Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Updated January 9, 2020
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Overview
Yemen on several occasions in 2018. The Qiam rocket is
On January 7, 2020, Iran launched 16 short-range ballistic
road-mobile, liquid-fueled, and finless, and it is capable of
missiles that were fired from three different locations inside
achieving a range of 800 km.
the country and hit various targets on two Iraqi military
installations housing U.S. troops—Al Asad Air Base and an
The Fateh-110 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile battlefield or
air base near Erbil in Northern Iraq. Experts argue that the
tactical ballistic missile with a range of about 250-300 km.
attack served as both Iranian retaliation for the U.S. killing
There may be four versions of the Fateh-110 in service; one
of Iranian’s top military commander, Major General
is apparently called the Khalij-Fars (“Persian Gulf”).
Qassem Soleimani, as well as a warning to the United
States against further military action against Iran. No U.S.
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
or allied casualties were reported.
(MRBMs)
Iran is developing and producing MRBM capabilities with
Iran has been acquiring, developing, and testing its ballistic
ranges estimated up to about 2,000 kilometers (some non-
missile capabilities for decades and continues to invest in
U.S. government sources cite slightly higher ranges),
developing ballistic missiles and in building an extensive
sufficient to strike targets throughout the Middle East.
network of related facilities. The recent attack may have
demonstrated advances in the accuracy of Iran’s missiles.
According to the National Air and Space Intelligence
Short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests indicate that
Center (NASIC) in 2017, Iran has perhaps fewer than 50
Iran is focused on increasing the accuracy of its missiles.
MRBM launchers and an unknown number of associated
Once forecasted to acquire an intercontinental-range
missiles. Iran continues to develop, test, and build more
ballistic missile by 2020, Iran has not yet demonstrated this
capable and increasingly accurate MRBMs. Iran argues
capacity. Furthermore, Iran’s space launch program
these missiles constitute an important deterrent and
continues to experience significant delays, and may be
retaliatory force against U.S. and other forces in the region
slowing.
in the event of war. Iran has also constructed an
underground network of bunkers and silo-like missile
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)
launch facilities, and is seeking improved air defenses,
The majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic
presumably to enhance the survivability of their MRBMs
missiles are tactical or short-range (less than 500
against preemptive attack.
kilometers). Most of Iran’s ballistic missiles are Scud-B and
Scud-C derivatives, with a majority likely being Scud-Cs.
Like the SRBM program, Iran relies to some extent on
Iran has less than 100 SRBM reusable transporter-erector-
others, particularly North Korea, for certain key missile
launchers (TELs) and likely has hundreds of SRBMs. Iran
components and materials in its MRBM program. Export
views its SRBM capability as necessary for battlefield and
controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult,
tactical military purposes. Iran often test-fires these missiles
but not impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such
as part of its military exercises. Iran’s SRBMs could strike
items, causing Iran to try to exploit weaknesses in existing
U.S. and allied bases in the Gulf region if moved from their
export and nonproliferation regimes, or to try to find
operating bases, as well as targets throughout Iraq, but they
foreign sellers willing to circumvent those laws.
could not reach Israel.
Shahab-3, Ghadr-1/Emad, and Sajil/Ashura
Iran has grown increasingly self-sufficient in producing
The Shahab-3 is a ballistic missile imported from the
SRBMs, but still probably relies on outside sources, such as
DPRK and based on the No-dong 1. The Shahab-3 has been
North Korea, for some key components and materiel.
given various names by Iran and others over time. There
Stricter international enforcement of export controls and
reportedly have been several different versions of this
broadening missile-related sanctions—which are in place
liquid-fueled missile flight tested with various other
under the Iran nuclear agreement—have reportedly slowed
modifications made to it, perhaps providing the Shahab-3
Iran’s efforts.
with ranges varying from about 800-1,000 km. The missile
is reportedly both road-mobile and silo-based. Because the
Shahab-1/2, Qiam, and Fateh-110
range of the Shahab-3 lies at the low end of an MRBM, Iran
The Qiam ballistic missile was first tested in August 2010,
has sought to develop, test, and deploy a much longer-range
and continues to be operational. UN Reports and U.S.
ballistic missile. Iran’s first efforts in extending the range of
government reports released in recent years have
the Shahab-3 manifested in what some have variously
highlighted escalations in both its use by Iran and transfer
referred to as the Ghadr-1. The Shahab-3 variant is road-
to regional forces allied with Iran. The Qiam was launched
mobile, liquid-fueled, and single-stage, and it is believed by
from Iran targeting ISIL fighters in Syria in June 2017, and
some experts to carry a smaller payload and a modified
modified versions of the SRBM have also been used in
reentry vehicle (RV). Modified Ghadr MRBMs were
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Iran’s Bal istic Missile and Space Launch Programs
reportedly tested in March 2016. The Emad, which began
Safir-1B is the second-generation Safir SLV capable of
being publicized in 2015 as a longer-range MRBM, appears
putting a 60 kilogram payload into low-earth orbit.
to be a Ghadr variant with a modified RV.
A more powerful rocket was displayed as a mockup in 2010
The Sajil (also transliterated Sejil/Sejjil) is a solid-fueled,
and named the Simorgh, which is designed to carry heavier
two-stage, ground-mobile ballistic missile that Iran says has
satellites into orbit using four main engines. Having
a range of about 2,000 km, according to official U.S.
postponed its first launch for several years, the design may
sources. This MRBM was first announced under the name
have undergone various modifications. Iranian state media
Ashoura in November 2007, but either the missile or the
claimed on July 27, 2017, that a Simorgh launched from the
solid propellant motor tested unsuccessfully at the time.
Imam Khomeini Space Center, a newly built space complex
Subsequently renamed the Sajil, it was flight tested
in southeastern Iran, placed a 250 kilogram satellite into
successfully in November 2008. Additional tests of the Sajil
low-earth orbit. Some U.S. media reports at the time
or a modified and apparently more capable version of it, the
indicated the Simorgh exploded shortly after launch and
Sajil-2, took place in May, September, and December 2009.
there is no evidence it achieved orbit.
The Sajil-2 has since highlighted significant progress in
Iran’s solid-propellant program, which could afford Iran’s
Space Launch and Long-Range Missiles
missiles reduced response time and risk of detection.
Some have long believed Iran’s space launch program
could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic
Figure 1.MRBM Sites and Ranges
missile (ICBM) with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that
could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the
United States (at least 10,000 km). According to the
intelligence community (IC) in 2018, “Tehran’s desire to
deter the United States might drive it to field an ICBM.
Progress on Iran’s space program, such as the launch of the
Simorgh SLV in July 2017, could shorten a pathway to an
ICBM because space launch vehicles use similar
technologies.”
ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes
inherent in a space launch program, but many years ago
Iran outlined a long-term dedicated space launch effort (that
has since slowed considerably) that is not simply a cover
for ICBM development. In addition, no country has
developed an ICBM from its space launch technology base;
space launch programs have generally developed from
military ballistic missile programs.
In 1999, the IC first assessed that Iran could test an ICBM
by 2015 if it received sufficient foreign assistance,
especially from a country such as China or Russia. CRS
assessed in 2012 that it was “increasingly uncertain whether
Source: CRS.
Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by 2015 for
Space Launch Program
several reasons: Iran does not appear to be receiving the
degree of foreign support many believe would be necessary;
Iran has an ambitious space launch and satellite program
Iran has found it increasingly difficult to acquire certain
and has stated that it plans to use future launches for
placing intelligence-gathering satellites into orbit, although
critical components and materials because of sanctions; and
Iran has not demonstrated the kind of flight test program
proliferation experts assess such a capability is likely a
many view as necessary to produce an ICBM.”
decade or so in the future.
Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)
Although not representing the IC, Adm. Gortney (Northern
Command) seemingly updated the U.S. government
Iran currently operates two types of SLVs: the Safir
(“Envoy”) and the Simorgh (“Phoenix”). Iran’
assessment, stating on March 10, 2016: “Iran has
s SLVs are
successfully orbited satellites using its ICBM-class booster
liquid-fueled, two-stage rockets capable of placing a
payload into low-earth orbit.
as early as this year. In light of these advances we assess
Iran may be able to deploy an operational ICBM by 2020 if
the regime chooses to do so.”
Iran used the Safir SLV to launch the OMID satellite into
orbit in February 2008. The Safir SLV used a first stage
based on the single-stage Shahab-3 with a specially
Stephen M. McCall, Analyst in Military Space, Missile
designed second stage. Iran still develops this liquid-fueled
Defense, and Defense Innovation
SLV. The Safir is designed to carry a light payload into
IF10938
low-earth orbit and as such is not considered to be capable
of providing a long-range nuclear weapons capability. The
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Iran’s Bal istic Missile and Space Launch Programs
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