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Updated June 13, 2023
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
Introduction
talking points authorized by President Reagan. The talking
Under the U.S. “one-China” policy, the U.S. government
points included a set of statements on what the United
has, since 1979, maintained official relations with the
States had not agreed to in the negotiations with the PRC
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and unofficial
over the communiqué. Those statements later came to be
relations with self-governed Taiwan, over which the PRC
known as the Six Assurances. Lilley first delivered them to
claims sovereignty. The Biden Administration presents
President Chiang on July 14, 1982. Taiwan’s government
today’s U.S. one-China policy as guided by three sets of
subsequently requested U.S. permission to make the Six
documents: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22
Assurances public. In a cable sent the day of the
U.S.C. §3301 et seq.); three U.S.-China joint communiqués
communiqué’s release, then-Secretary of State George
concluded in 1972, 1978, and 1982; and “Six Assurances”
Shultz provided Lilley with a reworded version of the Six
that President Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan’s
Assurances for Taiwan’s government to release. The same
government in 1982. Since 2017, Congress has affirmed its
day and the day after, in Washington, DC, then-Assistant
support for the Six Assurances in law eight times, without
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John
specifying whether all or only some of the assurances
H. Holdridge testified before Congress about the just-
should guide future U.S. policy.
released communiqué. He wove references to the Six
Assurances into his testimony, but did not label them as the
Historical Context
Six Assurances or disclose that President Reagan had
In the 1978 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué, the two countries
offered the assurances to Taiwan’s president the previous
announced that they had agreed to establish diplomatic
month. The three U.S. government versions of the Six
relations on January 1, 1979. In an accompanying
Assurances are presented in Table 1.
statement, the U.S. government said it would terminate
diplomatic relations with Taiwan on the same date. With
Differing Texts
some Members portraying the moves as a betrayal of
For nearly 38 years, the sole publicly-released U.S.
Taiwan, Congress passed the TRA, enacted on April 10,
government version of the Six Assurances was the language
1979. Among the TRA’s provisions is that the United States
in Holdridge’s 1982 testimony before Congress. The
“will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
Eagleburger and Shultz cables remained classified. In the
defense services” as necessary for Taiwan’s self-defense. In
absence of authoritative stand-alone text for the assurances,
1982, with continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan pursuant to
some sources asserted that they included an assurance that
the TRA a major irritant in the U.S.-China relationship, the
“the United States would not formally recognize Chinese
Ronald Reagan Administration sought to address the issue
sovereignty over Taiwan.” House Concurrent Resolutions
through negotiation of a third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué.
introduced in seven congresses cited that purported
assurance: H.Con.Res. 69 (109th Congress), H.Con.Res. 73
In that communiqué, known as the August 17th
(110th), H.Con.Res. 18 (111th), H.Con.Res. 122 (112th),
Communiqué for the day in 1982 on which it was released,
H.Con.Res. 29 (113th), H.Con.Res. 124 (115th), and
the PRC affirmed “a fundamental policy of striving for a
H.Con.Res. 117 (116th ).
peaceful reunification” with Taiwan. The United States
stated that it “understands and appreciates the Chinese
In 2016, the 114th Congress for the first time united behind
policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
a definitive text when the House passed H.Con.Res. 88 and
question.” With those statements “in mind,” the United
the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 38. Both resolutions included
States stated “that it does not seek to carry out a long-term
in “whereas” clauses relevant quotes from Holdridge’s
policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan
1982 testimony. Both resolutions affirmed “that the Taiwan
will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative
Relations Act and the Six Assurances are both cornerstones
terms, the level of those supplied [since 1979], and that it
of United States relations with Taiwan,” and urged “the
intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan,
President and Department of State to affirm the Six
leading over a period of time, to a final resolution.”
Assurances publicly, proactively, and consistently as a
cornerstone of United States-Taiwan relations.” Then, in
The Reagan Administration understood that the
2020, the Trump Administration declassified the
communiqué would be viewed with alarm in Taiwan. On
Eagleburger and Shultz cables, making public for the first
July 10, 1982, a month before its release, then-Under
time authoritative U.S. texts for two more versions of the
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger sent a cable to
Six Assurances. Three U.S. government-released versions
James Lilley, Director of the unofficial U.S. representative
of the Six Assurances that now exist in the public record,
office in Taiwan, the American Institute in Taiwan,
with their language differing in some key respects.
instructing him to seek a meeting with Taiwan President
Chiang Ching-kuo. Eagleburger provided Lilley with
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President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
Taiwan’s sovereignty: The declassified Eagleburger cable
that it is the policy of the United States “to faithfully
includes the statement that in negotiations with the PRC
enforce all existing United States Government
over the August 17 Communiqué, “We have not agreed to
commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the [TRA], the 3
take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” The
joint communiques, and the Six Assurances agreed to by
declassified Shultz cable is more ambiguous, stating that
President Ronald Reagan in July 1982.” P.L. 115-91 states,
the U.S. side “has not altered its position regarding
“It is the policy of the United States to reinforce its
sovereignty over Taiwan,” without stating what the U.S.
commitments to Taiwan under the [TRA] and consistent
position is. The Shultz cable includes the parenthetical
with the ‘Six Assurances.’”
statement, “FYI: If asked why we have modified the
statement on sovereignty, you should explain that we have
Table 1. The Language of the Six Assurances
consistently used this terminology in our public
CRS has bolded the verb tenses
statements.” The Holdridge testimony is similarly
ambiguous. Taking no position on Taiwan’s sovereignty
Eagleburger
Shultz cable:
Holdridge
has, however, been longstanding U.S. policy. In Senate
cable: language
for Taiwan to
testimony before
testimony on September 17, 2020, then-Assistant Secretary
for President
make public
Senate
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David R. Stilwell
Chiang (7/10/82)
(8/17/1982)
(8/17/1982)
stated that the United States “will not take a position on
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“[W]e did not
[Taiwan’s] sovereignty.” He said, “the question of
agreed to set a
not agreed to
agree to set a date
sovereignty was decided to be left undecided and to be
worked out between the two parties,” Taiwan and the PRC.
date certain for
set a date for
certain for ending
ending arms sales
ending arms
arms sales to
to Taiwan.”
sales to
Taiwan.”
Mediation Between Taipei and Beijing. The Eagleburger
cable uses past tense in stating, “
Taiwan.”
We have not agreed to any
mediation role for the U.S.” The Shultz cable and the
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“[The 1982 joint
Holdridge testimony use prospective language, stating that
agreed to prior
not agreed to
communiqué] should
the U.S. side “will not play any mediation role between
consultation on
consult with the not be read to imply
Taipei and Beijing” and “we see no mediation role for the
arms sales.”
PRC on arms
that we have agreed
United States.” (Italics here and below are by CRS.)
sales to
to engage in prior
Taiwan.”
consultations with
Not revising the TRA. The Eagleburger and Shultz cables
Beijing on arms sales
both state that the United States have not/has not “agreed to
to Taiwan.”
revise” the TRA. The Holdridge testimony is forward-
looking, stating, “We have no plans to seek any such
“We have not
The U.S. “will
“[W]e see no
revisions [to the TRA].”
agreed to any
not play any
mediation role for
mediation role for
mediation role
the United States.”
Legislative Implications
the U.S.”
between Taipei
The implication of Congress’ efforts to affirm the Six
and Beijing.”
Assurances appears to be that they should guide future U.S.
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“We have no plans
policy, verb tenses notwithstanding. Some bills introduced
agreed to revise
not agreed to
to seek any such
since the 114th Congress appear to be at odds with such a
the Taiwan
revise the
revisions [to the
prospective orientation, however. Examples include bills
Relations Act.”
Taiwan
TRA].”
with provisions seeking to amend the TRA (such as the
Relations Act.”
117th Congress’ S. 4428) or implicitly or explicitly seeking
to take a position on Taiwan’s sovereignty (such as the
“We have not
The U.S. “has
“[T]here has been
118th Congress’ H.R. 2511 and H.Con.Res. 10). Congress
agreed to take any
not altered its
no change in our
could consider whether to clarify the continued
position regarding
position
longstanding
applicability of all of the Six Assurances.
sovereignty over
regarding
position on the issue
Taiwan.”
sovereignty
of sovereignty over
Since 2017, Congress has passed eight laws affirming the
over Taiwan.”
Taiwan.”
Six Assurances. P.L. 117-263 and P.L. 117-81 both call for
“The PRC has at
The U.S. “will
“[N]or will we
“strengthening the United States partnership with Taiwan,
no time urged us
not exert
attempt to exert
consistent with the Three Communiques, the [TRA], and
to put pressure on pressure on
pressure on Taiwan
the Six Assurances.” P.L. 116-283 states that it is U.S.
Taiwan to
Taiwan to enter
to enter into
policy “that the [TRA] and the Six Assurances provided by
negotiate with the
into
negotiations with
the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation
PRC; however, we negotiations
the PRC.”
for United States-Taiwan relations.” P.L. 116-260 finds
can assure you
with the PRC.”
that, “It is the policy of the United States to reinforce its
that we will
commitments to Taiwan under the [TRA] in a manner
never do so.”
consistent with the ‘Six Assurances’ and in accordance with
the United States ‘One China’ policy.” P.L. 116-92 and P.L.
Source: “Declassified Cables,” American Institute in Taiwan; U.S.
115-232 state that it is the sense of Congress that, “the
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward
[TRA] and the ‘Six Assurances’ are both cornerstones of
China and Taiwan, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 1982.
United States relations with Taiwan.” P.L. 115-409 states
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President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
IF11665
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11665 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED