, you should explain that we have consistently
used this terminology in our public statements.” The
• The NDAAs for FY2021 through FY2024 and P.L. 115-
Holdridge testimony is similarly ambiguous.
409 attach a July 1982 date to the Six Assurances,
appearing to elevate the Reagan-authorized Eagleburger
cable text over the two texts issued in August 1982.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
•
IF11665
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11665 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

---