link to page 2 
October 8, 2020
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
Introduction
Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in
In July 1982, as his government negotiated with the
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied [since
People’s Republic of China (PRC) over a joint communiqué
1979], and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale
on Taiwan arms sales, President Ronald Reagan offered
of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time, to
Taiwan assurances about what the United States had not
a final resolution.
agreed to in those negotiations. These statements have
come to be known as the Six Assurances. (See Table 1
The joint communiqué angered Taiwan. After its release,
below.) A senior Reagan Administration official wove
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement
language from the assurances through his testimony before
accusing the U.S. government of having “mistaken the
Congress on August 17, 1982, the day of the communiqué’s
fallacious ‘peaceful intention’ of the Chinese communists
release, but successive administrations kept the precise text
as sincere and meaningful,” and expressing “profound
of the assurances classified, creating lingering uncertainties
regret.” The joint communiqué later became a point of
about their content. With its declassification of an internal
contention in U.S.-PRC relations, too. The PRC accuses the
1982 presidential memorandum (in 2019) and two 1982
United States of violating the communiqué by not reducing
State Department cables (in 2020), the Trump
its arms sales to Taiwan.
Administration has made public definitive language for the
Six Assurances, as well as new information about the
The U.S. government presents arms sales to Taiwan as
context in which they were offered.
consistent with the TRA, which states that the United States
“will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to
Affairs David R. Stilwell has portrayed the declassification
enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
decisions as part of an effort to bolster Taiwan and “prevent
capability.” The United States also argues that its
and reverse [the] PRC’s squeezing of ... Taiwan’s
commitments in the 1982 joint communiqué were
international space.” Declassification has also served to
predicated on the PRC’s continued commitment to peaceful
refocus attention on the 1982 U.S.-PRC joint communiqué
resolution of its sovereignty dispute with Taiwan, and that
on Taiwan arms sales and to affirm a longstanding U.S.
PRC military intimidation of Taiwan since has called the
policy of taking no position on Taiwan’s sovereignty.
PRC’s peaceful intentions into question. To emphasize the
linkage, the Trump Administration in 2019 declassified an
The 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué
internal presidential memorandum Reagan issued on the
and Its Legacy
day of the third communiqué’s release. Reagan wrote, “the
Between 1972 and 1982, the United States and the PRC
U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is
agreed to three joint communiqués, each of which included
conditioned absolutely upon the continued commitment of
significant language related to Taiwan. The PRC views the
China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC
communiqués as the political foundation for the U.S.-PRC
differences.” He added that, “it is essential that the quantity
relationship. The United States views them as an element of
and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be conditioned
its one-China policy, under which the United States since
entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.”
1979 has recognized the PRC as the sole legal government
The Six Assurances
of China while maintaining unofficial relations with
Taiwan. (A second major element of the U.S. one-China
More than a month before the 1982 joint communiqué’s
policy is the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22
release, the United States sought to ease Taiwan anxieties
U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979.)
about its possible provisions. In a newly declassified July
10, 1982, cable, then-Under Secretary of State Lawrence
The third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué, released on August
Eagleburger instructed James Lilley, Director of the
17, 1982, sought to settle differences between the United
American Institute in Taiwan, the unofficial U.S.
States and the PRC over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. In it,
representative office in Taiwan, to seek a meeting with
the PRC affirmed “a fundamental policy of striving for a
Taiwan President Chiang Ching-kuo. The cable provided
peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, over which the PRC
Lilley with talking points authorized by President Reagan,
claims sovereignty. The United States stated that it
including what later came to be known as the Six
“understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving
Assurances. Lilley delivered them on July 14, 1982.
for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.” With
those statements “in mind,” the United States stated
Taiwan subsequently requested U.S. permission to make
the Six Assurances public. In a newly declassified cable
that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy
sent on August 17, 1982—the day the third communiqué
of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to
was issued—then-Secretary of State George Schultz
provided Lilley with a version of the Six Assurances for
https://crsreports.congress.gov
link to page 2 President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
Taiwan to release publicly, with the proviso that in
Source: “Declassified Cables,” American Institute in Taiwan; U.S.
Taiwan’s statement, “there should of course be no linkage
Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy Toward
to President Reagan.” The Taiwan Foreign Ministry
China and Taiwan, 97th Cong., 2nd sess., August 17, 1982.
statement included a version of the Six Assurances, noting
that the U.S. side had made them known to Taiwan
Taiwan’s Sovereignty and Verb Tenses
“through appropriate channels.” Also on August 17, 1982,
While the text of the original Six Assurances remained
then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
classified, the sovereignty assurance was subject to debate.
Affairs John H. Holdridge testified before the Senate about
Since 2005, in every Congress except the 114th, Members
the communiqué. The Six Assurances as rendered in the
have introduced House Concurrent Resolutions calling for
two cables and in Holdridge’s Senate testimony are
the resumption of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. (See
presented in Table 1.
H.Con.Res. 69, H.Con.Res. 73, H.Con.Res. 18, H.Con.Res.
122, H.Con.Res. 29, H.Con.Res. 124, and H.Con.Res. 117.)
Table 1. The Language of the Six Assurances
All cite the Six Assurances as including an assurance that,
CRS has bolded the verb tenses
“[t]he United States would not formally recognize Chinese
sovereignty over Taiwan.” The declassified July 10, 1982,
As authorized
As authorized
As conveyed in
cable shows that President Reagan’s Six Assurances never
to be conveyed
for Taiwan to
congressional
included such an assurance. Instead, Reagan assured
to Taiwan
make public
testimony
Taiwan that the United States had “not agreed to take any
(7/10/82)
(8/17/1982)
(8/17/1982)
position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.”
“We have not
The U.S. side “has “…[W]e did not
Not taking a position is longstanding U.S. policy. In Senate
agreed to set a
not agreed to set
agree to set a date
testimony in September 2020, Assistant Secretary Stilwell
date certain for
a date for ending
certain for ending
again stated that the United States “will not take a position
ending arms sales arms sales to
arms sales to
on sovereignty.” He said the issue was “decided to be left
to Taiwan.”
Taiwan.”
Taiwan.”
undecided and to be worked out between” Taiwan and the
“We have not
The U.S. side “has “[The 1982 joint
PRC. That stance riles the PRC, which insists that Taiwan
agreed to prior
not agreed to
communiqué]
is part of China. It also irks Taiwan, which officially calls
consultation on
consult with the
should not be read
itself the Republic of China (ROC) and describes itself as a
arms sales.”
PRC on arms sales to imply that we
sovereign, independent country, without specifying where
to Taiwan.”
have agreed to
the ROC’s borders lie. In October 2020, Taiwan’s
engage in prior
legislature called on Taiwan’s government to seek to re-
consultations with
establish U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations. Re-affirmation
Beijing on arms
of the U.S. position that Taiwan’s sovereignty remains
sales to Taiwan."
unresolved would appear to discourage such efforts.
“We have not
The U.S. side “will " .. [W]e see no
The verb tenses for the Six Assurances have also been
agreed to any
not play any
mediation role for
subject to debate. In the July 10, 1982, cable, five
mediation role
mediation role
the United States.”
assurances are in past tense and one is in future tense. In the
for the U.S.”
between Taipei
August 17, 1982, cable, four are in past tense and two in
and Beijing.”
future tense. In Holdridge’s testimony, three are in past
“We have not
The U.S. side “has “We have no
tense and three are prospective. In August 2020 remarks,
agreed to revise
not agreed to
plans to seek any
Stilwell stated that the Six Assurances “endure today.”
the Taiwan
revise the Taiwan
such revisions [to
Relations Act.”
Relations Act.”
the TRA].”
The Six Assurances in U.S. Legislation
Congress has passed four laws and several resolutions
“We have not
The U.S. side “has “[T]here has been
referencing the Six Assurances. The National Defense
agreed to take
not altered its
no change in our
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92) and
any position
position regarding
longstanding
The John S. McCain NDAA for FY2019 (P.L. 115-232)
regarding
sovereignty over
position on the
each state that it is the sense of Congress that the TRA and
sovereignty over
Taiwan.”
issue of sovereignty
the Six Assurances “are both cornerstones” of U.S.-Taiwan
Taiwan.”
over Taiwan.”
relations. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (P.L.
“The PRC has at
The U.S. side “will “[N]or will we
115-409) states that it is U.S. policy to enforce existing U.S.
no time urged us
not exert
attempt to exert
government commitments to Taiwan, “consistent with the
to put pressure
pressure on
pressure on
[TRA], the 3 joint communiqués, and the Six Assurances.”
on Taiwan to
Taiwan to enter
Taiwan to enter
The NDAA for FY2018 (P.L. 115-91) states that it is U.S.
negotiate with
into negotiations
into negotiations
policy “to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan under the
the PRC;
with the PRC.”
with the PRC."
[TRA] and consistent with the ‘Six Assurances.’”
however, we can
assure you that
The House-passed NDAA for FY2021 (H.R. 6395) would
we will never
state that it is the sense of Congress that the TRA and the
do so.”
Six Assurances “are both cornerstones” of U.S.-Taiwan
relations. The Senate-passed NDAA for FY2021 (S. 4049)
https://crsreports.congress.gov
President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan
would state that it is U.S. policy that the TRA and the Six
Susan V. Lawrence, Specialist in Asian Affairs
Assurances “are the foundation for” U.S.-Taiwan relations.
IF11665
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