August 1, 2018Updated January 9, 2020
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
Overview
Iran has been acquiring, developing, and testing its ballistic
missile capabilities for decades. The United Nations
Security Council in 2015 adopted resolution 2231, calling
on, but not requiring, Iran to not develop nuclear-capable
ballistic missiles and to halt other ballistic missile activity.
Nevertheless, Iran continues to invest in developing
ballistic missiles and in building an extensive network of
facilities, although missile inventory information is scarce.
Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests
indicate that Iran is focused on increasing the accuracy of
its missiles. Once forecasted to have an intercontinentalrange ballistic missile before now, Iran has not yet
demonstrated this capacity. Furthermore, Iran’s space
launch program continues to experience significant delays,
and may be slowing.
On January 7, 2020, Iran launched 16 short-range ballistic
missiles that were fired from three different locations inside
the country and hit various targets on two Iraqi military
installations housing U.S. troops—Al Asad Air Base and an
air base near Erbil in Northern Iraq. Experts argue that the
attack served as both Iranian retaliation for the U.S. killing
of Iranian’s top military commander, Major General
Qassem Soleimani, as well as a warning to the United
States against further military action against Iran. No U.S.
or allied casualties were reported.
Iran has been acquiring, developing, and testing its ballistic
missile capabilities for decades and continues to invest in
developing ballistic missiles and in building an extensive
network of related facilities. The recent attack may have
demonstrated advances in the accuracy of Iran’s missiles.
Short- and medium-range ballistic missile tests indicate that
Iran is focused on increasing the accuracy of its missiles.
Once forecasted to acquire an intercontinental-range
ballistic missile by 2020, Iran has not yet demonstrated this
capacity. Furthermore, Iran’s space launch program
continues to experience significant delays, and may be
slowing.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)
The majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic
missiles are tactical or short-range (less than 500
kilometers). Most of Iran’s ballistic missiles are Scud-B and
Scud-C derivatives, with a majority likely being Scud-Cs.
Iran has less than 100 SRBM reusable transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs) and likely has hundreds of SRBMs. Iran
views its SRBM capability as necessary for battlefield and
tactical military purposes. Iran often test-fires these missiles
as part of its military exercises. Iran’s SRBMs could strike
U.S. and allied bases in the Gulf region if moved from their
operating bases, as well as targets throughout Iraq, but they
could not reach Israel.
Iran has grown increasingly self-sufficient in producing
SRBMs, but still probably relies on outside sources, such as
North Korea, for some key components and materiel.
Stricter international enforcement of export controls and
broadening missile-related sanctions—which are in place
under the Iran nuclear agreement—have reportedly slowed
Iran’s efforts.
Shahab-1/2, Qiam, and Fateh-110
The Qiam ballistic missile was first tested in August 2010,
and continues to be operational. UN Reports and U.S.
government reports released in recent years have
highlighted escalations in both its use by Iran and transfer
to regional forces allied with Iran. The Qiam was launched
from Iran targeting ISIL fighters in Syria in June 2017, and
modified versions of the SRBM have also been used in
Yemen on several occasions in 2018. The Qiam rocket is
road-mobile, liquid-fueled, and finless, and it is capable of
achieving a range of 800 km.
The Fateh-110 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile battlefield or
tactical ballistic missile with a range of about 250-300 km.
There may be four versions of the Fateh-110 in service; one
is apparently called the Khalij-Fars (“Persian Gulf”).
Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles
(MRBMs)
Iran is developing and producing MRBM capabilities with
ranges estimated up to about 2,000 kilometers (some nonU.S. government sources cite slightly higher ranges),
sufficient to strike targets throughout the Middle East.
Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs)
According to the National Air and Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC) in 2017, Iran has perhaps fewer than 50
MRBM launchers and an unknown number of associated
missiles. Iran continues to develop, test, and build more
capable and increasingly accurate MRBMs. Iran argues
these missiles constitute an important deterrent and
retaliatory force against U.S. and other forces in the region
in the event of war. Iran has also constructed an
underground network of bunkers and silo-like missile
launch facilities, and is seeking improved air defenses,
presumably to enhance the survivability of their MRBMs
against preemptive attack.
Iran views its SRBM capability as necessary for battlefield
and tactical military purposes. Iran often test-fires these
missiles as part of its military exercises. Iran’s SRBMs
could strike U.S. and allied bases in the Gulf region if
moved from their operating bases, as well as targets
throughout Iraq, but they could not reach Israel.
Like the SRBM program, Iran relies to some extent on
others, particularly North Korea, for certain key missile
components and materials in its MRBM program. Export
controls and sanctions have made it increasingly difficult,
but not impossible, for Iran to acquire the best of such
items, causing Iran to try to exploit weaknesses in existing
export and nonproliferation regimes, or to try to find
foreign sellers willing to circumvent those laws.
The majority of Iran’s heavy artillery rockets and ballistic
missiles are tactical or short-range (less than 500
kilometers). Most of Iran’s ballistic missiles are Scud-B and
Scud-C derivatives, with a majority likely being Scud-Cs.
Iran has less than 100 SRBM reusable transporter-erectorlaunchers (TELs) and likely has hundreds of SRBMs.
Iran has grown increasingly self-sufficient in producing
SRBMs, but still probably relies on outside sources, such as
North Korea, for some key components and materiel.
Stricter international enforcement of export controls and
broadening missile-related sanctions—which remain in
place under the Iran nuclear agreement—have reportedly
slowed Iran’s efforts.
Shahab-1/2, Qiam, and Fateh-110
The Qiam ballistic missile was first tested in August 2010,
and continues to be operational. UN Reports and U.S.
government reports released in recent years have
highlighted escalations in both its use by Iran and transfer
to regional forces allied with Iran. The Qiam was launched
from Iran targeting ISIL fighters in Syria in June 2017, and
modified versions of the SRBM have also been used in
Yemen on several occasions in 2018. The Qiam rocket is
road-mobile, liquid-fueled, and finless, and it is capable of
achieving a range of 800 km.
Shahab-3, Ghadr-1/Emad, and Sajil/Ashura
The Shahab-3 is a ballistic missile imported from the
DPRK and based on the No-dong 1. The Shahab-3 has been
given various names by Iran and others over time. There
reportedly have been several different versions of this
liquid-fueled missile flight tested with various other
modifications made to it, perhaps providing the Shahab-3
with ranges varying from about 800-1,000 km. The missile
is reportedly both road-mobile and silo-based.
Because the
range of the Shahab-3 lies at the low end of an
MRBM, Iran
has sought to develop, test, and deploy a
much longer-range
ballistic missile. Iran’s first efforts in
extending the range of
the Shahab-3 manifested in what
some have variously
referred to as the Ghadr-1. The
Shahab-3 variant is road-mobileroadmobile, liquid-fueled, and singlestagesingle-stage, and it is believed by
some experts to carry a smaller
payload and a modified
reentry vehicle (RV). Modified
Ghadr MRBMs were
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
reportedly tested in March 2016. The
Emad, which began
being publicized in 2015 as a longer-
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Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
range MRBM, appears range MRBM, appears
to be a Ghadr variant with a
modified RV.
The Sajil (also transliterated Sejil/Sejjil) is a solid-fueled,
two-stage, ground-mobile ballistic missile that Iran says has
a range of about 2,000 km, according to official U.S.
sources. This MRBM was first announced under the name
AshuraAshoura in November 2007, but either the missile or the
solid propellant motor tested unsuccessfully at the time.
Subsequently renamed the Sajil, it was flight tested
successfully in November 2008. Additional tests of the Sajil
or a modified and apparently more capable version of it, the
Sajil-2, took place in May, September, and December 2009.
The Sajil-2 has since highlighted significant progress in
Iran’s solid-propellant program, which could afford Iran’s
missiles reduced response time and risk of detection.
Figure 1.MRBM Sites and Ranges
low-earth orbit and as such is not considered to be capable
of providing a long-range nuclear weapons capability. The
Safir-1B is the second-generation Safir SLV capable of
putting a 60 kilogram payload into low-earth orbit.
A more powerful rocket was displayed as a mockup in 2010
and named the Simorgh, which is designed to carry heavier
satellites into orbit using four main engines. Having
postponed its first launch for several years, the design may
have undergone various modifications. Iranian state media
claimed on July 27, 2017, that a Simorgh launched from the
Imam Khomeini Space Center, a newly built space complex
in southeastern Iran, placed a 250 kilogram satellite into
low-earth orbit. Some U.S. media reports at the time
indicated the Simorgh exploded shortly after launch and
there is no evidence it achieved orbit.
Space Launch and Long-Range Missiles
Some have long believed Iran’s space launch program
could mask the development of an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) with ranges in excess of 5,500 km that
could threaten targets throughout Europe, and even the
United States (at least 10,000 km). According to the
intelligence community (IC) in 2018, “Tehran’s desire to
deter the United States might drive it to field an ICBM.
Progress on Iran’s space program, such as the launch of the
Simorgh SLV in July 2017, could shorten a pathway to an
ICBM because space launch vehicles use similar
technologies.”
ICBMs share many similar technologies and processes
inherent in a space launch program, but many years ago
Iran outlined a long-term dedicated space launch effort (that
has since slowed considerably) that is not simply a cover
for ICBM development. In addition, no country has
developed an ICBM from its space launch technology base;
space launch programs have generally developed from
military ballistic missile programs.
Source: CRS.
Space Launch Program
Iran has an ambitious space launch and satellite program,
which seeks to enhance its national pride and, perhaps more
importantly, its international reputation as a growing
advanced industrial power. Iran also views itself as a
potential leader in the Middle East offering space launch
and satellite services. Iran
and has stated that it plans to use
future launches for
placing intelligence-gathering satellites
into orbit, although
proliferation experts assess such a
capability is likely a
decade or so in the future.
Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)
Iran currently operates two types of SLVs: the Safir
(“Envoy”) and the Simorgh (“Phoenix”). Iran’s SLVs are
liquid-fueled, two-stage rockets capable of placing a
payload into low-earth orbit.
Iran used the Safir SLV to launch the OMID satellite into
orbit in February 2008. The Safir SLV used a first stage
based on the single-stage Shahab-3 with a specially
designed second stage. Iran still develops this liquid-fueled
SLV. The Safir is designed to carry a light payload into
low-earth orbit and as such is not considered to be capable
of providing a long-range nuclear weapons capability. The
In 1999, the IC first assessed that Iran could test an ICBM
by 2015 if it received sufficient foreign assistance,
especially from a country such as China or Russia (whose
support reportedly subsequently diminished in the 2000s).
CRS . CRS
assessed in 2012 that it was “increasingly uncertain
whether whether
Iran will be able to achieve an ICBM capability by
2015 for
several reasons: Iran does not appear to be
receiving the
degree of foreign support many believe would
be necessary;
Iran has found it increasingly difficult to
acquire certain
critical components and materials because
of sanctions; and
Iran has not demonstrated the kind of
flight test program
many view as necessary to produce an
ICBM.” Those assessments remain valid. ICBM.”
Although not representing the IC, Adm. Gortney (Northern
Command) seemingly updated the U.S. government
assessment, stating on March 10, 2016: “Iran has
successfully orbited satellites using its ICBM-class booster
as early as this year. In light of these advances we assess
Iran may be able to deploy an operational ICBM by 2020 if
the regime chooses to do so.”
Steven A. Hildreth, Specialist in U.S. and Foreign
National Security ProgramsStephen M. McCall, Analyst in Military Space, Missile
Defense, and Defense Innovation
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IF10938
Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs
IF10938
Cyrus A. Jabbari, Research Associate
Disclaimer
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